[House Document 111-89]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
111th Congress, - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 111-89
2d Session
REPORT ON MATTERS RELATED TO SUPPORT FOR THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 PUB.
L. 107-108
January 26, 2010.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
Consistent with the authorities related to official
immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit
drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-4), as
amended, and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am
providing a report by my Administration. This report includes
matters related to support for the interdiction of aircraft
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Barack Obama.
The White House, January 22, 2010.
United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in
Illicit Drug Trafficking
Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in
calendar year 2009. The President signed Presidential
Determination 2009-24 on August 13, 2009, for Colombia and
Presidential Determination 2010-02 on October 16, 2009, for
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified with respect to
Colombia and Brazil that (1) interdiction of aircraft
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking in that country's airspace is necessary because of
the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to
the national security of that country; and (2) each country has
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force
is directed against the aircraft. Consistent with 22 U.S.C.
2291-4(c), this report contains the following information for
both Colombia and Brazil: (a) the nature of the illicit drug
trafficking threat to the country; (b) an explanation of safety
procedures in place to protect against the innocent loss of
life in the air and on the ground in connection with
interdiction, including any training and other mechanisms in
place to ensure adherence to such procedures; (c) a description
of assistance provided by the United States to the interdiction
program; and (d) a summary of the country's aircraft
interception activity for which the United States provided
assistance in calendar year 2009.
Colombia
(A) On August 21, 2003, the Air Bridge Denial (ABD) Program
in Colombia began operations. In making a seventh certification
for Colombia in August 2009, the President determined, inter
alia, that narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary
threat to Colombia's national security. The threat
narcotrafficking poses to Colombia is demonstrated by various
factors, including the fact that Colombia is still the world's
largest producer of cocaine and a supplier of high quality
heroin; that Colombia faces a growing cocaine abuse problem;
that Colombian drug trafficking organizations suborn Colombian
officials and pay illegal armed groups to protect their
organizations; that illegal revenue from the Colombian drug
trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy; and that
narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the democratic
institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly,
drug trafficking also serves as the primary source of funding
for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and an
important source of funding for the Colombian United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army
(ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations by the Department of State.
(B) The Colombia ABD Program's safety procedures are
defined by the bilateral Letter of Agreement, signed on
December 20, 2007. In calendar year 2009, the basic procedures
for aerial interception of an unidentified, assumed suspect
(UAS) flight were as follows:
Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the
Government of Colombia detects or is informed of an aircraft
operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for
possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''), information on
that aircraft shall be gathered by the Colombian Government
from all reasonably available sources, including radar systems,
radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems
(which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed
flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant air
traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in
illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by
the Battle Commander Officer in the Colombian Air Force's
Command and Control Center (CAFCCC), based upon certain factors
set out in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information
provided to Colombian Government and United States Government
participants in the ongoing action.
Monitoring. If the Government of Colombia
determines or has preliminary reasons to believe that an
aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that
aircraft shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is
intermittent, positive re-identification shall be made with
reasonable certainty before the ABD event may continue. If the
Government of Colombia has been unable to identify the track of
interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be
considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF
procedures and may be intercepted.
Phase I--Interception. The interception phase
(Phase I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft
by radio and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to
determine the identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft.
If, duringthis phase, the Colombian Government determines that
the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit
drug trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the CAF
may order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place
suitable for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft
does not comply with the procedures and instructions given by the CAF,
the pilot may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's
order. If all of the procedures required under the Agreement
have been followed, the information gathered continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and the aircraft fails to
respond to the interceptor's order to land, the Government of
Colombia may, in accordance with the following, move to Phase
III.
Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if
he requests and receives permission to do so (Phase III). The
Commander of the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all
such requests. The COCAF may approve such request after
verifying that all procedures required under the Agreement have
been followed. Upon receipt of the authorization, the
interceptor aircraft shall warn the intercepted aircraft that
it will be fired upon if it refuses to comply, using
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) radio
communications procedures, and using the appropriate
frequencies.
The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to
follow the interceptor's directions. Both the United States
Government and Colombian Government acknowledge that even the
minimum level of force could result in loss of life. If the
intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate
notice to the CAFCCC of the location of the intercepted
aircraft.
