32
National Defense
1
2000-07-01
2000-07-01
false

SECURITY
E

SUBCHAPTER E
National Defense
Department

SUBCHAPTER E—SECURITY
Pt. 154

PART 154—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION

Subpart A—General Provisions
Sec.
154.1
Purpose.
154.2
Applicability.
154.3
Definitions.

Subpart B—Policies
154.6
Standards for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
154.7
Criteria for application of security standards.
154.8
Types and scope of personnel security investigations.
154.9
Authorized personnel security investigative agencies.
154.10
Limitations and restrictions.

Subpart C—Personnel Security Investigative Requirements
154.13
Sensitive positions.
154.14
Civilian employment.
154.15
Military appointment, enlistment, and induction.
154.16
Security clearance.
154.17
Special access programs.
154.18
Certain positions not necessarily requiring access to classified information.
154.19
Reinvestigation.
154.20
Authority to waive investigative requirements.

Subpart D—Reciprocal Acceptance of Prior Investigations and Personnel Security Determinations
154.23
General.
154.24
Prior investigations conducted by DoD investigative organizations.
154.25
Prior personnel security determinations made by DoD authorities.
154.26
Investigations conducted and clearances granted by other agencies of the Federal government.

Subpart E—Requesting Personnel Security Investigations
154.30
General.
154.31
Authorized requesters.
154.32
Criteria for requesting investigations.
154.33
Request procedures.
154.34
Priority requests.
154.35
Personal data provided by the subject of the investigation.

Subpart F—Adjudication
154.40
General.
154.41
Central adjudication.
154.42
Evaluation of personnel security information.
154.43
Adjudicative record.

Subpart G—Issuing Clearance and Granting Access
154.47
General.
154.48
Issuing clearance.
154.49
Granting access.
154.50
Administrative withdrawal.

Subpart H—Unfavorable Administrative Actions
154.55
Requirements.
154.56
Procedures.
154.57
Reinstatement of civilian employees.

Subpart I—Continuing Security Responsibilities
154.60
Evaluating continued security eligibility.
154.61
Security education.

Subpart J—Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records
154.65
General.
154.66
Responsibilities.
154.67
Access restrictions.
154.68
Safeguarding procedures.
154.69
Records disposition.
154.70
Foreign source information.

Subpart K—Program Management
154.75
General.
154.76
Responsibilities.
154.77
Reporting requirements.
154.78
Inspections.
Appendix A to Part 154—Investigative Scope
Appendix B to Part 154—Request Procedures
Appendix C to Part 154—Tables for Requesting Investigations
Appendix D to Part 154—Reporting of Nonderogatory Cases
Appendix E to Part 154—Personnel Security Determination Authorities
Appendix F to Part 154—Guidelines for Conducting Prenomination Personal Interviews
Appendix G to Part 154[Reserved]
Appendix H to Part 154—Adjudication Policy
Appendix I to Part 154—Overseas Investigations
Appendix J to Part 154—ADP Position Categories and Criteria for Designating Positions

Authority:
E.O. 10450, 18 FR 2489, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 936; E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874 and 15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166; E.O. 10865, 25 FR 1583, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398; E.O. 12333, 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p. 200.

Source:
52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A—General Provisions
§ 154.1
Purpose.
(a) To establish policies and procedures to ensure that acceptance and retention of personnel in the Armed Forces, acceptance and retention of civilian employees in the Department of Defense (DoD), and granting members of the Armed Forces, DoD civilian employees, DoD contractors, and other affiliated persons access to classified information are clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b) This part: (1) Establishes DoD personnel security policies and procedures;
(2) Sets forth the standards, criteria and guidelines upon which personnel security determinations shall be based;
(3) Prescribes the kinds and scopes of personnel security investigations required;
(4) Details the evaluation and adverse action procedures by which personnel security determinations shall be made; and
(5) Assigns overall program management responsibilities.
§ 154.2
Applicability.
(a) This part implements the Department of Defense Personnel Security Program and takes precedence over all other departmental issuances affecting that program.
(b) All provisions of this part apply to DoD civilian personnel, members of the Armed Forces, excluding the Coast Guard in peacetime, contractor personnel and other personnel who are affiliated with the Department of Defense except that the unfavorable administrative action procedures pertaining to contractor personnel requiring access to classified information are contained in DoD 5220.22-R and in 32 CFR part 155.
(c) The policies and procedures which govern the National Security Agency are prescribed by Public Laws 88-290 and 86-36, Executive Orders 10450 and 12333, DoD Directive 5210.45^1 , Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 1/14^2 and regulations of the National Security Agency.
^1 Copies may be obtained, at cost, from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
^2 Copies may be obtained, if needed from Central Intelligence Agency (CCISCMS/ICS), 1225 Ames Building, Washington, DC 20505.
(d) Under combat conditions or other military exigencies, an authority in paragraph A, Appendix E, may waive such provisions of this part as the circumstances warrant.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61024, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.3
Definitions.
(a) Access. The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information. An individual, in fact, may have access to classified information by being in a place where such information is kept, if the security measures that are in force do not prevent him from gaining knowledge of such information.
(b) Adverse action. A removal from employment, suspension from employment of more than 14 days, reduction in grade, reduction in pay, or furlough of 30 days or less.
(c) Background Investigation (BI). A personnel security investigation consisting of both record reviews and interviews with sources of information as prescribed in paragraph 3, Appendix A, this part, covering the most recent 5 years of an individual's life or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter, provided that at least the last 2 years are covered and that no investigation will be conducted prior to an individual's 16th birthday.
(d) Classified information. Official information or material that requires protection in the interests of national security and that is classified for such purpose by appropriate classifying authority in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12356.
(e) Defense Clearance and Investigative Index (DCII). The DCII is the single, automated, central DoD repository which identifies investigations conducted by DoD investigative agencies, and personnel security determinations made by DoD adjudicative authorities.
(f) DoD component. Includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Military Departments; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Directors of Defense Agencies and the Unified and Specified Commands.
(g) Entrance National Agency Check (ENTNAC). A personnel security investigation scoped and conducted in the same manner as a National Agency Check except that a technical fingerprint search of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not conducted.
(h) Head of DoD component. The Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands; and the Directors of Defense Agencies.
(i) Immigrant alien. Any alien lawfully admitted into the United States under an immigration visa for permanent residence.
(j) Interim security clearance. A security clearance based on the completion of minimum investigative requirements, which is granted on a temporary basis, pending the completion of the full investigative requirements.
(k) Limited access authorization. Authorization for access to Confidential or Secret information granted to non-US. citizens and immigrant aliens, which is limited to only that information necessary to the successful accomplishment of their assigned duties and based on a background investigation scoped for 10 years (paragraph 3, Appendix A).
(l) Minor derogatory information. Information that, by itself, is not of sufficient importance or magnitude to justify an unfavorable administrative action in a personnel security determination.
(m) National Agency check (NAC). A personnel security investigation consisting of a records review of certain national agencies as prescribed in paragraph 1, Appendix A, this part, including a technical fingerprint search of the files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
(n) National Agency Check Plus Written Inquiries (NACI). A personnel security investigation conducted by the Office of Personnel Management, combining a NAC and written inquiries to law enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references and schools.
(o) National security. National security means the national defense and foreign relations of the United States.
(p) Need-to-know. A determination made by a possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to perform tasks or services essential to the fulfillment of an official U.S. Government program. Knowledge, possession of, or access to, classified information shall not be afforded to any individual solely by virtue of the individual's office, position, or security clearance.
(q) Periodic Reinvestigation (PR). An investigation conducted every five years for the purpose of updating a previously completed background investigation, special background investigation, single scope background investigation or PR on persons occupying positions referred to in § 154.19. Investigative requirements are as prescribed in appendix A to part 154, section 5. The period of investigation will not normally exceed the most recent 5-year period.
(r) Personnel Security Investigation (PSI). Any investigation required for the purpose of determining the eligibility of DoD military and civilian personnel, contractor employees, consultants, and other persons affiliated with the Department of Defense, for access to classified information, acceptance or retention in the Armed Forces, assignment or retention in sensitive duties, or other designated duties requiring such investigation. PSIs include investigations of affiliations with subversive organizations, suitability information, or hostage situations (see § 154.9(d)) conducted for the purpose of making personnel security determinations. They also include investigations of allegations that arise subsequent to adjudicative action and require resolution to determine an individual's current eligibility for access to classified information or assignment or retention in a sensitive position.
(s) Scope. The time period to be covered and the sources of information to be contacted during the prescribed course of a PSI.
(t) Security clearance. A determination that a person is eligible under the standards of this part for access to classified information.
(u) Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community (SOIC). The DoD Senior Officers of the Intelligence Community include: the Director, National Security Agency/Central Security Service; Director, Defense Intelligence Agency; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Air Force; and the Director of Naval Intelligence, U.S. Navy.
(v) Sensitive position. Any position so designated within the Department of Defense, the occupant of which could bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a materially adverse effect on the national security. All civilian positions are either critical-sensitive, noncritical-sensitive, or nonsensitive as described in § 154.13(b).
(w) Significant derogatory information. Information that could, in itself, justify an unfavorable administrative action, or prompt an adjudicator to seek additional investigation or clarification.
(x) Special access program. Any program imposing “need-to-know” or access controls beyond those normally provided for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information. Such a program may include, but not be limited to, special clearance, adjudication, investigative requirements, material dissemination restrictions, or special lists of persons determined to have a need-to-know.
(y) Special Background Investigation (SBI). A personnel security investigation consisting of all of the components of a BI plus certain additional investigative requirements as prescribed in paragraph 4, Appendix B, this part. The period of investigation for an SBI is the last 15 years or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter, provided that the last 2 full years are covered and that no investigation will be conducted prior to an individual's 16th birthday.
(z) Special Investigative Inquiry (SII). A supplemental personnel security investigation of limited scope conducted to prove or disprove relevant allegations that have arisen concerning a person upon whom a personnel security determination has been previously made and who, at the time of the allegation, holds a security clearance or otherwise occupies a position that requires a personnel security determination under the provisions of this part.
(aa) Service. Honorable active duty (including attendance at the military academies), membership in ROTC Scholarship Program, Army and Air Force National Guard, Military Reserve Force (including active status and ready reserve), civilian employment in Government service, or civilian employment with a DoD contractor or as a consultant involving access under the DoD Industrial Security Program. Continuity of service is maintained with change from one status to another as long as there is no single break in service greater than 12 months.
(bb) Unfavorable administrative action. Adverse action taken as the result of personnel security determinations and unfavorable personnel security determinations as defined in this part.
(cc) Unfavorable personnel security determination. A denial or revocation of clearance for access to classified information; denial or revocation of access to classified information; denial or revocation of a Special Access authorization (including access to SCI); nonappointment to or nonselection for appointment to a sensitive position; nonappointment to or nonselection for any other position requiring a trustworthiness determination under this part; reassignment to a position of lesser sensitivity or to a nonsensitive position; and nonacceptance for or discharge from the Armed Forces when any of the foregoing actions are based on derogatory information of personnel security significance.
(dd) United States Citizen (Native Born). A person born in one of the 50 United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, American Samoa, Northern Mariana Islands, U.S. Virgin Islands; or Panama Canal Zone (if the father or mother (or both) was or is, a citizen of the United States).
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61024, Nov. 19, 1993]

Subpart B—Policies
§ 154.6
Standards for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
(a) General. Only U.S. citizens shall be granted a personnel security clearance, assigned to sensitive duties, or granted access to classified information unless an authority designated in Appendix E has determined that, based on all available information, there are compelling reasons in furtherance of the Department of Defense mission, including, special expertise, to assign an individual who is not a citizen to sensitive duties or grant a Limited Access Authorization to classified information. Non-U.S. citizens may be employed in the competitive service in sensitive civilian positions only when specifically approved by the Office of Personnel Management, pursuant to E.O. 11935. Exceptions to these requirements shall be permitted only for compelling national security reasons.
(b) Clearance and sensitive position standard. The personnel security standard that must be applied to determine whether a person is eligible for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties is whether, based on all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(c) Military service standard. The personnel security standard that must be applied in determining whether a person is suitable under national security criteria for appointment, enlistment, induction, or retention in the Armed Forces is that, based on all available information, there is no reasonable basis for doubting the person's loyalty to the Government of the United States.
§ 154.7
Criteria for application of security standards.
The ultimate decision in applying either of the security standards set forth in § 154.6 (b) and (c) must be an overall common sense determination based upon all available facts. The criteria for determining eligibility for a clearance under the security standard shall include, but not be limited to the following:
(a) Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts thereat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act.
(b) Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(c) Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means.
(d) Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the U.S. or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the U.S. or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
(e) Unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by statute, Executive Order or regulation.
(f) Performing or attempting to perform one's duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
(g) Disregard of public law, statutes, Executive Orders or regulations including violation of security regulations or practices.
(h) Criminal or dishonest conduct.
(i) Acts of omission or commission that indicate poor judgment, unreliability or untrustworthiness.
(j) Any behavior or illness, including any mental condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.
(k) Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be
(1) The presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States, or
(2) Any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
(l) Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained affluence.
(m) Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
(n) Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance, narcotic, cannabis or other dangerous drug.
(o) Any knowing and willful falsification, coverup, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral statement, document, form or other representation or device used by the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency.
(p) Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a congressional committee, court, or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment.
(q) Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws of society.
§ 154.8
Types and scope of personnel security investigations.
(a) General. The types of personnel security investigations authorized below vary in scope of investigative effort required to meet the purpose of the particular investigation. No other types are authorized. The scope of a PSI may be neither raised nor lowered without the approval of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
(b) National Agency Check. Essentially, a NAC is a records check of designated agencies of the Federal Government that maintain record systems containing information relevant to making a personnel security determination. An ENTNAC is a NAC (scope as outlined in paragraph 1, Appendix A) conducted on inductees and first-term enlistees, but lacking a technical fingerprint search. A NAC is also an integral part of each BI, SBI, and Periodic Reinvestigation (PR). Subpart C prescribes when an NAC is required.
(c) National Agency Check plus written inquiries. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) conducts a NAC plus Written Inquiries (NACIs) on civilian employees for all departments and agencies of the Federal Government, pursuant to E.O. 10450. NACIs are considered to meet the investigative requirements of this regulation for a nonsensitive or noncritical sensitive position and/or up to a Secret clearance and, in addition to the NAC, include coverage of law enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools covering the last 5 years.
(d) DoD National Agency check plus written inquiries. DIS will conduct a DNACI, consisting of the scope contained in paragraph 2, Appendix A, for DoD military and contractor personnel for access to Secret information. Subpart C prescribes when a DNACI is required.
(e) Background investigation. The BI is the principal type of investigation conducted when an individual requires Top Secret clearance or is to be assigned to a critical sensitive position. The BI normally covers a 5-year period and consists of a subject interview, NAC, LACs, credit checks, developed character references (3), employment records checks, employment references (3), and select scoping as required to resolve unfavorable or questionable information. (See paragraph 3, Appendix A). Subpart C prescribes when a BI is required.
(f) Special background investigation. (1) An SBI is essentially a BI providing additional coverage both in period of time as well as sources of information, scoped in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/14 but without the personal interview. While the kind of coverage provided for by the SBI determines eligibility for access to SCI, DoD has adopted this coverage for certain other Special Access programs. Subpart C prescribes when an SBI is required.
(2) The OPM, FBI, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Secret Service, and the Department of State conduct specially scoped BIs under the provisions of DCID 1/14. Any investigation conducted by one of the above-cited agencies under DCID 1/14 standards is considered to meet the SBI investigative requirements of this part.
(3) The detailed scope of an SBI is set forth in paragraph 4, Appendix A.
(g) Special investigative inquiry. (1) A Special Investigative Inquiry is a personnel security investigation conducted to prove or disprove allegations relating to the criteria outlined in § 154.7(a) of this part except current criminal activities (see § 154.9(c)(4)), that have arisen concerning an individual upon whom a personnel security determination has been previously made and who, at the time of the allegation, holds a security clearance or otherwise occupies a position that requires a trustworthiness determination.
(2) Special Investigative Inquiries are scoped as necessary to address the specific matters requiring resolution in the case concerned and generally consist of record checks and/or interviews with potentially knowledgeable persons. An SII may include an interview with the subject of the investigation when necessary to resolve conflicting information and/or to provide an opportunity to refute or mitigate adverse information.
(3) In those cases when there is a disagreement between Defense Investigative Service (DIS) and the requester as to the appropriate scope of the investigation, the matter may be referred to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for resolution.
(h) Periodic reinvestigation. As referred to in § 154.19(a) and other national directives, certain categories of duties, clearance, and access require the conduct of a PR every five years according to the scope outlined in paragraph 5, Appendix A. The PR scope applies to military, civilian, contractor, and foreign national personnel.
(i) Personal interview. Investigative experience over the years has demonstrated that, given normal circumstances, the subject of a personnel security investigation is the best source of accurate and relevant information concerning the matters under consideration. Further, restrictions imposed by the Privacy Act of 1974 dictate that Federal investigative agencies collect information to the greatest extent practicable directly from the subject when the information may result in adverse determinations about an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs. Accordingly, personal interviews are an integral part of the DoD personnel security program and shall be conducted in accordance with the requirements set forth in the following paragraphs of this section.
(1) BI/PR. A personal interview shall be conducted by a trained DIS agent as part of each BI and PR.
(2) Resolving adverse information. A personal interview of the subject shall be conducted by a DIS agent (or, when authorized, by investigative personnel of other DoD investigative organizations designated in this Regulation to conduct personnel security investigations), when necessary, as part of each Special Investigative Inquiry, as well as during the course of initial or expanded investigations, to resolve or clarify any information which may impugn the subject's moral character, threaten the subject's future Federal employment, raise the question of subject's security clearability, or be otherwise stigmatizing.
(3) Hostage situation. A personal interview shall be conducted by a DIS agent (or, when authorized, by investigative personnel of other DoD investigative organizations designated in this Regulation to conduct personnel security investigations) in those instances in which an individual has immediate family members or other persons bound by ties of affection or obligation who reside in a nation whose interests are inimical to the interests of the United States. (See § 154.9(d).
(4) Applicants/potential nominees for DoD military or civilian positions requiring access to SCI or other positions requiring an SBI. A personal interview of the individual concerned shall be conducted, to the extent feasible, as part of the selection process for applicants/potential nominees for positions requiring access to SCI or completion of an SBI. The interview shall be conducted by a designee of the Component to which the applicant or potential nominee is assigned. Clerical personnel are not authorized to conduct these interviews. Such interviews shall be conducted utilizing resources in the order of priority indicated below:
(i) Existing personnel security screening systems (e.g., Air Force Assessment Screening Program, Naval Security Group Personnel Security Interview Program, U.S. Army Personnel Security Screening Program); or
(ii) Commander of the nominating organization or such official as he or she has designated in writing (e.g., Deputy Commander, Executive Officer, Security Officer, Security Manager, S-2, Counterintelligence Specialist, Personnel Security Specialist, or Personnel Officer); or
(iii) Agents of investigative agencies in direct support of the Component concerned.
(5) Administrative procedures. (i) The personal interview required by paragraph (i)(4) of this section shall be conducted in accordance with Appendix F.
(ii) For those investigations requested subsequent to the personal interview requirements of paragraph (i)(4) of this section the following procedures apply:
(A) The DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation) shall be annotated under Item 20 (Remarks) with the statement “Personal Interview Conducted by (cite the duty assignment of the designated official (e.g., Commander, Security Officer, Personnel Security Specialist, etc.))” in all cases in which an SBI is subsequently requested.
(B) Unfavorable information developed through the personal interview required by paragraph (i)(4) of this section, will be detailed in a written report attached to the DD Form 1879 to include full identification of the interviewer. Failure to provide such information may result in conduct of an incomplete investigation by DIS.
(C) Whenever it is determined that it is not feasible to conduct the personal interview required by paragraph (i)(4) of this section prior to requesting the SBI, the DD Form 1879 shall be annotated under Item 20 citing the reason for not conducting the interview.
(j) Expanded investigation. If adverse or questionable information relevant to a security determination is developed during the conduct of a personnel security investigation, regardless of type, the investigation shall be expanded, consistent with the restrictions in § 154.10(e) to the extent necessary to substantiate or disprove the adverse or questionable information.
§ 154.9
Authorized personnel security investigative agencies.
(a) General. The DIS provides a single centrally directed personnel security investigative service to conduct personnel security investigations within the 50 States, District of Columbia, and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico for DoD Components, except as provided for in DoD Directive 5100.23.^1
DIS will request the Military Departments or other appropriate Federal Agencies to accomplish DoD investigative requirements in other geographic areas beyond their jurisdiction. No other DoD Component shall conduct personnel security investigations unless specifically authorized by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. In certain instances provided for below, the DIS shall refer an investigation to other investigative agencies.
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(b) Subversive affiliations—(1) General. In the context of DoD investigative policy, subversion refers only to such conduct as is forbidden by the laws of the United States. Specifically, this is limited to information concerning the activities of individuals or groups that involve or will involve the violation of Federal law, for the purpose of:
(i) Overthrowing the Government of the United States or the government of a State;
(ii) Substantially impairing for the purpose of influencing U.S. Government policies or decisions:
(A) The functions of the Government of the United States, or
(B) The functions of the government of a State;
(iii) Depriving persons of their civil rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States.
(2) Military Department/FBI jurisdiction. Allegations of activities covered by § 154.7 (a) through (f) are in the exclusive investigative domain of either the counterintelligence agencies of the Military Departments or the FBI, depending on the circumstances of the case and the provisions of the Agreement Governing the Conduct of Defense Department Counterintelligence Activities in Conjunction with the FBI. Whenever allegations of this nature are developed, whether before or after a security clearance has been issued or during the course of a personnel security investigation conducted by DIS, they shall be referred immediately to either the FBI or to a military department counterintelligence agency, as appropriate.
(3) DIS jurisdiction. Allegations of activities limited to those set forth in § 154.7 (g) through (j) of this part shall be investigated by DIS.
(c) Suitability information—(1) General. Most derogatory information developed through personnel security investigations of DoD military or civilian personnel is so-called suitability information, that is, information pertaining to activities or situations covered by § 154.7 (g) through (q). Almost all unfavorable personnel security determinations made by DoD authorities are based on derogatory suitability information, although such information is often used as a basis for unfavorable administrative actions not of a security nature, such as action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or removal from Federal employment under OPM regulations.
(2) Pre-clearance investigation. Derogatory suitability information, except that covered in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, developed during the course of a personnel security investigation, prior to the issuance of an individual's personnel security clearance, shall be investigated by DIS to the extent necessary to confirm or refute its applicability to § 154.7 (g) through (q).
(3) Postadjudication investigation. Derogatory suitability allegations, except those covered by paragraph (c)(4) of this section arising subsequent to clearance requiring investigation to resolve and to determine the individual's eligibility for continued access to classified information, reinstatement of clearance/access, or retention in a sensitive position shall be referred to DIS to conduct a Special Investigative Inquiry. Reinvestigation of individuals for adjudicative reconsideration due to the passage of time or evidence of favorable behavior shall also be referred to DIS for investigation. In such cases, completion of the appropriate statement of personal history by the individual constitutes consent to be investigated. Individual consent or completion of a statement of personal history is not required when § 154.19(b) applies. Postadjudication investigation of allegations of a suitability nature required to support other types of unfavorable personnel security determinations or disciplinary procedures independent of a personnel security determination shall be handled in accordance with applicable Component administrative regulations. These latter categories of allegations lie outside the DoD personnel security program and are not a proper investigative function for departmental counterintelligence organizations, Component personnel security authorities, or DIS.
(4) Allegations of criminal activity. Any allegations of conduct of a nature indicating possible criminal conduct, including any arising during the course of a personnel security investigation, shall be referred to the appropriate DoD, military department or civilian criminal investigative agency. Military department investigative agencies have primary investigative jurisdiction in cases where there is probable cause to believe that the alleged conduct will be the basis for prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
(d) Hostage situations—(1) General. A hostage situation exists when a member of an individual's immediate family or such other person to whom the individual is bound by obligation or affection resides in a country whose interests are inimical to the interests of the United States. The rationale underlying this category of investigation is based on the possibility that an individual in such a situation might be coerced, influenced, or pressured to act contrary to the best interests of national security.
(2) DIS jurisdiction. In the absence of evidence of any coercion, influence or pressure, hostage investigations are exclusively a personnel security matter, rather than counterintelligence, and all such investigations shall be conducted by DIS.
(3) Military Department and/or FBI jurisdiction. Should indications be developed that hostile intelligence is taking any action specifically directed against the individual concerned—or should there exist any other evidence that the individual is actually being coerced, influenced, or pressured by an element inimical to the interests of national security—then the case becomes a counterintelligence matter (outside of investigative jurisdiction of DIS) to be referred to the appropriate military department or the FBI for investigation.
(e) Overseas personnel security investigations. Personnel security investigations requiring investigation overseas shall be conducted under the direction and control of DIS by the appropriate military department investigative organization. Only postadjudication investigations involving an overseas subject may be referred by the requester directly to the military department investigative organization having investigative responsibility in the overseas area concerned (see Appendix I) with a copy of the investigative request sent to DIS. In such cases, the military department investigative agency will complete the investigation, forward the completed report of investigation directly to DIS, with a copy to the requester.
§ 154.10
Limitations and restrictions.
(a) Authorized requesters and personnel security determination authorities. Personnel security investigations may be requested and personnel security clearances (including Special Access authorizations as indicated) granted only by those authorities designated in § 154.31 and Appendix E.
(b) Limit investigations and access. The number of persons cleared for access to classified information shall be kept to a minimum, consistent with the requirements of operations. Special attention shall be given to eliminating unnecessary clearances and requests for personnel security investigations.
(c) Collection of investigative data. To the greatest extent practicable, personal information relevant to security determinations shall be obtained directly from the subject of a personnel security investigation. Such additional information required to make the necessary personnel security determination shall be obtained as appropriate from knowledgeable personal sources, particularly the subject's peers, and through checks of relevant records including school, employment, credit, medical, and law enforcement records.
(d) Privacy Act notification. Whenever personal information is solicited from an individual preparatory to the initiation of a personnel security investigation, the individual must be informed of—
(1) The authority (statute or Executive order that authorized solicitation);
(2) The principal purpose or purposes for which the information is to be used;
(3) The routine uses to be made of the information;
(4) Whether furnishing such information is mandatory or voluntary;
(5) The effect on the individual, if any, of not providing the information and
(6) That subsequent use of the data may be employed as part of an aperiodic, random process to screen and evaluate continued eligibility for access to classified information.
(e) Restrictions on investigators. Investigation shall be carried out insofar as possible to collect only as much information as is relevant and necessary for a proper personnel security determination. Questions concerning personal and domestic affairs, national origin, financial matters, and the status of physical health thus should be avoided unless the question is relevant to the criteria of § 154.7. Similarly, the probing of a person's thoughts or beliefs and questions about conduct that have no personnel security implications are unwarranted. When conducting investigations under the provisions of this part, investigators shall:
(1) Investigate only cases or persons assigned within their official duties.
(2) Interview sources only where the interview can take place in reasonably private surroundings.
(3) Always present credentials and inform sources of the reasons for the investigation. Inform sources of the subject's accessibility to the information to be provided and to the identity of the sources providing the information. Restrictions on investigators relating to Privacy Act advisements to subjects of personnel security investigations are outlined in paragraph (d) of this section.
(4) Furnish only necessary identity data to a source, and refrain from asking questions in such a manner as to indicate that the investigator is in possession of derogatory information concerning the subject of the investigation.
(5) Refrain from using, under any circumstances, covert or surreptitious investigative methods, devices, or techniques including mail covers, physical or photographic surveillance, voice analyzers, inspection of trash, paid informants, wiretap, or eavesdropping devices.
(6) Refrain from accepting any case in which the investigator knows of circumstances that might adversely affect his fairness, impartiality, or objectivity.
(7) Refrain, under any circumstances, from conducting physical searches of the subject or his property.
(8) Refrain from attempting to evaluate material contained in medical files. Medical files shall be evaluated for personnel security program purposes only by such personnel as are designated by DoD medical authorities. However, review and collection of medical record information may be accomplished by authorized investigative personnel.
(f) Polygraph restrictions. The polygraph may be used as a personnel security screening measure only in those limited instances authorized by the Secretary of Defense in DoD Directive 5210.48.^1
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).

Subpart C—Personnel Security Investigative Requirements
§ 154.13
Sensitive positions.
(a) Designation of sensitive positions. Certain civilian positions within the Department of Defense entail duties of such a sensitive nature, including access to classified information, that the misconduct, malfeasance, or nonfeasance of an incumbent in any such position could result in an unacceptably adverse impact upon the national security. These positions are referred to in this part as sensitive positions. It is vital to the national security that great care be exercised in the selection of individuals to fill such positions. Similarly, it is important that only positions which truly meet one or more of the criteria set forth in paragraph (b) of this section be designated as sensitive.
(b) Criteria for security designation of positions. Each civilian position within the Department of Defense shall be categorized, with respect to security sensitivity, as either nonsensitive, noncritical-sensitive, or critical-sensitive.
(1) The criteria to be applied in designating a position as sensitive are:
(i) Critical-sensitive.
(A) Access to Top Secret information.
(B) Development or approval of plans, policies, or programs that affect the overall operations of the Department of Defense or of a DoD Component.
(C) Development or approval of war plans, plans or particulars of future major or special operations of war, or critical and extremely important items of war.
(D) Investigative and certain investigative support duties, the issuance of personnel security clearances or access authorizations, or the making of personnel security determinations.
(E) Fiduciary, public contact, or other duties demanding the highest degree of public trust.
(F) Duties falling under Special Access programs.
(G) Category I automated data processing (ADP) positions.
(H) Any other position so designated by the head of the Component or designee.
(ii) Noncritical-sensitive.
(A) Access to Secret or Confidential information.
(B) Security police/provost marshal-type duties involving the enforcement of law and security duties involving the protection and safeguarding of DoD personnel and property.
(C) Category II automated data processing positions.
(D) Duties involving education and orientation of DoD personnel.
(E) Duties involving the design, operation, or maintenance of intrusion detection systems deployed to safeguard DoD personnel and property.
(F) Any other position so designated by the head of the Component or designee.
(2) All other positions shall be designated as nonsensitive.
(c) Authority to designate sensitive positions. The authority to designate sensitive positions is limited to those authorities designated in paragraph G, Appendix E. These authorities shall designate each position within their jurisdiction as to its security sensitivity and maintain these designations current vis-a-vis the specific duties of each position.
(d) Limitation of sensitive positions. It is the responsibility of those authorities authorized to designate sensitive positions to insure that only those positions are designated as sensitive that meet the criteria of paragraph (b) and (c) of this section that the designation of sensitive positions is held to a minimum consistent with mission requirements. Designating authorities shall maintain an accounting of the number of sensitive positions by category, i.e., critical or non-critical sensitive. Such information will be included in annual report required in subpart K.
(e) Billet control system for Top Secret. (1) To standardize and control the issuance of Top Secret clearances within the Department of Defense, a specific designated billet must be established and maintained for all DoD military and civilian positions requiring access to Top Secret information. Only persons occupying these billet positions will be authorized a Top Secret clearance. If an individual departs from a Top Secret billet to a billet/position involving a lower level clearance, the Top Secret clearance will be administratively rescinded. This Top Secret billet requirement is in addition to the existing billet structure maintained for SCI access.
(2) Each request to DIS for a BI or SBI that involves access to Top Secret or SCI information will require inclusion of the appropriate billet reference, on the request for investigation. Each Component head should in corporate, to the extent feasible, the Top Secret billet structure into the component Manpower Unit Manning Document. Such a procedure should minimize the time and effort required to maintain such a billet structure.
(3) A report on the number of established Top Secret billets will be submitted each year to the DUSD(P) as part of the annual clearance report referred to in subpart K.
§ 154.14
Civilian employment.
(a) General. The appointment of each civilian employee in any DoD Component is subject to investigation, except for reappointment when the break in employment is less than 12 months. The type of investigation required is set forth in this section according to position sensitivity.
(b) Nonsensitive positions. In accordance with the OPM Federal Personnel Manual, a NACI shall be requested not later than 3 working days after a person is appointed to a nonsensitive position. Although there is normally no investigation requirement for per diem, intermittent, temporary or seasonal employees in nonsensitive positions provided such employment does not exceed an aggregate of 120 days in either a single continuous or series of appointments, a NAC may be requested of DIS where deemed appropriate by the employing activity.
(c) Noncritical-sensitive positions. (1) An NACI shall be requested and the NAC portion favorably completed before a person is appointed to a noncritical-sensitive position (for exceptions see paragraph (e) (1) and (2) of this section). An ENTNAC, NAC or DNACI conducted during military or contractor employment may also be used for appointment provided a NACI has been requested from OPM and there is no more than 12 months break in service since completion of the investigation.
(2) Seasonal employees (including summer hires) normally do not require access to classified information. For those requiring access to classified information the appropriate investigation is required. The request for the NAC (or NACI) should be submitted to DIS by entering “SH” (summer hire) in red letters approximately one inch high on the DD Form 398-2, Personnel Security Questionnaire (National Agency Checklist). Additionally, to ensure expedited processing by DIS, summer hire requests should be assembled and forwarded to DIS in bundles, when appropriate.
(d) Critical-sensitive positions. A BI shall be favorably completed prior to appointment to critical-sensitive positions (for exceptions see paragraph (e) (1) and (2) of this section. Certain critical-sensitive positions require a preappointment SBI in accordance with § 154.17. Preappointment BIs and SBIs will be conducted by DIS.
(e) Exceptions—(1) Noncritical-sensitive. In an emergency, a noncritical-sensitive position may be occupied pending the completion of the NACI if the head of the requesting organization finds that the delay in appointment would be harmful to the national security and such finding is reduced to writing and made part of the record. In such instances, the position may be filled only after the NACI has been requested.
(2) Critical-sensitive. In an emergency, a critical-sensitive position may be occupied pending completion of the BI (or SBI, as appropriate) if the head of the requesting organization finds that the delay in appointment would be harmful to the national security and such finding is reduced to writing and made a part of the record. In such instances, the position may be filled only when the NAC portion of the BI (or SBI) or a previous valid NACI, NAC or ENTNAC has been completed and favorably adjudicated.
(f) Mobilization of DoD civilian retirees. The requirements contained in paragraph (a) of this section, regarding the type of investigation required by position sensitivity for DoD civilian retirees temporary appointment when the break in employment is greater than 12 months, should either be expedited or waived for the purposes of mobilizing selected reemployed annuitants under the provisions of title 5, United States Code, depending upon the degree of sensitivity of the position to which assigned. Particular priority should be afforded to newly assigned personnel assigned to the defense intelligence and security agencies with respect to granting security clearances in an expeditious manner under paragraph (a) of this section.
§ 154.15
Military appointment, enlistment, and induction.
(a) General. The appointment, enlistment, and induction of each member of the Armed Forces or their Reserve Components shall be subject to the favorable completion of a personnel security investigation. The types of investigation required are set forth in this section.
(b) Entrance investigation. (1) An ENTNAC shall be conducted on each enlisted member of the Armed Forces at the time of initial entry into the service. A DNACI shall be conducted on each commissioned officer, except as permitted by paragraph (d) of this section, warrant officer, cadet, midshipman, and Reserve Officers Training Candidate, at the time of appointment. A full NAC shall be conducted upon reentry of any of the above when there has been a break in service greater than 12 months.
(2) If an officer or warrant officer candidate has been the subject of a favorable NAC or ENTNAC and there has not been a break in service of more than 12 months, a new NAC is not authorized. This includes ROTC graduates who delay entry onto active duty pending completion of their studies.
(3) All derogatory information revealed during the enlistment or appointment process that results in a moral waiver will be fully explained on a written summary attached to the DD Form 398-2.
(c) Reserve Components and National Guard. Reserve Component and National Guard personnel not on active duty are subject to the investigative requirements of this section.
(d) Exceptions for certain commissioned officers of Reserve Components. The requirements for entrance investigation shall be rigidly adhered to except as follows. Health professionals, chaplains, and attorneys may be commissioned in the Reserve Components prior to completion of a DNACI provided that:
(1) A DNACI is initiated at the time an application for a commission is received; and
(2) The applying health professional, chaplain, or attorney agrees in writing that, if the results of the investigation are unfavorable, he or she will be subject to discharge if found to be ineligible to hold a commission. Under this exception, commissions in Reserve Components other than the National Guard may be tendered to immigrant alien health professionals, chaplains, and attorneys.
(e) Mobilization of military retirees. The requirements contained in paragraph (c) of this section, regarding a full NAC upon reentry to active duty of any officer or enlisted regular/reserve military retiree or Individual Ready Reserve who has been separated from service for a period of greater than 12 months, should be waived for the purposes of partial or full mobilization under provisions of title 10, (title 14, pertaining to the U.S. Coast Guard as an element of the Navy) U.S. Code, to include the period of prescribed service refresher training. Particular priority should be afforded to military retirees mobilized and assigned to the defense intelligence and security agencies communities.
§ 154.16
Security clearance.
(a) General. (1) The authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E are the only authorities authorized to grant, deny or revoke DoD personnel security clearances. The granting of such clearances shall be limited to only those persons who require access to classified information for mission accomplishment.
(2) Military, DoD civilian, and contractor personnel who are employed by or serving in a consultant capacity to the DoD, may be considered for access to classified information only when such access is required in connection with official duties. Such individuals may be granted either a final or interim personnel security clearance provided the investigative requirements set forth below are complied with, and provided further that all available information has been adjudicated and a finding made that such clearance would be clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b) Investigative requirements for clearance—(1) Top Secret. (i) Final Clearance:
(A) BI.
(B) Established billet per § 154.13(e) (1) through (3) (except contractors).
(ii) Interim Clearance:
(A) Favorable NAC, ENTNAC, DNACI, or NACI completed
(B) Favorable review of DD Form 398/SF-86/SF-171/DD Form 49
(C) BI or SBI has been initiated
(D) Favorable review of local personnel, base/military police, medical, and other security records as appropriate.
(E) Established billet per § 154.13(e) (1) through (3) (except contractors)
(F) Provisions of paragraph § 154.14(e) (1) and (2) have been met regarding civilian personnel.
(2) Secret. (i) Final Clearance:
(A) DNACI: Military (except first-term enlistees) and contractor employees
(B) NACI: Civilian employees
(C) ENTNAC: First-term enlistees
(ii) Interim Clearance:
(A) When a valid need to access Secret information is established, an interim Secret clearance may be issued in every case, provided that the steps outlined in paragraphs (b)(2)(ii) (B) through (E) of this section have been complied with.
(B) Favorable review of DD Form 398-2/SF-85/SF-171/DD Form 48.
(C) NACI, DNACI, or ENTNAC initiated.
(D) Favorable review of local personnel, base military police, medical, and security records as appropriate.
(E) Provisions of § 154.14(e) have been complied with regarding civilian personnel.
(3) Confidential. (i) Final Clearance:
(A) NAC or ENTNAC: Military and contractor employees (except for Philippine national members of the United States Navy on whom a BI shall be favorably completed.)
(B) NACI: Civilian employees (except for summer hires who may be granted a final clearance on the basis of a NAC).
(ii) Interim Clearance:
(A) Favorable review of DD Form 398-2/SF 85/SF 171/ DD Form 48.
(B) NAC, ENTNAC or NACI initiated.
(C) Favorable review of local personnel, base military police, medical, and security records as appropriate.
(D) Provisions of § 154.14(e) (1) and (2) have been complied with regarding civilian personnel.
(4) Validity of previously granted clearances. Clearances granted under less stringent investigative requirements retain their validity; however, if a higher degree of clearance is required, investigative requirements of this directive will be followed.
(c) Access to classified information by non-U.S. citizens. (1) Only U.S. citizens are eligible for a security clearance. Therefore, every effort shall be made to ensure that non-United States citizens are not employed in duties that may require access to classified information. However, when there are compelling reasons to grant access to classified information to an immigrant alien or a foreign national in furtherance of the mission of the Department of Defense, such individuals may be granted a “Limited Access Authorization” (LAA) under the following conditions:
(i) LAAs will be limited to Secret and Confidential level only; LAAs for Top Secret are prohibited.
(ii) Access to classified information is not inconsistent with that determined releasable by designated disclosure authorities, in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.11^1 to the country of which the individual is a citizen.
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(iii) Access to classified information must be limited to information relating to a specific program or project.
(iv) Favorable completion of an BI (scoped for 10 years); where the full investigative coverage cannot be completed, a counterintelligence scope polygraph examination will be required in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.48.
(v) Security clearances previously issued to immigrant aliens will be reissued as LAAs.
(vi) The Limited Access Authorization determination shall be made only by an authority designated in paragraph B, Appendix E.
(vii) LAAs issued by the Unified and Specified Commands shall be reported to the central adjudicative facility of the appropriate military department in accordance with the assigned responsibilities in DoD Directive 5100.3^1 for inclusion in the Defense Central Index of Investigation (DCII).
(2) In each case of granting a Limited Access Authorization, a record shall be maintained as to:
(i) The identity (including current citizenship) of the individual to whom the Limited Access Authorization is granted, to include name and date and place of birth;
(ii) Date and type of most recent investigation to include the identity of the investigating agency;
(iii) The nature of the specific program material(s) to which access is authorized (delineated as precisely as possible);
(iv) The classification level to which access is authorized; and
(v) The compelling reasons for granting access to the materials cited in (iii).
(vi) Status of the individual (i.e., immigrant alien or foreign national).
(3) Individuals granted LAAs under the foregoing provisions shall be the subject of a 5-year periodic reinvestigation as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(4) Foreign nationals who are LAA candidates must agree to submit to a counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination prior to being granted access in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.48.
(5) If geographical and political situations prevent the full completion of the BI (and/or counterintelligence-scope polygraph) issuance of an LAA shall not be authorized; exceptions to the policy may only be authorized by the DUSD(P).
(6) A report on all LAAs in effect, including the data required in paragraphs (d)(2) (i) through (vi) of this section shall be furnished to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy within 60 days after the end of each fiscal year. (See § 154.77).
(d) Access by persons outside the Executive Branch. (1) Access to classified information by persons outside the Executive Branch shall be accomplished in accordance with 32 CFR part 159. The investigative requirement shall be the same as for the appropriate level of security clearance, except as indicated below.
(2) Members of the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives do not require personnel security clearances. They may be granted access to DoD classified information which relates to matters under the jurisdiction of the respective Committees to which they are assigned and is needed to perform their duties in connection with such assignments.
(3) Congressional staff members requiring access to DoD classified information shall be processed for a security clearance in accordance with 32 CFR part 353 and the provisions of this part. The Director, Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) will initiate the required investigation (initial or reinvestigation) to DIS, adjudicate the results and grant, deny or revoke the security clearance, as appropriate. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) will be notified by WHS of the completed clearance action.
(4) State governors do not require personnel security clearances. They may be granted access to specifically designated classified information, on a “need-to-know” basis, based upon affirmation by the Secretary of Defense or the head of a DoD Component or single designee, that access, under the circumstances, serves the national interest. Staff personnel of a governor's office requiring access to classified information shall be investigated and cleared in accordance with the prescribed procedures of this part when the head of a DoD Component, or single designee, affirms that such clearance serves the national interest. Access shall also be limited to specifically designated classified information on a “need-to-know” basis.
(5) Members of the U.S. Supreme Court, the Federal judiciary and the Supreme Courts of the individual States do not require personnel security clearances. They may be granted access to DoD classified information to the extent necessary to adjudicate cases being heard before these individual courts.
(6) Attorneys representing DoD military, civilian or contractor personnel, requiring access to DoD classified information to properly represent their clients, shall normally be investigated by DIS and cleared in accordance with the prescribed procedures in paragraph (b) of this section. This shall be done upon certification of the General Counsel of the DoD Component involved in the litigation that access to specified classified information, on the part of the attorney concerned, is necessary to adequately represent his or her client. In exceptional instances, when the exigencies of a given situation do not permit timely compliance with the provisions of § 154.16(b), access may be granted with the written approval of an authority designated in Appendix E provided that as a minimum: a favorable name check of the FBI and the DCII has been completed, and a DoD Non-Disclosure Agreement has been executed. In post-indictment cases, after a judge has invoked the security procedures of the Classified Information Procedures Act (CIPA) the Department of Justice may elect to conduct the necessary background investigation and issue the required security clearance, in coordination with the affected DoD Component.
(e) Restrictions on issuance of personnel security clearances. Personnel security clearances must be kept to the absolute minimum necessary to meet mission requirements. Personnel security clearances shall not be issued:
(1) To persons in nonsensitive positions.
(2) To persons whose regular duties do not require authorized access to classified information.
(3) For ease of movement of persons within a restricted, controlled, or industrial area, whose duties do not require access to classified information.
(4) To persons who may only have inadvertent access to sensitive information or areas, such as guards, emergency service personnel, firemen, doctors, nurses, police, ambulance drivers, or similar personnel.
(5) To persons working in shipyards whose duties do not require access to classified information.
(6) To persons who can be prevented from accessing classified information by being escorted by cleared personnel.
(7) To food service personnel, vendors and similar commercial sales or service personnel whose duties do not require access to classified information.
(8) To maintenance or cleaning personnel who may only have inadvertent access to classified information unless such access cannot be reasonably prevented.
(9) To persons who perform maintenance on office equipment, computers, typewriters, and similar equipment who can be denied classified access by physical security measures.
(10) To perimeter security personnel who have no access to classified information.
(11) To drivers, chauffeurs and food service personnel.
(f) Dual citizenship. Persons claiming both U.S. and foreign citizenship shall be processed under § 154.16(b) and adjudicated in accordance with the “Foreign Preference” standard in Appendix I.
(g) One-time access. Circumstances may arise where an urgent operational or contractual exigency exists for cleared DoD personnel to have one-time or short duration access to classified information at a higher level than is authorized by the existing security clearance. In many instances, the processing time required to upgrade the clearance would preclude timely access to the information. In such situations, and only for compelling reasons in furtherance of the DoD mission, an authority referred to in paragraph (h)(1) of this section, may grant higher level access on a temporary basis subject to the terms and conditions prescribed below. This special authority may be revoked for abuse, inadequate record keeping, or inadequate security oversight. These procedures do not apply when circumstances exist which would permit the routine processing of an individual for the higher level clearance. Procedures and conditions for effecting emergency one-time access to the next higher classification level are as follows:
(1) Authorization for such one-time access shall be granted by a flag or general officer, a general court-martial convening authority or equivalent Senior Executive Service member, after coordination with appropriate security officials.
(2) The recipient of the one-time access authorization must be a U.S. citizen, possess a current DoD security clearance, and the access required shall be limited to classified information one level higher than the current clearance.
(3) Such access, once granted, shall be cancelled promptly when no longer required, at the conclusion of the authorized period of access, or upon notification from the granting authority.
(4) The employee to be afforded the higher level access shall have been continuously employed by a DoD Component or a cleared DoD contractor for the preceding 24-month period. Higher level access is not authorized for part-time employees.
(5) Pertinent local records concerning the employee concerned shall be reviewed with favorable results.
(6) Whenever possible, access shall be confined to a single instance or at most, a few occasions. The approval for access shall automatically expire 30 calendar days from date access commenced. If the need for access is expected to continue for a period in excess of 30 days, written approval of the granting authority is required. At such time as it is determined that the need for access is expected to extend beyond 90 days, the individual concerned shall be promptly processed for the level of clearance required. When extended access has been approved, such access shall be cancelled at or before 90 days from original date of access.
(7) Access at the higher level shall be limited to information under the control and custody of the authorizing official and shall be afforded under the general supervision of a properly cleared employee. The employee charged with providing such supervision shall be responsible for:
(i) Recording the higher-level information actually revealed,
(ii) The date(s) such access is afforded; and
(iii) The daily retrieval of the material accessed.
(8) Access at the next higher level shall not be authorized for COMSEC, SCI, NATO, or foreign government information.
(9) The exercise of this provision shall be used sparingly and repeat use within any 12 month period on behalf of the same individual is prohibited. The approving authority shall maintain a record containing the following data with respect to each such access approved:
(i) The name, and SSN of the employee afforded higher level access.
(ii) The level of access authorized.
(iii) Justification for the access, to include an explanation of the compelling reason to grant the higher level access and specifically how the DoD mission would be furthered.
(iv) An unclassified description of the specific information to which access was authorized and the duration of access along with the date(s) access was afforded.
(v) A listing of the local records reviewed and a statement that no significant adverse information concerning the employee is known to exist.
(vi) The approving authority's signature certifying (h)(9) (i) through (v) of this section.
(vii) Copies of any pertinent briefing/debriefings administered to the employee.
(h) Access by retired flag/general officers. (1) Upon determination by an active duty flag/general officer that there are compelling reasons, in furtherance of the Department of Defense mission, to grant a retired flag/general officer access to classified information in connection with a specific DoD program or mission, for a period not greater than 90 days, the investigative requirements of this part may be waived. The access shall be limited to classified information at a level commensurate with the security clearance held at the time of retirement—not including access to SCI.
(2) The flag/general officer approving issuance of the clearance shall, provide the appropriate DoD Component central clearance facility a written record to be incorporated into the DCII detailing:
(i) Full identifying data pertaining to the cleared subject;
(ii) The classification of the information to which access was authorized.
(3) Such access may be granted only after the compelling reason and the specific aspect of the DoD mission which is served by granting such access has been detailed and under the condition that the classified materials involved are not removed from the confines of a government installation or other area approved for storage of DoD classified information.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 55 FR 3223, Jan. 31, 1990]
§ 154.17
Special access programs.
(a) General. It is the policy of the Department of Defense to establish, to the extent possible, uniform and consistent personnel security investigative requirements. Accordingly, investigations exceeding established requirements are authorized only when mandated by statute, national regulations, or international agreement. In this connection, there are certain Special Access programs originating at the national or international level that require personnel security investigations and procedures of a special nature. These programs and the special investigative requirements imposed by them are described in this section. A Special Access program is any program designed to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive information established pursuant to section 4-2 of Executive Order 12356 and prior Orders. Title 32 CFR part 159 governs the establishment of Departmental Special Access Programs.
(b) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). (1) The investigative requirements for access to SCI is an SBI (See paragraph 4, Appendix A) including a NAC on the individual's spouse or cohabitant. When conditions indicate, additional investigation shall be conducted on the spouse of the individual and members of the immediate family (or other persons to whom the individual is bound by affection or obligation) to the extent necessary to permit a determination by the adjudication agency that the Personnel Security standards of DCID 1/14 are met.
(2) A previous investigation conducted within the past five years which substantially meets the investigative requirements prescribed by this section may serve as a basis for granting access approval provided that there has been no break in the individual's military service, DoD civilian employment, or access to classified information under the Industrial Security Program greater than 12 months. The individual shall submit one copy of an updated PSQ covering the period since the completion of the last SBI.
(c) Single Integrated Operation Plan—Extremely Sensitive Information (SIOP-ESI). The investigative requirement for access to SIOP-ESI is an SBI, including a NAC on the spouse and the individual's immediate family who are 18 years of age or over and who are U.S. citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens.
(d) Presidential support activities. (1) DoD Directive 5210.55 ^1 prescribes the policies and procedures for the nomination, screening, selection, and continued evaluation of DoD military and civilian personnel and contractor employees assigned to or utilized in Presidential Support activities. The type of investigation of individuals assigned to Presidential Support activities varies according to whether the person investigated qualifies for Category One or Category Two as indicated below:
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(i) Category one. (A) Personnel assigned on a permanent or full-time basis to duties in direct support of the President (including the office staff of the Director, White House Military Office, and all individuals under his control):
(1) Presidential aircrew and associated maintenance and security personnel.
(2) Personnel assigned to the White House communications activities and the Presidential retreat.
(3) White House transportation personnel.
(4) Presidential mess attendants and medical personnel.
(5) Other individuals filling administrative positions at the White House.
(B) Personnel assigned on a temporary or part-time basis to duties supporting the President:
(1) Military Social Aides.
(2) Selected security, transportation, flight-line safety, and baggage personnel.
(3) Others with similar duties.
(C) Personnel assigned to the Office of the Military Aide to the Vice President.
(ii) Category two. (A) Personnel assigned to honor guards, ceremonial units, and military bands who perform at Presidential functions and facilities.
(B) Employees of contractors who provide services or contractors employees who require unescorted access to Presidential Support areas, activities, or equipment—including maintenance of the Presidential retreat, communications, and aircraft.
(C) Individuals in designated units requiring a lesser degree of access to the President or Presidential Support activities.
(2) Personnel nominated for Category One duties must have been the subject of an SBI, including a NAC on the spouse and all members of the individual's immediate family of 18 years of age or over who are U.S. citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens. The SBI must have been completed within the 12 months preceding selection for Presidential Support duties. If such an individual marries subsequent to the completion of the SBI, the required spouse check shall be made at that time.
(3) Personnel nominated for Category Two duties must have been the subject of a BI, including a NAC on the spouse and all members of the individual's immediate family of 18 years of age or over who are U.S. citizens other than by birth or who are resident aliens. The BI must have been completed within the 12 months preceding selection for Presidential Support duties. It should be noted that duties (separate and distinct from their Presidential Support responsibilities) of some Category Two personnel may make it necessary for them to have special access clearances which require an SBI.
(4) The U.S. citizenship of foreign-born immediate family members of all Presidential Support nominees must be verified by investigation.
(5) A limited number of Category One personnel having especially sensitive duties have been designated by the Director, White House Military Office as “Category A.” These personnel shall be investigated under special scoping in accordance with the requirements of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Director, White House Military Office and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, July 30, 1980.
(e) Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP). (1) DoD Directive 5210.42 ^1 sets forth the standards of individual reliability required for personnel performing duties associated with nuclear weapons and nuclear components. The investigative requirement for personnel performing such duties is:
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(i) Critical position: BI. In the event that it becomes necessary to consider an individual for a critical position and the required BI has not been completed, interim certification may be made under carefully controlled conditions as set forth below.
(A) The individual has had a favorable DNACI, NAC (or ENTNAC) within the past 5 years without a break in service or employment in excess of 1 year.
(B) The BI has been requested.
(C) All other requirements of the PRP screening process have been fulfilled.
(D) The individual is identified to supervisory personnel as being certified on an interim basis.
(E) The individual is not used in a two-man team with another such individual.
(F) Justification of the need for interim certification is documented by the certifying official.
(G) Should the BI not be completed within 150 days from the date of the request, the certifying official shall query the Component clearance authority, who shall ascertain from DIS the status of the investigation. On the basis of such information, the certifying official shall determine whether to continue or to withdraw the interim certification.
(ii) Controlled position: DNACI/NACI. (A) An ENTNAC completed for the purpose of first term enlistment or induction into the Armed Forces does not satisfy this requirement.
(B) Interim certification is authorized for an individual who has not had a DNACI/NACI completed within the past 5 years, subject to the following conditions:
(1) The individual has had a favorable ENTNAC/NAC, or higher investigation, that is more than 5 years old and has not had a break in service or employment in excess of 1 year.
(2) A DNACI/NACI has been requested at the time of interim certification.
(3) All other requirements of the PRP screening process have been fulfilled.
(4) Should the DNACI/NACI not be completed within 90 days from the date of the request, the procedures set forth in paragraph (e)(1)(i)(G) of this section for ascertaining the delay of the investigation in the case of a critical position shall apply.
(iii) Additional requirements apply. (A) The investigation upon which certification is based must have been completed within the last 5 years from the date of initial assignment to a PRP position and there must not have been a break in service or employment in excess of 1 year between completion of the investigation and initial assignment.
(B) In those cases in which the investigation was completed more than 5 years prior to initial assignment or in which there has been a break in service or employment in excess of 1 year subsequent to completion of the investigation, a reinvestigation is required.
(C) Subsequent to initial assignment to the PRP, reinvestigation is not required so long as the individual remains in the PRP.
(D) A medical evaluation of the individual as set forth in DoD Directive 5210.42.
(E) Review of the individual's personnel file and other official records and information locally available concerning behavior or conduct which is relevant to PRP standards.
(F) A personal interview with the individual for the purpose of informing him of the significance of the assignment, reliability standards, the need for reliable performance, and of ascertaining his attitude with respect to the PRP.
(G) Service in the Army, Navy and Air Force Reserve does not constitute active service for PRP purposes.
(f) Access to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) classified information. (1) Personnel assigned to a NATO staff position requiring access to NATO Cosmic (Top Secret), Secret, or Confidential information shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated BI (10 year scope), DNACI/NACI or NAC/ENTNAC, current within five years prior to the assignment, in accordance with USSAN Instruction 1-69 and § 154.19(f).
(2) Personnel not assigned to a NATO staff position, but requiring access to NATO Cosmic, Secret or Confidential information in the normal course of their duties, must possess the equivalent final U.S. security clearance based upon the appropriate personnel security investigation (Appendix A) required by §§ 154.16(b) and 154.19(j) of this part.
(g) Other special access programs. Special investigative requirements for Special Access programs not provided for in this paragraph may not be established without the written approval of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
§ 154.18
Certain positions not necessarily requiring access to classified information.
(a) General. DoD Directive 5200.8 ^1 outlines the authority of military commanders under the Internal Security Act of 1950 to issue orders and regulations for the protection of property or places under their command. Essential to carrying out this responsibility is a commander's need to protect the command against the action of untrustworthy persons. Normally, the investigative requirements prescribed in this part should suffice to enable a commander to determine the trustworthiness of individuals whose duties require access to classified information or appointment to positions that are sensitive and do not involve such access. However, there are certain categories of positions or duties which, although not requiring access to classified information, if performed by untrustworthy persons, could enable them to jeopardize the security of the command or otherwise endanger the national security. The investigative requirements for such positions or duties are detailed in this section.
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(b) Access to restricted areas, sensitive information or equipment not involving access to classified information. (1) Access to restricted areas, sensitive information or equipment by DoD military, civilian or contractor personnel shall be limited to those individuals who have been determined trustworthy as a result of the favorable completion of a NAC (or ENTNAC) or who are under the escort of appropriately cleared personnel. Where escorting such persons is not feasible, a NAC shall be conducted and favorably reviewed by the appropriate component agency or activity prior to permitting such access. DoD Components shall not request, and shall not direct or permit their contractors to request, security clearances to permit access to areas when access to classified information is not required in the normal course of duties or which should be precluded by appropriate security measures. In determining trustworthiness under this paragraph, the provisions of § 154.7 and Appendix H will be utilized.
(2) In meeting the requirements of this paragraph, approval shall be obtained from one of the authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E of this part, for authority to request NACs on DoD military, civilian or contractor employees. A justification shall accompany each request which shall detail the reasons why escorted access would not better serve the national security. Requests for investigative requirements beyond a NAC shall be forwarded to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for approval.
(3) NAC requests shall—
(i) Be forwarded to DIS in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B, Appendix C,
(ii) Contain a reference to this paragraph on the DD Form 398-2, and
(iii) List the authority in Appendix E who approved the request.
(4) Determinations to deny access under the provisions of this paragraph must not be exercised in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner and shall be the responsibility of the military or installation commander as provided for in DoD Directive 5200.8.
(c) Nonappropriated fund employees. Each Nonappropriated Fund employee who is employed in a position of trust as designated by an official authorized in paragraph H, Appendix E, shall have been the subject of a NAC completed no longer than 12 months prior to employment or a prior personnel security investigation with no break in Federal service or employment greater than 12 months in accordance with DoD Manual 1401.1-M. An individual who does not meet established suitability requirements may not be employed without prior approval of the authorizing official. Issuance of a Confidential or Secret clearance will be based on a DNACI or NACI in accordance with § 154.16(b).
(d) Customs inspectors. DoD employees appointed as customs inspectors, under waivers approved in accordance with DoD 5030.49-R shall have undergone a favorably adjudicated NAC completed within the past 5 years unless there has been a break in DoD employment greater than 1 year in which case a current NAC is required.
(e) Red Cross/United Service Organizations personnel. A favorably adjudicated NAC shall be accomplished on Red Cross or United Service Organizations personnel as prerequisite for assignment with the Armed Forces overseas (32 CFR part 253).
(f) Officials authorized to issue security clearances. Any person authorized to adjudicate personnel security clearances shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated BI.
(g) Personnel security clearance adjudication officials. Any person selected to serve with a board, committee, or other group responsible for adjudicating personnel security cases shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated BI.
(h) Persons requiring DoD building passes. Pursuant to DoD Directive 5210.46 ^1 each person determined by the designated authorities of the Components concerned as having an official need for access to DoD buildings in the National Capital Region shall be the subject of a favorably, adjudicated NAC prior to issuance of a DoD building pass. Conduct of a BI for this purpose is prohibited unless approved in advance by ODUSD(P).
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(i) Foreign national employees overseas not requiring access to classified information. Foreign nationals employed by DoD organizations overseas, whose duties do not require access to classified information, shall be the subject of the following record checks, initiated by the appropriate military department investigative organization consistent with § 154.9(e) prior to employment:
(1) Host government law enforcement and security agency checks at the city, state (province), and national level, whenever permissible by the laws of the host government; and
(2) DCII.
(3) FBI-HQ/ID. (Where information exists regarding residence by the foreign national in the United States for one year or more since age 18).
(j) Special agents and investigative support personnel. Special agents and those noninvestigative personnel assigned to investigative agencies whose official duties require continuous access to complete investigative files and material require an SBI.
(k) Persons requiring access to chemical agents. Personnel whose duties involve access to or security of chemical agents shall be screened initially for suitability and reliability and shall be evaluated on a continuing basis at the supervisory level to ensure that they continue to meet the high standards required. At a minimum, all such personnel shall have had a favorably adjudicated NAC completed within the last 5 years prior to assignment in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5210.65.^1
^1 See footnote 1 to § 154.2(c).
(l) Education and orientation personnel. Persons selected for duties in connection with programs involving the education and orientation of military personnel shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated NAC prior to such assignment. This does not include teachers/administrators associated with university extension courses conducted on military installations in the United States. Non-US citizens from a country listed in Appendix G shall be required to undergo a BI if they are employed in a position covered by this paragraph.
(m) Contract guards. Any person performing contract guard functions shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated NAC prior to such assignment.
(n) Transportation of arms, ammunition and explosives (AA&E). Any DoD military, civilian or contract employee (including commercial carrier) operating a vehicle or providing security to a vehicle transporting Category I, II or Confidential AA&E shall have been the subject of a favorably adjudicated NAC or ENTNAC.
(o) Personnel occupying information systems positions designated ADP-I, ADP-II & ADP-III. DoD military, civilian personnel, consultants, and contractor personnel performing on unclassified automated information systems may be assigned to one of three position sensitivity designations (in accordance with Appendix J) and investigated as follows:
ADP-I:BI
ADP-II: DNACI/NACI
ADP-III:NAC/ENTNAC
Those personnel falling in the above categories who require access to classified information will, of course, be subject to the appropriate investigative scope contained in § 154.16(b).
(p) Others. Requests for approval to conduct an investigation on other personnel, not provided for in § 154.18 (b) through (o) considered to fall within the general provisions of § 154.18(a) shall be submitted, detailing the justification therefor, for approval to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Approval of such requests shall be contingent upon an assurance that appropriate review procedures exist and that adverse determinations will be made at no lower than major command level.
§ 154.19
Reinvestigation.
(a) General. DoD policy prohibits unauthorized and unnecessary investigations. There are, however, certain situations and requirements that necessitate reinvestigation of an individual who has already been investigated under the provisions of this part. It is the policy to limit reinvestigation of individuals to the scope contained in paragraph 5, Appendix A to meet overall security requirements. Reinvestigation, generally, is authorized only as follows:
(1) To prove or disprove an allegation relating to the criteria set forth in § 154.7 of this part with respect to an individual holding a security clearance or assigned to a position that requires a trustworthiness determination;
(2) To meet the periodic reinvestigation requirements of this part with respect to those security programs enumerated below; and
(3) Upon individual request, to assess the current eligibility of individuals who did not receive favorable adjudicative action after an initial investigation, if a potential clearance need exists and there are reasonable indications that the factors upon which the adverse determination was made no longer exists.
(b) Allegations related to disqualification. Whenever questionable behavior patterns develop, derogatory information is discovered, or inconsistencies arise related to the disqualification criteria outlined in § 154.7 that could have an adverse impact on an individual's security status, a Special Investigative Inquiry (SII), psychiatric, drug or alcohol evaluation, as appropriate, may be requested to resolve all relevant issues in doubt. If it is essential that additional relevant personal data is required from the investigative subject, and the subject fails to furnish the required data, the subject's existing security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties shall be terminated in accordance with § 154.56(b).
(c) Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Each individual having current access to SCI shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(d) Critical-sensitive positions. Each DoD civilian employee occupying a critical sensitive position shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(e) Presidential support duties. Each individual assigned Presidential Support duties shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(f) NATO staff. Each individual assigned to a NATO staff position requiring a COSMIC clearance shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A. Those assigned to a NATO staff position requiring a NATO SECRET clearance shall be the subject of a new NAC conducted on a 5-year recurring basis.
(g) Extraordinarily sensitive duties. In extremely limited instances, extraordinary national security implications associated with certain SCI duties may require very special compartmentation and other special security measures. In such instances, a Component SOIC may, with the approval of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, request PR's at intervals of less than 5 years as outlined in paragraph 5, Appendix A. Such requests shall include full justification and a recommendation as to the desired frequency. In reviewing such requests, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall give due consideration to:
(1) The potential damage that might result from the individual's defection or abduction.
(2) The availability and probable effectiveness of means other than reinvestigation to evaluate factors concerning the individual's suitability for continued SCI access.
(h) Foreign nationals employed by DoD organizations overseas. Foreign nationals employed by DoD organizations overseas who have been granted a “Limited Access Authorization” pursuant to § 154.16(d) shall be the subject of a PR, as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A, conducted under the auspices of DIS by the appropriate military department or other U.S. Government investigative agency consistent with § 154.9(e) and Appendix I of this part.
(i) Persons accessing very sensitive information classified Secret. (1) Heads of DoD Components shall submit a request to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for approval to conduct periodic reinvestigations on persons holding Secret clearances who are exposed to very sensitive Secret information.
(2) Generally, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will only approve periodic reinvestigations of persons having access to Secret information if the unauthorized disclosure of the information in question could reasonably be expected to:
(i) Jeopardize human life or safety.
(ii) Result in the loss of unique or uniquely productive intelligence sources or methods vital to U.S. security.
(iii) Compromise technologies, plans, or procedures vital to the strategic advantage of the United States.
(3) Each individual accessing very sensitive Secret information who has been designated by an authority listed in paragraph A, Appendix E as requiring periodic reinvestigation, shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as stated in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(j) Access to Top Secret information. Each individual having current access to Top Secret information shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis scoped as outlined in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
(k) Personnel occupying computer positions designated ADP-1. All DoD military, civilians, consultants, and contractor personnel occupying computer positions designated ADP-I, shall be the subject of a PR conducted on a 5-year recurring basis as set forth in paragraph 5, Appendix A.
§ 154.20
Authority to waive investigative requirements.
Authorized officials. Only an official designated in paragraph G, Appendix E, is empowered to waive the investigative requirements for appointment to a sensitive position, assignment to sensitive duties or access to classified information pending completion of the investigation required by this section. Such waiver shall be based upon certification in writing by the designated official that such action is necessary to the accomplishment of a DoD mission. A minor investigative element that has not been met should not preclude favorable.

