[House Document 111-18]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                     

111th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 111-18


 
  REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ILLICIT 
                            DRUG TRAFFICKING

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  A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
 ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 PUB 
                               L. 107-108




  February 2, 2009.--Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
                         ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, January 30, 2009.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Madam Speaker: Consistent with the authorities related 
to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-
4), as amended, and in order to keep the Congress fully 
informed, I am providing a report by my Administration. This 
report includes matters related to support for the interdiction 
of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
            Sincerely,
                                                      Barack Obama.
 United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in 
                        Illicit Drug Trafficking

    Columbia and Brazil are the only countries for which the 
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in 
calendar year 2008. The President signed Presidential 
Determination 2008-24 on August 15, 2008, for Colombia and 
Presidential Determination 2009-4 on October 15, 2008, for 
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified, with respect to 
Colombia and Brazil, that (1) the interdiction of aircraft 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking in that country's airspace is necessary because of 
the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to 
the national security of that country; and (2) each country has 
appropriate procedures in place to protect against the loss of 
innocent life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective 
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force 
is directed against the aircraft. Consistent with 22 U.S.C. 
2291-4(c), this report contains the following information of or 
both Colombia and Brazil: (a) the nature of the illicit drug 
trafficking threat to the country; (b) an explanation of safety 
procedures in place to protect against the loss of innocent 
life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
interdiction, including any training and other mechanisms in 
place to ensure adherence to such procedures; (c) a description 
of assistance provided by the United States to the interdiction 
program; and (d) a summary of the country's aircraft 
interception activity for which the United States provided 
assistance in calendar year 2008.

