[House Document 111-89]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




111th Congress, - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 111-89
2d Session

 
 REPORT ON MATTERS RELATED TO SUPPORT FOR THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
                  ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                     THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

  A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 PUB. 
                               L. 107-108




  January 26, 2010.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
         Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    Consistent with the authorities related to official 
immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit 
drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-4), as 
amended, and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am 
providing a report by my Administration. This report includes 
matters related to support for the interdiction of aircraft 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.

                                                      Barack Obama.
    The White House, January 22, 2010.
 United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in 
                        Illicit Drug Trafficking

    Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the 
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in 
calendar year 2009. The President signed Presidential 
Determination 2009-24 on August 13, 2009, for Colombia and 
Presidential Determination 2010-02 on October 16, 2009, for 
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified with respect to 
Colombia and Brazil that (1) interdiction of aircraft 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking in that country's airspace is necessary because of 
the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to 
the national security of that country; and (2) each country has 
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent 
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective 
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force 
is directed against the aircraft. Consistent with 22 U.S.C. 
2291-4(c), this report contains the following information for 
both Colombia and Brazil: (a) the nature of the illicit drug 
trafficking threat to the country; (b) an explanation of safety 
procedures in place to protect against the innocent loss of 
life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
interdiction, including any training and other mechanisms in 
place to ensure adherence to such procedures; (c) a description 
of assistance provided by the United States to the interdiction 
program; and (d) a summary of the country's aircraft 
interception activity for which the United States provided 
assistance in calendar year 2009.
Colombia
    (A) On August 21, 2003, the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) Program 
in Colombia began operations. In making a seventh certification 
for Colombia in August 2009, the President determined, inter 
alia, that narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary 
threat to Colombia's national security. The threat 
narcotrafficking poses to Colombia is demonstrated by various 
factors, including the fact that Colombia is still the world's 
largest producer of cocaine and a supplier of high quality 
heroin; that Colombia faces a growing cocaine abuse problem; 
that Colombian drug trafficking organizations suborn Colombian 
officials and pay illegal armed groups to protect their 
organizations; that illegal revenue from the Colombian drug 
trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy; and that 
narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the democratic 
institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly, 
drug trafficking also serves as the primary source of funding 
for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and an 
important source of funding for the Colombian United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army 
(ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations by the Department of State.
    (B) The Colombia ABD Program's safety procedures are 
defined by the bilateral Letter of Agreement, signed on 
December 20, 2007. In calendar year 2009, the basic procedures 
for aerial interception of an unidentified, assumed suspect 
(UAS) flight were as follows:
     Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the 
Government of Colombia detects or is informed of an aircraft 
operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for 
possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''), information on 
that aircraft shall be gathered by the Colombian Government 
from all reasonably available sources, including radar systems, 
radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems 
(which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed 
flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant air 
traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the 
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by 
the Battle Commander Officer in the Colombian Air Force's 
Command and Control Center (CAFCCC), based upon certain factors 
set out in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information 
provided to Colombian Government and United States Government 
participants in the ongoing action.
     Monitoring. If the Government of Colombia 
determines or has preliminary reasons to believe that an 
aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that 
aircraft shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is 
intermittent, positive re-identification shall be made with 
reasonable certainty before the ABD event may continue. If the 
Government of Colombia has been unable to identify the track of 
interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be 
considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF 
procedures and may be intercepted.
     Phase I--Interception. The interception phase 
(Phase I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft 
by radio and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to 
determine the identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. 
If, duringthis phase, the Colombian Government determines that 
the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit 
drug trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the CAF 
may order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place 
suitable for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft 
does not comply with the procedures and instructions given by the CAF, 