Subpart D—Reciprocal Acceptance of Prior Investigations and Personnel Security Determinations
§ 154.23
General.
Previously conducted investigations and previously rendered personnel security determinations shall be accepted within DoD in accordance with the policy set forth below.
§ 154.24
Prior investigations conducted by DoD investigative organizations.
As long as there is no break in military service/civilian employment greater than 12 months, any previous personnel security investigation conducted by DoD investigative organizations that essentially is equivalent in scope to an investigation required by this part will be accepted without requesting additional investigation. There is no time limitation as to the acceptability of such investigations, subject to the provisions of §§ 154.8(h) and 154.25(b) of this part.
§ 154.25
Prior personnel security determinations made by DoD authorities.
(a) Adjudicative determinations for appointment in sensitive positions, assignment to sensitive duties or access to classified information (including those pertaining to SCI) made by designated DoD authorities will be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all DoD Components without requiring additional investigation, unless there has been a break in the individual's military service/civilian employment of greater than 12 months or unless derogatory information that occurred subsequent to the last prior security determination becomes known. A check of the DCII should be conducted to accomplish this task.
(b) Whenever a valid DoD security clearance or Special Access authorization (including one pertaining to SCI) is on record, Components shall not request DIS or other DoD investigative organizations to forward prior investigative files for review unless:
(1) Significant derogatory information or investigation completed subsequent to the date of last clearance or Special Access authorization, is known to the requester; or
(2) The individual concerned is being considered for a higher level clearance (e.g., Secret or Top Secret) or the individual does not have a Special Access authorization and is being considered for one; or
(3) There has been a break in the individual's military service/civilian employment of greater than 12 months subsequent to the issuance of a prior clearance.
(4) The most recent SCI access authorization of the individual concerned was based on a waiver.
(c) Requests for prior investigative files authorized by this part shall be made in writing, shall cite the specific justification for the request (i.e., upgrade of clearance, issue Special Access authorization, etc.), and shall include the date, level, and issuing organization of the individual's current or most recent security clearance or Special Access authorization.
(d) All requests for non-DoD investigative files, authorized under the criteria prescribed by paragraphs (a), (b) (1), (2), (3), and (4) and (c) of this section shall be:
(1) Submitted on DD Form 398-2 to DIS;
(2) Annotated as a “Single Agency Check” of whichever agency or agency developed the investigative file or to obtain the check of a single national agency.
(e) When further investigation is desired, in addition to an existing non-DoD investigative file, a DD Form 1879 will be submitted to DIS with the appropriate security forms attached. The submission of a Single Agency Check via DD Form 398-2 will be used to obtain an existing investigative file or check a single national agency.
(f) Whenever a civilian or military member transfers from one DoD activity to another, the losing organization's security office is responsible for advising the gaining organization of any pending action to suspend, deny or revoke the individual's security clearance as well as any adverse information that may exist in security, personnel or other files. In such instances the clearance shall not be reissued until the questionable information has been adjudicated.
§ 154.26
Investigations conducted and clearances granted by other agencies of the Federal government.
(a) Whenever a prior investigation or personnel security determination (including clearance for access to information classified under E.O. 12356 of another agency of the Federal Government meets the investigative scope and standards of this part, such investigation or clearance may be accepted for the investigative or clearance purposes of this part, provided that the employment with the Federal agency concerned has been continuous and there has been no break longer than 12 months since completion of the prior investigation, and further provided that inquiry with the agency discloses no reason why the clearance should not be accepted. If it is determined that the prior investigation does not meet the provisions of this paragraph, supplemental investigation shall be requested.
(b) A NACI conducted by OPM shall be accepted and considered equivalent to a DNACI for the purposes of this part.
(c) Department of Defense policy on reciprocal acceptance of clearances with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of Energy is set forth in DoD Directive 5210.2.^1
^1 See footnote l to § 154.2(c).

Subpart E—Requesting Personnel Security Investigations
§ 154.30
General.
Requests for personnel security investigations shall be limited to those required to accomplish the Defense mission. Such requests shall be submitted only by the authorities designated in § 154.31. These authorities shall be held responsible for determining if persons under their jurisdiction require a personnel security investigation. Proper planning must be effected to ensure that investigative requests are submitted sufficiently in advance to allow completion of the investigation before the time it is needed to grant the required clearance or otherwise make the necessary personnel security determination.
§ 154.31
Authorized requesters.
Requests for personnel security investigation shall be accepted only from the requesters designated below:
(a) Military Departments. (1) Army.
(i) Central Clearance Facility.
(ii) All activity commanders.
(iii) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
(2) Navy (including Marine Corps).
(i) Central Adjudicative Facility.
(ii) Commanders and commanding officers of organizations listed on the Standard Navy Distribution List.
(iii) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
(3) Air Force.
(i) Air Force Security Clearance Office.
(ii) Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.
(iii) All activity commanders.
(iv) Chiefs of recruiting stations.
(b) Defense Agencies—Directors of Security and activity commanders.
(c) Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—Chief, Security Division.
(d) Office of the Secretary of Defense—Director for Personnel and Security, Washington Headquarters Services.
(e) Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands or their designees.
(f) Such other requesters approved by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
§ 154.32
Criteria for requesting investigations.
Authorized requesters shall use the tables set forth in Appendix C to determine the type of investigation that shall be requested to meet the investigative requirement of the specific position or duty concerned.
§ 154.33
Request procedures.
To insure efficient and effective completion of required investigations, all requests for personnel security investigations shall be prepared and forwarded in accordance with Appendix B and the investigative jurisdictional policies set forth in § 154.9.
§ 154.34
Priority requests.
To insure that personnel security investigations are conducted in an orderly and efficient manner, requests for priority for individual investigations or categories of investigations shall be kept to a minimum. DIS shall not assign priority to any personnel security investigation or categories of investigations without written approval of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
§ 154.35
Personal data provided by the subject of the investigation.
(a) To conduct the required investigation, it is necessary that the investigative agency be provided certain relevant data concerning the subject of the investigation. The Privacy Act of 1974 requires that, to the greatest extent practicable, personal information shall be obtained directly from the subject individual when the information may result in adverse determinations affecting an individual's rights, benefits, and privileges under Federal programs.
(b) Accordingly, it is incumbent upon the subject of each personnel security investigation to provide the personal information required by this part. At a minimum, the individual shall complete the appropriate investigative forms, provide fingerprints of a quality acceptable to the FBI, and execute a signed release, as necessary, authorizing custodians of police, credit, education, employment, and medical and similar records, to provide relevant record information to the investigative agency. When the FBI returns a fingerprint card indicating that the quality of the fingerprints is not acceptable, an additional set of fingerprints will be obtained from the subject. In the event the FBI indicates that the additional fingerprints are also unacceptable, no further attempt to obtain more fingerprints need be made; this aspect of the investigation will then be processed on the basis of the name check of the FBI files. As an exception, a minimum of three attempts will be made for all Presidential Support cases, for SCI access nominations if the requester so indicates, and in those cases in which more than minor derogatory information exists. Each subject of a personnel security investigation conducted under the provisions of this part shall be furnished a Privacy Act Statement advising of the authority for obtaining the personal data, the principal purpose(s) for obtaining it, the routine uses, whether disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, the effect on the individual if it is not provided, and that subsequent use of the data may be employed as part of an aperiodic review process to evaluate continued eligibility for access to classified information.
(c) Failure to respond within the time limit prescribed by the requesting organization with the required security forms or refusal to provide or permit access to the relevant information required by this part shall result in termination of the individual's security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties utilizing the procedures of § 154.59 or further administrative processing of the investigative request.

Subpart F—Adjudication
§ 154.40
General.
(a) The standard which must be met for clearance or assignment to sensitive duties is that, based on all available information, the person's loyalty, reliability, and trustworthiness are such that entrusting the person with classified information or assigning the person to sensitive duties is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b) The principal objective of the DoD personnel security adjudicative function, consequently, is to assure selection of persons for sensitive positions who meet this standard. The adjudication process involves the effort to assess the probability of future behavior which could have an effect adverse to the national security. Since few, if any, situations allow for positive, conclusive evidence of certain future conduct, it is an attempt to judge whether the circumstances of a particular case, taking into consideration prior experience with similar cases, reasonably suggest a degree of probability of prejudicial behavior not consistent with the national security. It is invariably a subjective determination, considering the past but necessarily anticipating the future. Rarely is proof of trustworthiness and reliability or untrustworthiness and unreliability beyond all reasonable doubt.
(c) Establishing relevancy is one of the key objectives of the personnel security adjudicative process in evaluating investigative material. It involves neither the judgment of criminal guilt nor the determination of general suitability for a given position; rather, it is the assessment of a person's trustworthiness and fitness for a responsibility which could, if abused, have unacceptable consequences for the national security.
(d) While equity demands optimal uniformity in evaluating individual cases, assuring fair and consistent assessment of circumstances from one situation to the next, each case must be weighed on its own merits, taking into consideration all relevant facts, and prior experience in similar cases. All information of record, both favorable and unfavorable, must be considered and assessed in terms of accuracy, completeness, relevance, seriousness, and overall significance. In all adjudications the protection of the national security shall be the paramount determinant.
§ 154.41
Central adjudication.
(a) To ensure uniform application of the requirement of this part and to ensure that DoD personnel security determinations are effected consistent with existing statutes and Executive orders, the head of each Military Department and Defense Agencies shall establish a single Central Adjudication Facility for his/her component. The function of such facility shall be limited to evaluating personnel security investigations and making personnel security determinations. The chief of each Central Adjudication Facility shall have the authority to act on behalf of the head of the Component concerned with respect to personnel security determinations. All information relevant to determining whether a person meets the appropriate personnel security standard prescribed by this part shall be reviewed and evaluated by personnel security specialists specifically designated by the head of the Component concerned, or designee.
(b) In view of the significance each adjudicative decision can have on a person's career and to ensure the maximum degree of fairness and equity in such actions, a minimum level of review shall be required for all clearance/access determinations related to the following categories of investigations:
(1) BI/SBI/PR/ENAC/SII:
(i) Favorable: Completely favorable investigations shall be reviewed and approved by an adjudicative official in the civilian grade of GS-7/9 or the military rank of O-3.
(ii) Unfavorable: Investigations that are not completely favorable shall undergo at least two levels of review by adjudicative officials, the second of which must be at the civilian grade of GS-11/12 or the military rank of O-4. When an unfavorable administrative action is contemplated under § 154.56(b), the letter of intent (LOI) to deny or revoke must be approved and signed by an adjudicative official at the civilian grade of GS-13/14 or the military rank of O-5. A final notification of unfavorable administrative action, subsequent to the issuance of the LOI, must be approved and signed at the civilian grade of GS-14/15 or the military rank of O-6.
(2) NACI/DNACI/NAC/ENTNAC:
(i) Favorable: A completely favorable investigation may be finally adjudicated after one level of review provided that the decisionmaking authority is at the civilian grade of GS-5/7 or the military rank of 0-2.
(ii) Unfavorable: Investigations that are not completely favorable must be reviewed by an adjudicative official in the civilian grade of GS-7/9 or the military rank of 0-3. When an unfavorable administrative action is contemplated under § 154.56(b), the letter of intent to deny/revoke must be signed by an adjudicative official at the civilian grade of GS-11/12 or the military rank of 0-4. A final notification of unfavorable administrative action subsequent to the issuance of the LOI must be signed by an adjudicative official at the civilian grade of GS-13 or the military rank of 0-5 or above.
(c) Exceptions to the above policy may only be granted by the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
§ 154.42
Evaluation of personnel security information.
(a) The criteria and adjudicative policy to be used in applying the principles at § 154.40 are set forth in § 154.7(a) and Appendix H of this part. The ultimate consideration in making a favorable personnel security determination is whether such determination is clearly consistent with the interests of national security and shall be an overall common sense evaluation based on all available information. Such a determination shall include consideration of the following factors:
(1) The nature and seriousness of the conduct;
(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct;
(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
(4) The age of the individual;
(5) The voluntariness of participation; and
(6) The absence or presence of rehabilitation.
(b) Detailed adjudication policy guidance to assist adjudicators in determining whether a person is eligible for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties is contained in Appendix H. Adjudication policy for access to SCI is contained in DCID 1/14.
§ 154.43
Adjudicative record.
(a) Each adjudicative determinations, whether favorable or unfavorable, shall be entered into the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII) on a daily basis, but in no case to exceed 5 working days from the date of determination.
(b) The rationale underlying each unfavorable personnel security determination, to include the appeal process, and each favorable personnel security determination where the investigation or information upon which the determination was made included significant derogatory information of the type set forth in § 154.7 and appendix H to part 154, shall be maintained in written or automated form and is subject to the provisions of 32 CFR part 285 and 32 CFR part 310. This information shall be maintained for a minimum of 5 years from the date of determination.
[58 FR 61025, Nov. 19, 1993]

Subpart G—Issuing Clearance and Granting Access
§ 154.47
General.
(a) The issuance of a personnel security clearance (as well as the function of determining that an individual is eligible for access to Special Access program information, or is suitable for assignment to sensitive duties or such other duties that require a trustworthiness determination) is a function distinct from that involving the granting of access to classified information. Clearance determinations are made on the merits of the individual case with respect to the subject's suitability for security clearance. Access determinations are made solely on the basis of the individual's need for access to classified information in order to perform official duties. Except for suspension of access pending final adjudication of a personnel security clearance, access may not be finally denied for cause without applying the provisions of § 154.56(b).
(b) Only the authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E are authorized to grant, deny or revoke personnel security clearances or Special Access authorizations (other than SCI). Any commander or head of an organization may suspend access for cause when there exists information raising a serious question as to the individual's ability or intent to protect classified information, provided that the procedures set forth in § 154.55(b) of this part are complied.
(c) All commanders and heads of DoD organizations have the responsibility for determining those position functions in their jurisdiction that require access to classified information and the authority to grant access to incumbents of such positions who have been cleared under the provisions of this part.
§ 154.48
Issuing clearance.
(a) Authorities designated in paragraph A, Appendix E shall record the issuance, denial or revocation of a personnel security clearance in the DCII (see § 154.43). A record of the clearance issued shall also be recorded in an individual's personnel/security file or official personnel folder, as appropriate.
(b) A personnel security clearance remains valid until the individual is separated from the Armed Forces, separated from DoD civilian employment, has no further official relationship with DoD, official action has been taken to deny, revoke or suspend the clearance or access, or regular access to the level of classified information for which the individual holds a clearance is no longer necessary in the normal course of his or her duties. If an individual resumes his or her affiliation with DoD no single break in the individual's relationship with DoD exists greater than 24 months and/or, the need for regular access to classified information at or below the previous level recurs, and no record of an unfavorable administrative action exists, the appropriate clearance shall be reissued without further investigation or adjudication provided there has been no additional investigation or development of derogatory information.
(c) Personnel security clearances of DoD military personnel shall be granted denied or revoked only by the designated authority of the parent Military Department. Issuance, reissuance, denial, or revocation of a personnel security clearance by any DoD Component concerning personnel who have been determined to be eligible for clearance by another component is expressly prohibited. Investigations conducted on Army, Navy, and Air Force personnel by DIS will be returned only to the parent service of the subject for adjudication regardless of the source of the original request. The adjudicative authority will be responsible for expeditiously transmitting the results of the clearance determination. As an exception, the employing DoD Component may issue an interim clearance to personnel under their administrative jurisdiction pending a final eligibility determination by the individual's parent Component. Whenever an employing DoD Component issues an interim clearance to an individual from another Component, written notice of the action shall be provided to the parent Component.
(d) When a Defense agency, to include Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, initiates an SBI (or PR) for access to SCI on a military member, DIS will return the completed investigation to the appropriate Military Department adjudicative authority in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section for issuance (or reissuance) of the Top Secret clearance. Following the issuance of the security clearance, the military adjudicative authority will forward the investigative file to the Defense agency identified in the “Return Results To” block of the DD Form 1879. The receiving agency will then forward the completed SBI on to DIA for the SCI adjudication in accordance with DCID 1/14.
(e) The interim clearance shall be recorded in the DCSI (§ 154.43) by the parent DoD Component in the same manner as a final clearance.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61025, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.49
Granting access.
(a) Access to classified information shall be granted to persons whose official duties require such access and who have the appropriate personnel security clearance. Access determinations (other than for Special Access programs) are not an adjudicative function relating to an individual's suitability for such access. Rather they are decisions made by the commander that access is officially required.
(b) In the absence of derogatory information on the individual concerned, DoD commanders and organizational managers shall accept a personnel security clearance determination, issued by any DoD authority authorized by this part to issue personnel security clearances, as the basis for granting access, when access is required, without requesting additional investigation or investigative files.
(c) The access level of cleared individuals will, wherever possible, be entered into the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII), along with clearance eligibility. However, completion of the DCII Access field is required effective October 1, 1993 in all instances where the adjudicator with a personnel security investigation. Agencies are encouraged to start completing this field as soon as possible.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61025, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.50
Administrative withdrawal.
As set forth in § 154.48 the personnel security clearance and access eligibility must be withdrawn when the events described therein occur. When regular access to a prescribed level of classified information is no longer required in the normal course of an individual's duties, the previously authorized access eligibility level must be administratively downgraded or withdrawn, as appropriate.

Subpart H—Unfavorable Administrative Actions
§ 154.55
Requirements.
(a) General. For purposes of this part, an unfavorable administrative action includes any adverse action which is taken as a result of a personnel security determination, as defined at § 154.3 and any unfavorable personnel security determination, as defined at § 154.3. This subpart is intended only to provide guidance for the internal operation of the Department of Defense and is not intended to, does not, and may not be relied upon, to create or enlarge the jurisdiction or review authority of any court or administrative tribunal, including the Merit Systems Protection Board.
(b) Referral for action. (1) Whenever derogatory information relating to the criteria and policy set forth in § 154.7(a) and Appendix H of this part is developed or otherwise becomes available to any DoD element, it shall be referred by the most expeditious means to the commander or the security officer of the organization to which the individual is assigned for duty. The commander or security officer of the organization to which the subject of the information is assigned shall review the information in terms of its security significance and completeness. If further information is needed to confirm or disprove the allegations, additional investigation should be requested. The commander of the duty organization shall insure that the parent Component of the individual concerned is informed promptly concerning the derogatory information developed and any actions taken or anticipated with respect thereto. However, referral of derogatory information to the commander or security officer shall in no way affect or limit the responsibility of the central adjudication facility to continue to process the individual for denial or revocation of clearance or access to classified information, in accordance with § 154.56(b), if such action is warranted and supportable by the criteria and policy contained in § 154.7(a) and Appendix H. No unfavorable administrative action as defined in § 154.3 may be taken by the organization to which the individual is assigned for duty without affording the person the full range of protections contained in § 154.56(b) or, in the case of SCI, Annex B, DCID 1/14.
(2) The Director DIS shall establish appropriate alternative means whereby information with potentially serious security significance can be reported other than through DoD command or industrial organization channels. Such access shall include utilization of the DoD Inspector General “hotline” to receive such reports for appropriate follow-up by DIS. DoD Components and industry will assist DIS in publicizing the availability of appropriate reporting channels. Additionally, DoD Components will augment the system when and where necessary. Heads of DoD Components will be notified immediately to take action if appropriate.
(c) Suspension.
(1) The commander or head of the organization shall determine whether, on the basis of all facts available upon receipt of the initial derogatory information, it is in the interests of national security to continue subject's security status unchanged or to take interim action to suspend subject's access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination), if information exists which raises serious questions as to the individual's ability to intent to protect classified information or execute sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination) until a final determination is made by the appropriate authority designated in appendix F to this part.
(2) Whenever a determination is made to suspend a security clearance for access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination), the individual concerned must be notified of the determination in writing by the commander, or head of the component or adjudicative authority, to include a brief statement of the reason(s) for the suspension action consistent with the interests of national security.
(3) Component field elements must promptly report all suspension actions to the appropriate central adjudicative authority, but not later than 10 working days from the date of the suspension action. The adjudicative authority will immediately update the DCII Eligibility and Access fields to alert all users to the individual's changed status.
(4) Every effect shall be made to resolve suspension cases as expeditiously as circumstances permit. Suspension cases exceeding 180 days shall be closely monitored and managed by the DoD Component concerned until finally resolved. Suspension cases pending in excess of 12 months will be reported to the DASD(CI&SCM) for review and appropriate action.
(5) A final security clearance eligibility determination shall be made for all suspension actions and the determination entered in the DCII. If, however, the individual under suspension leaves the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense and no longer requires a clearance (or trustworthiness determination), entry of the “Z” Code (adjudication action incomplete due to loss of jurisdiction) if the clearance eligibility field is appropriate. In no case shall a “suspension” code (Code Y) remain as a permanent record in the DCII.
(6) A clearance or access entry in the DCII shall not be suspended or downgraded based solely on the fact that a periodic reinvestigation was not conducted precisely within the 5 year time period for TOP SECRET/SCI or within the period prevailing for SECRET clearances under departmental policy. While every effort should be made to ensure that PRs are conducted within the prescribed time frame, agencies must be flexible in their administration of this aspect of the personnel security program so as not to undermine the ability of the Department of Defense to accomplish its mission.
(d) Final unfavorable administrative actions. The authority to make personnel security determinations that will result in an unfavorable administrative action is limited to those authorities designated in Appendix E, except that the authority to terminate the employment of a civilian employee of a military department or Defense agency is vested solely in the head of the DoD component concerned and in such other statutory official as may be designated. Action to terminate civilian employees of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DoD Components, on the basis of criteria listed in § 154.7 (a) through (f), shall be coordinated with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prior to final action by the head of the DoD Component. DoD civilian employees or members of the Armed Forces shall not be removed from employment or separated from the Service under provisions of this part if removal or separation can be effected under OPM regulations or administrative (nonsecurity) regulations of the military departments. However, actions contemplated in this regard shall not affect or limit the responsibility of the central adjudication facility to continue for process the individual for denial or revocation of a security clearance, access to classified information on or assignment to a sensitive position if warranted and supportable by the criteria and standards contained in this part.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61025, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.56
Procedures.
(a) General. No final personnel security determination shall be made on a member of the Armed Forces, an employee of the Department of Defense, a consultant to the Department of Defense, or any other person affiliated with the Department of Defense without granting the individual concerned the procedural benefits set forth in paragraph (b) of this section when such determination results in an unfavorable administrative action (see § 154.55(a)). As an exception, Red Cross/United Service Organizations employees shall be afforded the procedures prescribed by 32 CFR part 253.
(b) Unfavorable administrative action procedures. Except as provided for below, no unfavorable administrative action shall be taken under the authority of this part unless the person concerned has been given:
(1) A written statement of the reasons why the unfavorable administrative action is being taken. The statement shall be as comprehensive and detailed as the protection of sources afforded confidentiality under the provisions of the Privacy Act of 1974 (5 U.S.C. 552a) and national security permit. The statement will also provide the name and address of the agencies (agencies) to which the individual may write to obtain a copy of the investigative file(s) upon which the unfavorable administrative action is being taken. Prior to issuing a statement of reasons to a civilian employee for suspension or removal action, the issuing authority must comply with the provisions of Federal Personnel Manual, chapter 732, subchapter 1, paragraph 1-6b. The signature authority must be as provided for in § 154.41(b) (1)(ii) and (2)(ii).
(2) An opportunity to reply in writing to such authority as the head of the Component concerned may designate;
(3) A written response to any submission under subparagraph b. stating the final reasons therefor, which shall be as specific as privacy and national security considerations permit. The signature authority must be as provided for in § 154.41(b) (1)(ii) and (2)(ii). Such response shall be as prompt as individual circumstances permit, not to exceed 60 days from the date of receipt of the appeal submitted under paragraph (b)(2) of this section provided no additional investigative action is necessary. If a final response cannot be completed within the time frame allowed, the subject must be notified in writing of this fact, the reasons therefor, and the date a final response is expected, which shall not, in any case, exceed a total of 90 days from the date of receipt of the appeal under paragraph (b) of this section.
(4) An opportunity to appeal to a higher level of authority designated by the Component concerned.
(c) Exceptions to policy. Notwithstanding paragraph (b) of this section or any other provision of this part, nothing in this part shall be deemed to limit or affect the responsibility and powers of the Secretary of Defense to find that a person is unsuitable for entrance or retention in the Armed Forces, or is ineligible for a security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties, if the national security so requires, pursuant to section 7532, title 5, U.S. Code. Such authority may not be delegated and may be exercised only when it is determined that the procedures prescribed in paragraph (b) of this section are not appropriate. Such determination shall be conclusive.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61025, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.57
Reinstatement of civilian employees.
(a) General. Any person whose civilian employment in the Department of Defense is terminated under the provisions of this part shall not be reinstated or restored to duty or reemployed in the Department of Defense unless the Secretary of Defense, or the head of a DoD Component, finds that such reinstatement, restoration, or reemployment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security. Such a finding shall be made a part of the personnel security record.
(b) Reinstatement benefits. A DoD civilian employee whose employment has been suspended or terminated under the provisions of this part and who is reinstated or restored to duty under the provisions of section 3571 of title 5 U.S. Code is entitled to benefits as provided for by section 3 of Pub. L. 89-380.

Subpart I—Continuing Security Responsibilities
§ 154.60
Evaluating continued security eligibility.
(a) General. A personnel security determination is an effort to assess the future trustworthiness of an individual in terms of the likelihood of the individual preserving the national security. Obviously it is not possible at a given point to establish with certainty that any human being will remain trustworthy. Accordingly the issuance of a personnel security clearance or the determination that a person is suitable for assignment to sensitive duties cannot be considered as a final personnel security action. Rather, there is the clear need to assure that, after the personnel security determination is reached, the individual's trustworthiness is a matter of continuing assessment. The responsibility for such assessment must be shared by the organizational commander or manager, the individual's supervisor and, to a large degree, the individual himself. Therefore, the heads of DoD Components shall establish and maintain a program designed to evaluate on a continuing basis the status of personnel under their jurisdiction with respect to security eligibility. This program should insure close coordination between security authorities and personnel, medical, legal and supervisory personnel to assure that all pertinent information available within a command is considered in the personnel security process.
(b) Management responsibility. (1) Commanders and heads of organizations shall insure that personnel assigned to sensitive duties (or other duties requiring a trustworthiness determination under the provisions of this part) are initially indoctrinated and periodically instructed thereafter on the national security implication of their duties and on their individual responsibilities.
(2) The heads of all DoD components are encouraged to develop programs designed to counsel and assist employees in sensitive positions who are experiencing problems in their personal lives with respect to such areas as financial, medical or emotional difficulties. Such initiatives should be designed to identify potential problem areas at an early stage so that any assistance rendered by the employing activity will have a reasonable chance of precluding long term, job-related security problems.
(c) Supervisory responsibility. Security programs shall be established to insure that supervisory personnel are familiarized with their special responsibilities in matters pertaining to personnel security with respect to personnel under their supervision. Such programs shall provide practical guidance as to indicators that may signal matters of personnel security concern. Specific instructions should be disseminated concerning reporting procedures to enable the appropriate authority to take timely corrective action to protect the interests of national security as well as to provide any necessary help to the individual concerned to correct any personal problem which may have a bearing upon the individual's continued eligibility for access.
(1) In conjunction with the submission of PRs stated in § 154.19, and paragraph 5, Appendix A, supervisors will be required to review an individual's DD Form 398 to ensure that no significant adverse information of which they are aware and that may have a bearing on subject's continued eligibility for access to classified information is omitted.
(2) If the supervisor is not aware of any significant adverse information that may have a bearing on the subject's continued eligibility for access, then the following statement must be documented, signed and dated, and forwarded to DIS with the investigative package.
I am aware of no information of the type contained at Appendix D, 32 CFR part 154, relating to subject's trustworthiness, reliability, or loyalty that may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information.
(3) If the supervisor is aware of such significant adverse information, the following statement shall be documented, signed and dated and forwarded to DIS with the investigative package, and a written summary of the derogatory information forwarded to DIS with the investigative package:
I am aware of information of the type contained in Appendix D, 32 CFR part 154, relating to subject's trustworthiness, reliability, or loyalty that may reflect adversely on his/her ability to safeguard classified information and have reported all relevant details to the appropriate security official(s).
(4) In conjunction with regularly scheduled fitness and performance reports of military and civilian personnel whose duties entail access to classified information, supervisors will include a comment in accordance with paragraphs (c) (2) and (3) of this section as well as a comment regarding an employee's discharge of security responsibilities, pursuant to their Component guidance.
(d) Individual responsibility. (1) Individuals must familiarize themselves with pertinent security regulations that pertain to their assigned duties. Further, individuals must be aware of the standards of conduct required of persons holding positions of trust. In this connection, individuals must recognize and avoid the kind of personal behavior that would result in rendering one ineligible for continued assignment in a position of trust. In the final analysis, the ultimate responsibility for maintaining continued eligibility for a position of trust rests with the individual.
(2) Moreover, individuals having access to classified information must report promptly to their security office:
(i) Any form of contact, intentional or otherwise, with individuals of any nationality, whether within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:
(A) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
(B) The employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of exploitation by a foreign entity.
(ii) Any information of the type referred to in § 154.7 or appendix H to this part.
(e) Co-worker responsibility. Co-workers have an equal obligation to advise their supervisor or appropriate security official when they become aware of information with potentially serious security significance regarding someone with access to classified information or employed in a sensitive position.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61025, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.61
Security education.
(a) General. The effectiveness of an individual in meeting security responsibilities is proportional to the degree to which the individual understands them. Thus, an integral part of the DoD security program is the indoctrination of individuals on their security responsibilities. Moreover, such indoctrination is essential to the efficient functioning of the DoD personnel security program. Accordingly, heads of DoD Components shall establish procedures in accordance with this chapter whereby persons requiring access to classified information, or being assigned to positions that require the occupants to be determined trustworthy are periodically briefed as to their security responsibilities.
(b) Initial briefing. (1) All persons cleared for access to classified information or assigned to duties requiring a trustworthiness determination under this part shall be given an initial security briefing. The briefing shall be in accordance with the requirements of 32 CFR part 159 and consist of the following elements:
(i) The specific security requirements of their particular job.
(ii) The techniques employed by foreign intelligence activities in attempting to obtain classified information and their responsibility for reporting such attempts.
(iii) The prohibition against disclosing classified information, by any means, to unauthorized persons or discussing or handling classified information in a manner that would make it accessible to unauthorized persons.
(iv) The penalties that may be imposed for security violations.
(2) If an individual declines to execute Standard Form 312, “Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement” (replaced the Standard Form 189), the DoD Component shall initiate action to deny or revoke the security clearance of such person in accordance with § 154.56(b).
(c) Refresher briefing. Programs shall be established to provide, at a minimum, annual security training for personnel having continued access to classified information. The elements outlined in 32 CFR part 159 shall be tailored to fit the needs of experienced personnel.
(d) Foreign travel briefing. While world events during the past several years have diminished the threat to our national security from traditional cold-war era foreign intelligence services, foreign intelligence service continue to pursue the unauthorized acquisition of classified or otherwise sensitive U.S. Government information, through the recruitment of U.S. Government employees with access to such information. Through security briefings and education, the Department of Defense continues to provide for the protection of information and technology considered vital to the national security interests from illegal or unauthorized acquisition by foreign intelligence services.
(1) DoD Components will establish appropriate internal procedures requiring all personnel possessing a DoD security clearance to report to their security office all contacts with individuals of any nationality, whether within or outside the scope of the employee's official activities, in which:
(i) Illegal or unauthorized access is sought to classified or otherwise sensitive information.
(ii) The employee is concerned that he or she may be the target of exploitation by a foreign entity.
(2) The DoD security manager, security specialist or other qualified individual will review and evaluate the reported information. Any facts or circumstances of a reported contact with a foreign national that appear to:
(i) Indicate an attempt or intention to obtain unauthorized access to proprietary, sensitive, or classified information or technology;
(ii) Offer a reasonable potential for such; or
(iii) Indicate the possibility of continued contact with the foreign national for such purposes, shall be promptly reported to the appropriate counterintelligence agency.
(e) Termination briefing. (1) Upon termination of employment administrative withdrawal of security clearance, or contemplated absence from duty or employment for 60 days or more, DoD military personnel and civilian employees shall be given a termination briefing, return all classified material, and execute a Security Termination Statement. This statement shall include:
(i) An acknowledgment that the individual has read the appropriate provisions of the Espionage Act, other criminal statutes, DoD Regulations applicable to the safeguarding of classified information to which the individual has had access, and understands the implications thereof;
(ii) A declaration that the individual no longer has any documents or material containing classified information in his or her possession;
(iii) An acknowledgment that the individual will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or agency; and
(iv) An acknowledgment that the individual will report without delay to the FBI or the DoD Component concerned any attempt by any unauthorized person to solicit classified information.
(2) When an individual refuses to execute a Security Termination Statement, that fact shall be reported immediately to the security manager of the cognizant organization concerned. In any such case, the individual involved shall be debriefed orally. The fact of a refusal to sign a Security Termination Statement shall be reported to the Director, Defense Investigative Service who shall ensure that it is recorded in the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index.
(3) The Security Termination Statement shall be retained by the DoD Component that authorized the individual access to classified information for the period specified in the Component's records retention schedules, but for a minimum of 2 years after the individual is given a termination briefing.
(4) In addition to the provisions of paragraphs (e)(1), (e)(2), and (e)(3) of this section, DoD Components shall establish a central authority to be responsible for ensuring that Security Termination Statements are executed by senior personnel (general officers, flag officers and GS-16s and above). Failure on the part of such personnel to execute a Security Termination Statement shall be reported immediately to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]

Subpart J—Safeguarding Personnel Security Investigative Records
§ 154.65
General.
In recognition of the sensitivity of personnel security reports and records, particularly with regard to individual privacy, it is Department of Defense policy that such personal information shall be handled with the highest degree of discretion. Access to such information shall be afforded only for the purpose cited herein and to persons whose official duties require such information. Personnel security investigative reports may be used only for the purposes of determining eligibility of DoD military and civilian personnel, contractor employees, and other persons affiliated with the Department of Defense, for access to classified information, assignment or retention in sensitive duties or other specifically designated duties requiring such investigation, or for law enforcement and counterintelligence investigations. Other uses are subject to the specific written authorization of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
§ 154.66
Responsibilities.
DoD authorities responsible for administering the DoD personnel security program and all DoD personnel authorized access to personnel security reports and records shall ensure that the use of such information is limited to that authorized by this part and that such reports and records are safeguarded as prescribed herein. The heads of DoD Components and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy for the Office of the Secretary of Defense shall establish internal controls to ensure adequate safeguarding and limit access to and use of personnel security reports and records as required by §§ 154.67 and 154.68.
§ 154.67
Access restrictions.
Access to personnel security investigative reports and personnel security clearance determination information shall be authorized only in accordance with 32 CFR parts 286 and 286a and with the following:
(a) DoD personnel security investigative reports shall be released outside of the DoD only with the specific approval of the investigative agency having authority over the control and disposition of the reports.
(b) Within DoD, access to personnel security investigative reports shall be limited to those designated DoD officials who require access in connection with specifically assigned personnel security duties, or other activities specifically identified under the provisions of § 154.65.
(c) Access by subjects of personnel security investigative reports shall be afforded in accordance with 32 CFR part 286a.
(d) Access to personnel security clearance determination information shall be made available, other than provided for in paragraph (c) of this section, through security channels, only to DoD or other officials of the Federal Government who have an official need for such information.
§ 154.68
Safeguarding procedures.
Personnel security investigative reports and personnel security determination information shall be safeguarded as follows:
(a) Authorized requesters shall control and maintain accountability of all reports of investigation received.
(b) Reproduction, in whole or in part, of personnel security investigative reports by requesters shall be restricted to the minimum number of copies required for the performance of assigned duties.
(c) Personnel security investigative reports shall be stored in a vault, safe, or steel file cabinet having at least a lockbar and an approved three-position dial-type combination padlock or in a similarly protected area/container.
(d) Reports of DoD personnel security investigations shall be sealed in double envelopes or covers when transmitted by mail or when carried by persons not authorized access to such information. The inner cover shall bear a notation substantially as follows:
TO BE OPENED ONLY BY OFFICIALS DESIGNATED TO RECEIVE REPORTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATION
(e) An individual's status with respect to a personnel security clearance or a Special Access authorization is to be protected as provided for in 32 CFR part 286.
§ 154.69
Records disposition.
(a) Personnel security investigative reports, to include OPM NACIs may be retained by DoD recipient organizations, only for the period necessary to complete the purpose for which it was originally requested. Such reports are considered to be the property of the investigating organization and are on loan to the recipient organization. All copies of such reports shall be destroyed within 90 days after completion of the required personnel security determination. Destruction shall be accomplished in the same manner as for classified information in accordance with 32 CFR part 159.
(b) DoD record repositories authorized to file personnel security investigative reports shall destroy PSI reports of a favorable or of a minor derogatory nature 15 years after the date of the last action. That is, after the completion date of the investigation or the date on which the record was last released to an authorized user—whichever is later. Personnel security investigative reports resulting in an unfavorable administrative personnel action or court-martial or other investigations of a significant nature due to information contained in the investigation shall be destroyed 25 years after the date of the last action. Files in this latter category that are determined to be of possible historical value and those of widespread public or congressional interest may be offered to the National Archives after 15 years.
(c) Personnel security investigative reports on persons who are considered for affiliation with DoD will be destroyed after 1 year if the affiliation is not completed.
§ 154.70
Foreign source information.
Information that is classified by a foreign government is exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Privacy Acts. Further, information provided by foreign governments requesting an express promise of confidentiality shall be released only in a manner that will not identify or allow unauthorized persons to identify the foreign agency concerned.

Subpart K—Program Management
§ 154.75
General.
To ensure uniform implementation of the DoD personnel security program throughout the Department, program responsibility shall be centralized at DoD Component level.
§ 154.76
Responsibilities.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C31)) shall have primary responsibility for providing guidance, oversight, development and approval for policy and procedures governing personnel security program matters within the Department:
(1) Provide program management through issuance of policy and operating guidance.
(2) Provide staff assistance to the DoD Components and defense agencies in resolving day-to-day security policy and operating problems.
(3) Conduct inspections of the DoD Components for implementation and compliance with DoD security policy and operating procedures.
(4) Provide policy, oversight, and guidance to the component adjudication functions.
(5) Approve, coordinate and oversee all DoD personnel security research initiatives and activities.
(b) The General Counsel shall ensure that the program is administered in a manner consistent with the laws; all proceedings are promptly initiated and expeditiously completed; and that the rights of individuals involved are protected, consistent with the interests of national security. The General Counsel shall also ensure that all relevant decisions of the courts and legislative initiatives of the Congress are obtained on a continuing basis and that analysis of the foregoing is accomplished and disseminated to DoD personnel security program management authorities.
(c) The Heads of the Components shall ensure that:
(1) The DoD personnel security program is administered within their area of responsibility in a manner consistent with this part.
(2) A single authority within the office of the head of the DoD Component is assigned responsibility for administering the program within the Component.
(3) Information and recommendations are provided the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C31)) and the General Counsel at their request concerning any aspect of the program.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.77
Reporting requirements.
(a) The OASD(C31) shall be provided personnel security program management data by the Defense Data Manpower Center (DMDC) by December 31 each year for the preceding fiscal year. To facilitate accurate preparation of this report, all adjudicative determinations must be entered into the DC11 by all DoD central adjudication facilities no later than the end of the fiscal year. The information required below is essential for basic personnel security program management and in responding to requests from the Secretary of Defense and Congress. The report shall cover the preceding fiscal year, broken out by clearance category, according to military (officer or enlisted), civilian or contractor status and by the central adjudication facility that took the action, using the enclosed format:
(1) Number of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances issued;
(2) Number of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances denied;
(3) Number of Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential clearances revoked;
(4) Number of SCI access determinations issued;
(5) Number of SCI access determinations denied;
(6) Number of SCI access determinations revoked; and
(7) Total number of personnel holding a clearance for Top Secret, Secret, Confidential and Sensitive Compartmented Information as of the end of the fiscal year.
(b) The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) shall provide the OASD(C3I) a quarterly report that reflects investigative cases opened and closed during the most recent quarter, by case category type, and by major requester. The information provided by DIS is essential for evaluating statistical data regarding investigative workload and the manpower required to perform personnel security investigations. Case category types include National Agency Checks (NACs); Expanded NACs; Single Scope Background Investigations (SSBIs), Periodic Reinvestigations (PRs); Secret Periodic Reinvestigations (SPRs); Post Adjudicative (PA); Special Investigative Inquiries (SIIs); and Limited Inquiries (LIs). This report shall be forwarded to OASD(C3I) within 45 days after the end of each quarter.
(c) The reporting requirement for DMDC and DIS has been assigned Report Control Symbol DD-C3I(A) 1749.
[58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
§ 154.78
Inspections.
The heads of DoD Components shall assure that personnel security program matters are included in their administrative inspection programs.
Pt. 154, App. A

