[House Document 110-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]






110th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 110-45



 
                INITIAL IRAQ BENCHMARK ASSESSMENT REPORT

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                     THEPRESIDENTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES

                              transmitting

 A REPORT THAT ASSESSES THE STATUS OF EACH OF THE 18 IRAQI BENCHMARKS, 
  CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 1314 OF THE U.S. TROOP READINESS, VETERANS' 
 CARE, KATRINA RECOVERY, AND IRAQ ACCOUNTABILITY APPROPRIATIONS ACT OF 
                          2007, PUB. L. 110-28




    July 13, 2007.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
  Committee on Foreign Affairs and Armed Services, and ordered to be 
                                printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    Consistent with section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, 
Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability 
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the ``Act''), 
attached is the report that assesses the status of each of the 
18 Iraqi benchmarks contained in the Act and declares whether 
satisfactory progress toward meeting these benchmarks is, or is 
not, being achieved.
    This report has been prepared in consultation with the 
Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National 
Forces--Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the 
Commander of United States Central Command.

                                                    George W. Bush.
    The White House, July 12, 2007.
                  Initial Benchmark Assessment Report

                             July 12, 2007

    This report to Congress is submitted consistent with 
Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, 
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 
2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the ``Act''). It includes an 
assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is 
performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific 
benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to 
strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. 
This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent 
with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the 
Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National 
Forces--Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the 
Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with 
Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements 
other reports and information about Iraq provided to the 
Congress and is not intended as a single source of all 
information about the combined efforts or the future strategy 
of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.

                              INTRODUCTION

    Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, 
Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 
2007 (Public Law 110-28) states that the President is to submit 
to Congress two reports assessing the status of each of the 18 
benchmarks contained in the Act and declaring whether, in the 
President's judgment, satisfactory progress is being achieved 
with respect to those 18 benchmarks.
    These benchmarks relate to Government of Iraq actions 
believed to be important to advance reconciliation within Iraqi 
society, to improve the security of the Iraqi population, to 
provide essential services to the population, and to promote 
its economic well-being. These efforts complement other U.S. 
and Iraqi collaborative actions as part of the New Way Forward.

                 CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY: NEW WAY FORWARD

    Current U.S. strategy--the New Way Forward--recognizes that 
the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi 
Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a 
democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, 
and be an ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong 
strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will be an 
important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which 
remains a long-term goal, and requires the application of all 
elements of national power, including especially diplomatic, 
economic, and political power.\1\
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    \1\Over 2007 and into 2008, we are focusing on the following core 
objectives:
    1. Defeat al-Qaida and its supporters and ensure that no terrorist 
safe haven exists in Iraq.
    2. Support Iraqi efforts to quell sectarian violence in Baghdad and 
regain control over the capital.
    3. Ensure the territorial integrity of Iraq and counter/limit 
destructive Iranian and Syrian activity in Iraq.
    4. Help safeguard democracy in Iraq by encouraging strong 
democratic institutions impartially serving all Iraqis and preventing 
the return of the forces of tyranny.
    5. Foster the conditions for Iraqi national reconciliation but with 
the Iraqi Government clearly in the lead.
    6. Continue to strengthen Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and 
accelerate the transition of security responsibility to the Iraqi 
Government.
    7. Encourage an expanding Iraqi economy, including by helping Iraq 
maintain and expand its export of oil to support Iraqi development.
    8. Promote support for Iraq from its neighbors, the region, and the 
international community.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a 
transition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its 
security forces, the New Way Forward recognized that, in 
response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was 
necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a greater 
role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in 
securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace 
Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the 
necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can 
continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts 
against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in 
Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), and can 
meaningfully address the all-important issue of reconciliation 
among the various segments of Iraqi society. The strategy 
recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined 
efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling 
sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting 
the Coalition and Iraqi Government. Amid such violence, it 
became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to make the 
difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation.
    At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help 
build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying 
on lessons learned from our experience in training and 
equipping the ISF, we have significantly enhanced our training 
and mentoring commitment. We will continue this commitment 
through a combination of partnering Coalition units with Iraqi 
Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team 
personnel with the majority of ISF units. U.S commanders are 
committed to helping the Iraqi government expand the size of 
the ISF to make it a more capable counterinsurgency force.
    We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi 
governmental capacity not just at the national level, but at 
the provincial and local levels as well. Most notably, this has 
required an expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) program with 10 new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade 
Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT leaders and BCT commanders 
additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders 
are charged with supporting moderate elements against 
extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching 
projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of 
terrorists and insurgents.
    Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only 
about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel 
deployed to date. The full complement of ``civilian surge'' 
personnel will be completed by December 2007. In addition, 
economic assistance funds provided by Congress in the Act for 
Iraq have yet to be released. As provided for in the Act, the 
President has waived certain restrictions on a portion of these 
funds in a determination, which is being provided to Congress 
separately.
    As the President explained in January, all of these 
efforts, together with a new diplomatic offensive in the 
region, are designed to set the conditions for U.S. troops to 
begin coming home, without risking a humanitarian catastrophe 
in Iraq, sanctuaries for international terrorist networks, or a 
broader regional conflict that would threaten U.S. national 
security interests for generations. (The strategy is explained 
in greater detail at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/iraq/2007/
iraq-strategy011007.pdf) While all of those conditions have not 
yet been met, and the new strategy is still in its early 
stages, there are some encouraging signs that should, over 
time, point the way to a more normalized and sustainable level 
of U.S. engagement in Iraq, with a decreasing number of U.S. 
combat forces increasingly focused on a core set of missions, 
such as those set out by the bipartisan Iraq Study Group.

