[Senate Document 109-24]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





109th Congress, 2nd Session                                   S. Doc. 109-24

 
                         Committee on the Budget


                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                     -------------------------------

                                1974-2006

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                     U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                            WASHINGTON : 2006


                                 An Act

  To establish a new congressional budget process; to establish 
Committees on the Budget in each House; to establish a Congressional 
Budget Office; to establish a procedure providing congressional control 
over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch; and for other 
purposes.

 _the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
                           United States Senate

                         Committee on the Budget


                        ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

Judd Gregg, New Hampshire, Chairman            Kent Conrad, North 
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico                     Dakota, Ranking 
Charles E. Grassley, Iowa                        Member
Wayne Allard, Colorado                         Paul S. Sarbanes, 
Michael B. Enzi, Wyoming                         Maryland
Jeff Sessions, Alabama                         Patty Murray, 
Jim Bunning, Kentucky                            Washington
Michael D. Crapo, Idaho                        Ron Wyden, Oregon
John Ensign, Nevada                            Russell D. Feingold, 
John Cornyn, Texas                               Wisconsin
Lamar Alexander, Tennessee                     Tim Johnson, South 
Lindsey O. Graham, South Carolina                Dakota
                                                 Robert C. Byrd, West 
                                                   Virginia
                                                 Bill Nelson, Florida
                                                 Debbie Stabenow, 
                                                   Michigan
                                                 Robert Menendez, New 
                                                   Jersey

                 Scott B. Gudes, Majority Staff Director
                     Mary Ann Naylor, Staff Director




[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.041

                             Acknowledgments



  The publication of this history benefited from the contributions of a 
number of congressional offices and agencies, including the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress, the 
United States Senate Historical Office, and the Senate Library. The 
United States Senate Committee on the Budget especially wishes to 
acknowledge the outstanding contributions of Robert Keith, budget 
process specialist, and Mary Frances Bley and Jerry V. Mansfield, 
librarians, of CRS; Tara J. Olivero, archivist and historian serving 
with the Committee; and Lynne Seymour, chief clerk of the Committee. 
This history would not have been possible without their significant 
expertise and effort.

  Integral to the success of this project was Suzanne Kayne of the 
Government Printing Office and Senate Budget Committee senior staff Jim 
Hearn, Lisa Konwinski, John Righter, and Cheri Reidy, who provided keen 
editorial support.

  Finally, the Committee wishes to express appreciation to the former 
professional staff who contributed to the production of this history 
through personal interviews and recollections. These public servants 
served the members of the Senate Budget Committee and the Nation with 
esprit and distinction. Their efforts and accomplishments furthered the 
field of financial management, and made tangible, lasting improvements 
to the budget of the United States Government and the congressional 
budget process.

                              Introduction

  The following history of the Senate Budget Committee and the 
congressional budget process was created in a bipartisan effort. 
Significant contributions were made by Committee staff, the 
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, and the 
Office of the Senate Historian. Several individuals are highlighted in 
the acknowledgments.

  The Budget Committee is one of the Senate's youngest committees, 
having been created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The 
Committee, the budget resolution and reconciliation process, and 
enforcement authorities were created to enable Congress to create, 
enforce, and manage the annual Federal budget, including all types of 
Federal spending and revenues. From the outset under the first chairman 
and ranking member, Senators Edmund S. Muskie and Peter H. Dominick, the 
Committee has benefited from effective leadership and membership, and it 
has been supported by an outstanding professional staff.

  One responsibility of the Committee is to facilitate an understanding 
by the Congress and public of the policies, programs, financial 
resources, and estimates included in the budget, and how the 
congressional budget process works to enforce the budget blueprint. In 
that spirit, this history, including excerpts from interviews with 
former senior staff, is provided. We hope that the public, students, and 
employees of the three branches of government will find this volume 
informative and useful.


                     PREPARED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF

                        JUDD GREGG, CHAIRMAN, AND

                       KENT CONRAD, RANKING MEMBER

                         COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

                          UNITED STATES SENATE

                             109TH CONGRESS
                                Contents

                                                                    Page
  Acknowledgments-------------------------------------------         VII
  Introduction----------------------------------------------          IX
  Principal Duties and Functions of the Senate Committee on 
      the Budget--------------------------------------------           1
    Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget-------------------------------1
    Reconciliation Legislation-----------------------------------------7
    Budget Process Reform Proposals-----------------------------------11
    Executive Impoundment Proposals and Impoundment Legislation-------13
    Oversight of the Congressional Budget Office----------------------14
    Consideration of the Nomination of the Director and Deputy Director 
      of the Office of Management and Budget--------------------------16
  History of the Congressional Budget Process and the Senate 
      Committee on the Budget-------------------------------          19
    Background--------------------------------------------------------19
    Prelude to the 1974 Reform----------------------------------------24
    The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974------28
    The First Decade: From ``Dry Run'' to Reconciliation--------------39
    Coping with Deficits: the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and Related La47
    Moving Toward Balance: Budget Enforcement Laws in the 1990s and the 
      Emergence of Surpluses------------------------------------------52
    Congressional Budgeting in the 21st Century-----------------------60
  Staff Recollections---------------------------------------          71
    Beginnings--------------------------------------------------------73