Appendix A to Part 154—Investigative Scope
This appendix prescribes the scope of the various types of personnel security investigations.
1. National Agency Check (NAC). Components of a NAC. At a minimum, the first three of the described agencies (DCII, FBI/HQ, and FBI/ID) below shall be included in each complete NAC; however, a NAC may also include a check of any or all of the other described agencies, if appropriate.
a. DCII records consist of an alphabetical index of personal names and impersonal titles that appear as subjects or incidentals in investigative documents held by the criminal, counterintelligence, fraud, and personnel security investigative activities of the three military departments, DIS, Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), and the National Security Agency. DCII records will be checked on all subjects of DoD investigations.
b. FBI/HQ has on file copies of investigations conducted by the FBI. The FBI/HQ check, included in every NAC, consists of a review of files for information of a security nature and that developed during applicant-type investigations.
c. An FBI/ID check, included in every NAC (but not ENTNAC), is based upon a technical fingerprint search that consists of a classification of the subject's fingerprints and comparison with fingerprint cards submitted by law enforcement activities. If the fingerprint card is not classifiable, a “name check only” of these files is automatically conducted.
d. OPM. The files of OPM contain the results of investigations conducted by OPM under Executive Orders 9835 and 10450, those requested by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of Energy (DOE) and those requested since August 1952 to serve as a basis for “Q” clearances. Prior to that date, “Q” clearance investigations were conducted by the FBI. A “Q” clearance is granted to individuals who require access to DOE information. In order to receive a “Q” clearance, a full field background investigation must be completed on the individual requiring access in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Also on file are the results of investigations on the operation of the Merit System, violations of the Veterans Preference Act, appeals of various types, fraud and collusion in Civil Service examinations and related matters, data on all Federal employment, and an index of all BIs on civilian employees or applicants completed by agencies of the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government. The OPM files may also contain information relative to U.S. citizens who are, or who were, employed by a United Nations organization or other public international organization such as the Organization of American States. OPM records are checked on all persons who are, or who have been, civilian employees of the U.S. Government; or U.S. citizens who are, or who have been, employed by a United Nations organization or other public international organization; and on those who have been granted security clearances by the NRC or DOE.
e. Immigration and Naturalization Service (I&NS). The files of I&NS contain (or show where filed) naturalization certificates, certificates of derivative citizenship, all military certificates of naturalization, repatriation files, petitions for naturalization and declaration of intention, visitors’ visas, and records of aliens (including government officials and representatives of international organizations) admitted temporarily into the U.S. I&NS records are checked when the subject is:
(1) An alien in the U.S., or
(2) A naturalized citizen whose naturalization has not been verified, or
(3) An immigrant alien, or
(4) A U.S. citizen who receives derivative citizenship through the naturalization of one or both parents, provided that such citizenship has not been verified in a prior investigation.
f. State Department. The State Department maintains the following records:
(1) Security Division (S/D) files contain information pertinent to matters of security, violations of security, personnel investigations pertinent to that agency, and correspondence files from 1950 to date. These files are checked on all former State Department employees.
(2) Passport Division (P/D) shall be checked if subject indicates U.S. citizenship due to birth in a foreign country of American parents. This is a check of State Department Embassy files to determine if subject's birth was registered at the U.S. Embassy in the country where he was born. Verification of this registration is verification of citizenship.
g. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The files of CIA contain information on present and former employees, including members of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), applicants for employment, foreign nationals, including immigrant aliens in the U.S., and U.S. citizens traveling outside the U.S. after July 1, 1946. These files shall be checked under the following guidelines.
Investigation | Criteria for CIA Checks
NAC, DNACI or ENTNAC | Residence anywhere outside of the U.S. for a year or more since age 18 except under the auspices of the U.S. Government; and, travel, education, residence, or employment since age 18 in any designated country (Appendix G).
BI | Same as NAC, DNACI, and ENTNAC requirements plus travel, residence, employment, and education outside the U.S. for more than a continuous 3-month period during the past 5 years, or since age 18, except when under the auspices of the Government.
SBI | Same as BI requirements except the period of the investigation will cover the past 15 years, or since age 18. Also when subject's employment, education or residence has occurred overseas for a period of more than one year under the auspices of the U.S. Government, such checks will be made.
These files shall also be checked if subject has been an employee of CIA or when other sources indicate that CIA may have pertinent information.
h. Military Personnel Record Center files are maintained by separate departments of the Armed Forces, General Services Administration and the Reserve Records Centers. They consist of the Master Personnel Records of retired, separated, reserve, and active duty members of the Armed Force. These records shall be checked when the requester provides required identifying data indicating service during the last 15 years.
i. Treasury Department. The files of Treasury Department agencies (Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, and Bureau of Customs) will be checked only when available information indicates that an agency of the Treasury Department may be reasonably expected to have pertinent information.
j. The files of other agencies such as the National Guard Bureau, the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO), etc., will be checked when pertinent to the purpose for which the investigation is being conducted.
2. DoD National Agency Check plus Written Inquires (DNACI):
a. Scope: The time period covered by the DNACI is limited to the most recent five (5) years, or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter, provided that the investigation covers at least the last two (2) full years of the subject's life, although it may be extended to the period necessary to resolve any questionable or derogatory information. No investigation will be conducted prior to an individual's 16th birthday. All DNACI investigation information will be entered on the DD Form 398-2 and FD-Form 258 and forwarded to the Defense Investigative Service (paragraph D, Appendix B).
b. Components of a DNACI:
(1) NAC. This is the same as described in paragraph 1, above.
(2) Credit. (a) A credit bureau check will be conducted to cover the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands, at all locations where subject has resided (including duty stations and home ports), been employed, or attended school for 6 months (cumulative) during the past five (5) years.
(b) When information developed reflects unfavorably upon a person's current credit reputation or financial responsibility, the investigation will be expanded as necessary.
(3) Employment.—(a) Non-Federal Employment. (1) Verify, via written inquiry, all employment within the period of investigation with a duration of six (6) months or more. Current employment will be checked regardless of duration.
(2) If all previous employments have been less than 6 months long, the most recent employment, in addition to the current, will be checked in all cases.
(3) Seasonal holiday, part-time and temporary employment need not be checked unless subparagraph 2 above applies.
(b) Federal employment. All Federal employment (to include military assignments) within the period of investigation will be verified by the requester through locally available records, and a statement reflecting that such checks have been favorably accomplished will be contained in the investigative request. Those that cannot be verified in this fashion will be accomplished via written inquiry by DIS (within the 50 United States, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands).
3. Background Investigation (BI). The period of investigation for the BI is 5 years and applies to military, civilian, and contractor personnel.
a. NAC. See paragraph 1, above.
b. Local Agency Checks (LAC). Same as paragraph 4j, below, except period of coverage is five years.
c. Credit checks. Same as paragraph 4i, below.
d. SUBJECT Interview (SI). This is the principal component of a BI. In some instances an issue will arise after the primary SI and a secondary interview will be conducted. Interviews in the latter category are normally “issue” interviews that will be reported in the standard BI narrative format.
e. Employment records. Employment records will be checked at all places where employment references are interviewed with the exception of current Federal employment when the requester indicates that such employment has been verified with favorable results.
f. Employment reference coverage. A minimum of three references, either supervisors or co-workers, who have knowledge of the SUBJECT's activities in the work environment will be interviewed. At least one employment reference at the current place of employment will always be interviewed with the exception of an individual attending military basic training, or other military training schools lasting less than 90 days. However, if the SUBJECT has only been at the current employment for less than 6 months, it will be necessary to go not only to his or her current employment (for example, for one employment reference) but also to the preceding employment of at least 6 months for additional employment references. If the SUBJECT has not had prior employment of at least 6 months, interview(s) will be conducted at the most recent short-term employment in addition to the current employment.
g. Developed and Listed Character References. A minimum of three developed character references (DCR) whose combined association with the SUBJECT covers the entire period of investigation will be interviewed. If coverage cannot be obtained through the DCRs, listed character reference (LCR) will be contacted to obtain coverage.
h. Unfavorable information. Unfavorable information developed in the field will be expanded.
4. Special Background Investigation (SBI)— a. Components of an SBI. The period of investigation for an SBI is the last 15 years or since the 18th birthday, whichever is the shorter period, provided that the investigation covers at least the last 2 full years of the subject's life. No investigation will be conducted for the period prior to an individual's 16th birthday. Emphasis shall be placed on peer coverage whenever interviews are held with personal sources in making education, employment, and reference (including developed) contact.
b. NAC. In addition to conducting a NAC on the subject of the investigation, the following additional requirements apply.
(1) A DCII, FBI/ID name check only and FBI/HQ check shall be conducted on subject's current spouse or cohabitant. In addition, such other national agency checks as deemed appropriate based on information on the subject's SPH or PSQ shall be conducted.
(2) A check of FBI/HQ files on members of subject's immediate family who are aliens in the U.S. or immigrant aliens who are 18 years of age or older shall be conducted. As used throughout the part, members of subject's immediate family include the following:
(a) Current spouse.
(b) Adult children, 18 years of age or older, by birth, adoption, or marriage.
(c) Natural, adopted, foster, or stepparents.
(d) Guardians.
(e) Brothers and sisters either by birth, adoption, or remarriage of either parent.
(3) The files of CIA shall be reviewed on alien members of subject's immediate family who are 18 years of age or older, regardless of whether or not these persons reside in the U.S.
(4) I&NS files on members of subject's immediate family 18 years of age or older shall be reviewed when they are:
(a) Aliens in the U.S., or
(b) Naturalized U.S. citizens whose naturalization has not been verified in a prior investigation, or
(c) Immigrant aliens, or
(d) U.S. citizens born in a foreign country of American parent(s) or U.S. citizens who received derivative citizenship through the naturalization of one or both parents, provided that such citizenship has not been verified in a prior investigation.
c. Birth. Verify subject's date and place of birth (DPOB) through education, employment and/or other records. Verify through Bureau of Vital Statistics (BVS) records if not otherwise verified under d., below, or if a variance is developed.
d. Citizenship. Subject's citizenship status must be verified in all cases. U.S. citizens who are subjects of investigation will be required to produce documentation that will confirm their citizenship. Normally such documentation should be presented to the DoD Component concerned prior to the initiation of the request for investigation. When such documentation is not readily available, investigative action may be initiated with the understanding that the designated authority in the DoD Component will be provided with the documentation prior to the issuance of a clearance. DIS will not check the BVS for native-born U.S. citizens except as indicated in 4.c. above. In the case of foreign-born U.S. citizens, DIS will check I&NS records. The citizenship status of all foreign-born members of subject's immediate family shall be verified. Additionally, when the investigation indicates that a member of subject's immediate family has not obtained U.S. citizenship after having been eligible for a considerable period of time, an attempt should be made to determine the reason. The documents listed below are acceptable for proof of U.S. citizenship for personnel security determination purposes:
(1) A birth certificate must be presented if the individual was born in the United States. To be acceptable, the certificate must show that the birth record was filed shortly after birth and must be certified with the registrar's signature and the raised, impressed, or multicolored seal of his office except for States or jurisdictions which, as a matter of policy, do not issue certificates with a raised or impressed seal. Uncertified copies of birth certificates are not acceptable.
(a) A delayed birth certificate (a record filed more than one year after the date of birth) is acceptable provided that it shows that the report of birth was supported by acceptable secondary evidence of birth as described in subparagraph (b), below.
(b) If such primary evidence is not obtainable, a notice from the registrar stating that no birth record exists should be submitted. The notice shall be accompanied by the best combination of secondary evidence obtainable. Such evidence may include a baptismal certificate, a certificate of circumcision, a hospital birth record, affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts of the birth, or other documentary evidence such as early census, school, or family bible records, newspaper files and insurance papers. Secondary evidence should have been created as close to the time of birth as possible.
(c) All documents submitted as evidence of birth in the United States shall be original or certified documents. Uncertified copies are not acceptable.
(2) A certificate of naturalization shall be submitted if the individual claims citizenship by naturalization.
(3) A certificate of citizenship issued by the I&NS shall be submitted if citizenship was acquired by birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent or parents.
(4) A Report of Birth Abroad of A Citizen of The United States of America (Form FS-240), a Certification of Birth (Form FS-545 or DS-1350), or a Certificate of Citizenship is acceptable if citizenship was acquired by birth abroad to a U.S. citizen parent or parents.
(5) A passport or one in which the individual was included will be accepted as proof of citizenship.
e. Education. (1) Verify graduation or attendance at institutions of higher learning in the U.S. within the last 15 years, if such attendance was not verified during a prior investigation.
(2) Attempts will be made to review records at overseas educational institutions when the subject resided overseas in excess of one year.
(3) Verify attendance or graduation at the last secondary school attended within the past 10 years if there was no attendance at an institution of higher learning within the period of investigation.
(4) Verification of attendance at military academies is only required when the subject failed to graduate.
f. Employment. (1) Non-Federal employment. Verify all employment within the period of investigation to include seasonal, holiday, Christmas, part-time, and temporary employment. Interview one supervisor and one co-worker at subject's current place of employment as well as at each prior place of employment during the past 10 years of six months duration or longer. The interview requirement for supervisors and co-workers does not apply to seasonal, holiday, Christmas, part-time, and temporary employment (4 months or less) unless there are unfavorable issues to resolve or the letter of inquiry provides insufficient information.
(2) Federal employment. All Federal employment will be verified within the period of investigation to include Christmas, seasonal temporary, summer hire, part-time, and holiday employment. Do not verify Federal employment through review of records if already verified by the requester. If Federal employment has not been verified by the requester, then subject's personnel file at his/her current place of employment will be reviewed. All previous Federal employment will be verified during this review. In the case of former Federal employees, records shall be examined at the Federal Records Center in St. Louis, Missouri. Interview one supervisor and one co-worker at all places of employment during the past 10 years if so employed for 6 months or more.
(3) Military employment. Military service for the last 15 years shall be verified. The subject's duty station, for the purpose of interview coverage, is considered as a place of employment. One supervisor and one co-worker shall be interviewed at subject's current duty station if subject has been stationed there for 6 months or more; additionally, a supervisor and a co-worker at subject's prior duty stations where assigned for 6 months or more during the past 10 years shall be interviewed.
(4) Unemployment. Subject's activities during all periods of unemployment in excess of 30 consecutive days, within the period of investigation, that are not otherwise accounted for shall be verified.
(5) When an individual has resided outside the U.S. continuously for over one year, attempts will be made to confirm overseas employments as well as conduct required interviews of a supervisor and co-worker.
g. References. Three developed character references who have sufficient knowledge of subject to comment on his background, suitability, and loyalty shall be interviewed personally. Efforts shall be made to interview developed references whose combined association with subject covers the full period of the investigation with particular emphasis on the last 5 years. Employment, education, and neighborhood references, in addition to the required ones, may be used as developed references provided that they have personal knowledge concerning the individual's character, discretion, and loyalty. Listed character references will be interviewed only when developed references are not available or when it is necessary to identify and locate additional developed character references or when it is necessary to verify subject's activities (e.g., unemployment).
h. Neighborhood investigation. Conduct a neighborhood investigation to verify each of subject's residences in the U.S. of a period of 6 months or more on a cumulative basis, during the past 5 years or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter. During each neighborhood investigation, interview two neighbors who can verify subject's period of residence in that area and who were sufficiently acquainted to comment on subject's suitability for a position of trust. Neighborhood investigations will be expanded beyond this 5-year period only when there is unfavorable information to resolve in the investigation.
i. Credit. Conduct credit bureau check in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and overseas (where APO/FPO addresses are provided) at all places where subject has resided (including duty stations and home ports), been employed, or attended school for 6 months or more, on a cumulative basis, during the last 7 years or during the period of the investigation, whichever is shorter. When coverage by a credit bureau is not available, credit references located in that area will be interviewed. Financial responsibility, including unexplained affluence, will be stressed in all reference interviews.
j. Local Agency Checks (LAC's). LACs, including State central criminal history record repositories, will be conducted on subject at all places of residence to include duty stations and/or home ports, in the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, where residence occurred during the past 15 years or during the period of investigation, whichever is shorter. If subject's place of employment and/or education is serviced by a different law enforcement agency than that servicing the area of residence, LACs shall be conducted also in these areas.
k. Foreign travel. If subject has been employed, educated, traveled or resided outside of the U.S. for more than 90 days during the period of investigation, except under the auspices of the U.S. Government, additional record checks during the NAC shall be made in accordance with paragraph 1.f. of this Appendix. In addition, the following requirements apply:
(1) Foreign travel not under the auspices of the U.S. Government. When employment, education, or residence has occurred overseas for more than 90 days during the past 15 years or since age 18, which was not under the auspices of the U.S. Government, a check of records will be made at the Passport Office of the Department of State, the CIA, and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources, generally in the U.S., who knew the individual overseas to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to determine whether any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. If the individual has worked or lived outside of the U.S. continuously for over one year, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country in which the individual resided.
(2) Foreign travel under the auspices of the U.S. Government. When employment, education, or residence has occurred overseas for a period of more than one year, under the auspices of the U.S. Government, a record check will be made at the Passport Office of the Department of State, the CIA and other appropriate agencies. Efforts shall be made to develop sources (generally in the U.S.) who knew the individual overseas to cover significant employment, education, or residence and to determine whether any lasting foreign contacts or connections were established during this period. Additionally, the investigation will be expanded to cover fully this period through the use of such investigative assets and checks of record sources as may be available to the U.S. Government in the foreign country in which the individual resided.
1. Foreign connections. All foreign connections (friends, relatives, and/or business connections) of subject and immediate family in the U.S. or abroad, except where such association was the direct result of subject's official duties with the U.S. Government, shall be ascertained. Investigation shall be directed toward determining the significance of foreign connections on the part of subject and the immediate family, particularly where the association is or has been with persons whose origin was within a country whose national interests are inimical to those of the U.S. When subject or his spouse has close relatives residing in a Communist-controlled country, or subject has resided, visited, or traveled in such a country, not under U.S. Government auspices, the provisions of § 154.8(i)(3) of this part apply.
m. Organizations. Efforts will be made during reference interviews and record reviews to determine if subject and/or the immediate family has, or formerly had, membership in, affiliation with, sympathetic association towards, or participated in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group, or combination of persons of the type described in § 154.7(a) through (d) of this part.
n. Divorce. Divorces, annulments, and legal separations of subject shall be verified only when there is reason to believe that the grounds for the action could reflect on subject's suitability for a position of trust.
o. Military service. All military service and types of discharge during the last 15 years shall be verified.
p. Medical records. Medical records shall not be reviewed unless:
(1) The requester indicates that subject's medical records were unavailable for review prior to submitting the request for investigation, or
(2) The requester indicates that unfavorable information is contained in subject's medical records, or
(3) The subject lists one or more of the following on the SPH or PSQ:
(a) A history of mental or nervous disorders.
(b) That subject is now or has been addicted to the use of habit-forming drugs such as narcotics or barbiturates or is now or has been a chronic user to excess of alcoholic beverages.
q. Updating a previous investigation to SBI standards. If a previous investigation does not substantially meet the minimum standards of an SBI or if it is more than 5 years old, a current investigation is required but may be limited to that necessary to bring the individual's file up to date in accordance with the investigative requirements of an SBI. Should new information be developed during the current investigation that bears unfavorably upon the individual's activities covered by the previous investigation, the current inquiries shall be expanded as necessary to develop full details of this new information.
5. Periodic Reinvestigation (PR). a. Each DoD military, civilian, consultant and contractor employee (to include non-U.S. citizens (foreign nationals and/or immigrant aliens) holding a limited access authorization) occupying a critical sensitive position, possessing a TOP SECRET clearance, or occupying a special access program position shall be the subject of a PR initiated 5 years from the date of completion of the last investigation. The PR shall cover the period of the last 5 years.
b. Minimum investigative requirements. A PR shall include the following minimum scope.
(1) NAC. A valid NAC on the SUBJECT will be conducted in all cases. Additionally, for positions requiring SCI access, checks of DCII, FBI/HQ, FBI/ID name check only, and other agencies deemed appropriate, will be conducted on the SUBJECT's current spouse or cohabitant, if not previously conducted. Additionally, NACs will be conducted on immediate family members, 18 years of age or older, who are aliens and/or immigrant aliens, if not previously accomplished.
(2) Credit. Credit bureau checks covering all places where the SUBJECT resided for 6 months or more, on a cumulative basis, during the period of investigation, in the 50 States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico and overseas (where APO/FPO addresses are provided), will be conducted.
(3) Subject interview. The interview should cover the entire period of time since the last investigation, not just the last 5-year period. Significant information disclosed during the interview, which has been satisfactorily covered during a previous investigation, need not be explored again unless additional relevant information warrants further coverage. An SI is not required if one of the following conditions exists:
(a) The SUBJECT is aboard a deployed ship or in some remote area that would cause the interview to be excessively delayed.
(b) The SUBJECT is in an overseas location serviced by the State Department or the FBI.
(4) Employment. Current employment will be verified. Military and Federal service records will not routinely be checked, if previously checked by the requester when PR was originally submitted. Also, employment records will be checked wherever employment interviews are conducted. Records need be checked only when they are locally available, unless unfavorable information has been detected.
(5) Employment references. Two supervisors or co-workers at the most recent place of employment or duty station of 6 months; if the current employment is less than 6 months employment reference interviews will be conducted at the next prior place of employment, which was at least a 6-month duration.
(6) Developed Character References (DCRs). Two developed character references who are knowledgeable of the SUBJECT will be interviewed. Developed character references who were previously interviewed will only be reinterviewed when other developed references are not available.
(7) Local Agency Checks (LACs). DIS will conduct local agency checks on the SUBJECT at all places of residence, employment, and education during the period of investigation, regardless of duration, including overseas locations.
(8) Neighborhood Investigation. Conduct a neighborhood investigation to verify subjects’ current residence in the United States. Two neighbors who can verify subject's period of residence in that area and who are sufficiently acquainted to comment on the subject's suitability for a position of trust will be interviewed. Neighborhood investigations will be expanded beyond the current residence when unfavorable information arises.
(9) Ex-spouse interview. If the subject of investigation is divorced, the ex-spouse will be interviewed when the date of final divorce action is within the period of investigation.
(10) Select scoping. When the facts of the case warrant, additional select scoping will be accomplished, as necessary, to fully develop or resolve an issue.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
Pt. 154, App. B

Appendix B to Part 154—Request Procedures
A. General. To conserve investigative resources and to insure that personnel security investigations are limited to those essential to current operations and are clearly authorized by DoD policies, organizations requesting investigations must assure that continuing command attention is given to the investigative request process.
In this connection, it is particularly important that the provision of Executive Order 12356 requiring strict limitations on the dissemination of official information and material be closely adhered to and that investigations requested for issuing clearances are limited to those instances in which an individual has a clear need for access to classified information. Similarly, investigations required to determine eligibility for appointment or retention in DoD, in either a civilian or military capacity, must not be requested in frequency or scope exceeding that provided for in this part.
In view of the foregoing, the following guidelines have been developed to simplify and facilitate the investigative request process:
1. Limit requests for investigation to those that are essential to current operations and clearly authorized by DoD policies and attempt to utilize individuals who, under the provisions of this part, have already met the security standard;
2. Assure that military personnel on whom investigative requests are initiated will have sufficient time remaining in service after completion of the investigation to warrant conducting it;
3. Insure that request forms and prescribed documentation are properly executed in accordance with instructions;
4. Dispatch the request directly to the DIS Personnel Investigations Center;
5. Promptly notify the DIS Personnel Investigations Center if the investigation is no longer needed (notify OPM if a NACI is no longer needed); and
6. Limit access through strict need-to-know, thereby requiring fewer investigations.
In summary, close observance of the above-cited guidelines will allow the DIS to operate more efficiently and permit more effective, timely, and responsive service in accomplishing investigations.
B. National Agency Check (NAC). When a NAC is requested an original only of the DD Form 398-2 (National Agency Check Request) and a completed FD 258 (Applicant Fingerprint Card) are required. If the request is for an ENTNANC, an original only of the DD Form 398-2 and a completed DD Form 2280 (Armed Forces Fingerprint Card) are required. Those forms should be sent directly to: Personnel Investigation Center, Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 1083, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
C. National Agency Check plus written Inquiries (NACI). When a NACI is requested, an original and one copy of the SF 85 (Data for Nonsensitive or Noncritical-sensitive Position), an SF 171 (Personal Qualifications Statement), and an SF 87 (U.S. Civil Service Commission Fingerprint Chart) shall be sent directly to: Office of Personnel Management, Bureau of Personnel Investigations, NACI Center, Boyers, Pennsylvania 16018.
The notation “ALL REFERENCES” shall be stamped immediately above the title at the top of the Standard Form 85.
D. DoD National Agency Check with Inquiries (DNACI). 1. When a DNACI is requested, one copy of DD Form 1879, an original and two copies of the DD Form 398-2 (National Agency Check Request), two copies of FD 258 (Fingerprint Card), and an original of DD Form 2221 (Authority for Release of Information and Records) shall be sent directly to: Personnel Investigations Center, Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 1083, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
2. The DD Form 398-2 must be completed to cover the most recent five year period. All information, to include items relative to residences and employment, must be complete and accurate to avoid delays in processing.
E. Special Background Investigation (SBI)/Background Investigation (BI). 1. When requesting a BI or SBI, one copy of DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation), an original and four copies of DD Form 398 (Statement of Personnel History), two copies of FD 258, and an original of DD Form 2221 (Authority for Release of Information and Records) shall be sent directly to the: Personnel Investigations Center, Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 454, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
2. For the BI and SBI, the DD Form 398 must be completed to cover the most recent five and 15 year period, respectively, or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter.
F. Periodic Reinvestigation (PR). 1. PRs shall be requested only in such cases as are authorized by § 154.19 (a) through (k) of this part.
a. For a PR requested in accordance with § 154.19 (a) and (k) and the DD Form 1879 must be accompanied by the following documents:
(1) Original and four copies of DD Form 398.
(2) Two copies of FD-258.
(3) Original copy of DD Form 2221.
b. In processing PRs, previous investigative reports will not be requested by the requesting organization, unless significant derogatory or adverse information, postdating the most recent favorable adjudication, is developed during the course of reviewing other locally available records. In the latter instance, requests for previous investigative reports may only be made if it is determined by the requesting organization that the derogatory information is so significant that a review of previous investigative reports is necessary for current adjudicative determinations.
2. No abbreviated version of DD Form 398 may be submitted in connection with a PR.
3. The PR request shall be sent to the address in paragraph E.1.
G. Additional investigation to resolve derogatory or adverse information. 1. Requests for additional investigation required to resolve derogatory or adverse information shall be submitted by DD Form 1879 (Request for Personnel Security Investigation) to the: Defense Investigative Service, P.O. Box 454, Baltimore, Maryland 21203.
Such requests shall set forth the basis for the additional investigation and describe the specific matter to be substantiated or disproved.
2. The request should be accompanied by an original and four copies of the DD Form 398, where appropriate, two copies of FD-258 and an original copy of DD Form 2221, unless such documentation was submitted within the last 12 months to DIS as part of a NAC or other personnel security investigation. If pertinent, the results of a recently completed NAC, NACI, or other related investigative reports available should also accompany the request.
H. Obtaining results of prior investigations. Requesters requiring verification of a specified type of personnel security investigation, and/or requiring copies of prior investigations conducted by the DIS shall submit requests by letter or message to: Defense Investigative Service Investigative Files Division, P.O. Box 1211, Baltimore, Maryland 21203, Message Address: DIS PIC BALTIMORE MD/ /D0640.
The request will include subject's name, grade, social security number, date and place of birth, and DIS case control number if known.
I. Requesting postadjudication cases. 1. Requests pertaining to issues arising after adjudication of an investigation (postadjudication cases) shall be addressed to DIS on a DD Form 1879 accompanied by a DD Form 398, where appropriate.
2. All requests for initial investigations will be submitted to PIC regardless of their urgency. If, however, there is an urgent need for a postadjudication investigation, or the mailing of a request to PIC for initiation of a postadjudication case would prejudice timely pursuit of investigative action, the DD Form 1879 may be directed for initiation, in CONUS, to the nearest DIS Field Office, and in overseas locations, to the military investigative service element supporting the requester (Appendix I). The field element (either DIS or the military investigative agency) will subsequently forward either the DD Form 1879 or completed investigation to PIC.
3. A fully executed DD Form 1879 and appropriate supporting documents may not be immediately available. Further, a case that is based on sensitive security issues may be compromised by a request that the subject submit a DD Form 398. A brief explanation should appear on DD Form 1879s which does not include complete supporting documentation.
J. Requests involving contractor employees. To preclude duplicative investigative requests and double handling of contractor employee cases involving access to classified information, all requests for investigation of contractor personnel must be submitted, using authorized industrial security clearance forms, for processing through the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, except for programs in which specific approval has been obtained from the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to utilize other procedures.
K. Responsibility for proper documentation of requests. The official signing the request for investigation shall be responsible for insuring that all documentation is completed in accordance with these instructions.
Pt. 154, App. C
Appendix C to Part 154—Tables for Requesting Investigations
Guide for Requesting Background Investigations (BI) (Table 1)
A | B | C
If the individual is a: | And duties require: | Then a BI is required before:
U.S. national military member, civilian, consultant, or contractor employee | Top Secret clearance | Granting final clearance.
U.S. national civilian employee | Assignment to a “Critical” sensitive position | Assignment to the position.
U.S. national military member, DoD civilian or contractor employee | Occupying a “critical” position in the Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) | Occupying a “critical” position.
U.S. national military member or civilian employee | Granting, denying clearances | Performing clearance functions.
U.S. national military member or civilian employee | Membership on security screening, hearing, or review board | Appointment to the board.
Immigrant alien | Limited access to Secret or Confidential information | Issuing limited access authorization (Note 1).
| Non-U.S. national employee excluding immigrant alien | Limited access to Secret or Confidential information | Issuing limited access authorization.
Non-U.S. national nominee military education and orientation program (from a country listed at Appendix G) | Education and orientation for of military personnel | Before performing duties.
U.S. national military member DoD civilian or contractor employee | Assignment to a category two Presidential Support position | Assignment.
U.S. national military member, DoD civilian or contractor employee assigned to NATO | Access to NATO COSMIC information | Access may be granted.
Note 1: BI will cover a 10 year scope.
Guide for Requesting Special Background Investigations (SBI) (Table 2)
A | B | C
If the individual is a: | And duties require: | Then a SBI is required before:
U.S. national military member, DoD civilian, consultant, or contractor employee | Access to SCI Assisgnment to a category one Presidential Support position | Granting Access. Assignment.
| Access to SIOP-ESI | Granting access.
| Assignment to the National Security Agency | Assignment.
| Access to other Special Access programs approved under § 154.17(g) | Granting access.
| Assignment to personnel security, counterintelligence, or criminal investigative or direct investigative support duties | Assignment.
Guide for Requesting Periodic Reinvestigations (PR) (Table 3)
A | B | C
If the individual is a: | And duties require: | Then a PR is required before:
U.S. national military member, DoD civilian, consultant, or contractor employee | Access to SCI Top Secret Clearance | 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR. 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
| Access to NATO COSMIC | 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
| Assignment to Presidential Support activities | 5 years from date of last SBI/BI or PR.
U.S. national civilian employee | Assignment to a “Critical” sensitive position | 5 years from last SBI/BI or PR.
Non-U.S. national employee | Current limited access authorization to Secret or Confidential information | 5 years from last SBI/BI or PR.
Guide for Requesting DOD National Agency Check With Inquiries (DNACI) or NACI (Table 4)
A | B | C
If the individual is a: | And duties require: | Then DNACI/NACI is required
U.S. national military member or contractor | Secret clearance Interim Secret Clearance | Before granting clearance (note 1). May be automatically issued (note 2).
U.S. national civilian employee or consultant | Secret clearance Interim Secret Clearance | Before granting clearance. May be automatically issued (note 3).
| Appointment to “Non Critical” sensitive position | Before appointment.
U.S. national military member, DoD civilian or contractor employee | Occupying a “controlled” position in the Nuclear Weapon PRR | Before assignment.
| Applicant for appointment as a commissioned officer | Commission in the Award Forces | Before appointment (after appointment for health professionals, chaplains, and attorneys, under conditions authorized by § 154.15(d) of this part).
Naval Academy Midshipman, Military Academy Cadet, or Air Force Academy Cadet | Enrollment | To be initiated 90 days after entry.
Reserve Officer Training Corps Cadet of Midshipman | Entry to advanced course or College Scholarship Program | Then a DNACI is required to be initiated 90 days after entry.
Note 1: First term enlistees shall require an ENTNAC.
Note 2: Provided DD Form 398-2 is favorably reviewed, local records check favorably accomplished, and DNACI initiated.
Note 3: Provided an authority designated in Appendix E finds delay in such appointment would be harmful to national security; favorable review of DD Form 398-2; NACI initiated; favorable local records check accomplished. Table 5.
Guide for Requesting National Agency Checks (NAC) (Table 5)
A | B | C
If the individual is a: | And duties require: | Then a NAC is required:
A first-term enlistee | Retention in the Armed Forces (including National Guard and Reserve) | To be initiated NLT three work days after entry (note 1).
Prior service member reentering military service after break in Federal employment exceeding 1 year | Retention in the Armed Forces (including National Guard and Reserve) | To be initiated NLT three work days after reentry.
Nominee for military education and orientation program | Education and orientation of military personnel | Before performing duties (note 2).
U.S. national military, DoD civilian, or contractor employee | Access to restricted areas, sensitive information, or equipment as defined in § 154.18(b) | Before authorizing entry.
Nonappropriated fund instrumentality (NAFI) civilian employee | Appointment as NAFI custodian Accountability for non appropriated funds | Before appointment. Before completion of probationary period.
| Fiscal responsibility as determined by NAFI custodian | Before completion of probationary period.
| Other “positions of trust” | Before appointment.
Persons requiring access to chemical agents | Access to or security of chemical agents | Before assignment.
U.S. national, civilian employee nominee for customs inspection duties | Wavier under provisions of § 154.18(d) | Before appointment (note 3).
Red Cross/United States Organization personnel | Assignment with the Armed Forces overseas | Before assignment (See note 4 for foreign national personnel).
U.S. national | DoD building pass | Prior to issuance.
Foreign national employed overseas | No access to classified information | Prior to employment (note 4).
Note 1: Request ENTNAC only.
Note 2: Except where personnel whose country of origin is a country listed at Appendix G, a BI will be required (See § 154.18(1)).
Note 3: A NAC not over 5 years old suffices unless there has been a break in employment over 12 months. Then a current NAC is required.
Note 4: In such cases, the NAC shall consist of: (a) Host government law enforcement and security agency record checks at the city, state (province), and national level, and (b) DCII.
Pt. 154, App. D

Appendix D to Part 154—Reporting of Nonderogatory Cases
Background Investigation (BI) and Special Background Investigation (SBI) shall be considered as devoid of significant adverse information unless they contain information listed below:
1. Incidents, infractions, offenses, charges, citations, arrests, suspicion or allegations of illegal use or abuse of drugs or alcohol, theft or dishonesty, unreliability, irresponsibility, immaturity, instability or recklessness, the use of force, violence or weapons or actions that indicate disregard for the law due to multiplicity of minor infractions.
2. All indications of moral turpitude, heterosexual promiscuity, aberrant, deviant, or bizarre sexual conduct or behavior, transvestitism, transsexualism, indecent exposure, rape, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, child molestation, wife-swapping, window-peeping, and similar situations from whatever source. Unlisted full-time employment or education; full-time education or employment that cannot be verified by any reference or record source or that contains indications of falsified education or employment experience. Records or testimony of employment, education, or military service where the individual was involved in serious offenses or incidents that would reflect adversely on the honesty, reliability, trustworthiness, or stability of the individual.
3. Foreign travel, education, visits, correspondence, relatives, or contact with persons from or living in a foreign country or foreign intelligence service.
4. Mental, nervous, emotional, psychological, psychiatric, or character disorders/behavior or treatment reported or alleged from any source.
5. Excessive indebtedness, bad checks, financial difficulties or irresponsibility, unexplained affluence, bankruptcy, or evidence of living beyond the individual's means.
6. Any other significant information relating to the criteria included in paragraphs (a) through (q) of § 154.7 or Appendix H of this part.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
Pt. 154, App. E

Appendix E to Part 154—Personnel Security Determination Authorities
A. Officials authorized to grant, deny or revoke personnel security clearances (Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential):
1. Secretary of Defense and/or designee
2. Secretary of the Army and/or designee
3. Secretary of the Navy and/or designee
4. Secretary of the Air Force and/or designee
5. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and/or designee
6. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee
7. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee
B. Officials authorized to grant Limited Access Authorizations:
1. Secretaries of the Military Departments and/or designee
2. Director, Washington Headquarters Service for OSD and/or designee
3. Chairman, JCS and/or designee
4. Directors of the Defense Agencies and/or designee
5. Commanders, Unified and Specified Commands and/or designee
C. Officials authorized to grant access to SCI:
Director, NSA—for NSA
Director, DIA—for OSD, OJCS, and Defense Agencies
Senior Officers of the Intelligence Community of the Army, Navy, and Air Force—for their respective Military Departments, or their single designee.
D. Officials authorized to certify personnel under their jurisdiction for access to Restricted Data (to include Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information): see enclosure to DoD Directive 5210.2.
E. Officials authorized to approve personnel for assignment to Presidential Support activities: The Executive Secretary to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense or designee.
F. Officials authorized to grant access to SIOP-ESI:
1. Director of Strategic Target Planning
2. Director, Joint Staff, OJCS
3. Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
4. Chief of Naval Operations
5. Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force
6. Commandant of the Marine Corps
7. Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands
8. The authority to grant access delegated above may be further delegated in writing by the above officials to the appropriate subordinates.
G. Officials authorized to designate sensitive positions:
1. Heads of DoD Components or their designees for critical-sensitive positions.
2. Organizational commanders for noncritical-sensitive positions.
H. Nonappropriated Fund Positions of Trust:
Officials authorized to designate nonappropriated fund positions of trust: Heads of DoD Components and/or their designees.
Pt. 154, App. F

Appendix F to Part 154—Guidelines for Conducting Prenomination Personal Interviews
A. Purpose. The purpose of the personal interview is to assist in determining the acceptability of an individual for nomination and further processing for a position requiring an SBI.
B. Scope. Questions asked during the course of a personal interview must have a relevance to a security determination. Care must be taken not to inject improper matters into the personal interview. For example, religious beliefs and affiliations, beliefs and opinions regarding racial matters, political beliefs and affiliations of a nonsubversive nature, opinions regarding the constitutionality of legislative policies, and affiliations with labor unions and fraternal organizations are not proper subjects for inquiry. Department of Defense representatives conducting personal interviews should always be prepared to explain the relevance of their inquiries. Adverse inferences shall not be drawn from the refusal of a person to answer questions the relevance of which has not been established.
C. The interviewer. Except as prescribed in paragraph B. above, persons conducting personal interviews normally will have broad latitude in performing this essential and important function and, therefore, a high premium must necessarily be placed upon the exercise of good judgment and common sense. To insure that personal interviews are conducted in a manner that does not violate lawful civil and private rights or discourage lawful political activity in any of its forms, or intimidate free expression, it is necessary that interviewers have a keen and well-developed awareness of and respect for the rights of interviewees. Interviewers shall never offer an opinion as to the relevance or significance of information provided by the interviewee to eligibility for access to SCI. If explanation in this regard is required, the interviewer will indicate that the sole function of the interview is to obtain information and that the determination of relevance or significance to the individual's eligibility will be made by other designated officials.
D. Interview procedures. 1. The Head of the DoD Component concerned shall establish uniform procedures for conducting the interview that are designed to elicit information relevant to making a determination of whether the interviewee, on the basis of the interview and other locally available information (DD 398, Personnel Security Investigation Questionnaire, personnel records, security file, etc.), is considered acceptable for nomination and further processing.
2. Such procedures shall be structured to insure the interviewee his full rights under the Constitution of the United States, the Privacy Act of 1974 and other applicable statutes and regulations.
E. Protection of interview results. All information developed during the course of the interview shall be maintained in personnel security channels and made available only to those authorities who have a need-to-know in connection with the processing of an individual's nomination for duties requiring access to SCI or those who need access to information either to conduct the required SBI or to adjudicate the matter of the interviewee's eligibility for access to SCI, or as otherwise authorized by Executive order or statute.
F. Acceptability determination. 1. The determination of the interviewee's acceptability for nomination for duties requiring access to sensitive information shall be made by the commander, or designee, of the DoD organization that is considering nominating the interviewee for such duties.
2. Criteria guidelines contained in DCID 1/14 upon which the acceptability for nomination determination is to be based shall be provided to commanders of DoD organizations who may nominate individuals for access to SCI and shall be consistent with those established by the Senior Officer of the Intelligence Community of the Component concerned with respect to acceptability for nomination to duties requiring access to SCI.

Appendix G to Part 154[Reserved]
Pt. 154, App. H

Appendix H to Part 154—Adjudication Policy
General. The following adjudication policy has been developed to assist DoD adjudicators in making determinations with respect to an individual's eligibility for employment or retention in sensitive duties or eligibility for access to classified information. Adjudication policy relative to access to sensitive compartmented information is contained in DCID 1/14.
While reasonable consistency in reaching adjudicative determinations is desirable, the nature and complexities of human behavior preclude the development of a single set of guidelines or policies that is equally applicable in every personnel security case. Accordingly, the following adjudication policy is not intended to be interpreted as inflexible rules of procedure. The following policy requires dependence on the adjudicator's sound judgment, mature thinking, and careful analysis as each case must be weighed on its own merits, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, and prior experience in similar cases as well as the guidelines contained in the adjudication policy, which have been compiled from common experience in personnel security determinations.
Each adjudication is to be an overall common sense determination based upon consideration and assessment of all available information, both favorable and unfavorable, with particular emphasis being placed on the seriousness, recency, frequency and motivation for the individual's conduct; the extent to which conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the circumstances or consequences involved; and, to the extent that it can be estimated, the probability that conduct will or will not continue in the future. The listed “Disqualifying Factors” and ”Mitigating Factors” in this set of Adjudication Policies reflect the consideration of those factors of seriousness, recency, frequency, motivation, etc., to common situations and types of behavior encountered in personnel security adjudications, and should be followed whenever an individual case can be measured against this policy guidance. Common sense may occasionally necessitate deviations from this policy guidance, but such deviations should not be frequently made and must be carefully explained and documented.
The “Disqualifying Factors” provided herein establish some of the types of serious conduct under the criteria that can justify a determination to deny or revoke an individual's eligibility for access to classified information, or appointment to, or retention in sensitive duties. The “Mitigating Factors” establish some of the types of circumstances that may mitigate the conduct listed under the “Disqualifying Factors”. Any determination must include a consideration of both the conduct listed under “Disqualifying Factors” and any circumstances listed under the appropriate or corresponding “Mitigating Factors”.
The adjudication policy is subdivided into sections appropriate to each of the criteria provided in § 154.7 of this part, except § 154.7(i) for which conduct under any of the “Disqualifying Factors” of the adjudication policy or any other types of conduct may be appropriately included, if it meets the definition of § 154.7(i).
In all adjudications, the protection of the national security shall be the paramount determinant. In the last analysis, a final decision in each case must be arrived at by applying the standard that the issuance of the clearance or assignment to the sensitive position is “clearly consistent with the interests of national security.”

Loyalty
(See § 154.7 (a) through (d)).
Basis: Commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, anarchy, sedition, or attempts threat or preparation therefor, or conspiring with or aiding or abetting another to commit or attempt to commit any such act. Establishing or continuing a sympathetic association with a saboteur, spy, traitor, seditionist, anarchist, terrorist, revolutionist, or with an espionage or other secret agent or similar representative of a foreign nation whose interests may be inimical to the interests of the United States, or with any person who advocates the use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. Advocacy or use of force or violence to overthrow the Government of the United States or to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means. Knowing membership with the specific intent of furthering the aims of, or adherence to and active participation in any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons (hereafter referred to as organizations) which unlawfully advocates or practices the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State or which seeks to overthrow the Government of the United States or any State or subdivision thereof by unlawful means.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Furnishing a representative of a foreign government information or data which could damage the national security of the United States.
2. Membership in an organization that has been characterized by the Department of Justice as one which meets the criteria in the above cited “Basis.”
3. Knowing participation in acts that involve force or violence or threats of force or violence to prevent others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or to overthrow or alter the form of government of the United States or of any State.
4. Monetary contributions, service, or other support of the organization defined in “Basis”, above, with the intent of furthering the unlawful objectives of the organization.
5. Participation, support, aid, comfort or sympathetic association with persons, groups, organizations involved in terrorist activities, threats, or acts.
6. Evidence of continuing sympathy with the unlawful aims and objectives of such an organization, as defined in the “Basis” above.
7. Holding a position of major doctrinal or managerial influence in an organization as defined in the “Basis” above.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Lack of knowledge or understanding of the unlawful aims of the organization.
2. Affiliation or activity occurred during adolescent/young adult years (17-25), more than 5 years has passed since affiliation was severed, and affiliation was due to immaturity.
3. Affiliation for less than a year out of curiosity or academic interest.
4. Sympathy or support limited to the lawful objectives of the organization.

Foreign Preference
(See § 154.7(f)).
Basis: Performing or attempting to one's perform duties, acceptance and active maintenance of dual citizenship, or other acts conducted in a manner which serve or which could be expected to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. The active maintenance of dual citizenship, by one or more of the following:
a. Possession of a passport issued by a foreign nation and use of this passport to obtain legal entry into any sovereign state in preference to use of a U.S. passport.
b. Military service in the armed forces of a foreign nation or the willingness to comply with an obligation to so serve, or the willingness to bear arms at any time in the future on behalf of the foreign state.
c. Exercise or acceptance of rights, privileges or benefits offered by the foreign state to its citizens, (e.g., voting in a foreign election; receipt of honors or titles; financial compensation due to employment/retirement, educational or medical or other social welfare benefits), in preference to those of the United States.
d. Travel to or residence in the foreign state for the purpose of fulfilling citizenship requirements or obligations.
e. Maintenance of dual citizenship to protect financial interests, to include property ownership, or employment or inheritance rights in the foreign state.
f. Registration for military service or registration with a foreign office, embassy or consulate to obtain benefits.
2. Employment as an agent or other official representative of a foreign government, or seeking or holding political office in a foreign state.
3. Use of a U.S. Government position of trust or responsibility to influence decisions in order to serve the interests of another government in preference to those of the United States.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Claim of dual citizenship is with a foreign country whose interests are not inimical to those of the United States and is based solely on applicant's or applicant's parent(s)’ birth, the applicant has not actively maintained citizenship in the last ten years and indicates he or she will not in the future act so as to pursue this claim.
2. Military service while a U.S. citizen was in the armed forces of a state whose interests are not inimical to those of the United States and such service was officially sanctioned by United States authorities.
3. Employment is as a consultant only and services provided is of the type sanctioned by the United States Government.

Security Responsibility Safeguards
(See § 154.7 (g) and (e)).
Basis: Disregard of public law, Statutes, Executive Orders or Regulations, including violation of security regulations or practices, or unauthorized disclosure to any person of classified information, or of other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by Statute, Executive Order or Regulation.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Deliberate or reckless disregard of security regulations, public law, statutes or Executive Orders which could have resulted in the loss or compromise of classified information.
2. Deliberate or reckless violations of security regulations, including, but not limited to, taking classified information home or carrying classified data while in a travel status without proper authorization, intentionally copying classified documents in order to obsure classification markings, disseminating classified information to cleared personnel who have no “need to know”, or disclosing classified information, or other information, disclosure of which is prohibited by Statute, Executive Order or Regulation, to persons who are not cleared or authorized to receive it.
3. Pattern of negligent conduct in handling or storing classified documents.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Violation of security procedures was directly caused or significantly contributed to by an improper or inadequate security briefing, provided the individual reasonably relied on such briefing in good faith.
2. Individual is personally responsible for a large volume of classified information and the violation was merely administrative in nature.
3. Security violation was merely an isolated incident not involving deliberate or reckless violation of security policies, practices or procedures.

Criminal Conduct
(See § 154.7(h)).
Basis: Criminal or dishonest conduct.
When it is determined that an applicant for a security clearance, or a person holding a clearance, has engaged in conduct which would constitute a felony under the laws of the United States, the clearance of such person shall be denied or revoked unless it is determined that there are compelling reasons to grant or continue such clearance. Compelling reasons can only be shown by clear and convincing evidence of the following:
(a) The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated episode; and (3) the individual has demonstrated trustworthiness and respect for the law over an extended period since the offense occurred; or
(b) The felonious conduct (1) did not involve an exceptionally grave offense; (2) was an isolated episode; (3) was due to the immaturity of the individual at the time it occurred; and (4) the individual has demonstrated maturity, trustworthiness, and respect for the law since that time; or
(c) In cases where the individual has committed felonious conduct but was not convicted of a felony, there are extenuating circumstances which mitigate the seriousness of the conduct such that it does not reflect a lack of trustworthiness or respect for the law.
The above criteria supersede all criteria previously used to adjudicate criminal conduct involving commission of felonies under the Laws of the United States. Involvement in criminal activities which does not constitute a felony under the laws of the United States shall be evaluated in accordance with the criteria set forth below. (For purposes of this paragraph, the term “felony” means any crime punishable by imprisonment for more than a year. The term “exceptionally grave offense” includes crimes against the Federal Government, its instrumentalities, officers, employees or agents; or involves dishonesty, fraud, bribery or false statement; or involves breach of trust or fiduciary duty; or involves serious threat to life or public safety.)
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Criminal conduct involving:
a. Commission of a State felony.
b. Force, coercion, or intimidation.
c. Firearms, explosives, or other weapons.
d. Dishonesty or false statements, e.g. fraud, theft, embezzlement, falsification of documents or statements.
e. Obstruction or corruption of government functions.
f. Deprivation of civil rights.
g. Violence against persons.
2. Criminal conduct punishable by confinement for one year or more.
3. An established pattern of criminal conduct, whether the individual was convicted or not.
4. Failure to complete a rehabilitation program resulting from disposition of a criminal proceeding or violation of probation, even if the violation did not result in formal revocation of probation. Rehabilitation should not be considered a success or failure while the individual is still on parole/probation.
5. Criminal conduct that is so recent in time as to preclude a determination that recurrence is unlikely.
6. Close and continuing association with persons known to the individual to be involved in criminal activities.
7. Criminal conduct indicative of a serious mental aberration, lack of remorse, or insufficient probability of rehabilitative success, (e.g., spouse or child abuse).
8. Disposition:
a. Conviction.
b. Disposition on a legal issue not going to the merits of the crime.
c. Arrest or indictment pending trial when there is evidence that the individual engaged in the criminal conduct for which arrested or indicted.
9. Arrest record. In evaluating an arrest record, information that indicates that the individual was acquitted, that the charges were dropped or the subject of a “stet” or “nolle prosequi”, that the record was expunged, or that the cause was dismissed due to error not going to the merits, does not negate the security significance of the underlying conduct. Personnel security determinations are to be made on the basis of all available information concerning a person's conduct and actions rather than the legal outcome of a criminal proceeding.
Mitigating Factors: (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Immaturity attributable to the age of the individual at the time of the offense.
2. Extenuating circumstances surrounding the offense.
3. Circumstances indicating that the actual offense was less serious than the offense charged.
4. Isolated nature of the conduct.
5. Conduct occurring only in the distant past (such as more than 5 years ago) in the absence of subsequent criminal conduct.
6. Transitory conditions directly or significantly contributing to the conduct (such as divorce action, death in family, severe provocation) in the absence of subsequent criminal conduct.

Mental or Emotional Disorders
(See § 154.7(j)).
Basis: Any behavior or illness, including any mental condition, which, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability with due regard to the transient or continuing effect of the illness and the medical findings in such case.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior or condition falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority (board certified psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) that the individual has an illness or mental condition which may result in a significant defect in judgment or reliability.
2. Conduct or personality traits that are bizarre or reflect abnormal behavior or instability even though there has been no history of mental illness or treatment, but which nevertheless, in the opinion of competent medical authority, may cause a defect in judgment or reliability.
3. A diagnosis by competent medical authority that the individual suffers from mental or intellectual incompetence or mental retardation to a degree significant enough to establish or suggest that the individual could not recognize, understand or comprehend the necessity of security regulations, or procedures, or that judgment or reliability are significantly impaired, or that the individual could be influenced or swayed to act contrary to the national security.
4. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an illness or condition that had affected judgment or reliability may recur even though the individual currently manifests no symptoms, or symptoms currently are reduced or in remission.
5. Failure to take prescribed medication or participate in treatment (including follow-up treatment or aftercare), or otherwise failing to follow medical advice relating to treatment of the illness or mental condition.
Mitigating Factors: (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Diagnosis by competent medical authority that an individual's previous mental or emotional illness or condition that did cause significant defect in judgment or reliability is cured and has no probability of recurrence, or such a minimal probability of recurrence as to reasonably estimate there will be none.
2. The contributing factors or circumstances which caused the bizarre conduct or traits, abnormal behavior, or defect in judgment and reliability have been eliminated or rectified, there is a corresponding alleviation of the individual's condition and the contributing factors or circumstances are not expected to recur.
3. Evidence of the individual's continued reliable use of prescribed medication for a period of at least two years, without recurrence and testimony by competent medical authority that continued maintenance of prescribed medication is medically practical and likely to preclude recurrence of the illness or condition affecting judgment or reliability.
4. There has been no evidence of a psychotic condition, a serious or disabling neurotic disorder, or a serious character or personality disorder for the past 10 years.

Foreign Connections/Vulnerability To Blackmail or Coercion
(See paragraph § 154.7(k)).
Basis: Vulnerability to coercion, influence, or pressure that may cause conduct contrary to the national interest. This may be (1) the presence of immediate family members or other persons to whom the applicant is bonded by affection or obligation in a nation (or areas under its domination) whose interests may be inimical to those of the United States, or (2) any other circumstances that could cause the applicant to be vulnerable.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Indications that the individual now is being blackmailed, pressured or coerced by any individual, group, association, organization or government.
2. Indications that a vulnerable individual actually has been targeted and/or approached for possible blackmail, coercion or pressure by any individual, group, association, organization or government.
3. Indications that the individual has acted to increase the vulnerability for future possible blackmail, coercion or pressure by any individual, group, association, organization or governments, especially by foreign intelligence services. Indicators include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Failure to report to security officials any evidence, indication or suspicion that mail to relatives has been opened, unusually delayed or tampered with in any way, or that telephone calls have been monitored.
b. An increase in curiosity or official or quasi-official inquiries about the individual to relatives in the country where they reside occasioned by the receipt of mail, packages, telephone calls or visits from the individual.
c. Contact with, or visits by officials to the individual while visiting relatives in another country, to learn more about the individual, or the individual's employment or residence, etc.
d. Unreported attempts to obtain classified or other sensitive information or data by representatives of a foreign country.
4. Conduct or actions by the individual while visiting in a country hostile to the United States that increase the individual's vulnerability to be targeted for possible blackmail, coercion or pressure. These include, but are not limited to the following:
a. Violation of any laws of the foreign country where relatives reside during visits or through mailing letters or packages, (e.g., smuggling, currency exchange violations, unauthorized mailings, violations of postal regulations of the country, or any criminal conduct, including traffic violations) which may call the attention of officials to the individual.
b. Frequent and regular visits, correspondence, or telephone contact with relatives in the country where they reside, increasing the likelihood of official notice.
c. Failure to report to security officials those inquiries by friends or relatives for more than a normal level of curiosity concerning the individual's employment, sensitive duties, military service or access to classified information.
d. Repeated telephone or written requests to the foreign government officials for official favors, permits, visas, travel permission, or similar requests which increase the likelihood of official notice.
e. Reckless conduct, open or public misbehavior or commission of acts contrary to local customs or laws, or which violate the mores of the foreign country and increase the likelihood of official notice.
f. Falsification of documents, lying to officials, harassing or taunting officials or otherwise acting to cause an increase in the likelihood of official notice or to increase the individual's vulnerability because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
g. Commission of any illicit sexual act, drug purchase or use, drunkenness or similar conduct which increases the likelihood of official notice, or which increases the individual's vulnerability because personal freedom could be jeopardized.
5. Conduct or actions by the individual that increase the individual's vulnerability to possible coercion, blackmail or pressure, regardless of the country in which it occurred, including, but not limited to the following:
a. Concealment or attempts to conceal from an employer prior unfavorable employment history, criminal conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol use, sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described under that section below, or fraudulent credentials or qualifications for employment.
b. Concealment or attempts to conceal from immediate family members, or close associates, supervisors or coworkers, criminal conduct, mental or emotional disorders or treatment, drug or alcohol abuse, sexual preference, or sexual misconduct described under that section below.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying infomration):
1. The individual:
a. Receives no financial assistance from and provides no financial assistance to persons or organizations in the designated country.
b. Has been in the United States for at least 5 years since becoming a U.S. citizen without significant contact with persons or organizations from the designated country (each year of active service in the United States military may be counted).
c. Has close ties of affection to immediate family members in the United States.
d. Has adapted to the life-style in the United States, established substantive financial or other associations with U.S. enterprises or community activities.
e. Prefers the way of life and form of government in the U.S. over the other country.
f. Is willing to defend the U.S. against all threats including the designated country in question.
g. Has not divulged the degree of association with the U.S. government or access to classified information to individuals in the designated country in question.
h. Has not been contacted or approached by anyone or any organization from a designated country to provide information or favors, or to otherwise act for a person or organization in the designated country in question.
i. Has promptly reported to proper authorities all attempted contacts, requests or threats from persons or organizations from the designated country.
j. The individual is aware of the possible vulnerability to attempts of blackmail or coercion and has taken positive steps to reduce or eliminate such vulnerability.

Financial Matters
(See § 154.7(1)).
Basis: Excessive indebtedness, recurring financial difficulties, or unexplained affluence.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. History of bad debts, garnishments, liens, repossessions, unfavorable judgments, delinquent or uncollectable accounts or debts written off by creditors as uncollectable losses with little or no apparent or voluntary effort by the individual to pay amounts owed.
2. Bankruptcy:
a. Due to financial irresponsibility, or
b. With continuing financial irresponsibility thereafter.
3. Indebtedness aggravated or caused by gambling, alcohol, drug abuse, or other factors indicating poor judgement or financial irresponsibility.
4. A history or pattern of living beyond the person's financial means or ability to pay, a lifestyle reflecting irresponsible expenditures that exceed income or assets, or a history or pattern of writing checks not covered by sufficient funds or on closed accounts.
5. Indication of deceit or deception in obtaining credit or bank accounts, misappropriation of funds, income tax evasion, embezzlement, fraud, or attempts to evade lawful creditors.
6. lndifference to or disregard of financial obligations or indebtedness or intention not to meet or satisfy lawful financial obligations or when present expenses exceed net income.
7. Unexplained affluence or income derived from illegal gambling, drug trafficking or other criminal or nefarious means.
8. Significant unexplained increase in an individual's net worth.
Mitigating Factors: (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Scheduled program or systematic efforts demonstrated over a period of time (generally one year) to satisfy creditors, to acknowledge debts and arrange for reduced payments, entry into debt-consolidation program or seeking the advice and assistance of financial counselors or court supervised payment program.
2. Change to a more responsible lifestyle, reduction of credit card accounts, and favorable change in financial habits over a period of time (generally one year).
3. Stable employment record and favorable financial references.
4. Unforeseen circumstances beyond the individual's control (e.g. a major or catastrophic illness or surgery, accidental loss of property or assets not covered by insurance, decrease or cutoff of income, indebtedness resulting from court judgments not due to the individual's financial mismanagement), provided the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
5. Indebtedness due to failure of legitimate business efforts or business-related bankruptcy without evidence of fault or financial irresponsibility on the part of the individual, irresponsible mismanagement of an individual's funds by another who had fiduciary control or access to them without the individual's knowledge, or loss of assets as a victim of fraud or deceit, provided the individual demonstrates efforts to respond to the indebtedness in a reasonable and responsible fashion.
6. Any significant increase in net worth was due to legitimate business interests, inheritance or similar legal explanation.

Alcohol Abuse
(See paragraph § 154.7(m)).
Basis: Habitual or episodic use of intoxicants to excess.
Disqualifying Factors: (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Habitual or episodic consumption of alcohol to the point of impairment or intoxication.
2. Alcohol-related incidents such as traffic violations, fighting, child or spouse abuse, non-traffic violation or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use.
3. Deterioration of the individual's health or physical or mental condition due to alcohol use or abuse.
4. Drinking on the job, reporting for work in an intoxicated or “hungover” condition, tardiness or absences caused by or related to alcohol abuse, and impairment or intoxication occurring during, and immediately following, luncheon breaks.
5. Refusal or failure to accept counseling or professional help for alcohol abuse or alcoholism.
6. Refusal or failure to follow medical advice relating to alcohol abuse treatment or to abstain from alcohol use despite medical or professional advice.
7. Refusal or failure to significantly decrease consumption of alcohol or to change life-style and habits which contributed to past alcohol related difficulties.
8. Indications of financial or other irresponsibility or unreliability caused by alcohol abuse, or discussing sensitive or classified information while drinking.
9. Failure to cooperate in or successfully complete a prescribed regimen of an alcohol abuse rehabilitation program.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Successfully completed an alcohol awareness program following two or less alcohol-related incidents and has significantly reduced alcohol consumption, and made positive changes in life-style and improvement in job reliability.
2. Successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation program after three or more alcohol-related incidents, has significantly reduced or eliminated alcohol consumption in accordance with medical or professional advice, regularly attended Alcoholics Anonymous or similar support organization for approximately one year after rehabilitation, and abstained from the use of alcohol for that period of time.
3. Whenever one of the situations listed below occurs, the individual must have successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program and totally abstained from alcohol for a period of approximately two years:
a. The individual has had one previously failed rehabilitation program and subsequent alcohol abuse or alcohol related incidents.
b. The individual has been diagnosed by competent medical or health authority as an alcoholic, alcoholic dependent or chronic abuser of alcohol.
4. Whenever the individual has had repeated unsuccessful rehabilitation efforts and has continued drinking or has been involved in additional alcohol related incidents then the individual must have successfully completed an alcohol rehabilitation or detoxification program, totally abstained from alcohol for a period of at least three years and maintained regular and frequent participation in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or similar organizations.
5. If an individual's alcohol abuse was surfaced solely as a result of self referral to an alcohol abuse program and there have been no precipitating factors such as alcohol related arrests or incidents action will not normally be taken to suspend or revoke security clearance solely on the self referral for treatment.

Drug Abuse
(See § 154.7(n)).
Basis: Illegal or improper use, possession, transfer, sale or addiction to any controlled or psychoactive substance, narcotic, cannabis, or other dangerous drug.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Abuse of cannabis only, not in combination with any other substance.
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once every two months or less, but no more than six times.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a month.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a week.
d. Regular abuse, defined as an average of more than once a week.
e. Compulsive use, habitual use, physical or psychological dependency, or use once a day or more on the average.
2. Abuse of any narcotic, psychoactive substance or dangerous drug (to include prescription drugs), either alone, or in combination with another or cannabis, as follows:
a. Experimental abuse, defined as an average of once every two months or less, but no more than six times.
b. Occasional abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a month.
c. Frequent abuse, defined as an average of not more than once a week.
d. Regular abuse, defined as an average of more than once a week.
e. Compulsive use, habitual use, physical or psychological dependency, or use on an average of once a day or more on the average.
3. Involvement to any degree in the unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacture, sale, or distribution of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or cannabis or assistance to those involved in such acts whether or not the individual was arrested for such activity.
4. Involvement with narcotics, dangerous drugs or cannabis under the following conditions whether or not the individual engages in personal use:
a. Possession.
b. Possession of a substantial amount, more than could reasonably be expected for personal use.
c. Possession of drug paraphernalia for cultivating, manufacturing or distributing (e.g., possession of gram scales, smoking devices, needles for injecting intravenously, empty capsules or other drug production chemical paraphernalia.
d. Possession of personal drug paraphernalia such as needles for injecting, smoking devices and equipment, etc.
5. Information that the individual intends to continue to use (regardless of frequency) any narcotic, dangerous drug or cannabis. Note: There is no corresponding Mitigating Factor for this Disqualifying Factor because it is DoD policy that, as a general rule, if any individual expresses or implies any intent to continue use of any narcotic, dangerous drug, or other controlled substance, including marijuana and hashish, without a prescription, in any amount and regardless of frequency, it is to be considered contrary to the national interest and the interests of national security to grant or allow retention of a security clearance for access to classified information for that individual.)
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. Abuse of cannabis only, as follows: (Use this to assess Disqualifying Factor 1)
a. Experimental abuse, which occurred more than six months ago and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, psychoactive substance or dangerous drug in the future.
b. Occasional abuse of cannabis, which occurred more than 12 months ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
c. Frequent abuse of cannabis occurred more than 18 months ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
d. Regular abuse of cannabis occurred more than two years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future.
e. Compulsive, habitual use or physical or psychological dependency on cannabis occurred more than three years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use cannabis or any other narcotic, dangerous drug or psychoactive substance in the future and has demonstrated a stable life-style, with no indication of physical or psychological dependence.
2. For abuse other than cannabis alone. Use is considered cumulative and each separate substance must not be considered separately. (Use this to assess Disqualifying Factor 2).
a. Experimental abuse occurred more than 12 months ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
b. Occasional abuse occurred more than two years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle and satisfactory employment record and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
c. Frequent abuse occurred more than three years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
d. Regular abuse occurred more than four years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
e. Compulsive abuse occurred more than five years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to use any drugs or cannabis in the future, has a stable lifestyle, including satisfactory employment record with no further indication of drug abuse, and has successfully completed a drug rehabilitation program.
3. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying Factor 3.
a. Involvement in trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacture, sale or distribution occurred more than five years ago, the individual has demonstrated an intent not to do so in the future, and has a stable lifestyle and satisfactory employment record and has not been involved in any other criminal activity.
b. Cultivation was for personnel use only, in a limited amount for a limited period and the individual has not been involved in similar activity or other criminal activity for more than three years and has demonstrated intent not to do so again in the future.
c. Illegal sale or distribution involved only the casual supply to friends of small amounts (not for profit or to finance a personal supply) and occurred on only a few occasions more than two years ago, and the individual has demonstrated an intent not to do so again in the future.
4. Use this only to assess conduct under Disqualifying Factor 4 in the corresponding subparagraphs.
a. No possession of drugs or other criminal activity in the last two years.
b. The individual has not possessed drugs in the last three years, has had no other criminal activity in the last three years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
c. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia used in processing, manufacture or distribution for the last five years, has had no other criminal activity in the last five years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
d. The individual has not possessed drug paraphernalia for personal use in the last year, has had no other criminal activity in the last two years and has demonstrated an intent not to be involved in such activity in the future.
1. Narcotic. Opium and opium derivatives or synethtic substitutes.
2. Dangerous Drug. Any of the nonnarcotic drugs which are habit forming or have a potential for abuse because of their stimulant, depressant or hallucinogenic effect.
3. Cannabis. The intoxicating products of the hemp plant, Cannabis Sativa, including but not limited to marijuana, hashish, and hashish oil.

