[House Document 110-58]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
110th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - House Document 110-58
IRAQ BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
THE SECOND OF TWO REPORTS THAT ASSESSES THE STATUS OF EACH OF THE 18
IRAQI BENCHMARKS, CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 1314 OF THE U.S. TROOP
READINESS, VETERANS' CARE, KATRINA RECOVERY, AND IRAQ ACCOUNTABILITY
APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 2007, PUB. L. 110-28
September 17, 2007.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, and ordered to be
printed
To the Congress of the United States:
Consistent with section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness,
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the ``Act''),
attached is a report that assesses the status of each of the 18
Iraqi benchmarks contained in the Act and declares whether
satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is
not, being achieved.
The second of two reports submitted consistent with the
Act, it has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries
of State and Defense; the Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq;
the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander, United
States Central Command.
George W. Bush.
The White House, September 14, 2007.
Benchmark Assessment Report--September 14, 2007
This report is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of
the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and
Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-
28) (the ``Act''). It includes an assessment of how the
sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to
achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act,
as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in
light of that performance. This is the second of two reports to
be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in
consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense;
Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq; the United States
Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander, United States Central
Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This
assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq
provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source
of all information about the combined efforts or the future
strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.
Introduction
Section 1314 of the Act states that the President is to
submit to Congress two reports assessing the status of each of
the 18 benchmarks contained in the Act and declaring whether,
in the President's judgment, satisfactory progress is being
achieved with respect to those 18 benchmarks. These benchmarks
relate to Government of Iraq actions believed to be important
to advance reconciliation within Iraqi society, to improve the
security of the Iraqi population, to provide essential services
to the population, and to promote its economic well-being.
Iraqi Government efforts to achieve these benchmarks complement
other U.S. and Iraqi collaborative actions as part of the New
Way Forward.
Current U.S. strategy: New Way Forward
Current U.S. strategy--the New Way Forward--recognizes that
the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi
Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a
democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself and
be an ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong
strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will be an
important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which
remains a long-term goal, and requires the application of all
elements of national power, including especially diplomatic,
economic, political, and military power.
Our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a
transition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its
security forces. The New Way Forward recognized that, in
response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was
necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a greater
role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in
securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace
Iraqi efforts to provide security but to help provide the
necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can
continue to build its own capacity; can intensify efforts
against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in
Iraq (AQI) and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM); and
can meaningfully address the all-important issue of
reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society. The
strategy recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006
undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by
fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and
discrediting the Coalition and the Iraqi Government. Amid such
violence, it became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to
make the difficult compromises necessary to foster
reconciliation.
At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help
build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying
on lessons learned from our experience in training and
equipping the ISF, we have significantly enhanced our training
and mentoring commitment. We will continue this commitment
through a combination of partnering Coalition units with Iraqi
Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team
personnel with the majority of ISF units. U.S. commanders are
committed to helping the Iraqi government expand the size of
the ISF to make it a more capable counterinsurgency force.
We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi
governmental capacity not just at the national level, but at
the provincial and local levels as well. Most notably, this has
required an expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) program with 15 new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade
Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT leaders and BCT commanders
additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders
are charged with supporting moderate elements against
extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching
projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of
terrorists and insurgents.
As the President explained in January, all of these
efforts, together with a new diplomatic offensive in the
region, are designed to set the conditions for U.S. troops to
begin coming home, without risking a humanitarian catastrophe
in Iraq, sanctuaries for international terrorist networks, or a
broader regional conflict that would threaten U.S. national
security interests for generations. (The strategy is explained
in greater detail at http://www. whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/
iraq-strategyqv011007.pdf). While all of those conditions have
not yet been met, and the new strategy is still in its early
stages, there are encouraging signs that point the way to a
more normalized and sustainable level of U.S. engagement in
Iraq--with a decreasing number of U.S. combat forces
increasingly focused on a core set of tasks, such as
counterterrorism operations, and training, equipping, and
supporting Iraqi forces.
The next phase: Building on success
In the coming months, the United States will continue to
operate along four lines of operation--security, political,
economic, and diplomatic--to advance our objectives
ofprotecting the Iraqi population while degrading terrorist and
extremist networks; advancing local and national reconciliation;
setting the framework for a growing economy; and expanding
international support for Iraq. On the security side, General Petraeus
has recommended to the President, and the President has accepted, that
beginning in December 2007, we can transition to the next phase of our
strategy. During this phase, U.S. forces will gradually transition from
surge operations and transfer responsibility for population security to
Iraqi forces--but only in a manner that preserves security and builds
on success. Any adjustments in the missions of U.S. forces or
transitions to Iraqi forces will vary based on local conditions. This
approach stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency strategy
incorporated in the New Way Forward--but with Iraqis increasingly
shouldering more of the load.
In this next phase and based on the Government of Iraq's
request, we will also begin to develop the framework for an
enduring relationship between Iraq and the United States--based
on common principles. Iraqi leaders from all communities share
the vision for a reduced American presence as soon as
conditions allow and in a manner that sustains the gains seen
over the course of 2007. They also understand that their
success requires U.S. political, economic, diplomatic, and
security engagement beyond January 2009, and they have asked to
begin defining a long-term relationship between our two
countries. We anticipate that the elements of this relationship
will set the foundation for an enduring American commitment to
Iraq--encompassing strong security, economic, and diplomatic
ties--which is in the mutual interests of both the Iraqi people
and the American people.
As part of the next phase in our strategy, the President
has directed General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to update
their joint operation plan for Iraq and to adjust our military
and civilian resources accordingly. The President has also
directed General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker to provide a
fresh assessment to the American people and to the Congress in
March 2008 on the situation in Iraq and any adjustments that
may be needed to our strategy based on changing conditions.
This assessment will address:
An analysis of mission progress--including
security, economic, diplomatic, and political--from
September 15, 2007;
Recommended adjustments to military
resources in Iraq, including further force adjustments;
Recommended adjustments to economic
assistance for Iraq, including a status report on the
performance of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and
governmental capacity-building programs;
An assessment of regional and international
contributions to Iraq and efforts to enhance those
contributions;
An assessment of ``bottom-up'' political and
security initiatives, and whether the national
government is supporting them;
An assessment of ``top-down'' political and
security initiatives, including national reconciliation
initiatives; and
An assessment of institutional adjustments
within the United States Government to better support
the civilian and military missions in Iraq as we
transition to a longer-term posture.
The opening statements of General Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker--as delivered to the Congress on September 10 and
September 11, 2007--are attached to this report as Appendices 1
and 2. These documents provide additional detail on the
situation in Iraq as assessed by our experts on the ground and
elements of the next phase of our strategy.
Summary of achievements and shortfalls
This report provides, consistent with the Act, an
assessment of how the Iraqi Government is performing on 18
specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated.
Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some
sense of future trends; but many are more accurately
characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved
after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved
conditions on the ground. Still other benchmarks do not fully
measure the political accommodations that actually affect
violence in Iraq and the direction that country is headed. For
example, local political accommodations have dramatically
improved conditions in what had been some of Iraq's most
violent areas, and we are deploying our resources to help
ensure that these trends continue and spread. It will take
time, however, for improved conditions locally to translate
into broader political accommodations at the national level;
what is important is the overall trajectory, which, under our
present strategy, has begun to stabilize and turn upward,
compared to the deteriorating trajectory seen over the course
of 2006. Thus, the assessments in this report should be viewed
in a larger context: the discussion below provides a snapshot
of achievements and shortfalls that can round out the picture
given in the detailed assessment section of this report.
Security: Iraq faces daunting challenges: a complex
security situation whose main elements include a communal
struggle for power and resources between the Shi'a majority and
Sunni, Kurd, and other minorities. Al-Qaida in Iraq extremists
continue to act as accelerants for ethno-sectarian violence,
and Iranian lethal support to Shi'a militants clearly
intensifies the conflict. Foreign support to extremists in Iraq
continues to exacerbate the security challenges and frustrate
efforts to encourage political reconciliation.
The tempo of military actions to defeat al-Qaida increased
in June as the final U.S. surge brigades arrived in Iraq. The
surge effort has been complemented by carefully selected
counter-terrorist targeting of key leaders of al-Qaida and
other extremist groups. Tribal-based anti-terrorist initiatives
have also augmented Coalition efforts to combat al-Qaida.
Coalition efforts to secure the population against al-Qaida and
other terrorists and extremists in Baghdad and other provinces
across Iraq show signs of progress, but much hard work and
tough fighting remain. Al-Qaida and Iranian-supported extremist
groups have not been defeated, though we have made strong
progress.
The number of attacks on Coalition forces has been on a
downward trend since the middle of June. High-profile attacks
(by car bombs, suicide car bombs, and suicide vests) have
declined by over one-third since March of 2007. Coalition and
Iraqi forces, along with Iraqi tribal elements, have pushed al-
Qaida out of several former safe havens. Coalition forces have
killed or captured nearly 100 key leaders and over 2,500 rank
and file al-Qaida members in the past 7 months. As a result,
al-Qaida's ability to coordinate its activities and conduct
simultaneous attacks in multiple regions has been reduced.
Nonetheless, sporadic high-profile attacks by al-Qaida continue
to cause high civilian casualties, demonstrating al-Qaida's
intent to use civilian casualties to provoke additional
sectarian violence, shape public opinion, and destabilize the
Government of Iraq.
Coalition forces report that murders and executions
assessed to be ethno-sectarian in nature have declined
significantly both in Baghdad and nationwide from their high in
December 2006. However, the increase in ethno-sectarian deaths
in July and August of 2007--largely a function of three sizable
car bomb attacks in Kirkuk and Ninewa provinces--demonstrates
the challenge that ethno-sectarian violence continues to pose
for Iraq, particularly in rural locations that have light
security force presence.
Sunni tribal groups have turned against al-Qaida in al-
Anbar and Diyala provinces as well as in the Baghdad-area
neighborhoods of Ameriyah, Abu Ghraib, Adhamiya, and Arab
Jabour. They are cooperating with Coalition and Iraqi forces in
expelling al-Qaida from their areas. Attacks in al-Anbar are
now less than one-quarter the rate in January, and al-Qaida's
sanctuaries have been greatly reduced. The trend of tribal
engagement with the Coalition and the Government of Iraq
continues to expand to other areas of Iraq. More than 40,000
concerned Iraqi citizens have volunteered to support local
security initiatives since the start of the surge--and that
number is growing daily. Prime Minister Maliki is personally
involved in decisions to reconcile with these Sunni tribes and
citizens willing to fight al-Qaida. He has directed the
Government of Iraq to take steps to incorporate them into local
security forces--a clear demonstration of the potential of
``bottom-up'' reconciliation that has occurred since January
2007. In fact, Prime Minister Maliki recently approved hiring
approximately 12,000 Sunnis in al-Anbar, and 1,735 local men--
including former insurgents--in Abu Ghraib. These events
illustrate the growing sense among Iraqis that they need to
overcome their natural trepidation and make some form of
accommodation with former opponents.
Iran continues to supply Shi'a extremist groups with
training, funding, and weapons, including rockets, mortars, and
particularly explosively-formed projectile devices, which
account for an increasing percentage of U.S. combat deaths.
Coalition and Iraqi operations against these groups, combined
with a growing rejection of Shi'a violence by top Government of
Iraq officials, have led to some progress in reducing violent
attacks from Shi'a extremists.
The Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) continue to make progress,
but development of their capabilities in some areas has been
slower than hoped. Progress by the Iraqi Army has exceeded that
of both the national and local police. ISF performance has
generally met or exceeded expectations when units are partnered
with Coalition forces in combined operations or in tactical
overwatch--a potential model for the future. There are still
challenges in developing Iraqi institutions to sustain existing
forces, delays in obtaining required equipment, persistent
ethno-sectarian influences and political interference, a
limited pool of trained officers and non-commissioned officers
(NCOs), and attrition from combat. The Prime Minister's
initiative to expand the ISF will eventually provide additional
necessary forces, but the expansion will further strain the
institutions that develop, train, and equip Iraqi forces.
Despite these challenges, the ISF are increasingly engaged in
providing security for the Iraqi population. They are in the
fight. Over the last 18 months Iraqi forces suffered combat
deaths three times the number of combat deaths of Coalition
forces. We have been further encouraged by the recent downturn
in anti-Coalition attacks in Baghdad and southern Iraq since
the early September announcement of a stand-down in Jaysh al-
Mahdi (JAM) operations. Time will tell whether this has a
lasting effect.
Political Reconciliation: Reconciliation in a society
marked by nearly four decades of dictatorship will not be
linear and will take time, patience, and support from the
international community. The Iraqi leadership (and the United
States) has sought to set a metric for national reconciliation
through a series of laws to be enacted through Iraq's Council
of Representatives. Moving these laws forward depends on deal-
making among major players in a society divided along
sectarian, ethnic, and other lines--and navigation of a nascent
democratic system with checks and balances that, while
protecting minority groups, also slows legislative progress.
