    [House Document 119-37]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    119th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 119-37

                   ACTIONS TAKEN TO  DEAL WITH THE UNUSUAL AND
                    EXTRAORDINARY THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES'
                    ECONOMY AND  NATIONAL  SECURITY  POSED  BY
                    THE UNDERLYING  CONDITIONS  OF  OUR  TRADE
                    WITH FOREIGN NATIONS

                                   __________

                                    MESSAGE

                                      from

                        THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                                  transmitting

         DECLARING   A   NATIONAL   EMERGENCY    IN    EXECUTIVE    ORDER
          14257 OF  APRIL 2,  2025,  ARISING  FROM  NON-RECIPROCAL  TRADE
          AS    EVIDENCED    BY   LARGE   AND   PERSISTENT   ANNUA   U.S.
          GOODS  TRADE  DEFICITS,  PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(b);  PUBLIC
          LAW 95-223, SEC. 204(b); (91 STAT. 1627) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(b);
          PUBLIC LAW 94-412, SEC. 401(b); (90 STAT. 1257)

                    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      April 8, 2025.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Com-
       mittees on Foreign Affairs and Ways and Means,  and  ordered  to be
       printed

                                      ------

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

    59-011                    WASHINGTON : 2025

    To the Congress of the United States:
        Consistent with applicable law, including the National
    Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA) and the
    International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et
    seq.) (IEEPA), I am providing notice of certain actions I have
    taken to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the
    United States' economy and national security posed by the
    underlying conditions of our trade with foreign nations,
    including a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral trade
    relationships, disparate tariff rates and non-tariff barriers,
    and foreign economic policies that suppress domestic wages and
    consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S.
    goods trade deficits. That threat has its source in whole or
    substantial part outside the United States in the domestic
    economic policies of key trading partners and structural
    imbalances in the global trading system. In my judgment, action
    under the NEA and IEEPA is necessary and appropriate to deal
    with the unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
    security and economy of the United States.
        Executive Order 14257 of April 2, 2025 (Regulating Imports
    with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that
    Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods
    Trade Deficits) (the ``Executive Order''), declares a national
    emergency arising from non-reciprocal trade as evidenced by
    large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits. Such
    trade deficits have led to the hollowing out of our
    manufacturing base; inhibited our ability to scale advanced
    domestic manufacturing capacity; undermined critical supply
    chains; and rendered our defense-industrial base dependent on
    foreign adversaries.
        To deal with this national emergency, I have determined
    that it is necessary and appropriate to impose additional ad
    valorem duties on imports of goods from our trading partners
    under IEEPA. The additional ad valorem duties shall be imposed
    on imports of goods from all U.S. trading partners at varying
    rates, subject to exceptions specified in the Executive Order.
    The specific foreign trading partners, and the applicable duty
    rate for each trading partner, are listed in Annexes I and III
    of the Executive Order. It is necessary to apply additional
    duties on the imports of goods from all U.S. trading partners
    to reduce the overall U.S. global goods trade deficit and
    incentivize trading partners to take significant steps to
    remedy non-reciprocal trade practices, as well as align
    sufficiently with the United States on economic and national
    security matters.
        My Administration, will continue to consult with the
    Congress on our efforts to deal with the unusual and
    extraordinary threat described in this report and the Executive
    Order. As described in the Executive Order, the United States
    Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of
    State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of
    Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to
    the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for
    Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for
    National Security Affairs, is authorized to submit recurring
    and final reports to the Congress on this national emergency.
        The Executive Order further explains the circumstances that
    necessitate the exercise of authority under IEEPA and the NEA;
    why I found that those circumstances constitute an unusual and
    extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or
    substantial part outside the United States, to the national
    security and economy of the United States; the authorities
    exercised and the actions to be taken to deal with those
    circumstances; why I determined that such actions are necessary
    to deal with those circumstances; and the foreign countries
    with respect to which such actions are to be taken and why such
    actions are to be taken with respect to those countries.
        I am enclosing a copy of the Executive Order I have issued.

                                                       Donald J. Trump.
        The White House, April 7, 2025.