                 SUMMARY OF ACHIEVEMENTS AND SHORTFALLS

    This report provides, consistent with the Act, an 
assessment of how the Iraqi Government is performing on 18 
specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated. 
Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some 
sense of future trends; but many are more accurately 
characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved 
after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved 
conditions on the ground. For example, local political 
accommodations have dramatically improved conditions in what 
had been some of Iraq's most violent areas, and we are 
deploying our resources to help ensure that these trends 
continue and spread. It will take time, however, for improved 
conditions locally to translate into broader political 
accommodations at the national level; what is important is the 
overall trajectory, which, under our present strategy, has 
begun to stabilize, compared to the deteriorating trajectory 
seen over the course of 2006. Thus, the assessments in this 
report should be viewed in a larger context: the discussion 
below provides a snapshot of achievements and shortfalls that 
can round out the picture given in the detailed assessment 
section of this report.
    Security: The security situation in Iraq remains complex 
and extremely challenging. Iraqi and Coalition Forces continue 
to emphasize population security operations in Baghdad, its 
environs, and Anbar province to combat extremist networks, and 
create the space for political reconciliation and economic 
growth. As a result of increased offensive operations, 
Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased attacks in 
Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Tough 
fighting should be expected through the summer as Coalition and 
Iraqi Forces seek to seize the initiative from early gains and 
shape conditions for longer-term stabilization. These combined 
operations--named Operation Phantom Thunder--were launched on 
June 15, 2007, after the total complement of surge forces 
arrived in Iraq. The full surge in this respect has only just 
begun.
    These new operations are targeting primarily al-Qaida in 
Iraq (AQI) havens in Baghdad, Babil, Diyala, and Anbar 
provinces. While AQI may not account for most of the violence 
in Iraq, it is the organization responsible for the highest 
profile attacks, which serve as a primary accelerant to the 
underlying sectarian conflict. We presently assess that 
degrading AQI networks in these critical areas--together with 
efforts to degrade Iranian-backed Shi'a extremist networks--is 
a core U.S. national security interest and essential for Iraq's 
longer-term stability. Since January of this year, AQI has 
proven its resiliency and ability to conduct high-profile, 
mass-casualty attacks, mostly targeting Shi'a population 
centers through suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive 
device (SVBIEDs) attacks. The number of suicide and SVBIED 
attacks in March and April approached all-time highs, further 
exacerbating sectarian tension and making political deals more 
difficult to close. These incidents have shown a decrease in 
May and June, which may be the result of aggressive Coalition 
and Iraqi operations into former AQI havens. The surge of 
additional U.S. forces into these areas allows us to better 
combat AQI and other terrorists. We should expect, however, 
that AQI will attempt to increase its tempo of attacks as 
September approaches--in an effort to influence U.S. domestic 
opinion about sustained U.S. engagement in Iraq.
    In Baghdad, an overall decrease in sectarian violence is 
due in part to intensified Iraqi and Coalition operations 
focused on population security. An apparent decision earlier 
this year by the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia to largely stand 
down its operations appeared to have a temporary effect, but a 
breakdown in Muqtada al Sadr's ability to control JAM--or 
elements thereof--coinciding with the return of JAM fighters 
from Iran after receiving training in combat and explosives has 
spawned a recent increase in attacks on Coalition and Iraqi 
forces. Iran continues to train, fund, and equip extremist 
groups, both Shi'a and Sunni, that attack Iraqi and Coalition 
forces in and around Baghdad and the provinces in southern 
Iraq. JAM ``secret cells'' are a major recipient of that 
assistance--and are responsible for sonie of the most 
sophisticated attacks on Iraqi and Coalition Forces. As stated 
in the President's January 10, 2007, speech announcing the New 
Way Forward: ``We will interrupt the flow of support from Iran. 
And we will seek out and destroy the networks providing 
advanced weaponry and training to our enemies in Iraq.'' 
Operations against these networks are ongoing and will 
continue.
    In Anbar province, the local population is turning against 
AQI and seeking support from the Coalition. At the same time, 
U.S. military operations and cooperation with local tribal 
leaders have created openings for local political compromise 
and more effective civilian assistance. To reinforce these 
early signs of success, the President ordered additional U.S. 
military and civilian resources to Anbar. The trends have 
remained positive. The provincial government--for the first 
time in a year--is now able to meet in the province and 
recently approved a comprehensive provincial budget that 
appropriates virtually all of its $107 million allocation for 
capital expenditures. Attack levels have reached a 2-year low 
and some families that had fled Anbar are beginning to return. 
These developments have been noted in other primarily Sunni 
areas of Iraq, such as Salah ad-Din province, and areas around 
Baquba, in Diyala province, where efforts are underway to build 
on the Anbar experience.
    The ISF continues to show slow progress. ISF capability is 
increasing, but further ISF proficiency, improved logistics, 
and expanded forces are needed in order to assume more 
responsibility from Coalition Forces. Comprehensive data and 
statistics on the ISF--including its projected growth--can be 
found in the report Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, 
submitted quarterly to Congress by the Department of Defense, 
pursuant to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense 
Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109-289). It should be 
noted that Iraqi Security Forces bear the brunt of attacks from 
insurgents and terrorists. Despite casualty rates two to three 
times that of Coalition Forces, Iraqi Security Forces continue 
to fight bravely for their country.
    Political Reconciliation: Moving key legislation depends on 
deal-making among major players in a society deeply divided 
along sectarian, ethnic, and other lines. Meaningful and 
lasting progress on national reconciliation may also require a 
sustained period of reduced violence in order to build trust. 
For this reason, most of the major political benchmarks 
identified in the legislation--i.e., final passage of 
monumental pieces of legislation through Iraq's Council of 
Representatives by consensus--are lagging indicators of whether 
or not the strategy is succeeding or is going to be successful.
    As demonstrated by our PRT initiatives and moving resources 
outside of Baghdad and into the provinces, our strategy 
envisions ``bottom-up'' reconciliation to be as important, if 
not more important, than top-down reconciliation. Bottom-up 
reconciliation involves working at the local and provincial 
level, seeking local political accommodations and getting more 
Iraqis to invest in the future of a united and democratic Iraq. 
Bottom-up reconciliation can take many forms: in Anbar, we have 
seen greater involvement of tribal groups; in Salah ad Din, it 
is involving local and provincial leaders taking greater 
responsibility for their political and economic future; in 
Baghdad, it has involved local neighborhood councils working 
with newly deployed Coalition and Iraqi units to identify and 
isolate extremists. All of the new resources devoted to this 
strategy--the arrival of military reinforcements, the expansion 
of PRTs, and the diplomatic surge--can be leveraged to produce 
bottom-up reconciliation. Over time, we expect bottom-up 
reconciliation to be reflected in, and latch up with, progress 
on top-down measures.
    Effective steps toward national reconciliation will require 
national leadership from all communities and expression of a 
common national political will, or ``vision,'' that has so far 
been lacking. The consensus nature of Iraqi politics, and the 
checks and balances built into the Iraqi governance structure, 
inhibit Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ability to govern 
effectively--and would pose obstacles to any prime minister. 
These inhibitors slow progress on high-priority legislative 
benchmarks, although they are designed to create a decision-
making process through which all major communities have a voice 
and a stake. The increasing concern among Iraqi political 
leaders that the United States may not have a long-term 
commitment to Iraq has also served in recent months to 
reinforce hedging behaviors and made the hardest political 
bargains even more difficult to close.
    Nonetheless, there have been recent events that provide 
hope for the ability of the Government of Iraq to overcome 
these inhibitors. For example, the response to the June 13, 
2007, bombing of the al-Askari Mosque in Samarra was a well 
orchestrated unison of statements of condemnation and calls for 
calm by Prime Minister Maliki, President Jalal Talabani, Vice 
President Tariq Hashimi, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and 
other leaders. This indicates that when necessary, the 
Government of Iraq and major political figures can overcome the 
dynamics that otherwise inhibit effectiveness. Iraq's Council 
of Representatives on July 8 voted to extend its present term 
through July 31, and for working sessions to last 6 days a week 
from July 16 through July 31 (taking only Fridays off). We will 
be working closely with Iraqi leaders and members of the 
Council of Representatives to move important pieces of 
legislation forward during this time frame--taking account of 
the extended legal process mandated by Iraq's constitution for 
moving a law to final passage.
    Diplomatic Engagement: Iran and Syria have continued to 
foster instability in Iraq. As noted, Iran funds extremist 
groups to promote attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces, 
and the Iraqi Government. We see little change in Iran's policy 
of seeking U.S. defeat through direct financial and material 
support for attacks against U.S. military and civilians in 
Iraq. Iran is engaging in similar activities in Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, foreign fighters (especially suicide bombers) 
continue to use Syrian territory as their main transit route to 
Iraq. The Syrian Government also allows major insurgent 
organizers and financiers to operate in Damascus. We continue 
to assess that nearly 80 percent of suicide bombers are foreign 
fighters--with the vast majority traveling to Iraq through 
Syria--and to Syria from their home countries by air travel to 
Damascus. This Syria-based network is able to supply some 50 to 
80 suicide bombers to AQI per month. Since January, there have 
been nearly 280 suicide events in Iraq, accounting for nearly 
5,500 casualties, mostly innocent Iraqis going about their 
daily lives. Syria can and must do more to shut down these 
networks.
    The signing of the International Compact with Iraq, an 
initiative jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the 
Iraqi Government, and the Expanded Neighbors ministerial 
conference, with attendance by the Permanent Five members of 
the U.N. Security Council, the Arab League, the Organization of 
Islamic Conference, and the G-8, on May 3-4 in Sharm el-Sheikh, 
Egypt, helped provide more public international and regional 
support for Iraq. Compact implementation, including debt 
relief, will be our near-term focus. The Neighbors Process 
energy working group had a successful meeting in Istanbul, 
Turkey, last month, and the other two working groups are 
planning to meet later this summer. We expect the next Expanded 
Neighbors ministerial to be held later this summer or early 
fall in Istanbul.
    Economics and Essential Services: The economic picture is 
uneven. Key economic indicators paint a modestly improved 
picture--unemployment has eased slightly and inflation is 
currently abating. Government revenue is steady due to high oil 
prices, but the Iraqi Government has not yet made needed 
investments to increase oil and refining output. Private-sector 
activity is picking up in some areas, notably the more than $1 
billion that have been invested in wireless telecoms, but 
investors remain wary due topoor security and the continuing 
need for a stronger legal framework. The Iraqi Government has 
begun to show resolve in initiating budget execution and 
capital investment to restore services, but citizens nationwide 
complain about government corruption and the lack of essential 
services, such as electricity, fuel supply, sewer, water, 
health, and sanitation.
    At the provincial level, the economic governance picture is 
a patchwork, with some provinces performing better than others. 
Security conditions, ethnic and sectarian divisions, political 
dynamics, corruption, and leadership qualities of key political 
actors vary significantly by province. As a result, provincial 
governments vary greatly in the effectiveness of using their 
central government budget allocation to provide services for 
citizens. Where security is improving, such as in Anbar 
province, we see positive trends in governance, delivery of 
government services, and the efficacy of U.S. assistance.
    The International Compact with Iraq provides the framework 
through which the Iraqi Government will reform its governance, 
budget execution, and fiscal management, as well as improve 
service delivery. The Compact sets out the roadmap of reforms 
Iraq will need to implement over the next 5 years to be 
economically self-sufficient. Iraq's IMF Stand-by Arrangement 
is on track and has been extended to September 2007. For a 
follow-on IMF program, Iraq will need to continue increasing 
fuel prices.