Falsification
(See § 154.7(o)).
Basis: Any knowing and willful falsification, cover-up, concealment, misrepresentation, or omission of a material fact from any written or oral statement, document, form or other representation or device used by the Department of Defense or any other Federal agency.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Deliberate omission, concealment, falsification or misrepresentation of relevant and material facts including, but not limited to information concerning arrests, drug abuse or treatment, alcohol abuse or treatment, treatment for mental or emotional disorders, bankruptcy, military service information, organizational affiliations, financial problems, employment, foreign travel, or foreign connections from any Personnel Security Questionnaire, Personal History Statement or similar form used by any Federal agency to conduct investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security clearance or access eligibility, or award fiduciary responsibilities.
2. Deliberately providing false or misleading information concerning any of the relevant and material matters listed above to an investigator, employer, supervisor, security official or other official representative in connection with application for security clearance or access to classified information or assignment to sensitive duties.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. The information was not relevant or material to reaching a security clearance or access determination.
2. The falsification was an isolated incident in the distant past (more than 5 years) and the individual subsequently had accurately provided correct information voluntarily during reapplication for clearance or access and there is no evidence of any other falsification misrepresentation or dishonest conduct by the individual.
3. The behavior was not willful.
4. The falsification was done unknowingly or without the individual's knowledge.
5. The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts of falsification.
6. Omission of material fact was caused by or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, provided the individual reasonably relied on such improper or inadequate advice in good faith, and when the requirement subsequently was made known to the individual, the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided.

Refusal to Answer
(See § 154.7(p)).
Basis: Failing or refusing to answer or to authorize others to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional committee, court or agency in the course of an official inquiry whenever such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to an evaluation of the individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. Failure or refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers or to authorize others to do so, in connection with any application for security clearance or access, to include required non-disclosure and security termination agreements.
2. Failure or refusal to provide appropriate investigative forms, including release forms, for use by investigators in obtaining information from medical institutions, agencies or personal physicians, therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists, counselors, rehabilitation treatment, agencies or personnel; from police or criminal agencies, probation agencies or officers, financial institutions, employers, Federal or State agencies, professional associations or any other organizations as required as part of an investigation for security clearance, access, appointment or assignment to sensitive duties.
3. Failure or refusal to authorize others to provide relevant and material information necessary to reach a security clearance determination.
4. Failure or refusal to answer questions or provide information required by a Congressional committee, court or agency when such answers or information concern relevant and material matters pertinent to evaluating the individual's trustworthiness, reliability and judgment.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate disqualifying information):
1. The individual was unable to provide the information despite good faith and reasonable efforts to do so.
2. The individual was unaware of the necessity to provide the information requested or of the possible consequences of such refusal or failure to provide the information, and, upon being made aware of this requirement, fully frankly and truthfully provided the requested information.
3. The individual sought and relied in good faith on information and advice from legal counsel or other officials that the individual was not required to provide the information requested, and, upon being made aware of the requirement, fully, frankly and truthfully provided the requested information.

Sexual Misconduct
(See § 154.7(q)).
Basis: Acts of sexual misconduct or perversion indicative of moral turpitude, poor judgment, or lack of regard for the laws of society.
Disqualifying Factors (behavior falls within one or more of the following categories):
1. The conduct involves:
a. Acts performed or committed in open or public places.
b. Acts performed with a minor, or with animals.
c. Acts involving inducement, coercion, force, violence or intimidation of another person.
d. Prostitution, pandering or the commission of sexual acts for money or other remuneration or reward.
e. Sexual harassment.
f. Self mutilation, self punishment or degradation.
g. Conduct that involves spouse swapping, or group sex orgies.
h. Adultery that is recent, frequent and likely to continue and has an adverse effect on good order or discipline within the workplace (e.g., officer/enlisted, supervisor/subordinate, instructor/student).
i. Conduct determined to be criminal in the locale in which it occurred.
j. Deviant or perverted sexual behavior which may indicate a mental or personality disorder (e.g., transexualism, transvestism, exhibitionism, incest, child molestation, voyeurism, bestiality, or sodomy.)
2. The conduct has been recent.
3. The conduct increases the individual's vulnerability to blackmail, coercion or pressure.
4. Evidence that the applicant has intention or is likely to repeat the conduct in question.
Mitigating Factors (circumstances which may mitigate qualifying information):
1. Sexual misconduct occurred on an isolated basis during or preceding adolescence with no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature, and clear indication that the individual has no intention of participating in such conduct in the future.
2. Sexual misconduct was isolated, occurred more than 3 years ago, and there is clear indication that the individual has no intention of participating in such conduct in the future.
3. The individual was a minor or was the victim of force, or violence by another.
4. The individual has successfully completed professional therapy, has been rehabilitated and diagnosed by competent medical authority that misconduct is not likely to recur.
5. Demonstration that the individual's sexual misconduct can no longer form the basis for vulnerability to blackmail, coercion or pressure.
[52 FR 11219, Apr. 8, 1987, as amended at 58 FR 61026, Nov. 19, 1993]
Pt. 154, App. I

Appendix I to Part 154—Overseas Investigations

1. Purpose
The purpose of this appendix is to establish, within the framework of this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 20-1, standardized procedures for the military investigative agencies to follow when they perform administrative and investigative functions on behalf of DIS at overseas locations.

2. Type Investigation
This part describes in detail Background Investigations (BI) which are conducted for Limited Access Authorizations and those Special Investigative Inquiries conducted for post-adjudicative purposes. Hereafter they are referred to as LAA and Post-adjudicative cases and are briefly described in paragraphs a and b below:
a. Limited access authorization. A level of access to classified defense information that may be granted to a non-U.S. citizen under certain conditions, one of which is that a BI must have been completed with satisfactory results. § 154.16(d) further describes LAA cases.
b. Post-adjudication investigation. A Personnel Security Investigation (PSI) predicated on new, adverse or questionable security, suitability or hostage information that arises and requires the application of investigation procedures subsequent to adjudicative action on a DoD-affiliated person's eligibility for continued access to classified information, assignment to or retention in sensitive duties or other designated duties requiring such investigation. While these cases are normally predicated on the surfacing of unfavorable information subsequent to favorable adjudication, they may also be opened when favorable information is offered to counter a previous unfavorable adjudication. § 154.9(c)(3) further describes these cases.

3. General
a. As a rule, investigative activity in most PSIs occurs in the U.S. even when the Subject is at an overseas location. Therefore, the submission of requests for investigation to the Personnel Investigation Center (PIC) at Baltimore is a required procedure as it ensures uniform application of DoD PSI policy and the efficient dispatch and coordination of leads.
b. When the purpose of the investigation is for an LAA or post-adjudication on a Subject overseas, much, if not all of the leads are at an overseas location. While these cases also may be submitted directly to PIC for action, there is an inherent delay in the mailing of the request, the exchange of leads and reports with PIC, and transmittal of the reports back to the requester. To avoid this delay, the military investigative agencies, when acting for DIS overseas in accordance with 32 CFR part 361 may, with their Headquarters approval, accept these requests for investigations, initiate them and disseminate the results from the same level as they open, close, and disseminate their own cases. Usually this will greatly improve response time to the requester.
c. Under the procedures in paragraph b., above, DIS will not often be in a position to directly exercise its responsibility for control and direction until the case or lead is in progress or even completed; therefore, adherence to the policy stated in referenced documents, and as modified herein, is mandatory. When the policy of the military investigative agency is at variance with the above, the matter will be referred to the respective headquarters for resolution.
d. Since DIS is ultimately responsible for the personnel security product, it must be kept informed of all such matters referred to in this appendix. For instance, when the investigative agency overseas receives a DD Form 1879, Request for Personnel Security Investigation, which sets forth an issue outside DIS jurisdiction, it will reject the request, inform the requester of the reason and furnish an information copy of the DD Form 1879 and rejection letter to PIC. When the issue/jurisdiction is unclear to the investigative agency, the DD Form 1879 and the perceived jurisdictional question should be promptly forwarded to DIS for action and, if appropriate, to the component's headquarters for information. Questions on the interpretation of DIS or DoD policy and Directives pertaining to individual PSI cases can usually be resolved through direct communications with PIC.
e. 32 CFR part 361 establishes the supporting relationship of the military investigative agencies to DIS in overseas areas, and DIS provides these agencies with copies of relevant policy and interpretive guidance. For these reasons, the investigative agency vice the requester, is responsible for evaluating the request, processing it, collecting and evaluating the results within their jurisdiction for sufficiency, and forwarding the completed product to the appropriate activity.
f. The magnitude of operations at PIC requires that methods of handling LAA and post-adjudicative cases be consistent to the maximum extent possible. For this reason, the procedures for LAA cases are nearly identical to those for post-adjudicative cases. Briefly, the main exceptions are:
(1) The notification to PIC that a post-adjudication case has been opened will be by message, since an issue is present at the outset, whereas notification of an LAA case should normally be by mail.
(2) The scope of the LAA investigation is 10 years or since the person's 18th birthday, whichever is shortest, whereas the leads in a post-djudication case are limited to resolving the issue.

4. Jurisdiction
a. As set-forth in 32 CFR part 361 DIS is responsible for conducting all DoD PSIs in the 50 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, and will request the military departments to accomplish investigative requirements elsewhere. The military investigative agencies in overseas locations routinely respond to personnel security investigative leads for DIS.
b. DIS jurisdiction also includes investigation of subversive affiliations, suitability information, and hostage situations when such inquiries are required for personnel security purposes; however, jurisdiction will rest with the military investigative agencies, FBI and/or civil authorities as appropriate when the alleged subversion or suitability issue represents a violation of law or, in the case of a hostage situation, there is an indication that the person concerned is actually being pressured, coerced, or influenced by interests inimical to the United States, or that hostile intelligence is taking action specifically directed against that person. Specific policy guidance on the applicability of these procedures and the jurisdictional considerations are stated in § 154.9.

5. Case Opening
a. A request for investigation must be submitted by using DD Form 1879 and accompanied by supporting documentation unless such documentation is not immediately available, or the obtaining of documentation would compromise a sensitive investigation. Upon receipt of the request, the military investigative component will identify the issue(s), scope the leads, and ensure that the proposed action is that which is authorized for DIS as delineated in this part, 32 CFR part 361 and Defense Investigative Service Manual 201-1.
b. Upon such determination, the Component will prepare an Action Lead Sheet (ALS) which fully identifies the Subject and the scope of the case, and specifies precisely the leads which each investigative component (including DIS/PIC when appropriate) is to conduct.
c. Case opening procedures described above are identical for LAA and post-adjudication cases except with respect to notification of case opening to PIC:
(1) Post-adjudication Cases. These cases, because they involve an issue, are potentially sensitive and must be examined as early as possible by PIC for conformity to the latest DoD policy. Accordingly, the initial notification to PIC of case openings will always be by message. The message will contain at a minimum:
(a) Full identification of the subject;
(b) A narrative describing the allegation/facts in sufficient detail to support opening of the case; and
(c) A brief listing of the leads that are planned.
The DD Form 1879 and supporting documents, along with the agency's ALS, should be subsequently mailed to PIC.
(2) LAA Cases. The notification to PIC of case opening will normally be accomplished by mailing the DD Form 1879, DD Form 398 (Personal History Statement), a copy of the ALS, and any other supporting documents to PIC. Message notification to PIC in LAA cases will only be required if there is a security or suitability issue apparent in the DD Form 1879 or supporting documents.
(d) Beyond initial actions necessary to test allegation for investigative merit and jurisdiction, no further investigative action should commence until the notification of case opening to PIC has been dispatched.
(e) PIC will promptly respond to the notification of case opening by mail or message specifying any qualifying remarks along with a summary of previously existing data. PIC will also provide a DIS case control number (CCN). This number must be used by all components on all case related paperwork/reports.
(The investigating agency may assign its unique service CCN for interim internal control; however, the case will be processed, referenced, and entered into the DCII by the DIS case control number.) The first five digits of the DIS CCN will be the Julian date of the case opening when received at DIS.

6. Case Processing
a. The expected completion time for leads in LAA cases is 50 calendar days and for post-adjudication cases, 30 days, as computed from the date of receipt of the request. If conditions preclude completion in this time period, a pending report of the results to date, along with an estimated date of completion will be submitted to PIC.
b. Copies of all ALSs will be furnished to PIC. In addition, PIC will be promptly notified of any significant change in the scope of the case, or the development of an investigative issue.
c. The procedures for implementing the Privacy Act in PSI cases are set in DIS Manual 20-1-M 1. Any other restrictions on the release of information imposed by an overseas source or by regulations of the country where the inquiry takes place will be clearly stated in the report.
d. The report format for these cases will be that used by the military investigative agency.
e. Investigative action outside the jurisdictional area of an investigative component office may be directed elsewhere by ALS as needed in accordance with that agency's procedures and within the following geographical considerations:
(1) Leads will be sent to PIC if the investigative action is in the United States, District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Bahama Islands, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the following islands in the Pacific: Wake, Midway, Kwajalin, Johnston, Carolines, Marshalls, and Eniwetok.
(2) Leads to areas not listed above may be dispatched to other units of the investigative agency or even to another military agency's field units if there is an agreement or memorandum of understanding that provides for such action. For case accountability purposes, copies of such “lateral” leads must be sent to the PIC.
(3) Leads that cannot be dispatched as described in paragraph (2) above, and those that must be sent to a non-DoD investigative agency should be sent to PIC for disposition.
f. The Defense Investigative Manual calls for obtaining PIC approval before conducting a Subject interview on a post-adjudicative investigation. To avoid the delay that compliance with this procedure would create, a military investigative component may conduct the interview provided:
(1) All other investigative leads have been completed and reviewed.
(2) The CCN has been received, signifying DIS concurrence with the appropriateness of the investigation.
(3) Contrary instructions have not been received from the PIC.
(4) The interview is limited to the resolution of the relevant issues disclosed by the investigation.
g. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs f.(1) through (4) of this Appendix, if time is of the essence due to imminent transfer of the subject, a subject interview may be conducted at the discretion of the investigative agency.

7. Case Responsibility LAA and PA
Paragraph 3, above, describes the advantages of timely handling which accrue when the military investigative components act for DIS overseas. These actions for DIS may, however, be limited by the component's staffing and resource limitations, especially since some cases require more administration and management than others. Post-adjudication case leads, for instance, will normally be within the geographical jurisdiction of the component that accepted the request for investigation; therefore, relatively little case management is required. In contrast, LAA cases may require leads world-wide, and, therefore, create more complex case management and administration, especially in the tracking, monitoring and reviewing of leads outside the component's geographical area. Accordingly, an investigative component will accept the case from the requester, but only assign itself the appropriate leads within its own geographical jurisdiction and send the balance to PIC for appropriate disposition in accordance with the following:
a. The investigative agency will accept the request for investigation (thereby saving time otherwise lost in mailing to PIC) but limit its involvement in case management by extracting only those leads it will conduct or manage locally.
b. The agency should then prepare an ALS that shows clearly what leads it will cover and send PIC a copy of this ALS, along with the request for investigation and any other appropriate documentation. It must be clear in the ALS that PIC is to act on all those leads that the unit has not assigned to itself.
c. PIC, as case manager, will assume responsibility for the complete investigative package and, upon receipt of the last lead, will send the results to the appropriate activity.
d. The agency that accepted the case and assigned itself leads may send a copy of its report to the activity in the “Results to” block at the same time it sends the originals to PIC. If so, the letter of transmittal must inform the recipient that these reports are only a portion of the investigation, and that the balance will be forthcoming from PIC. Similarly, PIC must be informed of which investigative reports were disseminated. (This is normally done by sending PIC a copy of the letter of transmittal.)

8. Scope
a. LAA. The scope of investigation is 10 years or from age 18, whichever is the shortest period.
b. Post-Adjudication Cases. There is no standard scope. The inquiries conducted will be limited to those necessary to resolve the issue(s).

9. Case Closing: LAA and PA
a. Whether the investigative component or PIC closes out an investigation, there are three key elements to consider:
(1) The investigative results must be reviewed for quality and conformance to policy.
(2) The results must be sent to the activity listed in the “Results to” block of the DD Form 1879.
(3) PIC must be informed whether or not any dissemination was made by the investigative agency and, if so, what reports were furnished.
b. Investigative results may also be sent to a requester or higher level activity that makes a statement of need for the results. In such instances, a copy of the letter requesting the results and the corresponding letter of transmittal must be sent to PIC for retention.
c. When an investigative agency disseminates reports for PIC, it may use the transmittal documents, letters, or cover sheets it customarily uses for its own cases.
d. The material that is to be provided to PIC will consist of: The originals of all reports, and all other case documentation such as original statements, confidential source sheets, interview logs, requests for investigation, letters of transmittal to adjudicaters/requesters, or communications with the requester, such as those that modify the scope of the investigation.
e. For DIS to fulfill its responsibilities under DoD 5220.22-R and the Privacy Act of 1974 all inquiries conducted in its behalf must be set forth in an ROI for the permanent file, whether the case is completed, terminated early, or referred to another agency.

10. Referral
A case may require premature closing at any time after receipt of the DD Form 1879 by the investigative component if the information accompanying the request, or that which is later developed, is outside DIS jurisdiction. For example, alleged violations of law, a counterintelligence matter, or actual coercion/influence in a hostage situation (see paragraph 4.b. of this Appendix ) must be referred to the appropriate agency, and DIS involvement terminated. The requester will be informed by letter or indorsement to the DD Form 1879 of the information developed that, due to jurisdictional consideration, the case was referred to (fill in appropriate address) and that the DIS case is closed. The agency to which referral was made and PIC will be furnished with the results of all investigations conducted under DIS auspices. DIS, however, has an interest in the referral agency's actions and no information should be solicited from that agency.
Pt. 154, App. J

Appendix J to Part 154—ADP Position Categories and Criteria for Designating Positions
OMB Circular A-71 (and Transmittal Memo #B1), July 1978 OMB Circular A-130, December 12, 1985, and FPM Letter 732, November 14, 1978 contain the criteria for designating positions under the existing categories used in the personnel security program for Federal civilian employees as well as the criteria for designating ADP and ADP related positions. This policy is outlined below:

ADP Position Categories

1. Critical-Sensitive Positions
ADP-I positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the planning, direction, and implementation of a computer security program; major responsibility for the direction, planning and design of a computer system, including the hardware and software; or, can access a system during the operation or maintenance in such a way, and with a relatively high risk for causing grave damage, or realize a significant personal gain.

2. Noncritical-Sensitive Positions
ADP-II positions. Those positions in which the incumbent is responsible for the direction, planning, design, operation, or maintenance of a computer system, and whose work is technically reviewed by a higher authority of the ADP-I category to insure the integrity of the system.

3. Nonsensitive Positions
ADP-III positions. All other positions involved in computer activities.
In establishing the categories of positions, other factors may enter into the determination, permitting placement in higher or lower categories based on the agency's judgement as to the unique characteristics of the system or the safeguards protecting the system.

Criteria for Designating Positions
Three categories have been established for designating computer and computer-related positions—ADP-I, ADP-II, and ADP-III. Specific criteria for assigning positions to one of these categories is as follows:
Category | Criteria
ADP-I | Responsibility or the development and administration of agency computer security programs, and also including direction and control of risk analysis and/or threat assessment.
| Significant involvement in life-critical or mission-critical systems.
| Significant involvement in life-critical or mission-critical systems.
| Responsibility for the preparation or approval of data for input into a system which does not necessarily involve personal access to the system, but with relatively high risk for effecting grave damage or realizing significant personal gain.
| Relatively high risk assignments associated with or directly involving the accounting, disbursement, or authorization for disbursement from systems of (1) dollar amounts of $10 million per year or greater, or (2) lesser amounts if the activities of the individual are not subject to technical review by higher authority in the ADP-I category to ensure the integrity of the system.
| Positions involving major responsibility for the direction planning, design, testing, maintenance, operation, monitoring, and/or management of systems hardware and software.
| Other positions as designated by the agency head that involve relatively high risk for effecting grave damage or realizing significant personal gain.
ADP-II | Responsibility for systems design, operation, testing, maintenance, and/or monitoring that is carried out under technical review of higher authority in the ADP-I category, includes, but is not limited to:
| (1) access to and/or processing of proprietary data, information requiring protection under the Privacy Act of 1974, and Government-developed privileged information involving the award of contracts;
| (2) accounting, disbursement, or authorization for disbursement from systems of dollar amounts less than $10 million per year. Other positions are designated by the agency head that involve a degree of access to a system that creates a significant potential for damage or personal gain less than that in ADP-I positions.
ADP-III | All other positions involved in Federal computer activities.
Pt. 155

PART 155—DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL PERSONNEL SECURITY CLEARANCE PROGRAM
Sec.
155.1
Purpose.
155.2
Applicability and scope.
155.3
Definitions.
155.4
Policy.
155.5
Responsibilities.
155.6
Procedures.
Appendix A to Part 155—Additional Procedural Guidance

Authority:
E.O. 10865, 3 CFR 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398, as amended by E.O. 10909, 3 CFR 1959-1963 Comp., p. 437; E.O. 11382, 3 CFR 1966-1970 Comp., p. 690; and E.O. 12829, 3 CFR 1993 Comp., p. 570.

Source:
57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, unless otherwise noted.
§ 155.1
Purpose.
This part updates policy, responsibilities, and procedures of the Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review Program implementing E.O. 10865, as amended.
[57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, as amended at 59 FR 48565, Sept. 22, 1994]
§ 155.2
Applicability and scope.
This part:
(a) Applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD), and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”).
(b) By mutual agreement, also extends to other Federal Agencies that include:
(1) Department of Agriculture.
(2) Department of Commerce.
(3) Department of Interior.
(4) Department of Justice.
(5) Department of Labor.
(6) Department of State.
(7) Department of Transportation.
(8) Department of Treasury.
(9) Environmental Protection Agency.
(10) Federal Emergency Management Agency.
(11) Federal Reserve System.
(12) General Accounting Office.
(13) General Services Administration.
(14) National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
(15) National Science Foundation.
(16) Small Business Administration.
(17) United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
(18) United States Information Agency.
(19) United States International Trade Commission.
(20) United States Trade Representative.
(c) Applies to cases that the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office (DISCO) forwards to the “Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA)” for action under this part to determine whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the applicant.
(d) Provides a program that may be extended to other security cases at the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD(C^3I)).
(e) Does not apply to cases in which:
(1) A security clearance is withdrawn because the applicant no longer has a need for access to classified information;
(2) An interim security clearance is withdrawn by the DISCO during an investigation; or
(3) A security clearance is withdrawn for administrative reasons that are without prejudice as to a later determination of whether the grant or continuance of the applicant's security clearance would be clearly consistent with the national interest.
(f) Does not apply to cases for access to sensitive compartmented information or a special access program.
[57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, as amended at 59 FR 35464, July 12, 1994]
§ 155.3
Definitions.
(a) Applicant. Any U.S. citizen who holds or requires a security clearance or any immigrant alien who holds or requires a limited access authorization for access to classified information needed in connection with his or her employment in the private sector; any U.S. citizen who is a direct-hire employee or selectee for a position with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and who holds or requires NATO certificates of security clearance or security assurances for access to U.S. or foreign classified information; or any U.S. citizen nominated by the Red Cross or United Service Organizations for assignment with the Military Services overseas. The term “applicant” does not apply to those U.S. citizens who are seconded to NATO by U.S. Departments and Agencies or to U.S. citizens recruited through such Agencies in response to a request from NATO.
(b) Clearance Decision. A decision made in accordance with this part concerning whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant an applicant a security clearance for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information. A favorable clearance decision establishes eligibility of the applicant to be granted a security clearance for access at the level governed by the documented need for such access, and the type of investigation specified for that level in 32 CFR part 154. An unfavorable clearance decision denies any application for a security clearance and revokes any existing security clearance, thereby preventing access to classified information at any level and the retention of any existing security clearance.
§ 155.4
Policy.
It is DoD policy that:
(a) All proceedings provided for by this part shall be conducted in a fair and impartial manner.
(b) A clearance decision reflects the basis for an ultimate finding as to whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the applicant.
(c) Except as otherwise provided for by E.O. 10865, as amended, or this part, a final unfavorable clearance decision shall not be made without first providing the applicant with:
(1) Notice of specific reasons for the proposed action.
(2) An opportunity to respond to the reasons.
(3) Notice of the right to a hearing and the opportunity to cross-examine persons providing information adverse to the applicant.
(4) Opportunity to present evidence on his or her own behalf, or to be represented by counsel or personal representative.
(5) Written notice of final clearance decisions.
(6) Notice of appeal procedures.
(d) Actions pursuant to this part shall cease upon termination of the applicant's need for access to classified information except in those cases in which:
(1) A hearing has commenced;
(2) A clearance decision has been issued; or
(3) The applicant's security clearance was suspended and the applicant provided a written request that the case continue.
[57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, as amended at 59 FR 48565, Sept. 22, 1994]
§ 155.5
Responsibilities.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of Defense of Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence shall:
(1) Establish investigative policy and adjudicative standards and oversee their application.
(2) Coordinate with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD) on policy affecting clearance decisions.
(3) Issue clarifying guidance and instructions as needed.
(b) The General Counsel of the Department of Defense shall:
(1) Establish guidance and provide oversight as to legal sufficiency of procedures and standards established by this part.
(2) Establish the organization and composition of the DOHA.
(3) Designate a civilian attorney to be the Director, DOHA.
(4) Issue clarifying guidance and instructions as needed.
(5) Administer the program established by this part.
(6) Issue invitational travel orders in appropriate cases to persons to appear and testify who have provided oral or written statements adverse to the applicant relating to a controverted issue.
(7) Designate attorneys to be Department Counsels assigned to the DOHA to represent the Government's interest in cases and related matters within the applicability and scope of this part.
(8) Designate attorneys to be Administrative Judges assigned to the DOHA.
(9) Designate attorneys to be Administrative Judge members of the DOHA Appeal Board.
(10) Provide for supervision of attorneys and other personnel assigned or attached to the DOHA.
(11) Develop and implement policy established or coordinated with the GC, DoD, in accordance with this part.
(12) Establish and maintain qualitative and quantitative standards for all work by DOHA employees arising within the applicability and scope of this part.
(13) Ensure that the Administrative Judges and Appeal Board members have the requisite independence to render fair and impartial decisions consistent with DoD policy.
(14) Provide training, clarify policy, or initiate personnel actions, as appropriate, to ensure that all DOHA decisions are made in accordance with policy, procedures, and standards established by this part.
(15) Provide for maintenance and control of all DOHA records.
(16) Take actions as provided for in § 155.6(b), and the additional procedural guidance in appendix A to this part.
(17) Establish and maintain procedures for timely assignment and completion of cases.
(18) Issue guidance and instructions, as needed, to fulfill the foregoing responsibilities.
(19) Designate the Director, DOHA, to implement paragraphs (b)(5) through (b)(18) of this section, under general guidance of the GC, DoD.
(c) The Heads of the DoD Components shall provide (from resources available to the designated DoD Component) financing, personnel, personnel spaces, office facilities, and related administrative support required by the DOHA.
(d) The ASD(C^3I) shall ensure that cases within the scope and applicability of this part are referred promptly to the DOHA, as required, and that clearance decisions by the DOHA are acted upon without delay.
[57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, as amended at 59 FR 35464, July 12, 1994]
§ 155.6
Procedures.
(a) Applicants shall be investigated in accordance with the standards in 32 CFR part 154.
(b) An applicant is required to give, and to authorize others to give, full, frank, and truthful answers to relevant and material questions needed by the DOHA to reach a clearance decision and to otherwise comply with the procedures authorized by this part. The applicant may elect on constitutional or other grounds not to comply; but refusal or failure to furnish or authorize the providing of relevant and material information or otherwise cooperate at any stage in the investigation or adjudicative process may prevent the DOHA from making a clearance decision. If an applicant fails or refuses to:
(1) Provide relevant and material information or to authorize others to provide such information; or
(2) Proceed in a timely or orderly fashion in accordance with this part; or
(3) Follow directions of an Administrative Judge or the Appeal Board; then the Director, DOHA, or designee, may revoke any security clearance held by the applicant and discontinue case processing. Requests for resumption of case processing and reinstatement of a security clearance may be approved by the Director, DOHA, only upon a showing of good cause. If the request is denied, in whole or in part, the decision is final and bars reapplication for a security clearance for 1 year from the date of the revocation.
(c) Each clearance decision must be a fair and impartial common sense determination based upon consideration of all the relevant and material information and the pertinent criteria in 32 CFR 154.7 and adjudication policy in appendix H to 32 CFR part 154, including as appropriate:
(1) Nature and seriousness of the conduct and surrounding circumstances.
(2) Frequency and recency of the conduct.
(3) Age of the applicant.
(4) Motivation of the applicant, and the extent to which the conduct was negligent, willful, voluntary, or undertaken with knowledge of the consequences involved.
(5) Absence or presence of rehabilitation.
(6) Probability that the circumstances or conduct will continue or recur in the future.
(d) Whenever there is a reasonable basis for concluding that an applicant's continued access to classified information poses an imminent threat to the national interest, any security clearance held by the applicant may be suspended by the ASD(C^3I), with the concurrence of the GC, DoD, pending a final clearance decision. This suspension may be rescinded by the same authorities upon presentation of additional information that conclusively demonstrates that an imminent threat to the national interest no longer exists. Procedures in appendix A to this part shall be expedited whenever an applicant's security clearance has been suspended pursuant to this section.
(e) Nothing contained in this part shall limit or affect the responsibility and powers of the Secretary of Defense or the head of another Department or Agency to deny or revoke a security clearance when the security of the nation so requires. Such authority may not be delegated and may be exercised only when the Secretary of Defense or the head of another Department or Agency determines that the hearing procedures and other provisions of this part cannot be invoked consistent with the national security. Such a determination shall be conclusive.
(f) Additional procedural guidance is in appendix A to this part.
[57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, as amended at 59 FR 35464, July 12, 1994]
Pt. 155, App. A

Appendix A to Part 155—Additional Procedural Guidance
1. When the DISCO cannot affirmatively find that it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for an applicant, the case will be promptly referred to the DOHA.
2. Upon referral, the DOHA shall make a prompt determination whether to grant or continue a security clearance, issue a statement of reasons (SOR) as to why it is not clearly consistent with the national interest to do so, or take interim actions, including but not limited to:
a. Direct further investigation.
b. Propound written interrogatories to the applicant or other persons with relevant information.
c. Requiring the applicant to undergo a medical evaluation by a DoD Psychiatric Consultant.
d. Interviewing the applicant.
3. An unfavorable clearance decision shall not be made unless the applicant has been provided with a written SOR that shall be as detailed and comprehensive as the national security permits. A letter of instruction with the SOR shall explain that the applicant or Department Counsel may request a hearing. It shall also explain the adverse consequences for failure to respond to the SOR within the prescribed time frame.
4. The applicant must submit a detailed written answer to the SOR under oath or affirmation that shall admit or deny each listed allegation. A general denial or other similar answer is insufficient. To be entitled to a hearing, the applicant must specifically request a hearing in his or her answer. The answer must be received by the DOHA within 20 days from receipt of the SOR. Requests for an extension of time to file an answer may be submitted to the Director, DOHA, or designee, who in turn may grant the extension only upon a showing of good cause.
5. If the applicant does not file a timely and responsive answer to the SOR, the Director, DOHA, or designee, may discontinue processing the case, deny issuance of the requested security clearance, and direct the DISCO to revoke any security clearance held by the applicant.
6. Should review of the applicant's answer to the SOR indicate that allegations are unfounded, or evidence is insufficient for further processing, Department Counsel shall take such action as appropriate under the circumstances, including but not limited to withdrawal of the SOR and transmittal to the Director for notification of the DISCO for appropriate action.
7. If the applicant has not requested a hearing with his or her answer to the SOR and Department Counsel has not requested a hearing within 20 days of receipt of the applicant's answer, the case shall be assigned to an Administrative Judge for a clearance decision based on the written record. Department Counsel shall provide the applicant with a copy of all relevant and material information that could be adduced at a hearing. The applicant shall have 30 days from receipt of the information in which to submit a documentary response setting forth objections, rebuttal, extenuation, mitigation, or explanation, as appropriate.
8. If a hearing is requested by the applicant or Department Counsel, the case shall be assigned to an Administrative Judge for a clearance decision based on the hearing record. Following issuance of a notice of hearing by the Administrative Judge, or designee, the applicant shall appear in person with or without counsel or a personal representative at a time and place designated by the notice of hearing. The applicant shall have a reasonable time to prepare his or her case. The applicant shall be notified at least 15 days in advance of the time and place of the hearing, which generally shall be held at a location in the United States within a metropolitan area near the applicant's place of employment or residence. A continuance may be granted by the Administrative Judge only for good cause. Hearings may be held outside of the United States in NATO cases, or in other cases upon a finding of good cause by the Director, DOHA, or designee.
9. The Administrative Judge may require a prehearing conference.
10. The Administrative Judge may rule on questions of procedure, discovery, and evidence and shall conduct all proceedings in a fair, timely, and orderly manner.
11. Discovery by the applicant is limited to non-privileged documents and materials subject to control by the DOHA. Discovery by Department Counsel after issuance of an SOR may be granted by the Administrative Judge only upon a showing of good cause.
12. A hearing shall be open except when the applicant requests that it be closed, or when the Administrative Judge determines that there is a need to protect classified information or there is other good cause for keeping the proceeding closed. No inference shall be drawn as to the merits of a case on the basis of a request that the hearing be closed.
13. As far in advance as practical, Department Counsel and the applicant shall serve one another with a copy of any pleading, proposed documentary evidence, or other written communication to be submitted to the Administrative Judge.
14. Department Counsel is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to establish facts alleged in the SOR that have been controverted.
15. The applicant is responsible for presenting witnesses and other evidence to rebut, explain, extenuate, or mitigate facts admitted by the applicant or proven by Department Counsel, and has the ultimate burden of persuasion as to obtaining a favorable clearance decision.
16. Witnesses shall be subject to cross-examination.
17. The SOR may be amended at the hearing by the Administrative Judge on his or her own motion, or upon motion by Department Counsel or the applicant, so as to render it in conformity with the evidence admitted or for other good cause. When such amendments are made, the Administrative Judge may grant either party's request for such additional time as the Administrative Judge may deem appropriate for further preparation or other good cause.
18. The Administrative Judge hearing the case shall notify the applicant and all witnesses testifying that 18 U.S.C. 1001 is applicable.
19. The Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. 101 et seq.) shall serve as a guide. Relevant and material evidence may be received subject to rebuttal, and technical rules of evidence may be relaxed, except as otherwise provided herein, to permit the development of a full and complete record.
20. Official records or evidence compiled or created in the regular course of business, other than DoD personnel background reports of investigation (ROI), may be received and considered by the Administrative Judge without authenticating witnesses, provided that such information has been furnished by an investigative agency pursuant to its responsibilities in connection with assisting the Secretary of Defense, or the Department or Agency head concerned, to safeguard classified information within industry under to E.O. 10865, as amended. An ROI may be received with an authenticating witness provided it is otherwise admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence (28 U.S.C. 101 et seq.).
21. Records that cannot be inspected by the applicant because they are classified may be received and considered by the Administrative Judge, provided the GC, DoD, has:
a. Made a preliminary determination that such evidence appears to be relevant and material.
b. Determined that failure to receive and consider such evidence would be substantially harmful to the national security.
22. A written or oral statement adverse to the applicant on a controverted issue may be received and considered by the Administrative Judge without affording an opportunity to cross-examine the person making the statement orally, or in writing when justified by the circumstances, only in either of the following circumstances:
a. If the head of the Department or Agency supplying the statement certifies that the person who furnished the information is a confidential informant who has been engaged in obtaining intelligence information for the Government and that disclosure of his or her identity would be substantially harmful to the national interest; or
b. If the GC, DoD, has determined the statement concerned appears to be relevant, material, and reliable; failure to receive and consider the statement would be substantially harmful to the national security; and the person who furnished the information cannot appear to testify due to the following:
(1) Death, severe illness, or similar cause, in which case the identity of the person and the information to be considered shall be made available to the applicant; or
(2) Some other cause determined by the Secretary of Defense, or when appropriate by the Department or Agency head, to be good and sufficient.
23. Whenever evidence is received under item 21. or 22., the applicant shall be furnished with as comprehensive and detailed a summary of the information as the national security permits. The Administrative Judge and Appeal Board may make a clearance decision either favorable or unfavorable to the applicant based on such evidence after giving appropriate consideration to the fact that the applicant did not have an opportunity to confront such evidence, but any final determination adverse to the applicant shall be made only by the Secretary of Defense, or the Department or Agency head, based on a personal review of the case record.
24. A verbatim transcript shall be made of the hearing. The applicant shall be furnished one copy of the transcript, less the exhibits, without cost.
25. The Administrative Judge shall make a written clearance decision in a timely manner setting forth pertinent findings of fact, policies, and conclusions as to the allegations in the SOR, and whether it is clearly consistent with the national interest to grant or continue a security clearance for the applicant. The applicant and Department Counsel shall each be provided a copy of the clearance decision. In cases in which evidence is received under items 21. and 22., the Administrative Judge's written clearance decision may require deletions in the interest of national security.
26. If the Administrative Judge decides that it is clearly consistent with the national interest for the applicant to be granted or to retain a security clearance, the DISCO shall be so notified by the Director, DOHA, or designee, when the clearance decision becomes final in accordance with item 36., below.
27. If the Administrative Judge decides that it is not clearly consistent with the national interest for the applicant to be granted or to retain a security clearance, the Director, DOHA, or designee, shall expeditiously notify the DISCO, which shall in turn notify the applicant's employer of the denial or revocation of the applicant's security clearance. The letter forwarding the Administrative Judge's clearance decision to the applicant shall advise the applicant that these actions are being taken, and that the applicant may appeal the Administrative Judge's clearance decision.
28. The applicant or Department Counsel may appeal the Administrative Judge's clearance decision by filing a written notice of appeal with the Appeal Board within 15 days after the date of the Administrative Judge's clearance decision. A notice of appeal received after 15 days from the date of the clearance decision shall not be accepted by the Appeal Board, or designated Board Member, except for good cause. A notice of cross appeal may be filed with the Appeal Board within 10 days of receipt of the notice of appeal. An untimely cross appeal shall not be accepted by the Appeal Board, or designated Board Member, except for good cause.
29. Upon receipt of a notice of appeal, the Appeal Board shall be provided the case record. No new evidence shall be received or considered by the Appeal Board.
30. After filing a timely notice of appeal, a written appeal brief must be received by the Appeal Board within 45 days from the date of the Administrative Judge's clearance decision. The appeal brief must state the specific issue or issues being raised, and cite specific portions of the case record supporting any alleged error. A written reply brief, if any, must be filed within 20 days from receipt of the appeal brief. A copy of any brief filed must be served upon the applicant or Department Counsel, as appropriate.
31. Requests for extension of time for submission of briefs may be submitted to the Appeal Board or designated Board Member.
A copy of any request for extension of time must be served on the opposing party at the time of submission. The Appeal Board, or designated Board Member, shall be responsible for controlling the Appeal Board's docket, and may enter an order dismissing an appeal in an appropriate case or vacate such an order upon a showing of good cause.
32. The Appeal Board shall address the material issues raised by the parties to determine whether harmful error occurred. Its scope of review shall be to determine whether or not:
a. The Administrative Judge's findings of fact are supported by such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion in light of all the contrary evidence in the same record. In making this review, the Appeal Board shall give deference to the credibility determinations of the Administrative Judge;
b. The Administrative Judge adhered to the procedures required by E.O. 10865, as amended and this part; or
c. The Administrative Judge's rulings or conclusions are arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.
33. The Appeal Board shall issue a written clearance decision addressing the material issues raised on appeal. The Appeal Board shall have authority to:
a. Affirm the decision of the Administrative Judge;
b. Remand the case to an Administrative Judge to correct identified error. If the case is remanded, the Appeal Board shall specify the action to be taken on remand; or
c. Reverse the decision of the Administrative Judge if correction of identified error mandates such action.
34. A copy of the Appeal Board's written clearance decision shall be provided to the parties. In cases in which evidence was received under items 21. and 22., the Appeal Board's clearance decision may require deletions in the interest of national security.
35. Upon remand, the case file shall be assigned to an Administrative Judge for correction of error(s) in accordance with the Appeal Board's clearance decision. The assigned Administrative Judge shall make a new clearance decision in the case after correcting the error(s) identified by the Appeal Board. The Administrative Judge's clearance decision after remand shall be provided to the parties. The clearance decision after remand may be appealed pursuant to items 28. to 35.
36. A clearance decision shall be considered final when:
a. A security clearance is granted or continued pursuant to item 2.;
b. No timely notice of appeal is filed;
c. No timely appeal brief is filed after a notice of appeal has been filed;
d. The appeal has been withdrawn;
e. When the Appeal Board affirms or reverses an Administrative Judge's clearance decision; or
f. When a decision has been made by the Secretary of Defense, or the Department or Agency head, under item 23.
The Director, DOHA, or designee, shall notify the DISCO of all final clearance decisions.
37. An applicant whose security clearance has been finally denied or revoked by the DOHA is barred from reapplication for 1 year from the date of the initial unfavorable clearance decision.
38. A reapplication for a security clearance must be made initially by the applicant's employer to the DISCO and is subject to the same processing requirements as those for a new security clearance application. The applicant shall thereafter be advised he is responsible for providing the Director, DOHA, with a copy of any adverse clearance decision together with evidence that circumstances or conditions previously found against the applicant have been rectified or sufficiently mitigated to warrant reconsideration.
39. If the Director, DOHA, determines that reconsideration is warranted, the case shall be subject to this part for making a clearance decision.
40. If the Director, DOHA, determines that reconsideration is not warranted, the DOHA shall notify the applicant of this decision. Such a decision is final and bars further reapplication for an additional one year period from the date of the decision rejecting the application.
41. Nothing in this part is intended to give an applicant reapplying for a security clearance any greater rights than those applicable to any other applicant under this part.
42. An applicant may file a written petition, under oath or affirmation, for reimbursement of loss of earnings resulting from the suspension, revocation, or denial of his or her security clearance. The petition for reimbursement must include as an attachment the favorable clearance decision and documentation supporting the reimbursement claim. The Director, DOHA, or designee, may in his or her discretion require additional information from the petitioner.
43. Claims for reimbursement must be filed with the Director, DOHA, or designee, within 1 year after the date the security clearance is granted. Department Counsel generally shall file a response within 60 days after receipt of applicant's petition for reimbursement and provide a copy thereof to the applicant.
44. Reimbursement is authorized only if the applicant demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence to the Director, DOHA, that all of the following conditions are met:
a. The suspension, denial, or revocation was the primary cause of the claimed pecuniary loss; and
b. The suspension, denial, or revocation was due to gross negligence of the Department of Defense at the time the action was taken, and not in any way by the applicant's failure or refusal to cooperate.
45. The amount of reimbursement shall not exceed the difference between the earnings of the applicant at the time of the suspension, revocation, or denial and the applicant's interim earnings, and further shall be subject to reasonable efforts on the part of the applicant to mitigate any loss of earnings. No reimbursement shall be allowed for any period of undue delay resulting from the applicant's acts or failure to act. Reimbursement is not authorized for loss of merit raises and general increases, loss of employment opportunities, counsel's fees, or other costs relating to proceedings under this part.
46. Claims approved by the Director, DOHA, shall be forwarded to the Department or Agency concerned for payment. Any payment made in response to a claim for reimbursement shall be in full satisfaction of any further claim against the United States or any Federal Department or Agency, or any of its officers or employees.
47. Clearance decisions issued by Administrative Judges and the Appeal Board shall be indexed and made available in redacted form to the public.
[57 FR 5383, Feb. 14, 1992, as amended at 59 FR 35464, July 12, 1994; 59 FR 48565, Sept. 22, 1994]
Pt. 156

PART 156—DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM (DoDPSP)
Sec.
156.1
Purpose.
156.2
Applicability and scope.
156.3
Policy
156.4
Responsibilities.

Authority:
50 U.S.C. 781.

Source:
58 FR 42855, Aug. 12, 1993, unless otherwise noted.
§ 156.1
Purpose.
This part:
(a) Updates the policy and responsibilities for the DoDPSP under Pub. L. 81-832; E.O. 10450, 18 FR 2489, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 936; E.O. 10865, 25 FR 1583, 3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398; E.O. 12333, 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 Comp., p.200; and E.O. 12356, 47 FR 14874 and 15557, 3 CFR 1982 Comp., p. 166.
(b) Continues to authorize the publication of DoD 5200.2-R ^1 in accordance with DoD 5025.1-M.^2
^1 Copies may be obtained at cost, from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
^2 See footnote 1 to 156.1(b).
§ 156.2
Applicability and scope.
This part applies to:
(a) The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard when it is operating as a Military Service in the Navy), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies, except as provided for the National Security Agency (NSA) in paragraph (b) of this section (hereafter referred to collectively as “the DoD Components”).
(b) The NSA is exempt from the provisions of this Directive. The personnel security program for the NSA is implemented pursuant to DoD Directive 5210.45,^3 and internal regulations of the NSA.
^3 See footnote 1 to 156.1(b).
(c) DoD military and civilian personnel, consultants to the Department of Defense, contractors cleared under the Defense Industrial Security Program (DISP) Regulations DoD 5220.22 ^4 and others affiliated with the Department of Defense.
^4 See footnote 1 to 156.1(b).
§ 156.3
Policy.
It is DoD policy that:
(a) No person shall be appointed as a civilian employee of the Department of Defense, accepted for entrance into the Armed Forces of the United States, authorized access to classified information, or assigned to duties that are subject to investigation under this part unless such appointment, acceptance, clearance, or assignment is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.
(b) A personnel security clearance shall be granted and assignment to sensitive duties shall be authorized only to U.S. citizens. As an exception, a non-U.S. citizen may, by an authorized official (as specified in 32 CFR part 154) be assigned to sensitive duties or granted a Limited Access Authorization for access to classified information if there is a need for access in support of a specific DoD program, project, or contract.
(c) The personnel security standard that shall be applied in determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance or assignment to sensitive duties is whether, based on all available information, the person's allegiance, trustworthiness, reliability, and judgment are such that the person can reasonably to expected to comply with Government policy and procedures for safeguarding classified information and performing sensitive duties.
(d) 32 CFR part 154 shall identify those positions and duties that require a personnel security investigation (PSI). A PSI is required for:
(1) Appointment to a sensitive civilian position.
(2) Entry into military service.
(3) The granting of a security clearance or approval for access to classified information.
(4) Assignment to other duties that require a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
(5) Continuing eligibility for retention of a security clearance and approval for access to classified information or for assignment to other sensitive duties.
(e) 32 CFR part 154 shall contain personnel security criteria and adjudicative guidance to assist in determining whether an individual meets the clearance and sensitive position standards referred to in paragraphs (a) and (c) of this section.
(f) No unfavorable personnel security determination shall be made except in accordance with procedures set forth in 32 CFR part 154 or 32 CFR part 155 or as otherwise authorized by law.
§ 156.4
Responsibilities.
(a) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence shall:
(1) Be responsible for overall policy, guidance, and control of the DoDPSP.
(2) Develop and implement plans, policies, and procedures for the DoDPSP.
(3) Issue and maintain DoD 5200.2-R consistent with DoD 5025.1-M.
(4) Conduct an active oversight program to ensure compliance with DoDPSP requirements.
(5) Ensure that research is conducted to assess and improve the effectiveness of the DoDPSP (DoD Directive 5210.79 ^5 ).
^5 See footnote 1 to 156.1(b).
(6) Ensure that the Defense Investigative Service is operated pursuant to 32 CFR part 361.
(7) Ensure that the DoD Security Institute provides the education, training, and awareness support to the DoDPSP under DoD Directive 5200.32.^6
^6 See footnote 1 to 156.1(b).
(8) Be authorized to make exceptions to the requirements of this part on a case-by-case basis when it is determined that doing so furthers the mission of the Department of Defense and is consistent with the protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure.
(b) The General Counsel of the Department of Defense shall:
(1) Be responsible for providing advice and guidance as to the legal sufficiency of procedures and standards implementing the DoDPSP and the DISP.
(2) Exercise oversight of PSP appeals procedures to verify that the rights of individuals are being protected consistent with the constitution, laws of the United States, Executive Orders, Directives, or Regulations that implement the DoDPSP and DISP, and with the interests of national security.
(c) The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
(1) Designate a senior official who shall be responsible for implementing the DoDPSP within their components.
(2) Ensure that the DoDPSP is properly administered under this Directive within their components.
(3) Ensure that information and recommendations are provided to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence on any aspect of the program.
Pt. 157

PART 157—DISSEMINATION OF DoD TECHNICAL INFORMATION
Sec.
157.1
Purpose.
157.2
Applicability and scope.
157.3
Policy.
157.4
Responsibilities.
157.5
Definitions.
157.6
Certification for access to technical information.

Authority:
R.S. 161, 5 U.S.C. 22.

Source:
45 FR 17988, Mar. 25, 1980, unless otherwise noted.
§ 157.1
Purpose.
This part: (a) Consolidates into one document this part and parts of DoD Instruction 5100.38, “Defense Documentation Center for Scientific and Technical Information,” March 29, 1965;
(b) Supplements DoD Directive 5100.36, “Department of Defense Technical Information,” December 31, 1962, and DoD Instruction 5129.43, “Assignment of Functions for the Defense Scientific and Technical Information Program,” January 22, 1963;
(c) Provides policy and assigns responsibilities for the dissemination of DoD technical information;
(d) Establishes certification procedures for access to DoD technical information.
§ 157.2
Applicability and scope.
(a) The provisions of this part apply to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to as “DoD Components”), and other U.S. Government agencies disseminating or requesting access to DoD technical information.
(b) The procedures established by this part shall be used by technical Information Dissemination Activities to control access to DoD technical information. The access afforded through use of these procedures does not override special consideration or approvals that affect the flow of controlled information.
(c) This part does not apply to primary distribution of technical information or to interlibrary loan within Department of Defense.
§ 157.3
Policy.
The purpose of the DoD Technical Information Program is to ensure the complete and timely exchange among DoD technical activities, including both the in-house and DoD contractor communities, of all technical information generated by or relevant to the pursuit of DoD technical programs with due consideration of security requirements and access restrictions. All DoD Components responsible for dissemination of technical information shall make a positive effort to provide users accurate and timely technical information, utilizing the most effective media, including symposia, newsletters, technical reports, inquiry responses, online data networks, consultation and other media, and making optimum use of computer technology to store, sort, select, and package data and information.
§ 157.4
Responsibilities.
(a) The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE), or designee, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Research and Advanced Technology) shall:
(1) Manage and disseminate DoD technical information, as provided in DoD Directive 5100.36, “Department of Defense Technical Information,” December 31, 1962.
(2) Approve service charges collected by Information Dissemination Activities to provide partial reimbursement and to prevent excessive, unwarranted use of these services.
(b) The Heads of DoD Components shall:
(1) Pursue organized, coordinated, and comprehensive programs for technical information dissemination. These programs shall provide for the interchange of technical information within Department of Defense; between Department of Defense and other Federal agencies and their contractors; among Department of Defense, NATO governments and other allies; and between Department of Defense and the national and international scientific and technical community in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R, “Information Security Program Regulation,” December 1978, and parts 286 and 286a of this title.
(2) Within the limits of security and access restrictions necessary to ensure adequate intra-DoD technical information exchange.
(i) Vigorously pursue a policy that ensures that technical information generated within activities under their cognizance is provided for public use through appropriate Federal agencies and technology transfer programs according to approved DoD clearance procedures; and
(ii) Wherever possible, provide unclassified technical documents and other information to expedite the information transfer procedures. However, all critical technology to which the Department of Defense has title or proprietary interest shall be classified at the appropriate level.
(3) Certify access for DoD technical information users as described in § 157.6.
(4) Introduce an active technology transfer program aimed at transferring to the public as much DoD-developed technology as is consistent with the DoD mission. Active participation by DoD laboratories, centers, and other organizations in Federal and local government technology transfer organizations, such as the Federal Laboratory Consortium, is encouraged.
(5) Support a program for the domestic dissemination of DoD-developed technology that, because of its commercial significance, should be made available as early as possible, but only by means that will ensure the continued applicability of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, the Export Administration Act of 1969, Export Administration Amendments of 1977, and the Export Administration Regulations of the Department of Commerce as to when the technology should not be exported.
(6) Make planning and technical requirements information available through Industry Information Centers so that industry can plan and apply its resources effectively.
(7) Make technical information on selected technologies available through Information Analysis Centers to support the DoD mission.
(8) Sponsor or support technical symposia, conferences and meetings for disseminating technical information in accordance with DoD Directive 5200.12,1 “Security Sponsorship and Procedures for Scientific and Technical Meetings Involving Disclosure of Classified Military Information,” June 15, 1979, when the requirement exists to disseminate the information more rapidly than normal publishing procedures permit. In accordance with DoD Instruction 5129.43,^1 “Assignment of Functions for the Defense Scientific and Technical Information Program,” January 22, 1963, certain data concerning DoD-sponsored technical symposia will be transmitted to the USDR&E.
(9) Ensure compliance with provisions of DoD Directive 5000.11, ^1 which prescribes policy and procedures for the “Data Elements and Data Codes Standardization Program,” where applicable, to assigned functions for disseminating DoD technical information.
^1 Copies may be obtained, if needed, from the U.S. Naval Publications and Forms Center, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120. Attention: Code 301.
(c) The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) shall operate and maintain certification and registration procedures as described in § 157.6 and shall provide appropriate forms and instructions.
(d) Technical information dissemination activities shall collect service charges, as approved by the USDRE, to prevent excessive, unwarranted use of their services and to provide partial reimbursement of costs.
§ 157.5
Definitions.
(a) Technical information. Information, including scientific information, which relates to research, development, engineering, test, evaluation, production, operation, use, and maintenance of munitions and other military supplies and equipment.
(b) Technical information dissemination activity. Any activity, such as DTIC, that operates to assist individuals and organizations within the Department of Defense to effect adequate and timely dissemination of technical information describing planned or ongoing RDT&E effort and the documented results of such efforts and to provide systems and services to assist eligible users to identify, access, acquire, and use DoD technical information.
(c) Primary distribution. The initial distribution of a technical document after completion of the original manuscript or its equivalent.
(d) Critical technology. Technical data, whose acquisition by a potential adversary would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. Control of critical technology requires the control of associated critical end products (defined as “keystone”) that embody extractable critical technology or that consist of equipment which completes a process line, allowing the line to be fully utilized.
(e) Technology transfer. The process through which Government research and technology are transformed into processes, products, or services that can be applied to actual or potential public or private needs. It includes the application of technology that has been developed for a particular mission and, after modification and diversification, fills a different need in another environment.
(f) Eligible user. Any DoD office, contractor, subcontractor, DoD potential contractor, or other U.S. Government office or its contractor whose eligibility and need to receive DoD technical information has been certified.
(g) Contractor. An individual or organization outside the U.S. Government that has accepted any type of agreement or order for providing research, supplies, or services to a U.S. Government agency. The term specifically includes both prime contractors and subcontractors.
(h) DoD potential contractor. An individual or organization outside Department of Defense declared eligible for documentation services by a sponsoring DoD activity on the basis of registration and active participation in a program specifically designed to exchange information concerning Defense support capability.
(i) Industry information centers. Centers established by DoD Components to inform the Defense industrial community of DoD acquisition, research and development requirements, plans, and future needs. They serve as DoD access points to Defense planning and requirements documents for representatives of industry, small business, university and nonprofit institutions registered for access to DoD information services.
(j) Technical information dissemination. A fundamental and integral part of each RDT&E effort (contractual or in-house) that ensures, within procedures established for security and other specific access restrictions, maximum utility of and access to technical information about and technical documents generated from Defense-supported RDT&E.
§ 157.6
Certification for access to technical information.
(a) Policy. (1) The Department of Defense shall disseminate technical information in support of its technical programs and in support of similar programs within other U.S. Government agencies. This dissemination shall be made to organizations whose official U.S. Government affiliations are certified. Classified information dissemination will be within the scope of its certified field of interest requirements and facility clearances. However, requests from foreign organizations for and transmittal of classified and controlled information products shall be made only through appropriate DoD foreign release offices under established release procedures.
(2) A uniform certification procedure shall be used for the effective control of the flow of technical information and shall utilize the DD Form 1540, “Registration for Scientific and Technical Information Services,” cited in DoD 5220.22-R, “Industrial Security Regulation,” January 1979.
(3) Certification shall be according to subject fields and groups of interest and recorded on DD Form 1540. Such certification is a warranty that the user's oficial responsibilities require access to technical information that can be described by one or another of the prescribed DoD categories of science and technology.
(b) Responsibilities. (1) The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) and the Defense Contract Administration Services (DCAS) shall operate and maintain the certification procedures and DD Forms 1540 and 1541, “Facility Clearance Register.”
(i) DTIC shall:
(A) Develop and distribute such instructions and procedural guidance as necessary for use by DoD Components, U.S. Government contractors and subcontractors, DoD potential contractors, and other U.S. Government offices to maintain the most effective use of the certification procedures within the terms of this Instruction and existing security regulations.
(B) Maintain at DTIC the central authority file of eligible users and notify affected dissemination activities of each new eligible user, along with conditions and scope of coverage, and of any subsequent changes thereto.
(C) Provide information products from DTIC to eligible users as follows:
(a) Unclassified technical information, subject to any approvals that may be required for controlled information.
(b) Classified technical information in only those subject fields of interest and at the security level authorized on DD Form 1540 and in accordance with any approvals that may be required for controlled information.
(D) Recommend changes to DoD 5220.22-M,^1 “Industrial Security Manual for Safeguarding Classified Information,” October 1977, and related security procedures in conformance with this part.
1 See footnote 1 to § 157.4(b)(8).
(ii) DCAS shall certify the DD Form 1541 and report any change affecting a facility clearance through submission of a revised DD Form 1541 to the central authority file.
(2) Each DoD Component conducting, administering, or sponsoring research, development, test and evaluation and other technical work shall:
(i) Require in-house activities to complete all parts of the DD Form 1540 and submit it to the DTIC before requesting reports or information from dissemination activities. The commanding officer, the technical director, or their authorized designee shall review, approve, modify, or disapprove the registration for technical information services on DD Form 1540 submitted by their personnel.
(ii) Review, approve, modify, or disapprove DD Form 1540 submitted by non-DoD activities or organizations under its cognizance. Personnel selected to authorize DD Form 1540 shall have the technical competence and familiarity with contractor or grantee programs necessary to judge the subject fields of interest of the applicant.
(iii) Instruct and assist its sponsored activities in filling out and submitting DD Form 1540.
(iv) Recommend changes to DoD 5220.22-M and related security procedures in conformance with this part.
(v) Promptly report to the DTIC any changes of certification status, such as change in mission of the DoD Component, contract termination, and contract or grant revision.
(vi) Designate an office at each appropriate level of the organization with responsibility for:
(A) Providing and maintaining procedures that are responsive to this Instruction and with applicable security regulations.
(B) Reviewing special cases, such as referral of questions on DD Form 1540 from the DTIC.
(3) Each dissemination activity, within the scope of its mission, shall make its technical information available to eligible users in accordance with the certification terms and the applicable security and distribution controls.
(c) Agencies outside the Department of Defense. (1) Components of non-DoD executive branch agencies who participate in the DoD Industrial Security Program shall follow the procedures prescribed for DoD Components in § 157.6(b)(2) when DoD technical information is required.
(2) Components of non-DoD executive branch agencies who do not participate in the DoD Industrial Security Program shall make specific arrangements with the DTIC for certification of DD Form 1540 and facility clearance authorization when DoD technical information is required.
(3) Components of the legislative and judicial branches, their contractors, and their grantees who are in need of unclassified information shall make specific arrangements with DTIC for certification of DD Form 1540. Certification for classified information, if needed, must be approved by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Research and Advanced Technology). In these cases, submission of the completed DD Form 1540 by contractors and grantees must be accompanied by adequate facility clearance authorization.
Pt. 158

PART 158—GUIDELINES FOR SYSTEMATIC DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN PERMANENTLY VALUABLE DoD RECORDS
Sec.
158.1
Reissuance and purpose.
158.2
Applicability and scope.
158.3
Definitions.
158.4
Policy.
158.5
Procedures.
158.6
Responsibilities.
158.7
Categories of information that require review before declassification.
158.8
Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Army systems.
158.9
Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Navy systems.
158.10
Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Air Force systems.
158.11
Declassification considerations.
158.12
Department of State areas of interest.
158.13
Central Intelligence Agency areas of interest.