For these reasons, most of the major political benchmarks
identified in the Act may prove to be lagging indicators of
whether or not the strategy is succeeding.
While key national legislation has not yet passed, the
objectives of such laws are in some ways already being
achieved. For example: there is no revenue sharing law, and yet
significant oil revenues are being distributed by the central
government to the provinces in an equitable manner. There is no
provincial powers law, and yet the provincial governors and
councils are making decisions on budget expenditures through
engagement with the central government and ministries and are
providing essential services for their constituents. There is
no amnesty law, and yet immunity is being granted to many
former insurgents, who in turn are being recruited to join
legitimate security institutions. There is no de-
Ba'athification reform law, and yet more than 45,000 former
Ba'athist members of the old armed services have been granted
pensions or even restored to active duty or Iraqi government
service. Amnesty or de-Ba'athification laws were assumed
necessary to drive a wedge between nationalist elements of the
largely Sunni insurgency and al-Qaida. In fact, Sunnis in
record numbers are turning against al-Qaida, reclaiming their
communities, and turning towards the central government for
additional resources. These are precisely the ``effects'' the
benchmarks were intended to produce, even if the formal
benchmarks themselves have not been met. In the coming months,
our strategy will increasingly focus on helping the Iraqis knit
together this new ``bottom-up'' progress with the ``top-down''
political process. It will still remain vital for Iraq's
national government to codify what is happening in practice
through formal legislation over time.
On that point, political progress at the national level has
still been disappointing. The natural tension between groups
has been exacerbated by political blocs threatening to withdraw
support from the government. These threats were not fully
carried out in most cases, but they have contributed to an
environment of mistrust and gridlock. It became clear in July
that the fundamental problem at the national level was not the
failure to pass legislation but that the principal political
groups--Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd--could not agree on a set of
decision-making processes and power sharing arrangements.
Consequently, Iraq's leadership (represented by the Prime
Minister, Presidency Council, and the President of the Kurdish
Region) met in Baghdad in August to address these more
fundamental issues of executive branch decision-making.
These leaders on August 26--following 8 days of meetings--
announced a basic agreement on key benchmarks legislation on
provincial powers and de-Ba'athification. They also formalized
the use of the ``3 plus 1 group'', or the Prime Minister and
the three-member Presidency Council, for collective decision-
making on sensitive and strategic matters. The leaders agreed
to streamline executive branch activities to facilitate swift
decision-making through an ``inner-cabinet'' consisting of core
ministers, including Oil, Electricity, Defense, and Interior.
And, for the first time, they ``affirmed the necessity of a
long-term relationship with the United States'' based on common
interests for the future of Iraq. The communique issued by
these leaders has not solved Iraq's serious problems at the
national level, but it does represent an important step forward
in the ongoing struggle to overcome the fear and mistrust now
dividing Iraq's ethnic and religious communities. The leaders'
August 26 agreement is a necessary building block to meaningful
political progress--which begins with all major communities
coming together for dialogue on resolving key differences.
Diplomatic Engagement: Since the interim Benchmarks report
in mid-July, there has been significant diplomatic activity
with a focus on working with Iraq's neighbors to address
problems in Iraq, especially security problems. In late July,
after two trilateral meetings at the ambassador level, the
United States, Iraq, and Iran formed a Security Subcommittee
which met for the first time on August 6, 2007 in Baghdad. The
Security Subcommittee has focused on curtailing the activities
of militias and foreign terrorists in Iraq and developing ways
to increase control over Iraq's borders. Despite these efforts,
the Iranian government has shown no signs of curtailing their
destructive activities inside Iraq--including the direct
provision of lethal munitions and training to Shi'a extremist
groups that are attacking Coalition forces and Iraqis. Indeed,
attacks by the most dangerous roadside bombs--explosively-
formed projectiles (EFPs)--have been on an upward trajectory
this year, reaching a high of more than 90 attacks in July.
We have encouraged the Government of Iraq to engage in
discussions with the Government of Syria to express its serious
concerns about foreign terrorists, especially suicide bombers.
In early August, the United States participated in a Border
Security Working Group meeting in Damascus as part of the
Neighbors Process. The participants discussed the issue of
foreign terrorists continuing to use neighboring territories as
a main transit route to Iraq and agreed to establish an
experts' group to work on specific border control measures.
Prime Minister Maliki followed up with a separate visit to
Syria later in August, during which the Syrian Government
committed to implementing border control measures. Although
there has been some improvement, it remains too early to
determine whether these Syrian actions have been effective in
reducing foreign fighter flows into Iraq, which account for
many of the high-profile terrorist attacks in Iraq aimed at
instigating sectarian violence. Moreover, Syria continues to
provide safe-haven to Ba'athist insurgents and financiers, and
may be providing support to extremist political elements who
are opposed to political reconciliation.
In addition to his visit to Syria, Prime Minister Maliki
traveled to Turkey and Iran in August 2007 for discussions on
security, energy, and other bilateral issues. Several other
senior Iraqi government officials have traveled in the region
as Iraq continues to increase its economic and diplomatic
relations with neighboring states. For the first time in years,
Iraq is exporting oil through Turkey. Iraq is nearing agreement
on a commercial deal for Kuwait to supply critically needed
diesel fuel. Jordan issued a statement welcoming the Iraqi
leaders August 26 communique. Saudi Arabia is planning to open
an Embassy in Baghdad--its first since the fall of Saddam.
The International Compact with Iraq, an initiative jointly
sponsored by the United Nations and the Government of Iraq, was
signed on May 3, 2007 in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt. The following
day the Expanded Neighbors ministerial conference took place
and was attended by the Permanent Five members of the U.N.
Security Council, the Arab League, the Organization of Islamic
Conference, and the G-8. Both events helped provide more
international and regional support for Iraq. Plans are underway
to create a standing secretariat for the Neighbors Process and
a second ministerial-level conference is scheduled for late
October in Turkey.
On August 10, the United Nations Security Council
unanimously adopted UNSCR 1770, extending the mandate of the
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The renewed
UNAMI mandate provides an expanded role for the U.N. in
advising, supporting, and assisting the Government of Iraq.
UNAMI is also empowered to assist in the provisions for
resolving disputed internal borders.
These international developments may appear independent of
one another, but they are in fact part of an interrelated
effort to establish a new international framework for
supporting Iraq. This framework will take time to develop and
mature, but its three primary components--the Expanded
Neighbors Process, the International Compact, and the expanded
Security Council mandate for UNAMI--provide promising new
platforms for drawing the international community closer to
Iraq with the full support and assistance of the Iraqi
government.
Economics and Essential Services: The economic picture in
Iraq continues to improve, though very significant challenges
remain. Key macroeconomic indicators paint a modestly improved
picture--non-oil real growth is projected to be 5 percent in
2007, non-fuel inflation has further abated (year-on-year core
inflation has declined to 16 percent and overall inflation to
30 percent in July 2007, while 2007 year-to-date inflationis 5
percent), and the unemployment rate appears to be easing. Government
revenue remains above target due to high oil export prices.
A national investment commission head has been appointed to
promote increased private sector activity and legal and
regulatory reform. Idle yet viable state-owned factories have
signed loan agreements to restart operations. Reopening these
factories will create new private business opportunities for
suppliers located near the factories. An auction of the cell
phone spectrum in August netted the Government of Iraq a
better-than-expected sum of $3.75 billion. However, lack of
adequate security remains the largest impediment to increased
private economic activity, and a major economic turnaround
remains unlikely until the security picture improves.
The provision of essential services at the provincial level
is generally improving. However, provincial government
performance remains mixed, with those provinces experiencing
continued violence and kinetic operations finding it more
difficult to provide services. On average, the provinces are
obligating funding for essential services and infrastructure
projects at a rate faster than in 2006. The improvements are
most dramatic in provinces such as al-Anbar, where security
gains have, for the first time since 2003 created an
environment conducive to delivery of government services. At
the national level, the Ministry of Oil has finally begun the
process of investment spending, but much higher rates of
investment are still necessary to promote growth, fund future
investment, and contribute to better quality of life.
Iraq has maintained satisfactory performance on its
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Stand-by Arrangement. The IMF
Executive Board completed a successful review of the program on
August 1 and extended the program until December 2007. IMF
Executive Board members praised the Iraqi authorities for their
commitment to implementing difficult economic reforms in a
dynamic political and security environment. Iraq will negotiate
a new program with the IMF before the end of the year.
The Government of Iraq remains similarly committed to the
International Compact with Iraq, which provides a reform
framework for Iraq to become financially self-sufficient within
5 years. A semiannual review of the Compact occurred at the
U.N. on July 20, during which Iraq presented a report on key
developments since the Compact was signed on May 3, 2007. Of
Iraq's 262 actionable benchmarks under the Compact, 169 are in
progress and on track. Delegates from the international
community praised the report and welcomed Iraq's efforts to
implement its reform commitments. Several participants also
called for greater assistance for Iraq, especially through
faster progress on concluding debt relief agreements.
Congressional benchmarks
Broad context is necessary for assessing the performance of
the Iraqi government with respect to the 18 benchmarks
identified in the Act. Iraqi leaders face a daunting challenge,
and they and their families take great risks daily. We continue
to encourage and press them to achieve established benchmarks,
since we believe that those efforts will contribute over time
to Iraq's stability, to its ability to provide for its own
security, and to the international effort to counter violent
extremism. Nonetheless, our efforts in Iraq extend far beyond
these benchmarks, as the recent testimony of Ambassador Crocker
and General Petraeus explained in more detail. Every day, our
Embassy and military officials work with the Iraqis to
establish the strategic environment in which security and
meaningful reconciliation can develop and take root--in ways
not easily measured by benchmarks based heavily on adopting
legislation.
Standard of Measurement: Section 1314(b)(2)(A) states:
``The President shall submit an initial report to Congress, not
later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the
specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his
judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these
benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.'' Section
1314(b)(2)(D) further provides that ``[t]he President shall
submit a second report to the Congress, not later than
September 15, 2007, following the same procedures and criteria
outlined [in the paragraphs] above.''
To make this judgment (i.e., whether ``satisfactory
progress * * * is, or is not, being achieved''), we have
carefully examined all the facts and circumstances with respect
to each of the 18 benchmarks and asked the following question:
As measured from a January 2007 baseline, do we assess that
present trend data demonstrate a positive trajectory, which is
tracking toward satisfactory accomplishment in the near term?
If the answer is yes, we have provided a ``Satisfactory''
assessment; if the answer is no, the assessment is ``Not
Satisfactory.'' Where benchmarks contain more than one element
we have provided assessments for each element. As a result,
some benchmarks show mixed progress, with some elements
assessed satisfactory and other elements judged not
satisfactory. Two benchmarks could not be fully assessed at
this time because the preconditions for achieving them have not
been reached. For benchmarks receiving a not satisfactory
assessment, we have explained what, if any, strategic
adjustments may be required to improve the present trajectory.
The current assessment indicates additional progress has
occurred since the initial report of July 2007. In that report,
the Iraq government made satisfactory progress on eight
benchmarks and eight benchmarks were assessed as
unsatisfactory, including two with mixed progress. Today's
report is based on data available as of September 1 and
reflects that the Iraqis have made satisfactory progress since
January 2007 on nine benchmarks, including on de-
Ba'athification reform which in July was assessed as
unsatisfactory. In addition, while the current report assesses
seven benchmarks as not satisfactory, this includes four
benchmarks with progress on some aspects while not on others.
In both the July report and today's assessment, two benchmarks
are not rated because the necessary preconditions are not yet
present.
It is important to note that the metric used in this report
differs from that employed by the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) in its August 2007 report. Legislation mandating
this GAO report required a determination of whether or not the
Government of Iraq has met or not met each benchmark and the
status of achievement of these benchmarks. Additionally, the
GAO report took account of information only through July 31,
2007. This report takes account of information through
September 1, 2007 and evaluates whether the Iraqi government
has made satisfactory progress on each benchmark.
The present analysis and assessment of the 18 benchmarks
follows.
Assessment of the Benchmarks
Section 1314 (b)(2)(A) The President shall submit an
initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the
Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of
each of the specific benchmarks * * * and declaring, in his
judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these
benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.
Section 1314 (b)(2)(C) If the President's assessment of any
of the specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory,
the President shall include in that report a description of
such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and
military components of the strategy, as announced by the
President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall
include in the report the advisability of implementing such
aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, as he deems
appropriate.
Section 1314 (b)(2)(D) The President shall submit a second
report to the Congress, not later than September 15, 2007,
following the same procedures and criteria outlined above.
Section 1314 (b)(I)(A) The United States Strategy in Iraq,
hereafter, shall be conditioned on the Iraqi Government meeting
benchmarks * * * including:
(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then
completing the constitutional review.