                        CONGRESSIONAL BENCHMARKS

    This background discussion provides a context for assessing 
the performance of the Iraqi Government with respect to the 18 
benchmarks. The Iraqi leaders face a challenging situation, and 
they and their families run great risks on a daily basis. We 
continue to encourage and press them to achieve the established 
benchmarks, since we believe that those efforts will contribute 
to Iraq's stability, its ability to provide for its own 
security, and to the international effort to counter violent 
extremism. Nonetheless, our efforts in Iraq extend far beyond 
these benchmarks. Every day, our Embassy and military officials 
are working with Iraqis to encourage stability and 
reconciliation in ways that are not easily measured by these 
benchmarks. As Congress has requested, in September General 
Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker will report on these efforts 
and provide a more comprehensive assessment of the situation in 
Iraq, including an assessment of the 18 benchmarks measured 
herein. This assessment will provide a clearer picture of how 
the new strategy is unfolding, and what if any adjustments 
should be made.
    Standard of Measurement: Section 1314(b)(2)(A) states: 
``The President shall submit an initial report to Congress, not 
later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of each of the 
specific benchmarks established above, and declaring, in his 
judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these 
benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.'' In order to make 
this judgment (e.g., whether ``satisfactory progress . . . is, 
or is not, being achieved''), we have carefully examined all 
the facts and circumstances with respect to each of the 18 
benchmarks and asked the following question: As measured from a 
January 2007 baseline, do we assess that present trend data 
demonstrates a positive trajectory, which is tracking toward 
satisfactory accomplishment in the near 8 term? If the answer 
is yes, we have provided a ``Satisfactory'' assessment; if the 
answer is no, the assessment is ``Unsatisfactory.'' For those 
benchmarks receiving the latter assessment, we have explained 
what, if any, strategic adjustments may be required to improve 
the present trajectory. The present analysis and assessment of 
these 18 benchmarks follows.

                      Assessment of the Benchmarks

    Section 1314 (b)(2)(A) The President shall submit an 
initial report, in classified and unclassified format, to the 
Congress, not later than July 15, 2007, assessing the status of 
each of the specific benchmarks . . . and declaring, in his 
judgment, whether satisfactory progress toward meeting these 
benchmarks is, or is not, being achieved.
    Section 1314 (b)(2)(C) If the President's assessment of any 
of the specific benchmarks established above is unsatisfactory, 
the President shall include in that report a description of 
such revisions to the political, economic, regional, and 
military components of the strategy, as announced by the 
President on January 10, 2007. In addition, the President shall 
include in the report the advisability of implementing such 
aspects of the bipartisan Iraq Study Group, as he deems 
appropriate.
    Section 1314 (b)(1)(A) The United States Strategy in Iraq, 
hereafter, shall be conditioned on the Iraqi Government meeting 
benchmarks . . . including:

(i) Forming a Constitutional Review Committee and then completing the 
        constitutional review

    The Council of Representatives (COR) formed the 
Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) on November 15, 2006. The 
Constitutional Review is now underway. The CRC presented a 
partial list of recommendations on May 23, 2007, in an interim 
report and received an extension from the COR until the end of 
August to resolve outstanding issues concerning: (i) 
Presidential powers, (ii) the powers of the regions vs. the 
central government, and (iii) the status of Kirkuk (Article 140 
of the Constitution). The political blocs still need to reach 
an accommodation on these difficult political issues.
    The Embassy will continue to discuss with the CRC Chairmen 
and the COR Speaker and Deputy Speakers the need to develop a 
well-defined plan for the COR debate of the report. The Embassy 
is also continuing to discuss with the United Nations 
Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) the necessary preparatory 
steps for a public referendum on proposed constitutional 
revisions. As noted in the Iraq Study Group Report 
Recommendation 26, there is a role for UNAMI in the 
constitutional review process.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory 
progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) 
and then completing the constitutional review. The CRC has been 
formed, and, while difficult issues remain, significant 
progress has been made on many substantive issues and technical 
details involved in the constitutional review process. The CRC 
has requested an extension to resolve remaining issues, and its 
Chairman remains committed to moving the process forward. While 
the progress on this benchmark has been satisfactory, the 
achievement of the desired reconciliation effect depends on 
progress with respect to several other benchmarks as well as 
this one.