                                COLOMBIA

    (A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program 
in Colombia began operations. In making a sixth certification 
for Colombia in August 2008, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary threat to 
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors. 
These factors include the fact that Colombia is still the 
world's largest producer of cocaine and a supplier of high-
quality heroin; that Colombia faces a growing domestic cocaine 
abuse problem; that Colombia drug trafficking organizations 
suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed groups to 
protect their organizations; that illegal revenue from the 
Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy and 
that narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the 
democratic institutions of government and law enforcement. 
Significantly, drug trafficking also serves as the primary 
source of funding for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and an important source of funding for the 
Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombia 
National Liberation Army (ELN), all of which are classified as 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations by the Department of State.
    (B) The Colombia ABC Program's safety procedures are set 
forth in the bilateral Letter of Agreement, signed on December 
20, 2007. In calendar year 2008, the basic procedures for 
aerial interception of an unidentified, assumed suspect (UAS) 
flight were as follows:
     Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the 
Government of Colombia detects or is informed of an aircraft 
operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for 
possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''), information on 
that aircraft shall be gathered by the Government of Colombia 
from all reasonably available sources, including radar systems, 
radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems 
(which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed 
flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant air 
traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the 
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by 
the Battle Commander Officer in the Colombian Air Force's 
Command and Control Center (CAFCCC), based upon certain factors 
set out in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information 
provided to Colombia Government and United States Government 
participants in the ongoing action.
     Monitoring. If the Government of Colombia 
determines or has preliminary reasons to believe that an 
aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that 
aircraft shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is 
intermittent, positive reidentification shall be made with 
reasonable certainty before the ABD event may continue. If the 
Government of Colombia has been unable to identify the track of 
interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be 
considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF 
procedures and may be intercepted.
     Phase I--Interception. The interception phase 
includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft by radio 
and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to determine the 
identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this 
phase, the Colombian Government determines that the aircraft is 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the 
CAF may order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated 
place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, 
the suspect aircraft does not comply with the procedures and 
instructions given by the CAF, the CAF pilot may request 
permission to proceed to Phase II.
     Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists 
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing 
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the 
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the CAF 
interceptor's order. If all of the procedures required under 
the Agreement have been followed, the information gathered 
continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and the 
aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's orders to land, 
the Government of Colombia may, in accordance with the 
following procedures, move to Phase III.
     Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted 
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under 
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or 
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor 
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if 
he requests and receives permission to do so. The Commander of 
the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such requests. 
The COCAF may approve such request after verifying that all 
procedures required under the Agreement have been followed. 
Upon receipt of the authorization, the interceptor aircraft 
must warn the intercepted aircraft that it will be fired upon 
if it refuses to comply, using International Civil Aviation 
Organization radio communications procedures, and using the 
appropriate frequencies.
    The interceptor must use reasonable force to disable the 
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in 
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as 
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to obey the previously issued order to land before 
the CAF interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may 
be increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to 
follow the interceptor's directions. Both the United States 
Government and the Government of Colombia acknowledge that even 
the minimum level of force could result in loss of life. If the 
intercepted aircraft has landed or has been shot down, the 
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate 
notice to the CAFCCC of the location of the intercepted 
aircraft.
    The safety procedures require similar identification and 
warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft 
has been located on the ground. Further, the United States 
Government and Government of Colombia have agreed upon 
additional restraints on the use of force, including a 
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial 
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly 
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to 
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to 
be under duress.
    In addition to the safety procedures described above, the 
Letter of Agreement governing the ABD Program provide for 
safety oversight by two Colombian personnel (the ground safety 
monitor and an air safety monitor) as well as the United States 
(through the Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) 
Command Duty Officer). Collectively, these three individuals 
are referred to as the ABD ``safety oversight triad'' and are 
required to oversee all Phase I, II, and III actions.
    In the past years, the United States Government trained the 
Colombian Government's pilots and sensor operators to operate 
Citation aircraft involved in the program. In 2008, as the 
program matured, pilot and crew refresher training, as well as 
training of new Colombian personnel, continued. A semiannual 
review of the program, held in February 2008, helped to address 
issues that had arisen in the program's implementation. The 
United States Government also received weekly and monthly 
reports on program events.
    (C) In 2008, the United States Government provided 
personnel to staff positions in Colombia's ABD Program, 
including a Department of Defense JIATF-S Tactical Commander 
and JIATF-S Command Duty Officer, and a Host Nation Rider 
Assistant.
    JIATF-S's Tactical Commander exercised command and control 
of United States Government ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint 
Operation Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer was 
the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The 
Host National Rider Assistant served as a United States 
Government representative who assisted the Host Nation Rider on 
board the detection aircraft. One employee of the Narcotics 
Affairs Section in the United States Embassy in Bogota is 
devoted exclusively to overseeing implementation of this 
program.
    From January 1, 2008, until December 31, 2008, the United 
States Government provided maintenance support to the Colombian 
Government's five Citation aircraft for the ABD Program. On 
January 1, 2008, the title to these aircraft was transferred to 
the Government of Colombia. The United States Government also 
provided radar information and intelligence to the Colombian 
Government. Additional United States Government assets (both 
aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security have provided support for this program under 
the conditions contained in the Agreement.
    (D) From January 1, 2008, until December 31, 2008, the 
Government of Colombia, with the assistance of the United 
States Government, located 60 UAS flights within Colombian 
airspace. Of these 60 UAS flights, ten were determined to be 
legitimate flights. Of the remaining aircraft, none were 
subject to warning shots or lethal force, nor were any aircraft 
forced to land. In part due to the efficacy of the ABD Program, 
most UAS flights were located near the Venezuelan border and 
remained only briefly in Colombian airspace, thereby reducing 
the Colombian Government's ability to engage the aircraft via 
ABD procedures. While conducting law enforcement inspections as 
part of the ABD Program at airfields throughout the country, 
the Government of Colombia impounded two aircraft, seizing one 
metric ton of cocaine from those aircraft, and arresting five 
persons. The United States Government is unaware of any deaths 
or injuries resulting from the Government of Colombia's actions 
with respect to these flights.