The Council of Representatives (COR) formed the
Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) on November 15, 2006, and
constitutional review is underway. The CRC, in a May 2007
interim report, offered a range of amendments for COR
consideration and in addition highlighted the need to resolve
outstanding issues concerning: (i) Presidential powers, (ii)
the powers of the regions vs. the central government, and (iii)
the status of Kirkuk (Article 140 of the Constitution).
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC)
and then completing the constitutional review. The Embassy has
engaged the CRC Chairman and the COR Speaker and Deputy
Speakers on the need to develop a well-defined plan for the COR
debate on the recommendations of the interim report. Despite
the COR's August adjournment, the CRC continued to work on the
three additional unresolved constitutional issues described
above.
(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-
Ba'athification reform.
De-Ba'athification reform is potentially the most emotional
issue being discussed by the Government of Iraq. Legislation
necessary to reform and implement certain de-Ba'athification
programs involves competing concepts of justice,
accountability, reconciliation, and economic compensation. The
public discussion of these issues tends to polarize Iraqis even
as many of the proposed changes take place on the ground. For
example, former Ba'ath party members who served in the army
have been granted pensions. While the de-Ba'athification
legislation is debated at the highest levels in Baghdad, more
than 45,000 former army personnel have been granted pensions or
reinstated to active duty.
In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the
need for United States Government support of reintegration of
former Ba'athists and Arab nationalists into civic life, and
the New Way Forward strategy makes de-Ba'athification reform an
integral part of the United States Government's Iraq policy.
The Embassy has pressed hard on all political elements to move
forward.
On August 26 the leaders of Iraq's five major political
groups announced an agreement had been reached on, inter alia,
draft de-Ba'athification legislation. While the agreed-upon
draft still must pass the hurdles of debate and adoption in the
Council of Representatives, the work accomplished by the
leaders on this legislation is a significant sign of progress.
Even in the absence of legislation, limited political
accommodation remains possible, particularly when pursued
through outreach by local political leaders.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-
Ba'athification reform. The fact that legislation has not yet
passed the COR should not diminish the significance of the
agreement reached by the leaders or the re-integration of
former Ba'athists taking place on the ground. The overarching
goal of de-Ba'athification reform is political accommodation
between the Shi'a and Sunni communities. The leaders' agreement
combined with the return of former Ba'athists to civic life is
a significant step in that regard. Debate on this draft law in
the COR is an integral part of developing the broad political
acceptance needed to promote real reconciliation.
(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the
equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people
of Iraq without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients,
and enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the
energy resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs,
Kurds, and other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner.
The Hydrocarbon Framework Law and the companion Revenue
Sharing Law are fundamentally important to defining federalism
in Iraq. If adopted, they would: catalyze new sources of
investment capital and technology for the oil and gas sector;
facilitate substantial near term increases in government
revenues which could be used for the benefit of Iraq's people;
and serve as a vehicle for political reconciliation between
regions and communities.
Iraq's political leaders continue to be actively engaged in
developing these laws.
The United States has provided technical advice, both to
the Government of Iraq and to the Kurdish Regional Government
(KRG), and has encouraged all parties to approve the draft laws
and submit them for consideration to the full COR.
The Hydrocarbon Framework Law was approved by the Council
of Ministers in February 2007 and reviewed by the Shura Council
(a legal body) in the spring. Two versions of the law were
submitted to the COR in July. The companion Revenue Management
Law was agreed to by Kurdish and Shi'a Arab political parties
in June 2007 and in July was submitted to the Shura Council for
review. The Revenue Management Law must be approved by the
Council of Ministers (COM) before submission to the COR.
Discussions among Iraqi political leaders are ongoing, and this
legislation remains a primary focus for political party
leaders.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing
legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon
revenue. Passage of the national laws remains a high priority
for the United States and the Government of Iraq and could be
accomplished relatively quickly if a consensus in support can
be constructed. Many Sunni leaders (and some Shi'a as well)
continue to disagree on the appropriate balance between
national and regional control of hydrocarbon exploration and
production. Meanwhile, the Kurdish Regional Government has
sought to reinforce its own position on the national law by
passing a new hydrocarbons licensing regime through its
regional parliament. Given the fluid nature of the Iraqi
political process, it is difficult to predict what further
progress might occur once the COR reconvenes. Despite this
uncertainty, the Government of Iraq is already distributing
significant oil revenue on an equitable basis to the provinces
and KRG through the Iraqi budget.
(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to
form semi-autonomous regions.
In line with the Iraqi constitution, the COR enacted a
``Regions Law'' in October 2006 that establishes procedures for
the formation of federal regions in Iraq. The legislation
delayed the effective date of implementation for a period of 18
months after enactment, which means no steps can be taken to
form federal regions before April 2008. The United States
Government encouraged Iraqi political parties to reach a
compromise on this law and believes that the 18-month delay in
implementation was in the interests of Iraq and the United
States, given current political conditions in Iraq.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on
procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. The COR passed the
Regions Law with a delayed effective date. Implementation of
this legislation could take place after provincial elections
are held and after the passage of an updated elections law.
(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an
Independent High Electoral Commission, provincial elections
law, provincial council authorities, and a date for provincial
elections.
On January 23, 2007, the COR passed the Independent High
Electoral Commission (IHEC) Law, which the Presidency Council
(the President and two Deputy Presidents) signed into law on
February 27, 2007. On April 28, 2007, the COR appointed the
nine IHEC Commissioners in a process that the U.N. deemed fair
and transparent. The Commissioners have completed appropriate
training and are in the process of selecting representatives to
oversee elections in the provinces.
The mid-August high-level meetings produced agreement among
the leaders of Iraq's five major parties on a draft law
delineating provincial powers. Draft legislation is expected to
be submitted to the COR shortly. This law lays out the
authorities of provincial governments and their relationship to
the national government in Baghdad.
In Recommendation 29, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the
need for provincial elections at the earliest possible date.
Iraqi officials said in August that a provincial powers law was
a prerequisite for setting a date for provincial elections, and
therefore they await movement from the COR. The United States
Government and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq
(UNAMI) are strongly encouraging the Government of Iraq to set
a date for provincial elections. Additionally, the United
States Government is working with Iraq Security Forces to
ensure that they are adequately prepared to provide security
for free and fair elections when a date is set.
Assessment: There are multiple components to this
benchmark, each deserving its own assessment.
Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government
of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an
IHEC Commission.
Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial
elections law.
Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of
Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing
provincial council authorities, which are encapsulated in the
Provincial Powers law.
Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq
has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date
for provincial elections.
There remains no mechanism to address the marked under-
representation of Sunnis on four provincial councils.
Nevertheless, in some places, such as al-Anbar, local
authorities appointed additional provincial council members in
November 2006 to ease problems of a lack of representation
through non-electoral means. In passing an expanded mandate for
UNAMI on August 10, the United Nations Security Council
reaffirmed its commitment to assist the IHEC prepare for the
next round of elections. This situation does not necessitate a
revision to our current plan and strategy, and positive action
on this issue is one of our highest priorities.
(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing
amnesty.
The preconditions for a general amnesty do not yet exist.
That said, the Government of Iraq established a high-level
Reconciliation Committee to support and oversee efforts by
groups that want to oppose al-Qaida in Iraq and other extremist
elements. This committee is working with a joint U.S. Embassy/
MNF-I group that is facilitating such actions in coordination
with other anti-terrorist efforts on the ground. In the absence
of legislation, the Government of Iraq--at the direction of the
Prime Minister--has initiated a program of limited immunity for
individuals who have turned away from supporting al-Qaida and
have now pledged support to the government. While this program
may not meet the requirement for enacting and implementing
legislation, on-the-ground programs of limited immunity are
accomplishing some of the desired effects of this benchmark.
Assessment: No assessment can be made until the necessary
preconditions have been reached for implementing a general
amnesty. However, a process of local accommodation and limited
immunity has been developed and effectively implemented in al-
Anbar province, Abu Ghraib, and other locations where local
volunteers, including some Shi'a, have been approved for hire
by the Minister of Interior or Defense while awaiting
completion of the reconciliation committee's screening.
Although the Government of Iraq has not enacted or implemented
amnesty legislation, these local programs may be creating
preconditions for future amnesty legislation. The Embassy
continues to engage the Government of Iraq at the highest
levels on questions of amnesty.
(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a
strong militia disarmament program to ensure that such security
forces are accountable only to the central government and loyal
to the constitution of Iraq.
The necessary preconditions for a Disarmament,
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program in any post-
conflict society are steep, and key elements such as political
reconciliation and security provided by the government do not
yet exist, despite considerable efforts by the Government of
Iraq, MNF-I, and the United States Embassy. Although a DDR
Committee has been established, there is limited momentum
toward developing and implementing a comprehensive disarmament
program for militia members while Iraq faces a combination of
sectarian violence, terrorist attacks, and a continuing
insurgency. However, there are signs that certain programs and
projects designed at the local level to re-integrate certain
individuals and small groups back into the population are
achieving some modest success. In general, these projects
include education-based programs for former detainees.
The 2007 budget of the Government of Iraq includes $150
million for DDR. However, the funds will not be released until
the Government of Iraq enacts legislation and establishes a
satisfactory program for implementation.
In Recommendation 38 and 39, the Iraq Study Group proposes
that neutral international experts act as advisors to the
Government of Iraq and that the United States Government fund
and support a single office to provide assistance to these
experts. The study also notes that ``solving the problem of
militias requires national reconciliation'' and states that, as
a party in the conflict, the United States Government should
not be directly involved in a DDR program's implementation.
Consequently, the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1710 expanded UNAMI's mandate to include ``advise,
support, and assist * * * the Government of Iraq at an
appropriate time and in connection with progress on
reconciliation efforts, on planning, funding, and implementing
reintegration programs for former members of illegal armed
groups.''
Assessment: No assessment can be made until the necessary
preconditions have been reached for implementing a strong
militia disarmament program. However, the Government of Iraq
has initiated a process that reintegrates former militia
members into the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior
architecture. In effect, this may be facilitating the necessary
conditions for a future DDR program.
(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic,
and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security
Plan.
Through its February 2007 establishment of the Executive
Steering Committee (ESC) and related subcommittees, the
Government of Iraq has established supporting political, media,
economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan (Operation Fardh Al Qanoon). The United States
Embassy and MNF-I will remain intensively engaged with the ESC
to continue to improve its effectiveness and ensure that the
subcommittees fulfill the purpose for which they were created.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward establishing supporting political, media,
economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad
Security Plan. Since the July 2007 assessment period, the ESC
and related subcommittees have continued to meet weekly in
their efforts to coordinate and synchronize policies, services,
and other non-kinetic aspects of Operation Fardh Al Qanoon with
security operations.
(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to
support Baghdad operations.
The Ministry of Defense has generated a total of eight
Iraqi Army Brigade Headquarters and 27 Iraqi Army Battalions to
support Baghdad operations. These units are actively involved
in joint and independent operations throughout Baghdad and the
Baghdad belts. The Government of Iraq provided the number of
units required, and they were trained to the proper individual
and collective baseline. As unit manning and composition issues
were identified, the Government of Iraq addressed them. For
example, in order to compensate for the number of soldiers
absent during Operation Fardh Al Qanoon for leave or other
reasons, the Government of Iraq expanded combat unit manning to
120 percent of authorization, thus achieving higher present for
duty strength. Current presentfor duty rates are now 75 percent
of authorized strength, which is within Iraqi Army standard.
Some of these units have performed exceptionally well,
voluntarily extending their deployments up to 270 days and
raising their operational readiness ratings. Over the past 2
months the units serving with Coalition forces in the Baghdad
Area of Operations --the 6th and 9th Iraqi Army Divisions--have
conducted almost 400 combined operations, 700 independent
operations, and more than 7,000 independent patrols. Some units
have been less impressive, suffering from a variety of issues
related to a lack of leadership and equipment to support their
assigned missions.
Overall, Coalition ground commanders who work side by side
with these units are generally pleased with their performance
and are witness to their continual development and growing
confidence as they gain experience in the counterinsurgency
effort. That said, Iraqi Security forces are not yet able to
assume responsibility for security throughout the country.
Placing that burden on the Iraqis before they are ready risks
sacrificing the gains we have made. The ISF will require
additional training, equipping, and logistical support.
It was an impressive achievement for the Government of Iraq
to provide the equivalent of three additional trained and ready
brigades to Baghdad. Programs are in place to ensure they
remain capable of sustaining this level of effort through
scheduled rotations and a robust training pipeline.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi
brigades to support Baghdad operations.
(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to
execute this plan and to make tactical and operational
decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders, without
political intervention to include the authority to pursue all
extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.