                                Executive Order

                                  ----------

       Regulating Imports With a  Reciprocal Tariff to  Rectify
        Trade Practices That Contribute to Large and Persistent
        Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits

        By the authority vested in me as President by the
    Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,
    including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 4c
    (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act
    (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 604 of the Trade Act of
    1974, as amended (19 U.S.C. 2483), and section 301 of title 3,
    United States Code.
        I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of
    America, find that underlying conditions, including a lack of
    reciprocity in our bilateral trade relationships, disparate
    tariff rates and non-tariff barriers, and U.S. trading
    partners' economic policies that suppress domestic wages and
    consumption, as indicated by large and persistent annual U.S.
    goods trade deficits, constitute an unusual and extraordinary
    threat to the national security and economy of the United
    States. That threat has its source in whole or substantial part
    outside the United States in the domestic economic policies of
    key trading partners and structural imbalances in the global
    trading system. I hereby declare a national emergency with
    respect to this threat.
        On January 20, 2025, I signed the America First Trade
    Policy Presidential Memorandum directing my Administration to
    investigate the causes of our country's large and persistent
    annual trade deficits in goods, including the economic and
    national security implications and risks resulting from such
    deficits, and to undertake a review of, and identify, any
    unfair trade practices by other countries. On February 13,
    2025, I signed a Presidential Memorandum entitled ``Reciprocal
    Trade and Tariffs,'' that directed further review of our
    trading partners' non-reciprocal trading practices, and noted
    the relationship between non-reciprocal practices and the trade
    deficit. On April 1, 2025, I received the final results of
    those investigations, and I am taking action today based on
    those results.
        Large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits have
    led to the hollowing out of our manufacturing base; inhibited
    our ability to scale advanced domestic manufacturing capacity;
    undermined critical supply chains; and rendered our defense-
    industrial base dependent on foreign adversaries. Large and
    persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficits are caused in
    substantial part by a lack of reciprocity in our bilateral
    trade relationships. This situation is evidenced by disparate
    tariff rates and non-tariff barriers that make it harder for
    U.S. manufacturers to sell their products in foreign markets.
    It is also evidenced by the economic policies of key U.S.
    trading partners insofar as they suppress domestic wages and
    consumption, and thereby demand for U.S. exports, while
    artificially increasing the competitiveness of their goods in
    global markets. These conditions have given rise to the
    national emergency that this order is intended to abate and
    resolve.
        For decades starting in 1934, U.S. trade policy has been
    organized around the principle of reciprocity. The Congress
    directed the President to secure reduced reciprocal tariff
    rates from key trading partners first through bilateral trade
    agreements and later under the auspices of the global trading
    system. Between 1934 and 1945, the executive branch negotiated
    and signed 32 bilateral reciprocal trade agreements designed to
    lower tariff rates on a reciprocal basis. After 1947 through
    1994, participating countries engaged in eight rounds of
    negotiation, which resulted in the General Agreements on
    Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and seven subsequent tariff reduction
    rounds.
        However, despite a commitment to the principle of
    reciprocity, the trading relationship between the United States
    and its trading partners has become highly unbalanced,
    particularly in recent years. The post-war international
    economic system was based upon three incorrect assumptions:
    first, that if the United States led the world in liberalizing
    tariff and non-tariff barriers the rest of the world would
    follow; second, that such liberalization would ultimately
    result in more economic convergence and increased domestic
    consumption among U.S. trading partners converging towards the
    share in the United States; and third, that as a result, the
    United States would not accrue large and persistent goods trade
    deficits.
        This framework set in motion events, agreements, and
    commitments that did not result in reciprocity or generally
    increase domestic consumption in foreign economies relative to
    domestic consumption in the United States. Those events, in
    turn, created large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade
    deficits as a feature of the global trading system.
        Put simply, while World Trade Organization (WTO) Members
    agreed to bind their tariff rates on a most-favored-nation
    (MFN) basis, and thereby provide their best tariff rates to all
    WTO Members, they did not agree to bind their tariff rates at
