[House Document 110-91]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                     

110th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 110-
91
 
  REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ILLICIT 
                            DRUG TRAFFICKING

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

  A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
   ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4




  February 6, 2008.--Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
                         ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, January 31, 2008.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Madam Speaker: consistent with the authorities 
relating to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, as 
amended, 22 D.S.C. 2291-4), and in order to keep the Congress 
fully informed, I am providing a report prepared by my 
Administration. This report includes matters relating to the 
interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
 United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in 
                        Illicit Drug Trafficking

    Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the 
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in 
calendar year 2007. The President signed Presidential 
Determination 2007-28 on August 16, 2007, for Colombia, and 
Presidential Determination 2008-3 on October 16, 2007, for 
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified with respect to 
Colombia and Brazil that: (1) interdiction of aircraft 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking in that country's airspace is necessary because of 
the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to 
the national security of that country; and (2) each country has 
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent 
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective 
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force 
is directed against the aircraft. Consistent with 22 U.S.C. 
2291-4(c), this report contains the following information for 
both Colombia and Brazil: (a) the nature of the illicit drug 
trafficking threat to the country; (b) an explanation of safety 
procedures in place to protect against the innocent loss of 
life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
interdiction, including any training and other mechanisms in 
place to ensure adherence to such procedures; (c) a description 
of assistance provided by the United States to the interdiction 
program; and (d) a summary of the country's aircraft 
interception activity for which the United States provided 
assistance in calendar year 2007.