The Prime Minister has provided Iraqi commanders the
necessary authority to conduct security operations and
continues to reaffirm his commitment to support these
authorities. ISF continue to prosecute targets across Iraq,
including in operations throughout Baghdad and in provinces
that have already been turned over to Provincial Iraqi Control.
The Prime Minister and senior commanders increasingly recognize
the threat to long-term security posed by Shi'a militia
extremists and continue to support targeting such elements. In
late August, the Prime Minister removed the Shi'a commander of
the Karbala Operations Command, ordered the arrest of three
prominent Shi'a militia extremists who were in Karbala for the
12th Imam Commemoration, ordered an Iraqi Special Forces raid
on key JAM cells in Karbala, and the strong response from the
Iraqi government--as well as the public outrage at the
violence--appears to have led to Muqtada al-Sadr's call for his
extremist militia to halt all attacks against Coalition forces.
The Iraqi Army as an institution continues to appear more
nationally oriented and less susceptible to political
interference than the Iraqi National Police or local forces,
although some reform of the National Police has occurred. The
degree of JAM influence within police forces is largely
dependent upon the region or city. Within Baghdad, Iraqi Police
in Sadr City and parts of Kadhamiyah are complicit with JAM
activity. JAM influence is also strong in the cities of Al
Amarrah, Hussaniyah, and Diwaniyah due to heavy infiltration of
JAM members. Police activities in those areas that have been
cleared and retained by Coalition and Iraqi forces appear to be
the most even-handed.
Coalition military leaders who work closely with their
Iraqi counterparts to plan and conduct security operations have
seen uneven progress on efforts to reduce political
interference in military decisions. Where Iraqi security forces
are fighting alongside Coalition Forces or manning joint
security stations, ISF tactical commanders generally act on
mission orders from their established chains of command.
There are no reported instances of political interference
in operations directed against Sunni insurgents. However, there
is evidence of political officials attempting to limit the
effectiveness of independent Iraqi operations against Shi'a
extremists. Political interference typically emanates from
individuals in the Government of Iraq below the level of the
Prime Minister, and the Prime Minister has taken actions to
limit such interference. For example, the Prime Minister was
recently provided evidence of arrest lists for Sunni targets
generated by an office below him that bypassed operational
commanders. The Prime Minister responded by reorganizing and
reducing the size of the office. As far as we can determine,
any previous restrictions on targeting certain sects are no
longer present.
There also is still evidence of political interference with
ISF operations from both the Ministry of Interior and the
Office of the Commander in Chief (OCINC). Questionable judicial
warrants by the OCINC have been used to try to replace Sunni
officers who demonstrated effectiveness against Jaysh al-Mahdi
operations in Baghdad and in southern provinces. In Muthanna
province, there is evidence that Ministry of Interior officials
have used de-Ba'athification laws to replace effective Sunni
police officers with Shi'a officers. JAM-associated Ministry of
Interior officials continue to exert such a significant
influence over the Basra Police that the new Basra Provincial
Director of Police raised this issue at a meeting with the
Ministerial Council on National Security.
There is strong evidence of efforts to remove sectarian
commanders in the National Police. Since the start of this
year, all Division Commanders, all Brigade Commanders, and 17
of 27 battalion commanders in the National Police were relieved
of duty due to allegations of sectarian activity. In addition,
a former Police Division Commander reassigned due to serious
allegations has since been removed from his follow-on
assignment as well. This is a signal that the Government of
Iraq is committed to taking action with regard to sectarian
bias.
While the recent interventions by the Prime Minister and
other government officials to curb sectarian bias are
encouraging, the fear of being replaced for political or
sectarianreasons remains and continues to influence commanders'
decisions on which operations to undertake. Given the importance of
this issue, we will need to continue monitoring the activities of
government officials for signs of interference with ISF commanders'
abilities to make tactical and operational decisions.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities
to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational
decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders, to include the
authority to pursue all extremists. However, there has not been
satisfactory progress towards eliminating political
intervention by leaders throughout the chain of command. The
historical prejudices inherent to Iraq remain a challenge that
will only be fully solved by time and the experience of
democratic government.
(xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing
even-handed enforcement of the law.
Individual Iraqi Army and National Police units that work
closely with Coalition Forces generally act responsibly. The
achievements of the 30 joint security stations and 31 Coalition
outposts throughout Baghdad neighborhoods provide clear
evidence that the Iraqi police and army are capable of fairly
administering the rule of law under a partnering construct. The
actions of many individual Iraqi commanders demonstrate that
they independently act in a fair and professional manner. For
example, operations against insurgent cells seem to be even-
handed--targeting both Sunni and Shi'a elements. In the last
week of August, Coalition and Iraqi Special Forces jointly
killed or captured more than 100 cell members, about one third
of whom were JAM members who had committed criminal actions.
Education and training have been key ingredients in
improving enforcement of the law. Under the National Police
Transformation plan, eight of the nine National Police brigades
have completed a month-long training course on the rule of law,
professionalism, and policing techniques. The latest class of
1,800 National Policemen just graduated from the Numaniyah
National Police College on 20 August. Initial indications show
that even seasoned units perform better after completing such a
``re-bluing'' program. Similar programs are also used for local
police. Still, some police units operating outside of close
Coalition supervision tend to gravitate to old habits of
sectarianism. In late August, the Minister of Interior had to
issue an arrest warrant for a police company commander and
several in his command for sectarian behavior. This indicates
both the persistence of the problem and a genuine desire by the
leadership to clean up the image and performance of the police
force.
Improvements within the Iraqi legal system are providing
the Government of Iraq with new ways to handle rule of law
issues. The government introduced a new military justice
system, trained 16 judges and 4 prosecutors, and established a
unit training program for Commanders and Disciplinary Officers
that is administered by almost 100 trained legal advisors
assigned across all Iraqi Army divisions. Within the past
month, high-profile and high-ranking offenders within the ISF--
both Sunni and Shi'a--have been arrested and are currently
under investigation, pending trial for their sectarian-based
crimes. Judges in the secure Rusafa Rule of Law Complex have
already shown their determination to impose tough justice on
both Sunni and Shi'a members of sectarian death squads. Since
the start of the year they have sentenced roughly equal numbers
of Sunni and Shi'a criminals to death.
Through continued mentoring and partnership, additional
training of ISF units, and increased emphasis by the Government
of Iraq, even-handed enforcement of the law may increasingly
become the norm, even in the absence of Coalition oversight. We
expect Government of Iraq actions, not Coalition oversight, to
hold the ISF to a high standard in the future.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress in ensuring that the Iraqi Army is providing even-
handed enforcement of the law, though much remains to be done
in this area. However the Iraqi Police has not made
satisfactory progress, as some elements still act with a
sectarian bias. The replacement of 28 National Police
Commanders, as well as the ``re-bluing'' training for National
Police Brigades, should produce improvements in this area over
the coming months.
(xii) Ensuring that, as President Bush quoted Prime
Minister Maliki as saying, ``the Baghdad Security Plan will not
provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their]
sectarian or political affiliation.''
In accordance with the promise made by Prime Minister
Maliki, the Government of Iraq has allowed Coalition forces to
conduct operations in all areas of Baghdad.
Almost 3 months into surge operations, the coordinated
offensive operations of ISF and Coalition forces have made
significant progress against terrorist and extremist elements,
particularly in Baghdad, the surrounding ``belts,'' and Diyala.
In Baghdad, the focus of operations has been along the fault
lines between Sunni and Shi'a neighborhoods, where economic and
social conditions make the population most susceptible to
extremism. Our counterinsurgency strategy relies on
establishing joint security stations in troubled neighborhoods,
continuous joint ISF and Coalition Force security operations,
Coalition outposts to expand the reach of Coalition forces, and
reconstruction programs to restore quality of life. These
actions have resulted in a steady improvement in population
security, increasing trust of Baghdad residents, and a decrease
in the number of areas where terrorists and extremists can
operate. In late March 2007, only about 10 percent of Baghdad
neighborhoods were secured by Iraqi and Coalition forces. By
the end of August more than three-quarters of the city's
neighborhoods had been cleared and now benefit from the
continued presence of security forces.
Prior to clearing operations in Baqubah, Coalition
operations were plagued by IED attacks and had difficulty
locating insurgent cells and weapons caches. Once Coalition and
Iraqi forces established a permanent presence in the city,
weekly IED and indirect fire attacks dropped by 75 percent, and
local citizens began pointing out booby-trapped houses, buried
IEDs and weapons caches. Total attacks against civilians, ISF,
andCoalition forces for all of Diyala province have decreased
in 7 of the past 10 weeks. In the past month alone more than 140 IEDs
and 61 weapons caches have been cleared, in great part due to tips from
local residents.
Even in places like Sadr City, Coalition and Iraqi forces
have pressured militia extremists and criminals. Since January,
more than 80 operations have been conducted, spanning each
sector of Sadr City and capturing or killing many insurgent and
militia cell leaders. In contrast to the perception that Sadr
City is a safe haven for extremists, Coalition and Iraqi
patrols operate there and continue to disrupt cells that plant
IEDs or launch mortar attacks in Baghdad. Reconstruction
projects continue in Sadr City with hospital renovations 94
percent complete, three new water system projects completed in
July and at least four ongoing medical clinic projects.
The Government of Iraq and Coalition elements are
exploiting improved security by revitalizing economic and
social programs, thereby preventing the reappearance of
conditions that would promote a return of extremists. The
Baqubah Flour Mill just received a shipment of 560 tons of
grain--its first in over a year. This mill will now employ 200
local workers. In Amariyah, Ghazaliyah, Yusifiyah, Adhamiyah,
and Abu Ghraib, tribal initiatives against al-Qaida are gaining
momentum and have garnered the increased support of the
Government of Iraq. In Adhamiyah alone, 1000 Iraqis volunteered
to help the ISF and Coalition forces bring security to their
neighborhood. Overall, operations in Baghdad have made an
impact, but work remains to be done, especially in the Sadr
City area of Baghdad and in Kadhamiyah. These neighborhoods
remain some of our bigger challenges.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward ensuring that the Baghdad Security Plan will
not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their
sectarian or political affiliation.
(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and
eliminating militia control of local security.
Ethno-sectarian violence is incited by a variety of
motivations and methods, making it difficult to measure and
control. Coalition and Iraqi partners are working hard to break
the vicious cycle of provocation and retaliation that was at
the heart of last winter's surge in casualties and displacement
from troubled neighborhoods. After considering a number of
indicators developed from both host nation and Coalition
reports, there are promising signs that we may be succeeding in
breaking this cycle.
While there are still millions of Iraqis who have been
displaced from their homes by intimidation and violence, some
small groups are beginning to return to areas where violence
has been reduced. By both our estimate and those of the
national intelligence community, the number of ethno-sectarian
attacks and deaths nationwide has fluctuated somewhat over the
past several months, but they are now less than half of the
December 2006 levels. Ethno-sectarian attacks in the Baghdad
districts have fallen even more sharply, down to roughly one-
quarter the levels of December 2006. Total attacks on civilians
across Iraq have declined in 13 of the past 18 weeks.
Unfortunately, total civilian casualties did not fall as
significantly over the same period, as al-Qaida launched
several high-casualty vehicle IED attacks in Baghdad and the
northern provinces in an attempt to provoke greater sectarian
violence. However, in a sign of progress, Iraqis did not
respond to these attacks with widespread sectarian-based
retaliation, allowing for an underlying downward trend in
civilian casualties. Overall, these trends have been achieved
through increased Coalition and Iraqi presence in Baghdad,
operations in the Baghdad belts, and an increase in the number
of national leaders who have publicly renounced sectarian
violence and called for restraint in the wake of high-profile
IED attacks.
Despite these gains, progress against militia extremists is
mixed. Operations conducted since May have significantly
contributed to eliminating militia control of local security in
areas that Coalition forces have cleared and now hold. In some
cities such as Baghdad, Ramadi, Abu Ghraib, and Baqubah, local
militia members are formally joining the local Iraqi security
forces and providing effective community security, as well as
valuable tips on caches and the location of extremist leaders.
Despite the recent assassination of the elected governors in
Qadisiyah and Muthanna, we believe that discrete offensive
operations against militia extremist leaders in the central
southern provinces offer the opportunity for larger gains
against the militias. However, militias are still acting
outside the law in the uncleared parts of Baghdad and the
southern provinces of Karbala, Basra, Qadisiyah, and Maysan. In
these areas, militia members have either infiltrated Iraqi
Security Forces or brokered deals with the local ISF or
civilian leadership.