                                 BRAZIL

    (A) Brazil's ABD Program began operations on October 17, 
2004. In making a fifth certification for Brazil pursuant to 22 
U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary threat to 
Brazil's national security on the basis of several factors. 
These factors include the fact that aerial drug shipments are a 
key component of this threat and a preferred method of 
narcotrafficking; that the amount of cocaine shipped through 
Brazil has increased over the last decade; and that it is 
estimated that well over 100 metric tons of cocaine enter 
Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it remaining in-
country, making Brazil the second largest consumer of illicit 
drugs. In addition, there are confirmed ties between drug 
traffickers and those involved in illegal arms trafficking. The 
resulting domestic drug trade has fueled widespread urban 
violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, as 
organized criminal gangs fight to control a share of the 
lucrative enterprise.
    (B) The Brazil ABD Program's operating guidelines are 
contained in the Operational Guidelines of the Aerospace 
Defense System, the details of which have been disclosed to the 
United States in the form of Brazilian responses to U.S. 
questions appended to a 2004 exchange of diplomatic notes. 
According to that 2004 exchange of notes and subsequent 
discussions with Brazilian officials, the key safety procedures 
built into the Brazil program include that interdiction is 
restricted to presumed illegal drug distribution routes and 
areas without high population density. Also, commercial 
aircraft, hijacked aircraft, aircraft with innocent people on 
board, or aircraft in which the pilot appears incapacitated or 
under duress are not subject to interdiction. Furthermore, 
International Civil Aviation Organization procedures for visual 
and electronic means of communication are adhered to during the 
identification and communication phases. The decision-making 
authority throughout the interdiction process is limited to 
specifically defined Air Defense personnel.
    Also, according to the Government of Brazil, Brazil has a 
multistage procedure to identity, evaluate, and take action 
against an aircraft reasonably suspected of being primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The key stages of that 
process are as follows:
     Initial Classification. When the Government of 
Brazil detects an aircraft that displays irregular air traffic 
traits, it will consider that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' 
(also referred to as ``track of interest'') and a candidate for 
possible aerial interception. The Brazilian Government will 
proceed to gather information on the aircraft to determine 
whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the Brazilian 
Government is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate, 
the aircraft will be considered ``surveillance worthy'' by the 
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
     Interception. During interception, the Government 
of Brazil will attempt to determine with greater certainty the 
identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or 
interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures to 
identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or electronic 
observation of the nationality markings, registration number, 
license number, or identifying features of the intercepted 
aircraft. The Government of Brazil will further attempt to 
gather information regarding the intercepted aircraft that may 
help determine whether the intercepted aircraft is reasonably 
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. 
If the aircraft is determined to be reasonably suspected of 
being primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking, the 
Brazilian Air Force classifies the aircraft as ``suspicious'' 
and may proceed to the interrogation phase.
     Interrogation in the Air. The tracker or 
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications 
with the intercepted aircraft through radio communications or 
visual signals and order the intercepted aircraft to change its 
routing or to land, if factors continue to support a 
determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit 
drug trafficking.
     Use of Warning Shots. The Government of Brazil 
will move to the firing of warning shots to demonstrate to the 
pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the 
interceptor's order if the gathered information continues to 
indicate that an aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to 
respond to the interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may 
only be ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior 
Authority or the Air Operations Commander after verification 
that all requisite procedures have been satisfied. The 
intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from abeam of 
the intercepted aircraft, in a position that will permit the 
intercepted aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft but that 
will avoid damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted 
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor 
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be escorted 
to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement 
authorities will subject it to ground control measures.
    Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air. If, 
after warning shots are fired, the intercepted aircraft does 
not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's directions, the 
aircraft will be designate as ``hostile.'' The Brazilian Air 
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal 
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been 
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted 
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably avoid 
using ammunition capable of causing a fuel tank explosion. 
After the first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting 
aircraft will relay information regarding the effect of the 
fire to the Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the 
intercepted aircraft again, if possible, before requesting 
authorization to fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft 
lands, the Brazilian federal police will attempt to take 
control of the aircraft for law enforcement purposes.
    (C) Brazil's aerial interdiction program differs from 
Colombia's in that, among other things, Brazil independently 
administers its program. The Government of Brazil is solely 
responsible for all actions relating to each aerial 
interdiction event, but has committed to share pertinent 
operational information about such events after the fact with 
the United States Government in a timely and transparent 
manner. The United States does not provide significant or 
direct assistance to Brazil's program. Some United States 
Government activities that could potentially contribute to 
Brazil's ABD Program indirectly are the Department of Defense's 
training program for pilots and other Government of Brazil 
officials, United States Government authorization of sales of 
defense articles to the Government of Brazil, and real-time 
radar track data made available to Brazil's Liaison Officer at 
JIATF-S.
    (D) During the 2008 reporting cycle, the United States is 
unaware of any incidents in which the Brazilian Air Force 
security forces, including the Brazilian Air Force, federal 
police, and other law enforcement agencies, used lethal force 
against aircraft under Brazil's interdiction program or any 
deaths or injuries resulting from Brazilian Air Force action 
related to the program.
    The Government of Brazil has shared with the United States 
its official statistics for the operation of its interdiction 
program between January and September 2008 on the condition 
that the information be treated confidentially. The data is not 
included in this report, but can be made available upon request 
to Members and staff. The United States Embassy in Brasilia is 
seeking from the Government of Brazil the program's operational 
statistics for the remainder of 2008 and will make those 
statistics available upon request as well.

                                  
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