                                COLOMBIA

    (A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program 
in Colombia began operations. In making a fifth certification 
for Colombia in August 2007, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary threat to 
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors. 
These factors include: 1) Colombia is still the world's largest 
producer of cocaine and a supplier of high-quality heroin; 2) 
Colombia faces a growing cocaine abuse problem; 3) Colombian 
drug trafficking organizations bribe Colombian officials and 
pay illegal armed groups to protect their organizations; 4) 
illegal revenue from the Colombian drug trade disrupts the 
legitimate Colombian economy; and 5) narcotrafficking presents 
a corrosive threat to the democratic institutions of government 
and law enforcement. Significantly, drug trafficking also 
serves as the primary source of funding for the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia and is an important source of funding 
for the Colombian National Liberation Army, both of which are 
classified by the Department of State as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, as well as a source of funding for other illegal 
armed groups.
    (B) From January I, 2007 until March 14, 2007, the ABD 
Program's safety procedures were defined by the bilateral 
Letter of Agreement, signed on April 28, 2003. From March 14, 
2007 through December 31, 2007, the procedures were defined by 
the first superseding bilateral Letter of Agreement, signed on 
March 14, 2007.\1\ No substantive changes were made to the 
procedures by the first superseding agreement. In calendar year 
2007, the basic procedures for aerial interception of an 
unidentified assumed suspect (UAS) flight were as follows:
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    \1\ A second superseding Letter of Agreement was signed on December 
20, 2007 and entered into force on January I, 2008. As described below, 
the new agreement introduces some changes to the United States 
Government oversight of the Colombia program.
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     Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the 
Government of Colombia (GOC) detects or is informed of an 
aircraft operating in a defined zone of control that is a 
candidate for possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''), 
information on that aircraft shall be gathered by the GOC from 
all reasonably available sources, including radar systems, 
radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems 
(which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed 
flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant air 
traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the 
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by 
the Battle Commander Officer in the Colombian Air Force's 
Command and Control Center (CAFCCC), based upon certain factors 
set out in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information 
provided to GOC and U.S. participants in the ongoing action.
     Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has 
preliminary reasons to believe that an aircraft is engaged 
primarily in illicit drug trafficking, the GOC will track and 
monitor the aircraft. If tracking is intermittent, the GOC 
shall make positive reidentification with reasonable certainty 
before the ABD event may continue. If the GOC has been unable 
to identify the track of interest as a legitimate track, the 
Colombian Air Force (CAF) shall consider the aircraft to be 
``suspect'' under CAF procedures and may initiate efforts to 
intercept it.
     Phase I--Interception. The interception phase 
includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft by radio 
and, if necessary, by visual signals, in order to determine the 
identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this 
phase, the GOC determines that the aircraft is reasonably 
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking 
(on the basis of several factors), the CAF may order the 
intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place suitable for 
a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft does 
not comply with the procedures and instructions given by the 
CAF, the pilot may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
     Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists 
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing 
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the 
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's 
order. If all of the procedures required under the Agreement 
have been followed, the information gathered continues to 
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and the aircraft fails to 
respond to the interceptor's order to land, the GOC may move to 
Phase III.
     Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted 
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under 
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or 
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor 
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if 
he requests and receives permission to do so. The Commander of 
the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such requests. 
The COCAF may approve such a request after verifying that all 
procedures required under the Agreement have been followed. 
Upon receipt of the authorization, the interceptor aircraft 
shall warn the intercepted aircraft that it will be fired upon 
if it refuses to comply, using International Civil Aviation 
Organization radio communications procedures, and using the 
appropriate frequencies.
    The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the 
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in 
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as 
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before 
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be 
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to 
follow the interceptor's directions. Both the United States 
Government and GOC acknowledge that even the minimum level of 
force could result in loss of life. If the intercepted aircraft 
has landed or been shot down, the interceptor aircraft or 
tracker aircraft shall give immediate notice to the CAFCCC of 
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
    The safety procedures require similar identification and 
warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft 
has been located on the ground. Furthermore, the United States 
Government and GOC have agreed upon additional restraints on 
the use of force, including a prohibition on the use of force 
against state or commercial aircraft, aircraft that have filed 
and are not significantly deviating from a flight plan, 
aircraft whose pilots appear to be incapacitated, and aircraft 
whose pilots genuinely appear to be under duress.
    In addition to the safety procedures described above, the 
Letters of Agreement governing the ABD Program in 2007 provided 
for oversight by three United States Government personnel: a 
ground safety monitor, an air safety monitor, and a Joint 
Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) Command Duty Officer 
(collectively, the ABD ``safety oversight triad''). All three 
entities in the safety triad are required to be involved in all 
Phase I, II, and III actions.\2\
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    \2\ As of January 1, 2008, and pursuant to the second superseding 
ABD Letter of Agreement signed on December 20, 2007, the nationalities 
of participants in the ``safety oversight triad'' will be modified. The 
structure and purpose of the triad will remain the same but, consistent 
with the broader ``nationalization'' of the ABD Program, the air and 
ground safety monitor will be provided by the Government of Colombia. 
The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer will continue to provide United States 
Government oversight.
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    In past years, the United States Government trained the 
GOC's pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation 
tracking aircraft involved in the program. In 2007 pilot and 
crew refresher training, as well as training of new Colombian 
personnel, were ongoing as the program matured. A semi-annual 
review of the program held in February 2007, helped to address 
issues that have arisen in the program's implementation. 
Furthermore, the United States Government received weekly and 
monthly reports on program events.
    (C) In 2007 the United States Government provided a number 
of positions to Colombia's ABD Program, including a Department 
of Defense JIATF-S Tactical Commander and a JIATF-S Command 
Duty Officer, a Ground Safety Monitor in the CAFCCC, Air Safety 
Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft, and a Host Nation 
Rider Assistant.\3\
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    \3\ As of January 1, 2008, and pursuant to the second superseding 
ABD Letter of Agreement signed on December 20, 2007, the GOC--rather 
than the United States--will provide the air and ground safety monitors 
for the ABD Program.
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    The JIATF-S Tactical Commander exercised command and 
control of United States Government ABD assets through JIATF-
S's Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty 
Officer was the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at 
the JOC. The Ground Safety Monitor was the United States 
Government's representative at the CAFCCC during ABD 
operations. The Air Safety Monitor was the United States 
Government's representative on tracking aircraft and was 
available to observe decisions made by GOC personnel, 
communicates with the U.S. Ground Safety Monitor and the JIATF-
S Command Duty Officer, and reported to them whether the 
agreed-upon procedures were being followed. The Host Nation 
Rider Assistant served as a United States Government 
representative who assisted the Host Nation Rider on board the 
detection aircraft. An employee of the Narcotics Affairs 
Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted exclusively to 
overseeing implementation of this program.
    From January 1, 2007 until December 31, 2007, the United 
States Government provided to the GOC five Citations aircraft 
on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD program. On January 
1, 2008, the United States transferred title to these aircraft 
to the Government of Colombia. The United States Government 
provided radar information and intelligence to the GOC.
    Additional U.S. assets (both aircraft and personnel) from 
the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security have provided 
support for this program under the conditions contained in the 
Agreement.
    In addition, the GOC has agreed that the five U.S.-
supported ground-based radars and the Peace Panorama System 
(the airspace management system linking ground-based radars in 
Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute United States 
Government support for ABD.
    (D) From January 1, 2007 until December 31, 2007, the GOC, 
with U.S. assistance, identified over 80 UAS flights within 
Colombian airspace. Over ten of these unidentified flights were 
determined to be legal flights. The GOC was in a position to 
act upon approximately 53 of the remaining 70 UAS flights. Of 
these, the GOC forced three suspect drug-trafficking aircraft 
to land, and impounded them. The GOC impounded two other 
aircraft in Colombia during routine inspections on legal 
airfields. Additionally, they seized 1.2 metric tons of cocaine 
and arrested three persons in connection with illegal aerial 
drug trafficking. Four suspect aircraft were destroyed in 
Colombia, and another aircraft was impounded in Central America 
as a result of Colombian coordination with JIATF-S and Central 
American authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace 
heading towards Central America. The United States Government 
is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from the GOC's 
actions with respect to these flights.