    similarly low levels or to apply tariff rates on a reciprocal
    basis. Consequently, according to the WTO, the United States
    has among the lowest simple average MFN tariff rates in the
    world at 3.3 percent, while many of our key trading partners
    like Brazil (11.2 percent), China (7.5 percent), the European
    Union (EU) (5 percent), India (17 percent), and Vietnam (9.4
    percent) have simple average MFN tariff rates that are
    significantly higher.
        Moreover, these average MFN tariff rates conceal much
    larger discrepancies across economies in tariff rates applied
    to particular products. For example, the United States imposes
    a 2.5 percent tariff on passenger vehicle imports (with
    internal combustion engines), while the European Union (10
    percent), India (70 percent), and China (15 percent) impose
    much higher duties on the same product. For network switches
    and routers, the United States imposes a 0 percent tariff, but
    for similar products, India (10 percent) levies a higher rate.
    Brazil (18 percent) and Indonesia (30 percent) impose a higher
    tariff on ethanol than does the United States (2.5 percent).
    For rice in the husk, the U.S. MFN tariff is 2.7 percent (ad
    valorem equivalent), while India (80 percent), Malaysia (40
    percent), and Turkey (an average of 31 percent) impose higher
    rates. Apples enter the United States duty-free, but not so in
    Turkey (60.3 percent) and India (50 percent).
        Similarly, non-tariff barriers also deprive U.S.
    manufacturers of reciprocal access to markets around the world.
    The 2025 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade
    Barriers (NTE) details a great number of non-tariff barriers to
    U.S. exports around the world on a trading-partner by trading-
    partner basis. These barriers include import barriers and
    licensing restrictions; customs barriers and shortcomings in
    trade facilitation; technical barriers to trade (e.g.,
    unnecessarily trade restrictive standards, conformity
    assessment procedures, or technical regulations); sanitary and
    phytosanitary measures that unnecessarily restrict trade
    without furthering safety objectives; inadequate patent,
    copyright, trade secret, and trademark regimes and inadequate
    enforcement of intellectual property rights; discriminatory
    licensing requirements or regulatory standards; barriers to
    cross-border data flows and discriminatory practices affecting
    trade in digital products; investment barriers; subsidies;
    anticompetitive practices; discrimination in favor of domestic
    state-owned enterprises, and failures by governments in
    protecting labor and environment standards; bribery; and
    corruption.
        Moreover, non-tariff barriers include the domestic economic
    policies and practices of our trading partners, including
    currency practices and value-added taxes, and their associated
    market distortions, that suppress domestic consumption and
    boost exports to the United States. This lack of reciprocity is
    apparent in the fact that the share of consumption to Gross
    Domestic Product (GDP) in the United States is about 68
    percent, but it is much lower in others like Ireland (27
    percent), Singapore (31 percent), China (39 percent), South
    Korea (49 percent), and Germany (50 percent).
        At the same time, efforts by the United States to address
    these imbalances have stalled. Trading partners have repeatedly
    blocked multilateral and plurilateral solutions, including in
    the context of new rounds of tariff negotiations and efforts to
    discipline non-tariff barriers. At the same time, with the U.S.
    economy disproportionately open to imports, U.S. trading
    partners have had few incentives to provide reciprocal
    treatment to U.S. exports in the context of bilateral trade
    negotiations.
        These structural asymmetries have driven the large and
    persistent annual U.S. goods trade deficit. Even for countries
    with which the United States may enjoy an occasional bilateral
    trade surplus, the accumulation of tariff and non-tariff
    barriers on U.S. exports may make that surplus smaller than it
    would have been without such barriers. Permitting these
    asymmetries to continue is not sustainable in today's economic
    and geopolitical environment because of the effect they have on
    U.S. domestic production. A nation's ability to produce
    domestically is the bedrock of its national and economic
    security.
        Both my first Administration in 2017, and the Biden
    Administration in 2022, recognized that increasing domestic
    manufacturing is critical to U.S. national security. According
    to 2023 United Nations data, U.S. manufacturing output as a
    share of global manufacturing output was 17.4 percent, down
    from a peak in 2001 of 28.4 percent.
        Over time, the persistent decline in U.S. manufacturing
    output has reduced U.S. manufacturing capacity. The need to
    maintain robust and resilient domestic manufacturing capacity
    is particularly acute in certain advanced industrial sectors
    like automobiles, shipbuilding, pharmaceuticals, technology
    products, machine tools, and basic and fabricated metals,
    because once competitors gain sufficient global market share in
    these sectors, U.S. production could be permanently weakened.
    It is also critical to scale manufacturing capacity in the
    defense-industrial sector so that we can manufacture the
    defense materiel and equipment necessary to protect American
