[House Document 110-91]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 110-
91
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT INVOLVED IN ILLICIT
DRUG TRAFFICKING
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4
February 6, 2008.--Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, January 31, 2008.
Hon. Nancy Pelosi,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Madam Speaker: consistent with the authorities
relating to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft
engaged in illicit drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, as
amended, 22 D.S.C. 2291-4), and in order to keep the Congress
fully informed, I am providing a report prepared by my
Administration. This report includes matters relating to the
interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush.
United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in
Illicit Drug Trafficking
Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in
calendar year 2007. The President signed Presidential
Determination 2007-28 on August 16, 2007, for Colombia, and
Presidential Determination 2008-3 on October 16, 2007, for
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified with respect to
Colombia and Brazil that: (1) interdiction of aircraft
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking in that country's airspace is necessary because of
the extraordinary threat posed by illicit drug trafficking to
the national security of that country; and (2) each country has
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force
is directed against the aircraft. Consistent with 22 U.S.C.
2291-4(c), this report contains the following information for
both Colombia and Brazil: (a) the nature of the illicit drug
trafficking threat to the country; (b) an explanation of safety
procedures in place to protect against the innocent loss of
life in the air and on the ground in connection with
interdiction, including any training and other mechanisms in
place to ensure adherence to such procedures; (c) a description
of assistance provided by the United States to the interdiction
program; and (d) a summary of the country's aircraft
interception activity for which the United States provided
assistance in calendar year 2007.
COLOMBIA
(A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program
in Colombia began operations. In making a fifth certification
for Colombia in August 2007, the President determined that
narcotrafficking continues to pose an extraordinary threat to
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors.
These factors include: 1) Colombia is still the world's largest
producer of cocaine and a supplier of high-quality heroin; 2)
Colombia faces a growing cocaine abuse problem; 3) Colombian
drug trafficking organizations bribe Colombian officials and
pay illegal armed groups to protect their organizations; 4)
illegal revenue from the Colombian drug trade disrupts the
legitimate Colombian economy; and 5) narcotrafficking presents
a corrosive threat to the democratic institutions of government
and law enforcement. Significantly, drug trafficking also
serves as the primary source of funding for the Revolutionary
Armed Forces of Colombia and is an important source of funding
for the Colombian National Liberation Army, both of which are
classified by the Department of State as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations, as well as a source of funding for other illegal
armed groups.
(B) From January I, 2007 until March 14, 2007, the ABD
Program's safety procedures were defined by the bilateral
Letter of Agreement, signed on April 28, 2003. From March 14,
2007 through December 31, 2007, the procedures were defined by
the first superseding bilateral Letter of Agreement, signed on
March 14, 2007.\1\ No substantive changes were made to the
procedures by the first superseding agreement. In calendar year
2007, the basic procedures for aerial interception of an
unidentified assumed suspect (UAS) flight were as follows:
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\1\ A second superseding Letter of Agreement was signed on December
20, 2007 and entered into force on January I, 2008. As described below,
the new agreement introduces some changes to the United States
Government oversight of the Colombia program.
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Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the
Government of Colombia (GOC) detects or is informed of an
aircraft operating in a defined zone of control that is a
candidate for possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''),
information on that aircraft shall be gathered by the GOC from
all reasonably available sources, including radar systems,
radio and visual contact with the aircraft, electronic systems
(which help determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed
flight plan and what type of plane it is), and relevant air
traffic control centers, to begin to determine whether the
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in
illicit drug trafficking. That determination shall be made by
the Battle Commander Officer in the Colombian Air Force's
Command and Control Center (CAFCCC), based upon certain factors
set out in the Agreement, in conjunction with other information
provided to GOC and U.S. participants in the ongoing action.
Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has
preliminary reasons to believe that an aircraft is engaged
primarily in illicit drug trafficking, the GOC will track and
monitor the aircraft. If tracking is intermittent, the GOC
shall make positive reidentification with reasonable certainty
before the ABD event may continue. If the GOC has been unable
to identify the track of interest as a legitimate track, the
Colombian Air Force (CAF) shall consider the aircraft to be
``suspect'' under CAF procedures and may initiate efforts to
intercept it.
Phase I--Interception. The interception phase
includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft by radio
and, if necessary, by visual signals, in order to determine the
identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this
phase, the GOC determines that the aircraft is reasonably
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking
(on the basis of several factors), the CAF may order the
intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place suitable for
a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft does
not comply with the procedures and instructions given by the
CAF, the pilot may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's
order. If all of the procedures required under the Agreement
have been followed, the information gathered continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and the aircraft fails to
respond to the interceptor's order to land, the GOC may move to
Phase III.
Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if
he requests and receives permission to do so. The Commander of
the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such requests.
The COCAF may approve such a request after verifying that all
procedures required under the Agreement have been followed.
Upon receipt of the authorization, the interceptor aircraft
shall warn the intercepted aircraft that it will be fired upon
if it refuses to comply, using International Civil Aviation
Organization radio communications procedures, and using the
appropriate frequencies.
The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to
follow the interceptor's directions. Both the United States
Government and GOC acknowledge that even the minimum level of
force could result in loss of life. If the intercepted aircraft
has landed or been shot down, the interceptor aircraft or
tracker aircraft shall give immediate notice to the CAFCCC of
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
The safety procedures require similar identification and
warning procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft
has been located on the ground. Furthermore, the United States
Government and GOC have agreed upon additional restraints on
the use of force, including a prohibition on the use of force
against state or commercial aircraft, aircraft that have filed
and are not significantly deviating from a flight plan,
aircraft whose pilots appear to be incapacitated, and aircraft
whose pilots genuinely appear to be under duress.
In addition to the safety procedures described above, the
Letters of Agreement governing the ABD Program in 2007 provided
for oversight by three United States Government personnel: a
ground safety monitor, an air safety monitor, and a Joint
Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) Command Duty Officer
(collectively, the ABD ``safety oversight triad''). All three
entities in the safety triad are required to be involved in all
Phase I, II, and III actions.\2\
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\2\ As of January 1, 2008, and pursuant to the second superseding
ABD Letter of Agreement signed on December 20, 2007, the nationalities
of participants in the ``safety oversight triad'' will be modified. The
structure and purpose of the triad will remain the same but, consistent
with the broader ``nationalization'' of the ABD Program, the air and
ground safety monitor will be provided by the Government of Colombia.
The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer will continue to provide United States
Government oversight.
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In past years, the United States Government trained the
GOC's pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation
tracking aircraft involved in the program. In 2007 pilot and
crew refresher training, as well as training of new Colombian
personnel, were ongoing as the program matured. A semi-annual
review of the program held in February 2007, helped to address
issues that have arisen in the program's implementation.
Furthermore, the United States Government received weekly and
monthly reports on program events.
(C) In 2007 the United States Government provided a number
of positions to Colombia's ABD Program, including a Department
of Defense JIATF-S Tactical Commander and a JIATF-S Command
Duty Officer, a Ground Safety Monitor in the CAFCCC, Air Safety
Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft, and a Host Nation
Rider Assistant.\3\
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\3\ As of January 1, 2008, and pursuant to the second superseding
ABD Letter of Agreement signed on December 20, 2007, the GOC--rather
than the United States--will provide the air and ground safety monitors
for the ABD Program.
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The JIATF-S Tactical Commander exercised command and
control of United States Government ABD assets through JIATF-
S's Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty
Officer was the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at
the JOC. The Ground Safety Monitor was the United States
Government's representative at the CAFCCC during ABD
operations. The Air Safety Monitor was the United States
Government's representative on tracking aircraft and was
available to observe decisions made by GOC personnel,
communicates with the U.S. Ground Safety Monitor and the JIATF-
S Command Duty Officer, and reported to them whether the
agreed-upon procedures were being followed. The Host Nation
Rider Assistant served as a United States Government
representative who assisted the Host Nation Rider on board the
detection aircraft. An employee of the Narcotics Affairs
Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted exclusively to
overseeing implementation of this program.
From January 1, 2007 until December 31, 2007, the United
States Government provided to the GOC five Citations aircraft
on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD program. On January
1, 2008, the United States transferred title to these aircraft
to the Government of Colombia. The United States Government
provided radar information and intelligence to the GOC.
Additional U.S. assets (both aircraft and personnel) from
the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security have provided
support for this program under the conditions contained in the
Agreement.
In addition, the GOC has agreed that the five U.S.-
supported ground-based radars and the Peace Panorama System
(the airspace management system linking ground-based radars in
Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute United States
Government support for ABD.