Authority:
E.O. 12356, 10 U.S.C.

Source:
48 FR 29840, June 29, 1983, unless otherwise noted.
§ 158.1
Reissuance and purpose.
This part is reissued; establishes procedures and assigns responsibilities for the systematic declassification review of information classified under E.O. 12356 and Information Security Oversight Office Directive No. 1, DoD Directive 5200.1 and DoD 5200.1-R, and prior orders, directives, and regulations governing security classification; and implements section 3.3 of E.O. 12356.
§ 158.2
Applicability and scope.
(a) This part applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and to activities assigned to the OSD for administrative support, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to collectively as “DoD Components”).
(b) This part applies to the systematic review of permanently valuable classified information, developed by or for the Department of Defense and its Components, or its predecessor components and activities, that is under the exclusive or final original classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense.
(c) Its provisions do not cover Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 or information in nonpermanent records.
(d) Systematic declassification review of records pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities) or intelligence sources or methods shall be in accordance with special procedures issued by the Director of Central Intelligence.
§ 158.3
Definitions.
(a) Cryptologic information. Information pertaining to or resulting from the activities and operations involved in the production of signals intelligence (SIGINT) or to the maintenance of communications security (COMSEC).
(b) Foreign government information. Information that is provided to the United States by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both are to be held in confidence; or produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both are to be held in confidence.
(c) Intelligence method. Any process, mode of analysis, means of gathering data, or processing system or equipment used to produce intelligence.
(d) Intelligence source. A person or technical means that provides intelligence.
§ 158.4
Policy.
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information about DoD operations to the public.
§ 158.5
Procedures.
(a) DoD classified information that is permanently valuable, as defined by 44 U.S.C. 2103, that has been accessioned into the National Archives of the United States, will be reviewed systematically for declassification by the Archivist of the United States, with the assistance of the DoD personnel designated for that purpose, as it becomes 30 years old; however, file series concerning intelligence activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, and cryptology records created after 1945 will be reviewed as they become 50 years old.
(b) All other DoD classified information and foreign government information that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components, including that held in Federal records centers or other storage areas, may be reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising control of such information.
(c) DoD classified information and foreign government information in the possession or control of DoD Components shall be declassified when they become 30 years old, or 50 years old in the case of DoD intelligence activities (including special activities) created after 1945, intelligence sources or methods created after 1945, or cryptology created after 1945, if they are not within one of the categories specified in §§ 158.7 through 158.10 or in 48 FR 4403, January 31, 1983.
(d) Systematic review for declassification shall be in accordance with procedures contained in DoD 5200 1-R. Information that falls within any of the categories in §§ 158.7 through 158.10 and in 44 FR 4403 shall be declassified if the designated DoD reviewer determines, in light of the declassification considerations contained in § 158.11 that classification no longer is required. In the absence of such a declassification determination, the classification of the information shall continue as long as required by national security considerations.
(e) Before any declassification or downgrading action, DoD information under review should be coordinated with the Department of State on subjects cited in § 158.12, and with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on subjects cited in § 158.13.
§ 158.6
Responsibilities.
(a) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall:
(1) Exercise oversight and policy supervision over the implementation of this part.
(2) Request DoD Components to review §§ 158.7 through 158.11 of this part every 5 years.
(3) Revise §§ 158.7 through 158.11 to ensure they meet DoD needs.
(4) Authorize, when appropriate, other Federal agencies to apply this part to DoD information in their possession.
(b) The Head of each DoD Component shall:
(1) Recommend changes to §§158.7 through 158.13 of this part.
(2) Propose, with respect to specific programs, projects, and systems under his or her classification jurisdiction, supplements to §§ 158.7 through 158.11 of this part.
(3) Provide advice and designate experienced personnel to provide timely assistance to the Archivist of the United States in the systematic review of records under this part.
(c) The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service (NSA/CSS), shall develop, for approval by the Secretary of Defense, special procedures for systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic information.
(d) The Archivist of the United States is authorized to apply this part when reviewing DoD classified information that has been accessioned into the Archives of the United States.
§ 158.7
Categories of information that require review before declassification.
The following categories of information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD review in accordance with this part:
(a) Nuclear propulsion information.
(b) Information concerning the establishment, operation, and support of the U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System.
(c) Information concerning the safeguarding of nuclear materials or facilities.
(d) Information that could affect the conduct of current or future U.S. foreign relations. (Also see § 158.12.)
(e) Information that could affect the current or future military usefulness of policies, programs, weapon systems, operations, or plans when such information would reveal courses of action, concepts, tactics, or techniques that are used in current operations plans.
(f) Research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of chemical and biological weapons and defensive systems; specific identification of chemical and biological agents and munitions; chemical and biological warfare plans; and U.S. vulnerability to chemical or biological warfare attack.
(g) Information about capabilities, installations, exercises, research, development, testing and evaluation, plans, operations, procedures, techniques, organization, training, sensitive liaison and relationships, and equipment concerning psychological operations; escape, evasion, rescue and recovery, insertion, and infiltration and exfiltration; cover and support; deception; unconventional warfare and special operations; and the personnel assigned to or engaged in these activities.
(h) Information that reveals sources or methods of intelligence or counter-intelligence, counterintelligence activities, special activities, identities of clandestine human agents, methods of special operations, analytical techniques for the interpretation of intelligence data, and foreign intelligence reporting. This includes information that reveals the overall scope, processing rates, timeliness, and accuracy of intelligence systems and networks, including the means of interconnecting such systems and networks and their vulnerabilities.
(i) Information that relates to intelligence activities conducted jointly by the Department of Defense with other Federal agencies or to intelligence activities conducted by other Federal agencies in which the Department of Defense has provided support. (Also see § 158.13.)
(j) Airborne radar and infrared imagery.
(k) Information that reveals space system:
(1) Design features, capabilities, and limitations (such as antijam characteristics, physical survivability features, command and control design details, design vulnerabilities, or vital parameters).
(2) Concepts of operation, orbital characteristics, orbital support methods, network configurations, deployments, ground support facility locations, and force structure.
(l) Information that reveals operational communications equipment and systems:
(1) Electronic counter-counter-measures (ECCM) design features or performance capabilities.
(2) Vulnerability and susceptibility to any or all types of electronic warfare.
(m) Information concerning electronic intelligence, telemetry intelligence, and electronic warfare (electronic warfare support measures, electronic countermeasures (ECM), and ECCM) or related activities, including:
(1) Information concerning or revealing nomenclatures, functions, technical characteristics, or descriptions of foreign communications and electronic equipment, its employment or deployment, and its association with weapon systems or military operations.
(2) Information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, or scope of activities involved in acquiring, analyzing, and evaluating the above information, and the degree of success obtained.
(n) Information concerning Department of the Army systems listed in §158.8.
(o) Information concerning Department of the Navy systems listed in §158.9.
(p) Information concerning Department of the Air Force systems listed in §158.10.
(q) Cryptologic information (including cryptologic sources and methods). This includes information concerning or revealing the processes, techniques, operations, and scope of SIGINT comprising communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and telemetry intelligence; and the cryptosecurity and emission security components of COMSEC, including the communications portion of cover and deception plans.
(1) Recognition of cryptologic information may not always be an easy task. There are several broad classes of cryptologic information, as follows:
(i) Those that relate to COMSEC. In documentary form, they provide COMSEC guidance or information. Many COMSEC documents and materials are accountable under the Communications Security Material Control System. Examples are items bearing transmission security (TSEC) nomenclature and crypto keying material for use in enciphering communications and other COMSEC documentation such as National COMSEC Instructions, National COMSEC/Emanations Security (EMSEC) Information Memoranda, National COMSEC Committee Policies, COMSEC Resources Program documents, COMSEC Equipment Engineering Bulletins, COMSEC Equipment System Descriptions, and COMSEC Technical Bulletins.
(ii) Those that relate to SIGINT. These appear as reports in various formats that bear security classifications, sometimes followed by five-letter codewords (World War II's ULTRA, for example) and often carrying warning caveats such as “This document contains codeword material” and “Utmost secrecy is necessary . . .” Formats may appear as messages having addressees, “from” and “to” sections, and as summaries with SIGINT content with or without other kinds of intelligence and comment.
(iii) RDT&E reports and information that relate to either COMSEC or SIGINT.
(2) Commonly used words that may help in identification of cryptologic documents and materials are “cipher,” “code,” “codeword,” “communications intelligence” or “COMINT,” “communications security” or “COMSEC,” “cryptanalysis,” “crypto,” “cryptography,” “cryptosystem,” “decipher,” “decode,” “decrypt,” “direction finding,” “electronic intelligence” or “ELINT,” “electronic security,” “encipher,” “encode,” “encrypt,” “intercept,” “key book,” “signals intelligence” or “SIGINT,” “signal security,” and “TEMPEST.”
§ 158.8
Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Army systems.
The following categories of Army information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this part.
(a) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) missile information, including the principle of operation of warheads (fuzing, arming, and destruct operations); quality or reliability requirements; threat data; vulnerability; ECM and ECCM); details of design, assembly, and construction; and principle of operations.
(b) BMD systems data, including the concept definition (tentative roles, threat definition, and analysis and effectiveness); detailed quantitative technical system description-revealing capabilities or unique weaknesses that are exploitable; overall assessment of specific threat-revealing vulnerability or capability; discrimination technology; and details of operational concepts.
(c) BMD optics information that may provide signature characteristics of U.S. and United Kingdom ballistic weapons.
(d) Shaped-charge technology.
(e) Fleshettes.
(f) M380 Beehive round.
(g) Electromagnetic propulsion technology.
(h) Space weapons concepts.
(i) Radar-fuzing programs.
(j) Guided projectiles technology.
(k) ECM and ECCM to weapons systems.
(l) Armor materials concepts, designs, or research.
(m) 2.75-inch Rocket System.
(n) Air Defense Command and Coordination System (AN/TSQ-51).
(o) Airborne Target Acquisition and Fire Control System.
(p) Chaparral Missile System.
(q) Dragon Guided Missile System Surface Attack, M47.
(r) Forward Area Alerting Radar (FAAR) System.
(s) Ground laser designators.
(t) Hawk Guided Missile System.
(u) Heliborne, Laser, Air Defense Suppression and Fire and Forget Guided Missile System (HELLFIRE).
(v) Honest John Missile System.
(w) Lance Field Artillery Missile System.
(x) Land Combat Support System (LCSS).
(y) M22 (SS-11 ATGM) Guided Missile System, Helicopter Armament Subsystem.
(z) Guided Missile System, Air Defense (NIKE HERCULES with Improved Capabilities with HIPAR and ANTIJAM Improvement).
(aa) Patriot Air Defense Missile System.
(bb) Pershing IA Guided Missile System.
(cc) Pershing II Guided Missile System.
(dd) Guided Missile System, Intercept Aerial M41 (REDEYE) and Associated Equipment.
(ee) U.S. Roland Missile System.
(ff) Sergeant Missile System (less warhead) (as pertains to electronics and penetration aids only).
(gg) Shillelagh Missile System.
(hh) Stinger/Stinger-Post Guided Missile System (FIM-92A).
(ii) Terminally Guided Warhead (TWG) for Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS).
(jj) TOW Heavy Antitank Weapon System.
(kk) Viper Light Antitank/Assault Weapon System.
§ 158.9
Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Navy systems.
The following categories of Navy information shall be reviewed systematically for declassification by designated DoD reviewers in accordance with this part.
(a) Naval nuclear propulsion information.
(b) Conventional surface ship information:
(1) Vulnerabilities of protective systems, specifically:
(i) Passive protection information concerning ballistic torpedo and underbottom protective systems.
(ii) Weapon protection requirement levels for conventional, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.
(iii) General arrangements, drawings, and booklets of general plans (applicable to carriers only).
(2) Ship-silencing information relative to:
(i) Signatures (acoustic, seismic, infrared, magnetic (including alternating magnetic (AM)), pressure, and underwater electric potential (UEP)).
(ii) Procedures and techniques for noise reduction pertaining to an individual ship's component.
(iii) Vibration data relating to hull and machinery.
(3) Operational characteristics related to performance as follows:
(i) Endurance or total fuel capacity.
(ii) Tactical information, such as times for ship turning, zero to maximum speed, and maximum to zero speed.
(c) All information that is uniquely applicable to nuclear-powered surface ships or submarines.
(d) Information concerning diesel submarines as follows:
(1) Ship-silencing data or acoustic warfare systems relative to:
(i) Overside, platform, and sonar noise signature.
(ii) Radiated noise and echo response.
(iii) All vibration data.
(iv) Seismic, magnetic (including AM), pressure, and UEP signature data.
(2) Details of operational assignments, that is, war plans, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and surveillance tasks.
(3) General arrangements, drawings, and plans of SS563 class submarine hulls.
(e) Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) data.
(f) Information concerning mine warfare, mine sweeping, and mine countermeasures.
(g) ECM or ECCM features and capabilities of any electronic equipment.
(h) Torpedo information as follows:
(1) Torpedo countermeasures devices: T-MK6 (FANFARE) and NAE beacons.
(2) Tactical performance, tactical doctrine, and vulnerability to counter-measures.
(i) Design performance and functional characteristics of guided missiles, guided projectiles, sonars, radars, acoustic equipments, and fire control systems.
§ 158.10
Categories of information that require review before declassification: Department of the Air Force systems.
The Department of the Air Force has determined that the categories identified in § 158.7 of this part shall apply to Air Force information.
§ 158.11
Declassification considerations.
(a) Technological developments; widespread public knowledge of the subject matter; changes in military plans, operations, systems, or equipment; changes in the foreign relations or defense commitments of the United States; and similar events may bear upon the determination of whether information should be declassified. If the responsible DoD reviewer decides that, in view of such circumstances, the public disclosure of the information being reviewed no longer would result in damage to the national security, the information shall be declassified.
(b) The following are examples of considerations that may be appropriate in deciding whether information in the categories listed in §§ 158.7 through 158.10 may be declassified when it is reviewed:
(1) The information no longer provides the United States a scientific, engineering, technical, operational, intelligence, strategic, or tactical advantage over other nations.
(2) The operational military capability of the United States revealed by the information no longer constitutes a limitation on the effectiveness of the Armed Forces.
(3) The information is pertinent to a system that no longer is used or relied on for the defense of the United States or its allies and does not disclose the capabilities or vulnerabilities of existing operational systems.
(4) The program, project, or system information no longer reveals a current weakness or vulnerability.
(5) The information pertains to an intelligence objective or diplomatic initiative that has been abandoned or achieved and will no longer damage the foreign relations of the United States.
(6) The information reveals the fact or identity of a U.S. intelligence source, method, or capability that no longer is employed and that relates to no current source, method, or capability that upon disclosure could cause damage to national security or place a person in immediate jeopardy.
(7) The information concerns foreign relations matters whose disclosure can no longer be expected to cause or increase international tension to the detriment of the national security of the United States.
(c) Declassification of information that reveals the identities of clandestine human agents shall be accomplished only in accordance with procedures established by the Director of Central Intelligence for that purpose.
(d) The NSA/CSS is the sole authority for the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information. The procedures established by the NSA/CSS to facilitate the review and declassification of classified cryptologic information are:
(1) COMSEC documents and materials. (i) If records or materials in this category are found in agency files that are not under COMSEC control, refer them to the senior COMSEC authority of the agency concerned or by appropriate channels to the following address: Director, National Security Agency, Attn: Director of Policy (Q4), Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755.
(ii) If the COMSEC information has been incorporated into other documents by the receiving agency, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before declassification.
(2) SIGINT information. (i) If the SIGINT information is contained in a document or record originated by a DoD cryptologic organization, such as the NSA/CSS, and is in the files of a noncryptologic agency, such material will not be declassified if retained in accordance with an approved records disposition schedule. If the material must be retained, it shall be referred to the NSA/CSS for systematic review for declassification.
(ii) If the SIGINT information has been incorporated by the receiving agency into documents it produces, referral to the NSA/CSS is necessary before any declassification.
§ 158.12
Department of State areas of interest.
(a) Statements of U.S. intent to defend, or not to defend, identifiable areas, or along identifiable lines, in any foreign country or region.
(b) Statements of U.S. intent militarily to attack in stated contingencies identifiable areas in any foreign country or region.
(c) Statements of U.S. policies or initiatives within collective security organizations (for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Organization of American States (OAS)).
(d) Agreements with foreign countries for the use of, or access to, military facilities.
(e) Contingency plans insofar as they involve other countries, the use of foreign bases, territory or airspace, or the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons.
(f) Defense surveys of foreign territories for purposes of basing or use in contingencies.
(g) Reports documenting conversations with foreign officials, that is, foreign government information.
§ 158.13
Central Intelligence Agency areas of interest.
(a) Cryptologic, cryptographic, or SIGINT. (Information in this category shall continue to be forwarded to the NSA/CSS in accordance with § 158.11(d). The NSA/CSS shall arrange for necessary coordination.)
(b) Counterintelligence.
(c) Special access programs
(d) Information that identifies clandestine organizations, agents, sources, or methods.
(e) Information on personnel under official or nonofficial cover or revelation of a cover arrangement.
(f) Covertly obtained intelligence reports and the derivative information that would divulge intelligence sources or methods.
(g) Methods or procedures used to acquire, produce, or support intelligence activities.
(h) CIA structure, size, installations, security, objectives, and budget.
(i) Information that would divulge intelligence interests, value, or extent of knowledge on a subject.
(j) Training provided to or by the CIA that would indicate its capability or identify personnel.
(k) Personnel recruiting, hiring, training, assignment, and evaluation policies.
(l) Information that could lead to foreign political, economic, or military action against the United States or its allies.
(m) Events leading to international tension that would affect U.S. foreign policy.
(n) Diplomatic or economic activities affecting national security or international security negotiations.
(o) Information affecting U.S. plans to meet diplomatic contingencies affecting national security.
(p) Nonattributable activities conducted abroad in support of U.S. foreign policy.
(q) U.S. surreptitious collection in a foreign nation that would affect relations with the country.
(r) Covert relationships with international organizations or foreign governments.
(s) Information related to political or economic instabilities in a foreign country threatening American lives and installations therein.
(t) Information divulging U.S. intelligence collection and assessment capabilities.
(u) U.S. and allies’ defense plans and capabilities that enable a foreign entity to develop countermeasures.
(v) Information disclosing U.S. systems and weapons capabilities or deployment.
(w) Information on research, development, and engineering that enables the United States to maintain an advantage of value to national security.
(x) Information on technical systems for collection and production of intelligence, and their use.
(y) U.S. nuclear programs and facilities.
(z) Foreign nuclear programs, facilities, and intentions.
(aa) Contractual relationships that reveal the specific interest and expertise of the CIA.
(bb) Information that could result in action placing an individual in jeopardy.
(cc) Information on secret writing when it relates to specific chemicals, reagents, developers, and microdots.
(dd) Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) (— Branch, —Division) between July 31, 1946, and December 31, 1950, marked CONFIDENTIAL or above.
(ee) Reports of the Foreign Documents Division between 1946 and 1950 marked RESTRICTED or above.
(ff) Q information reports.
(gg) FDD translations.
(hh) U reports.
Pt. 159

PART 159—DOD INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM
Sec.
159.1
Purpose.
159.2
Applicability and scope.
159.3
Policy.
159.4
Procedures.
159.5
Responsibilities.

Authority:
E.O. 12356 and 5 U.S.C. 301.

Source:
53 FR 44877, Nov. 7, 1988, unless otherwise noted.
§ 159.1
Purpose.
(a) This part updates policies and procedures of the DoD information Security Program, implements Executive Order 12356 and 32 CFR part 2001, delegates authority, and assigns responsibilities.
(b) This part authorizes the development, publication, and maintenance of the following documents, consistent with DoD 5025.1-M.
(1) DoD 5200.1-R, “Information Security Program Regulation”;
(2) DoD 5200.1-H, “Department of Defense Handbook for Writing Security Classification Guidance”;
(3) DoD 5200.1-I, “Index of Security Classification Guides”;
(4) DoD 5200.1-PH, “A Guide to Marking Classified Documents”; and
(5) Other DoD 5200.1-PH series issuances necessary to ensure or facilitate compliance with and implementation of DoD 5200.1-R and E.O. 12356 and 32 CFR part 2001.
§ 159.2
Applicability and scope.
(a) This part applies to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies (hereafter referred to as “DoD Components”).
(b) This part covers all information that is owned, produced by or for, or is under the control of the Department of Defense that shall be protected from unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security under Executive Order 12356 and ISOO Directive No. 1 and all such information received by the Department of Defense from other sources, including that received from or produced pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or international organization.
§ 159.3
Policy.
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to assure that information that warrants protection against unauthorized disclosure is properly classified and safeguarded as well as to facilitate the flow of unclassified information about DoD operations to the public.
§ 159.4
Procedures.
To carry out this policy, there is established a DoD Information Security Program that shall be administered to ensure that:
(a) Information requiring protection in the interest of national security is properly classified and safeguarded.
(b) Overclassification and unnecessary classification are avoided.
(c) Information is classified as long as required by national security considerations.
(d) Unnecessary expense to the Department of Defense, industry, and the U.S. government, resulting from protection of information no longer requiring classification, is eliminated.
(e) Declassified information is made available to the public under 32 CFR part 285.
(f) Classified inventories are reduced to the minimum necessary to meet operational requirements, thereby affording better protection to that which remains.
(g) DoD military and civilian personnel, who require access to classified information in the conduct of official business, are familiar with the requirements of DoD 5200.1-R and E.O. 12356 and 32 CFR part 2001, and that they comply with those requirements.
§ 159.5
Responsibilities.
(a) The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) shall:
(1) Direct and administer the DoD Information Security Program, establish policy, standards, criteria, and procedures to comply with E.O. 12356, except its section 3.4.
(2) Conduct an active oversight program to ensure effective implementation of DoD 5200.1-R, Executive Order 12356, and 32 CFR part 2001, to include security education and training.
(3) Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the government regarding the DoD information Security Program.
(b) The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) shall direct and administer a DoD Mandatory Declassification Review Program under section 3.4., E.O. 12356, and establish policies and procedures for processing mandatory declassification review requests, including appeals, under section 3.4(d) of E.O. 12356 and section 2001.32(a)(2)(iii) of Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 1 ^1 that make maximum use of DoD Component resources and systems established to implement 32 CFR part 285.
^1 Copies may be obtained, if needed, from the Director, Information Security Oversight, General Service Administration, Washington, DC 20405.
(c) The Head of each DoD Component shall:
(1) Designate a senior official who shall be responsible for the direction and administration of the Component's Information Security Program, to include active oversight, and security education and training programs to ensure implementation of DoD 5200.1-R within the Component.
(2) Ensure that funding and resources are adequate to carry out such oversight, and security education and training programs.
(3) Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the government regarding the Component's Information Security Program.
(4) Establish procedures to limit access to classified information to those who need to know.
(5) Develop plans for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case of fire, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorist activities, or enemy action. These plans shall include the treatment of classified information located in foreign countries.
(d) Pursuant to E.O. 12356, the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, as the designee of the Secretary of Defense, is authorized to impose special requirements with respect to the marking, reproduction, distribution, accounting, and protection of and access to classified cryptologic information. The Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, will develop special procedures for the declassification review of cryptologic information. This authority may not be redelegated.
Pt. 159a

PART 159a—INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION

Subpart A—Policy
Sec.
159a.1
Purpose.
159a.2
Applicability.
159a.3
Nongovernment operations.
159a.4
Combat operations.
159a.5
Atomic energy material.
159a.6
Sensitive compartmented and communications security information.
159a.7
Automatic Data Processing systems.

Subpart B—General Provisions
159a.9
Definitions.
159a.10
Policies.
159a.11
Security classification designations.
159a.12
Authority to classify, downgrade, and declassify.

Subpart C—Classification
159a.14
Classification responsibilities.
159a.15
Classification principles, criteria, and considerations.
159a.16
Duration of original classification.
159a.17
Classification guides.
159a.18
Resolution of conflicts.
159a.19
Obtaining classification evaluations.
159a.20
Information developed by private sources.
159a.21
Regrading.
159a.22
Industrial operations.

Subpart D—Declassification and Downgrading
159a.24
General provisions.
159a.25
Systematic review.
159a.26
Mandatory declassification review.
159a.27
Declassification of transferred documents or material.
159a.28
Downgrading.
159a.29
Miscellaneous.

Subpart E—Marking
159a.31
General provisions.
159a.32
Specific markings on documents.
159a.33
Markings on special categories of material.
159a.34
Classification authority, duration, and change in classification markings.
159a.35
Additional warning notices.
159a.36
Remarking old material.

Subpart F—Safekeeping and Storage
159a.37
Storage and storage equipment.
159a.38
Custodial precautions.
159a.39
Activity entry and exit inspection program.

Subpart G—Compromise of Classified Information
159a.41
Policy.
159a.42
Cryptographic and sensitive compartmented information.
159a.43
Responsibility of discoverer.
159a.44
Preliminary inquiry.
159a.45
Investigation.
159a.46
Responsibility of authority ordering investigation.
159a.47
Responsibility of originator.
159a.48
System of control of damage assessments.
159a.49
Compromises involving more than one agency.
159a.50
Espionage and deliberate compromise.
159a.51
Unauthorized absentees.

Subpart H—Access, Dissemination, and Accountability
159a.53
Access.
159a.54
Dissemination.
159a.55
Accountability and control.

Subpart I—Transmission
159a.57
Methods of transmission or transportation.
159a.58
Preparation of material for transmission, shipment, or conveyance.
159a.59
Restrictions, procedures, and authorization concerning escort or handcarrying of classified information.

Subpart J—Disposal and Destruction
159a.61
Policy.
159a.62
Methods of destruction.
159a.63
Destruction procedures.
159a.64
Records of destruction.
159a.65
Classified waste.
159a.66
Classified document retention.

Subpart K—Security Education
159a.68
Responsibility and objectives.
159a.69
Scope and principles.
159a.70
Initial briefings.
159a.71
Refresher briefings.
159a.72
Foreign travel briefings.
159a.73
Termination briefings.

Subpart L—Foreign Government Information
159a.75
Classification.
159a.76
Declassification.
159a.77
Marking.
159a.78
Protective measures.

Subpart M—Special Access Programs
159a.80
Policy.
159a.81
Establishment of special access programs.
159a.82
Review of special access programs.
159a.83
Control and central office administration.
159a.84
Codewords and nicknames.
159a.85
Reporting of special access programs.
159a.86
Accounting for special access programs.
159a.87
Limitations on access.
159a.88
“Carve-Out” contracts.
159a.89
Oversight reviews.

Subpart N—Program Management
159a.91
Executive branch oversight and policy direction.
159a.92
Department of Defense.
159a.93
DoD components.
159a.94
Information requirements.
159a.95
Defense Information Security Committee.

Subpart O—Administration Sanctions
159a.97
Individual responsibility.
159a.98
Violation subject to sanctions.
159a.99
Corrective action.
159a.100
Administrative discrepancies.
159a.101
Reporting violations.
Appendix A to Part 159a—Equivalent Foreign and International Pact Organization Security Classifications
Appendix B to Part 159a—General Accounting Office Officials Authorized to Certify Security Clearances
Appendix C to Part 159a—Instructions Governing Use of Code Words, Nicknames, and Exercise Terms
Appendix D to Part 159a—Federal Aviation Administration Air Transportation, Security Field Offices
Appendix E to Part 159a—Transportation Plan

Authority:
E.O. 12356, 5 U.S.C. 301.

Source:
54 FR 26959, June 27, 1989, unless otherwise noted.

Subpart A—Policy
§ 159a.1
Purpose.
Information of the Department of Defense relating to national security shall be protected against unauthorized disclosure as long as required by national security considerations. This part establishes a system for classification, downgrading and declassification of information; sets forth policies and procedures to safeguard such information; and provides for oversight and administrative sanctions for violations.
§ 159a.2
Applicability.
This part governs the DoD Information Security Program and takes precedence over all DoD Component regulations that implement that Program. Under 32 CFR part 159, E.O. 12356, and Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) Directive No. 1, it establishes, for the Department of Defense, uniform policies, standards, criteria, and procedures for the security classification, downgrading, declassification, and safeguarding of information that is owned by, produced for or by, or under the control of the Department of Defense or its Components.
§ 159a.3
Nongovernment operations.
Except as otherwise provided herein, the provisions of this part that are relevant to operations of nongovernment personnel entrusted with classified information shall be made applicable thereto by contracts or other legally binding instruments. (See DOD Directive 5220.22 ^1 , DoD 5220.22-R ^2 , and DoD 5220.22-M ^3 .
^1 Copies may be obtained, if needed, from the Naval Publications and Forms Center, Attn: Code 106, 5801 Tabor Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19120.
^2 Copies may be obtained at cost, from the National Technical Information Service, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.
^3 Copies may be obtained, at cost, from the Government Printing Office.
§ 159a.4
Combat operations.
The provisions of this part relating to accountability, dissemination, transmission, or safeguarding of classified information may be modified by military commanders but only to the extent necessary to meet local conditions in connection with combat or combat-related operations. Classified information should be introduced into forward combat areas or zones or areas of potential hostile activity only when essential to accomplish the military mission.
§ 159a.5
Atomic energy material.
Nothing in this part supersedes any requirement related to “Restricted Data” in the Atomic Energy Act of August 30, 1954, as amended, or the regulations of the Department of Energy under that Act. “Restricted Data” and material designated as “Formerly Restricted Data,” shall be handled, protected, classified, downgraded, and declassified to conform with Pub. L. 83-703 and the regulations issued pursuant thereto.
§ 159a.6
Sensitive compartmented and communications security information.
(a) Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) and Communications Security (COMSEC) Information shall be handled and controlled in accordance with applicable national directives and DOD Directives and Instructions. Other classified information, while in established SCI or COMSEC areas, may be handled in the same manner as SCI or COMSEC information. Classification principles and procedures, markings, downgrading, and declassification actions prescribed in this part apply to SCI and COMSEC information.
(b) Pursuant to 32 CFR part 159, the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service may prescribe special rules and procedures for the handling, reporting of loss, storage, and access to classified communications security devices, equipments, and materials in mobile, hand-held or transportable systems, or that are used in conjunction with commercial telephone systems, or in similar circumstances where operational demands preclude the application of standard safeguards. These special rules may include procedures for safeguarding such devices and materials, and penalties for the negligent loss of government property.
§ 159a.7
Automatic Data Processing systems.
This part applies to protection of classified information processed, stored or used in, or communicated, displayed or disseminated by an automatic data processing (ADP) system. Additional security policy, responsibilities, and requirements applicable specifically to ADP systems are contained in DoD Directive 5200.28 ^4 and DoD 5200.28-M.
^4 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.

Subpart B—General Provisions
§ 159a.9
Definitions.
(a) Access. The ability and opportunity to obtain knowledge of classified information.
(b) Applicable Associated Markings. The markings, other than classfication markings, and warning notices listed or refered to in § 159a.31(d).
(c) Carve-Out. A classified contract issued in connection with an approved Special Access Program in which the Defense Investigative Service has been relieved of inspection, responsibility in whole or in part under the Defense Industrial Security Program.
(d) Classification Authority. The authority vested in an official of the Department of Defense to make an initial determination that information requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security.
(e) Classification Guide. A document issued by an authorized original classifier that prescribes the level of classification and appropriate declassification instructions for specified information to be classified derivatively. For purposes of this part, this term does not include DD Form 254, “Contract Security Classification Specification.”
(f) Classified Information. Information or material that is:
(1) Owned by, produced for or by, or under the control of the U.S. Government; and
(2) Determined under E.O. 12356 or prior orders and this part to require protection against unauthorized disclosure; and
(3) So designated.
(g) Classifier. An individual who makes a classification determination and applies a security classification to information or material. A classifier may be an original classification authority or a person who derivatively assigns a security classification based on a property classified source or a classification guide.
(h) Communications Security (COMSEC). The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value which might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications and to ensure the authenticity of such communications. COMSEC includes cryptosecurity, emission security, transmission security, and physical security of COSMEC material and information.
(i) Compromise. The disclosure of classified information to persons not authorized access thereto.
(j) Confidential Source. Any individual or organization that has provided, or that may reasonably be expected to provide, information to the United States on matters pertaining to the national security with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information or relationship, or both, be held in confidence.
(k) Continental United States (CONUS). United States territory, including adjacent territorial waters, located within the North American continent between Canada and Mexico.
(l) Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI). A secure telecommunications or information handling equipment ancillary device, or associated cryptographic component, which is unclassified but controlled.

Note:
Equipments and components so designated bear the designator “Controlled Cryptographic Item” or “CCI.”)
(m) Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information. That Top Secret Restricted Data or Secret Restricted Data revealing the theory of operation or design of the components of a thermo-nuclear or implosion-type fission bomb, warhead, demolition munition or test device. Specifically excluded is information concerning arming, fuzing, and firing systems; limited life components; and total contained quantities of fissionable, fusionable, and high explosive materials by type. Among these excluded items are the components which DoD personnel set, maintain, operate, test, or replace.
(n) Custodian. An individual who has possession of or is otherwise charged with the responsibility for safeguarding or accounting for classified information.
(o) Declassification. The determination that classified information no longer requires, in the interest of national security, any degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with a removal or cancellation of the classification designation.
(p) Declassification Event. An event that eliminates the need for continued classification of information.
(q) Derivative Classification. A determination that information is in substance the same as information currently classified, and the application of the classification markings.
(r) Document. Any recorded information regardless of its physical form or characteristics, including, without limitation, written or printed matter, data processing cards and tapes, maps, charts, paintings, drawings, engravings, sketches, working notes and papers, or reproductions by any means or process, and sound, voice, magnetic or electronic recordings in any form.
(s) DoD Component. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Military Departments, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Unified and Specified Commands, and the Defense Agencies.
(t) Downgrade. A determination that classified information requires, in the interest of national security, a lower degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such lower degree of protection.
(u) Foreign Government Information. Information that is:
(1) Provided to the United States by a foreign government or governments, an international organization of governments, or any element thereof with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence; or
(2) Produced by the United States pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangement with a foreign government or governments or an international organization of governments, or any element thereof, requiring that the information, the arrangement, or both, are to be held in confidence.
(v) Formerly Restricted Data. Information removed from the Restricted Data category upon a joint determination by the Department of Energy (or antecedent agencies) and the Department of Defense that such information relates primarily to the military utilization of atomic weapons and that such information can be safeguarded adequately as classified defense information. For purposes of foreign dissemination, however, such information is treated in the same manner as Restricted Data.
(w) Information. Knowledge that can be communicated by any means.
(x) Information Security. The result of any system of policies and procedures for identifying, controlling, and protecting from unauthorized disclosure, information whose protection is authorized by executive order or statute.
(y) Intelligence Activity. An activity that an agency within the Intelligence Community is authorized to conduct under E.O. 12333.
(z) Limited Dissemination. Restrictive controls for classified information established by an original classification authority to emphasize need-to-know protective measures available within the regular security system.
(aa) Material. Any product or substance on, or in which, information is embodied.
(bb) National Security. The national defense and foreign relations of the United States.
(cc) Need-to-know. A determination made by a possessor of classified information that a prospective recipient, in the interest of national security, has a requirement for access to, or knowledge, or possession of the classified information in order to accomplish lawful and authorized Government purposes.
(dd) Original Classification. An initial determination that information requires, in the interest of national security, protection against unauthorized disclosure, together with a classification designation signifying the level of protection required.
(ee) Regrade. A determination that classified information requires a different degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together with a change of classification designation that reflects such different degree of protection.
(ff) Restricted Data. All data concerning:
(1) Design, manufacture or utilization of atomic weapons;
(2) The production of special nuclear material; or
(3) The use of special nuclear material in the production of energy, but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category under section 142 of Pub. L. 83-703.
(gg) Security Clearance. A determination that a person is eligible under the standards of DoD 5200.2-R for access to classified information.
(hh) Senior Information Security Authority. A senior official designated in writing by the head of each DoD Component to be responsible for implementation of the Information Security Program within the Component.
(ii) Sensitive Compartmented Information. Information and material that requires special controls for restricted handling within compartmented intelligence systems and for which compartmentation is established.
(jj) Special Access Program. Any program approved in accordance with subpart M of this part which imposes need-to-know or access controls beyond those normally required for access to Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret information.
(kk) Special Activity. An activity, or functions in support of such activity, conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad that is planned and executed so that the role of the U.S. Government is neither apparent nor acknowledged publicly; but that is not intended to influence U.S. political processes, public opinion, policies, or media, and does not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions.
(ll) Unauthorized Disclosure. A communication or physical transfer of classified information to an unauthorized recipient.
(mm) United States and Its Territories, Possessions, Administrative, and Commonwealth Areas. The 50 States; the District of Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico; the Territories of Guam, American Samoa, and the Virgin Islands; the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands; and the Possessions, Midway and Wake Islands.
(nn) Upgrade. A determination that certain classified information requires, in the interest of national security, a higher degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure than currently provided, together with a changing of the classification designation to reflect such higher degree.
§ 159a.10
Policies.
(a) Classification—(1) Basic Policy. Except as provided in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, E.O. 12356, as implemented by the ISOO Directive No. 1, and this part, provides the only basis for classifying information. It is the policy of the Department of Defense to make available to the public as much information concerning its activities as possible consistent with the need to protect the national security. Accordingly, security classification shall be applied only to protect the national security.
(2) Resolution of Doubts. Unnecessary classification and higher than necessary classification should be avoided. If there is reasonable doubt about the need to classify information, it shall be safeguarded as if it were classsified “Confidential” pending a determination by an original classification authority, who shall make this determination within 30 days. If there is reasonable doubt about the appropriate level of classification, it shall be safeguarded at the higher level of classification pending a determination by an original classification authority, who shall make this determination within 30 days. Upon a classification determination, markings shall be applied in accordance with subpart E of this part.
(3) Duration. Information shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations. Each decision to classify requires a simultaneous determination of the duration such classification must remain in force or that the duration of classification cannot be determined.
(b) Declassification. Decisions concerning declassification shall be based on the loss of the information's sensitivity with the passage of time or upon the occurrence of a declassification event.
(c) Safeguarding. Information classified under this part shall be afforded the level of protection against unauthorized disclosure commensurate with the level of classification assigned under the varying conditions that may arise in connection with its use, dissemination, storage, movement or transmission, and destruction.
§ 159a.11
Security classification designations.
(a) General. Information or material that requires protection against unauthorized disclosure in the interest of national security shall be classified in one of three designations, namely: “Top Secret,” “Secret,” or “Confidential.” The markings “For Official Use Only,” and “Limited Official Use” shall not be used to identify classified information. Moreover, no other term such as “Sensitive,” “Conference,” or “Agency” shall be used in conjunction with the authorized classification designations to identify classified information.
(b) Top Secret. “Top Secret” shall be applied only to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to the national security. Examples of exceptionally grave damage include armed hostilities against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations vitally affecting the national security; the compromise of vital national defense plans or complex cryptologic and communications intelligence systems; the revelation of sensitive intelligence operations; and the disclosure of scientific or technological developments vital to national security.
(c) Secret. “Secret” shall be applied only to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security. Examples of serious damage include disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the national security; significant impairment of a program or policy directly related to the national security; revelation of significant military plans or intelligence operations; compromise of significant military plans or intelligence operations; and compromise of significant scientific or technological developments relating to national security.
(d) Confidential. “Confidential” shall be applied only to information or material the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. Examples of damage include the compromise of information that indicates strength of ground, air, and naval forces in the United States and overseas areas; disclosure of technical information used for training, maintenance, and inspection of classified munitions of war; revelation of performance characteristics, test data, design, and production data on munitions of war.
§ 159a.12
Authority to classify, downgrade, and declassify.
(a) Original Classification Authority—(1) Control. Authority for original classification of information as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential may be exercised only by the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and by officials to whom such authority is specifically delegated in accordance with and subject to the restrictions of this section of the part. In the absence of an original classification authority, the person designated to act in his or her absence may exercise the classifier's authority.
(2) Delegation of Classification Authority. Original classification authority shall not be delegated to persons who only reproduce, extract, or summarize classified information, or who only apply classification markings derived from source material or as directed by a classification guide. Delegations of original classification authority shall be limited to the minimum number required for efficient administration and to those officials whose duties involve the origination and evaluation of information warranting classification at the level stated in the delegation.
(i) Top Secret. Only the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the senior official designated by each under § 5.3(a) of E.O. 12356, provided that official has original Top Secret classification authority, may delegate original Top Secret classification authority. Such delegation may only be made to officials who are determined to have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise such authority.
(ii) Secret and Confidential. Only the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the senior official designated by each under § 5.3(a) of E.O. 12356, and officials with original Top Secret classification authority, may delegate original Secret and Confidential classification authority to officials whom they determine respectively to have a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise such authority.
(iii) Each delegation of original classification authority shall be in writing and shall specify the title of the position held by the recipient.
(3) Requests for Classification Authority. (i) A request for the delegation of original classification authority shall be made only when there is a demonstrable and continuing need to exercise such authority and the following conditions exist:
(A) The normal course of operations or missions of the organization results in the origination of information warranting classification;
(B) There is a substantial degree of local autonomy in operations or missions as distinguished from dependence upon a higher level of command or supervision for relatively detailed guidance;
(C) There is adequate knowledge by the originating level to make sound classification determinations as distinguished from having to seek such knowledge from a higher level of command or supervision; and
(D) There is a valid reason why already designated classification authorities in the originator's chain of command or supervision have not issued or cannot issue classification guidance to meet the originator's normal needs.
(ii) Each request for a delegation of original classification authority shall:
(A) Identify the title of the position held by the nominee and the nominee's organization;
(B) Contain a description of the circumstances, consistent with paragraph (a)(3)(i) of this section, that justify the delegation of such authority; and
(C) Be submitted through established channels to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Military Department concerned, the senior official designated by each under § 5.3(a) of E.O. 12356, or the appropriate Top Secret classification authority.
(4) Training Requirements for Original Classification Authorities. Heads of DoD Component shall establish procedures to ensure that all original classification authorities in their Component, to include themselves, are indoctrinated in the fundamentals of security classification, limitations on their authority to classify information, and their responsibilities as such. This indoctrination shall be a prerequisite to the exercise of such authority and shall be a matter of record that is subject to audit. Heads of DoD Components shall ensure this indoctrination is given to all present original classification authorities within 12 months of the effective date of this part.
(b) Derivative Classification Responsibility. Derivative application of classification markings is a responsibility of those who incorporate, paraphrase, restate, or generate in new form, information that is already classified, or those who apply markings in accordance with guidance from an original classification authority. Persons who apply derivative classifications should take care to determine whether their paraphrasing, restating, or summarizing of classified information has removed all or part of the basis for classification. Persons who apply such derivative classification markings shall:
(1) Respect original classification decisions;
(2) Verify the information's current level of classification as far as practicable before applying the markings; and
(3) Carry forward to any newly created documents the assigned dates or events for declassification and any additional authorized markings.
(c) Record and Report Requirements. (1) Records of designations of original classification authority shall be maintained as follows:
(i) Top Secret Authorities. A current listing by title and organization of officials designated to exercise original Top Secret classification authority shall be maintained by:
(A) The Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) (ODUSD(P)) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the headquarters of each Unified Command and the headquarters of subordinate Joint Commands; and the Defense Agencies.
(B) The Offices of the Secretaries of the Military Departments for the officials of their respective departments, including Specified Commands but excluding officials from their respective departments wo are serving in headquarters elements of Unified Commands and headquarters of Joint Commands subordinate thereto.
(ii) Secret and Confidential Authorities. A current listing by title and organization of officials designated to exercise original Secret and Confidential classification authority shall be maintained by:
(A) The ODUSD(P) for the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(B) The offices of the Secretaries of the Military Departments for the officials of their respective departments, including Specified Commands but excluding officials from their respective departments who are serving in headquarters elements of Unified Commands and headquarters elements of Joint Commands subordinate thereto.
(C) The Director, Joint Staff, for the OJCS.
(D) The Commanders-in-Chief of the Unified Commands, for their respective headquarters and the headquarters of subordinate Joint Commands.
(E) The Directors of the Defense Agencies, for their respective agencies.
(iii) If the listing of titles of positions and organizations prescribed in paragraphs (c)(1) (i) and (ii) of this section discloses intelligence or other information that either qualifies for security classification protection or otherwise qualifies to be withheld from public release under statute, some other means may be recommended by the DoD Component by which original classification authorities can be readily identified. Such recommendations shall be submitted to ODUSD(P) for approval.
(iv) The listings prescribed in paragraphs (c)(1) (i) and (ii) of this section shall be reviewed at least annually by the senior official designated in or pursuant to § 159a.92(a)(1), § 159a.93 (a) or (b) or designee to ensure that officials so listed have demonstrated a continuing need to exercise original classification authority.
(2) The DoD Components that maintain listings of designated original classification authorities shall, upon request, submit copies of such listings to ODUSD(P).
(d) Declassification and Downgrading Authority. (1) Authority to declassify and downgrade information classified under provisions of this part shall be exercised as follows:
(i) By the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments, with respect to all information over which their respective Departments exercise final classification jurisdiction;
(ii) By the official who authorized the original classification, if that official is still serving in the same position, by a successor, or by a supervisory official of either; and
(iii) By other officials designated for the purpose in accordance with paragraph (d)(2) of this section.
(2) The Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Directors of the Defense Agencies, or their senior officials designated under § 159a.93 (b) or (c) may designate additional officials at the lowest practicable echelons of command and supervision to exercise declassification and downgrading authority over classified information in their functional areas of interest. Records of officials so designated shall be maintained in the same manner as prescribed in § 159a.12(c)(1)(i) for records of designations of original classification authority.

Subpart C—Classification
§ 159a.14
Classification responsibilities.
(a) Accountability of Classifiers. (1) Classifiers are accountable for the propriety of the classifications they assign, whether by exercise of original classification authority or by derivative classification.
(2) An official who classifies a document or other material and is identified thereon as the classifier is and continues to be an accountable classifier even though the document or material is approved or signed at a higher level in the same organization.
(b) Classification Approval. (1) When an official signs or approves a document or other material already marked to reflect a particular level of classification, he or she shall review the information contained therein to determine if the classification markings are appropriate. If, in his or her judgment, the classification markings are not supportable, he or she shall, at that time, cause such markings to be removed or changed as appropriate to reflect accurately the classification of the information involved.
(2) A higher level official through or to whom a document or other material passes for signature or approval becomes jointly responsible with the accountable classifier for the classification assigned. Such official has discretion to decide whether a subordinate who has classification authority shall be identified as the accountable classifier when he or she has exercised that authority.
(c) Classification Planning. (1) Advance classification planning is an essential part of the development of any plan, operation, program, research and development project, or procurement action that involves classified information. Classification must be considered from the outset to assure adequate protection for the information and for the activity itself, and to eliminate impediments to the execution or implementation of the plan, operations order, program, project or procurement action.
(2) The official charged with developing any plan, program or project in which classification is a factor, shall include under an identifiable title or heading, classification guidance covering the information involved. The guidance shall conform to the requirements contained in § 159a.17.
(d) Challenges to Classification. If holders of classified information have substantial reason to believe that the information is classified improperly or unnecessarily, they shall communicate that belief to their security manager or the classifier of the information to bring about any necessary correction.
(1) Each DoD Component shall establish procedures whereby holders of classified information may challenge the decision of the classifier.
(2) Challenges to classification made under this subsection shall include sufficient description of the information being challenged to permit identification of the information and its classifier with reasonable effort. Challenges to classification shall also include the reason or reasons why the challenger believes that the information is classified improperly or unnecessarily.
(3) Challenges received under this subsection shall be acted upon within 30 days of receipt. The challenger shall be notified of any changes made as a result of the challenge or the reasons why no change is made.
(4) Pending final determination of a challenge to classification, the information or document in question shall be safeguarded as required for the level of classification initially assigned.
(5) The fact that an employee or military member of the Department of Defense has issued a challenge to classification shall not in any way result in or serve as a basis for adverse personnel action.
(6) The provisions of this paragraph do not apply to or affect declassification review actions undertaken under the mandatory review requirements of § 159a.26 of this part or under the provisions of 32 CFR part 285.
§ 159a.15
Classification principles, criteria, and considerations.
(a) Reasoned Judgment. Reasoned judgment shall be exercised in making classification decisions. A positive basis must exist for classification. Both advantages and disadvantages of classification must be weighed. If, after consideration of the provisions of this section, there is reasonable doubt, the provisions of § 159a.10(a)(2) apply.
(b) Identification of Specific Information. Before a classification determination is made, each item of information that may require protection shall be identified. This requires identification of that specific information that comprises the basis for a particular national advantage or advantages that, if the information were compromised, would or could be damaged, minimized, or lost, thereby adversely affecting national security.
(c) Specific Classifying Criteria. A determination to classify shall be made only by an original classification authority when, first, the information is within paragraphs (c) (1) through (10) of this section; and second, the unauthorized disclosure of the information, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security. The determination involved in the first step is separate and distinct from that in the second. Except as provided in paragraph (d) of this section, the fact that the information falls under one or more of the criteria shall not mean that the information automatically meets the damage criteria. Information shall be considered for classification if it concerns:
(1) Military plans, weapons, or operations;
(2) Vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security;
(3) Foreign government information;
(4) Intelligence activities including special activities, or intelligence sources or methods;
(5) Foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States;
(6) Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to the national security;
(7) U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities;
(8) Cryptology;
(9) A confidential source; or
(10) Other categories of information that are related to national security and that require protection against unauthorized disclosure as determined by the Secretary of Defense or Secretaries of the Military Departments. Recommendations concerning the need to designate additional categories of information that may be considered for classification shall be forwarded through channels to the appropriate Secretary for determination. Each such determination shall be reported promptly to the Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P), for promulgation in an Appendix to this part and reporting to the Director, ISOO.
(d) Presumption of Damage. Unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information, the identity of a confidential foreign source, or intelligence sources or methods is presumed to cause damage to the national security.
(e) Limitations on Classification. (1) classification may not be used to conceal violations of law, inefficiency, or administrative error, to prevent embarrassment to a person, organization or agency, or to restrain competition.
(2) Basic scientific research information not clearly related to national security may not be classified.
(3) A product of nongovernment research and development that does not incorporate or reveal classified information to which the producer or developer was given prior access may not be classified until and unless the government acquires a proprietary interest in the product. This prohibition does not affect the provisions of the Patent Secrecy Act of 1952.
(4) References to classified documents that do not reveal classified information may not be classified or used as a basis for classification.
(5) Classification may not be used to limit dissemination of information that is not classifiable under the provisions of E.O. 12356 or this part or to prevent or delay public release of such information.
(6) Information may be classified or reclassified after receiving a request for it under the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, or the mandatory review provisions of this part (§ 159a.26) if such classification is consistent with this part and is accomplished personally and on a document-by-document basis, except as provided in paragraph (e)(7) of this section, by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense, by the Secretaries or Under Secretaries of the Military Departments, by the senior official designated by each Secretary under § 5.3(a) of E.O. 12356, or by an official with original Top Secret classification authority.
(7) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments may reclassify information previously declassified and disclosed, and they may classify unclassified information that has been disclosed, if they determine in writing that the information requires protection in the interest of national security and the information may reasonably be recovered. Any such reclassification or classification shall be reported to the DUSD(P) for subsequent reporting to the Director, ISOO.
(f) Classifying Scientific Research Data. Ordinarily, except for information that meets the definition of Restricted Data, basic scientific research or its results shall not be classified. However, classification would be appropriate if the information concerns an unusually significant scientific breakthrough and there is sound reason to believe that it is not known or within the state-of-the-art of other nations, and it supplies the United States with an advantage directly related to national security.
(g) Classifying Documents. Each document and portion thereof shall be classified on the basis of the information it contains or reveals. The fact that a document makes reference to a classified document is not a basis for classification unless the reference citation, standing alone, reveals classified information. The overall classification of a document or group of physically-connected documents shall be at least as high as that of the most highly classified component. The subject or title of a classified document normally should be unclassified. When the information revealed by a subject or title warrants classification, an unclassified short title should be added for reference purposes.
(h) Classifying Material Other Than Documents. (1) Items of equipment or other physical objects shall be classified only when classified information may be derived from them by visual observation of their internal or external appearance or structure, or by their operation, test, application, or use. The overall classification assigned to end items of equipment or objects shall be at least as high as the highest classification of any of its integrated parts.
(2) If mere knowledge of the existence of the item of equipment or object would compromise or nullify its national security advantage, its existence would warrant classification.
(i) State of the Art and Intelligence. Classification requires consideration of the information available from intelligence sources concerning the extent to which the same or similar information is known or is available to others. It is also important to consider whether it is known, publicly or internationally, that the United States has the information or even is interested in the subject matter. The state-of-the-art in other nations may often be a vital consideration.
(j) Effect of Open Publication. Classified information shall not be declassified automatically as a result of any unofficial publication or inadvertent or unauthorized disclosure in the United States or abroad of identical or similar information. Appearance in the public domain of information currently classified or being considered for classification does not preclude initial or continued classification. However, such disclosures require immediate determination of the degree of damage to the national security and reevaluation of the information to determine whether the publication has so compromised the information that downgrading or declassification is warranted. Similar consideration must be given to related items of information in all programs, projects, or items incorporating or pertaining to the compromised items of information. Holders should continue classification until advised to the contrary by a competent government authority.
(k) Reevaluation of Classification Because of Compromise. Classified information, and information related thereto, that has been lost or possibly compromised, shall be reevaluated and acted upon as follows:
(1) The original classifying authority, upon learning that a loss or possible compromise of specific classified information has occurred, shall prepare a written damage assessment and;
(i) Reevaluate the information involved and determine whether (A) Its classification should be continued without change; (B) The specific information, or parts therof, should be modified to minimize or nullify the effects of the reported compromise and the classification retained; (C) Declassification, downgrading, or upgrading is warranted; and (D) Counter-measures are appropriate and feasible to negate or minimize the effect of the compromise.
(ii) Give prompt notice to all holders of such information when the determination is within categories (A), (C), or (D) of paragraph (k)(1)(i) of this section.
(2) Upon learning that a compromise or probable compromise has occurred, any official having original classification jurisdiction over related information shall reevaluate the related information and determine whether one of the courses of action enumerated in paragraph (k)(1)(i) of this section should be taken or, instead, whether upgrading of the related information is warranted. When such a determination is within categories (B), (C), or (D) of paragraph (k)(1)(i) of this section, that upgrading of the related items is warranted, prompt notice of the determination shall be given to all holders of the related information.
(l) Compilation of Information. Certain information that would otherwise be unclassified may require classification when combined or associated with other unclassified information. However, a compilation of unclassified items of information should normally not be classified. In unusual circumstances, classification may be required if the combination of unclassified items of information provides an added factor that warrants classification under paragraph (c) of this section. Classification on this basis shall be fully supported by a written explanation that will be provided with the material so classified.
(m) Extracts of Information. Information extracted from a classified source shall be derivatively classified or not classified in accordance with the classification markings shown in the source. The overall and internal markings of the source should supply adequate classification guidance. If internal markings or classification guidance are not found in the source, and no reference is made to an applicable and available classification guide, the extracted information shall be classified according either to the overall marking of the source, or guidance obtained from the classifier of the source material.
§ 159a.16
Duration of original classification.
(a) General. When a determination is made by an official with authority to classify originally information as Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential, such official must also determine how long the classification shall remain in effect.
(b) Duration of Classification. (1) Information shall be classified as long as required by national security considerations.
(2) When it can be determined, a specific date or event for declassification shall be set by the original classification authority at the time the information is classified originally. Such dates or events shall be consistent with national security. Any event specified for declassification shall be an event certain to occur.
(3) Original classification authorities may not be able to predetermine a date or event for automatic declassification in which case they shall provide for the indefinite duration of classification.
(4) Information classified under predecessor orders and marked for declassification review shall remain classified until reviewed for declassification under the provisions of this part.
(c) Subsequent Extension of Duration of Classification. The duration of classification specified at the time of original classification may be extended only by officials with requisite original classification authority and only if all known holders of the information can be notified of such action before the date or event previously set for declassification. Any decision to continue classification of information designated for automatic declassification under E.O. 12065 or predecessor orders, other than on a document-by-document basis, shall be reported to the DUSD(P) who shall, in turn, report to the Director, ISOO.
§ 159a.17
Classification guides.
(a) General. (1) A classification guide shall be issued for each classified system, program, plan, or project as soon as practicable before the initial funding or implementation of the system, program, plan or project. Successive operating echelons shall prescribe more detailed supplemental guides that are considered essential to assure accurate and consistent classification. In preparing classification guides, originators shall review DoD 5200.1-H ^5.
^5 See footnote 2 to § 159a.3.
(2) Classification guides shall:
(i) Identify the information elements to be protected, using categorization to the extent necessary to ensure that the information involved can be identified readily and uniformly;
(ii) State which the classification designations (that is, Top Secret, Secret, or Confidential) applies to each element or category of information;
(iii) State declassification instructions for each element or category of information in terms of a period of time, the occurrence of an event, or a notation that the information shall not be declassified automatically without approval of the originating agency; and
(iv) State any special public release procedures and foreign disclosure considerations.
(3) Each classification guide shall be approved personally and in writing by an official who:
(i) Has program or supervisory responsibility over the information or is the senior agency official designated by the Secretary of Defense or Secretaries of the Military Departments in accordance with § 5.3(a) of E.O. 12356; and
(ii) Is authorized to classify information originally at the highest level of classification prescribed in the guide.
(b) Multiservice Interest. For each classified system, program, project, plan, or item involving more than one DoD Component, a classification guide shall be issued by: (1) The element in the Office of the Secretary of Defense that assumes or is expressly designated to exercise overall cognizance over it; or (2) The DoD Component that is expressly designated to serve as the executive or administrative agent for the particular effort. When there is doubt which Component has cognizance of the information involved, the matter shall be referred to the DUSD(P) for resolution.
(c) Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation. A program security classification guide shall be developed for each system and equipment development program that involves research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) of classified technical information. For each such program covered by an approved Decision Coordinating Paper (DCP) or Program Objective Memorandum (POM), initial basic classification guidance applicable to technical characteristics of the system or equipment shall be developed and submitted with the proposed DCP or POM to the Director, Defense Research and Engineering for approval. A detailed classification guide shall be developed and issued as near in time as possible to the approval of the DCP or POM.
(d) Project Phases. Whenever possible, classification guides shall cover specifically each phase of transition, that is, RDT&E, procurement, production, service use, and obsolescence, with changes in assigned classifications to reflect the changing sensitivity of the information involved.
(e) Review of Classification Guides. (1) Classification guides shall be reviewed by the originator for currency and accuracy not less than once every 2 years. Changes shall be issued promptly. If no changes are made, the originator shall so annotate the record copy and show the date of the review.
(2) Classification guides issued before August 1, 1982, that are in current use must be updated to meet the requirements of paragraph (a)(2) of this section. Such updating shall be accomplished by the next biennial review. Converting previous declassification determinations directed by classification guides shall be accomplished in accordance with the following:
(i) Automatic declassification dates or events remain in force unless changed by competent authority in accordance with § 159a.16(c).
(ii) Dates for declassification review shall be changed to automatic declassification dates or provide for the indefinite duration of classification.
(f) Distribution of Classification Guides. (1) A copy of each approved classification guide and changes thereto other than those covering SCI or a Special Access Program and which discloses information that require special access, shall be sent to the Director of Freedom of Information and Security Review, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), and to the Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P). A copy of each approved classification guide covering SCI shall be submitted to and maintained by the Senior Intelligence Officer who has security cognizance over the issuing activity.
(2) Two copies of each approved classification guide and its changes shall be sent by the originator to the Administrator, Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), Defense Logistic Agency, unless such guide is classified Top Secret, or covers SCI, or is determined by the approval authority of the guide to be too sensitive for automatic secondary distribution to DoD Components, such as a Special Access Program guide revealing the nature of the Program. Each classification guide forwarded to DTIC must bear distribution statement B, C, D, E, F, or X from DoD Directive 5230.24 ^6 on its front cover or first page if there is no cover.
^6 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(g) Index of Security Classification Guides. (1) All security classification guides, except as provided in paragraph (g)(2) of this section, issued under this part shall be listed in DoD 5200.1-I ^7 , on the basis of information provided on DD Form 2024, “DoD Security Classification Guide Data Elements.” The originator of each guide shall execute DD Form 2024 when the guide is approved, changed, revised, reissued, or canceled, and when its biennial review is accomplished. The original copy of each executed DD Form 2024 shall be forwarded to the Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P) who will maintain the Index. Report Control Symbol DD-POL (B&AR)1418 applies to this information collection system.
^7 Controlled distribution.
(2) Any classification guide that because of classification considerations is not listed in accordance with paragraph (g)(1) of this section, shall be reported by the originator to the Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P). The report shall include the title of the guide, its date, the classification of the guide, and identification of the originating activity. A separate classified list of such guides will be maintained. Report Control Symbol DD-POL(B&AR)1418 applies to this information collection system.
§ 159a.18
Resolution of conflicts.
(a) General. When two or more offices, headquarters, or activities disagree concerning a classification, declassification, or regrading action, the disagreement must be resolved promptly.
(b) Procedures. If agreement cannot be reached by informal consultation, the matter shall be referred for decision to the lowest superior common to the disagreeing parties. If agreement cannot be reached at the major command (or equivalent) level, the matter shall be referred for decision to the headquarters office having overall classification management responsibilities for the Component. That office shall also be advised of any disagreement at any echelon if prompt resolution is not likely to occur.
(c) Final Decision. Disagreements between DoD Component headquarters, if not resolved promptly, shall be referred for final resolution to the ODUSD(P).
(d) Timing. Action under this section at each level of consideration shall be completed within 30 days. Failure to reach a decision within 30 days shall be cause for referral to the next level for consideration.
§ 159a.19
Obtaining classification evaluations.
Procedures. If a person not authorized to classify originates or develops information that he or she believes should be safeguarded, he or she shall:
(a) Safeguard the information in the manner prescribed for the intended classification.
(b) Mark the information (or cover sheet) with the intended classification designation prescribed in § 159a.11;
(c) Transmit the information under appropriate safeguards to an appropriate classification authority for evaluation. The transmittal shall state that the information is tentatively marked to protect it in transit. If such authority is not readily identifiable, the information should be forwarded to a headquarters activity of a DoD Component, to the headquarters office having overall classification management responsibilities for a DoD Component, or to the DUSD(P). A determination whether to classify the information shall be made within 30 days of receipt;
(d) Upon decision by the classifying authority, the tentative marking shall be removed. If a classification is assigned, appropriate markings shall be applied; but
(e) In an emergency requiring immediate communication of the information, after taking the action prescribed by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section transmit the information and then proceed in accordance with paragraph (c) of this section.
§ 159a.20
Information developed by private sources.
(a) General. There are some circumstances in which information not meeting the definition in § 159a.9(f) may warrant protection in the interest of national security.
(b) Patent Secrecy Act. The Patent Secrecy Act of 1952 provides that the Secretary of Defense, among others, may determine that disclosure of an invention by granting of a patent would be detrimental to national security. See DoD Directive 5535.2 ^8 . A patent application on which a secrecy order has been imposed shall be handled as follows within the Department of Defense:
^8 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(1) If the patent application contains information that warrants classification, it shall be assigned a classification and be marked and safeguarded accordingly.
(2) If the patent application does not contain information that warrants classification, the following procedures shall be followed:
(i) A cover sheet (or cover letter for transmittal) shall be placed on the application with substantially the following language:
The attached material contains information on which secrecy orders have been issued by the U.S. Patent Office after determination that disclosure would be detrimental to national security (Patent Secrecy Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 181-188). Its transmission or revelation in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law. Handle as though classified CONFIDENTIAL (or such other classification as would have been assigned had the patent application been within the definition provided in § 159a.9(f)).
(ii) The information shall be withheld from public release; its dissemination within the Department of Defense shall be controlled; the applicant shall be instructed not to disclose it to any unauthorized person; and the patent application (or other document incorporating the protected information) shall be safeguarded in the manner prescribed for equivalent classified material.
(3) If filing of a patent application with a foreign government is approved under provisions of the Patent Secrecy Act of 1952 and agreements on interchange of patent information for defense purposes, the copies of the patent application prepared for foreign registration (but only those copies) shall be marked at the bottom of each page as follows:
Withheld under the Patent Secrecy Act of 1952 (35 U.S.C. 181-188). Handle as CONFIDENTIAL (or such other level as has been determined).
(c) Independent Research and Development. (1) Information in a document or material that is a product of government-sponsored independent research and development conducted without access to classified information may not be classified unless the government first acquires a proprietary interest in such product.
(2) If no prior access was given but the person or company conducting the independent research or development believes that protection may be warranted in the interest of national security, the person or company should safeguard the information in accordance with § 159a.19 and submit it to an appropriate DoD element for evaluation. The DoD element receiving such a request for evaluation shall make or obtain a determination whether a classification would be assigned if it were government information. If the determination is negative, the originator shall be advised that the information is unclassified. If the determination is affirmative, the DoD element shall make or obtain a determination whether a proprietary interest in the research and development will be acquired. If so, the information shall be assigned proper classification. If not, the originator shall be informed that there is no basis for classification and the tentative classification shall be canceled.
(d) Other Private Information. The procedure specified in § 159a.19 shall apply in any case not specified in paragraph (c) of this section, such as an unsolicited contract bid, in which private information is submitted to a DoD element for a determination of classification.
§ 159a.21
Regrading.
(a) Raising to a Higher Level of Classification. The upgrading of classified information to a higher level than previously determined by officials with appropriate classification authority and jurisdiction over the subject matter is permitted only when all known holders of the information:
(1) Can be notified promptly of such action, and
(2) Are authorized access to the higher level of classification, or the information can be retrieved from those not authorized access to information at the contemplated higher level of classification.
(b) Classification of Information Previously Determined to be Unclassified. Unclassified information, once communicated as such, may be classified only when the classifying authority:
(1) Makes the determination required for upgrading in paragraph (a) of this section;
(2) Determines that control of the information has not been lost by such communication and can still be prevented from being lost; and
(3) In the case of information released to secondary distribution centers, such as the DTIC, determines that no secondary distribution has been made and can still be prevented (see also § 159a.15(e) (6) and (7)).
(c) Notification. All known holders of information that has been upgraded shall be notified promptly of the upgrading action.
(d) Downgrading. When it will serve a useful purpose, original classification authorities may, at the time of original classification, specify that downgrading of the assigned classification will occur on a specified date or upon the occurrence of a stated event.
§ 159a.22
Industrial operations.
(a) Classification in Industrial Operations. Classification of information in private industrial operations shall be based only on guidance furnished by the government. Industrial management may not make original classification determinations and shall implement the classification decisions of the U.S. Government contracting authority.
(b) Contract Security Classification Specification. DD Form 254, “Contract Security Classification Specification,” shall be used to convey contractual security classification guidance to industrial management. DD Forms 254 shall be changed by the originator to reflect changes in classification guidance and reviewed for currency and accuracy not less than once every 2 years. Changes shall conform with this part and DoD 5220.22-R and DoD 5220.22-M and shall be provided to all holders of the DD Form 254 as soon as possible. When no changes are made as a result of the biennial review, the originator shall so notify all holders of the DD Form 254 in writing.