    interests at home and abroad.
        In fact, because the United States has supplied so much
    military equipment to other countries, U.S. stockpiles of
    military goods are too low to be compatible with U.S. national
    defense interests. Furthermore, U.S. defense companies must
    develop new, advanced manufacturing technologies across a range
    of critical sectors including bio-manufacturing, batteries, and
    microelectronics. If the United States wishes to maintain an
    effective security umbrella to defend its citizens and
    homeland, as well as for its allies and partners, it needs to
    have a large upstream manufacturing and goods-producing
    ecosystem to manufacture these products without undue reliance
    on imports for key inputs.
        Increased reliance on foreign producers for goods also has
    compromised U.S. economic security by rendering U.S. supply
    chains vulnerable to geopolitical disruption and supply shocks.
    In recent years, the vulnerability of the U.S. economy in this
    respect was exposed both during the COVID-19 pandemic, when
    Americans had difficulty accessing essential products, as well
    as when the Houthi rebels later began attacking cargo ships in
    the Middle East.
        The decline of U.S. manufacturing capacity threatens the
    U.S. economy in other ways, including through the loss of
    manufacturing jobs. From 1997 to 2024, the United States lost
    around 5 million manufacturing jobs and experienced one of the
    largest drops in manufacturing employment in history.
    Furthermore, many manufacturing job losses were concentrated in
    specific geographical areas. In these areas, the loss of
    manufacturing jobs contributed to the decline in rates of
    family formation and to the rise of other social trends, like
    the abuse of opioids, that have imposed profound costs on the
    U.S. economy.
        The future of American competitiveness depends on reversing
    these trends. Today, manufacturing represents just 11 percent
    of U.S. gross domestic product, yet it accounts for 35 percent
    of American productivity growth and 60 percent of our exports.
    Importantly, U.S. manufacturing is the main engine of
    innovation in the United States, responsible for 55 percent of
    all patents and 70 percent of all research and development
    (R&D) spending. The fact that R&D expenditures by U.S.
    multinational enterprises in China grew at an average rate of
    13.6 percent a year between 2003 and 2017, while their R&D
    expenditures in the United States grew by an average of just 5
    percent per year during the same time period, is evidence of
    the strong link between manufacturing and innovation.
    Furthermore, every manufacturing job spurs 7 to 12 new jobs in
    other related industries, helping to build and sustain our
    economy.
        Just as a nation that does not produce manufactured
    products cannot maintain the industrial base it needs for
    national security, neither can a nation long survive if it
    cannot produce its own food. Presidential Policy Directive 21
    of February 12, 2013 (Critical Infrastructure Security and
    Resilience), designates food and agriculture as a ``critical
    infrastructure sector'' because it is one of the sectors
    considered ``so vital to the United States that [its]
    incapacity or destruction . . . would have a debilitating
    impact on security, national economic security, national public
    health or safety, or any combination of those matters.''
    Furthermore, when I left office, the United States had a trade
    surplus in agricultural products, but today, that surplus has
    vanished. Eviscerated by a slew of new non-tariff barriers
    imposed by our trading partners, it has been replaced by a
    projected $49 billion annual agricultural trade deficit.
        For these reasons, I hereby declare and order:
        Section 1. National Emergency. As President of the United
    States, my highest duty is ensuring the national and economic
    security of the country and its citizens.
        I have declared a national emergency arising from
    conditions reflected in large and persistent annual U.S. goods
    trade deficits, which have grown by over 40 percent in the past
    5 years alone, reaching $1.2 trillion in 2024. This trade
    deficit reflects asymmetries in trade relationships that have
    contributed to the atrophy of domestic production capacity,
    especially that of the U.S. manufacturing and defense-
    industrial base. These asymmetries also impact U.S. producers'
    ability to export and, consequentially, their incentive to
    produce.
        Specifically, such asymmetry includes not only non-
    reciprocal differences in tariff rates among foreign trading
    partners, but also extensive use of non-tariff barriers by
    foreign trading partners, which reduce the competitiveness of
    U.S. exports while artificially enhancing the competitiveness
    of their own goods. These non-tariff barriers include technical
    barriers to trade; non-scientific sanitary and phytosanitary
    rules; inadequate intellectual property protections; suppressed
    domestic consumption (e.g., wage suppression); weak labor,
    environmental, and other regulatory standards and protections;
    and corruption. These non-tariff barriers give rise to
    significant imbalances even when the United States and a
    trading partner have comparable tariff rates.
        The cumulative effect of these imbalances has been the