The safety procedures require similar identification and
warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft
has been located on the ground. Further, the United States
Government and Government of Colombia have agreed upon
additional restraints on the use of force, including a
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to
be under duress.
In addition to the safety procedures described above, the
Letters of Agreement governing the ABD Program provide for
safety oversight by two Colombian personnel (the ground safety
monitor and an air safety monitor) as well as the U.S. (through
the Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) Command Duty
Officer). Collectively, these three individuals are referred to
as the ABD ``safety oversight triad'' and are required to
oversee all Phase I, II, and III actions.
In past years, the United States Government trained the
Colombian Government's pilots and sensor operators to operate
the Citation aircraft involved in the program. In 2009, pilot
and crew refresher training as well as training of new
Colombian personnel were ongoing as the program matures. A
semi-annual review of the program, held in February 2008,
helped to address issues that arise in the program's
implementation. The United States Government also received
weekly and monthly reports on program events.
(C) In 2009, the United States Government provided a number
of positions to Colombia's ABD Program, including a Department
of Defense JIATF-S Tactical Commander and a JIATF-S Command
Duty Officer; and a Host Nation Rider Assistant.
JIATF-S's Tactical Commander exercised command and control
of United States Government ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint
Operations Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer was
the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The
Host Nation Rider Assistant served as a United States
Government representative who assisted the Host Nation Rider on
board the detection aircraft. An employee of the Narcotics
Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted
exclusively to overseeing implementation of this program.
From January 1, 2009 to December 31, 2009, the United
States Government provided maintenance support to the
Government of Colombia titled five Citation aircraft for the
ABD Program. The United States Government also provided radar
information and intelligence to the Colombian Government.
Additional United States Government assets (both aircraft and
personnel) from the Departments of Defense and Homeland
Security have provided support for this program under the
conditions contained in the Agreement. In addition, the
Colombian Government has agreed that the five United States
Government-supported ground-based radars and the Peace Panorama
System (which is the airspace management system linking ground-
based radars in Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute
United States Government support for ABD.
(D) From January 1, 2009, until December 31, 2009, the
Government of Colombian, with the assistance of the United
States Government, identified 35 unidentified assumed suspect
(UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Of these 35 UAS
Flights 10 of these unidentified flights were determined to be
legal flights. The Government of Colombia was in a position to
act upon approximately 22 of the remaining 25 UAS flights. Four
of the 22 aircraft were forced to land and three of the
aircraft were impounded, 400 kilos of cocaine seized and $2
million confiscated. While conducting law enforcement
inspections as part of the ABD Program at airfields throughout
the country, the Colombian Government impounded three aircraft,
seizing 784 kilos of cocaine from those aircraft, and arresting
five persons. The United States Government is unaware of any
deaths or injuries resulting from the Colombian Government's
actions with respect to these flights.
This was the fourth year that ABD assets were used in
maritime patrol missions off the coasts of Colombia. Ten
vessels were impounded with 38 crewmembers arrested and 350
kilos of cocaine confiscated and $2.0 million confiscated.
Brazil
(A) Brazil's ABD Program began operations on October 17,
2004. In making a sixth certification for Brazil pursuant to 22
U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined, inter alia, that
narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of
this threat and a preferred method of narcotrafficking. The
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the
6 last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons
of cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of
it remaining in-country, making Brazil the second largest
consumer of cocaine behind the United States. In addition,
there are confirmed ties between drug traffickers and those
involved in illegal arms trafficking. The resulting domestic
drug trade has fueled widespread urban violence in Brazil,
notably in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal
gangs fight to control a share of the lucrative enterprise.
(B) The Brazil shoot down program's operating guidelines
are contained in the Operational Guidelines of the Aerospace
Defense System (NOSDAs), the details of which have been
disclosed to the United States in the form of Brazilian
responses to U.S. questions appended to a 2004 exchange of
diplomatic notes. Further, in 2008 the Brazilian Government
provided the text of its high-level shootdown procedural
framework. According to that 2004 exchange of notes, and
subsequent discussions with Brazilian officials, the key safety
procedures built into the Brazil program include that
interdiction is restricted to presumed illegal drug
distribution routes and areas without high population density.
