[House Document 119-37]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
119th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 119-37
ACTIONS TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE UNUSUAL AND
EXTRAORDINARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES'
ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY POSED BY
THE UNDERLYING CONDITIONS OF OUR TRADE
WITH FOREIGN NATIONS
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
DECLARING A NATIONAL EMERGENCY IN EXECUTIVE ORDER
14257 OF APRIL 2, 2025, ARISING FROM NON-RECIPROCAL TRADE
AS EVIDENCED BY LARGE AND PERSISTENT ANNUA U.S.
GOODS TRADE DEFICITS, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(b); PUBLIC
LAW 95-223, SEC. 204(b); (91 STAT. 1627) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(b);
PUBLIC LAW 94-412, SEC. 401(b); (90 STAT. 1257)
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
April 8, 2025.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Com-
mittees on Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means, and ordered to be
printed
------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
59-011 WASHINGTON : 2025
To the Congress of the United States:
Consistent with applicable law, including the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA) and the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
seq.) (IEEPA), I am providing notice of certain actions I have
taken to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the
United States' economy and national security posed by the
underlying conditions of our trade with foreign nations,
including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers,
and foreign economic policies that suppress domestic wages and
consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S.
goods trade deficits. That threat has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States in the domestic
economic policies of key trading partners and structural
imbalances in the global trading system. In my judgment, action
under the NEA and IEEPA is necessary and appropriate to deal
with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security and economy of the United States.
Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 (Regulating Imports
with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that
Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods
Trade Deficits) (the ``Executive Order''), declares a national
emergency arising from non-reciprocal trade as evidenced by
large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits. Such
trade deficits have led to the hollowing out of our
manufacturing base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced
domestic manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply
chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base dependent on
foreign adversaries.
To deal with this national emergency, I have determined
that it is necessary and appropriate to impose additional ad
valorem duties on imports of goods from our trading partners
under IEEPA. The additional ad valorem duties shall be imposed
on imports of goods from all U.S. trading partners at varying
rates, subject to exceptions specified in the Executive Order.
The specific foreign trading partners, and the applicable duty
rate for each trading partner, are listed in Annexes I and III
of the Executive Order. It is necessary to apply additional
duties on the imports of goods from all U.S. trading partners
to reduce the overall U.S. global goods trade deficit and
incentivize trading partners to take significant steps to
remedy non-reciprocal trade practices, as well as align
sufficiently with the United States on economic and national
security matters.
My Administration, will continue to consult with the
Congress on our efforts to deal with the unusual and
extraordinary threat described in this report and the Executive
Order. As described in the Executive Order, the United States
Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of
State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to
the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for
Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, is authorized to submit recurring
and final reports to the Congress on this national emergency.
The Executive Order further explains the circumstances that
necessitate the exercise of authority under IEEPA and the NEA;
why I found that those circumstances constitute an unusual and
extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
substantial part outside the United States, to the national
security and economy of the United States; the authorities
exercised and the actions to be taken to deal with those
circumstances; why I determined that such actions are necessary
to deal with those circumstances; and the foreign countries
with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such
actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.
I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order I have issued.
Donald J. Trump.
The White House, April 7, 2025.
Executive Order
----------
Regulating Imports With a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify
Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent
Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits
By the authority vested in me as President by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 4c
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of
1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3,
United States Code.
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of
America, find that underlying conditions, including a lack of
reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate
tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading
partners' economic policies that suppress domestic wages and
consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S.
goods trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and economy of the United
States. That threat has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States in the domestic economic policies of
key trading partners and structural imbalances in the global
trading system. I hereby declare a national emergency with
respect to this threat.
On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade
Policy Presidential Memorandum directing my Administration to
investigate the causes of our country's large and persistent
annual trade deficits in goods, including the economic and
national security implications and risks resulting from such
deficits, and to undertake a review of, and identify, any
unfair trade practices by other countries. On February 13,
2025, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled ``Reciprocal
Trade and Tariffs,'' that directed further review of our
trading partners' non-reciprocal trading practices, and noted
the relationship between non-reciprocal practices and the trade
deficit. On April 1, 2025, I received the final results of
those investigations, and I am taking action today based on
those results.
Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits have
led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing base; inhibited
our ability to scale advanced domestic manufacturing capacity;
undermined critical supply chains; and rendered our defense-
industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in
substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral
trade relationships. This situation is evidenced by disparate
tariff rates and non-tariff barriers that make it harder for
U.S. manufacturers to sell their products in foreign markets.
It is also evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S.
trading partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and
consumption, and thereby demand for U.S. exports, while
artificially increasing the competitiveness of their goods in
global markets. These conditions have given rise to the
national emergency that this order is intended to abate and
resolve.
For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has been
organized around the principle of reciprocity. The Congress
directed the President to secure reduced reciprocal tariff
rates from key trading partners first through bilateral trade
agreements and later under the auspices of the global trading
system. Between 1934 and 1945, the executive branch negotiated
and signed 32 bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to
lower tariff rates on a reciprocal basis. After 1947 through
1994, participating countries engaged in eight rounds of
negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff reduction
rounds.
However, despite a commitment to the principle of
reciprocity, the trading relationship between the United States
and its trading partners has become highly unbalanced,
particularly in recent years. The post-war international
economic system was based upon three incorrect assumptions:
first, that if the United States led the world in liberalizing
tariff and non-tariff barriers the rest of the world would
follow; second, that such liberalization would ultimately
result in more economic convergence and increased domestic
consumption among U.S. trading partners converging towards the
share in the United States; and third, that as a result, the
United States would not accrue large and persistent goods trade
deficits.
This framework set in motion events, agreements, and
commitments that did not result in reciprocity or generally
increase domestic consumption in foreign economies relative to
domestic consumption in the United States. Those events, in
turn, created large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade
deficits as a feature of the global trading system.
Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO) Members
agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-favored-nation
(MFN) basis, and thereby provide their best tariff rates to all
WTO Members, they did not agree to bind their tariff rates at
similarly low levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal
basis. Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States
has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the
world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading partners
like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent), the European
Union (EU) (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4
percent) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are
significantly higher.
Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much
larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates applied
to particular products. For example, the United States imposes
a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with
internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10
percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) impose
much higher duties on the same product. For network switches
and routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff, but
for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a higher rate.
Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose a higher
tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5 percent).
For rice in the husk, the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad
valorem equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40
percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose higher
rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in
Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent).
Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S.
manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around the world.
The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
Barriers (NTE) details a great number of non-tariff barriers to
U.S. exports around the world on a trading-partner by trading-
partner basis. These barriers include import barriers and
licensing restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in
trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g.,
unnecessarily trade restrictive standards, conformity
assessment procedures, or technical regulations); sanitary and
phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily restrict trade
without furthering safety objectives; inadequate patent,
copyright, trade secret, and trademark regimes and inadequate
enforcement of intellectual property rights; discriminatory
licensing requirements or regulatory standards; barriers to
cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices affecting
trade in digital products; investment barriers; subsidies;
anticompetitive practices; discrimination in favor of domestic
state-owned enterprises, and failures by governments in
protecting labor and environment standards; bribery; and
corruption.
Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic economic
policies and practices of our trading partners, including
currency practices and value-added taxes, and their associated
market distortions, that suppress domestic consumption and
boost exports to the United States. This lack of reciprocity is
apparent in the fact that the share of consumption to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is about 68
percent, but it is much lower in others like Ireland (27
percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South
Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).
At the same time, efforts by the United States to address
these imbalances have stalled. Trading partners have repeatedly
blocked multilateral and plurilateral solutions, including in
the context of new rounds of tariff negotiations and efforts to
discipline non-tariff barriers. At the same time, with the U.S.
economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S. trading
partners have had few incentives to provide reciprocal
treatment to U.S. exports in the context of bilateral trade
negotiations.