    transfer of resources from domestic producers to foreign firms,
    reducing opportunities for domestic manufacturers to expand
    and, in turn, leading to lost manufacturing jobs, diminished
    manufacturing capacity, and an atrophied industrial base,
    including in the defense-industrial sector. At the same time,
    foreign firms are better positioned to scale production,
    reinvest in innovation, and compete in the global economy, to
    the detriment of U.S. economic and national security.
        The absence of sufficient domestic manufacturing capacity
    in certain critical and advanced industrial sectors--another on
    outcome of the large and persistent annual U.S. goods trade
    deficits--also compromises U.S. economic and national security
    by rendering the U.S. economy less resilient to supply chain
    disruption. Finally, the large, persistent annual U.S. goods
    trade deficits, and the concomitant loss of industrial
    capacity, have compromised military readiness; this
    vulnerability can only be redressed through swift corrective
    action to rebalance the flow of imports into the United States.
    Such impact upon military readiness and our national security
    posture is especially acute with the recent rise in armed
    conflicts abroad. I call upon the public and private sector to
    make the efforts necessary to strengthen the international
    economic position of the United States.
        Sec. 2. Reciprocal Tariff Policy. It is the policy of the
    United States to rebalance global trade flows by imposing an
    additional ad valorem duty on all imports from all trading
    partners except as otherwise provided herein. The additional ad
    valorem duty on all imports from all trading partners shall
    start at 10 percent and shortly thereafter, the additional ad
    valorem duty shall increase for trading partners enumerated in
    Annex I to this order at the rates set forth in Annex I to this
    order. These additional ad valorem duties shall apply until
    such time as I determine that the underlying conditions
    described above are satisfied, resolved, or mitigated.
        Sec. 3. Implementation. (a) Except as otherwise provided in
    this order, all articles imported into the customs territory of
    the United States shall be, consistent with law, subject to an
    additional ad valorem rate of duty of 10 percent. Such rates of
    duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for consumption,
    or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after 12:01
    a.m. eastern daylight time on April 5, 2025, except that goods
    loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in transit on
    the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight
    time on April 5, 2025, and entered for consumption or withdrawn
    from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m. eastern
    daylight time on April 5, 2025, shall not be subject to such
    additional duty.
        Furthermore, except as otherwise provided in this order, at
    12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, all articles
    from trading partners enumerated in Annex I to this order
    imported into the customs territory of the United States shall
    be, consistent with law, subject to the country-specific ad
    valorem rates of duty specified in Annex I to this order. Such
    rates of duty shall apply with respect to goods entered for
    consumption, or withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or
    after 12:01 a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, except
    that goods loaded onto a vessel at the port of loading and in
    transit on the final mode of transit before 12:01 a.m. eastern
    daylight time on April 9, 2025, and entered for consumption or
    withdrawn from warehouse for consumption after 12:01 a.m.
    eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, shall not be subject to
    these country-specific ad valorem rates of duty set forth in
    Annex I to this order. These country-specific ad valorem rates
    of duty shall apply to all articles imported pursuant to the
    terms of all existing U.S. trade agreements, except as provided
    below.
        (b) The following goods as set forth in Annex II to this
    order, consistent with law, shall not be subject to the ad
    valorem rates of duty under this order: (i) all articles that
    are encompassed by 50 U.S.C. 1702(b); (ii) all articles and
    derivatives of steel and aluminum subject to the duties imposed
    pursuant to section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and
    proclaimed in Proclamation 9704 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting
    Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), as amended,
    Proclamation 9705 of March 8, 2018 (Adjusting Imports of Steel
    Into the United States), as amended, and Proclamation 9980 of
    January 24, 2020 (Adjusting Imports of Derivative Aluminum
    Articles and Derivative Steel Articles Into the United States),
    as amended, Proclamation 10895 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting
    Imports of Aluminum Into the United States), and Proclamation
    10896 of February 10, 2025 (Adjusting Imports of Steel into the
    United States); (iii) all automobiles and automotive parts
    subject to the additional duties imposed pursuant to section
    232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, and
    proclaimed in Proclamation 10908 of March 26, 2025 (Adjusting
    Imports of Automobiles and Automobile Parts Into the United