the pilot may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
     Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists 
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing 
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the 
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's 
order. If all of the procedures required under the Agreement 
have been followed, the information gathered continues to 
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and the aircraft fails to 
respond to the interceptor's order to land, the Government of 
Colombia may, in accordance with the following, move to Phase 
III.
     Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted 
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under 
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or 
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor 
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if 
he requests and receives permission to do so (Phase III). The 
Commander of the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all 
such requests. The COCAF may approve such request after 
verifying that all procedures required under the Agreement have 
been followed. Upon receipt of the authorization, the 
interceptor aircraft shall warn the intercepted aircraft that 
it will be fired upon if it refuses to comply, using 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) radio 
communications procedures, and using the appropriate 
frequencies.
    The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the 
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in 
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as 
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before 
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be 
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to 
follow the interceptor's directions. Both the United States 
Government and Colombian Government acknowledge that even the 
minimum level of force could result in loss of life. If the 
intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the 
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate 
notice to the CAFCCC of the location of the intercepted 
aircraft.
    The safety procedures require similar identification and 
warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft 
has been located on the ground. Further, the United States 
Government and Government of Colombia have agreed upon 
additional restraints on the use of force, including a 
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial 
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly 
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to 
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to 
be under duress.
    In addition to the safety procedures described above, the 
Letters of Agreement governing the ABD Program provide for 
safety oversight by two Colombian personnel (the ground safety 
monitor and an air safety monitor) as well as the U.S. (through 
the Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) Command Duty 
Officer). Collectively, these three individuals are referred to 
as the ABD ``safety oversight triad'' and are required to 
oversee all Phase I, II, and III actions.
    In past years, the United States Government trained the 
Colombian Government's pilots and sensor operators to operate 
the Citation aircraft involved in the program. In 2009, pilot 
and crew refresher training as well as training of new 
Colombian personnel were ongoing as the program matures. A 
semi-annual review of the program, held in February 2008, 
helped to address issues that arise in the program's 
implementation. The United States Government also received 
weekly and monthly reports on program events.
    (C) In 2009, the United States Government provided a number 
of positions to Colombia's ABD Program, including a Department 
of Defense JIATF-S Tactical Commander and a JIATF-S Command 
Duty Officer; and a Host Nation Rider Assistant.
    JIATF-S's Tactical Commander exercised command and control 
of United States Government ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint 
Operations Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer was 
the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The 
Host Nation Rider Assistant served as a United States 
Government representative who assisted the Host Nation Rider on 
board the detection aircraft. An employee of the Narcotics 
Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted 
exclusively to overseeing implementation of this program.
    From January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009, the United 
States Government provided maintenance support to the 
Government of Colombia titled five Citation aircraft for the 
ABD Program. The United States Government also provided radar 
information and intelligence to the Colombian Government. 
Additional United States Government assets (both aircraft and 
personnel) from the Departments of Defense and Homeland 
Security have provided support for this program under the 
conditions contained in the Agreement. In addition, the 
Colombian Government has agreed that the five United States 
Government-supported ground-based radars and the Peace Panorama 
System (which is the airspace management system linking ground-
based radars in Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute 
United States Government support for ABD.
    (D) From January 1, 2009, until December 31, 2009, the 
Government of Colombian, with the assistance of the United 
States Government, identified 35 unidentified assumed suspect 
(UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Of these 35 UAS 
Flights 10 of these unidentified flights were determined to be 
legal flights. The Government of Colombia was in a position to 
act upon approximately 22 of the remaining 25 UAS flights. Four 
of the 22 aircraft were forced to land and three of the 
aircraft were impounded, 400 kilos of cocaine seized and $2 
million confiscated. While conducting law enforcement 
inspections as part of the ABD Program at airfields throughout 
the country, the Colombian Government impounded three aircraft, 
seizing 784 kilos of cocaine from those aircraft, and arresting 
five persons. The United States Government is unaware of any 
deaths or injuries resulting from the Colombian Government's 
actions with respect to these flights.
    This was the fourth year that ABD assets were used in 
maritime patrol missions off the coasts of Colombia. Ten 
vessels were impounded with 38 crewmembers arrested and 350 
kilos of cocaine confiscated and $2.0 million confiscated.