(ii) Enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform

    De-Ba'athification reform is among the most sensitive 
pieces of legislation being considered as it involves competing 
conceptions of justice, accountability, reconciliation, and 
economic compensation. Senior Iraqi political leaders remain at 
odds over some of the most fundamental aspects of de-
Ba'athification reform, including over which categories of 
former Ba'ath party members would be proscribed by the law. For 
example, there is division among political and ethnic groups 
regarding what rank of ex-Ba'athists should be allowed to 
return to civic life. While leaders have been discussing the 
law, a public discussion on the accommodations that different 
parts of Iraqi society will have to make with each other is not 
yet underway. An inflexible time line on this issue could be 
detrimental, as a bad law would not improve prospects for 
reconciliation.
    Reintegration of former Ba'athists who have not committed 
crimes has already begun; however, a sweeping, government-led, 
legislated, and institutionalized reform program over time 
would send a positive signal in favor of reconciliation. 
Alternatively, allowing former Ba'athists who do not accept a 
democratic Iraq into the government or security services could 
undermine the Iraqi government and embolden the insurgency. 
Many Iraqis are understandably frightened by the prospect of 
their former Ba'athist tormentors replaying their previous rise 
to power by subverting the government from within.
    In Recommendation 27, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the 
need for United States Government support of reintegration of 
former Ba'athists and Arab nationalists into civic life. The 
New Way Forward strategy makes de-Ba'athification reform an 
integral part of the United States Government's Iraq policy. 
The Embassy has pressed hard on all political elements to move 
forward.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made 
satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing 
legislation on de-Ba'athification reform. This is among the 
most divisive political issues for Iraq, and compromise will be 
extremely difficult. Given the lack of satisfactory progress, 
we have not achieved the desired reconciliation effect that 
meaningful and broadly accepted de-Ba'athification reform might 
bring about. This does not, however, necessitate a revision to 
the current plan and strategy. DeBa'athification remains a core 
priority of U.S. political engagement, and pushing reforms too 
fast or in a manner that results in a poor law could be 
detrimental to our overall reconciliation objectives.

(iii) Enacting and implementing legislation to ensure the equitable 
        distribution of hydrocarbon resources to the people of Iraq 
        without regard to the sect or ethnicity of recipients, and 
        enacting and implementing legislation to ensure that the energy 
        resources of Iraq benefit Sunni Arabs, Shi'a Arabs, Kurds, and 
        other Iraqi citizens in an equitable manner

    The final draft of the Revenue Management Law must be 
approved by the Council of Ministers (COM) and vetted by the 
Iraqi Government's legal office before submission to the COR. 
The United States has provided technical advice to the Iraqi 
Government and is actively engaged in encouraging both sides to 
expeditiously approve the draft law in the COM and move it to 
the COR. Prime Minister Maliki intends to submit the Revenue 
Management Law to the COM soon, for subsequent consideration by 
the COR along with the framework Hydrocarbon law.
    Assessment: The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is 
too early to tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and 
implement legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of 
hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis. The Government of Iraq has 
not met its self-imposed goal of May 31 for submitting the 
framework hydrocarbon and revenue-sharing laws to the COR. 
Although the KRG and the Shi'a parties have agreed to the text 
of the Revenue Management Law, Council of Ministers' approval 
has been delayed by a Sunni party boycott. The effect of 
limited progress toward this benchmark has been to reduce the 
perceived confidence in, and effectiveness of, the Iraqi 
Government. This does not, however, necessitate a revision to 
our current plan and strategy, under which we have assigned a 
high priority to this subject, and the process overall has 
continued to move forward.

(iv) Enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-
        autonomous regions

    The COR enacted a law in October 2006 that establishes 
procdures to form regions. Under the Iraqi constitution, 
regions have certain powers, such as control over regional 
security forces, that provinces do not. The law will come into 
effect 18 months after being passed, which means no steps can 
be taken to form regions before April 2008. The United States 
Government encouraged Iraqi political parties to reach a 
compromise on this law and believes that the 18-month delay in 
implementation is in the interests of Iraq and the United 
States, given current political conditions in Iraq.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory 
progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on 
procedures to form semi-autonomous regions. The regions law has 
been passed. Implementation of this legislation should take 
place after provincial elections are held and after the passage 
of an updated elections law. The procedures are in place, but 
whether establishment of additional regions (in addition to the 
already-recognized KRG) is desirable depends on a number of 
factors, including the outcome of efforts at constitutional 
reform. The progress toward this benchmark has been 
satisfactory, and the effect is that this potentially 
contentious issue has not been a source of discord.

(v) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing an Independent 
        High Electoral Commission, provincial elections law, provincial 
        council authorities, and a date for provincial elections

    On January 23, 2007, the COR passed the Independent High 
Electoral Commission (IHEC) Law, which the Presidency Council 
(the President and two Deputy Presidents) approved on February 
27, 2007. On April 28, 2007, the COR appointed the nine IHEC 
Commissioners in a process that the U.N. deemed fair and 
transparent. The Commissioners have completed appropriate 
training and are in the process of selecting representatives to 
oversee elections in the provinces. A Provincial Powers Law 
that defines the authorities and structures of local 
governments has been read twice in the COR, but changes are 
being considered, particularly related to the powers of the 
governor and the reach of the central government at the local 
level.
    At the highest levels, the Embassy is urging the Iraqi 
Government to take the legislative and administrative action 
necessary to ensure timely and fair elections. The Embassy is 
intensively engaged with the GOI and the COR at all levels to 
expedite legislation or amendments to existing legislation that 
will allow provincial elections to take place. New legislation 
or amendments to the existing law are required to set a date 
and secure funding for elections, as well as to establish the 
electoral system to be used for the vote, among other issues.
    In cooperation with the U.N., the United States Government 
is providing program support to the new IHEC in three areas: 
(i) building immediate IHEC staff capacity, particularly in 
public outreach and internal organization; (ii) building 
database capacity that will support the new voter registry; and 
(iii) standing up provincial, district, and precinct-level 
election bodies. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are 
monitoring political and security conditions in provinces that 
may affect elections.
    In Recommendation 29, the Iraq Study Group emphasizes the 
need for provincial elections at the earliest possible date. 
The United States Government and UNAMI are working closely with 
the Iraqi Government to accelerate the drafting and passage of 
the Provincial Powers Law and set a date for provincial 
elections. Additionally, the United States Government is 
working with Iraq Security Forces to ensure that they are 
adequately prepared to provide security for free and fair 
elections.
    Assessment: There are multiple components to this 
benchmark, each deserving its own assessment:
     Establishing the IHEC Commission: The Government 
of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an 
IHEC Commission. The Commission has been established.
     Elections Law: The Government of Iraq has not made 
satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial 
elections law. Drafting of the law has just begun.
     Provincial Council Authorities: The Government of 
Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing 
provincial council authorities. The COR is working on 
legislation, which has had its second reading; however, the COR 
committee continues to work on revisions to the draft law, and 
it remains unclear when the legislation will come to a third 
and final vote by the full COR.
     Provincial Elections Date: The Government of Iraq 
has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date 
for provincial elections. Legislation required for setting the 
date has not been enacted.
    The effect is that there is still no mechanism in place to 
address the under-representation of Sunnis in provincial 
councils that was caused by past Sunni election boycotts. 
However, at this time, this does not necessitate a revision to 
our current plan and strategy, under which we regard movement 
on this issue as one of the highest priorities, and have seen 
progress in key areas--particularly with respect to the IHEC, 
which is a critical building block to holding genuine and 
credible local elections with U.N. assistance and support.