    States); (iv) other products enumerated in Annex II to this
    order, including copper, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors,
    lumber articles, certain critical minerals, and energy and
    energy products; (v) all articles from a trading partner
    subject to the rates set forth in Column 2 of the Harmonized
    Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); and (vi) all
    articles that may become subject to duties pursuant to future
    actions under section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962.
        (c) The rates of duty established by this order are in
    addition to any other duties, fees, taxes, exactions, or
    charges applicable to such imported articles, except as
    provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this section below.
        (d) With respect to articles from Canada, I have imposed
    additional duties on certain goods to address a national
    emergency resulting from the flow of illicit drugs across our
    northern border pursuant to Executive Order 14193 of February
    1, 2025 (Imposing Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
    Across Our Northern Border), as amended by Executive Order
    14197 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the Situation at Our
    Northern Border), and Executive Order 14231 of March 2, 2025
    (Amendment to Duties To Address the Flow of Illicit Drugs
    Across Our Northern Border). With respect to articles from
    Mexico, I have imposed additional duties on certain goods to
    address a national emergency resulting from the flow of illicit
    drugs and illegal migration across our southern border pursuant
    to Executive Order 14194 of February 1, 2025 (Imposing Duties
    To Address the Situation at Our Southern Border), as amended by
    Executive Order 14198 of February 3, 2025 (Progress on the
    Situation at Our Southern Border), and Executive Order 14227 of
    March 2, 2025 (Amendment to Duties To Address the Situation at
    Our Southern Border). As a result of these border emergency
    tariff actions, all goods of Canada or Mexico under the terms
    of general note 11 to the HTSUS, including any treatment set
    forth in subchapter XXIII of chapter 98 and subchapter XXII of
    chapter 99 of the HTSUS, as related to the Agreement between
    the United States of America, United Mexican States, and Canada
    (USMCA), continue to be eligible to enter the U.S. market under
    these preferential terms. However, all goods of Canada or
    Mexico that do not qualify as originating under USMCA are
    presently subject to additional ad valorem duties of 25
    percent, with energy or energy resources and potash imported
    from Canada and not qualifying as originating under USMCA
    presently subject to the lower additional ad valorem duty of 10
    percent.
        (e) Any ad valorem rate of duty on articles imported from
    Canada or Mexico under the terms of this order shall not apply
    in addition to the ad valorem rate of duty specified by the
    existing orders described in subsection (d) of this section. If
    such orders identified in subsection (d) of this section are
    terminated or suspended, all items of Canada and Mexico that
    qualify as originating under USMCA shall not be subject to an
    additional ad valorem rate of duty, while articles not
    qualifying as originating under USMCA shall be subject to an ad
    valorem rate of duty of 12 percent. However, these ad valorem
    rates of duty on articles imported from Canada and Mexico shall
    not apply to energy or energy resources, to potash, or to an
    article eligible for duty-free treatment under USMCA that is a
    part or component of an article substantially finished in the
    United States.
        (f) More generally, the ad valorem rates of duty set forth
    in this order shall apply only to the non-U.S. content of a
    subject article, provided at least 20 percent of the value of
    the subject article is U.S. originating. For the purposes of
    this subsection, ``U.S. content'' refers to the value of an
    article attributable to the components produced entirely, or
    substantially transformed in, the United States. U.S. Customs
    and Border Protection (CBP), to the extent permitted by law, is
    authorized to require the collection of such information and
    documentation regarding an imported article, including with the
    entry filing, as is necessary to enable CBP to ascertain and
    verify the value of the U.S. content of the article, as well as
    to ascertain and verify whether an article is substantially
    finished in the United States.
        (g) Subject articles, except those eligible for admission
    under ``domestic status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.43, which
    are subject to the duty specified in section 2 of this order
    and are admitted into a foreign trade zone on or after 12:01
    a.m. eastern daylight time on April 9, 2025, must be admitted
    as ``privileged foreign status'' as defined in 19 CFR 146.41.
        (h) Duty-free de minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C.
    1321(a)(2)(A)-(B) shall remain available for the articles
    described in subsection (a) of this section. Duty-free de
    minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall remain
    available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this
    section until notification by the Secretary of Commerce to the
    President that adequate systems are in place to fully and
    expeditiously process and collect duty revenue applicable