The national government continues its efforts to curb
militia control of Iraqi Security Forces by its selection of
leaders and key arrests, but they remain one step behind the
problem. It is too early to be optimistic about statements by
Muqtada al-Sadr, though the increasing number of Shi'a and
Sunni tribal sheikhs reaching out to become part of the
solution is a promising sign. We will continue to provide
guidance and support to the Government of Iraq in negotiations,
reconciliation, military operations, and legal action to
address this issue.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward reducing sectarian violence. Where ISF and
Coalition forces have conducted clear and hold operations,
militia control has been significantly reduced. However,
satisfactory progress has not been made toward eliminating
militia control of local security in other areas, as evidenced
by continued militia influence of certain Baghdad neighborhoods
and other areas across Iraq.
(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security
stations in neighborhoods across Baghdad.
Nearly all of the planned joint security stations,
Coalition outposts, and other patrol bases have been
established across Baghdad and the surrounding area. As of
August 31, 2007, 30 of 33 planned joint security stations were
operational and 31 Coalition combat outposts had achieved
operational capability. Joint security stations provide
anaround-the-clock security presence in most of Baghdad and are
particularly effective as they merge Coalition partnering with Iraqi
presence and action. There are numerous examples where Iraqi presence
has facilitated a lower application of force and a more positive
result. Other stations are being established in outlying areas where
interaction with the local people can have a direct impact on the
reduction of violence within the city. This increased interaction with
the local population should continue to suppress crime and sectarian
violence as well as provide valuable intelligence to support economic
growth, political accommodation, and counterinsurgency operations.
Joint security stations are also being successfully
employed in al-Anbar province and numerous other locations
across Iraq. Coalition leaders will continue to consult with
the Baghdad Operational Center and national leadership to
determine additional emplacements.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward establishing the planned Joint Security
Stations in Baghdad neighborhoods.
(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces units
capable of operating independently.
Iraqi Army, Air Force, and Police units\1\ continue to grow
in size. The Iraqi Army has expanded greatly since December
2006, when there were 149 units in operation and 9 under
development. Currently, there are 152 combat units in operation
and 29 under development. Since March 2007, there has been a 14
percent increase in the number of independent Iraqi Army
operations, including 20 units operating independently as part
of Fardh Al-Qanoon and 10 units assuming the lead role in their
areas of responsibility. While only a small percentage of
battalions are rated as capable of completely independent
counterinsurgency operations (Operational Readiness Assessment
Level One), over 75 percent are capable of planning, executing,
and sustaining operations with some Coalition support and of
making significant contributions to combat operations. The
greatest constraints on independent operations are a shortage
of trained leaders and immature logistics capability.
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\1\ A unit is an Iraqi Army combat battalion or an Iraqi Army
combat brigade headquarters or an Iraqi Army combat division
headquarters.
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Iraqi Security Forces recently demonstrated their improved
ability when they independently planned, rehearsed, and
executed security for the annual pilgrimage in commemoration of
the death of the Seventh Imam. This event, which included a
march of a million Shi'a pilgrims to Baghdad's Kadhamiyah
Shrine, had been marred by significant violence each of the
last 3 years, including 1,000 people who were killed in a
stampede in 2005 when they feared a car bomb attack. This
year's event had no violence and was a great tribute to the
Iraqi Security Forces and the government. The ISF planning and
execution of the 12th Imam celebration in Karbala in late
August 2007 was marred by JAM-instigated violence, but the Iraq
security forces protected the shrines and defeated JAM attacks.
Rapid reaction by the Government of Iraq--led by the Prime
Minister personally--contained the violence and demonstrated
another step toward eventual independent security capability.
The Iraqi Police continues to grow in size, particularly in
newly cleared population centers where the increased demand for
officers is often well-supported by local volunteers and the
Government of Iraq. Police forces in the seven provinces under
Iraqi control operate independently. Police capabilities in the
remaining provinces show improvement that has been enhanced by
local militias and concerned citizens joining the fight against
al-Qaida. The use of additional local security forces has
significantly increased the number of tips, resulting in a 50
percent increase in the number of caches found nationwide and a
doubling of caches found in Baghdad. The increased number of
tips has also led to the capture or killing of al-Qaida and
irreconcilable militia leaders.
Although not yet capable of independent operations, three
Air Force flying squadrons are progressing satisfactorily,
doubling the amount of cargo and passengers flown since the
start of the year. They have also conducted joint
infrastructure security operations with the Iraqi Army and
energy ministries and recently stood up an Iraqi Air Operations
Center.
The growing size of Iraqi Security Forces and the need to
increase the manning levels of existing units continues to
present the Government of Iraq with force management
challenges, particularly in the areas of leaders and logistics.
For the present time, Coalition partnership and support remains
necessary for most ISF operations. The Coalition is assisting
the Government of Iraq as it develops a more mature ISF force
structure that is capable of providing institutional
sustainment. Again, we should be wary of placing too much
strain on this force until we are comfortable it can meet the
challenges posed by our determined common enemies in Iraq.
Assessment: Although there is progress in the development
and operation of the Iraqi Security Forces, the Government of
Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward increasing the
number of Iraqi Security Force units capable of operating
independently. Many units have made considerable progress in
their ability to conduct combat operations, but the number of
units earning Operational Readiness Assessment Level One
ratings has not increased as much as desired. However, we
should not understate the marked increase in ISF capability to
conduct combat operations successfully, including clearing and
holding neighborhoods, planning and conducting operations,
defending themselves, protecting the population, and responding
to contingencies on short notice.
(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political
parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
Article 37 of the Iraqi Constitution guarantees all Iraqis
freedom to form and join associations and political parties.
Minorities are guaranteed equal access to and participation in
elections for the COR. The COR elected in December 2005
includes representatives from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish,
Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, andYazidi communities. The
Rules of Procedure for the COR guarantee the ability of its members to
express their opinions, regardless of political party or affiliation,
helping to ensure the full participation of all its members, and COR
leaders have followed these rules in practice. COR rules permit groups
as small as 10 members out of 275 to propose legislation.
The United States Mission is fully engaged with the Iraqi
parliament to ensure appreciation for the concern attached by
the United States to representation of women and minorities and
a role for minority parties.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory
progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority political
parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.
(xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi
revenues for reconstruction projects, including delivery of
essential services, on an equitable basis.
While it is too soon to tell by how much budget execution
will improve by the end of 2007, there is no doubt that the
Government of Iraq is overcoming many of the problems it faced
in 2006. Indeed, 2007 capital budget execution is already on
par with last year's total level, and the full $10 billion
capital budget has been allocated. Given the long-term nature
of some capital projects, some of the 2007 capital funds will
not be disbursed until later years. The Government of Iraq has
also launched its 2008 budget process, which will ensure the
progress in 2007 continues to move forward.
Both the central government and the provincial governments
are becoming more effective at allocating and spending their
capital budgets for reconstruction and the delivery of
essential services.\2\ The 2007 Iraqi budget represents the
first time in modern Iraqi history that provincial governments
have been able to formulate and implement their own capital
budgets. The Government of Iraq ministries are already
exceeding their 2006 levels of budget execution. The ability to
allocate and spend a capital budget effectively is a necessary
first step for a functioning government to meet the needs of
its people. Government of Iraq and provincial officials across
the country have shown by their actions that budget execution
is, indeed, a focal point as they continue to improve
governance and move toward self-reliance.
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\2\ To aid interpretation, a terminology guide from Baghdad Cable
2541 follows:
--Government of Iraq ``Spending Plan/Budget Allocation'': Budgetary
authority to a Government of Iraq unit, in accordance with the Budget
Law, with sub-allocations deferred by the Ministry of Finance (MOF.)
This equates to a United States Government ``commitment'' or an
internal reservation of funds for a particular purpose.
--Government of Iraq ``Release'': Equates to United States
Government apportionment; release of funds from MOF (OMB has this
responsibility in the United States Government) to a spending unit
based on project needs or cash flow. Ministry of Planning and
Development Cooperation (MOPDC) reviews and approves the spending
unit's request for release, and the MOF confirms consistency with the
approved budget allocation and liquidity needs of the spending unit.
--Government of Iraq ``Commitment'': Equates to a United States
Government obligation, i.e.,the spending unit awards a contract or
other binding agreement.
--Government of Iraq ``Disbursed'': Equates to United States
Government expenditures or outlays. Two types of expenditures are often
used interchangeably: (1) funds disbursed to a non-Government of Iraq
entity (e.g., contractor) resulting in a net outlay; and (2)
disbursements from one Government of Iraq account to another.
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In 2006, the Government of Iraq spent roughly 22 percent of
its $6.2 billion non-provincial capital budget. Lack of
technical capacity, security issues, and, in many cases, fear
of prosecution for corruption effectively paralyzed much of the
Government of Iraq's spending. In 2007, an intense focus and
training on budget execution at the highest levels of the
Government of Iraq bolstered technical capacity and encouraged
action, though capacity constraints persist. As a result,
according to Ministry of Finance (MOF) data through mid-July
2007, total Government of Iraq ministries have already spent
approximately 24 percent of their 2007 capital budgets.
Ministerial allocation and spending are also moving ahead,
with the most successful ministries being key service
providers, such as Oil, Electricity, Housing, Municipalities
and Public Works, Planning, and Education. These select
ministries have all spent at least 21 percent of their 2007
capital budget, with some committing as much as 57 percent.
Some ministries remain challenged in the face of capacity
constraints and problems associated with lack of security and
will continue to be monitored appropriately.
Provincial Reconstruction Team data indicate that
provincial governments have committed over 47 percent of their
2007 capital budgets. Provinces also continue to spend their
remaining 2006 funds and are estimated by the MOF to have
committed 100 percent of these funds, most of which were
received in late December 2006.
The province of al-Anbar exemplifies the improvement in
provincial budget execution. On June 4,2007, the Anbar
Provincial Council approved its province's capital budget. It
then issued a call for tenders, analyzed the bids, and signed
the first 17 contracts in a public ceremony on August 13, 2007.
Over half of the remaining contracts to spend the rest of the
provincial budget are ready for signature, bringing al-Anbar's
spending commitments to $25 million as of mid-August.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq is making satisfactory
progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces. The
full $10 billion capital budget is allocated, although spending
units will not be able to spend all these funds by the end of
2007 given the long-term nature of some capital projects. The
Ministry of Planning Development and Cooperation and the
Ministry of Finance have released 30 percent of 2007 budgeted
capital funds to Iraqi government ministries, as well as 24
percent of 2007 budgeted capital funds to regions and
provinces. Processing of Letters of Credit has improved,
benefiting the Ministry of Electricity and other ministries
that rely on international procurement. The Ministry of
Planning Development and Cooperation is demonstrating
leadership on procurement policy and technical assistance.
Despite these efforts and its stronger performance relative
to last year, the Government of Iraq is unlikely to spend its
entire $10 billion capital budget by the end of 2007.
Nevertheless, it should be highlighted that both ministries and
provinces are executing a greater percentage of much larger
capital budgets, which significantly increases ministry and
provincial expenditures on an absolute dollar basis.
(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not
undermining or making false accusations against members of the
ISF.
Progress is clearly being made in this area, though the
overall effect is difficult to accurately assess. The maturing
of the inspectors general system and the continued education of
commanders at all levels are positive signs. The Council of
Representatives' approval of the Military Justice Law and
improvements in the judicial system have helped to
institutionalize the rule of law and stand in marked contrast
to the legacy of former regime practices.
Sectarian bias is not limited to Shi'a officials, as some
Sunni politicians have made baseless claims against ISF
officials who are Shi'a. It appears from anecdotal evidence
that some Iraqi authorities may not be pursuing some of these
allegations. It is difficult to determine whether these
accusations result from actual misconduct, inaccurate
reporting, or the sectarian-bias of Iraqi political
authorities. We continue to challenge the Government of Iraq to
investigate each one and take action, as appropriate.
The Prime Minister and his ministerial council are trying
to curb this problem. We will push for improvements, although
the key to success will be our ability to institutionalize the
rule of law in government practices. At the same time we will
continue to press Iraqi political leaders to investigate and
then confront those who make baseless accusations against ISF
leaders for sectarian and political gain.
Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made
satisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraq's political
authorities are not undermining or making false accusations
against members of the ISF. Though there is weekly evidence of
a more determined effort by the Government of Iraq to address
these issues and seek resolution, there remains much work to be
done in this benchmark. The historical challenge inherent in
Iraq, compounded by the damage done by sectarian violence
following the Samarra Mosque bombing, remains a challenge that
will only be fully solved by education and time.
APPENDIX I
Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq, General David H. Petraeus,
Commander, Multi-National Force--Iraq, 10-11 September 2007
Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committees,
thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the
security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I
recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward.
At the outset, I would like to note that this is my
testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and
recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony
myself. It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in
the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.
As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the
surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in
the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq,
Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have achieved progress in
the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven
across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq
has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the numbers of
incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest levels seen since
June 2006.
One reason for the decline in incidents is that Coalition
and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq.
Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we
have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the
initiative in many areas.
We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing
the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported
Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah
operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq.
Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-
sectarian violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-
sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since
the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number
of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this
period, although the numbers in each area are still at
troubling levels.