Subpart D—Declassification and Downgrading
§ 159a.24
General provisions.
(a) Policy. Information classified under E.O. 12356 and prior orders shall be declassified or downgraded as soon as national security considerations permit. Decisions concerning declassification shall be based on the loss of sensitivity of the information with the passage of time or on the occurrence of an event that permits declassification. Information that continues to meet the classification requirements of § 159a.15(c) despite the passage of time will continue to be protected in accordance with this part.
(b) Responsibility of Officials. Officials authorized under § 159a.12(c) to declassify or downgrade information that is under the final classification jurisdiction of the Department of Defense shall take such action in accordance with this subpart.
(c) Declassification Coordination. DoD Component declassification review of classified information shall be coordinated with any other DoD or non-DoD office, Component, or agency that has a direct interest in the subject matter.
(d) Declassification by the Director of the ISOO. If the Director of the ISOO determines that information is classified in violation of E.O. 12356, the Director may require the activity that originally classified the information to declassify it. Any such decision by the Director may be appealed through the Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P), to the National Security Council (NSC). The information shall remain classified pending a prompt decision on the appeal.
§ 159a.25
Systematic review.
(a) Assistance to the Archivist of the United States. The Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Military Departments shall designate experienced personnel to assist the Archivist of the United States in the systematic review of classified information. Such personnel shall:
(1) Provide guidance and assistance to National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) employees in identifying and separating documents and specific categories of information within documents that are deemed to require continued classification; and
(2) Refer doubtful cases to the DoD Component having classification jurisdiction over the information or material for resolution.
(b) Systematic Review Guidelines. The Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P), in coordination with DoD Components, shall review, evaluate, and recommend revisions of DoD Directive 5200.30 ^9 at least every 5 years.
^9 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(c) Systematic Review Procedures. (1) Except as noted in this subsection, classified information transferred to the NARA that is permanently valuable will be reviewed systematically for declassification by the Archivist of the United States with the assistance of the DoD personnel designated for that purpose under paragraph (a) of this section as it becomes 30 years old. Information concerning intelligence (including special activities), sources, or methods created after 1945, and information concerning cryptology created after 1945, accessioned into the NARA will be reviewed systematically as it becomes 50 years old. Such information shall be downgraded or declassified by the Archivist of the United States under E.O. 12356, the directives of the ISOO, and DoD Directive 5200.30.
(2) All DoD classified information that is permanently valuable and in the possession or control of DoD Components, including that held in Federal Records Centers or other storage areas, may be reviewed systematically for declassification by the DoD Component exercising control of such information. Systematic declassification review conducted by DoD Components and personnel designated under paragraph (a) of this section shall proceed as follows:
(i) Information over which the Department of Defense exercises exclusive or final original classification authority and that under DoD Directive 5200.30, the responsible reviewer determines is to be declassified, shall be marked accordingly.
(ii) Information over which the Department of Defense exercises exclusive or final original classification authority that, after review, is determined to warrant continued protection shall remain classified as long as required by national security considerations.
(3) Classified information over which the Department of Defense does not exercise exclusive or final original classification authority encountered during DoD systematic review may not be declassified unless specifically authorized by the agency having classification jurisdiction over it.
(d) Systematic Review of Classified Cryptologic Information. Notwithstanding any other provision of this part, systematic review and declassification of classified cryptologic information shall be conducted in accordance with special procedures developed in consultation with affected agencies by the Director, National Security Agency/Chief, Central Security Service, and approved by the Secretary of Defense under E.O. 12356 and DoD Directive 5200.30.
(e) Systematic Review of Intelligence Information. Systematic review for declassification of classified information pertaining to intelligence activities (including special activities), or intelligence sources or methods shall be in accordance with special procedures to be established by the Director of Central Intelligence after consultation with affected agencies.
§ 159a.26
Mandatory declassification review.
(a) Information Covered. Upon request by a U.S. citizen or permanent resident alien, a Federal agency, or a State or local government to declassify and release such information, any classified information (except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section) shall be subject to review by the originating or responsible DoD Component for declassification in accordance with this section.
(b) Presidential Information. Information originated by a President, the White House staff, committees, commissions, or boards appointed by the President, or others specifically providing advice and counsel to a President or acting on behalf of a President is exempt from the provisions of this section.
(c) Cryptologic Information. Requests for the declassification review of cryptologic information shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5200.30.
(d) Submission of Requests for Mandatory Declassification Review. Requests for mandatory review of DoD classified information shall be submitted as follows:
(1) Requests shall be in writing and reasonably describe the information sought with sufficient particularity to enable the Component to identify documents containing that information, and be reasonable in scope; for example, the request does not involve such a large number or variety of documents as to leave uncertain the identity of the particular information sought.
(2) Requests shall be submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (ASD(PA)) (entry point for OSD records), the Military Department, or other Component most concerned with the subject matter that is designated under 32 CFR part 285 to receive requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act. These offices are identified in appropriate parts of title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations for each DoD Component.
(e) Requirements for Processing. Unless otherwise directed by the ASD(PA), requests for mandatory review shall be processed as follows:
(1) The designated office shall acknowledge receipt of the request. When a request does not satisfy the conditions of paragraph (d)(1) of this section, the requester shall be notified that unless additional information is provided or the scope of the request narrowed, no further action will be undertaken.
(2) DoD Component action upon the initial request shall be completed within 60 days (45 working days). If no determination has been made within 60 days (45 working days) of receipt of the request, the requester shall be notified of his right to appeal and of the procedures for making such an appeal.
(3) The designated office shall determine whether, under the declassification provisions of this part, the requested information may be declassified, and, if so, make such information available to the requester, unless withholding is otherwise warranted under applicable law. If the information may not be released in whole or in part, the requester shall be given a brief statement as to the reasons for denial, notice of the right to appeal the determination within 60 days (45 working days) to a designated appellate authority (including name, title, and address of such authority), and the procedures for such an appeal.
(4) When a request is received for information classified by another DoD Component or an agency outside the Department of Defense, the designated office shall:
(i) Forward the request to such DoD Component or outside agency for review together with a copy of the document containing the information requested, when practicable and when appropriate, with its recommendation to withhold any of the information;
(ii) Notify the requester of the referral unless the DoD Component or outside agency to which the request is referred objects to such notice on grounds that its association with the information requires protection; and
(iii) Request, when appropriate, that the DoD Component or outside agency notify the referring office of its determination.
(5) If the request requires the rendering of services for which fees may be charged under title 5 of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act in accordance with DoD Instruction 7230.7 ^1 ^0 the DoD Component may calculate the anticipated amount of fees to be charged and ascertain the requester's willingness to pay the allowable charges as a precondition to taking further action upon the request.
^1 ^0 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3
(6) A requester may appeal to the head of a DoD Component or designee whenever that DoD Component has not acted on an initial request within 60 days or the requester has been notified that requested information may not be released in whole or in part. Within 30 days after receipt, an appellate authority shall determine whether continued classification of the requested information is required in whole or in part, notify the requester of its determination, and make available to the requester any information determined to be releasable. If continued classification is required under this part, the requester shall be notified of the reasons therefor. If so requested, an appellate authority shall communicate its determination to any referring DoD Component or outside agency.
(7) The ASD(PA) shall act as appellate authority for all appeals regarding OSD, OJCS, and Unified Command records.
(f) Foreign Government Information. Requests for mandatory review for the declassification of foreign government information shall be processed and acted upon under the provisions of this section subject to § 159a.76(c).
(g) Prohibition. No DoD Component in possession of a document shall in response to a request under the Freedom of Information Act or this section refuse to confirm the existence or nonexistence of the document, unless the fact of its existence or nonexistence would itself be classifiable under this part.
(h) Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data. Any proposed action on a request, including requests from Presidential libraries, for DoD classified documents that are marked “Restricted Data” or “Formerly Restricted Data” must be coordinated with the Department of Energy.
§ 159a.27
Declassification of transferred documents or material.
(a) Material Officially Transferred. In the case of classified information or material transferred under statute, E.O., or directive from one department or agency or DoD Component to another in conjunction with a transfer of functions, as distinguished from transfers merely for purposes of storage, the receiving department, agency, or DoD Component shall be deemed to be the original classifying authority over such material for purposes of downgrading and declassification.
(b) Material Not Officially Transferred. When a DoD Component has in its possession classified information or material originated in an agency outside the Department of Defense that has ceased to exist and such information or material has not been transferred to another department or agency within the meaning of paragraph (a) of this section, or when it is impossible to identify the originating agency, the DoD Component shall be deemed to be the originating agency for the purpose of declassifying or downgrading such information or material. If it appears probable that another department, agency, or DoD Component may have a substantial interest in the classification of such information, the DoD Component deemed to be the originating agency shall notify such other department, agency, or DoD Component of the nature of the information or material and any intention to downgrade or declassify it. Until 60 days after notification, the DoD Component shall not declassify or downgrade such information or material without consulting the other department, agency, or DoD Component. During this period, the other department, agency, or DoD Component may express objections to downgrading or declassifying such information or material.
(c) Transfer for Storage or Retirement. Whenever practicable, classified documents shall be reviewed for downgrading or declassification before they are forwarded to a Records Center for storage or to the NARA for permanent preservation. Any downgrading or declassification determination shall be indicated on each document by markings as required by subpart E of this part.
§ 159a.28
Downgrading.
(a) Automatic Downgrading. Classified information marked for automatic downgrading in accordance with this or prior regulations or E.Os. is downgraded accordingly without notification to holders.
(b) Downgrading Upon Reconsideration. Classified information not marked for automatic downgrading may be assigned a lower classification designation by the originator or by an official authorized to declassify the same information. Prompt notice of such downgrading shall be provided to known holders of the information.
§ 159a.29
Miscellaneous.
(a) Notification of Changes in Declassification. When clasified material has been properly marked with specific dates or events for declassification, it is not necessary to issue notices of declassification to any holders. However, when declassification action is taken earlier than originally scheduled, or the duration of classification is extended, the authority making such changes shall ensure prompt notification of all holders to whom the information was originally transmitted. The notification shall specify the marking action to be taken, the authority therefor, and the effective date. Upon receipt of notification, recipients shall effect the proper changes and shall notify holders to whom they have transmitted the classified information. See § 159a.34 (a) and (e) for markings and the use of posted notices.
(b) Foreign Relations Series. In order to permit the State Department editors of Foriegn Relations of the United States to meet their mandated goal of publishing twenty years after the event, DoD Components shall assist the editors in the Department of State by easing access to appropriate classified materials in their custody and by expediting declassification review of items from their files selected for possible publication.
(c) Reproduction for Declassification Review. The provisions of § 159a.55(f) shall not restrict the reproduction of documents for the purpose of facilitating declassification review under the provisions of this subpart or the Freedom of Information Act, as amended. After review for declassification, however, those reproduced documents that remain classified must be destroyed in accordance with subpart J of this part.

Subpart E—Marking
§ 159a.31
General provisions.
(a) Designation. Subject to the exceptions in paragraph (c) of this section, information determined to require classification protection under this part shall be so designated. Designation by means other than physical marking may be used but shall be followed by physical marking as soon as possible.
(b) Purpose of Designation. Designation by physical marking, notation, or other means serves to warn the holder about the classification of the information involved; to indicate the degree of protection against unauthorized disclosure that is required for that particular level of classification; and to facilitate downgrading and declassification actions.
(c) Exceptions. (1) No article that has appeared, in whole or in part, in newspapers, magazines or elsewhere in the public domain, or any copy thereof, that is being reviewed and evaluated to compare its content with classified information that is being safeguarded in the Department of Defense by security classification, may be marked with any security classification, control or other kind of restrictive marking. The results of the review and evaluation, if classified, shall be separate from the article in question.
(2) Classified documents and material shall be marked in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section unless the markings themselves would reveal a confidential source or relationship not otherwise evident in the document, material, or information.
(3) The marking requirements of paragraph (d) (1)(iv) and (2)(iv) of this section do not apply to documents or other material that contain, in whole or in part, Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data information. Such documents or other material or portions thereof shall not be declassified without approval of the Department of Energy with respect to Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data information, and with respect to any other national security information contained therein, the approval of the originating agency.
(d) Documents or Other Material in General. (1) At the time of original classification, the following shall be shown on the face of all originally classified documents or clearly associated with other forms of classified information in a manner appropriate to the medium involved:
(i) The identity of the original classification authority by position title, unless he or she is the signer or approver of the document;
(ii) The agency and office of origin;
(iii) The overall classification of the document;
(iv) The date or event for automatic declassification or the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR”; and, if applicable,
(v) Any downgrading action to be taken and the date or event thereof.
(2) At the time of derivative classification, the following shall be shown on the face of all derivatively classified documents or clearly associated with other forms of classified information in a manner appropriate to the medium involved:
(i) The source of classification, that is, a source document or classification guide. If classification is derived from more than one source, the phrase “Multiple Sources” will be shown and the identification of each source will be maintained with the file or record copy of the document;
(ii) The agency and office of origin of the derivatively classified document;
(iii) The overall classification of the document;
(iv) The date or event for declassification or the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR,” carried forward from the classification source. If the classification is derived from multiple sources, either the most remote date or event for declassification marked on the sources or if required by any source, the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” shall be shown; and, if applicable,
(v) Any downgrading action to be taken and the date or event thereof.
(3) In addition to the foregoing, classified documents shall be marked as prescribed in § 159a.32, subpart L of this part, if the document contains foreign government information, and with any applicable special notation listed in § 159a.35. Such notations shall be carried forward from source documents to derivatively classified documents when appropriate. Provides illustrated guidance on the application of classification and associated markings to documents prepared by the Department of Defense.
(4) Material other than paper documents shall show the required information on the material itself or if that is not practical, in related or accompanying documentation.
(e) Identification of Classification Authority. (1) Identification of a classification authority shall be shown on the “Classified by” line prescribed under § 159a.34(c) and shall be sufficient, standing alone, to identify a particular official, source document or classification guide.
(i) If all information in a document or material is classified as an act of original classification, the classification authority who made the determination shall be identified on the “Classified by” line, unless the classifier is also the signer or approver of the document.
(ii) If the classification of all information in a document or material is derived from a single source (for example, a source document or classification guide), the “Classified by” line shall identify the source document or classification guide, including its date when necessary to insure positive identification.
(iii) If the classification of information contained in a document or material is derived from more than one original classification authority, or an original classification authority and another source, or from more than one source document, classification guide, or combination thereof, the “Classified by” line shall be marked “Multiple Sources” and identification of all such authorities and sources shall be maintained with the file or record copy of the document.
(iv) If an official with requisite classification authority has been designated by the head of an activity to approve security classifications assigned to all information leaving the activity, the title of that designated official shall be shown on the “Classified by” line. The designated official shall maintain records adequate to support derivative classification actions.
(2) Guidance concerning the identification of the classification authority on electronically transmitted messages is contained in § 159a.32(h).
(3) Guidance concerning the identification of the classification authority on DoD documents that contain only foreign or NATO classified information is contained in § 159a.77(d).
(f) Wholly Unclassified Material. Normally, unclassified material shall not be marked or stamped “Unclassified” unless it is essential to convey to a recipient of such material that it has been examined with a view to imposing a security classification and that it has been determined that it does not require classification. However, the marking “Unclassified” may be applied to formerly classified material.
§ 159a.32
Specific markings on documents.
(a) Overall and Page Marking. Except as otherwise specified for working papers, the overall classification of a document, whether or not permanently bound, or any copy or reproduction thereof, shall be conspicuously marked, stamped or affixed permanently at the top and bottom on the outside of the front cover (if any), on the title page (if any), on the first page, and on the outside of the back cover (if any). Each interior page, except those that are blank, shall be marked top and bottom according to its content, to include “Unclassified” when no classified information is contained on such a page. Alternatively, the overall classification of the document may be conspicuously marked or stamped at the top and bottom of each interior page when such marking is necessary to achieve production efficiency and the particular information to which classification is assigned is otherwise sufficiently identified consistent with the intent of paragraph (c) of § 159a.32. In any case, the classification marking of a page shall not supplant the classification marking of portions paragraph (c) of this section of the page marked with lower levels of classification.
(b) Marking Components. The major components of some complex documents are likely to be used separately. In such instances, each major component shall be marked as a separate document in accordance with § 159a.31. Examples include each annex, appendix, or similar component of a plan, program, or operations order; attachments and appendices to a memorandum or letter; and each major part of a report. If an entire major component is unclassified, the first page of the component may be marked at the top and bottom with the designation “UNCLASSIFIED” and a statement included, such as, “All portions of this (annex, appendix, etc.) are UNCLASSIFIED.” When this method of marking is used, no further markings are required on the unclassified major component.
(c) Portion Marking. (1) Each section, part, paragraph, or similar portion of a classified document shall be marked to show the level of classification of the information contained in or revealed by it, or that it is unclassified. Portions of documents shall be marked in a manner that eliminates doubt as to which of its portions contains or reveals classified information. Classification levels of portions of a document, except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, shall be shown by the appropriate classification symbol placed immediately following the portion's letter or number, or in the absence of letters or numbers, immediately before the beginning of the portion. In marking sections, parts, paragraphs, or similar portions, the parenthetical symbols “(TS)” for Top Secret, “(S)” for Secret, “(C)” for Confidential, and “(U)” for unclassified, shall be used. When appropriate, the symbols “RD” for Restricted Data and “FRD” for Formerly Restricted Data shall be added, for example, “(S-RD)” or “(C- FRD).” In addition, portions that contain Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information (CNWDI) will be marked “(N)” following the classification, for example, “(S-RD)(N).”
(2) Portion marking of DoD documents containing foreign government information shall be in accordance with § 159a.77(d).
(3) Illustrations, photographs, figures, graphs, drawings, charts and similar portions of classified documents will be clearly marked to show their classification or unclassified status. Such markings shall not be abbreviated and shall be prominent and placed within or contiguous to the portion. Captions of such portions shall be marked on the basis of their content alone by placing the symbol “(TS),” “(S),” “(C),” or “(U)” immediately preceding the caption.
(4) If, in an exceptional situation, parenthetical portion marking is determined to be impracticable, the document shall contain a statement sufficient to identify the information that is classified and the level of such classification. Thus, for example, each portion of a classified document need not be marked separately if all portions are classified at the same level, provided a statement to that effect is included in the document. In the case of classified compilations, the explanations required by paragraph (d) of this section meet this requirement.
(5) When elements of information in one portion require different classifications, but segregation into separate portions would destroy continuity or context, the highest classification required for any item shall be applied to that portion or paragraph.
(6) Waivers of the foregoing portion marking requirements may be granted for good cause. Any request by a DoD Component senior official for a waiver of portion marking requirements shall be submitted to the DUSD(P) and include the following:
(i) Identification of the information or class of documents for which such waiver is sought;
(ii) Detailed explanation of why the waiver should be granted;
(iii) The Component's judgment of the anticipated dissemination of the information or class of documents for which the waiver is sought, and
(iv) The extent to which such information subject to the waiver may be a basis for derivative classification. Waivers shall be granted only upon a written determination by the DUSD(P) as the designee of the Secretary of Defense, that there will be minimal circulation of the specified documents or information, and minimal potential usage of these documents or information as a source for derivative classification determinations; or there is some other basis to conclude that the benefits of portion marking are clearly outweighed by the increased administrative burdens. The granting and revocation of portion marking waivers shall be reported to the Director of the ISOO by the DUSD(P).
(d) Compilations—(1) Documents. When classification is required to protect a compilation of unclassified information pursuant to § 159a.15(1), the overall classification assigned to such documents shall be placed conspicuously at the top and bottom of each page and on the outside of the front and back covers, if any, and an explanation of the basis for the assigned classification shall be included on the document or on its text.
(2) Portions of Documents. If a classified document contains particular portions that are unclassified when standing alone, but classified information will be revealed when they are combined or associated, those portions shall be marked as unclassified, the page shall be marked with the highest classification of any information on or revealed by the page, and an explanation shall be added to the page, or to the document, to explain the classification of the combination or association to the holder. This method of marking also may be used if classified portions on a page, or within a document, will reveal information of a higher classification when they are combined or associated than when they are standing alone.
(e) Subjects and Titles of Documents. Subjects or titles of classified documents shall be marked with the appropriate symbol, “(TS),” “(S),” “(C),” or “(U)” placed immediately following and to the right of the item. When applicable, other appropriate symbols, for example, “(RD)” or “(FRD),” shall be added. (Subjects or titles of documents should be unclassified, if possible.)
(f) File, Folder, or Group of Documents. When a file, folder, or group of classified documents is removed from secure storage it shall be marked conspicuously with the highest classification of any classified document included therein or shall have an appropriate classified document cover sheet affixed.
(g) Transmittal Documents. A transmittal document, including endorsements and comments when such endorsements and comments are added to the basic communication, shall carry on its face a prominent notation of the highest classification of the information transmitted by it, and a legend showing the classification, if any, of the transmittal document, endorsement, or comment standing alone. For example, an unclassified document that transmits as an attachment a classified document shall bear a notation substantially as follows: “UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE.”
(h) Electronically Transmitted Messages. (1) The copy of a classified message (for example, DD Form 173, Joint Messageform) approved for electronic transmission and maintained as the record copy shall be marked as required by § 159a.31(d) for other documents. Additionally, copies not electronically transmitted (such as, mail and courier copies) shall be marked as required by § 159a.31(d).
(2) The first item of information in the text of a classified electronically transmitted message shall be its overall classification. Paper copies of classified electronically transmitted messages shall be marked at the top and bottom with the assigned classification. Portions shall be marked as prescribed herein for paper copies of documents. When such messages are printed by an automated system, classification markings may be applied by that system, provided that page markings so applied are clearly distinguishable on the face of the document from the printed text.
(3) The originator of a classified electronically transmitted message shall be considered the accountable classifier under § 159a.15(a). The highest level official identified on the message as the sender or, in the absence of such identification, the head of the organization originating the message, is deemed to be the classifier of the message. Thus, a “Classified by” line is not required on such messages. The originator is responsible for maintaining adequate records as required by § 159a.31(d)(2) to show the source of an assigned derivative classification.
(4) The last line of text of a classified electronically transmitted message shall show the date or event for downgrading, if appropriate, and the date or event for automatic declassification or “Originating Agency's Determination Required,” by abbreviated markings from § 159a.34. The foregoing is not required for messages that contain information identified as Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data.
(5) Any document, the classification of which is based solely upon the classification of the content of a classified electronically transmitted message, shall cite the message on the “Classified by” line of the newly created document.
(i) Translations. Translations of U.S. classified information into a language other than English shall be marked to show the United States as the country of origin, with the appropriate U.S. classification markings and the foreign language equivalent thereof (see Appendix A to this part).
§ 159a.33
Markings on special categories of material.
(a) General Provisions. Security classification and applicable associated markings (see § 159a.31(d) and § 159a.33(k)) assigned by the classifier shall be conspicuously stamped, printed, written, painted, or affixed by means of a tag, sticker, decal, or similar device, on classified material other than paper copies of documents, and on containers of such material, if possible. If marking the material or container is not practicable, written notification of the security classification and applicable associated markings shall be furnished to recipients. The following procedures for marking various kinds of materials containing classified information are not all inclusive and may be varied to accommodate the physical characteristics of the material containing the classified information and to accommodate organizational and operational requirements.
(b) Charts, Maps, and Drawings. Charts, maps, and drawings shall bear the appropriate classification marking for the legend, title, or scale blocks in a manner that differentiates between the overall classification of the document and the classification of the legend or title itself. The higher of these markings shall be inscribed at the top and bottom of each such document. When folding or rolling charts, maps, or drawings would cover the classification markings, additional markings shall be applied that are clearly visible when the document is folded or rolled. Applicable associated markings shall be included in or near the legend, title, or scale blocks.
(c) Photographs, Films, and Recordings. Photographs, films (including negatives), recordings, and their containers shall be marked to assure that a recipient or viewer will know that classified information of a specified level of classification is involved.
(1) Photographs. Negatives and positives shall be marked, whenever practicable, with the appropriate classification designation and applicable associated markings. Roll negatives or positives may be so marked at the beginning and end of each strip. Negatives and positives shall be kept in containers bearing conspicuous classification markings. All prints and reproductions shall be conspicuously marked with the appropriate classification designation and applicable associated markings on the face side of the print if possible. When such markings cannot be applied to the face side, they may be stamped on the reverse side or affixed by pressure tape label, stapled strip, or other comparable means.

Note:
When self-processing film or paper is used to photograph or reproduce classified information, all parts of the last exposure shall be removed from the camera and destroyed as classified waste, or the camera shall be protected as classified.
(2) Transparencies and Slides. Applicable classification markings shall be shown clearly in the image area of each transparency or slide, if possible. In the case of a 35mm or a similar size transparency or slide where the classification markings are not conspicuous unless projected on a screen, for example, the classification markings also shall be marked on its border, holder, or frame. Duplicate classification markings in image areas and on borders, holders, or frames are required if there is any doubt that the image area markings are not conspicuous enough to be seen when the transparencies or slides are not being projected. Other applicable associated markings shall be shown in the image area, or on the border, holder, or frame, or in accompanying documention. It is not necessary that each transparency or slide of a set of transparencies or slides bear applicable associated markings when the set is controlled as a single document. In such cases, the first transparency or slide shall bear the applicable associated markings.
(3) Motion Picture Films and Video Tapes. Classified motion picture films and video tapes shall be marked at the beginning and end by titles bearing the appropriate classification markings. Applicable associated markings shall be included at the beginning of such films or tapes. All such marking shall be visible when projected. Reels and cassettes shall be marked with the appropriate classification and kept in containers bearing conspicuous classification and applicable associated markings.
(4) Recordings. Sound, magnetic, or electronic recordings shall contain at the beginning and end a clear statement of the assigned classification that will provide adequate assurance that any listener or viewer will know that classified information of a specified level is involved. Recordings shall be kept in containers or on reels that bear conspicuous classification and applicable associated markings.
(5) Microforms. Microforms are images, usually produced photographically on transparent or opaque materials, in sizes too small to be read by the unaided eye. Accordingly, the assigned security classification and abbreviated applicable associated markings shall be conspicuously marked on the microform medium or its container, so as to be readable by the unaided eye. These markings shall also be included on the image so that when the image is enlarged and displayed or printed, the markings will be conspicuous and readable. Such marking will be accomplished as appropriate for the particular microform involved. For example, roll film microforms (or roll microfilm employing 16, 35, 70, or 105 mm films) may generally be marked as provided for roll motion picture film in § 159a.33(c)(3) and decks of “aperture cards” may be marked as provided in § 159a.33(d) for decks of automatic data processing punched cards. Whenever possible, microfiche, microfilm strips, and microform chips shall be marked in accordance with this paragraph.
(d) Decks of ADP Punched Cards. When a deck of classified ADP punched cards is handled and controlled as a single document, only the first and last card require classification markings. An additional card shall be added (or the job control card modified) to identify the contents of the deck and the highest classification therein. Such additional card shall include applicable associated markings. Cards removed for separate processing or use and not immediately returned to the deck shall be protected to prevent compromise of any classified information contained therein, and for this purpose shall be marked individually as prescribed in § 159a.32(a).
(e) Removable ADP and Word Processing Storage Media—(1) External. Removable information storage media and devices, used with ADP systems and typewriters or word processing systems, shall bear external markings clearly indicating the classification of the information and applicable associated markings. Included are media and devices that store information recorded in analog or digital form and that are generally mounted or removed by the users or operators. Examples include magnetic tape reels, cartridges, and cassettes; removable discs, disc cartridges, disc packs and diskettes; paper tape reels; and magnetic cards.
(2) Internal. ADP systems and word processing systems employing such media shall provide for internal classification marking to assure that classified information contained therein that is reproduced or generated, will bear applicable classification and associated markings. An exception may be made by the DoD Component head, or designee, for the purpose of exempting existing word processing systems when the internal classification and applicable associated markings cannot be implemented without extensive system modification, provided procedures are established to ensure that users and recipients of the media, or the information therein, are clearly advised of the applicable classification and associated markings. For ADP systems, exceptions may be authorized by the DoD Component Designated Approving Authority or Authorities, designated under DoD Directive 5200.28. For purposes of these exemption provisions, “existing systems” means word processing and ADP systems already acquired, or, in the case of associated automated information systems, those for which the life cycle management process has already progressed beyond the “definition/design” phase as set forth in DoD Directive 7920.1 ^{11}. Requirements for the security of nonremovable ADP storage media and clearance or declassification procedures for various ADP storage media are contained in DoD 5200.28-M ^1 ^2.
^1 ^1 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
^1 ^2 See footnote 7 to § 159a.16(g)(1).
(f) Documents Produced by ADP Equipment. The first page, and the front and back covers, if any, of documents produced by ADP equipment shall be marked as prescribed in § 159a.32(a). Interior pages also shall be marked as prescribed in § 159a.32(a) except that the classification markings of interior pages of fan-folded printouts may be applied by the ADP equipment. When the application of associated markings prescribed by § 159a.31(d) by the ADP equipment is not consistent with economical and efficient use of such equipment, such markings may be applied to a document produced by ADP equipment by superimposing upon the first page of such document a “Notice of Declassification Instructions and Other Associated Markings.” Such notice shall include the date or event for declassification or the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” and all other such applicable markings. If individual pages of a document produced by ADP equipment are removed or reproduced for distribution to other users, each such page or group of pages shall be marked as prescribed in § 159a.31(d) or by superimposing upon each such page or group of pages, a copy of any “Notice of Declassification Instructions and Other Associated Markings” applicable to such page or group of pages.
(g) Material for Training Purposes. In using unclassified documents or material to simulate classified documents or material for training purposes, such documents or material shall be marked clearly to indicate the actual unclassified status of the information, for example, “(insert classification designation) for training; otherwise unclassified” or “UNCLASSIFIED SAMPLE.”
(h) Miscellaneous Material. Documents and material such as rejected copy, typewriter ribbons, carbons, and similar items developed in connection with the handling, processing, production, and of use classified information shall be handled in a manner that assures adequate protection of the classified information involved and destruction at the earliest practicable time (see § 159a.32). Unless a requirement exists to retain this material or documents for a specific purpose, there is no need to mark, stamp, or otherwise indicate that the information is classified.
(i) Special Access Program Documents and Material. Additional markings as prescribed in directives, regulations and instructions relating to an approved Special Access Program shall be applied to documents and material containing information subject to the special access program. Such additional markings shall not serve as the sole basis for continuing classification of the documents or material to which the markings have been applied. When appropriate, such markings shall be excised to ease timely declassification, downgrading, or removal of the information from special control procedures.
(j) Secure Telecommunications and Information Handling Equipment. Applicable classification or Controlled Cryptographic Item (CCI) markings shall be applied to secure telecommunications and information handling equipment or associated cryptographic components. Safeguarding and control procedures for classified and CCI equipment and for safeguarding COMSEC facilities are contained in DoD Instruction 5230.22 ^{12} a , National Communications Security Committee (NCSC) Policy Directive 6, DoD Directive C-5200.5 ^1 ^3 , National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Instruction 4001, and National COMSEC Instruction 4003, 4006, and 4008.
^{12} a See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
^{13} Classified document. Not releasable to the public.
(k) Associated Markings. Other applicable associated markings required for documents by § 159a.31(d) shall be accomplished as prescribed in this section or in any other appropriate manner.
§ 159a.34
Classification authority, duration, and change in classification markings.
(a) Declassification and Regrading Marking Procedures. When classified information is downgraded or declassified in accordance with the assigned downgrading or declassification markings, such markings shall be a sufficient notation of the authority for such action. Whenever classified information is downgraded or declassified earlier than originally scheduled, or upgraded, the material shall be marked promptly and conspicuously to indicate the change, the authority for the action, the date of the action and the identity of the person taking the action. In addition, except for upgrading (see paragraph (d) of this section), prior classification markings shall be canceled, if practicable, but in any event those on the cover (if any) and first page shall be canceled, and the new classification markings, if any, shall be substituted.
(b) Applying Derivative Declassification Dates. (1) New material that derives its classification from information classified on or after August 1, 1982, shall be marked with the declassification date, event, or the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” assigned to the source information.
(2) New material that derives its classification from information classified prior to August 1, 1982, shall be treated as follows:
(i) If the source material bears a declassification date or event, that date or event shall be carried forward to the new material;
(ii) If the source material bears no declassification date or event, or bears an indeterminate date or event such as “Upon Notification by Originator,” “Cannot Be Determined,” or “Impossible to Determine,” or is marked for declassification review, the new material shall be marked with the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR”; or
(iii) If the source material is foreign government information bearing no date or event for declassification or is marked for declassification review, the new material shall be marked with the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR.”
(3) New material that derives its classification from a classification guide issued prior to August 1, 1982, that has not been updated to conform with this Regulation shall be treated as follows:
(i) If the guide specifies a declassification date or event, that date or event shall be applied to the new material; or
(ii) If the guide specifies a declassification review date, the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” shall be applied to the new material.
(c) Commonly Used Markings. Each classified document is marked on its face with one or more of the following markings:
(1) Original Classification. The following markings are used in original classification § 159a.31(d)(1):
Classified by ________ (See Note 1)
Declassify on ________ (See Note 2)
Message Abbreviation:
DECL ________ (See Note 3)
(2) Derivative Classification. The following markings are used in derivative classification § 159a.31(d)(2):
Classified by ________ (See Note 4)
Declassify on ________ (See Note 5)
Message Abbreviation:
DECL ________ (See Note 3)
(3) Downgrading. The following marking is used to specify a downgrading § 159a.31(d) (1) and (2):
Downgrade to ____ on ____ (See Note 6)
Message Abbreviation:
DNG/__/______ (See Note 7)
Note 1: Insert identification (position title) of the original classification authority. This line may be omitted if the original classification authority is also the signer or approver of the document.
Note 2: Insert the specific date, an event certain to occur, or the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR.”
Note 3: Insert day, month, and year for declassification, for example, “6 Jun 90,” an event certain to occur, or “OADR.”
Note 4: Insert identity of the single security classification guide, source document, or other authority for the classification. If more than one such source is applicable, insert the phrase “Multiple Sources.”
Note 5: Insert the specific date or event for declassification or the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR.” When multiple sources are used, either the most remote date or event for declassification marked on the sources or, if present on any source, the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” is applied to the new document.
Note 6: Insert Secret or Confidential and specific date or event, for example, “Downgrade to CONFIDENTIAL on 6 July 1988.”
Note 7: Insert “S” or “C” to indicate the downgraded classification and specific date or event, for example, “DNG/C/6 Jun 87.”
(4) There is no requirement for adding declassification instructions on documents with Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data markings (see § 159a.31(b)(3) and § 159a.35 (a) and (b)). Except for electronically transmitted messages, only a completed “Classified by” line is added to documents so marked.
(5) Electronically transmitted messages do not require a “classified by” line (See § 159a.32(h)(3)).
(6) DoD 5200.1-PH provides additional marking guidance.
(d) Upgrading. When material is upgraded it shall be promptly and conspicuously marked as prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section except that in all such cases the old classification markings shall be canceled and new markings substituted.
(e) Limited Use of Posted Notice for Large Quantities of Material. (1) When the volume of material is such that prompt remarking of each classified item cannot be accomplished without unduly interfering with operations, the custodian may attach downgrading and declassification notices to the storage unit instead of the remarking required by paragraph (a) of this section. Each notice shall specify the authority for the downgrading or declassification action, the date of the action, and the storage unit to which it applies.
(2) When individual documents or materials are permanently withdrawn from storage units, they shall be remarked promptly as prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section. However, when documents or materials subject to a downgrading or declassification notice are withdrawn from one storage unit solely for transfer to another, or a storage unit containing such documents or materials is transferred from one place to another, the transfer may be made without remarking if the notice is attached to or remains with each shipment.
§ 159a.35
Additional warning notices.
(a) General Provisions. (1) In addition to the marking requirements prescribed in § 159a.31(d), the warning notices prescribed in this section shall be displayed prominently on classified documents or materials, when applicable. In the case of documents, these warning notices shall be marked conspicuously on the outside of the front cover, or on the first page if there is no front cover. Transmittal documents, including those that are unclassified (§ 159a.35(g)), also shall bear these additional warning notices, when applicable. In addition, abbreviated forms of the notices set forth in § 159a.35(a), (b), and (c) shall be included in portion markings, as applicable. Further, the warning notice in paragraph (d) of this section, in its short form, shall be included at least once on interior pages, as applicable.
(2) When display of warning notices on other materials is not possible, their applicability to the information shall be included in the written notification of the assigned classification.
(b) Restricted Data. Classified documents or material containing Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended shall be marked as follows:

RESTRICTED DATA
This material contains Restricted Data as defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions.
(c) Formerly Restricted Data. Classified documents or material containing Formerly Restricted Data, as defined in section 142.d, Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, but no Restricted Data, shall be marked as follows:

FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA
Unauthorized disclosure subject to administrative and criminal sanctions. Handle as Restricted Data in foreign dissemination. Section 144.b, Atomic Energy Act, 1954.
(d) Intelligence Sources or Methods Information. (1) Documents that contain information relating to intelligence sources or methods shall include the following marking unless otherwise proscribed by DoD Instruction 5230.22:

WARNING NOTICE—Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved
(2) Existing stamps or preprinted labels containing the caveat “Warning Notice—Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved” may be used on documents created on or after the effective date of this part until replacement is required. Any replacement or additional stamps or labels purchased after the effective date of this part shall conform to the wording of paragraph (d)(1) of this section.
(e) COMSEC Material. Before release to contractors, COMSEC documents will indicate on the title page, or first page if no title page exists, the following notation:
COMSEC Material—Access by Contractor Personnel Restricted to U.S. Citizens Holding Final Government Clearance.
This notation shall be placed on COMSEC documents or material when originated and when release to contractors can be anticipated. Other COMSEC documents or material shall be marked in accordance with National COMSEC Instruction (NACSI) 4003. Foreign dissemination of COMSEC information is governed by NCSC Policy Directive 6.
(f) Dissemination and Reproduction Notice. Classified information that the DoD originator has determined to be subject to special dissemination or reproduction limitations as outlined in § 159a.54(1) shall include, as applicable, a statement or statements on its cover sheet, first page, or in the text, substantially as follows:
Reproduction requires approval of originator or higher DoD authority.
Further dissemination only as directed by (insert appropriate office or official) or higher DoD authority.
(g) Other Notations. Other notations of restrictions on reproduction, dissemination or extraction of classified information may be used as authorized by DoD Directive C-5200.5, DoD Instruction 5230.22, DoD Directive 5210.2 ^1 ^4 , DoD Directive 5100.55 ^1 ^5 , DoD Directive 5200.30, Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Publication 119, DoD Directive 5230.24, and NACSI 4003.
^1 ^4 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
^1 ^5 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
§ 159a.36
Remarking old material.
(a) General. (1) Documents and material classified under E.O. 12065 and predecessor E.O.s that are marked for automatic downgrading or automatic declassification on a specific date or event shall be downgraded and declassified pursuant to such markings. Declassification instructions on such documents or material need not be restated to conform with § 159a.32(c). (See also § 159a.34(a)). Information extracted from these documents or material for use in new documents or material shall be marked for declassification on the date specified in accordance with § 159a.31(d)(2).
(2) Documents and material classified under DoD C-5105.21-M-1 ^{16} and predecessor E.O.s that are not marked for automatic downgrading or automatic declassification on a specific date or event shall not be downgraded or declassified without authorization of the originator. Declassification instructions on such documents or material need not be restated to conform with § 159a.32(a). Information extracted from these documents or material for use in new documents or material shall be marked for declassification upon the determination of the originator, that is, the “Declassify on” line shall be completed with the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” in accordance with § 159a.31(d)(2).
^{16} See footnote 13 to § 159a.33(j).
(b) Earlier Declassification and Extension of Classification. Nothing in this section shall be construed to preclude declassification under subpart D of this part or subsequent extension of classification under § 159a.16(c).