    pursuant to this subsection for articles otherwise eligible for
    de minimis treatment. After such notification, duty-free de
    minimis treatment under 19 U.S.C. 1321(a)(2)(C) shall not be
    available for the articles described in subsection (a) of this
    section.
        (i) The Executive Order of April 2, 2025 (Further Amendment
    to Duties Addressing the Synthetic Opioid Supply Chain in the
    People's Republic of China as Applied to Low-Value Imports),
    regarding low-value imports from China is not affected by this
    order, and all duties and fees with respect to covered articles
    shall be collected as required and detailed therein.
        (j) To reduce the risk of transshipment and evasion, all ad
    valorem rates of duty imposed by this order or any successor
    orders with respect to articles of China shall apply equally to
    articles of both the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
    and the Macau Special Administrative Region.
        (k) In order to establish the duty rates described in this
    order, the HTSUS is modified as set forth in the Annexes to
    this order. These modifications shall enter into effect on the
    dates set forth in the Annexes to this order.
        (l) Unless specifically noted herein, any prior
    Presidential Proclamation, Executive Order, or other
    Presidential directive or guidance related to trade with
    foreign trading partners that is inconsistent with the
    direction in this order is hereby terminated, suspended, or
    modified to the extent necessary to give full effect to this
    order.
        Sec. 4. Modification Authority. (a) The Secretary of
    Commerce and the United States Trade Representative, in
    consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the
    Treasury, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to
    the President for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for
    Trade and Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for
    National Security Affairs, shall recommend to me additional
    action, if necessary, if this action is not effective in
    resolving the emergency conditions described above, including
    the increase in the overall trade deficit or the recent
    expansion of non-reciprocal trade arrangements by U.S. trading
    partners in a manner that threatens the economic and national
    security interests of the United States.
        (b) Should any trading partner retaliate against the United
    States in response to this action through import duties on U.S.
    exports or other measures, I may further modify the HTSUS to
    increase or expand in scope the duties imposed under this order
    to ensure the efficacy of this action.
        (c) Should any trading partner take significant steps to
    remedy non-reciprocal trade arrangements and align sufficiently
    with the United States on economic and national security
    matters, I may further modify the HTSUS to decrease or limit in
    scope the duties imposed under this order.
        (d) Should U.S. manufacturing capacity and output continue
    to worsen, I may further modify the HTSUS to increase duties
    under this order.
        Sec. 5. Implementation Authority. The Secretary of Commerce
    and the United States Trade Representative, in consultation
    with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the
    Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President
    for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and
    Manufacturing, the Assistant to the President for National
    Security Affairs, and the Chair of the International Trade
    Commission are hereby authorized to employ all powers granted
    to the President by IEEPA as may be necessary to implement this
    order. Each executive department and agency shall take all
    appropriate measures within its authority to implement this
    order.
        Sec. 6. Reporting Requirements. The United States Trade
    Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State,
    the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the
    Secretary of Homeland Security, the Assistant to the President
    for Economic Policy, the Senior Counselor for Trade and
    Manufacturing, and the Assistant to the President for National
    Security Affairs, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and
    final reports to the Congress on the national emergency
    declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the
    NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
    1703(c)).
        Sec. 7. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall
    be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
              (i) the authority granted by law to an executive
            department, agency, or the head thereof; or
              (ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of
            Management and Budget relating to budgetary,
            administrative, or legislative proposals.
        (b) This order shall be implemented consistent with
    applicable law and subject to the availability of
    appropriations.
        (c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any
    right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law
    or in equity by any party against the United States, its
    departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or
    agents, or any other person.

                                                       Donald J. Trump.
        The White House, April 2, 2025.

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