Iraqi Security Forces have also continued to grow and to
shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing
concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in
their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been
standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they
have taken the lead in operations in many areas.
Additionally, in what may be the most significant
development of the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of Al
Qaeda that started in Anbar Province and helped produce such
significant change there has now spread to a number of other
locations as well.
Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we
can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be
able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade
combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security
gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.
Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq
remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright
frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our
objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither
quick nor easy.
Having provided that summary, I would like to review the
nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the
surge, describe the current situation, and explain the
recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the
way ahead in Iraq.
THE NATURE OF THE CONFLICT
The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is
competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power
and resources. This competition will take place, and its
resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new
Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more-
or less-violently. This chart shows the security challenges in
Iraq. Foreign and home-grown terrorists, insurgents, militia
extremists, and criminals all push the ethno-sectarian
competition toward violence. Malign actions by Syria and,
especially, by Iran fuel that violence. Lack of adequate
governmental capacity, lingering sectarian mistrust, and
various forms of corruption add to Iraq's challenges.
THE SITUATION IN DECEMBER 2006 AND THE SURGE
In our recent efforts to look to the future, we found it
useful to revisit the past. In December 2006, during the height
of the ethno-sectarian violence that escalated in the wake of
the bombing of the Golden Dome Mosque in Samarra, the leaders
in Iraq at that time--General George Casey and Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad--concluded that the coalition was failing to
achieve its objectives. Their review underscored the need to
protect the population and reduce sectarian violence,
especially in Baghdad. As a result, General Casey requested
additional forces to enable the Coalition to accomplish these
tasks, and those forces began to flow in January.
In the ensuing months, our forces and our Iraqi
counterparts have focused on improving security, especially in
Baghdad and the areas around it, wresting sanctuaries from Al
Qaeda control, and disrupting the efforts of the Iranian-
supported militia extremists. We have employed
counterinsurgency practices that underscore the importance of
units living among the people they are securing, and
accordingly, our forces have established dozens of joint
security stations and patrol bases manned by Coalition and
Iraqi forces in Baghdad and in other areas across Iraq.
In mid-June, with all the surge brigades in place, we
launched a series of offensive operations focused on: expanding
the gains achieved in the preceding months in Anbar Province;
clearing Baqubah, several key Baghdad neighborhoods, the
remaining sanctuaries in Anbar Province, and important areas in
the so-called ``belts'' around Baghdad; and pursuing Al Qaeda
in the Diyala River Valley and several other areas.
Throughout this period, as well, we engaged in dialogue
with insurgent groups and tribes, and this led to additional
elements standing up to oppose Al Qaeda and other extremists.
We also continued to emphasize the development of the Iraqi
Security Forces and we employed nonkinetic means to exploit the
opportunities provided by the conduct of our kinetic
operations--aided in this effort by the arrival of additional
Provincial Reconstruction Teams.
CURRENT SITUATION AND TRENDS
The progress our forces have achieved with our Iraqi
counterparts has, as I noted at the outset, been substantial.
While there have been setbacks as well as successes and tough
losses along the way, overall, our tactical commanders and I
see improvements in the security environment. We do not,
however, just rely on gut feel or personal observations; we
also conduct considerable data collection and analysis to gauge
progress and determine trends. We do this by gathering and
refining data from coalition and Iraqi operations centers,
using a methodology that has been in place for well over a year
and that has benefited over the past seven months from the
increased presence of our forces living among the Iraqi people.
We endeavor to ensure our analysis of that data is conducted
with rigor and consistency, as our ability to achieve a nuanced
understanding of the security environment is dependent on
collecting and analyzing data in a consistent way over time.
Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our
methodology, and they concluded that the data we produce is the
most accurate and authoritative in Iraq.
As I mentioned up front, and as the chart before you
reflects, the level of security incidents has decreased
significantly since the start of the surge of offensive
operations in mid-June, declining in 8 of the past 12 weeks,
with the level of incidents in the past two weeks the lowest
since June 2006 and with the number of attacks this past week
the lowest since April 2006.
Civilian deaths of all categories, less natural causes,
have also declined considerably, by over 45% Iraq-wide since
the height of the sectarian violence in December. This is shown
by the top line on this chart, and the decline by some 70% in
Baghdad is shown by the bottom line. Periodic mass casualty
attacks by Al Qaeda have tragically added to the numbers
outside Baghdad, in particular. Even without the sensational
attacks, however, the level of civilian deaths is clearly still
too high and continues to be of serious concern.
As the next chart shows, the number of ethno-sectarian
deaths, an important subset of the overall civilian casualty
figures, has also declined significantly since the height of
the sectarian violence in December. Iraq-wide, as shown by the
top line on this chart, the number of ethno-sectarian deaths
has come down by over 55%, and it would have come down much
further were it not for the casualties inflicted by barbaric Al
Qaeda bombings attempting to reignite sectarian violence. In
Baghdad, as the bottom line shows, the number of ethno-
sectarian deaths has come down by some 80% since December. This
chart also displays the density of sectarian incidents in
various Baghdad neighborhoods and it both reflects the progress
made in reducing ethno-sectarian violence in the Iraqi capital
and identifies the areas that remain the most challenging.
As we have gone on the offensive in former Al Qaeda and
insurgent sanctuaries, and as locals have increasingly
supported our efforts, we have found a substantially increased
number of arms, ammunition, and explosives caches. As this
chart shows, we have, so far this year, already found and
cleared over 4,400 caches, nearly 1,700 more than we discovered
in all of last year. This may be a factor in the reduction in
the number of overall improvised explosive device attacks in
recent months, which as this chart shows, has declined sharply,
by about one-third, since June.
The change in the security situation in Anbar Province has,
of course, been particularly dramatic. As this chart shows,
monthly attack levels in Anbar have declined from some 1,350 in
October 2006 to a bit over 200 in August of this year. This
dramatic decrease reflects the significance of the local
rejection of Al Qaeda and the newfound willingness of local
Anbaris to volunteer to serve in the Iraqi Army and Iraqi
Police Service. As I noted earlier, we are seeing similar
actions in other locations, as well.
To be sure, trends have not been uniformly positive across
Iraq, as is shown by this chart depicting violence levels in
several key Iraqi provinces. The trend in Nineveh Province, for
example, has been much more up and down, until a recent
decline, and the same is true in Sala ad Din Province, though
recent trends there and in Baghdad have been in the right
direction. In any event, the overall trajectory in Iraq--a
steady decline of incidents in the past three months--is still
quite significant.
The number of car bombings and suicide attacks has also
declined in each of the past 5 months, from a high of some 175
in March, as this chart shows, to about 90 this past month.
While this trend in recent months has been heartening, the
number of high profile attacks is still too high, and we
continue to work hard to destroy the networks that carry out
these barbaric attacks.
Our operations have, in fact, produced substantial progress
against Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq. As this chart
shows, in the past 8 months, we have considerably reduced the
areas in which Al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also
neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of
Al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key
leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is
certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance and we are
pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively. Of note, as
the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq explained,
these gains against Al Qaeda are a result of the synergy of
actions by: conventional forces to deny the terrorists
sanctuary; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
assets to find the enemy; and special operations elements to
conduct targeted raids. A combination of these assets is
necessary to prevent the creation of a terrorist safe haven in
Iraq.
In the past six months we have also targeted Shia militia
extremists, capturing a number of senior leaders and fighters,
as well as the deputy commander of Lebanese Hezbollah
Department 2800, the organization created to support the
training, arming, funding, and, in some cases, direction of the
militia extremists by the Iranian Republican Guard Corps' Qods
Force. These elements have assassinated and kidnapped Iraqi
governmental leaders, killed and wounded our soldiers with
advanced explosive devices provided by Iran, and
indiscriminately rocketed civilians in the International Zone
and elsewhere. It is increasingly apparent to both Coalition
and Iraqi leaders that Iran, through the use of the Qods Force,
seeks to turn the Iraqi Special Groups into a Hezbollah-like
force to serve its interests and fight a proxy war against the
Iraqi state and coalition forces in Iraq.
The most significant development in the past six months
likely has been the increasing emergence of tribes and local
citizens rejecting Al Qaeda and other extremists. This has, of
course, been most visible in Anbar Province. A year ago the
province was assessed as ``lost'' politically. Today, it is a
model of what happens when local leaders and citizens decide to
oppose Al Qaeda and reject its Taliban-like ideology. While
Anbar is unique and the model it provides cannot be replicated
everywhere in Iraq, it does demonstrate the dramatic change in
security that is possible with the support and participation of
local citizens. As this chart shows, other tribes have been
inspired by the actions of those in Anbar and have volunteered
to fight extremists as well. We have, in coordination with the
Iraqi government's National Reconciliation Committee, been
engaging these tribes and groups of local citizens who want to
oppose extremists and to contribute to local security. Some
20,000 such individuals are already being hired for the Iraqi
Police, thousands of others are being assimilated into the
Iraqi Army, and thousands more are vying for a spot in Iraq's
Security Forces.
IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
As I noted earlier, Iraqi Security Forces have continued to
grow, to develop their capabilities, and to shoulder more of
the burden of providing security for their country. Despite
concerns about sectarian influence, inadequate logistics and
supporting institutions, and an insufficient number of
qualified commissioned and non-commissioned officers, Iraqi
units are engaged around the country.
As this chart shows, there are now nearly 140 Iraqi Army,
National Police, and Special Operations Forces Battalions in
the fight, with about 95 of those capable of taking the lead in
operations, albeit with some coalition support. Beyond that,
all of Iraq's battalions have been heavily involved in combat
operations that often result in the loss of leaders, soldiers,
and equipment. These losses are among the shortcomings
identified by operational readiness assessments, but we should
not take from these assessments the impression that Iraqi
forces are not in the fight and contributing. Indeed, despite
their shortages, many Iraqi units across Iraq now operate with
minimal coalition assistance.
As counterinsurgency operations require substantial numbers
of boots on the ground, we are helping the Iraqis expand the
size of their security forces. Currently, there are some
445,000 individuals on the payrolls of Iraq's Interior and
Defense Ministries. Based on recent decisions by Prime Minister
Maliki, the number of Iraq's security forces will grow further
by the end of this year, possibly by as much as 40,000. Given
the security challenges Iraq faces, we support this decision,
and we will work with the two security ministries as they
continue their efforts to expand their basic training capacity,
leader development programs, logistical structures and
elements, and various other institutional capabilities to
support the substantial growth in Iraqi forces.
Significantly, in 2007, Iraq will, as in 2006, spend more
on its security forces than it will receive in security
assistance from the United States. In fact, Iraq is becoming
one of the United States' larger foreign military sales
customers, committing some $1.6 billion to FMS already, with
the possibility of up to $1.8 billion more being committed
before the end of this year. And I appreciate the attention
that some members of Congress have recently given to speeding
up the FMS process for Iraq.
To summarize, the security situation in Iraq is improving,
and Iraqis' elements are slowly taking on more of the
responsibility for protecting their citizens. Innumerable
challenges lie ahead; however, Coalition and Iraqi Security
Forces have made progress toward achieving sustainable
security. As a result, the United States will be in a position
to reduce its forces in Iraq in the months ahead.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Two weeks ago I provided recommendations for the way ahead
in Iraq to the members of my chain of command and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. The essence of the approach I recommended is
captured in its title: ``Security While Transitioning: From
Leading to Partnering to Overwatch.'' This approach seeks to
build on the security improvements our troopers and our Iraqi
counterparts have fought so hard to achieve in recent months.
It reflects recognition of the importance of securing the
population and the imperative of transitioning responsibilities
to Iraqi institutions and Iraqi forces as quickly as possible,
but without rushing to failure. It includes substantial support
for the continuing development of Iraqi Security Forces. It
also stresses the need to continue the counterinsurgency
strategy that we have been employing, but with Iraqis gradually
shouldering more of the load. And it highlights the importance
of regional and global diplomatic approaches. Finally, in
recognition of the fact that this war is not only being fought
on the ground in Iraq but also in cyberspace, it also notes the
need to contest the enemy's growing use of that important
medium to spread extremism.
The recommendations I provided were informed by operational
and strategic considerations. The operational considerations
include recognition that:
military aspects of the surge have achieved
progress and generated momentum;
Iraqi Security Forces have continued to grow and
have slowly been shouldering more of the security burden in
Iraq;
a mission focus on either population security or
transition alone will not be adequate to achieve our
objectives;
success against Al Qaeda-Iraq and Iranian-
supported militia extremists requires conventional forces as
well as special operations forces; and
the security and local political situations will
enable us to draw down the surge forces.