These structural asymmetries have driven the large and
persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficit. Even for countries
with which the United States may enjoy an occasional bilateral
trade surplus, the accumulation of tariff and non-tariff
barriers on U.S. exports may make that surplus smaller than it
would have been without such barriers. Permitting these
asymmetries to continue is not sustainable in today's economic
and geopolitical environment because of the effect they have on
U.S. domestic production. A nation's ability to produce
domestically is the bedrock of its national and economic
security.
Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden
Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing domestic
manufacturing is critical to U.S. national security. According
to 2023 United Nations data, U.S. manufacturing output as a
share of global manufacturing output was 17.4 percent, down
from a peak in 2001 of 28.4 percent.
Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing
output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity. The need to
maintain robust and resilient domestic manufacturing capacity
is particularly acute in certain advanced industrial sectors
like automobiles, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology
products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals,
because once competitors gain sufficient global market share in
these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently weakened.
It is also critical to scale manufacturing capacity in the
defense-industrial sector so that we can manufacture the
defense materiel and equipment necessary to protect American
interests at home and abroad.
In fact, because the United States has supplied so much
military equipment to other countries, U.S. stockpiles of
military goods are too low to be compatible with U.S. national
defense interests. Furthermore, U.S. defense companies must
develop new, advanced manufacturing technologies across a range
of critical sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and
microelectronics. If the United States wishes to maintain an
effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and
homeland, as well as for its allies and partners, it needs to
have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing
ecosystem to manufacture these products without undue reliance
on imports for key inputs.
Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also has
compromised U.S. economic security by rendering U.S. supply
chains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption and supply shocks.
In recent years, the vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this
respect was exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when
Americans had difficulty accessing essential products, as well
as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking cargo ships in
the Middle East.
The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens the
U.S. economy in other ways, including through the loss of
manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to 2024, the United States lost
around 5 million manufacturing jobs and experienced one of the
largest drops in manufacturing employment in history.
Furthermore, many manufacturing job losses were concentrated in
specific geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of
manufacturing jobs contributed to the decline in rates of
family formation and to the rise of other social trends, like
the abuse of opioids, that have imposed profound costs on the
U.S. economy.
The future of American competitiveness depends on reversing
these trends. Today, manufacturing represents just 11 percent
of U.S. gross domestic product, yet it accounts for 35 percent
of American productivity growth and 60 percent of our exports.
Importantly, U.S. manufacturing is the main engine of
innovation in the United States, responsible for 55 percent of
all patents and 70 percent of all research and development
(R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S.
multinational enterprises in China grew at an average rate of
13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017, while their R&D
expenditures in the United States grew by an average of just 5
percent per year during the same time period, is evidence of
the strong link between manufacturing and innovation.
Furthermore, every manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in
other related industries, helping to build and sustain our
economy.
Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured
products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs for
national security, neither can a nation long survive if it
cannot produce its own food. Presidential Policy Directive 21
of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and
Resilience), designates food and agriculture as a ``critical
infrastructure sector'' because it is one of the sectors
considered ``so vital to the United States that [its]
incapacity or destruction . . . would have a debilitating
impact on security, national economic security, national public
health or safety, or any combination of those matters.''
Furthermore, when I left office, the United States had a trade
surplus in agricultural products, but today, that surplus has
vanished. Eviscerated by a slew of new non-tariff barriers
imposed by our trading partners, it has been replaced by a
projected $49 billion annual agricultural trade deficit.
For these reasons, I hereby declare and order:
Section 1. National Emergency. As President of the United
States, my highest duty is ensuring the national and economic
security of the country and its citizens.
I have declared a national emergency arising from
conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods
trade deficits, which have grown by over 40 percent in the past
5 years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024. This trade
deficit reflects asymmetries in trade relationships that have
contributed to the atrophy of domestic production capacity,
especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and defense-
industrial base. These asymmetries also impact U.S. producers'
ability to export and, consequentially, their incentive to
produce.
Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-
reciprocal differences in tariff rates among foreign trading
partners, but also extensive use of non-tariff barriers by
foreign trading partners, which reduce the competitiveness of
U.S. exports while artificially enhancing the competitiveness
of their own goods. These non-tariff barriers include technical
barriers to trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary
rules; inadequate intellectual property protections; suppressed
domestic consumption (e.g., wage suppression); weak labor,
environmental, and other regulatory standards and protections;
and corruption. These non-tariff barriers give rise to
significant imbalances even when the United States and a
trading partner have comparable tariff rates.
The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the
transfer of resources from domestic producers to foreign firms,
reducing opportunities for domestic manufacturers to expand
and, in turn, leading to lost manufacturing jobs, diminished
manufacturing capacity, and an atrophied industrial base,
including in the defense-industrial sector. At the same time,
foreign firms are better positioned to scale production,
reinvest in innovation, and compete in the global economy, to
the detriment of U.S. economic and national security.
The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity
in certain critical and advanced industrial sectors--another on
outcome of the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade
deficits--also compromises U.S. economic and national security
by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain
disruption. Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods
trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial
capacity, have compromised military readiness; this
vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective
action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States.
Such impact upon military readiness and our national security
posture is especially acute with the recent rise in armed
conflicts abroad. I call upon the public and private sector to
make the efforts necessary to strengthen the international
economic position of the United States.
Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is the policy of the
United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an
additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading
partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad
valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall
start at 10 percent and shortly thereafter, the additional ad
valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in
Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this
order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until
such time as I determine that the underlying conditions
described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated.
Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except as otherwise provided in
this order, all articles imported into the customs territory of
the United States shall be, consistent with law, subject to an
additional ad valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of
duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for consumption,
or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01
a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, except that goods
loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in transit on
the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
time on April 5, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn
from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on April 5, 2025, shall not be subject to such
additional duty.
Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this order, at
12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, all articles
from trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order
imported into the customs territory of the United States shall
be, consistent with law, subject to the country-specific ad
valorem rates of duty specified in Annex I to this order. Such
rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for
consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or
after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, except
that goods loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in
transit on the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern
daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for consumption or
withdrawn from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m.
eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, shall not be subject to
these country-specific ad valorem rates of duty set forth in
Annex I to this order. These country-specific ad valorem rates
of duty shall apply to all articles imported pursuant to the
terms of all existing U.S. trade agreements, except as provided
below.
(b) The following goods as set forth in Annex II to this
order, consistent with law, shall not be subject to the ad
valorem rates of duty under this order: (i) all articles that
are encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b); (ii) all articles and
derivatives of steel and aluminum subject to the duties imposed
pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and
proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting
Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended,
Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel
Into the United States), as amended, and Proclamation 9980 of
January 24, 2020 (Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum
Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States),
as amended, Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting
Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), and Proclamation
10896 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the
United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive parts
subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant to section
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and
proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March 26, 2025 (Adjusting
Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United
States); (iv) other products enumerated in Annex II to this
order, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors,
lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy and
energy products; (v) all articles from a trading partner
subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of the Harmonized
Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and (vi) all
articles that may become subject to duties pursuant to future
actions under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
(c) The rates of duty established by this order are in
addition to any other duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or
charges applicable to such imported articles, except as
provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section below.
(d) With respect to articles from Canada, I have imposed
additional duties on certain goods to address a national
emergency resulting from the flow of illicit drugs across our
northern border pursuant to Executive Order 14193 of February
1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
Across Our Northern Border), as amended by Executive Order
14197 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2, 2025
(Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
Across Our Northern Border). With respect to articles from
Mexico, I have imposed additional duties on certain goods to
address a national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit
drugs and illegal migration across our southern border pursuant
to Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties
To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border), as amended by
Executive Order 14198 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the
Situation at Our Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of
March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at
Our Southern Border). As a result of these border emergency
tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico under the terms
of general note 11 to the HTSUS, including any treatment set
forth in subchapter XXIII of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of
chapter 99 of the HTSUS, as related to the Agreement between
the United States of America, United Mexican States, and Canada
(USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S. market under
these preferential terms. However, all goods of Canada or
Mexico that do not qualify as originating under USMCA are
presently subject to additional ad valorem duties of 25
percent, with energy or energy resources and potash imported
from Canada and not qualifying as originating under USMCA
presently subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10
percent.