(D) From January 1, 2007 until December 31, 2007, the GOC,
with U.S. assistance, identified over 80 UAS flights within
Colombian airspace. Over ten of these unidentified flights were
determined to be legal flights. The GOC was in a position to
act upon approximately 53 of the remaining 70 UAS flights. Of
these, the GOC forced three suspect drug-trafficking aircraft
to land, and impounded them. The GOC impounded two other
aircraft in Colombia during routine inspections on legal
airfields. Additionally, they seized 1.2 metric tons of cocaine
and arrested three persons in connection with illegal aerial
drug trafficking. Four suspect aircraft were destroyed in
Colombia, and another aircraft was impounded in Central America
as a result of Colombian coordination with JIATF-S and Central
American authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace
heading towards Central America. The United States Government
is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from the GOC's
actions with respect to these flights.
BRAZIL
(A) Brazil's ABD program began operations on October 17,
2004. In making a fourth certification for Brazil pursuant to
22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined, inter alia,
that narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of
this threat and a preferred method of narcotrafficking. The
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the
last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons of
cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it
remaining in-country. Additionally, there are confirmed ties
between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms
trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled
widespread urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal gangs fight to control a
share of the lucrative enterprise.
(B) The goal of Brazil's interdiction program is to
facilitate the safe landing of intercepted aircraft so that law
enforcement personnel may take control of the aircraft on the
ground. If an aircraft is suspected to be primarily engaged in
drug trafficking, the Government of Brazil (GOB) will take
several steps to identify, contact, warn, divert, and, if
necessary, take action to coerce the aircraft down without
using deadly force against the aircraft in the air. As a last
resort, however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may
authorize the use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if
it refuses to respond to the full range of program actions
taken by the Brazilian Air Force. The basic procedures are as
follows:
Initial Classification. When the GOB detects an
aircraft that displays irregular air traffic traits, it will
consider that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' (also referred to
as a ``track of interest'') and a candidate for possible aerial
interception. The GOB will proceed to gather information on
that aircraft to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably
suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
If the GOB is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate,
the aircraft will be considered ``surveillance worthy'' by the
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
Interception. During interception, the GOB will
attempt to determine with greater certainty the identity of the
intercepted aircraft. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will
take all reasonable measures to identify the intercepted
aircraft by visual or electronic observation of the nationality
markings, registration number, license number, or identifying
features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will further
attempt to gather information regarding the intercepted
aircraft that may help determine whether the intercepted
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in
illicit drug trafficking. If the aircraft is determined to be
so, the Brazilian Air Force classifies the aircraft as
``suspicious'' and may proceed to the interrogation phase.
Interrogation in the Air. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish radio or visual
communication with the intercepted aircraft and order it to
change its routing or to land, if factors continue to support a
determination that the aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit
drug trafficking.
Use of Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the
firing of warning shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's
order if the gathered information continues to indicate that
the aircraft is suspect and the aircraft fails to respond to
the interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may only be
ordered and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior Authority
or the Air Operations Commander, after verification that all
requisite procedures have been satisfied. The intercepting
aircraft will fire the warning shots from a beam of the
intercepted aircraft in a position that will permit the
intercepted aircraft to see the intercepting aircraft, but that
will avoid damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be escorted
to land at a designated airfield, where law enforcement
authorities will subject it to ground control measures.
Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the
Air. If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's
directions, the aircraft will be designated as ``hostile'' and
will, after appropriate authorization from Brazilian
authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian Air
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably without
using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the
first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft
will relay information regarding the effect of the fire to the
Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted
aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to
fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian
federal police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for
law enforcement purposes.
(C) Brazil's aerial interdiction program differs from
Colombia's in that, among other things, Brazil independently
administers its program. The GOB is solely responsible for all
actions relating to each aerial interdiction event, but has
committed to share pertinent operational information about such
events after the fact with the United States in a timely and
transparent manner. Although the GOB neither requires nor has
requested a direct U.S. role in support of its program, the
Brazilian Liaison Officer at JIATF-S has access to real-time
aerial-interception related information, and various agencies
of the United States Government currently provide assistance to
Brazil that could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction
program, such as cooperative law enforcement programs,
intelligence sharing, and approvals of military sales.
(D) During the 2007 reporting cycle, the United States
Government is unaware of any incidents in which the Brazilian
Air Force security forces, including the Brazilian Air Force,
federal police, and other law enforcement agencies, used lethal
force against aircraft under Brazil's interdiction program or
any deaths or injuries resulting from Brazilian Air Force
action related to the program.
The GOB has shared with the United States Government its
official statistics for the operation of its interdiction
program between January and July 2007, on the condition that
the information is treated confidentially. The data is not
included in this report, but can be made available upon request
to congressional members and staff. The U.S. Embassy in
Brasilia is seeking from the GOB the program's operational
statistics for the remainder of 2007 and will make those
statistics available upon request as well.