My recommendations also took into account a number of
strategic considerations:
political progress will take place only if
sufficient security exists;
long-term U.S. ground force viability will benefit
from force reductions as the surge runs its course;
regional, global, and cyberspace initiatives are
critical to success; and
Iraqi leaders understandably want to assume
greater sovereignty in their country, although, as they
recently announced, they do desire continued presence of
coalition forces in Iraq in 2008 under a new U.N. Security
Council Resolution and, followingthat, they want to negotiate a
long term security agreement with the United States and other nations.
Based on these considerations, and having worked the
battlefield geometry with Lieutenant General Ray Odierno to
ensure that we retain and build on the gains for which our
troopers have fought, I have recommended a drawdown of the
surge forces from Iraq. In fact, later this month, the Marine
Expeditionary Unit deployed as part of the surge will depart
Iraq. Beyond that, if my recommendations are approved, that
unit's departure will be followed by the withdrawal of a
brigade combat team without replacement in mid-December and the
further redeployment without replacement of four other brigade
combat teams and the two surge Marine battalions in the first 7
months of 2008, until we reach the pre-surge level of 15
brigade combat teams by mid-July 2008.
I would also like to discuss the period beyond next summer.
Force reductions will continue beyond the pre-surge levels of
brigade combat teams that we will reach by mid-July 2008;
however, in my professional judgment, it would be premature to
make recommendations on the pace of such reductions at this
time. In fact, our experience in Iraq has repeatedly shown that
projecting too far into the future is not just difficult, it
can be misleading and even hazardous. The events of the past
six months underscore that point. When I testified in January,
for example, no one would have dared to forecast that Anbar
Province would have been transformed the way it has in the past
6 months. Nor would anyone have predicted that volunteers in
onetime Al Qaeda strongholds like Ghazaliyah in western Baghdad
or in Adamiya in eastern Baghdad would seek to join the fight
against Al Qaeda. Nor would we have anticipated that a Shia-led
government would accept significant numbers of Sunni volunteers
into the ranks of the local police force in Abu Ghraib. Beyond
that, on a less encouraging note, none of us earlier this year
appreciated the extent of Iranian involvement in Iraq,
something about which we and Iraq's leaders all now have
greater concern.
In view of this, I do not believe it is reasonable to have
an adequate appreciation for the pace of further reductions and
mission adjustments beyond the summer of 2008 until about mid-
March of next year. We will, no later than that time, consider
factors similar to those on which I based the current
recommendations, having by then, of course, a better feel for
the security situation, the improvements in the capabilities of
our Iraqi counterparts, and the enemy situation. I will then,
as I did in developing the recommendations I have explained
here today, also take into consideration the demands on our
Nation's ground forces, although I believe that that
consideration should once again inform, not drive, the
recommendations I make.
This chart captures the recommendations I have described,
showing the recommended reduction of brigade combat teams as
the surge runs its course and illustrating the concept of our
units adjusting their missions and transitioning
responsibilities to Iraqis, as the situation and Iraqi
capabilities permit. It also reflects the no-later-than date
for recommendations on force adjustments beyond next summer and
provides a possible approach we have considered for the future
force structure and mission set in Iraq.
One may argue that the best way to speed the process in
Iraq is to change the MNF-I mission from one that emphasizes
population security, counterterrorism, and transition, to one
that is strictly focused on transition and counterterrorism.
Making that change now would, in our view, be premature. We
have learned before that there is a real danger in handing over
tasks to the Iraqi Security Forces before their capacity and
local conditions warrant. In fact, the drafters of the recently
released National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq recognized this
danger when they wrote, and I quote, ``We assess that changing
the mission of Coalition forces from a primarily
counterinsurgency and stabilization role to a primary combat
support role for Iraqi forces and counterterrorist operations
to prevent AQI trom establishing a safe haven would erode
security gains achieved thus far.''
In describing the recommendations I have made, I should
note again that, like Ambassador Crocker, I believe Iraq's
problems will require a long-term effort. There are no easy
answers or quick solutions. And though we both believe this
effort can succeed, it will take time. Our assessments
underscore, in fact, the importance of recognizing that a
premature drawdown of our forces would likely have devastating
consequences.
That assessment is supported by the findings of a 16 August
Defense Intelligence Agency report on the implications of a
rapid withdrawal of US forces trom Iraq. Summarizing it in an
unclassified fashion, it concludes that a rapid withdrawal
would result in the further release of the strong centrifugal
forces in Iraq and produce a number of dangerous results,
including a high risk of disintegration of the Iraqi Security
Forces; rapid deterioration of local security initiatives; Al
Qaeda-Iraq regaining lost ground and freedom of maneuver; a
marked increase in violence and further ethno-sectarian
displacement and refugee flows; alliances of convenience by
Iraqi groups with internal and external forces to gain
advantages over their rivals; and exacerbation of already
challenging regional dynamics, especially with respect to Iran.
Lieutenant General Odierno and I share this assessment and
believe that the best way to secure our national interests and
avoid an unfavorable outcome in Iraq is to continue to focus
our operations on securing the Iraqi people while targeting
terrorist groups and militia extremists and, as quickly as
conditions are met, transitioning security tasks to Iraqi
elements.
CLOSING COMMENTS
Before closing, I want to thank you and your colleagues for
your support of our men and women in uniform in Iraq. The
Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Coast Guardsmen with
whom I'm honored to serve are the best equipped and, very
likely, the most professional force in our nation's history.
Impressively, despite all that has been asked of them in recent
years, they continue to raise their right hands and volunteer
to stay in uniform. With three weeks to go in this fiscal year,
in fact, the Army elements in Iraq, for example, have achieved
well over 130% of the reenlistment goals in the initial term
and careerist categories and nearly 115% in the midcareer
category. All of us appreciate what you have done to ensure
that these great troopers have had what they've needed to
accomplish their mission, just as we appreciate what you have
done to take care of their families, as they, too, have made
significant sacrifices in recent years.
The advances you have underwritten in weapons systems and
individual equipment; in munitions; in command, control, and
communications systems; in intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities; in vehicles and counter-IED
systems and programs; and in mannedand unmanned aircraft have
proven invaluable in Iraq. The capabilities that you have funded most
recently--especially the vehicles that will provide greater protection
against improvised explosive devices--are also of enormous importance.
Additionally, your funding of the Commander's Emergency Response
Program has given our leaders a critical tool with which to prosecute
the counterinsurgency campaign. Finally, we appreciate as well your
funding of our new detention programs and rule of law initiatives in
Iraq.
In closing, it remains an enormous privilege to soldier
again in Iraq with America's new ``Greatest Generation.'' Our
country's men and women in uniform have done a magnificent job
in the most complex and challenging environment imaginable. All
Americans should be very proud of their sons and daughters
serving in Iraq today.
Thank you very much.
APPENDIX II
Statement of Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, United States Ambassador to
the Republic of Iraq, Before a Joint Hearing of the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services, September 10, 2007
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman,
Thank you for the opportunity to address Congress this
week. I have considered it a privilege and an honor to serve in
Iraq at a time when so much is at stake for our country and the
people of the region--and when so many Americans of the highest
caliber in our military and civilian services are doing the
same. I know that a heavy responsibility weighs on my shoulders
to provide the country with my best, most honest assessment of
the situation in Iraq and the implications for the United
States.
Americans, in this chamber and beyond, are looking for more
than an update on the latest events. They want to know the
answers to some key questions. Are our objectives realistic? Is
it possible that Iraq will become a united, stable country with
a democratic government operating under the rule of law? What
is the trajectory--is Iraq, on the whole, moving in the right
direction? Can we expect more and under what time frame? Are
there alternative courses of action for our country which are
superior?
These are sensible questions to be asked by a nation
investing in and sacrificing for another country and people. In
asking these questions, however, we must not lose sight of the
vital interests the United States has in a successful outcome
in Iraq.
My intention today is to give you an assessment of
political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq. In
doing so, I will not minimize the enormity of the challenges
faced by Iraqis, nor the complexity of the situation. Yet at
the same time, I intend to demonstrate that it is possible for
the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that
Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems
confronting them today. A secure, stable democratic Iraq at
peace with its neighbors is attainable. In my judgment, the
cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and diplomatic
developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that
line is not steep. The process will not be quick, it will be
uneven, punctuated by setbacks as well as achievements, and it
will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment. There
will be no single moment at which we can claim victory; any
turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect.
This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a
disheartening one. I have found it helpful, during my time in
Iraq to reflect on our own history. At many points in the early
years, our survival as a nation was questionable. Our efforts
to build the institutions of government were not always
successful in the first instance. And tough issues--such as
slavery, universal suffrage, civil rights, and state rights--
were resolved only after acrimonious debate and sometimes
violence.
Iraq is experiencing a revolution--not just regime change.
It is only by understanding this that we can appreciate what is
happening in Iraq and what Iraqis have achieved, as well as
maintain a sense of realism about the challenges that remain.
CONTEXT
Evaluating where Iraqis are today only makes sense in the
context of where they have been. Any Iraqi under 40 years old--
and that is the overwhelming majority of the population--would
have known nothing but the rule of the Ba'ath party before
liberation four and a half years ago. Those 35 years were
filled with crimes against humanity on every scale. Saddam
Hussein ruled without any mercy, not hesitating to use lethal
force and torture against even those in his inner circle. His
genocidal campaign against the Kurds and savagery toward
southern Shi'a are well known. But he also used violence and
intimidation as tools in the complete deconstruction of Iraqi
society. No organization or institution survived that was not
linked in some way to regime protection. He created a pervasive
climate of fear in which even family members were afraid to
talk to one another.
This is the legacy that Iraqis had as their history when
Saddam's statue came down on April 9, 2003. No Nelson Mandela
existed to emerge on the national political scene; anyone with
his leadership talents would have not survived. A new Iraq had
to be built almost literally from scratch, and the builders in
most cases were themselves reduced to their most basic
identity, ethnic or sectarian.
Much progress has been made, particularly in building an
institutional framework where there was none before. But rather
than being a period in which old animosities and suspicions
were overcome, the past 18 months, in particular, have further
strained Iraqi society. The sectarian violence of 2006 and
early 2007 had its seeds in Saddam's social deconstruction and
it had dire consequences for the people of Iraq as well as its
politics. Extensive displacement and widespread sectarian
killings by al-Qa'ida and other extremist groups have gnawed
away atthe already frayed fabric of Iraqi society and politics.
It is no exaggeration to say that Iraq is--and will remain for some
time--a traumatized society.
NATIONAL POLITICS
It is against this backdrop that developments in Iraq must
be seen. Iraqis are facing some of the most profound political,
economic, and security challenges imaginable. They are not
simply grappling with the issue of who rules Iraq--but they are
asking what kind of country Iraq will be, how it will be
governed, and how Iraqis will share power and resources among
each other. The constitution approved in a referendum in 2005
answered some of these questions in theory, but much remains
uncertain in both law and practice.
Some of the more promising political developments at the
national level are neither measured in benchmarks nor visible
to those far from Baghdad. For instance, there is a budding
debate about federalism among Iraq's leaders and, importantly,
within the Sunni community. Those living in place like al-Anbar
and Salahaddin are beginning to realize how localities having
more of a say in daily decision making will empower their
communities. No longer is an all-powerful Baghdad seen as the
panacea to Iraq's problems. This thinking is nascent, but it is
ultimately critical to the evolution of a common vision among
all Iraqi leaders.
Similarly, there is a palpable frustration in Baghdad over
the sectarian system that was used to divide the spoils of the
state in the last few years. Leaders from all communities
openly acknowledge that a focus on sectarian gains has led to
poor governance and served Iraqis badly. And many claim to be
ready to make the sacrifices that will be needed to put
government performance ahead of sectarian and ethnic concerns.
Such ideas are no longer controversial, although their
application will be.
Finally, we are seeing Iraqis come to terms with complex
issues not by first providing a national framework, but instead
by tackling immediate problems. One such example is how the
central government has accepted over 1700 young men from the
Abu Ghurayb area west of Baghdad, including former members of
insurgent groups, to be part of the Iraqi security forces.
Another is how the government, without much public fanfare, has
contacted thousands of members of the former Iraqi army,
offering them retirement, return to the military, or public
sector employment. So without the proclamation of a general
amnesty, we see amnesty being granted, and deba'athification
reform in advance of national legislation. In both instances,
the seeds of reconciliation are being planted.
Our country, however, has come to associate progress on
national reconciliation as meaning the passage of key pieces of
legislation. There is logic to this, as the legislation we are
urging the Iraqis to produce does--in one way or another--have
to do with the question of how to share power and resources
among Iraq's many communities. This legislation also has to do
with the vision of the future Iraqi state. The oil and revenues
sharing laws, for instance, deal with deeper issues than simply
whether Iraqis in oil producing areas are willing to share
their wealth with other Iraqis. What is difficult about the oil
laws is that they take Iraq another step down the road toward a
federal system that all Iraqis have not yet embraced. But once
again, we see that even in the absence of legislation there is
practical action as the central government shares oil revenues
through budget allocations on an equitable basis with Iraq's
provinces.