Also, commercial aircraft, hijacked aircraft, aircraft with
innocent people on board, or aircraft in which the pilot
appears incapacitated or under duress are not subject to
interdiction. Furthermore, ICAO procedures for visual and
electronic means of communication are adhered to during the
identification and communication phases of interdiction and
decision-making authority through the interdiction process is
limited to specifically defined Air Defense authorities.
Also, according to the Government of Brazil, Brazil has a
multistage procedure to identify, evaluate, and take action
against an aircraft reasonably suspected of being primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The key stages of that
process are as follows:
Initial Classification. When the Government of
Brazil detects an aircraft that displays irregular air traffic
traits, it will consider that aircraft to be ``unidentified''
(also referred to as a ``track of interest'') and a candidate
for possible aerial interception. The Government of Brazil will
proceed to gather information on that aircraft to determine
whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the Government of
Brazil is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate,
theaircraft will be considered ``surveillance worthy'' by the Brazilian
Air Force and may be intercepted.
Interception. During interception, the Government
of Brazil will attempt to determine with greater certainty the
identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures to
identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or electronic
observation of the nationality markings, registration number,
license number, or identifying features of the intercepted
aircraft. The Government of Brazil will further attempt to
gather information regarding the intercepted aircraft that may
help determine whether the intercepted aircraft is reasonably
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
If the aircraft is determined to be reasonably suspected of
being primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, the
Brazilian Air Force classifies the aircraft as ``suspicious''
and may proceed to the interrogation phase.
Interrogation in the Air. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications
with the intercepted aircraft through radio communications or
visual signals and order the intercepted aircraft to change its
routing or to land, if factors continue to support a
determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit
drug trafficking.
Use of Warning Shots. The Government of Brazil
will move to the firing of warning shots to demonstrate to the
pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the
interceptor's order if the gathered information continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to
respond to the interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may
only be ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior
Authority or the Air Operations Commander after verification
that all requisite procedures have been satisfied. The
intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from abeam of
the intercepted aircraft, in a position that will permit the
intercepted aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft but that
will avoid damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be escorted
to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement
authorities will subject it to ground control measures.
Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the
Air. If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's
directions, the aircraft will be designated as ``hostile'' and
will, after-appropriate authorization from Brazilian
authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian Air
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably avoid
using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the
first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft
will relay information regarding the effect of the fire to the
Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted
aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to
fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian
federal police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for
law enforcement purposes.
(C) Brazil's aerial interdiction program differs from
Colombia's in that, among other things, Brazil independently
administers its program. The Government of Brazil is solely
responsible for all actions relating to each aerial
interdiction event, but has committed to share pertinent
operational information about such events after the fact with
the United States in a timely and transparent manner. Although
the Government of Brazil neither receives nor has requested
significant or direct U.S. assistance in support of its
program, the following are examples of assistance that could
potentially be used to locate, identify, track or shoot down a
civil aircraft: the provision by Joint Inter Agency Task Force
South of information and police intelligence to the Brazilian
Federal Police on suspect flights; the conduct of a Red Flag
exercise and provisions of training or Brazilian Air Force
pilots by DOD, which could enhance the skills, tactics,
techniques and procedures used to intercept aircraft; and the
authorization by United States Government personnel of the sale
or export of defense articles and defense services to Brazil.
(D) During the 2009 reporting cycle, there were no
incidents in which the Brazilian Air Force security forces,
including the Brazilian Air Force, federal police and other law
enforcement agencies, used lethal force against aircraft under
Brazil's interdiction program. Nor were there any deaths or
injuries resulting from Brazilian Air Force action related to
the program.
The Government of Brazil has shared with the United States
Government its official statistics for the operation of its
interdiction program between September 2008 and August 31,
2009, on the condition that the information be treated
confidentially. The data is not included in this report, but
can be made available upon request to Members and staff. The
U.S. Embassy in Brasilia is seeking from the Government of
Brazil the program's operational statistics for the remainder
of 2009 and will make those statistics available upon request
as well.