Subpart F—Safekeeping and Storage
§ 159a.37
Storage and storage equipment.
(a) General Policy. Classified information shall be stored only under conditions adequate to prevent unauthorized persons from gaining access. The requirements specified in this part represent the minimum acceptable security standards. DoD policy concerning the use of force for the protection of property or information is specified in DoD Directive 5210.56 ^{17}
^{17} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(b) Standards for Storage Equipment. The GSA establishes and publishes minimum standards, specifications, and supply schedules for containers, vault doors, alarm systems, and associated security devices suitable for the storage and protection of classified information. Heads of DoD Components may establish additional controls to prevent unauthorized access. Security filing cabinets conforming to Federal specifications bear a Test Certification Label on the locking drawer, attesting to the security capabilities of the container and lock. (On some older cabinets the label was affixed on the inside of the locked drawer compartment). Cabinets manufactured after February 1962 indicate “General Services Administration Approved Security Container” on the outside of the top drawer.
(c) Storage of Classified Information. Classified information that is not under the personal control and observation of an authorized person, will be guarded or stored in a locked security container as prescribed in the following:
(1) Top Secret. Top Secret information shall be stored in:
(i) A safe-type steel file container having a built-in, three-position, dial-type combination lock approved by the GSA or a Class A vault or vault type room that meets the standards established by the head of the DoD Component concerned. When located in buildings, structural enclosures, or other areas not under U.S. Government control, the storage container, vault, or vault-type room must be protected by an alarm system or guarded during nonoperating hours.
(ii) An alarmed area, provided such facilities are adjudged by the local responsible official to afford protection equal to or better than that prescribed in paragraph (c)(1) (i) of this section. When an alarmed area is used for the storage of Top Secret material, the physical barrier must be adequate to prevent:
(A) Surreptitious removal of the material, and
(B) Observation that would result in the compromise of the material. The physical barrier must be such that forcible attack will give evidence of attempted entry into the area. The alarm system must provide immediate notice to a security force of attempted entry. Under field conditions, the field commander will prescribe the measures deemed adequate to meet the storage standards contained in paragraphs (c)(1)(i) and (ii) of this section.
(2) Secret and Confidential. Secret and Confidential information shall be stored in the manner prescribed for Top Secret; or in a Class B vault, or a vault-type room, strong room, or secure storage room that meets the standards prescribed by the head of the DoD Component; or, until phased out, in a steel filing cabinet having a built-in, three-position, dial type combination lock; or, as a last resort, an existing steel filing cabinet equipped with a steel lock bar, provided it is secured by a GSA-approved changeable combination padlock. In this latter instance, the keeper or keepers and staples must be secured to the cabinet by welding, rivets, or peened bolts and DoD Components must prescribe supplementary controls to prevent unauthorized access.
(3) Specialized Security Equipment—(i) Field Safe and One-drawer Container. One-drawer field safes, and GSA approved security containers are used primarily for storage of classified information in the field and in transportable assemblages. Such containers must be securely fastened or guarded to prevent their theft.
(ii) Map and Plan File. A GSA-approved map and plan file has been developed for storage of odd-sized items such as computer cards, maps, and charts.
(4) Other Storage Requirements. Storage areas for bulky material containing classified information, other than Top Secret, shall have access openings secured by GSA-approved changeable combination padlocks (Federal specification FF-P110 series) or key-operated padlocks with high security cylinders (exposed shackle, military specification P-43951 series, or shrouded shackle, military specification P-43607 series).
(i) When combination padlocks are used, the provisions of paragraph (e) of this section apply.
(ii) When key-operated high security padlocks are used, keys shall be controlled as classified information with classification equal to that of the information being protected and:
(A) A key and lock custodian shall be appointed to ensure proper custody and handling of keys and locks;
(B) A key and lock control register shall be maintained to identify keys for each lock and their current location and custody;
(C) Keys and locks shall be audited each month;
(D) Keys shall be inventoried with each change of custodian;
(E) Keys shall not be removed from the premises;
(F) Keys and spare locks shall be protected in a secure container;
(G) Locks shall be changed or rotated at least annually, and shall be replaced upon loss or compromise of their keys; and
(H) Master keying is prohibited.
(d) Procurement and Phase-In of New Storage Equipment—(1) Preliminary Survey. DoD activities shall not procure new storage equipment until:
(i) A current survey has been made of on-hand security storage equipment and classified records; and
(ii) Based upon the survey, it has been determined that it is not feasible to use available equipment or to retire, return, declassify or destroy enough records on hand to make the needed security storage space available.
(2) Purchase of New Storage Equipment. New security storage equipment shall be procured from those items listed on the GSA Federal Supply Schedule. Exceptions may be made by heads of DoD Components, with notification to the DUSD(P).
(3) Nothing in this subpart shall be construed to modify existing Federal Supply Class Management Assignments made under DoD Directive 5030.47.^{18}
^{18} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(e) Designations and Combinations—(1) Numbering and Designating Storage Facilities. There shall be no external mark as to the level of classified information authorized to be stored therein. For identification purposes each vault or container shall bear externally an assigned number or symbol.
(2) Combinations to Containers—(i) Changing. Combinations to security containers shall be changed only by individuals having that responsibility and an appropriate security clearance. Combinations shall be changed:
(A) When placed in use;
(B) Whenever an individual knowing the combination no longer requires access;
(C) When the combination has been subject to possible compromise;
(D) At least annually; or
(E) When taken out of service. Built-in combination locks shall be reset to the standard combination 50-25-50; combination padlocks shall be reset to the standard combination 10-20-30.
(ii) Classifying Combinations. The combination of a vault or container used for the storage of classified information shall be assigned a security classification equal to the highest category of the classified information authorized to be stored therein.
(iii) Recording Storage Facility Data. A record shall be maintained for each vault, secure room, or container used for storing classified information, showing location of the container, the names, home addresses, and home telephone numbers of the individuals having knowledge of the combination. Standard Form 700, “Security Container Information” shall be used for this purpose. (Use of this Standard Form is required when existing supplies of similar purpose forms are exhausted or by September 30, 1986, whichever occurs earlier).
(iv) Dissemination. Access to the combination of a vault or container used for the storage of classified information shall be granted only to those individuals who are authorized access to the classified information stored therein.
(3) Electrically Actuated Locks. Electricially actuated locks (for example, cypher and magnetic strip card locks) do not afford the required degree of protection of classified information and may not be used as a substitute for the locks prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section.
(f) Repair of Damaged Security Containers. Neutralization of lock-outs or repair of any damage that affects the integrity of a security container approved for storage of classified information shall be accomplished only by authorized persons who are cleared or continuously escorted while so engaged.
(1) A GSA-approved security container is considered to have been restored to its original state of security integrity if:
(i) All damaged or altered parts (for example, locking drawer, and drawer head) are replaced; or
(ii) When a container has been drilled immediately adjacent to or through the dial ring to neutralize a lock-out, the replacement lock is equal to the original equipment, and the drilled hole is repaired with a tapered, hardened tool-steel pin, or a steel dowel, drill bit, or bearing with a diameter slightly larger than the hole and of such length that when driven into the hole there shall remain at each end of the rod a shallow recess not less than 1/8 inch nor more than 3/16 inch deep to permit the acceptance of substantial welds, and the rod is welded both on the inside and outside surfaces. The outside of the drawer head shall then be puttied, sanded, and repainted in such a way that no visible evidence of the hole or its repair remains on the outer surface after replacement of the damaged parts (for example, new lock).
(2) GSA-approved containers that have been drilled in a location or repaired in a manner other than as described in paragraph (f)(1) of this section, will not be considered to have been restored to their original state of security integrity. The Test Certification Label on the inside of the locking drawer and the “General Services Administration Approved Security Container” label, if any, on the outside of the top drawer shall be removed from such containers.
(3) If damage to a GSA-approved security container is repaired with welds, rivets, or bolts that cannot be removed and replaced without leaving evidence of entry, the cabinet is limited thereafter to the storage of Secret and Confidential material.
(4) If the damage is repaired using methods other than those permitted in paragraphs (f) (1) and (3) of this section, use of the container will be limited to unclassified material and a notice to this effect will be permanently marked on the front of the container.
§ 159a.38
Custodial precautions.
(a) Responsibilities of Custodians. (1) Custodians of classified information shall be responsible for providing protection and accountability for such information at all times and for locking classified information in appropriate security equipment whenever it is not in use or under direct supervision of authorized persons. Custodians shall follow procedures that ensure that unauthorized persons do not gain access to classified information.
(2) Only the head of a DoD Component, or single designee at the headquarters and major command levels, may authorize removal of classified information from designated working areas in off-duty hours, for work at home or otherwise, provided that a GSA-approved security container is furnished and appropriate regulations otherwise provide for the maximum protection possible under the circumstances. (See also § 159a.55.) Any such arrangements approved before the effective date of this part shall be reevaluated and, if continued approval is warranted, compliance with this paragraph is necessary.
(b) Care During Working Hours. DoD personnel shall take precaution to prevent unauthorized access to classified information.
(1) Classified documents removed from storage shall be kept under constant surveillance and face down or covered when not in use. Cover sheets shall be Standard Forms 703, 704, and 705 for, respectively, Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential documents. (Use of these Standard Forms is required when existing supplies of similar purpose forms are exhausted or by September 30, 1986, whichever occurs earlier).
(2) Preliminary drafts, carbon sheets, plates, stencils, stenographic notes, worksheets, typewriter ribbons, and other items containing classified information shall be either destroyed immediately after they have served their purpose; or shall be given the same classification and secure handling as the classified information they contain.
(3) Destruction of typewriter ribbons from which classified information can be obtained shall be accomplished in the manner prescribed for classified working papers of the same classification. After the upper and lower sections have been cycled through and overprinted five times in all ribbon or typing positions, fabric ribbons may be treated as unclassified regardless of their classified use thereafter. Carbon and plastic typewriter ribbons and carbon paper that have been used in the production of classified information shall be destroyed in the manner prescribed for working papers of the same classification after initial usage. However, any ribbon in a typewriter that uses technology which enables the ribbon to be struck several times in the same area before it moves to the next position may be treated as unclassified.
(c) End-of-Day Security Checks. Heads of activities that process or store classified information shall establish a system of security checks at the close of each working day to ensure that the area is secure; Standard Form 701, “Activity Security Checklist” shall be used to record such checks. An integral part of the security check system shall be the securing of all vaults, secure rooms, and containers used for the storage of classified material; Standard Form 702, “Security Container Check Sheet” shall be used to record such actions. In addition, Standard Forms 701 and 702 shall be annotated to reflect after-hours, weekend, and holiday activity. (Use of these Standard Forms is required when existing supplies of similar purpose forms are exhausted or by September 30, 1986, whichever occurs earlier).
(d) Emergency Planning. (1) Plans shall be developed for the protection, removal, or destruction of classified material in case of fire, natural disaster, civil disturbance, terrorist activities, or enemy action. Such plans shall establish detailed procedures and responsibilities for the protection of classified material to ensure that the material does not come into the possession of unauthorized persons. These plans shall include the treatment of classified information located in foreign countries.
(2) These emergency planning procedures do not apply to material related to COMSEC. Planning for the emergency protection including emergency destruction under no-notice conditions of classified COMSEC material shall be developed in accordance with the requirements of NSA KAG I-D.
(3) Emergency plans shall provide for the protection of classified material in a manner that will minimize the risk of injury or loss of life to personnel. In the case of fire or natural disaster, the immediate placement of authorized personnel around the affected area, preinstructed and trained to prevent the removal of classified material by unauthorized personnel, is an acceptable means of protecting classified material and reducing casualty risk. Such plans shall provide for emergency destruction to preclude capture of classified material when determined to be required. This determination shall be based on an overall commonsense evaluation of the following factors:
(i) Level and sensitivity of classified material held by the activity;
(ii) Proximity of land-based commands to hostile or potentially hostile forces or to communist-controlled countries;
(iii) Flight schedules or ship deployments in the proximity of hostile or potentially hostile forces or near communist-controlled countries;
(iv) Size and armament of land-based commands and ships;
(v) Sensitivity of operational assignment; and
(vi) Potential for aggressive action of hostile forces.
(4) When preparing emergency destruction plans, consideration shall be given to the following:
(i) Reduction of the amount of classified material held by a command as the initial step toward planning for emergency destruction;
(ii) Storage of less frequently used classified material at more secure commands in the same geographical area (if available);
(iii) Transfer of as much retained classified material to microforms as possible, thereby reducing the bulk that needs to be evacuated or destroyed;
(iv) Emphasis on the priorities for destruction, designation of personnel responsible for destruction, and the designation of places and methods of destruction. Additionally, if any destruction site or any particular piece of destruction equipment is to be used by more than one activity or entity, the order or priority for use of the site or equipment must be clearly delineated;
(v) Identification of the individual who is authorized to make the final determination when emergency destruction is to begin and the means by which this determination is to be communicated to all subordinate elements maintaining classified information;
(vi) Authorization for the senior individual present in an assigned space containing classified material to deviate from established plans when circumstances warrant; and
(vii) Emphasis on the importance of beginning destruction sufficiently early to preclude loss of material. The effect of premature destruction is considered inconsequential when measured against the possibility of compromise.
(5) The emergency plan shall require that classified material holdings be assigned a priority for emergency evacuation or destruction. Priorities should be based upon the potential effect on national security should such holdings fall into hostile hands, in accordance with the following general guidelines:
(i) Priority One. Exceptionally grave damage (Top Secret material);
(ii) Priority Two. Serious damage (Secret material); and
(iii) Priority Three. Damage (Confidential material).
(6) If, as determined by appropriate threat analysis, Priority One material cannot otherwise be afforded a reasonable degree of protection from hostile elements in a no-notice emergency situation, provisions shall be made for installation of Anticompromise Emergency Destruct (ACED) equipment to ensure timely initiation and positive destruction of such material a
in accordance with the following standard: “With due regard for personnel and structural safety, the ACED system shall reach a stage in destruction sequences at which positive destruction is irreversible within 60 minutes at shore installations, 30 minutes in ships, and 3 minutes in aircraft following activation of the ACED system.” b
a Technological limitations, particularly as to personnel and structural safety, place constraints on the amount of material that can be accommodated in buildings, ships, and aircraft by current ACED systems; therefore, only Priority One material reasonably can be so protected at this time. Nevertheless, after processing Priority One material in an emergency situation involving possible loss to hostile forces, it is imperative that Priority Two material and then Priority Three material be destroyed insofar as is possible by whatever means available.
b The time frames indicated above are those for the initiation of irreversible destruction, not necessarily for the completion of such destruction.
(7) An ACED requirement is presumed to exist and provisions shall be made for an ACED system to protect Priority One material in the following environments:
(i) Shore-based activities located in or within 50 miles of potentially hostile countries, or located within or adjacent to countries with unstable governments;
(ii) Reconnaissance aircraft, both manned and unmanned, that operate within JCS-designated reconnaissance reporting areas (see Memorandum by the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff (SM) 701-76, Volume II, “Peacetime Reconnaissance and Certain Sensitive Operations”; c
c SM 701-76 is available on a strict need-to-know basis from the Chief, Documents Division, Joint Secretariat, OJCS.
(iii) Naval surface noncombatant vessels operating in hostile areas when not accompanied by a combatant vessel;
(iv) Naval subsurface vessels operating in hostile areas; and
(v) U.S. Navy Special Project ships (Military Sealift Command-operated) operating in hostile areas.
(8) Except in the most extraordinary circumstances, ACED is not applicable to commands and activities located within the United States. Should there be reason to believe that an ACED requirement exists in environments other than in those listed in paragraph (d)(7) of this section, a threat and vulnerability study should be prepared and submitted to the head of the DoD Component concerned or his designee for approval. The threat and vulnerability study should include, at a minimum, the following data, classified if appropriate:
(i) Volume and type of Priority One material held by the activity, that is, paper products, microforms, magnetic tape, and circuit boards.
(ii) A statement certifying that the amount of Priority One material held by the activity has been reduced to the lowest possible level;
(iii) An estimate of the time, beyond the time frames cited above, required to initiate irreversible destruction of Priority One material held by the activity, and the methods by which destruction of that material would be attempted in the absence of an ACED system;
(iv) Size and composition of the activity;
(v) Location of the activity and the degree of control it, or other United States authority, exercises over security; and
(vi) Proximity to potentially hostile forces and potential for aggressive action by such forces.
(9) When a requirement is believed to exist for ACED equipment not in the GSA or DoD inventories, the potential requirement shall be submitted to the DUSD(P) for validation in accordance with subsection V. B. of DoD Directive 3224.3 ^{19} ,d.
^{19} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
d Information on ACED systems may be obtained from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-09N), Navy Department, Washington, DC 20350.
(10) In determining the method of destruction of other than Priority One material, any method specified for routine destruction or any other means that will ensure positive destruction of the material may be used. Ideally, any destruction method should provide for early attainment of a point at which the destruction process is irreversible. Additionally, classified material may be jettisoned at sea to prevent its easy capture. It should be recognized that such disposal may not prevent recovery of the material. Where none of the methods previously mentioned can be employed, the use of other means, such as dousing the classified material with a flammable liquid and igniting it, or putting to use the facility garbage grinders, sewage treatment plants, and boilers should be considered.
(11) Under emergency destruction conditions, destruction equipment may be operated at maximum capacity and without regard to pollution, preventive maintenance, and other constraints that might otherwise be observed.
(12) Commands and activities that are required to maintain an ACED system pursuant to paragraph (d)(7) of this section, shall conduct drills periodically to ensure that responsible personnel are familiar with the emergency plan. Such drills should be used to evaluate the anticipated effectiveness of the plan and the prescribed equipment and should be the basis for improvements in planning and equipment use. Actual destruction should not be initiated during drills.
(e) Telecommunications Conversations. Classified information shall not be discussed in telephone conversations except as authorized over approved secure communications circuits, that is, cryptographically protected circuits or protected distribution systems installed in accordance with National COMSEC Instruction 4009.
(f) Security of Meetings and Conferences. Security requirements and procedures governing disclosure of classified information at conferences, symposia, conventions, and similar meetings, and those governing the sponsorship and attendance of U.S. and foreign personnel at such meetings, are set forth in DoD Directive 5200.12^{20}, DoD Instruction 5230.20^{21}, DoD 5220.22-R, and DoD 5220.22-M.
^{20} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
^{21} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(g) Safeguarding of U.S. Classified Information Located in Foreign Countries. Except for classified information that has been authorized for release to a foreign government or international organization pursuant to DoD Directive 5230.11^{22}, and is under the security control of such government or organization, the retention of U.S. classified material in foreign countries may be authorized only when that material is necessary to satisfy specific U.S. Government requirements. This includes classified material temporarily transferred into a foreign country via U.S. Government personnel authorized to escort or handcarry such material pursuant to § 159a.59, as applicable. Whether permanently or temporarily retained, the classified materials shall be stored under U.S. Government control as follows:
^{22} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(1) At a U.S. military installation, or a location where the United States enjoys extraterritorial status, such as an embassy or consulate.
(2) At a U.S. Government activity located in a building used exclusively by U.S. Government tenants, provided the building is under 24-hour control by U.S. Government personnel.
(3) At a U.S. Government activity located in a building not used exclusively by U.S. Government tenants nor under host government control, provided the classified material is stored in security containers approved by the GSA and is placed under 24-hour control by U.S. Government personnel.
(4) At a U.S. Government activity located in a building not used exclusively by U.S. Government tenants but which is under host government control, provided the classified material is stored in GSA-approved security containers which are further secured in a locked room or area to which only U.S. personnel have access.
(5) When host government and U.S. personnel are co-located, U.S. classified material that has not been authorized for release to the host government pursuant to DoD Directive 5230.11, shall, to the extent possible, be segregated from releasable classified material to facilitate physical control and prevent inadvertent compromise. However, U.S. classified material that is releasable to the host country need not be subject to the 24-hour U.S. control requirement provided the host government exercises its own control measures over the pertinent areas or containers during non-duty hours.
(6) Foreign nationals shall be escorted while in areas where nonreleasable U.S. classified material is handled or stored. However, when required by operational necessity, foreign nationals may be permitted, during duty hours, unescorted entry to such areas provided the nonreleasable information is properly stored or is under the direct personal supervision and control of cleared U.S. personnel who can prevent unauthorized access.
§ 159a.39
Activity entry and exit inspection program.
(a) Policy. (1) Commanders and heads of activities shall establish and maintain an inspection program to deter and detect unauthorized introduction or removal of classified material from DoD owned or leased installations and facilities. This program does not replace existing programs for facility and installation security and law enforcement inspection requirements.
(2) The inspection program shall be implemented in a manner which does not interfere unduly with the performance of assigned missions.
(3) The inspection program shall be implemented in a manner which does not significantly disrupt the ingress and egress of persons who are employees of, or visitors to, defense installations and facilities.
(4) Inspections carried out under this program shall be limited to the extent feasible to areas where classified work is being performed, and cover only persons employed within, or visiting, such areas.
(5) Inspections carried out under this program shall be performed at a sufficient frequency to provide a credible deterrent to those who would be inclined to remove classified materials without authority from the installation or facility in question.
(6) The method and frequency of such inspections at a given installation or facility is at the discretion of the commander or head of the installation or facility, or other designated official. Such inspections shall conform to the procedures set forth in the following:
(i) Inspection Frequency. (A) Inspections may be aperiodic, that is, at irregular intervals.
(B) Inspections may be accomplished at one or more designated entry/exit points; they need not be carried out at all entry/exit points at the same time.
(C) Inspections may be done on a random basis using any standard which may be appropriate, for example, every third person; every tenth person; every hundredth person, at the entry/exit point(s) designated.
(D) Inspections at a particular entry/exit point(s) may be limited as appropriate to various periods of time, for example, one week, one day, or one hour.
(E) Inspections shall be conducted at all entry/exit points after normal duty hours, including weekends and holidays, on a continuous basis, if practicable.
(b) Inspection Procedures and Identification. (1) Inspections shall be limited to that which is necessary to determine whether classified material is contained in briefcases, shoulder or handbags, luggage, athletic bags, packages, or other similar containers being removed from or taken into the premises. Inspections shall not be done of wallets, change purses, clothing, cosmetic cases, or other objects of an unusually personal nature.
(2) DoD Components shall provide employees who have a legitimate need to remove classified material from the installation or activity with written or printed authorizations to pass through designated entry/exit points. (See § 159a.59(f)) This may include:
(i) The authorization statements prescribed in § 159a.59.
(ii) If authorized in Component instructions, wallet-size cards which describe in general terms the purpose(s) for authorizing the employee to remove classified material from the facility (for example, use at meetings or transmission to authorized recipients).
(3) Inspectors are to ensure that personnel are not removing classified material without authorization. Where inspectors determine that individuals do not appear to have appropriate authorization to remove classified material, they shall request such individual to obtain appropriate authorization before exiting the premises. If, due to the circumstances, this is not feasible, the inspector should attempt to verify by telephone the authority of the individual in question to remove the classified material with the employing office. When such verification cannot be obtained, and if removal cannot be prevented, the inspector shall advise the employing office and appropriate security office as soon as feasible that classified material was removed by the named individual at a particular time and without apparent authorization.
(4) If the employing office determines that classified material was removed by one of its employees without authority, it shall request an investigation of the circumstances of the removal by appropriate investigative authorities. Where such investigation confirms a violation of security procedures, other than espionage or deliberate compromise, for which § 159a.50 applies, appropriate administrative, disciplinary, or legal action shall be taken.

Subpart G—Compromise of Classified Information
§ 159a.41
Policy.
Compromise of classified information presents a threat to the national security. Once a compromise is known to have occurred, the seriousness of damage to U.S. interests must be determined and appropriate measures taken to negate or minimize the adverse effect of such compromise. When possible, action also should be taken to regain custody of the documents or material that were compromised. In all cases, however, appropriate action must be taken to identify the source and reason for the compromise and remedial action taken to ensure further compromises do not occur. The provisions of DoD Instruction 5240.4 ^2 ^3 and DoD Directive 5210.50 ^2 ^4 apply to compromises covered by this subpart.
^2 ^3 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
^2 ^4 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
§ 159a.42
Cryptographic and sensitive compartmented information.
(a) The procedures for handling compromises of cryptographic information are set forth in NACSI 4006 and implementing instructions.
(b) The procedures for handling compromises of SCI information are set forth in DoD TS-5105.21-M-2 ^2 ^5 and DoD C-5105.21-M-1 ^2 ^6 .
^2 ^5 See footnote 13 to § 159a.33(j).
^2 ^6 See footnote 13 to § 159a.33(j).
§ 159a.43
Responsibility of discoverer.
(a) Any person who has knowledge of the loss or possible compromise of classified information shall immediately report such fact to the security manager of the person's activity (see § 159a.93(e)) or to the commanding officer or head of the activity in the security manager's absence.
(b) Any person who discovers classified information out of proper control shall take custody of such information and safeguard it in an appropriate manner, and shall notify immediately an appropriate security authority.
§ 159a.44
Preliminary inquiry.
The immediate commander, supervisor, security manager, or other authority shall initiate a preliminary inquiry to determine the circumstances surrounding the loss or possible compromise of classified information. The preliminary inquiry shall establish one of the following:
(a) That a loss or compromise of classified information did not occur;
(b) That a loss or compromise of classified information did occur but the compromise reasonably could not be expected to cause damage to the national security. If, in such instances, the official finds no indication of significant security weakness, the report of preliminary inquiry will be sufficient to resolve the incident and, when appropriate, support the administrative sanctions under § 159a.98; or
(c) That the loss or compromise of classified information did occur and that the compromise reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national security or that the probability of damage to the national security cannot be discounted. Upon this determination, the responsible official shall:
(1) Report the circumstances of the compromise to an appropriate authority as specified in DoD Component instructions;
(2) If the responsible official is the originator, take the action prescribed in § 159a.47; and
(3) If the responsible official is not the originator, notify the originator of the known details of the compromise, including identification of the classified information. If the originator is unknown, notification will be sent to the office specified in DoD Component instructions.
§ 159a.45
Investigation.
If it is determined that further investigation is warranted, such investigation will include the following:
(a) Identification of the source, date, and circumstances of the compromise.
(b) Complete description and classification of each item of classified information compromised;
(c) A thorough search for the classified information;
(d) Identification of any person or procedure responsible for the compromise. Any person so identified shall be apprised of the nature and circumstances of the compromise and be provided an opportunity to reply to the violation charged. If such person does not choose to make a statement, this fact shall be included in the report of investigation;
(e) An analysis and statement of the known or probable damage to the national security that has resulted or may result (See § 159a.15(k)), and the cause of the loss or compromise; or a statement that compromise did not occur or that there is minimal risk of damage to the national security;
(f) An assessment of the possible advantage to foreign powers resulting from the compromise; and
(g) A compilation of the data in paragraphs (a) through (f) of this section, in a report to the authority ordering the investigation to include an assessment of appropriate corrective, administrative, disciplinary, or legal actions. (Also see § 159a.100).
§ 159a.46
Responsibility of authority ordering investigation.
(a) The report of investigation shall be reviewed to ensure compliance with this part and instructions issued by DoD Components.
(b) The recommendations contained in the report of investigation shall be reviewed to determine sufficiency of remedial, administrative, disciplinary, or legal action proposed and, if adequate, the report of investigation shall be forwarded with recommendations through supervisory channels (See § 159a.98 and § 159a.99).
(c) Whenever an action is contemplated against any person believed responsible for the compromise of classified information, damage assessments shall be coordinated with the legal counsel of the DoD Component where the individual responsible is assigned or employed. Whenever a violation of criminal law appears to have occurred and a criminal prosecution is contemplated, the DoD Component responsible for the damage assessment shall apprise the General Counsel, Department of Defense. See § 159a.101.
§ 159a.47
Responsibility of originator.
The originator or an official higher in the originator's supervisory chain shall, upon receipt of notification of loss or probable compromise of classified information, take action as prescribed in § 159a.15(k).
§ 159a.48
System of control of damage assessments.
Each DoD Component shall establish a system of controls and internal procedures to ensure that damage assessments are conducted when required and that records are maintained in a manner that facilitates their retrieval and use within the Component.
§ 159a.49
Compromises involving more than one agency.
(a) Whenever a compromise involves the classified information or interests of more than one DoD Component or other agency, each such activity undertaking a damage assessment shall advise the others of the circumstances and findings that affect their information and interests. Whenever a damage assessment incorporating the product of two or more DoD Components or other agencies is needed, the affected activities shall agree upon the assignment of responsibility for the assessment.
(b) Whenever a compromise of U.S. classified information is the result of actions taken by foreign nationals, by foreign government officials, or by U.S. nationals employed by international organizations, the activity performing the damage assessment shall ensure, through appropriate intergovernmental liaison channels, that information pertinent to the assessment is obtained. Whenever more than one activity is responsible for the assessment, those activities shall coordinate the request prior to transmittal through appropriate channels.
§ 159a.50
Espionage and deliberate compromise.
Cases of espionage and deliberate unauthorized disclosure of classified information to the public shall be reported in accordance with DoD Instruction 5240.4 and DoD Directive 5210.50 and implementing issuances.
§ 159a.51
Unauthorized absentees.
When an individual who has had access to classified information is on unauthorized absence, an inquiry as appropriate under the circumstances, to include consideration of the length of absence and the degree of sensitivity of the classified information involved, shall be conducted to detect if there are any indications of activities, behavior, or associations that may be inimical to the interest of national security. When such indications are detected, a report shall be made to the DoD Component counterintelligence organization.

Subpart H—Access, Dissemination, and Accountability
§ 159a.53
Access.
(a) Policy. (1) Except as otherwise provided for in paragraph (c) of this section, no person may have access to classified information unless that person has been determined to be trustworthy and unless access is essential to the accomplishment of lawful and authorized Government purposes, that is, the person has the appropriate security clearance and a need-to-know. Further, cleared personnel may not have access until they have been given an initial security briefing (see § 159a.70). Procedures shall be established by the head of each DoD Component to prevent unnecessary access to classified information. There shall be a demonstrable need for access to classified information before a request for a personnel security clearance can be initiated. The number of people cleared and granted access to classified information shall be maintained at the minimum number that is consistent with operational requirements and needs. No one has a right to have access to classified information solely by virtue of rank or position. The final responsibility for determining whether an individual's official duties require possession of or access to any element or item of classified information, and whether the individual has been granted the appropriate security clearance by proper authority, rests upon the individual who has authorized possession, knowledge, or control of the information and not upon the prospective recipient. These principles are equally applicable if the prospective recipient is a DoD Component, including commands and activities, other Federal agencies, DoD contractors, foreign governments, and others.
(2) Because of the extreme importance to the national security of Top Secret information and information controlled within approved Special Access Programs, employees shall not be permitted to work alone in areas where such information is in use or stored and accessible by those employees. This general policy is an extra safeguarding measure for the nation's most vital classified information and it is not intended to cast doubt on the integrity of DoD employees. The policy does not apply in those situations where one employee with access is left alone for brief periods during normal duty hours. When compelling operational requirements indicate the need, DoD Component heads may waive this requirement in specific, limited cases. This waiver authority may be delegated to the senior official (§ 159a.93 (b) and (c)) of the DoD Component who may redelegate the authority but only if so authorized by the head of the DoD Component. (Any waiver should include provisions for periodically ensuring the health and welfare of individuals left alone in vaults or secure areas).
(b) Access by Persons Outside the Executive Branch. Classified information may be made available to individuals or agencies outside the Executive Branch provided that such information is necessary for performance of a function from which the Government will derive a benefit or advantage, and that such release is not prohibited by the originating department or agency. Heads of DoD Components shall designate appropriate officials to determine, before the release of classified information, the propriety of such action in the interest of national security and assurance of the recipient's trustworthiness and need-to-know.
(1) Congress. Access to classified information or material by Congress, its committees, members, and staff representatives shall be in accordance with DoD Directive 5400.4 ^2 ^7 . Any DoD employee testifying before a congressional committee in executive session in relation to a classified matter shall obtain the assurance of the committee that individuals present have a security clearance commensurate with the highest classification of the information that may be discussed. Members of Congress, by virtue of their elected positions, are not investigated or cleared by the Department of Defense.
^2 ^7 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(2) Government Printing Office (GPO). Documents and material of all classifications may be processed by the GPO, which protects the information in accordance with the DoD/GPO Security Agreement of February 20, 1981.
(3) Representatives of the General Accounting Office (GAO). Representatives of the GAO may be granted access to classified information originated by and in possession of the Department of Defense when such information is relevant to the performance of the statutory responsibilities of that office, as set forth in DoD Directive 7650.1 ^2 ^8 . Officials of the GAO, as designated in Appendix B to this part, are authorized to certify security clearances, and the basis therefor. Certifications will be made by these officials pursuant to arrangements with the DoD Component concerned. Personal recognition or presentation of official GAO credential cards are acceptable for identification purposes.
^2 ^8 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(4) Industrial, Educational, and Commercial Entities. (i) Bidders, contractors, grantees, educational, scientific or industrial organizations may have access to classified information only when such access is essential to a function that is necessary in the interest of the national security, and the recipients are cleared in accordance with DoD 5220.22-R.
(ii) Contractor employees whose duties do not require access to classified information are not eligible for personnel security clearance and cannot be investigated under the DISP. In exceptional situations, when a military command is vulnerable to sabotage and its mission is of critical importance to national security, National Agency Checks may be conducted on such individuals with the approval of the DUSD(P).
(5) Historical Researchers. Persons outside the Executive Branch who are engaged in historical research projects may be authorized access to classified information provided that an authorized official within the DoD Component with classification jurisdiction over the information:
(i) Makes a written determination that such access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security in view of the intended use of the material to which access is granted by certifying that the requester has been found to be trustworthy pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section;
(ii) Limits such access to specific categories of information over which that DoD Component has classification jurisdiction and to any other category of information for which the researcher obtains the written consent of a DoD Component or non-DoD department or agency that has classification jurisdiction over information contained in or revealed by documents within the scope of the proposed historical research;
(iii) Maintains custody of the classified material at a DoD installation or activity or authorizes access to documents in the custody of the NARA;
(iv) Obtains the researcher's agreement to safeguard the information and to submit any notes and manuscript for review by all DoD Components or non-DoD departments or agencies with classification jurisdiction for a determination that no classified information is contained therein by execution of a statement entitled, “Conditions Governing Access to Official Records for Historical Research Purposes”; and
(v) Issues an authorization for access valid for not more than 2 years from the date of issuance that may be renewed under regulations of the issuing DoD Component.
(6) Former Presidential Appointees. Persons who previously occupied policy making positions to which they were appointed by the President may not remove classified information upon departure from office as all such material must remain under the security control of the U.S. Government. Such persons may be authorized access to classified information that they originated, received, reviewed, signed, or that was addressed to them while serving as such an appointee, provided that an authorized official within the DoD Component with classification jurisdiction for such information:
(i) Makes a written determination that such access is clearly consistent with the interests of national security in view of the intended use of the material to which access is granted and by certifying that the requester has been found to be trustworthy pursuant to paragraph (a)(1) of this section;
(ii) Limits such access to specific categories of information over which that DoD Component has classification jurisdiction and to any other category of information for which the former appointee obtains the written consent of a DoD Component or non-DoD department or agency that has classification jurisdiction over information contained in or revealed by documents with the scope of the proposed access;
(iii) Retains custody of the classified material at a DoD installation or activity or authorizes access to documents in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service; and
(iv) Obtains the former presidential appointee's agreement to safeguard the information and to submit any notes and manuscript for review by all DoD Components or non-DoD departments or agencies with classification jurisdiction for a determination that no classified information is contained therein.
(7) Judicial Proceedings. DoD Directive 5405.2 ^2 ^9 governs the release of classified information in litigation.
^2 ^9 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(c) Access by Foreign Nationals, Foreign Governments, and International Organizations. (1) Classified information may be released to foreign nationals, foreign governments, and international organizations only when authorized under the provisions of the National Disclosure Policy and DoD Directive 5230.11; and
(2) Access to COMSEC information by foreign persons and activities shall be in accordance with policy issuances of the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NTISSC).
(d) Other Situations. When necessary in the interests of national security, heads of DoD Components, or their single designee, may authorize access by persons outside the Federal government, other than those enumerated in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, to classified information upon determining that the recipient is trustworthy for the purpose of accomplishing a national security objective; and that the recipient can and will safeguard the information from unauthorized disclosure.
(e) Access Required by Other Executive Branch Investigative and Law Enforcement Agents. (1) Normally, investigative agents of other departments or agencies may obtain access to DoD information through established liaison or investigative channels.
(2) When the urgency or delicacy of a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), or Secret Service investigation precludes use of established liaison or investigative channels, FBI, DEA, or Secret Service agents may obtain access to DoD information as required. However, this information shall be protected as required by its classification. Before any public release of the information so obtained the approval of the head of the activity or higher authority shall be obtained.
(f) Access by Visitors. Procedures shall be established to control access to classified information by visitors. (DoD Instruction 5230.20 provides further guidance regarding foreign visitors.)
(1) Except when a continuing, frequent working relationship is established, through which current security clearance and need-to-know are determined, DoD personnel visiting other activities of the Department of Defense, its contractors, and other agencies shall provide advance notification of the pending visit that establishes the visitor's security clearance and the purpose of the visit. Visit requests shall be signed by an official other than the visitor who is in a position to verify the visitor's security clearance.
(2) Visit requests normally should include the following:
(i) Full name, date and place of birth, social security number, and rank or grade of visitor;
(ii) Security clearance of the visitor;
(iii) Employing activity of the visitor;
(iv) Name and address of activity to be visited;
(v) Date and duration of proposed visit;
(vi) Purpose of visit in sufficient detail to establish need-to-know; and
(vii) Names of persons to be contacted.
(3) Visit requests may remain valid for not more than 1 year.
§ 159a.54
Dissemination.
(a) Policy. DoD Components shall establish procedures consistent with this Regulation for the dissemination of classified material. The originating official or activity may prescribe specific restrictions on dissemination of classified information when necessary. (See § 159a.35(f). Particular emphasis shall be placed on traditional need-to-know measures to aid in the strict control of classified information.)
(b) Restraints on Special Access Requirements. Special requirements with respect to access, distribution, and protection of classified information shall require prior approval in accordance with subpart M of this part.
(c) Information Originating in a Non-DoD Department or Agency. Except under rules established by the Secretary of Defense, or as provided by section 102 of the National Security Act, classified information originating in a department or agency other than Department of Defense shall not be disseminated outside the Department of Defense without the consent of the originating department or agency.
(d) Foreign Intelligence Information. Dissemination of foreign intelligence information shall be in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 5230.22 and DoD Directive C-5230.23 ^3 ^0 .
^3 ^0 See footnote 13 to § 159a.33(j).
(e) Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data. Information bearing the warning notices prescribed in § 159a.35 (b) and (c) shall not be disseminated outside authorized channels without the consent of the originator. Access to and dissemination of Restricted Data by DoD personnel shall be subject to DoD Directive 5210.2.
(f) NATO Information. Classified information originated by NATO shall be safeguarded in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.55.
(g) COMSEC Information. COMSEC information shall be disseminated in accordance with NACSI 4005 and implementing instructions.
(h) Dissemination of Top Secret Information. (1) Top Secret information, originated within the Department of Defense, may not be disseminated outside the Department of Defense without the consent of the originating DoD Component, or higher authority.
(2) Top Secret information, whenever segregable from classified portions bearing lower classifications, shall be distributed separately.
(3) Standing distribution requirements for Top Secret information and materials, such as distribution lists, shall be reviewed at least annually to verify the recipients’ need-to-know.
(i) Dissemination of Secret and Confidential Information. (1) Secret and Confidential information, originated within the Department of Defense, may be disseminated within the Executive Branch, unless prohibited by the originator. (See § 159a.35(f)).
(2) Standing distribution requirements for Secret and Confidential information and materials, such as distribution lists, shall be reviewed at least annually to verify the recipients’ need-to-know.
(j) Code Words, Nicknames, and Exercise Terms. The use of code words, nicknames, and exercise terms is subject to the provisions of subpart M and Appendix C.
(k) Scientific and Technical Meetings. Use of classified information in scientific and technical meetings is subject to the provisions of DoD Directive 5200.12.
(l) Limited Dissemination (LIMDIS). This section establishes limits on measures for the protection of information beyond those involving access to classified information per se, but not so stringent as to require the establishment of a Special Access Program. It prohibits use of terminology indicating enhancements to need-to-know, such as Special Need-to-Know (SNTK), MUST KNOW, Controlled Need-to-Know (CNTK), or other similar security upgrade designations and associated unique security requirements such as specialized nondisclosure statements. Limited dissemination controls are the only security enhancement short of a Special Access Program which may be employed for control over specific information for specified periods of time. In this context, these procedures may be initiated and continued on a showing that additional access controls are required in order to assure the security of the designated information. The decision to apply these procedures shall be made at the original classification authority level of command or supervision in accordance with the implementing information security instructions promulgated by the DoD Component. Except by agreement, such requirements shall not be imposed outside of the approving DoD Component. LIMDIS protective measures are restricted to one or more of the following:
(1) Decentralized maintenance of disclosure listings, briefings concerning access limitations, and physical security restrictions limited to requirements such as placing the material in sealed envelopes within approved storage containers to avoid inadvertent disclosure and the commingling with other files;
(2) Using unclassified nicknames (no code words may be assigned to LIMDIS information);
(3) Marking the material as LIMDIS along with the assigned nickname;
(4) Marking inner envelopes containing designated LIMDIS information with the notation: “To be Opened Only By Personnel Authorized Access”;
(5) Requiring electronically transmitted messages containing designated information to be marked with the uniform caveat LIMDIS; and
(6) Prescribing unique oversight procedures to be accomplished by Component professional security personnel (industrial security inspections will be conducted in the normal manner by the Defense Investigative Service).
§ 159a.55
Accountability and control.
(a) Top Secret Information. DoD activities shall establish the following procedures:
(1) Control Officers. Top Secret Control Officers (TSCOs) and alternates shall be designated within offices to be responsible for receiving, dispatching, and maintaining accountability registers of Top Secret documents. Such individuals shall be selected on the basis of experience and reliability, and shall have Top Secret security clearances. TSCOs need not be appointed in those instances where there is no likelihood of processing Top Secret documentation.
(2) Accountability—(i) Top Secret Registers. Top Secret accountability registers shall be maintained by each office originating or receiving Top Secret information. Such registers shall be retained for 2 years and shall, as a minimum, reflect the following:
(A) Sufficient information to identify adequately the Top Secret document or material to include the title or appropriate short title, date of the document, and identification of the originator;
(B) The date the document or material was received;
(C) The number of copies received or later reproduced; and
(D) The disposition of the Top Secret document or material and all copies of such documents or material.
(ii) Serialization and Copy Numbering. Top Secret documents and material shall be numbered serially. In addition, each Top Secret document shall be marked to indicate its copy number, for example, copy -1- of -2- copies.
(iii) Disclosure Records. Each Top Secret document or item of material shall have appended to it a Top Secret disclosure record. The name and title of all individuals, including stenographic and clerical personnel to whom information in such documents and materials has been disclosed, and the date of such disclosure, shall be recorded thereon. Disclosures to individuals who may have had access to containers in which Top Secret information is stored, or who regularly handle a large volume of such information need not be so recorded. Such individuals, when identified on a roster, are deemed to have had access to such information. Disclosure records shall be retained for 2 years after the documents or materials are transferred, downgraded, or destroyed.
(3) Inventories. All Top Secret documents and material shall be inventoried at least once annually. The inventory shall reconcile the Top Secret accountability register with the documents or material on hand. At such time, each document or material shall be examined for completeness. DoD Component senior officials (§ 159a.93 (b) and (c)) may authorize the annual inventory of Top Secret documents and material in repositories, libraries, or activities that store large volumes of Top Secret documents or material to be limited to documents and material to which access has been granted within the past year, and 10 percent of the remaining inventory. If a storage system contains large volumes of information and security measures are adequate to prevent access by unauthorized persons, a request for waiver of the annual inventory requirement accompanied by full justification may be submitted to the DUSD(P).
(4) Retention. Top Secret information shall be retained only to the extent necessary to satisfy current requirements. Custodians shall destroy nonrecord copies of Top Secret documents when no longer needed. Record copies of documents that cannot be destroyed shall be reevaluated and, when appropriate, downgraded, declassified, or retired to designated records centers.
(5) Receipts. Top Secret documents and material will be accounted for by a continuous chain of receipts. Receipts shall be maintained for 2 years.
(b) Secret Information. Administrative procedures shall be established by each DoD Component for controlling Secret information and material originated or received by an activity; distributed or routed to a sub-element of such activity; and disposed of by the activity by transfer of custody or destruction. The control system for Secret information must be determined by a practical balance of security and operating efficiency and must meet the following minimum requirements:
(1) It must provide a means to ensure that Secret material sent outside a major subordinate element (the activity) of the DoD Component concerned has been delivered to the intended recipient. Such delivery may be presumed where the material is sent electronically over secure voice or data circuits. Ensuring physical delivery may be accomplished by use of a receipt as provided in § 159.58(c)(2) or through hand-to-hand transfer when the receiving party acknowledges responsibility for the Secret material.
(2) It must provide a record of receipt and dispatch of Secret material by each major subordinate element. The dispatch record requirement may be satisfied when the distribution of Secret material is evident from addresses or distribution lists for classified documentation. Records of receipt and dispatch are required regardless of the means used to ensure delivery of the material (see paragraph (b)(1) of this section).
(3) Records of receipt and dispatch for Secret material shall be retained for a minimum of 2 years.
(c) Confidential Information. Administrative controls shall be established to protect Confidential information received, originated, transmitted, or stored by an activity.
(d) Receipt of Classified Material. Procedures shall be developed within DoD activities to protect incoming mail, bulk shipments, and items delivered by messenger until a determination is made whether classified information is contained therein. Screening points shall be established to limit access to classified information to cleared personnel.
(e) Working Papers. (1) Working papers are documents and material accumulated or created in the preparation of finished documents and material. Working papers containing classified information shall be:
(i) Dated when created;
(ii) Marked with the highest classification of any information contained therein;
(iii) Protected in accordance with the assigned classification;
(iv) Destroyed when no longer needed; and
(v) Accounted for, controlled, and marked in the manner prescribed for a finished document of the same classification when:
(A) Released by the originator outside the activity or transmitted electrically or through message center channels within the activity;
(B) Retained more than 90 days from date of origin;
(C) Filed permanently; or
(D) Top Secret information is contained therein.
(2) Heads of DoD Components, or their single designees, may approve waivers of accountability, control, and marking requirements for working papers containing Top Secret information for activities within their Components on a case-by-case basis provided a determination is made that:
(i) The conditions set forth in paragraph (e)(1)(v) (A), (B), or (C) of this section, will remain in effect;
(ii) The activity seeking a waiver routinely handles large volumes of Top Secret working papers and compliance with prescribed accountability, control, and marking requirements would have an adverse affect on the activity's mission or operations; and
(iii) Access to areas where Top Secret working papers are handled is restricted to personnel who have an appropriate level of clearance, and other safeguarding measures are adequate to preclude the possibility of unauthorized disclosure.
(3) In all cases in which a waiver is granted under paragraph (e)(2) of this section, the DUSD(P) shall be notified.
(f) Restraint on Reproduction. Except for the controlled initial distribution of information processed or received electrically or as provided by § 159a.2(f) and § 159a.29(c), portions of documents and materials that contain Top Secret information shall not be reproduced without the consent of the originator or higher authority. Any stated prohibition against reproduction shall be observed strictly. (See § 159a.35(f)) To the extent possible, DoD Components shall establish classified reproduction facilities where only designated personnel can reproduce classified materials and institute key control systems for reproduction areas. Also, when possible, two people shall be involved in the reproduction process to help assure positive control and safeguarding of all copies. The following additional measures apply to reproduction equipment and to the reproduction of classified information:
(1) Copying of documents containing classified information shall be minimized;
(2) Officials authorized to approve the reproduction of Top Secret and Secret information shall be designated by position title and shall review the need for reproduction of classified documents and material with a view toward minimizing reproduction.
(3) Specific reproduction equipment shall be designated for the reproduction of classified information. Rules for reproduction of classified information shall be posted on or near the designated equipment;
(4) Notices prohibiting reproduction of classified information shall be posted on equipment used only for the reproduction of unclassified information;
(5) DoD Components shall ensure that equipment used for reproduction of classified information does not leave latent images in the equipment or on other material;
(6) All copies of classified documents reproduced for any purpose including those incorporated in a working paper are subject to the same controls prescribed for the document from which the reproduction is made; and
(7) Records shall be maintained for 2 years to show the number and distribution of reproduced copies of all Top Secret documents, of all classified documents covered by special access programs distributed outside the originating agency, and of all Secret and Confidential documents that are marked with special dissemination and reproduction limitations.
(See § 159a.35(f))

Subpart I—Transmission
§ 159a.57
Methods of transmission or transportation.
(a) Policy. Classified information may be transmitted or transported only as specified in this subpart.
(b) Top Secret Information. Transmission of Top Secret information shall be effected only by:
(1) The Armed Forces Courier Service (ARFCOS);
(2) Authorized DoD Component Courier Services,
(3) If appropriate, the Department of State Courier System;
(4) Cleared and designated U.S. military personnel and Government civilian employees traveling on a conveyance owned, controlled, or chartered by the U.S. Government or DoD contractors;
(5) Cleared and designated U.S. Military personnel and government civilian employees by surface transportation;
(6) Cleared and designated U.S. Military personnel and government civilian employees on scheduled commercial passenger aircraft within and between the United States, its Territories, and Canada, when approved in accordance with § 159a.59(d)(1).
(7) Cleared and designated U.S. Military personnel and government civilian employees on scheduled commercial passenger aircraft on flights outside the United States, its territories, and Canada, when approved in accordance with § 159a.59(d)(2).
(8) Cleared and designated DoD contractor employees within and between the United States and its Territories provided that the transmission has been authorized in writing by the appropriate contracting officer or his designated representative, and the designated employees have been briefed on their responsibilities as couriers or escorts for the protection of Top Secret material. Complete guidance for Top Secret transmission is specified in DoD 5220.22-R and DoD 5220.22-M.
(9) A cryptographic system authorized by the Director, NSA, or via a protected distribution system designed and installed to meet the standards included in the National COMSEC and Emanations Security (EMSEC) Issuance System.
(c) Secret Information. Transmission of Secret information may be effected by:
(1) Any of the means approved for the transmission of Top Secret information except that Secret information may be introduced into the ARFCOS only when the control of such information cannot be otherwise maintained in U.S. custody. This restriction does not apply to SCI and COMSEC information;
(2) Appropriately cleared contractor employees within and between the United States and its Territories provided that:
(i) The designated employees have been briefed in their responsibilities as couriers or escorts for protecting Secret information;
(ii) The classified information remains under the constant custody and protection of the contractor personnel at all times; and
(iii) The transmission otherwise meets the requirements specified in DoD 5220.22-R and DoD 5220.22-M. In other areas, appropriately cleared DoD contractor employees may transmit classified material only as prescribed by DoD 5220.22-R and DoD 5220.22-M.
(3) U.S. Postal Service registered mail within and between the United States and its Territories;
(4) U.S. Postal Service registered mail through Army, Navy, or Air Force Postal Service facilities outside the United States and its Territories, provided that the information does not at any time pass out of U.S. citizen control and does not pass through a foreign postal system or any foreign inspection;
(5) U.S. Postal Service and Canadian registered mail with registered mail receipt between U.S. Government and Canadian Government installations in the United States and Canada;
(6) Carriers authorized to transport Secret information by way of a Protective Security Service (PSS) under the DoD Industrial Security Program. This method is authorized only within the U.S. boundaries and only when the size, bulk, weight, and nature of the shipment, or escort considerations make the use of other methods impractical. Routings for these shipments will be obtained from the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC);
(7) The following carriers under appropriate escort: government and government contract vehicles including aircraft, ships of the U.S. Navy, civil service-operated U.S. Naval ships, and ships of U.S. registry. Appropriately cleared operators of vehicles, officers of ships or pilots of aircraft who are U.S. citizens may be designated as escorts provided the control of the carrier is maintained on a 24-hour basis. The escort shall protect the shipment at all times, through personal observation or authorized storage to prevent inspection, tampering, pilferage, or unauthorized access. However, observation of the shipment is not required during the period it is stored in an aircraft or ship in connection with flight or sea transit, provided the shipment is loaded into a compartment that is not accessible to any unauthorized persons or in a specialized secure, safe-like container that is:
(i) Constructed of solid building material that provides a substantial resistance to forced entry;
(ii) Constructed in a manner that precludes surreptitious entry through disassembly or other means, and that attempts at surreptitious entry would be readily discernible through physical evidence of tampering; and
(iii) Secured by a numbered cable seal lock affixed to a substantial metal hasp in a manner that precludes surreptitious removal and provides substantial resistance to forced entry.
(8) Use of specialized containers aboard aircraft requires that:
(i) Appropriately cleared personnel maintain observation of the material as it is being loaded aboard the aircraft and that observation of the aircraft continues until it is airborne;
(ii) Observation by appropriately cleared personnel is maintained at the destination as the material is being off-loaded and at any intermediate stops. Observation will be continuous until custody of the material is assumed by appropriately cleared personnel.
(d) Confidential Information. Transmission of Confidential information may be effected by:
(1) Means approved for the transmission of Secret information. However, U.S. Postal Service registered mail shall be used for Confidential only as indicated in paragraph (c)(2) of this section;
(2) U.S. Postal Service registered mail for:
(i) Confidential information of NATO;
(ii) Other Confidential material to and from FPO or APO addressees located outside the United States and its Territories;
(iii) Other addressees when the originator is uncertain that their location is within U.S. boundaries. Use of return postal receipts on a case-by-case basis is authorized.
(3) U.S. Postal Service first class mail between DoD Component locations anywhere in the United States and its Territories. However, the outer envelope or wrappers of such Confidential material shall be endorsed “POSTMASTER: Address Correction Requested/Do Not Forward.” Certified or, if appropriate, registered mail shall be used for material directed to DoD contractors and to non-DoD agencies of the Executive Branch. U.S. Postal Service Express Mail Service may be used between DoD Component locations, between DoD contractors, and between DoD Components and DoD contractors.
(4) Within U.S. boundaries, commercial carriers that provide a Constant Surveillance Service (CSS). Information concerning commercial carriers that provide CSS may be obtained from the MTMC.
(5) In the custody of commanders or masters of ships of U.S. registry who are U.S. citizens. Confidential information shipped on ships of U.S. registry may not pass out of U.S. Government control. The commanders or masters must give and receive classified information receipts and agree to:
(i) Deny access to the Confidential material by unauthorized persons, including customs inspections, with the understanding that Confidential cargo that would be subject to customs inspection will not be unloaded; and
(ii) Maintain control of the cargo until a receipt is obtained from an authorized representative of the consignee.
(6) Such alternative or additional methods of transmission as the head of any DoD Component may establish by rule or regulation, provided those methods afford at least an equal degree of security.
(e) Transmission of Classified Material to Foreign Governments. After a determination by designated officials pursuant to DoD Directive 5230.11 that classified information or material may be released to a foreign government, the material shall be transferred between authorized representatives of each government in compliance with the provisions of this subpart. To assure compliance, each contract, agreement, or other arrangement that involves the release of classified material to foreign entities shall either contain transmission instructions or require that a separate transportation plan be approved by the appropriate DoD security and transportation officials prior to release of the material. (See DoD TS-5105.21-M-3 ^{31} for guidance regarding SCI.)
^{31} See footnote 13 to § 159a.33(j)
(1) Classified material to be released directly to a foreign government representative shall be delivered or transmitted only to a person who has been designated in writing by the recipient government as its officer, agent, or employee (hereafter referred to as the designated representative). Foreign governments may designate a freight forwarder as their agent. This written designation shall contain assurances that such person has a security clearance at the appropriate level and that the person will assume full security responsibility for the material on behalf of the foreign government. The recipient will be required to execute a receipt for the material, regardless of the level of classification.
(2) Classified material that is suitable for transfer by courier or postal service, and which cannot be transferred directly to a foreign government's designated representative as specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, shall be transmitted by one of the methods specified in paragraph (b), (c), or (d) of this section, for the designated classification level to:
(i) An embassy, consulate, or other official agency of the recipient government having extraterritorial status in the United States, or to
(ii) A U.S. Embassy or a U.S. military organization in the recipient country or in a third-party country, if applicable, for delivery to a designated representative of the intended recipient government. In either case, the assurance in paragraph (e)(1) of this section, and a receipt, must be obtained.
(3) The shipment of classified material as freight via truck, rail, aircraft, or ship shall be in compliance with the following:
(i) Shipment Resulting from Foreign Military Sales (FMS). DoD officials authorized to approve a FMS transaction that involves the delivery of U.S. classified material to a foreign purchaser shall, at the outset of negotiation or consideration of proposal, consult with DoD transportation authorities (Military Traffic Management Command, Military Sealift Command, Military Airlift Command, or other, as appropriate) to determine whether secure shipment from the CONUS point of origin to the ultimate foreign destination is feasible. Normally, the United States will use the Defense Transportation System (DTS) to deliver classified material to the recipient government. If, in the course of FMS case processing, the foreign purchaser proposes to take delivery and custody of the classified material in the United States and use it own facilities and transportation for onward shipment to its territory, the foreign purchaser or its designated representative shall be required to submit a transportation plan for DoD review and approval. This plan, as a minimum, shall specify the storage facilities, delivery and transfer points, carriers, couriers or escorts, and methods of handling to be used from the CONUS point of origin to the final destination and return shipment when applicable. (See Appendix E to this part) Security officials of the DoD Component that initiates the FMS transaction shall evaluate the transportation plan to determine whether the plan adequately ensures protection of the highest level of classified material involved. Unless the DoD Component initiating the FMS transaction approves the transportation plan as submitted, or it is modified to meet U.S. security standards, shipment by other than DTS shall not be permitted. Transmission instructions or the requirement for an approved transportation plan shall be incorporated into the security requirements of the United States Department of Defense Offer and Acceptance (DD Form 1513).
(ii) Shipments Resulting from Direct Commercial Sales. Classified shipments resulting from direct commercial sales must comply with the same security standards that apply to FMS shipments. Defense contractors, therefore, will consult, as appropriate, with the purchasing government, the DIS Regional Security Office, and the owning Military Department prior to consummation of a commercial contract that will result in the shipment of classified material to obtain approval of the transportation plan.
(iii) Delivery within the United States, Its Territories, or Possessions. Delivery of classified material to a foreign government at a point within the United States, its territories, or its possessions, shall be made only to a person identified in writing by the recipient government as its designated representative as specified in paragraph (e)(1) of this section. The only authorized delivery points are:
(A) An embassy, consulate, or other official agency under the control of the recipient government.
(B) Point of origin. When a designated representative of the recipient government accepts delivery of classified U.S. material at the point of origin (for example, a manufacturing facility or depot), the DoD official who transfers custody shall obtain a receipt for the classified material and assure that the recipient is cognizant or secure means of onward movement of the classified material to its final destination, consistent with the approved transportation plan.
(C) Military or commercial ports of embarkation (POE) that are recognized points of departure from the United States, its territories, or possessions, for onloading aboard a ship, aircraft, or other carrier authorized under paragraph (e)(3)(v) of this section. In these cases, the transportation plan shall provide for U.S.-controlled secure shipment to the CONUS transshipment point and the identification of a secure storage facility, government or commercial, at or in proximity to the POE. A DoD official authorized to transfer custody is to supervise or observe the onloading of FMS material being transported via the DTS and other onloading wherein physical and security custody of the material has yet to be transferred formally to the foreign recipient. In the event that transfer of physical and security custody cannot be accomplished promptly, the DoD official shall ensure that the classified material is either returned to a secure storage facility of the U.S. shipper (government or contractor); or segregated and placed under constant surveillance of a duly cleared U.S. security force at the POE; or held in the secure storage facility (government or commercial) designated in the transportation plan.
(D) Freight forwarder facility that is identified by the recipient government as its designated representative and that is cleared in accordance with paragraph (e)(3)(vi) of this section, to the level of the classified material to be received. In these cases, a person identified as a designated representative must be present to accept delivery of the classified material and receipt for it, to include full acceptance of security responsibility.
(iv) Delivery Outside the United States, Its Territories, or Possessions—(A) Delivery within the recipient country. Classified U.S. material to be delivered to a foreign government within the recipient country shall be delivered on arrival in the recipient country to a U.S. Government representative who shall arrange for its transfer to a designated representative of the recipient government. If the shipment is escorted by a U.S. Government official authorized to accomplish the transfer of custody, the material may be delivered directly to the recipient government's designated representative upon arrival.
(B) Delivery Within a Third Country. Classified material to be delivered to a foreign government representative within a third country shall be delivered to an agency or installation of the United States, or of the recipient government, that has extraterritorial status or otherwise is exempt from the jurisdiction of the third country. Unless the material is accompanied by a U.S. Government official authorized to accomplish the transfer of custody, a U.S. Government official shall be designated locally to receive the shipment upon arrival and be vested with authority to effect delivery to the intended recipient government's designated representative.
(v) Overseas Carriers. Overseas shipments of U.S. classified material shall be made only via ships, aircraft, or other carriers that are:
(A) Owned or chartered by the U.S. Government or under U.S. registry,
(B) Owned or chartered by or under the registry of the recipient government, or
(C) Otherwise expressly authorized by the head of the DoD Component having classification jurisdiction over the material involved. Overseas shipments of classified material shall be escorted, prepared for shipment, packaged, and stored onboard as prescribed elsewhere in this subpart and in DoD 5220.22-R and DoD 5220.22-M.
(vi) Freight Forwarders. Only freight forwarders that have been granted an appropriate security clearance by the Department of Defense or the recipient government are eligible to receive, process, and store U.S. classified material authorized for release to foreign governments. However, a freight forwarder that does not have access to or custody of the classified material need not be cleared.
(f) Consignor-Consignee Responsibility for Shipment of Bulky Material. The consignor of a bulk shipment shall:
(1) Normally, select a carrier that will provide a single line service from the point of origin to destination, when such a service is available;
(2) Ship packages weighing less than 200 pounds in closed vehicles only;
(3) Notify the consignee, and military transshipping activities, of the nature of the shipment (including level of classification), the means of shipment, the number of seals, if used, and the anticipated time and date of arrival by separate communication at least 24 hours in advance of arrival of the shipment. Advise the first military transshipping activity that, in the event the material does not move on the conveyance originally anticipated, the transshipping activity should so advise the consignee with information of firm transshipping date and estimated time of arrival. Upon receipt of the advance notice of a shipment of classified material, consignees and transshipping activities shall take appropriate steps to receive the classified shipment and to protect it upon arrival.
(4) Annotate the bills of lading to require the carrier to notify the consignor immediately by the fastest means if the shipment is unduly delayed enroute. Such annotations shall not under any circumstances disclose the classified nature of the commodity. When seals are used, annotate substantially as follows:
DO NOT BREAK SEALS EXCEPT IN EMERGENCY OR UPON AUTHORITY OF CONSIGNOR OR CONSIGNEE. IF BROKEN APPLY CARRIER'S SEALS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY CONSIGNOR AND CONSIGNEE.
(5) Require the consignee to advise the consignor of any shipment not received more than 48 hours after the estmated time of arrival furnished by the consignor or transshipping activity. Upon receipt of such notice, the consignor shall immediately trace the shipment. If there is evidence that the classified material was subjected to compromise, the procedures set forth in subpart G of this part for reporting compromises shall apply.
(g) Transmission of COMSEC Information. COMSEC information shall be transmitted in accordance with National COMSEC Instruction 4005.
(h) Transmission of Restricted Data. Restricted Data shall be transmitted in the same manner as other information of the same security classification. The transporting and handling of nuclear weapons or nuclear components shall be in accordance with DoD Directives 4540.1 ^{32} and 5210.41 ^{33} and applicable DoD Component directives and regulations.
^{32} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3
^{33} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3
[54 FR 26959, June 27, 1989; 54 FR 46610, Nov. 6, 1989]
§ 159a.58
Preparation of material for transmission, shipment, or conveyance.
(a) Envelopes or Containers. (1) Whenever classified information is transmitted, it shall be enclosed in two opaque sealed envelopes or simliar wrappings when size permits, except as provided by the following:
(2) Whenever classified material is transmitted of a size not suitable for transmission in accordance with paragraph (a)(1) of this section, it shall be enclosed in two opaque sealed containers, such as boxes or heavy wrappings.
(i) If the classified information is an internal component of a packageable item of equipment, the outside shell or body may be considered as the inner enclosure provided it does not reveal classified information.
(ii) If the classified material is an inaccessible internal component of a bulky item of equipment that is not reasonably packageable, the outside or body of the item may be considered to be a sufficient enclosure provided the shell or body does not reveal classified information.
(iii) If the classified material is an item or equipment that is not reasonably packageable and the shell or body is classified, it shall be concealed with an opaque covering that will hide all classified features.
(iv) Specialized shipping containers, including closed cargo transporters, may be used instead of the above packaging requirements. In such cases, the container may be considered the outer wrapping or cover.
(3) Material used for packaging shall be of such strength and durability as to provide security protection while in transit, prevent items from breaking out of the container, and to facilitate the detection of any tampering with the container. The wrappings shall conceal all classified characteristics.
(4) Closed and locked vehicles, compartments, or cars shall be used for shipments of classified information except when another method is authorized by the consignor. Alternative methods authorized by the consignor must provide security equivalent to or better than the methods specified herein. In all instances, individual packages weighing less than 200 pounds gross shall be shipped only in a closed vehicle.
(5) To minimize the possibility of compromise of classified material caused by improper or inadequate packaging thereof, responsible officials shall ensure that proper wrappings are used for mailable bulky packages. Responsible officials shall require the inspection of bulky packages to determine whether the material is suitable for mailing or whether it should be transmitted by other approved means.
(6) When classified material is hand-carried outside an activity, a locked briefcase may serve as the outer wrapper. In such cases, the addressing requirements of paragraph (b)(4) of this section do not apply; however, the requirements of paragraph (b)(3) of this section are applicable.
(b) Addressing. (1) Classified information shall be addressed to an official government activity or DoD contractor with a facility clearance and not to an individual. This is not intended, however, to prevent use of office code numbers or such phrases in the address as “Attention: Research Department,” or similar aids in expediting internal routing, in addition to the organization address.
(2) Classified written information shall be folded or packed in such a manner that the text will not be in direct contact with the inner envelope or container. A receipt form shall be attached to or enclosed in the inner envelope or container for all Secret and Top Secret information; Confidential information will require a receipt only if the originator deems it necessary. The mailing of written materials of different classifications in a single package should be avoided. However, when written materials of different classifications are transmitted in one package, they shall be wrapped in a single inner envelope or container. A receipt listing all classified information for which a receipt is requested shall be attached or enclosed. The inner envelope or container shall be marked with the highest classification of the contents.
(3) The inner envelope or container shall show the address of the receiving activity, classification, including, where appropriate, the “Restricted Data” marking, and any applicable special instructions. It shall be carefully sealed to minimize the possibility of access without leaving evidence of tampering.
(4) An outer or single envelope or container shall show the complete and correct address and the return address of the sender.
(5) An outer cover or single envelope or container shall not bear a classification marking, a listing of the contents divulging classified information, or any other unusual data or marks that might invite special attention to the fact that the contents are classified.
(6) Care must be taken to ensure that classified information intended only for U.S. elements of international staffs or other organizations is addressed specifically to those elements.
(c) Receipt Systems. (1) Top Secret information shall be transmitted under a chain of receipts covering each individual who gets custody.
(2) Secret information shall be covered by a receipt when transmitted to a foreign government (including foreign government embassies located in the United States) and when transmitted between major subordinate elements of DoD Components and other authorized addressees except that a receipt is not required when there is a hand-to-hand transfer between U.S. personnel and the recipient acknowledges responsibility for the Secret information.
(3) Receipts for Confidential information are not required except when the information is transmitted to a foreign government (including foreign government embassies located in the United States) or upon request.
(4) Receipts shall be provided by the transmitter of the material and the forms shall be attached to the inner cover.
(i) Postcard receipt forms may be used.
(ii) Receipt forms shall be unclassified and contain only such information as is necessary to identify the material being transmitted.
(iii) Receipts shall be retained for at least 2 years.
(5) In those instances where a fly-leaf (page check) form is used with classified publications, the postcard receipt will not be required.
(d) Exceptions. Exceptions may be authorized to the requirements contained in this subpart by the head of the Component concerned or designee, provided the exception affords equal protection and accountability to that provided above. Proposed exceptions that do not meet these minimum standards shall be submitted to the DUSD(P) for approval.
§ 159a.59
Restrictions, procedures, and authorization concerning escort or handcarrying of classified information.
(a) General Restrictions. Appropriately cleared personnel may be authorized to escort or handcarry classified material between their duty station and an activity to be visited subject to the following conditions:
(1) The storage provisions of § 159a.37 and § 159a.38(g) of subpart F of this part shall apply at all stops enroute to the destination, unless the information is retained in the personal possession and under constant surveillance of the individual at all times. The hand carrying of classified information on trips that involve an overnight stop is not permissible without advance arrangements for proper overnight storage in a U.S. Government facility or, if in the United States, a cleared contractor's facility that has the requisite storage capability.
(2) Classified material shall not be read, studied, displayed, or used in any manner in public conveyances or places.
(3) When classified material is carried in a private, public or government conveyance, it shall not be placed in any detachable storage compartment such as automobile trailers, luggage racks, aircraft travel pods, or drop tanks nor, under any circumstances, left unattended.
(4) Responsible officials shall provide a written statement to all individuals escorting or carrying classified material aboard commercial passenger aircraft authorizing such transmission. This authorization statement may be included in official travel orders and should ordinarily permit the individual to pass through passenger control points without the need for subjecting the classified material to inspection. Specific procedures for carrying classified documents aboard commercial aircraft are contained in paragraph (c) of this section.
(5) Each activity shall list all classified information carried or escorted by traveling personnel. All classified information shall be accounted for.
(6) Individuals authorized to hand-carry or escort classified material shall be fully informed of the provisions of this subpart, and shall sign a statement to that effect prior to the issuance of written authorization or identification media. This statement shall be retained for a minimum of 2 years; it need not be executed on each occasion that the individual is authorized to transport classified information provided a signed statement is on file.
(b) Restrictions on Handcarrying Classified Information Aboard Commercial Passenger Aircraft. Classified information shall not be hand-carried aboard commercial passenger aircraft unless:
(1) There is neither time nor means available to move the information in the time required to accomplish operational objectives or contract requirements.
(2) The handcarry has been authorized by an appropriate official in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.
(3) In the case of the handcarry of classified information across international borders, arrangements have been made to ensure that such information will not be opened by customs, border, postal, or other inspectors, either U.S. or foreign.
(4) The handcarry is accomplished aboard a U.S. carrier. Foreign carriers will be utilized only when no U.S. carrier is available and then the approving official must ensure that the information will remain in the custody and physical control of the U.S. escort at all times.
(c) Procedures for Handcarrying Classified Information Aboard Commercial Passenger Aircraft—(1) Basic requirements. (i) Advance and continued coordination by the DoD activity and contractor officials shall be made with departure airline and terminal officials and, when possible, with intermediate transfer terminals to develop mutually satisfactory arrangements within the terms of this issuance and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) guidance. Specifically, a determination should be made beforehand whether documentation described in paragraph (c)(4) of this section, will be required. Local FAA Security Officers can be of assistance in making this determination. To aid coordination and planning, a listing of FAA field offices is at Appendix D to this part.
(ii) The individual designated as courier shall be in possession of either DD Form 2, “Armed (or Uniformed) Services Identification Card” (any color), or other DoD or contractor picture identification card and written authorization to carry classified information.
(2) Procedures for carrying classified information in envelopes. Persons carrying classified information should process through the airline ticketing and boarding procedures the same as all other passengers except for the following:
(i) The classified information being carried shall contain no metal bindings and shall be contained in sealed envelopes. Should such envelopes be contained in a briefcase or other carry-on luggage, the briefcase or luggage shall be routinely offered for opening for inspection for weapons. The screening officials may check envelopes by X-ray machine, flexing, feel, and weight, without opening the envelopes themselves.
(ii) Opening or reading of the classified document by the screening official is not permitted.
(3) Procedures for transporting classified information in packages. Classified information in sealed or packaged containers shall be processed as follows:
(i) The government or contractor official who has authorized the transport of the classified information shall notify the appropriate air carrier in advance.
(ii) The passenger carrying the information shall report to the affected airline ticket counter before boarding, present his documentation, and the package or cartons to be exempt from screening. The airline representative will review the documentation and description of the containers to be exempt.
(iii) If satisfied with the identification of the passenger and his documentation, the official will provide the passenger with an escort to the screening station and authorize the screening personnel to exempt the container from physical or other type inspection.
(iv) If the airline official is not satisfied with the identification of the passenger or the authenticity of his documentation, the passenger will not be permitted to board, and not be subject to further screening for boarding purposes.
(v) The actual loading and unloading of the information will be under the supervision of a representative of the air carrier; however, appropriately cleared personnel shall accompany the material and keep it under surveillance during loading and unloading operations. In addition, appropriately cleared personnel must be available to conduct surveillance at any intermediate stops where the cargo compartment is to be opened.
(vi) DoD Components and contractor officials shall establish and maintain appropriate liaison with local FAA officials, airline representatives and airport terminal administrative and security officials. Prior notification is emphasized to ensure that the airline representative can make timely arrangements for courier screening.
(4) Documentation. (i) When authorized to carry sealed envelopes or containers containing classified information, both government and contractor personnel shall present an identification card carrying a photograph, descriptive data, and signature of the individual. (If the identification card does not contain date of birth, height, weight, and signature, these items must be included in the written authorization.)
(A) DoD personnel shall present an official identification issued by U.S. Government agency.
(B) Contractor personnel shall present identification issued by the contractor or the U.S. Government. Contractors’ identification cards shall carry the name of the employing contractor, or otherwise be marked to denote “contractor.”
(C) The courier shall have the original of the authorization letter. A reproduced copy is not acceptable; however, the traveler shall have sufficient authenticated copies to provide a copy to each airline involved. The letter shall be prepared on letterhead stationery of the agency or contractor authorizing the carrying of classified material in addition, the letter shall:
(1) Give the full name of the individual and his employing agency or company;
(2) Describe the type of identification the individual will present (for example, Naval Research Laboratory Identification Card, No. 1234; ABC Corporation Identification Card No. 1234);
(3) Describe the material being carried (for example, three sealed packages, 9″ × 8″ × 24″, addressee and addressor);
(4) Identify the point of departure, destination, and known transfer points;
(5) Carry a date of issue and an expiration date;
(6) Carry the name, title, and signature of the official issuing the letter. Each package or carton to be exempt shall be signed on its face by the official who signed the letter; and
(7) Carry the name of the government agency designated to confirm the letter of authorization, and its telephone number. The telephone number of the agency designated shall be an official U.S. Government number.
(ii) Information relating to the issuance of DoD identification cards is contained in DoD Instruction 1000.13 ^{34} . The green, gray, and red DD Forms 2 and other DoD and contractor picture ID card are acceptable to FAA.
^{34} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(iii) The Director, DIS, shall establish standards for the issuance of identification cards when required by contractor employees selected as couriers or whose duties will involve handcarrying of classified material.
(d) Authority to Approve Escort or Handcarry of Classified Information Aboard Commercial Passenger Aircraft—(1) Within the United States, its Territories, and Canada. (i) DoD Component officials who have been authorized to approve travel orders and designate couriers may approve the escort or handcarry of classified information within the United States, its Territories, and Canada.
(ii) The Director, DIS, may authorize contractor personnel to handcarry classified material in emergency or time-sensitive situations subject to adherence with the procedures and limitations specified in this section.
(2) Outside the United States, its Territories, and Canada. The head of a DoD Component, or single designee at the headquarters or major command level, may authorize the escort or handcarrying of classified information outside the area encompassed by the boundaries of the United States, its Territories, and Canada upon certification by the requestor that:
(i) The material is not present at the destination;
(ii) The material is needed urgently for a specified official purpose; and
(iii) There is a specified reason that the material could not be transmitted by other approved means to the destination in sufficient time for the stated purpose.