(vi) Enacting and implementing legislation addressing amnesty

    There is little progress toward legislation establishing 
amnesty for those who fought against the government since 2003 
or who committed crimes in the name of the Iraqi Government. 
Neither the GOI nor the COR are pressing forward the passage of 
amnesty legislation.
    At some point; Iraq's process of reconciliation would 
benefit from an amnesty that recognizes the need to avoid 
criminal prosecution of certain acts of a military nature 
committed since 2003. However, a general amnesty program would 
be counterproductive in the current environment. As long as 
violence remains extensive and no major armed group has 
signaled a willingness to cooperate with the Iraqi Government 
and renounce violence, there is no group for which amnesty 
would be appropriate.
    Opportunities to offer amnesty locally, to specific 
populations and individuals, may appear quickly and will 
require Iraqi Government legislation or programs to exploit the 
willingness of fighters to abandon violence. Such actions could 
serve as a model for a wider amnesty program. United States 
officials have made clear to Iraqi leaders that any amnesty, 
when it comes, should not distinguish between acts against 
Coalition Forces and acts against Iraqis.
    In a token of progress, an amnesty workshop was conducted 
on May 12, 2007, in Baghdad. Political-party representatives 
and academics gathered to discuss amnesty concepts. From this 
small workshop, 10 recommendations were developed and forwarded 
to various government representatives for comment, thus 
beginning a dialogue on amnesty.
    In Recommendations 31 and 37, the Iraq Study Group advised 
three elements for any amnesty legislation: 1) it must be far-
reaching, 2) it must involve reconciliation by those in 
government with their enemies, and 3) the legislative and 
executive branches of the United States Government must not 
undercut it. However, the Study also notes, as mentioned in the 
assessment above, that ``there are many armed groups within 
Iraq, and very little will to lay down arms.''
    Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful general 
amnesty are not present; however, in the current security 
environment, it is not clear that such action should be a near-
term Iraqi goal. The Government of Iraq has established a high-
level Government of Iraq Reconciliation Committee to support 
and oversee efforts of groups that want to oppose AQI and other 
extremist elements--working with ajoint U.S. Embassy/MNF-I 
group that is facilitating such actions in coordination with 
units on the ground. These efforts are more relevant at this 
point than are general amnesty initiatives. Nonetheless, the 
Government of Iraq should develop amnesty programs later in the 
year, so they are ready to be implemented if opportunities 
arise. Given the absence of the necessary conditions for 
amnesty, the absence of amnesty legislation has had no effect. 
The current plan and strategy calls for the passage of such 
legislation when the necessary conditions are present.

(vii) Enacting and implementing legislation establishing a strong 
        militia disarmament program to ensure that such security forces 
        are accountable only to the central government and loyal to the 
        constitution of Iraq

    The COR included $150 million in its 2007 budget for 
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), but the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) is waiting to release the funds 
pending development of a Government of Iraq plan for DDR. 
However, the COR has not moved toward passage of legislation to 
establish a disarmament program, nor are senior Iraqi officials 
or political-party leaders focused on passing such a law. There 
is disagreement among Iraqi experts as to whether new or 
additional legislation is necessary as militia and other 
illegal armed-group activity is already against Iraqi law. 
Although the Iraqi Government has formed a DDR Committee, there 
is no momentum in the Government of Iraq toward developing and 
implementing a comprehensive disarmament program for militia 
members. No armed group has yet committed to disarmament. The 
necessary preconditions for a DDR program, such as political 
reconciliation and security provided by the government, do not 
yet exist despite considerable efforts by the Iraqi Government, 
MNF-I, and the Embassy.
    The resources and personnel currently dedicated to the DDR 
effort would be better used elsewhere in the process of 
reconciliation that will ultimately lead armed groups to lay 
down arms. In the meantime, other measures to give young men 
alternatives to committing violence, such as a vigorous 
vocational-training program, micro-financing opportunities, 
education programs within the theater detention system, and 
jobs creation programs, should and are being pursued. Improved 
use of these tools to take advantage of localized security 
gains will require further planning by the Iraqi Government.
    In Recommendation 38 and 39, the Iraq Study Group proposes 
that neutral international experts act as advisors to the Iraqi 
Government and that the United States Government fund and 
support a single office to provide assistance to these experts. 
The study also notes ``. . . solving the problem of militias 
requires national reconciliation'' and states that, as a party 
in the conflict, the United States Government should not be 
directly involved in a DDR program's implementation.
    Assessment: The prerequisites for a successful militia 
disarmament program are not present. In fact, international 
experts, including the U.N., have expressed reservations to 
advancing this proposal at the present time. The U.N. DDR 
Advisory Mission to Baghdad Report (April 25-May 2, 2007) 
stated, ``The Iraq environment makes it most unlikely that 
traditional DDR can take place, and planning should take this 
into account.'' Likewise, a State Department internal review 
has shown that the timing is not right for a full-scale DDR 
program in Iraq. Given the absence of the necessary conditions 
for DDR, the absence of legislation on militia disarmament has 
had no effect. The current plan and strategy calls for the 
passage of such legislation when the necessary conditions are 
present.

(viii) Establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services 
        committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan

    As part of Operation Fardh AI-Qanun (FAQ), the Iraqi 
Government established an Executive Steering Committee (ESC) to 
better coordinate and synchronize the non-kinetic aspects of 
FAQ with security operations. The ESC is chaired by the Prime 
Minister and meets weekly to discuss appropriate issues. In 
support of the ESC, six sub-committees have been formed to 
address topics of economics, services, political issues, media, 
popular mobilization, and security. These subcommittees are 
chaired by Iraqi Government leaders and are supported by United 
States Government officials. Additionally, the Iraqi National 
Security Advisor is responsible for the ESC secretariat and 
coordinates weekly planning meetings with the subcommittees. 
While the secretariat and subcommittees vary in their 
effectiveness, the overall level of coordination and focus on 
non-kinetic aspects is significantly higher than previous 
efforts.
    While establishing political, media, economic, and services 
committees is important, it is even more vital that the Iraqi 
Government steadily increase its relevance to Iraqis outside 
the International Zone through proper provision of services, 
security, and offering a viable alternative to militias.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory 
progress toward establishing supporting political, media, 
economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad 
Security Plan. The establishment of the ESC and related 
subcommittees meets the requirement of the benchmark. 
Nevertheless, both the U.S. Mission and MNF-I will remain 
intensively engaged with the ESC to continue to improve its 
effectiveness and ensure that the subcommittees fulfill the 
purpose for which they were created as their contribution to 
date has not been adequate. Progress toward achieving this 
benchmark has been satisfactory, and we will continue to 
monitor and engage with the committees to produce a 
satisfactory effect over the next 60 days.

(ix) Providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support 
        Baghdad operations

    The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) had difficulty 
deploying three additional full Iraqi Army (IA) brigades at 
sufficient strength to Baghdad, but compensated by pulling 16 
units from a variety of IA divisions to provide the equivalent 
additional force. Since the initial deployment, the IGFC has 
continued to generate the required additional forces by first 
extending a brigade from 1 IA Division and battalions from 4 IA 
Division in Baghdad and then identifying and deploying a 
replacement brigade from I IA Division and battalions from 4 IA 
division to relieve other units by mid-June 2007. Manning 
levels for deploying units continue to be of concern. However, 
MNF-I is working with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) to 
implement policies to improve present-for-duty numbers, and in 
the current 30-day period, for example, over 10,000 soldiers 
will have completed basic training and been assigned to units.
    Iraq Study Group Recommendations 20 and 21 call for the 
Iraqi Government to shoulder a greater share of the security 
mission in Iraq, and ultimately take it over. Iraq Study Group 
Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi Government to establish 
milestones for reconciliation and improve security. Providing 
three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad 
operations reflects implementation of these recommendations.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory 
progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi 
brigades to support Baghdad operations. While manning levels 
for the deployed Iraqi units continue to be of concern, the 
Iraqi Government has provided the equivalent of three 
additional brigades to Baghdad and has made provisions to 
sustain this level of effort and to address manning issues--in 
addition to steadily increasing the strengths of Iraqi units 
already deployed in Baghdad. The progress toward this benchmark 
has been satisfactory, and the effect is satisfactory in that 
the three brigades are operating in support of Baghdad 
operations.