In many respects, the debates currently occurring in Iraq
are akin to those surrounding our civil rights movement or
struggle, over states rights. With deba'athification, Iraqis
are struggling to come to terms with a vicious past. They are
trying to balance fear that the Ba'ath party would one day
return to power with the recognition that many former members
of the party are guilty of no crime and joined the organization
not to repress others but for personal survival. With
provincial powers, they are grappling with very serious
questions about what the right balance between the center and
the periphery is for Iraq. Some see the devolution of power to
regions and provinces as being the best insurance against the
rise of a future tyrannical figure in Baghdad. Others see Iraq,
with its complex demographics, as in need of a strong central
authority.
In short, we should not be surpised or dismayed that Iraqis
have not fully resolved such issues. Rather, we should ask
whether the way in which they are approaching such issues gives
us a sense of their seriousness and ultimate capability to
resolve Iraq's fundamental problems. Is the collective national
leadership of Iraq ready to prioritize Iraq over sectarian and
community interests? Can and will they come to agreement about
what sort of Iraq they want?
I do believe that Iraq's leaders have the will to tackle
the country's pressing problems, although it will take longer
than we originally anticipated because of the environment and
the gravity of the issues before them. Prime Minister al-Maliki
and the other Iraqi leaders face enormous obstacles in their
efforts to govern effectively. They approach the task will a
deep sense of commitment and patriotism. An important part of
this positive judgment was the effort made by the leaders this
past summer. After weeks of preparatory work and many days of
intensive meetings, Iraq's five most prominent national leaders
from the three major communities issued a communique on August
26 that noted agreement on draft legislation dealing with de-
ba'athification and provincial powers. This agreement by no
means solves all of Iraq's problems. But the commitment of its
leaders to work together on hard issues is encouraging.
Perhaps most significantly, these five Iraqi leaders
together decided to publicly express their joint desire to
develop a long-term relationship with the United States.
Despite their many differences in perspectives and experiences,
they all agreed on language acknowledging the need for a
continued presence by the multinational forces in Iraq and
expressing gratitude for the sacrifices these forces have made
for Iraqis.
PROVINCIAL AND LOCAL POLITICS
At the provincial level, political gains have been more
pronounced, particularly in the north and west of Iraq where
the security improvements have been in some places dramatic. In
these areas, there is abundant evidence that the security gains
have opened the door for meaningful politics.
In al-Anbar, the progress on the security side has been
extraordinary. Six months ago, violence was rampant, our forces
were under daily attack, and Iraqis were cowering from the
intimidation of al-Qa'ida. But al-Qa'ida overplayed its hand in
al-Anbar and Anbaris began to reject its excesses--be they
beheading school children or cutting off peoples' fingers as
punishment for smoking. Recognizing the Coalition could help
eject al-Qa'ida, the tribes began to fight with us, not against
us, and the landscape in al-Anbar is dramatically different as
a result. Tribal representatives are on the provincial council,
which is now meeting regularly to find ways of restoring
services, developing the economy, and executing a provincial
budget. These leaders are looking for help to rebuild their
cities and talking of attracting investment. Such scenes are
also unfolding in parts of Diyala and Ninewa, where Iraqis have
mobilized with the help of the Coalition and Iraqi security
forces to evict al-Qa'ida from their communities. The world
should note that when al-Qa'ida began implementing its twisted
vision of the Caliphate in Iraq, Iraqis, from al-Anbar to
Baghdad to Diyala', have overwhelmingly rejected it.
Shi'a extremists are also facing rejection. Recent attacks
by elements of the Iranian-backed Jaysh al-Mahdi on worshipers
in the holy city of Karbala have provoked a backlash and
triggered a call by Muqtada as-Sadr for Jaysh al-Mahdi to cease
attacks against Iraqis and coalition forces.
A key challenge for Iraqis now is to link these positive
developments in the provinces to the central government in
Baghdad. Unlike our states, Iraqi provinces have little ability
to generate funds through taxation, making them dependent on
the central government for resources. The growing ability of
the provinces to design and execute budgets and the readiness
of the central, government to resource them are success
stories. On September 5, Iraq's senior federal leadership
traveled to al-Anbar where they announced a 70% increase in the
2007 provincial capital budget as well as $50 million to
compensate losses in the fight against al-Qa'ida. The support
of the central government is also needed to maintain hard-won
security in areas like al-Anbar through the rapid expansion of
locally-generated police. The Government of Iraq has placed
some 21,000 Anbaris on police roles.
ECONOMICS AND CAPACITY BUILDING
Iraq is starting to make some gains in the economy.
Improving security is stimulating revival of markets, with the
active participation of local communities. War damage is being
cleared and buildings repaired, roads and sewers built and
commerce energized.
The IMF estimates that economic growth will exceed six
percent for 2007. Iraqi ministries and provincial councils have
made substantial progress this year in utilizing Iraq's oil
revenue for investment. The 2007 governmental budget allocated
$10 billion (nearly one-third Iraq's expected oil export
revenue) to capital investment. Over $3 billion was allocated
to the provinces and the Kurdish Region for spending. The
latest data show that spending units (national ministries, and
provincial councils) have proceeded to commit these funds at
more than twice the rate of last year. Doing the best are the
provincial authorities, in the process gaining experience with
making plans and decisions, and running fair tenders. In so
doing, they are stimulating local business development and
providing employment. Over time we expect the experience with
more responsive local authorities will change Iraqi attitudes
towards their elected leaders, and of the provinces towards
Baghdad.
At two conferences in Dubai in the last two weeks, hundreds
of Iraqi businessmen met an equal number of foreign investors
newly interested in acquiring shares of businesses in Iraq. An
auction of cell phone spectrum conducted by Pricewaterhouse
Coopers netted the Government a better-than-expected sum of
$3.75 billion. The Minister of Finance plans to use the funds,
along with all the country's oil revenue, to apply to its
pressing investment and current expenditure needs.
Overall, however, the Iraqi economy is performing
significantly under potential. Insecurity in the countryside
raises transport costs and especially affects manufacturing and
agriculture. Electricity supply has improved in many parts of
the country, but is woefully inadequate in Baghdad. Many
neighborhoods in the city receive two hours a day or less from
the national grid, although power supplies for essential
services such as water pumping stations or hospitals are much
better. The Minister of Electricity said last week that it
would take $25 billion through 2016 to meet demand
requirements, but that by investing the $2billion a year the
Ministry is now receiving from the government's budget, as well as
private investment in power generation, that goal could be met.
We are deploying our assistance funds to make a difference
to ordinary Iraqis and to support our political objectives.
Military units are using Commanders Emergency Response (CERP)
funds to ensure that residents see a difference when
neighborhood violence declines. USAID Community Stabilization
Funds provide tens of thousands of jobs. With the recent
apportionment of 2007 Supplemental funds, we are putting
``Quick Response Funds'' in the hands of our Provincial
Reconstruction Team leaders to build communities and
institutions in post-kinetic environments. Vocational training
and microfinance programs are supporting nascent private
businesses. And in Baghdad, we are increasing our engagement
and capacity building efforts with ministries.
REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS
There is expanding international and regional engagement
with Iraq. In August, the UN Security Council, at Iraq's
invitation, provided the United Nations Assistance Mission in
Iraq (UNAMI) with an expanded mandate through UNSCR 1770. The
work of the International Compact with Iraq moves forward,
jointly chaired by Iraq and the UN. Seventy-four countries
pledged support for Iraq's economic reform efforts at a
Ministerial Conference in May. The UN has reported progress in
75% of the 400 areas Iraq has identified for action. Later this
month, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the UN Secretary General
will chair a ministerial-level meeting in New York to discuss
further progress under the Compact and how UNSCR 1770 can be
most effectively implemented.
Many of Iraq's neighbors recognize that they have a stake
in the outcome of the current conflict in Iraq, and are
engaging with Iraq in a constructive way. A neighbors'
ministerial in May, also attended by the P-5 and the G-8, has
been followed by meetings of working groups on security, border
issues, and energy. An ambassadorial level meeting just took
place in Baghdad, and another neighbors' ministerial will be
held in Istanbul in October.
Against the backdrop of these new mechanisms, the business
of being neighbors is quietly unfolding. For the first time in
years, Iraq is exporting oil through its neighbor, Turkey, as
well as through the Gulf. Iraq and Kuwait are nearing
conclusion on a commercial deal for Kuwait to supply its
northern neighbor with critically needed diesel. Jordan
recently issued a statement welcoming the recent leaders'
communique and supporting Iraqi efforts at reconciliation. And
Saudi Arabia is planning on opening an Embassy in Baghdad--its
first since the fall of Saddam.
Syria's role has been more problematic. On one hand, Syria
has hosted a meeting of the border security working group and
interdicted some foreign terrorists in transit to Iraq. On the
other hand, suicide-bombers continue to cross the border from
Syria to murder Iraqi civilians.
Iran plays a harmful role in Iraq. While claiming to
support Iraq in its transition, Iran has actively undermined it
by providing lethal capabilities to the enemies of the Iraqi
state. In doing so, the Iranian government seems to ignore the
risks that an unstable Iraq carries for its own interests.
LOOKING AHEAD
2006 was a bad year in Iraq. The country came close to
unraveling politically, economically, and in security terms.
2007 has brought improvement. Enormous challenges remain.
Iraqis still struggle with fundamental questions about how to
share power, accept their differences and overcome their past.
The changes to our strategy last January--the surge--have
helped change the dynamics in Iraq for the better. Our
increased presence made besieged communities feel that they
could defeat al-Qa'ida by working with us. Our population
security measures have made it much harder for terrorists to
conduct attacks. We have given Iraqis the time and space to
reflect on what sort of country they want. Most Iraqis
genuinely accept Iraq as a multi-ethnic, multi-sectarian
society--it is the balance of power that has yet to be sorted
out.
Whether Iraq reaches its potential is of course ultimately
the product of Iraqi decisions. But the involvement and support
of the United States will be hugely important in shaping a
positive outcome. Our country has given a great deal in blood
and treasure to stabilize the situation in Iraq and help Iraqis
build institutions for a united, democratic country governed
under the rule of law. Realizing this vision will take more
time and patience on the part of the United States.
I cannot guarantee success in Iraq. I do believe, as I have
described, that it is attainable. I am certain that abandoning
or drastically curtailing our efforts will bring failure, and
the consequences of such a failure must be clearly understood.
An Iraq that falls into chaos or civil war will mean massive
human suffering--well beyond what has already occurred within
Iraq's borders. It could well invite the intervention of
regional states, all of which see their future connected to
Iraq's in some fundamental way. Undoubtedly, Iran would be a
winner in this scenario, consolidating its influence over Iraqi
resources and possibly territory. The Iranian President has
already announced that Iran will fill any vacuum in Iraq. In
such an environment, the gains made against al-Qa'ida and other
extremists groups could easily evaporate and they could
establish strongholds to be used as safehavens for regional and
international operations. Our current course is hard. The
alternatives are far worse.
Every strategy requires recalibration as time goes on. This
is particularly true in an environment like Iraq where change
is a daily or hourly occurrence. As chief of mission in Iraq, I
am constantly assessing our efforts and seeking to ensure that
they are coordinated with and complementary to the efforts of
our military. I believe that, thanks to the support of
Congress, we have an appropriate civilian posture in Iraq. Over
the coming year, we will continue to increase our civilian
efforts outside of Baghdad and the international zone. This
presence has allowed us to focus on capacity building,
especially in the provinces--units which are likely to grow in
influence as more power devolves from Baghdad. The number of
Provincial Recanstruction Teams has grown from ten to 25 this
year. In support of these goals, we will be asking Congress for
additional economic assistance including additional quick
response funds for capacity building. We will also seek support
for two significant proposals that hold the prospect of
creating permanent jobs for thousands of Iraqis. One would be
the establishment of an ``Iraqi-American Enterprise Fund,''
modeled on our successful funds in Poland and elsewhere in
Central Europe. Such a fund could make equity investments in
new and revamped firms based in Iraq. The second would be a
large-scale operations and maintenance facility based on our
Highway Trust Fund. On a cost-sharing basis, such a fund would
train Iraqis to budget for and maintain important public sector
infrastructure (power plants, dams, roads). Over time, the
cost-sharing would phase down and out, leaving behind well-
trained professionals and instilling the habits of preventative
maintenance.
We will continue our efforts to assist Iraqis in the
pursuit of national reconciliation, while recognizing that
progress on this front may come in many forms and must
ultimately be done by Iraqis themselves. We will seek
additional ways to neutralize regional interference and enhance
regional and international support. And we will help Iraqis
consolidate the positive developments at local levels and
connect them with the national government. Finally, I expect we
will invest much effort in developing the strategic partnership
between the United States and Iraq, which is an investment in
the future of both countries.