(e) Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles imported from
Canada or Mexico under the terms of this order shall not apply
in addition to the ad valorem rate of duty specified by the
existing orders described in subsection (d) of this section. If
such orders identified in subsection (d) of this section are
terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico that
qualify as originating under USMCA shall not be subject to an
additional ad valorem rate of duty, while articles not
qualifying as originating under USMCA shall be subject to an ad
valorem rate of duty of 12 percent. However, these ad valorem
rates of duty on articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall
not apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to an
article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA that is a
part or component of an article substantially finished in the
United States.
(f) More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty set forth
in this order shall apply only to the non-U.S. content of a
subject article, provided at least 20 percent of the value of
the subject article is U.S. originating. For the purposes of
this subsection, ``U.S. content'' refers to the value of an
article attributable to the components produced entirely, or
substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), to the extent permitted by law, is
authorized to require the collection of such information and
documentation regarding an imported article, including with the
entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to ascertain and
verify the value of the U.S. content of the article, as well as
to ascertain and verify whether an article is substantially
finished in the United States.
(g) Subject articles, except those eligible for admission
under ``domestic status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, which
are subject to the duty specified in section 2 of this order
and are admitted into a foreign trade zone on or after 12:01
a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, must be admitted
as ``privileged foreign status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.
(h) Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.
1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall remain available for the articles
described in subsection (a) of this section. Duty-free de
minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain
available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this
section until notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the
President that adequate systems are in place to fully and
expeditiously process and collect duty revenue applicable
pursuant to this subsection for articles otherwise eligible for
de minimis treatment. After such notification, duty-free de
minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be
available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this
section.
(i) The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further Amendment
to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the
People's Republic of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports),
regarding low-value imports from China is not affected by this
order, and all duties and fees with respect to covered articles
shall be collected as required and detailed therein.
(j) To reduce the risk of transshipment and evasion, all ad
valorem rates of duty imposed by this order or any successor
orders with respect to articles of China shall apply equally to
articles of both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
and the Macau Special Administrative Region.
(k) In order to establish the duty rates described in this
order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in the Annexes to
this order. These modifications shall enter into effect on the
dates set forth in the Annexes to this order.
(l) Unless specifically noted herein, any prior
Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other
Presidential directive or guidance related to trade with
foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with the
direction in this order is hereby terminated, suspended, or
modified to the extent necessary to give full effect to this
order.
Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of
Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to
the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for
Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, shall recommend to me additional
action, if necessary, if this action is not effective in
resolving the emergency conditions described above, including
the increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent
expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S. trading
partners in a manner that threatens the economic and national
security interests of the United States.
(b) Should any trading partner retaliate against the United
States in response to this action through import duties on U.S.
exports or other measures, I may further modify the HTSUS to
increase or expand in scope the duties imposed under this order
to ensure the efficacy of this action.
(c) Should any trading partner take significant steps to
remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align sufficiently
with the United States on economic and national security
matters, I may further modify the HTSUS to decrease or limit in
scope the duties imposed under this order.
(d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output continue
to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to increase duties
under this order.
Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of Commerce
and the United States Trade Representative, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and
Manufacturing, the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade
Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers granted
to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to implement this
order. Each executive department and agency shall take all
appropriate measures within its authority to implement this
order.
Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade
Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President
for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and
Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and
final reports to the Congress on the national emergency
declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the
NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
1703(c)).
Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall
be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive
department, agency, or the head thereof; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget relating to budgetary,
administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
applicable law and subject to the availability of
appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any
right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
or in equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or
agents, or any other person.
Donald J. Trump.
The White House, April 2, 2025.
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