(x) Providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this 
        plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in 
        consultation with U.S. Commanders without political 
        intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists 
        including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias

    The Prime Minister has given Iraqi (and MNF-I) commanders 
the necessary authority to conduct security operations and has 
taken initial steps to reduce political interference in 
decisions on military actions. Coalition military leaders work 
closely with their Iraqi counterparts to plan and carry out 
security operations. Coalition military forces also contribute 
to the operation of joint security stations and provide the 
embedded transition teams that mentor Iraqi military and police 
counterparts. New Rules of Engagement for the Baghdad 
Operational Command have come into effect. There have been no 
reported instances of political interference in operations that 
U.S. commanders have recommended against Sunni Arab insurgents 
or AQI since the start of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. There have 
been concerns, however, about political interference (though 
not at the Prime Minister's level) in some operations to target 
Shi'a extremist networks, especially JAM. In recent 
engagements, particularly in some areas in southern Iraq, Iraqi 
forces were called upon to quell JAM-fueled violence and 
performed admirably. The Iraqi Army continues to be a more 
nationally oriented institution than the Iraqi National Police 
or local police forces.
    ISF forces are currently fighting alongside Coalition 
Forces and jointly manning Joint Security Stations (JSS) 
throughout Iraq. In most cases, tactical commanders act on 
mission orders issued by their chain of command or coordinated 
locally with MNF-I forces. In addition, the ISF has done a 
reasonably good job policing its own ranks by reporting 
infractions and removing guilty parties.
    There continues to be evidence of sectarian bias in the 
appointment of senior military and police commanders, which in 
turn gives rise to suspicions that political considerations may 
be behind Iraqi commanders' decisions on which operations to 
undertake or support. Prime Minister Maliki is willing to take 
action when evidence of this is clear. Seven of nine National 
Police Brigade Commanders and 16 battalion commanders have been 
relieved in the past 7 months due to concerns over sectarian 
activities; however, sectarian-based decisions continue to be 
evident through intelligence channels. There is evidence of 
target lists emanating from the Office of the Commander in 
Chief that bypassed operational commanders and directed lower-
level intelligence officers and commanders to make arrests, 
primarily of Sunnis. Authority to make tactical and operational 
decisions without political interference is an issue of trust.
    Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi 
Government to establish milestones for reconciliation and to 
improve security. This benchmark helps establish the conditions 
for reconciliation by pursuing non-sectarian security policies 
without political intervention, in line with this 
recommendation.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not made 
satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with 
all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and 
operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders 
without political intervention to include the authority to 
pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite 
militias. Iraqi and coalition forces have been given 
authorities to go after insurgents and militias, but there 
remains a negative political influence at a variety of levels 
with evidence of sectarian behavior. Thus, while there has been 
progress, it has been too uneven to warrant a satisfactory 
judgment at this time. MNF-I and the Embassy continue to 
monitor developments for evidence on the transparency of 
security decision-making and the degree of political or 
sectarian influence on security operations. We have observed a 
mix of positive and negative examples of civil-military 
relations with the current surge in operations, due largely to 
increased overwatch and partnering relations. While progress 
toward this benchmark at this time is unsatisfactory, and the 
resultant effect has been negative in terms of overall 
perceptions of performance, this does not necessitate a 
revision to our current plan and strategy, under which we 
continue to improve Iraqi command and control capabilities, and 
expand our embedding and partnership with Iraqi units.

(xi) Ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed 
        enforcement of the law

    Left on their own, many ISF units still tend to gravitate 
to old habits of sectarianism when applying the law. The good 
news is that individual units have demonstrated the ability to 
act as responsible partners when employed with Coalition 
influence, and some Iraqi commanders have demonstrated clearly 
that they are Iraqis first. Some Sunni residents of Baghdad 
continue to believe that Shi'a-dominated National Police units 
and, to a lesser degree, Iraqi Army units are biased against 
them. There have been inadequate efforts to detain some senior 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) officials believed responsible for 
human rights abuses, although 7 National Police Brigade 
Commanders and 16 National Police Battalion Commanders have 
been replaced, along with both Division Commanders. Some senior 
officials responsible for abuse continue to hold positions of 
responsibility. At lower levels, experience shows that even-
handedness across the ISF is patchy with various units 
displaying differing degrees of even-handedness; however, a 
number of extremely capable and non-sectarian senior military 
and police leaders have emerged and are making a difference 
with their units.
    The expansion of partnered units and embedded-training 
teams has increased the Coalition's ability to monitor the 
actions of the ISF. In Baghdad, for example, Coalition Forces 
and ISF have established 30 JSSs to provide an extensive 
permanent security presence throughout Baghdad's neighborhoods. 
These JSSs allow greater oversight of the ISF by Coalition 
Forces, which maintain 24-hour coverage throughout Baghdad in 
an effort to protect the city's population. An expanded use of 
embedded U.S. military and police advisor teams has also 
ensured that the ISF now receive greater exposure to modern 
policing techniques that are both more effective and in 
compliance with international human rights standards.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has not at this time 
made satisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraqi Security 
Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law; 
however, there has been significant progress in achieving 
increased even-handedness through the use of coalition 
partnering and embedded-transition teams with Iraqi Security 
Force units. The presence of Coalition Forces in JSSs and 
Combat Outposts (COPs) has had a positive effect on ensuring a 
more even-handed approach, and Iraqi officials continue to 
communicate the importance that all terrorist organizations be 
targeted, regardless of their affiliation or ethnic background. 
ISF performance has generally been adequate, particularly when 
partnered with Coalition Forces. Because we are holding the ISF 
to a high standard, however, the overall judgment at this time 
remains unsatisfactory. This does not necessitate a revision to 
our current plan and strategy, under which we continue to press 
the Government of Iraq on these issues, improve command and 
control capabilities, and expand our embedding and partnership 
with Iraqi units.

(xii) Ensuring that, as Prime Minister Maliki was quoted by President 
        Bush as saying, ``the Baghdad Security Plan will not provide a 
        safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of [their] sectarian or 
        political affiliation''