Brazil

    (A) Brazil's ABD Program began operations on October 17, 
2004. In making a sixth certification for Brazil pursuant to 22 
U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined, inter alia, that 
narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's 
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of 
this threat and a preferred method of narcotrafficking. The 
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the 
6 last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons 
of cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of 
it remaining in-country, making Brazil the second largest 
consumer of cocaine behind the United States. In addition, 
there are confirmed ties between drug traffickers and those 
involved in illegal arms trafficking. The resulting domestic 
drug trade has fueled widespread urban violence in Brazil, 
notably in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal 
gangs fight to control a share of the lucrative enterprise.
    (B) The Brazil shoot down program's operating guidelines 
are contained in the Operational Guidelines of the Aerospace 
Defense System (NOSDAs), the details of which have been 
disclosed to the United States in the form of Brazilian 
responses to U.S. questions appended to a 2004 exchange of 
diplomatic notes. Further, in 2008 the Brazilian Government 
provided the text of its high-level shootdown procedural 
framework. According to that 2004 exchange of notes, and 
subsequent discussions with Brazilian officials, the key safety 
procedures built into the Brazil program include that 
interdiction is restricted to presumed illegal drug 
distribution routes and areas without high population density. 
Also, commercial aircraft, hijacked aircraft, aircraft with 
innocent people on board, or aircraft in which the pilot 
appears incapacitated or under duress are not subject to 
interdiction. Furthermore, ICAO procedures for visual and 
electronic means of communication are adhered to during the 
identification and communication phases of interdiction and 
decision-making authority through the interdiction process is 
limited to specifically defined Air Defense authorities.
    Also, according to the Government of Brazil, Brazil has a 
multistage procedure to identify, evaluate, and take action 
against an aircraft reasonably suspected of being primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The key stages of that 
process are as follows:
     Initial Classification. When the Government of 
Brazil detects an aircraft that displays irregular air traffic 
traits, it will consider that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' 
(also referred to as a ``track of interest'') and a candidate 
for possible aerial interception. The Government of Brazil will 
proceed to gather information on that aircraft to determine 
whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the Government of 
Brazil is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate, 
theaircraft will be considered ``surveillance worthy'' by the Brazilian 
Air Force and may be intercepted.
     Interception. During interception, the Government 
of Brazil will attempt to determine with greater certainty the 
identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or 
interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures to 
identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or electronic 
observation of the nationality markings, registration number, 
license number, or identifying features of the intercepted 
aircraft. The Government of Brazil will further attempt to 
gather information regarding the intercepted aircraft that may 
help determine whether the intercepted aircraft is reasonably 
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. 
If the aircraft is determined to be reasonably suspected of 
being primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, the 
Brazilian Air Force classifies the aircraft as ``suspicious'' 
and may proceed to the interrogation phase.
     Interrogation in the Air. The tracker or 
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications 
with the intercepted aircraft through radio communications or 
visual signals and order the intercepted aircraft to change its 
routing or to land, if factors continue to support a 
determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit 
drug trafficking.
     Use of Warning Shots. The Government of Brazil 
will move to the firing of warning shots to demonstrate to the 
pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the 
interceptor's order if the gathered information continues to 
indicate that an aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to 
respond to the interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may 
only be ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior 
Authority or the Air Operations Commander after verification 
that all requisite procedures have been satisfied. The 
intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from abeam of 
the intercepted aircraft, in a position that will permit the 
intercepted aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft but that 
will avoid damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted 
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor 
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be escorted 
to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement 
authorities will subject it to ground control measures.
     Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the 
Air. If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted 
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's 
directions, the aircraft will be designated as ``hostile'' and 
will, after-appropriate authorization from Brazilian 
authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian Air 
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal 
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been 
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted 
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably avoid 
using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the 
first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft 
will relay information regarding the effect of the fire to the 
Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted 
aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to 
fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian 
federal police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for 
law enforcement purposes.
    (C) Brazil's aerial interdiction program differs from 
Colombia's in that, among other things, Brazil independently 
administers its program. The Government of Brazil is solely 
responsible for all actions relating to each aerial 
interdiction event, but has committed to share pertinent 
operational information about such events after the fact with 
the United States in a timely and transparent manner. Although 
the Government of Brazil neither receives nor has requested 
significant or direct U.S. assistance in support of its 
program, the following are examples of assistance that could 
potentially be used to locate, identify, track or shoot down a 
civil aircraft: the provision by Joint Inter Agency Task Force 
South of information and police intelligence to the Brazilian 
Federal Police on suspect flights; the conduct of a Red Flag 
exercise and provisions of training or Brazilian Air Force 
pilots by DOD, which could enhance the skills, tactics, 
techniques and procedures used to intercept aircraft; and the 
authorization by United States Government personnel of the sale 
or export of defense articles and defense services to Brazil.
    (D) During the 2009 reporting cycle, there were no 
incidents in which the Brazilian Air Force security forces, 
including the Brazilian Air Force, federal police and other law 
enforcement agencies, used lethal force against aircraft under 
Brazil's interdiction program. Nor were there any deaths or 
injuries resulting from Brazilian Air Force action related to 
the program.
    The Government of Brazil has shared with the United States 
Government its official statistics for the operation of its 
interdiction program between September 2008 and August 31, 
2009, on the condition that the information be treated 
confidentially. The data is not included in this report, but 
can be made available upon request to Members and staff. The 
U.S. Embassy in Brasilia is seeking from the Government of 
Brazil the program's operational statistics for the remainder 
of 2009 and will make those statistics available upon request 
as well.

                                  
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