Subpart J—Disposal and Destruction
§ 159a.61
Policy.
Documentary record information originated or received by a DoD Component in connection with the transaction of public business, and preserved as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, operations, decisions, procedures, or other activities of any U.S. Government department or agency or because of the informational value of the data contained therein, may be disposed of or destroyed only in accordance with DoD Component record management regulations. Nonrecord classified information, and other material of similar temporary nature, shall be destroyed when no longer needed under procedures established by the head of the cognizant DoD Component. These procedures shall incorporate means of verifying the destruction of classified information and material and be consistent with the following requirements.
§ 159a.62
Methods of destruction.
Classified documents and material shall be destroyed by burning or, with the approval of the cognizant DoD Component head or designee, by melting, chemical decomposition, pulping, pulverizing, cross-cut shredding, or mutilation sufficient to preclude recognition or reconstruction of the classified information. (Strip shredders purchased prior to June 1, 1986 may continue to be used but only in circumstances where reconstruction of the residue is precluded. Shredding significant amounts of unclassified material together with classified material normally will meet this requirement.)
§ 159a.63
Destruction procedures.
(a) Procedures shall be instituted that ensure all classified information intended for destruction actually is destroyed. Destruction records and imposition of a two-person rule, that is, having two cleared persons involved in the entire destruction process, will satisfy this requirement for Top Secret information. Imposition of a two-person rule, without destruction records, will satisfy this requirement for Secret information, as will use of destruction records without imposition of the two-person rule. Only one cleared person needs to be involved in the destruction process for Confidential information.
(b) When burn bags are used for the collection of classified material that is to be destroyed at central destruction facilities, such bags shall be controlled in a manner designed to minimize the possibility of their unauthorized removal and the unauthorized removal of their classified contents prior to actual destruction. When filled, burn bags shall be sealed in a manner that will facilitate the detection of any tampering with the bag.
(c) Procedures to ensure that all classified information intended for destruction actually is destroyed, other than those in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, shall be submitted to the DoD Component's senior official (§ 159a.93(b) and (c)) for approval.
§ 159a.64
Records of destruction.
(a) Records of destruction are required for Top Secret information. The record shall be dated and signed at the time of destruction by two persons cleared for access to Top Secret information. However, in the case of Top Secret information placed in burn bags for central disposal, the destruction record may be signed by the officials when the information is so placed and the bags are sealed. Top Secret burn bags shall be numbered serially and a record kept of all subsequent handling of the bags until they are destroyed. This record may be in lieu of actual burn bag receipts and shall be maintained for a minimum of 2 years.
(b) Records of destruction of Secret and Confidential information are not required except for NATO Secret and some limited categories of specially controlled Secret information. When records of destruction are used for Secret information, only one cleared person has to sign such records. (DoD Directive 5100.55 provides guidance on the destruction of NATO classified material.)
(c) Records of destruction shall be maintained for 2 years.
§ 159a.65
Classified waste.
Waste material, such as handwritten notes, carbon paper, typewriter ribbons, and working papers that contains classified information must be protected to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the information. Classified waste shall be destroyed when no longer needed by a method described in § 159a.62. Destruction records are not required.
§ 159a.66
Classified document retention.
(a) Classified documents that are not permanently valuable records of the government shall not be retained more than 5 years from the date of origin, unless such retention is authorized by and in accordance with DoD Component record disposition schedules.
(b) Throughout the Department of Defense, the head of each activity shall establish at least one clean-out day each year where a portion of the work performed in every office with classified information stored is devoted to the destruction of unneeded classified holdings.

Subpart K—Security Education
§ 159a.68
Responsibility and objectives.
Heads of DoD Components shall establish security education programs for their personnel. Such programs shall stress the objectives of improving the protection of information that requires it. They shall also place emphasis on the balance between the need to release the maximum information appropriate under the Freedom of Information Act (32 CFR part 285) and the interest of the Government in protecting the national security.
§ 159a.69
Scope and principles.
The security education program shall include all personnel authorized or expected to be authorized access to classified information. Each DoD Component shall design its program to fit the requirements of different groups of personnel. Care must be exercised to assure that the program does not evolve into a perfunctory compliance with formal requirements without achieving the real goals of the program. The program shall, as a minimum, be designed to:
(a) Advise personnel of the adverse effects to the national security that could result from unauthorized disclosure and of their personal, moral, and legal responsibility to protect classified information within their knowledge, possession, or control;
(b) Indoctrinate personnel in the principles, criteria, and procedures for the classification, downgrading, declassification, marking, control and accountability, storage, destruction, and transmission of classified information and material, as prescribed in this Regulation, and alert them to the strict prohibitions against improper use and abuse of the classification system;
(c) Familiarize personnel with procedures for challenging classification descisions believed to be improper;
(d) Familiarize personnel with the security requirements of their particular assignment;
(e) Inform personnel of the techniques employed by foreign intelligence activities in attempting to obtain classified information, and their responsibility to report such attempts;
(f) Advise personnel of the penalties for engaging in espionage activities;
(g) Advise personnel of the strict prohibition against discussing classified information over an unsecure telephone or in any other manner that permits interception by unauthorized persons;
(h) Inform personnel of the penalties for violation or disregard of the provisions of this part (see § 159a.97(b));
(i) Instruct personnel that individuals having knowledge, possession, or control of classified information must determine, before disseminating such information, that the prospective recipient has been cleared for access by competent authority; needs the information in order to perform his or her official duties; and can properly protect (or store) the information.
§ 159a.70
Initial briefings.
DoD personnel granted a security clearance (see §159a.53) shall not be permitted to have access to classified information until they have received an initial security briefing and have signed Standard Form 189, “Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement.” DoD 5200.1-PH-1^{35} provides a sample briefing and additional information regarding Standard Form 189. Cleared personnel employed prior to June 1, 1986 must sign Standard Form 189 as soon as practicable but not later than February 28, 1990.
^{35} See footnote 2 to § 159a.3
§ 159a.71
Refresher briefings.
Programs shall be established to provide, at a minimum, annual security training for personnel having continued access to classified information. The elements outlined in § 159a.69 shall be tailored to fit the needs of experienced personnel.
§ 159a.72
Foreign travel briefings.
(a) Personnel who have had access to classified information shall be given a foreign travel briefing, before travel, to alert them to their possible exploitation under the following conditions:
(1) Travel to or through communist-controlled countries; and
(2) Attendance at international scientific, technical, engineering or other professional meetings in the United States or in any country outside the United States where it can be anticipated that representatives of Communist-controlled countries will participate or be in attendance. (See also DoD Directive 5240.6 ^3 ^6 .)
^3 ^6 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(b) Individuals who travel frequently, or attend or host meetings of foreign visitors as described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, need not be briefed for each occasion, but shall be provided a thorough briefing at least once every 6 months and a general reminder of security responsibilities before each such activity.
§ 159a.73
Termination briefings.
(a) Upon termination of employment, administrative withdrawal of security clearance, or contemplated absence from duty or employment for 60 days or more, DoD military personnel and civilian employees shall be given a termination briefing, return all classified material, and execute a Security Termination Statement. This statement shall include:
(1) An acknowledgment that the individual has read the appropriate provisions of the Espionage Act, other criminal statutes, DoD regulations applicable to the safeguarding of classified information to which the individual has had access, and understands the implications thereof;
(2) A declaration that the individual no longer has any documents or material containing classified information in his or her possession;
(3) An acknowledgement that the individual will not communicate or transmit classified information to any unauthorized person or agency; and
(4) An acknowledgement that the individual will report without delay to the FBI or the DoD Component concerned any attempt by any unauthorized person to solicit classified information.
(b) When an individual refuses to execute a Security Termination Statement, that fact shall be reported immediately to the security manager of the cognizant organization concerned. In any such case, the individual involved shall be debriefed orally. The fact of a refusal to sign a Security Termination Statement shall be reported to the Director, Defense Investigative Service who shall assure that it is recorded in the Defense Central Index of Investigations.
(c) The security termination statement shall be retained by the DoD Component that authorized the individual access to classified information for the period specified in the Component's record retention schedules, but for a minimum of 2 years after the individual is given a termination briefing.

Subpart L—Foreign Government Information
§ 159a.75
Classification.
(a) Classification. (1) Foreign government information classified by a foreign government or international organization of governments shall retain its original classification designation or be assigned a U.S. classification designation that will ensure a degree of protection equivalent to that required by the government or organization that furnished the information. Original classification authority is not required for this purpose.
(2) Foreign government information that was not classified by a foreign entity but was provided with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the information, the source of the information, or both, are to be held in confidence must be classified by an original classification authority. The two-step procedure for classification prescribed in § 159a.15(c) does not apply to the classification of such foreign government information because E.O. 12356 states a presumption of damage to the national security in the event of unauthorized disclosure of such information. Therefore, foreign government information shall be classified at least Confidential, but higher whenever the damage criteria of § 159a.11 (b) or (c) are determined to be met.
(b) Duration of Classification. (1) Foreign government information shall not be assigned a date or event for automatic declassification unless specified or agreed to by the foreign entity.
(2) Foreign government information classified by the Department of Defense under this or previous regulations shall be protected for an indefinite period (see § 159a.77(e)).
§ 159a.76
Declassification.
(a) Policy. In considering the possibility of declassification of foreign government information, officials shall respect the intent of this regulation to protect foreign government information and confidential foreign sources.
(b) Systematic Review. When documents containing foreign government information are encountered during the systematic review process they shall be referred to the originating agency for a declassification determination. Consultation with the foreign originator through appropriate channels may be necessary before final action can be taken.
(c) Mandatory Review. Requests for mandatory review for declassification of foreign government information shall be processed and acted upon in accordance with the provisions of § 159a.26, except that foreign government information will be declassified only in accordance with the guidelines developed for such purpose and after necessary consultation with other DoD Components or government agencies with subject matter interest. When these guidelines cannot be applied to the foreign government information requested, or in the absence of such guidelines, consultation with the foreign originator through appropriate channels normally should be effected prior to final action taken on the request. When the responsibile DoD Component is knowledgeable of the foreign originator's view toward declassification or continued classification of the types of information requested, consultation with the foreign originator may not be necessary.
§ 159a.77
Marking.
(a) Equivalent U.S. Classification Designations. Except for the foreign security classification designation RESTRICTED, foreign classification designations, including those of international organizations of governments, that is, NATO, generally parallel U.S. classification designations. A table of equivalents is contained in Appendix A to this part.
(b) Marking NATO Documents. Classified documents originated by NATO, if not already marked with the appropriate classification in English, shall be so marked. Markings required under § 159a.34(c) shall not be placed on documents originated by NATO. Documents originated by NATO that are marked RESTRICTED shall be marked with the following additional notation: “To be safeguarded in accordance with USSAN Instruction 1-69” (see DoD Directive 5100.55).
(c) Marking Other Foreign Government Documents. (1) If the security classification designation of foreign government documents is shown in English, no other classification marking shall be applied. If the foreign classification designation is not shown in English, the equivalent overall U.S. classification designation (see Appendix A to this part) shall be marked conspicuously on the document. When foreign government documents are marked with a classification designation having no U.S. equivalent, as in the last column of Appendix A to this part, such documents shall be marked in accordance with paragraph (c)(2) of this section.
(2) Certain foreign governments use a fourth classification designation as shown in the last column of Appendix A to this part. Such designations equate to the foreign classification RESTRICTED. If the foreign government documents are marked with any of the classification designations listed in the last column of Appendix A to this part, no other classification marking shall be applied. In all such cases, the notation, “This classified material is to be safeguarded in accordance with DoD 5200.1-R or DoD 5220.22-M,” shall be shown on the face of the document.
(3) Other marking requirements prescribed by this Regulation for U.S. classified documents are not applicable to documents of foreign governments or international organizations of governments.
(d) Marking of DoD Classification Determinations. Foreign documents containing foreign government information not classified by the foreign government but provided to the Department of Defense in confidence shall be classified as prescribed in § 159a.75(a)(2) and marked with the appropriate U.S. classification.
(e) Marking of Foreign Government Information in DoD Documents. (1) Except where such markings would reveal that information is foreign government information when that fact must be concealed, or reveal a confidential source or relationship not otherwise evident in the document or information, foreign government information incorporated in DoD documents shall be identified in a manner that ensures that such information is not declassified prematurely or made accessible to nationals of a third country without consent of the originator. This requirement may be satisfied by marking the face of the document “FOREIGN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION,” or with another marking that otherwise indicates that the information is foreign government information, and by including the appropriate identification in the portion or paragraph classification markings, for example, (NS) or (U.K.-C). All other markings prescribed by § 159a.31(d) are applicable to these documents. In addition, DoD classified documents that contain extracts of NATO classified information shall bear a marking substantially as follows on the cover or first page: “THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NATO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.”
(2) When foreign RESTRICTED or NATO RESTRICTED information is included in an otherwise unclassified DoD document, the DoD document shall be marked CONFIDENTIAL. All requirements of § 159a.31(d) apply to such documents. Portion markings on such a document include, for example “(U),” “(NR),” and “(FRG-R).” In addition, the appropriate caveat from paragraph (a) of this section, shall be included on the face of the document.
(3) The “Classified by” line of DoD documents containing only foreign government information normally shall be completed with the identity of the foreign government or international organization involved, for example, “Classified by Government of Australia” or “Classfied by NATO,” provided that other requirements of § 159a.31(e) do not pertain to such documents.
(4) The “Declassify on” line of DoD documents containing foreign government information normally shall be completed with the notation “Originating Agency's Determination Required” or “OADR” (see § 159a.36 and § 159a.75(b)).
§ 159a.78
Protective measures.
(a) NATO Classified Information. NATO classified information shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of DoD Directive 5100.55.
(b) Other Foreign Government Information. (1) Classified foreign government information other than NATO information shall be protected as is prescribed by this part for U.S. classified information of a comparable classification.
(2) Foreign government information, unless it is NATO information, that is marked under § 159a.77(c)(2) or § 159a.77(e)(2) shall be protected as U.S. CONFIDENTIAL, except that such information may be stored in locked filing cabinets, desks, or other similar closed spaces that will prevent access by unauthorized persons.

Subpart M—Special Access Programs
§ 159a.80
Policy.
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to use the security classification categories and the applicable sections of E.O. 12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive, to limit access to classified information on a “need-to-know” basis to personnel who have been determined to be trustworthy. It is further policy to apply the “need-to-know” principle in the regular system so that there will be no need to resort to formal Special Access Programs. Also, need-to-know control principles shall be applied within Special Access Programs. In this context, Special Access Programs may be created or continued only on specific showing that:
(a) Normal management and safeguarding procedures are not sufficient to limit “need-to-know” or access; and
(b) The number of persons who will need access will be reasonably small and commensurate with the objective of providing extra protection for the information invoved.
§ 159a.81
Establishment of special access programs.
(a) Procedures for the establishment of Special Access Programs involving NATO classified information are based on international treaty requirements (see DoD Directive 5100.55).
(b) The policies and procedures for access to and dissemination of Restricted Data and Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information are contained in DoD Directive 5210.2.
(c) Special Access Programs for foreign intelligence information under the cognizance of the Director of Central Intelligence, or those of the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee originate outside the Department of Defense. However, coordination with the DUSD(P) and the Component's central point of contact is necessary before the establishment or implementation of any such Programs by any DoD Component. The information required by § 159a.80(f)(1) will be provided.
(d) Excluding those Programs and that information specified in paragraphs (a)(1), (2), and (3) of this section, Special Access Programs shall be established within the Military Departments by:
(1) Submitting to the Secretary of the Department the information required under § 159a.80(f)(1).
(2) Obtaining written approval from the Secretary of the Department;
(3) Providing to the DUSD(P) notice of the approval; and
(4) Maintaining the information and rationale upon which approval was granted within the Military Department's central office.
(e) Excluding those Programs and that information in paragraphs (d)(1), (2), and (3) of this section, Special Access Programs that are desired to be established in any DoD Component other than the Military Departments shall be submitted with the information referred to in § 159a.80(f)(1) to the DUSD(P) for approval.
(f) Upon specific written notice to one of the appropriate DoD Special Access Program approval officials, receipt of their written concurrence, protective Special Access Program controls may be applied to a prospective Special Access Program for up to a 6-month period from the date of such notice. However, in all instances, the Program must be terminated as a prospective Special Access Program or formally approved as a Special Access Program by the end of the 6-month time period.
(g) Unless under DoD Directive S-5210.36 ^3 ^7 , Special Access Programs which involve one or more DoD Components, or a DoD Component and a non-DoD activity, shall be covered by a written agreement which must document who has the principal security responsibility, who is the primary sponsor of the Program, and who is responsible for obtaining Special Access Program approval.
^3 ^7 See footnote 13 to § 159a.33(j).
§ 159a.82
Review of special access programs.
(a) Excluding those Programs specified in § 159a.81 (a), (b), or (c), each Special Access Program shall be reviewed annually by the DoD Component responsible for establishment of the Program. To accommodate such reviews, DoD Components shall institute procedures to ensure the conduct of annual security inspections, with or without prior notice, and regularly scheduled audits by security, contract administration, and audit organizations. Also, Program managers shall ensure that Special Access Program activities have undergone a current review by legal counsel for compliance with law, executive order, regulation, and national policy. To accomplish such reviews, specially cleared pools of attorneys may be utilized, but in all cases legal counsel shall be provided with all information necessary to perform such reviews.
(b) Special Access Programs, excluding those specified in § 159a.81 (a), (b), or (c), or those required by treaty or international agreement, shall terminate automatically every 5 years unless reestablished in accordance with the procedures contained in § 159a.81.
§ 159a.83
Control and central office administration.
(a) Special Access Programs shall be controlled and managed in accordance with DoD Directive 5205.7 ^3 ^8
. Each DoD Component shall appoint a Special Access Program coordinator to establish and maintain a central office and to serve as a single point of contact for information concerning the establishment and security administration of all Special Access Programs established by or existing in the Component. These officials shall report to the DUSD(P) on the status of DoD Special Access Programs within the Component to include:
^3 ^8 See footnote 1 to § 159a.3.
(1) The establishment of a Special Access Program as required by § 159a.81(d)(3); and
(2) Changes in Program status as required by § 159a.85 (b) or (c).
(b) Officials serving as single points of contact, as well as members of their respective staffs and other persons providing support to Special Access Programs who require access to multiple sets of particularly sensitive information, shall be subject to a counterintelligence-scope polygraph examination periodically but not less than once every 5 years. Additionally, such testing will be subject to the limitations imposed by Congress. The program for each DoD Component, as well as requests for waiver, shall be submitted for approval by the DUSD(P).
§ 159a.84
Codewords and nicknames.
Excluding those Programs specified in § 159a.81 (a), (b), and (c), each Special Access Program will be assigned a classified code word, or an unclassified nickname, or both. DoD Components other than Military Departments may request codewords and nicknames from the DUSD(P) individually or in block. If codewords or nicknames are obtained in block, however, the issuing Component shall promptly notify the DUSD(P) upon activitation and assignment.
§ 159a.85
Reporting of special access programs.
(a) Report of Establishment. Reports to the Secretary of the Military Department or the DUSD(P) required under § 159a.81 for Special Access Programs shall include:
(1) The responsible department, agency, or DoD Component, including office identification;
(2) The codeword and/or nickname of the Program;
(3) The relationship, if any, to other Special Access Programs in the Department of Defense or other government agencies;
(4) The rationale for establishing the Special Access Program including the reason why normal management and safeguarding procedures for classified information are inadequate;
(5) The estimated number of persons granted special access in the responsible DoD Component; other DoD Components; other government agencies; contractors; and the total of such personnel;
(6) A summary statement pertaining to the Program security requirements with particular emphasis upon those personnel security requirements governing access to Program information;
(7) The date of Program establishment;
(8) The estimated number and approximate dollar value, if known, of carve-out contracts that will be or are required to support the Program; and
(9) The DoD Component official who is the point of contact (last name, first name, middle initial; position or title; mailing address; and telephone number).
(10) A security plan and appropriate security classification guide and notification that a proper DD Form 254, “Contract Security Classification Specification,” has been issued to contractors participating in the Program.
(b) Annual Reports. DoD Component annual reports from other than the Military Departments to the DUSD(P) shall be submitted not later than January 31 of each year, showing the changes in information provided under paragraph (a) of this section, as well as the date of last review. Annual reports shall reflect actual rather than estimated numbers of carve-out contracts and persons granted access and shall summarize the results of the inspections and audits required by § 159a.82(a). Reports from the Military Departments which have approval authority will summarize the required reviews which have been conducted during the year by the central offices, to include details and numbers of carve-out contracts associated with approved Special Access Programs and their overall security posture and numbers of approved Programs by type. Additionally, the Military Department Secretaries authorized to approve such Programs shall furnish a name listing, by unclassified nickname if practicable, or approved Special Access Programs under their cognizance, and they will report any changes to the listing as they occur pursuant to the notification requirements of § 159a.81(d)(3), that is, additions, deletions, and corrections to the DUSD(P). The effective date of information in the annual reports shall be December 31.
(c) Termination Reports. The DUSD(P) shall be notified upon termination of a Special Access Program.
§ 159a.86
Accounting for special access programs.
Each of the central offices which must be identified in accordance with § 159a.83(a) shall maintain a complete listing of currently approved DoD Special Access Programs which encompasses the information outlined in § 159a.85(a). These listings shall be readily available to the DUSD(P) or his designated representatives.
§ 159a.87
Limitations on access.
Access to data reported under this subpart shall be limited to the DUSD(P) and the minimum number of properly indoctrinated staff necessary to perform the functions assigned the DUSD(P) herein. Access may not be granted to any other person for any purpose without the approval of the DoD Components sponsoring the Special Access Programs concerned.
§ 159a.88
“Carve-Out” contracts.
(a) The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the DUSD(P), or their designees, shall ensure that, in those Special Access Programs involving contractors, special access controls are made applicable by legally binding instruments.
(b) To the extent necessary for DIS to execute its security responsibilities with respect to Special Access Programs under its security cognizance, DIS personnel shall have access to all information relating to the administration of these Programs.
(c) Excluding those Programs specified in § 159a.81(c), the use of “carve-out” contracts that relieve the DIS from inspection responsibility under the Defense Industrial Security Program is prohibited unless:
(1) Such contract supports a Special Access Program approved and administered under § 159a.81;
(2) Mere knowledge of the existence of a contract or of its affiliation with the Special Access Program is classified information; and
(3) Carve-out status is approved for each contract by the Secretary of a Military Department, the Director, NSA, the DUSD(P), or their designees.
(d) Approval to establish a “carve-out” contract must be requested from the Secretary of a Military Department, or designee(s), the Director, NSA, or designee(s), or in the case of other DoD Components, from the DUSD(P). Approved “carve-out” contracts shall be assured the support necessary for the requisite protection of the classified information involved. The support shall be specified through a system of controls that shall provide for:
(1) A written security plan, oral waivers of which are prohibited except in critical situations that must be documented as soon as possible after the fact.

Note:
The plan must identify that DD Forms 254 have been distributed to the Defense Investigative Service as outlined in DoD Directive 5205.7.
(2) Professional security personnel at the sponsoring DoD Component performing security inspections at each contractor's facility which shall be conducted, at a minimum, with the frequency prescribed by paragraph 4-103 of DoD 5220.22-R;
(3) “Carve-out” contracting procedures;
(4) A central office of record; and
(5) An official to be the single point of contact for security control and administration. DoD Components other than the Military Departments and NSA shall submit such appropriate rationale and security plan along with requests for approval to the DUSD(P).
(e) An annual inventory of carve-out contracts shall be conducted by each DoD Component which participates in Special Access Programs.
(f) This subsection relates back to the date of execution for each contract to which carve-out contracting techniques are applied. The carve-out status of any contract expires upon termination of the Special Access Program which it supports.
§ 159a.89
Oversight reviews.
(a) DUSD(P) shall conduct oversight reviews, as required, to determine compliance with this subpart.
(b) Pursuant to statutory authority, the Inspector General, Department of Defense, shall conduct oversight of Special Access Programs.

Subpart N—Program Management
§ 159a.91
Executive branch oversight and policy direction.
(a) National Security Council. Pursuant to the provisions of E.O. 12356, the NSC shall provide overall policy direction for the Information Security Program.
(b) Administrator of General Services. The Administrator of General Services is responsible for implementing and monitoring the Information Security Program established under E.O. 12356. In accordance with E.O. 12356, the Administrator delegates the implementation and monitorship functions of the Program to the Director of the ISOO.
(c) Information Security Oversight Office—(1) Composition. The ISOO has a full-time director appointed by the Administrator of General Services with approval of the President. The Director has the authority to appoint a staff for the office.
(2) Functions. The Director of the ISOO is charged with the following principal functions that pertain to the Department of Defense:
(i) Oversee DoD actions to ensure compliance with E.O. 12356 implementing directives, for example, the ISOO Directive No. 1 and this part;
(ii) Consider and take action on complaints and suggestions from persons within or outside the government with respect to the administration of the Information Security Program;
(iii) Report annually to the President through the NSC on the implementation of E.O. 12356;
(iv) Review this Regulation and DoD guidelines for systematic declassification review; and
(v) Conduct on-site reviews of the Information Security Program of each DoD Component that generates or handles classified information.
(3) Information Requests. The Director of the ISOO is authorized to request information or material concerning the Department of Defense, as needed by the ISOO in carrying out its functions.
(4) Coordination. Heads of DoD Components shall ensure that any significant requirements levied directly on the Component by the ISOO are brought to the attention of the Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P).
§ 159a.92
Department of Defense.
(a) Management Responsibility. (1) The DUSD(P) is the Senior DoD Information Security Authority having DoD-wide authority and responsibility to ensure effective and uniform compliance with and implementation of E.O. 12356 and its implementing ISOO Directive No. 1. As such, the DUSD(P) shall have primary responsibility for providing guidance, oversight and approval of policy and procedures governing the DoD Information Security Program. The DUSD(P) or his designee may approve waivers or exceptions to the provisions of this part to the extent such action is consistent with E.O. 12356 and ISOO Directive No. 1.
(2) The heads of DoD Components may approve waivers to the provisions of this part only as specifically provided for herein.
(3) The Director, NSA/Chief, Central Security Service, under 32 CFR part 159, is authorized to impose special requirements with respect to the marking, reproduction, distribution, accounting, and protection of and access to classified cryptologic information. In this regard, the Director, NSA, may approve waivers or exceptions to these special requirements. Except as provided in § 159a.6 the authority to lower any COMSEC security standards rests with the Secretary of Defense. Requests for approval of such waivers or exceptions to established COMSEC security standards which, if adopted, will have the effect of lowering such standards, shall be submitted to the DUSD(P) for approval by the Secretary of Defense.
§ 159a.93
DoD components.
(a) General. The head of each DoD Component shall establish and maintain an Information Security Program designed to ensure compliance with the provisions of this part throughout the Component.
(b) Military Departments. In accordance with 32 CFR part 159 the Secretary of each Military Department shall designate a Senior Information Security Authority who shall be responsible for complying with and implementing this part within the Department.
(c) Other Components. In accordance with 32 CFR part 159, the head of each other DoD Component shall designate a Senior Information Security Authority who shall be responsible for complying with and implementing this Regulation within their respective Component.
(d) Program Monitorship. The Senior Information Security Authorities designated under paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section, are responsible within their respective jurisdictions for monitoring, inspecting with or without prior announcement, and reporting on the status of administration of the DoD Information Security Program at all levels of activity under their cognizance.
(e) Field Program Management. (1) Throughout the Department of Defense, the head of each activity shall appoint, in writing, an official to serve as security manager for the activity. This official shall be responsible for the administration of an effective Information Security Program in that activity with particular emphasis on security education and training, assignment of proper classifications, downgrading and declassification, safeguarding, and monitorship, to include sampling classified documents for the purpose of assuring compliance with this part.
(2) Activity heads shall ensure that officials appointed as security managers either possess, or obtain within a reasonable time after appointment, knowledge of and training in the Information Security Program commensurate with the needs of their positions. The Director of Security Plans and Programs, ODUSD(P) shall, with the assistance of the Director, Defense Security Institute, develop minimum standards for training of activity security managers. Such training should result in appropriate certifications to be recorded in the personnel files of the individuals involved.
(3) Activity heads shall ensure that officials appointed as security managers are authorized direct and ready access to the appointing official on matters concerning the Information Security Program. They also shall provide sufficient resources of time, staff, and funds to permit accomplishment of the security manager's responsibilities, to include meaningful oversight of the Information Security Program at all levels of the activity.
§ 159a.94
Information requirements.
(a) Information Requirements. DoD Components shall submit on a fiscal year basis a consolidated report concerning the Information Security Program of the Component on SF 311, “Agency Information Security Program Data,” to reach the ODUSD(P) by October 20 of each year. SF 311 shall be completed in accordance with the instructions thereon and augmenting instructions issued by the ODUSD(P). The ODUSD(P) shall submit the DoD report (SF 311) to the ISOO by October 31 of each year. Interagency Report Control Number 0230-GSA-AN applies to this information collection system as well as to that contained in § 159a.12.
§ 159a.95
Defense Information Security Committee.
(a) Purpose. The Defense Information Security Committee (DISC) is established to advise and assist the DUSD(P) and the Director, Security Plans and Programs (ODUSD(P) in the formulation of DoD Information Security Program policy and procedures.
(b) Direction and Membership. The DISC shall meet at the call of the DUSD(P) or the Director, Security Plans and Programs. It is comprised of the DUSD(P) as Chairman; the Director, Security Plans and Programs, as Vice Chairman; and the senior officials (designated in accordance with section E.3.a., DoD Directive 5200.1,^{39} or their representatives) responsible for directing and administering the Information Security Program of the OJCS, the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Defense Nuclear Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Investigative Service. Other DoD Components may be invited to attend meetings of particular interest to them.
^{39} See footnote 1 to § 159a.3

Subpart O—Administrative Sanctions
§ 159a.97
Individual responsibility.
All personnel, civilian or military, of the Department of Defense are responsible individually for complying with the provisions of this part.
§ 159a.98
Violations subject to sanctions.
(a) DoD Military and civilian personnel are subject to administrative sanctions if they:
(1) Knowingly and willfully classify or continue the classification of information in violation of E.O. 12356, any implementing issuances, or this part.
(2) Knowingly, willfully, or negligently disclose to unauthorized persons information properly classified under E.O. 12356 or prior orders; or
(3) Knowingly and willfully violate any other provision of E.O. 12356, any implementing issuances or this part.
(b) Sanctions include but are not limited to a warning notice, reprimand, termination of classification authority, suspension without pay, forfeiture of pay, removal or discharge, and will be imposed upon any person, regardless of office or level of employment, who is responsible for a violation specified under this paragraph as determined appropriate under applicable law and DoD regulations. Nothing in this part prohibits or limits action under the Uniform Code of Military Justice based upon violations of that Code.
§ 159a.99
Corrective action.
The Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the heads of other DoD Components shall ensure that appropriate and prompt corrective action is taken whenever a violation under § 159a.98(a) occurs or repeated administrative discrepancies or repeated disregard of requirements of this Regulation occur (see § 159a.100). Commanders and supervisors, in consultation with appropriate legal counsel, shall utilize all appropriate criminal, civil, and administative enforcement remedies against employees who violate the law and security requirements as set forth in this part and other pertinent DoD issuances.
§ 159a.100
Administrative discrepancies.
Repeated administrative discrepancies in the marking and handling of classified information and material such as failure to show classification authority; failure to apply internal classification markings; failure to adhere to the requirements of this part that pertain to dissemination, storage, accountability, and destruction, and that are determined not to constitute a violation under § 159a.98(a) may be grounds for adverse administrative action including warning, admonition, reprimand or termination of classification authority as determined appropriate under applicable policies and procedures.
§ 159a.101
Reporting violations.
(a) Whenever a violation under § 159a.98(a)(2) occurs, the Director of Counterintelligence and Investigative Programs, ODUSD(P) shall be informed of the date and general nature of the occurrence including the relevent parts of this part, the sanctions imposed, and the corrective action taken. Whenever a violation under § 159a.98(a) (1) or (3) occurs, the Director of Security Plans and Programs, OSUSD(P) shall be provided the same information. Notification of such violations shall be furnished to the Director of the ISOO in accordance with § 5.4(d) of E.O. 12356 by the ODUSD(P).
(b) Any action resulting in unauthorized disclosure of properly classified information that constitutes a violation of the criminal statutes and evidence reflected in classified information of possible violations of Federal criminal law by a DoD employee and of possible violations by any other person of those Federal criminal laws specified in guidelines adopted by the Attorney General shall be the subject of a report processed in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.50 and DoD Instruction 5240.4.
(c) Any action reported under paragraph (b) of this section, shall be reported to the Attorney General by the General Counsel, Department of Defense.
(d) Reports shall be made to appropriate counterintelligence, investigative, and personnel security authorities concerning any employee who is known to have been responsible for repeated security violations over a period of a year, for appropriate evaluation, including readjudication of the employee's security clearance.
Pt. 159a, App. A
Appendix A to Part 159a—Equivalent Foreign and International Pact Organization Security Classifications
Country | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential |
Argentina | Estrictamente Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Australia | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential |
Austria | Streng Geheim | Geheim | Verschuluss |
Belgium:
French | Tres Secret | Secret | Confidentiel Restreints | Difusion.
Flemish | Zeer Geheim | Geheim | Vertrouwelijk Verspreiding | Bepertke.
Bolivia | Syoersecreto or Muy Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Resedrvado.
Brazil | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Cambodia | Tres Secret | Secret | Secret/Confidential |
Canada | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted.
Chile | Secreto | Secreto | Reservado | Reservado.
Columbia | Ultrasecreto | Secreto | Reservado Restringido | Confidencial.
Costa Rica | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial |
Denmark | Hojst Himmiligt | Himmiligt | Fortroligt | Til Tjenestebrug.
Ecuador | Secretisimo | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
El Salvador | Ultra Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Ethiopia | Yemlaz Birtou Mistir | Kilkil | |
Finland | Erittain Salainen | Salainen | |
France | Tres Secret | Secret Defense | Confidentiel Defense Restreinte | Diffusion.
Germany | Streng Geheim | Geheim | Va-Vertraulich |
Greece | Akpre Anopphton | Anopphton | Emilieteytikon Xpheere | Mepinpiemenhe.
Guatemala | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Haiti | | Secret | Confidential |
Honduras | Super Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Hong Kong | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted.
Hungary | Szigoruan Titkos | Titkos | Bizalmas |
India | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted.
Indonesia | Sangat Rahasia | Rahasia | Terbatas |
Iran | Bekoli Serri | Serri | Kheili Mahramaneh | Mahramaneh.
Iraq | (Absolutely secret) | (Secret) | | (Limited).
Ireland Gaelic | Top Secret An-Sicreideach | Secret Sicreideach | Confidential Runda | Restricted Srianta.
Israel | Sodi Beyoter | Sodi | Shamur | Mugbal.
Italy | Segretissimo | Segreto | Riservatissimo | Riservato.
Japan | Kimitsu | Gokuhi | Hi Bugaihi | Toriatsukaichui.
Jordan | Maktum Jiddan | Maktum | Sirri | Mahdud.
Korea | | | |
Laos | Tres Secret | Secret | Secret/Confidentiel Restreinte | Difusion.
Lebanon | Tres Secret | Secret | Confidentiel |
Mexico | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Restringido.
Netherlands | Zeer Geheim | Geheim | Confidentieel or Vertrouwelijk | Dienstgeheim.
New Zealand | Top Secret | Secret | Condifential | Dienstgeheim.
Nicaragua | Alto Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Norway | Strengt Hemmelig | Hemmelig | Konfideneielt | Begrenset.
Pakistan | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted.
Paraguay | Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Peru | Estrictamente Secreto | Secreto | Condifencial | Reservado.
Philippines | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted.
Portugal | Muito Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial | Reservado.
Spain | Maximo Secreto | Secreto | Confidencial Limitada | Diffussion.
Sweden (Red Borders) | Hemlig | Hemlig | Hemlig |
Switzerland | (^1) | (^1) | (^1) |
French | Secret | Secret | Secret Exclusive Du | Reserve A L'Usage.
| German | Streng Geheim | Geheim | Vertraulich Lichen Gebrauch | Nur Fur Dienst-
Italian | Segreto | Segreto | Segreto Di Servizio | Ad Exclusive Uso.
Thailand | Lup Tisud | Lup Maag | Lup | Pok Pid.
Turkey | Cok Gizli | Gizli | Ozel | Hizmete Ozel.
Union of South Africa:
English | Top Secret | Secret | Confidential | Restricted.
Afrikaana | Uiters Geheim | Geheim | Vertroulik | Reperk.
United Arab Republic (Egypt) | Top Secret | Very Secret | Secret | Official.
^1 Three languages. TOP SECRET has a registration number to distinguish from SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL.
[54 FR 26959, June 27, 1989, as amended at 54 FR 31334, July 28, 1989]
Pt. 159a, App. B

Appendix B to Part 159a—General Accounting Office Officials Authorized To Certify Security Clearances (See § 159a.53(b)(3))
The Comptroller General, Deputy Comptroller General and Assistant Comptroller General and Assistants to the Comptroller General
The General Counsel and Deputy General Counsel
The Director and Deputy Director, Personnel; the Security Officer
The Director and Deputy Director, Office of Internal Review
The Director and Assistants to the Director of the Office of Program Planning and the Office of Policy
The Director and Deputy Directors of the Community and Economic Development Division
The Director, and Deputy Directors, Associate Directors, Deputy Associate Directors, Senior Group Directors, and the Assistant to the Director for Planning and Administration of the Energy and Minerals Division
The Director, Deputy Directors, Associate Directors and Division Personnel Security Officer of the Human Resources Division
The Directors, Deputy Directors, and Associate Directors, of the following Divisions:
Claims
Field Operations
Financial and General Management Studies
General Government
International
Logistics and Communications
Procurement and Systems Acquisition
Program Analysis Division
Directors and Managers of International Division Overseas Offices as follows:
Director European Branch, Frankfurt, Germany
Director Far East Branch, Honolulu, Hawaii
Manager, Sub Office, Bangkok, Thailand
Regional Managers and Assistsant Regional Managers of the Field Operations Division's Regional Offices as follows:
Atlanta, Georgia
Boston, Massachusetts
Chicago, Illinois
Cincinnati, Ohio
Dallas, Texas
Denver, Colorado
Detroit, Michigan
Kansas City, Missouri
Los Angeles, California
New York, New York
Norfolk, Virginia
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
San Francisco, California
Seattle, Washington
Washington, D.C.
Pt. 159a, App. C

Appendix C to Part 159a—Instructions Governing Use of Code Words, Nicknames, and Exercise Terms (See § 159a.54(j))

1. Definitions
a. Using Component. The DoD Component to which a code word is allocated for use, and which assigns to the word a classified meaning, or which originates nicknames and exercise terms using the procedure established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
b. Code Word. A single word selected from those listed in Joint Army-Navy-Air Force Publication (JANAP) 299 and later volumes, and assigned a classified meaning by appropriate authority to insure proper security concerning intentions, and to safeguard information pertaining to actual military plans or operations classified as Confidential or higher. A code word shall not be assigned to test, drill or exercise activities. A code word is placed in one of three categories:
(1) Available. Allocated to the using component. Available code words individually will be unclassified until placed in the active category.
(2) Active. Assigned a classified meaning and current.
(3) Canceled. Formerly active, but discontinued due to compromise, suspected compromise, cessation, or completion of the operation to which the code word pertained. Canceled code words individually will be unclassified and remain so until returned to the active category.
c. Nickname. A combination of two separate unclassified words which is assigned an unclassified meaning and is employed only for unclassified administrative, morale, or public information purposes.
d. Exercise Term. A combination of two separate unclassified words, normally unclassified, used exclusively to designate a test, drill, or exercise. An exercise term is employed to preclude the possibility of confusing exercise directions with actual operations directives.

2. Policy and Procedure
a. Code Words. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for allocating words or blocks of code words from JANAP 299 to DoD Components. DoD Components may request allocation of such code words as required and may reallocate available code words within their organizations, in accordance with individual policies and procedure, subject to applicable rules set forth herein.
(1) A permanent record of all code words shall be maintained by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(2) The using Component shall account for available code words and maintain a record of each active code word. Upon being canceled, the using component shall maintain the record for 2 years; thence the record of each code word may be disposed of in accordance with current practices, and the code word returned to the available inventory.
b. Nicknames
(1) Nicknames may be assigned to actual events, projects, movement of forces, or other nonexercise activities involving elements of information of any classification category, but the nickname, the description or meaning it represents, and the relationship of the nickname and its meaning must be unclassified. A nickname is not designed to achieve a security objective.
(2) Nicknames, improperly selected, can be counterproductive. A nickname must be chosen with sufficient care to ensure that it does not:
(a) Express a degree of bellicosity inconsistent with traditional American ideals or current foreign policy;
(b) Convey connotations offensive to good taste or derogatory to a particular group, sect, or creed; or,
(c) Convey connotations offensive to our allies or other Free World nations.
(3) The following shall not be used as nicknames:
(a) Any two-word combination voice call sign found in JANAP 119 or ACP 110. (However, single words in JANAP 119 or ACP 110 may be used as part of a nickname if the first word of the nickname does not appear in JANAP 299 and later volumes.)
(b) Combination of words including word “project,” “exercise,” or “operation.” (The word “project” often is used as the first or second word with an unclassified nickname originating outside the Department of Defense.)
(c) Words that may be used correctly either as a single word or as two words, such as “moonlight.”
(d) Exotic words, trite expressions, or well-known commercial trademarks.
(4) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
(a) Establish a procedure by which nicknames may be authorized for use by DoD Components.
(b) Prescribe a method for the using Components to report nicknames used.
(5) The heads of DoD Components shall:
(a) Establish controls within their Components for the assignment of nicknames authorized under subparagraph 2.b.(4)(a), above.
(b) Under the procedures established, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of nicknames as they are assigned.
c. Exercise Term
(1) Unclassified exercise terms may be assigned only to tests, drills, or exercises for the purpose of emphasizing that the event is a test, drill, or exercise and not an actual operation. However, the description or meaning it represents, and the relationship of the exercise term and its meaning can be classified or unclassified. A classified exercise term is not authorized.
(2) Selection of exercise terms will follow the same guidance as contained in subparagraphs 2.b.(2) and (3), above.
(3) The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
(a) Establish a procedure by which exercise terms may be authorized for use by DoD Components.
(b) Prescribe a method for using Components to report exercise terms used.
(4) The heads of DoD Components shall:
(a) Establish controls within their Component for the assignment of exercise terms authorized under subparagraph 2.c.(3), above.
(b) Under the procedures established, advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff of exercise terms as they are assigned.

3. Assignment of Classified Meanings to Code Words
a. The DoD Component responsible for the development of a plan or the execution of an operation shall be responsible for determining whether to assign a code word.
b. Code words shall be activated for the following purposes only:
(1) To designate a classified military plan or operation;
(2) To designate classified geographic locations in conjunction with plans or operations referred to in subparagraph 3.b.(1), above; or,
(3) To cancel intentions in discussions and messages or other documents pertaining to plans, operations, or geographic locations referred to in subparagraphs 3.b.(1) and (2), above.
c. The using Component shall assign to a code word a specific meaning classified Secret or Confidential. Code words shall not be used to cover unclassified meanings. The assigned meaning need not in all cases be classified as high as the overall classification assigned to the plan or operation. Top Secret code words may be issued only with DUSD(P) or DoD Component head approval.
d. Code words shall be selected by each using Component in such manner that the word used does not suggest the nature of its meaning.
e. A code word shall not be used repeatedly for similar purposes; that is, if the initial phase of an operation is designated “Meaning,” succeeding phases shall not be designated “Meaning II” and “Meaning III,” but should have different code words.
f. Each DoD Component shall establish policies and procedures for the control and assignment of classified meanings to code words, subject to applicable rules set forth herein.

4. Notice of Assignment, Dissemination, and Cancelation of Code Words and Meanings
a. The using Component shall promptly notify the Joint Chiefs of Staff when a code word is made active, indicating the word, and its classification. Similar notice shall be made when any changes occur, such as the substitution of a new word for one previously placed in use.
b. The using Component is responsible for further dissemination of active code words and meanings to all concerned activities, to include classification of each.
c. The using Component is responsible for notifying the Joint Chiefs of Staff of canceled code words. This cancellation report is considered final action, and no further reporting or accounting of the status of the canceled code word will be required.

5. Classification and Downgrading Instructions
a. During the development of a plan, or the planning of an operation by the headquarters of the using Component, the code word and its meaning shall have the same classification. When dissemination of the plan to other DoD Components or to subordinate echelons of the using Component is required, the using Component may downgrade the code words assigned below the classification assigned to their meanings in order to facilitate additional planning implementation, and execution by such other Components or echelons, but code words shall, at a minimum, be classified Confidential.
b. A code word which is replaced by another code word due to a compromise or suspected compromise, or for any other reason, shall be canceled, and classified Confidential for a period of 2 years, after which the code word will become unclassified.
c. When a plan or operation is discontinued or completed, and is not replaced by a similar plan or operation but the meaning cannot be declassified, the code word assigned thereto shall be canceled and classified Confidential for a period of 2 years, or until the meaning is declassified, whichever is sooner, after which the code word will become unclassified.
d. In every case, whenever a code word is referred to in documents, the security classification of the code word shall be placed in parentheses immediately following the code word, for example, “Label (C).”
e. When the meaning of a code word no longer requires a classification, the using Component shall declassify the meaning and the code word and return the code word to the available inventory.

6. Security Practices
a. The meaning of a code word may be used in a message or other document, together with the code word, only when it is essential to do so. Active code words may be used in correspondence or other documents forwarded to addresses who may or may not have knowledge of the meaning. If the context of a document contains detailed instructions or similar information which indicates the purpose or nature of the related meaning, the active code word shall not be used.
b. In handling correspondence pertaining to active code words, care shall be used to avoid bringing the code words and their meanings together. They should be handled in separate card files, catalogs, indexes, or lists, enveloped separately, and dispatched at different times so they do not travel through mail or courier channels together.
c. Code words shall not be used for addresses, return addresses, shipping designators, file indicators, call signs, identification signals, or for other similar purposes.

7. Former Words
All code words formerly categorized as “inactive” or “obsolete” shall be placed in the current canceled category and classified Confidential. Unless otherwise restricted, all code words formerly categorized as “canceled” or “available” shall be individually declassified. All records associated with such code words may be disposed of in accordance with current practices, provided such records have been retained at least 2 years after the code words were placed in the former categories of “inactive,” “obsolete,” or “canceled.”

8. Non-DoD Words
Nicknames or code words originating outside of the Department of Defense that are jointly used by the originating organization and the Department of Defense shall be registered with the DUSD(P) to prevent confusion with DoD-originated words.
Pt. 159a, App. D

Appendix D to Part 159a—Federal Aviation Administration Air Transportation, Security Field Offices (See § 159a.59(c)(1)(i))
City | State
Anchorage | Alaska
Atlanta | Georgia
Baltimore | Maryland
Boston | Massachusetts
Chicago (O'Hare) | Illinois
Cleveland | Ohio
Dallas | Texas
Denver | Colorado
Detroit | Michigan
Honolulu | Hawaii
Houston | Texas
Kansas City | Missouri
Las Vegas | Nevada
Los Angeles | California
Miami | Florida
Minneapolis | Minnesota
Newark | New Jersey
New Orleans | Louisiana
New York (John F. Kennedy) | New York
New York (La Guardia) | New York
Philadelphia | Pennsylvania
Pittsburgh | Pennsylvania
Portland | Oregon
| St. Louis | Missouri
San Antonio | Texas
San Diego | California
San Francisco | California
San Juan | Puerto Rico
Seattle | Washington
Tampa | Florida
Tucson | Arizona
Washington (Dulles) | Washington, DC
Washington (National) | Washington, DC
Pt. 159a, App. E

Appendix E to Part 159a—Transportation Plan (See § 159a.57(e))
The provisions of § 159a.57(e) of this part require that transmission instructions or a separate transportation plan be included with any contract, agreement or other arrangement involving the release of classified material to foreign entities. The transportation plan is to be submitted to and approved by applicable DoD authorities. As a minimum, the transportation plan shall include the following provisions:
a. A description of the classified material together with a brief narrative as to where and under what circumstances transfer of custody will occur;
b. Identification, by name or title, of the designated representative of the foreign recipient government or international organization who will receipt for and assume security responsibility for the U.S. classified material (person(s) so identified must be cleared for access to the level of the classified material to be shipped);
c. Identification and specific location of delivery points and any transfer points;
d. Identification of commercial carriers and freight forwarders or transportation agents who will be involved in the shipping process, the extent of their involvement, and their security clearance status;
e. Identification of any storage or processing facilities to be used and, relative thereto, certification that such facilities are authorized by competent government authority to receive, store, or process the level of classified material to be shipped;
f. When applicable, the identification, by name or title, of couriers and escorts to be used and details as to their responsibilities and security clearance status;
g. Description of shipping methods to be used as authorized by the provisions of subpart I, together with the identification of carriers (foreign and domestic);
h. In those cases when it is anticipated that the U.S. classified material or parts thereof may be returned to the United States for repair, service, modification, or other reasons, the plan must require that shipment shall be via a carrier of U.S. or recipient government registry, handled only by authorized personnel, and that the applicable Military Department (for foreign military sales (FMS)) or Defense Investigative Service (for commercial sales) will be given advance notification of estimated time and place of arrival and will be consulted concerning inland shipment;
i. The plan shall require the recipient government or international organization to examine shipping documents upon receipt of the classified material in its own territory and advise the responsible Military Department in the case of FMS, or Defense Investigative Service in the case of commercial sales, if the material has been transferred enroute to any carrier not authorized by the transportation plan; and
j. The recipient government or international organization also will be required to inform the responsible Military Department or the Defense Investigative Service promptly and fully of any known or suspected compromise of U.S. classified material while such material is in its custody or under its cognizance during shipment.