                                 BRAZIL

    (A) Brazil's ABD program began operations on October 17, 
2004. In making a fourth certification for Brazil pursuant to 
22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined, inter alia, 
that narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's 
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of 
this threat and a preferred method of narcotrafficking. The 
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the 
last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons of 
cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it 
remaining in-country. Additionally, there are confirmed ties 
between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms 
trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled 
widespread urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal gangs fight to control a 
share of the lucrative enterprise.
    (B) The goal of Brazil's interdiction program is to 
facilitate the safe landing of intercepted aircraft so that law 
enforcement personnel may take control of the aircraft on the 
ground. If an aircraft is suspected to be primarily engaged in 
drug trafficking, the Government of Brazil (GOB) will take 
several steps to identify, contact, warn, divert, and, if 
necessary, take action to coerce the aircraft down without 
using deadly force against the aircraft in the air. As a last 
resort, however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may 
authorize the use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if 
it refuses to respond to the full range of program actions 
taken by the Brazilian Air Force. The basic procedures are as 
follows:
     Initial Classification. When the GOB detects an 
aircraft that displays irregular air traffic traits, it will 
consider that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' (also referred to 
as a ``track of interest'') and a candidate for possible aerial 
interception. The GOB will proceed to gather information on 
that aircraft to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably 
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. 
If the GOB is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate, 
the aircraft will be considered ``surveillance worthy'' by the 
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
     Interception. During interception, the GOB will 
attempt to determine with greater certainty the identity of the 
intercepted aircraft. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will 
take all reasonable measures to identify the intercepted 
aircraft by visual or electronic observation of the nationality 
markings, registration number, license number, or identifying 
features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will further 
attempt to gather information regarding the intercepted 
aircraft that may help determine whether the intercepted 
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking. If the aircraft is determined to be 
so, the Brazilian Air Force classifies the aircraft as 
``suspicious'' and may proceed to the interrogation phase.
     Interrogation in the Air. The tracker or 
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish radio or visual 
communication with the intercepted aircraft and order it to 
change its routing or to land, if factors continue to support a 
determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit 
drug trafficking.
     Use of Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the 
firing of warning shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the 
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's 
order if the gathered information continues to indicate that 
the aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to respond to 
the interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may only be 
ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior Authority 
or the Air Operations Commander, after verification that all 
requisite procedures have been satisfied. The intercepting 
aircraft will fire the warning shots from a beam of the 
intercepted aircraft in a position that will permit the 
intercepted aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft, but that 
will avoid damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted 
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor 
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be escorted 
to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement 
authorities will subject it to ground control measures.
     Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the 
Air. If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted 
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's 
directions, the aircraft will be designated as ``hostile'' and 
will, after appropriate authorization from Brazilian 
authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian Air 
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal 
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been 
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted 
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably without 
using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the 
first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft 
will relay information regarding the effect of the fire to the 
Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted 
aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to 
fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian 
federal police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for 
law enforcement purposes.
    (C) Brazil's aerial interdiction program differs from 
Colombia's in that, among other things, Brazil independently 
administers its program. The GOB is solely responsible for all 
actions relating to each aerial interdiction event, but has 
committed to share pertinent operational information about such 
events after the fact with the United States in a timely and 
transparent manner. Although the GOB neither requires nor has 
requested a direct U.S. role in support of its program, the 
Brazilian Liaison Officer at JIATF-S has access to real-time 
aerial-interception related information, and various agencies 
of the United States Government currently provide assistance to 
Brazil that could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction 
program, such as cooperative law enforcement programs, 
intelligence sharing, and approvals of military sales.
    (D) During the 2007 reporting cycle, the United States 
Government is unaware of any incidents in which the Brazilian 
Air Force security forces, including the Brazilian Air Force, 
federal police, and other law enforcement agencies, used lethal 
force against aircraft under Brazil's interdiction program or 
any deaths or injuries resulting from Brazilian Air Force 
action related to the program.
    The GOB has shared with the United States Government its 
official statistics for the operation of its interdiction 
program between January and July 2007, on the condition that 
the information is treated confidentially. The data is not 
included in this report, but can be made available upon request 
to congressional members and staff. The U.S. Embassy in 
Brasilia is seeking from the GOB the program's operational 
statistics for the remainder of 2007 and will make those 
statistics available upon request as well.

                                  
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