    The United States has surged more than 30,000 military 
personnel into Iraq. These forces support Operation Fardh al-
Qanun in Baghdad, Anbar, and in the regions to the north and 
south of the capital. As noted above, Coalition Forces, in 
conjunction with ISF, have established and staffed JSSs in all 
sectors of Baghdad and are conducting joint operations in once 
contentious neighborhoods, such as the Shi'a dominated Sadr 
City and Sunni-dominated Mansour District. There is currently 
only one JSS in Sadr City, though more are planned and 
operations have been conducted throughout Sadr City on a near-
daily basis. The completion of additional JSSs throughout 
Baghdad should significantly increase the success of this 
effort.
    Operations in some parts of Baghdad remain a significant 
challenge, though there are currently no areas of Baghdad where 
Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces are not allowed to 
conduct operations. The Government of Iraq has supported 
operations by Iraqi and Coalition Forces targeting insurgents, 
militias, and terrorists across Iraq. United States diplomatic 
and military personnel have engaged the Iraqi Government at the 
highest levels to stress the importance of aggressively 
targeting all violent groups, regardless of sect or 
affiliation. The Iraqi Government has shown increased 
willingness to target and conduct actions against extremist 
groups and militias, such as Jaysh al-Mahdi Secret Cells, in 
order to establish a more secure environment in Baghdad.
    Iraq Study Group Recommendation 25 calls for the Iraqi 
Government to establish milestones for reconciliation and to 
improve security. This benchmark helps establish the conditions 
for reconciliation by denying safe havens, regardless of 
sectarian or political affiliation, in line with this 
recommendation.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory 
progress in ensuring the Baghdad Security Plan does not provide 
a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or 
political affiliations. United States commanders report overall 
satisfaction with their ability to target any and all extremist 
groups. United States diplomatic and military personnel 
continue to engage the Iraqi Government at the highest levels 
to stress the importance of aggressively targeting all violent 
groups, regardless of sect or affiliation. Tribal elements in 
Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din are seeking support for tribal 
initiatives similar to those that have shown success in al-
Anbar against AQI. Cache-finds averaging over three times last 
year's levels result from civilians increasingly providing 
intelligence leading to these discoveries, indicating an 
erosion of insurgent safe havens. The Government of Iraq has 
supported operations by Iraqi and Coalition Security forces 
targeting extremists across Iraq, including in Sadr City and 
the outer belts of Baghdad. Coalition Forces operate in these 
areas almost every night, though there remains one individual 
that Prime Minister Maliki has made the decision to delay 
targeting. The progress toward this benchmark has been 
satisfactory, and the effect is that the Coalition and the ISF 
are able to continue clearing and securing areas in and around 
Baghdad from which the enemy had been operating.

(xiii) Reducing the level of sectarian violence in Iraq and eliminating 
        militia control of local security

    Though precise measurements of sectarian violence vary, 
trends data supplied over time by MNF-I demonstrate a decrease 
in sectarian violence, particularly in Baghdad, since the 
beginning of Operation Fardh al-Qanun. Militia activity 
initially decreased but staged a resurgence in mid-May before 
falling again in June to the lowest level in a year.
    Similar trends have been observed throughout Iraq; however, 
it is too early to determine how sustainable they will prove to 
be. As part of Operation Fardh al-Qanun, Coalition Forces have 
established over 30 JSSs and almost 30 COPs, throughout 
Baghdad. These stations bring security forces into the 
neighborhoods and provide the Iraqi populace with a means to 
deliver valuable information to security forces in order to 
target groups that incite sectarian violence. Similar outposts 
have been established throughout cities and rural areas of 
Iraq.
    The United States Government is supporting a Ministry of 
Interior initiative to inspect all 47 Baghdad police stations 
to verify station police are performing their duties to 
standard. This action, coupled with the expanded use of 
embedded U.S. military and police advisor teams, helps ensure 
that Iraqi Security Forces are exposed on a daily basis to 
modern policing techniques that are more effective and in 
compliance with international human rights standards. 
Nonetheless, the police remain the element in which progress 
has been slowest and in which improvement is most needed.
    Militia presence is still strong and reaches into the 
security services of a number of ministries. Despite some 
progress, militias are still a dominant force in parts of 
Baghdad, Basrah, and many provinces in Iraq--and will likely 
remain so until the security situation begins to stabilize over 
time. (See pages 14-15, above.)
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq--with substantial 
Coalition assistance--has made satisfactory progress toward 
reducing sectarian violence but has shown unsatisfactory 
progress towards eliminating militia control of local security. 
Furthermore, though sectarian violence has been reduced, it is 
not yet reduced to a level the Coalition judges acceptable. The 
effect of unsatisfactory progress toward eliminating militia 
control of local security has been negative in terms of 
perceptions of the authority and fairness of the Government of 
Iraq. However, this does not necessitate a revision to our 
current plan and strategy, under which we continue to press the 
Government of Iraq on these issues and are conducting 
aggressive operations with Iraqi forces to uproot the command 
and control of the most violent and destabilizing militia 
elements in Iraq.

(xiv) Establishing all of the planned joint security stations in 
        neighborhoods across Baghdad

    Many of the planned JSS, U.S. Combat Outposts, and other 
patrol bases have been established across Baghdad and the 
surrounding area. Over 60 of these stations are located within 
Baghdad, and 30 more are planned. Joint Security Stations 
provide an around-the-clock security presence in most of 
Baghdad and JSSs are particularly effective as they merge 
Coalition technology and resolve with Iraqi presence and 
calming influence. There are numerous examples where Iraqi 
presence has facilitated a lower application of force. This 
increased interaction with the local population should directly 
contribute to reducing crime and sectarian violence, such as 
murders and executions.
    Other stations are being established in outlying areas 
where interaction with the local people can have a direct 
impact on the reduction of violence within the city. As 
security conditions on the ground warrant review of the 
location and quantity of these stations, Coalition leaders will 
consult with the Baghdad Operational Commander, LTG Abboud, to 
determine future emplacements and additions.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq--with substantial 
Coalition assistance--has made satisfactory progress toward 
establishing the planned JSSs in Baghdad. As of June 16, 
Multinational Division-Baghdad reports 32 JSSs have achieved 
initial operational capability and 36 COPs have achieved 
initial or full operational capability. This benchmark is on 
track for completion at the required time. The progress toward 
this benchmark has been satisfactory, and the effects are 
increased control and security in the areas where these JSSs 
have been established.

(xv) Increasing the number of Iraqi security forces units capable of 
        operating independently

    Coalition Forces continue the Train-and-Equip program for 
the Iraqi Security Forces and field advisors to the Ministries 
of Interior and Defense in order to build Iraqi capacity to 
manage and sustain forces in the field. To advance the 
development of the fledgling Iraqi bureaucratic processes for 
committing funds, we have obtained the Iraqi Government's 
approval to pursue many of its procurement and logistical 
requirements through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. 
The United States is also negotiating an Acquisition Cross 
Service Agreement (ACSA) with the Iraqi Government. As the 
security ministries increase their capacity to support and 
sustain Iraqi forces, Iraqi units will become more capable of 
operating independently. Iraq earlier this year invested $7.3 
billion for the training and equipping of its own security 
forces--an impressive investment that will need time to have an 
impact on the ground.
    There are 9 Iraqi Army divisions, 31 Brigades, and 95 
battalions in the operational lead for their area of 
responsibility. For an Iraqi unit to be designated capable of 
independent operations, it must achieve an Operational 
Readiness Assessment (ORA) Level 1 status. There has been a 
slight reduction in units assessed as capable of independent 
operations since January 2007. This reduction is due to a 20 
percent increase in unit authorization levels (meaning the 
equipment numbers against which the unit is measured are 
higher), a fixed number of equipment sets and training seats, a 
lack of officers and NCOs (with some provided to less capable 
units to help stand them up), combat losses, and the 
sustainment challenges that come with these dynamics. In 
addition, there are more Iraqi units in the field and more 
being moved around the battlefield. This of course increases 
the logistics, services, and combat multiplier (close air 
support and artillery support) requirements exponentially.
    Ministry of Interior capacity requires continued 
development. The Fiscal Year 2007 Department of Defense 
supplemental funding request focused on key shortfalls, 
particularly in MOI equipment maintenance. Because the MOD is 
only partially effective at managing ministry functions, the 
Coalition continues to assist with fielded Iraqi Army forces.
    Assessment: The Iraqi Government has made unsatisfactory 
progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces 
units capable of operating independently. Development of ISF 
capabilities continues to grow while the ISF increases 
operational tempo for Operation Fardh al-Qanun. Readiness 
assessments for the National Police continue to show slow but 
steady improvement, but we continue to have concerns about the 
sectarian leaning of some national police units. The effect is 
that the presence of Coalition partners and support remains 
necessary for ISF operations. This does not necessitate a 
revision to the current plan and strategy, however, because the 
plan and strategy emphasize the importance of embedded trainers 
and the partnering of Iraqi and Coalition units. ISF 
performance has generally been adequate, particularly when 
units are partnered with Coalition Forces.

(xvi) Ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the 
        Iraqi legislature are protected

    Article 37 of the Iraq constitution guarantees all Iraqis 
freedom to form and join associations and political parties. 
Minorities are guaranteed equal access to and participation in 
elections for the COR. The COR elected in December 2005 
includes representatives from the Shi'a, Sunni, Kurdish, 
Turkmen, Chaldo-Assyrian Christian, and Yazidi communities. The 
Rules of Procedure for the COR guarantee the ability of its 
members to express their opinions, regardless of political 
party or affiliation, helping to ensure the full participation 
of all its members. COR rules permit groups as small as 10 
members out of 275 to propose legislation.
    The electoral system used to elect the current COR--
provincial proportional representation--was chosen by the 
previous Iraqi parliament in 2005 to balance a number of 
factors, including the ability of women and of small minority 
parties to gain a share of representation. Iraqi 
parliamentarians and political parties are considering changes 
to the electoral laws, but there appears to be no effort that 
would adversely affect the rights of minorities.
    The U.S. Mission is fully engaged with the Iraqi parliament 
to ensure appreciation for the concern attached by the United 
States to representation of women and minorities and a role for 
minority parties.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory 
progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority political 
parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected. Minority 
political parties in the COR participate in COR activities in a 
manner consistent with minority parties in other parliamentary 
democracies. Women COR members work closely with each other, 
often across party lines. We anticipate a continued role for 
minorities and women in the parliament.

(xvii) Allocating and spending $10 billion in Iraqi revenues for 
        reconstruction projects, including delivery of essential 
        services, on an equitable basis

    In 2006, the Iraqi Government managed to execute only 22 
percent of its capital budget (an estimated $1.35 billion of 
$6.2 billion budgeted). It is worth noting that implementation 
and expenditure of the budget were slowed by the fact that the 
permanent government was not established until June 2006. A 
significant improvement in performance is necessary to make 
satisfactory progress on the 2007 benchmark. The benchmark 
would be fully achieved by allocating and obligating $10 
billion of investment capital during this calendar year, along 
with satisfactory progress on contract disbursements. As is 
normal in any capital budget, a portion of the funds will 
disburse in future years based on contract progress. While it 
is too soon to tell how much improvement will take place by the 
end of 2007, many of the problems from 2006 are being overcome. 
Most critical to the effort is the performance of the Ministry 
of Oil, with nearly 25 percent of the total capital budget; it 
remains unclear whether the Ministry has made any real effort 
to expend those funds.
    True success lies not only in the percentage of the capital 
budget actually spent in 2007, but in the effects of spending, 
as the Iraqi Government seeks to establish its credibility with 
citizens through improved delivery of public services and 
tangible economic development. Moreover, adherence to and 
improved familiarity with the decentralized and accountable 
fiduciary structures introduced since the fall of Saddam will 
give Iraqi citizens added confidence in and a reason to support 
their local, regional, and national governments. The effects of 
this new emphasis and these new procedures are already being 
felt, albeit unevenly, across the country. Some ministries have 
developed and are implementing aggressive spending plans (such 
as the Ministry of Education), and several provinces (Anbar, in 
particular) are demonstrating their empowerment through their 
new spending programs. Should these successes spread across 
Iraq, this would mark the beginning of a new relationship 
between citizens and their government.
    The most important change in 2007 is that all parties and 
all levels of Iraqi Government, from central to provincial to 
local, share an acute and unifying emphasis on budget 
execution. Unlike last year, the budget passed in February 2007 
included detailed capital budgets. The Government of Iraq has 
established a senior-level budget execution task force (led by 
a Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Finance, and the 
Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation) to spur 
spending and improve communications between the central and 
provincial governments. New procedures have been enacted to 
expedite spending processes, such as revised procurement 
regulations and a rescission clause in the 2007 budget law. 
Budget execution officials have been provided with additional 
training and resources. Improvements are still needed in 
tracking budget performance; audited figures are generally 
available only 3 or more months after the end of any given 
spending period.
    These changes have nearly tripled the ministries' rates of 
allocation when compared to last year at this time, though 
efforts must continue accelerating to make sufficient progress 
on this benchmark. Ministerial spending is moving ahead. The 
Ministry of Finance has moved more than 21 percent of the 
overall ministerial capital budget to the individual 
ministries' capital investment accounts, which enables them to 
award contracts and request additional releases based on 
contract schedules. With respect to provinces, a majority of 
the 2006 budget funding was released late in December. 
Provinces continue to apply those funds to improving services 
and advancing local reconstruction priorities, while at the 
same time processing their 2007 budgets. Most provinces are 
making significant progress in capital spending, but those with 
security challenges are lagging. Importantly, provincial budget 
allocations were calculated based on population statistics, 
which supports the constitution's concerns with equality.
    Assessment: The Iraqi Government is making satisfactory 
progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces, but 
even if the full $10 billion capital budget is allocated, 
spending units will not be able to spend all these funds by the 
end of 2007. Execution of the complete 2007 capital budget is a 
very aggressive target for the Government of Iraq, which 
expects significant increases in 2007 spending following major 
initiatives to improve its budget execution processes. Although 
the trend to date is positive, sustaining progress through 
September to meet this benchmark at year-end requires 
accelerated spending and procurement activity, which are 
challenging tasks in the face of capacity constraints and 
security problems.

(xviii) Ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining 
        or making false accusations against members of the ISF

    Iraqi authorities continue to undermine and make false 
accusations against ISF members. There are still several 
reports each month of allegations of wrongdoing against ISF 
members believed to be nonsectarian in their approach to 
security. In most cases, we are unable to assess the validity 
of these allegations but believe them to be untrue. It appears 
from anecdotal evidence that Iraqi political authorities may 
not be pursuing allegations even-handedly. Trumped up charges 
by the de-Ba'athification Commission have been used in the past 
to cleanse Sunni officers from formations. Questionable 
judicial warrants by the Office of the Commander in Chief are a 
more recent technique to target Sunni commanders while 
influential sectarian actors linked to security ministries 
continue to degrade formal command structures. Similarly, some 
Sunni politicians have made baseless claims against ISF 
officials, suggesting that unsubstantiated claims of sectarians 
can cut both ways.
    Some members of the COR and Council of Ministers have 
publicly supported ISF leaders while behind the scenes they 
continue to turn a blind eye to sectarian activities. United 
States military and diplomatic personnel continue to engage 
Iraqi Government officials at the highest levels to stress the 
need for Iraqi political authorities to cease making baseless 
accusations against ISF leaders for sectarian and political 
gain.
    Assessment: The Government of Iraq has made unsatisfactory 
progress in ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not 
undermining or making false accusations against members of the 
ISF. Accusations that undermine the independence and 
nonsectarianism of the ISF occur and are not adequately 
addressed by the Government of Iraq. The effect is at times to 
deny the ISF the services of qualified officers or to 
discourage them from operating in a professional non-sectarian 
manner. However, this does not necessitate a revision to the 
current plan and strategy, under which we continue to monitor 
the situation by means of our close involvement with the ISF 
and to press Iraqi political leaders to refrain from this 
behavior.

                                  
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