      People and Structure                                            73
      Carroll Arms                                                    74
    
    
                                                                    Page

Sid Brown (the Committee's First Chief of Budget Review)              75

Technology                                                            75
    Markups, Resolutions, and the Senate Floor------------------------76
    Tests of Budget Enforcement---------------------------------------80
    Committee Dynamics------------------------------------------------82
    Interaction with the Senate Leadership and the Executive Branch---83
    Reconciliation----------------------------------------------------86
    Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)---------------------------------------90
    Post-GRH Budget Agreements----------------------------------------92

       1987 Agreements: Omnibus Reconciliation (OBRA) and Balanced 
           Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act     92
       1989 Agreement: OBRA                                           93
       1990 Agreements: Budget Enforcement Act, Andrews Air 
           Force Base Summit                                          94
       1993 Agreement: OBRA                                           96
       1997 Agreement: Balanced Budget Act                            97
    The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)-----------------------------98
    Contemporary Budgeting--------------------------------------------99
    Reflections on the Budget Process and Committee Successes and 
      Challenges-----------------------------------------------------102
  Leadership and Membership of the Senate Committee on the 
      Budget------------------------------------------------         109
    Listing of Chairmen and Ranking Members--------------------------109
    Biographies of Chairmen and Ranking Members----------------------111
       Edmund S. Muskie, Maine                                       111
       Peter H. Dominick, Colorado                                   113
       Henry Bellmon, Oklahoma                                       115
       Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina                            117
       Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico                                  119
       Lawton Chiles, Florida                                        121
       Jim Sasser, Tennessee                                         123
       J. James Exon, Nebraska                                       125
       Frank R. Lautenberg, New Jersey                               127
       Kent Conrad, North Dakota                                     129
    
    
                                                                    Page

       Don Nickles, Oklahoma                                         131
       Judd Gregg, New Hampshire                                     133
    Committee Members Who Have Served in Other Elective or Appointive 
      Positions------------------------------------------------------135
    Membership of the Committee by Congress--------------------------137
    Membership of the Committee by State-----------------------------147
    Alphabetical Listing of Members of the Committee-----------------155
    Majority Staff Directors to the Committee------------------------159
    Minority Staff Directors to the Committee------------------------160
    Majority Counsels to the Committee-------------------------------161
    Minority Counsels to the Committee-------------------------------162
    Chief Clerks to the Committee------------------------------------163
  Authorities Pertaining to the Jurisdiction and Duties of 
      the Senate Committee on the Budget--------------------         165
    Statutory Provisions---------------------------------------------165
    Senate Rule XXV, Paragraph (e)-----------------------------------167
    S. Res. 445 (108th Congress)-------------------------------------168
    Standing Order on the Referral of Budget Process Legislation (197169
    S. Res. 45 (94th Congress)---------------------------------------170
    Committee Rules of Procedure-------------------------------------171
  Legislation Developed by the Senate Committee on the 
      Budget------------------------------------------------         172
    Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget: Fiscal Years 1976-2007-----172
    Budget Reconciliation Acts---------------------------------------173
    Other Significant Legislation Enacted Into Law-------------------175
  Glossary of Budget Terms----------------------------------         179
  Bibliography----------------------------------------------         185
  Appendix--------------------------------------------------         189
    Opening Statements from First Committee Hearing, August 14, 1974-189
    Flow Chart of the Budget and Appropriations Process--------------192


              Principal Duties and Functions of the Senate 
                         Committee on the Budget

The principal duties and functions of the Senate Committee on the Budget 
are set forth in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 (the 1974 Act), the Standing Rules of the Senate, and other 
authorities (these authorities are identified and discussed in more detail 
in a later section). Over the years, the Committee's duties and functions 
have been modified or supplemented through the enactment of amendments to 
the 1974 Act, the enactment of new laws, the inclusion of procedural 
features in annual budget resolutions, changes in Senate rules, and through 
other means.

In brief, the Senate Committee on the Budget's principal duties and 
functions include: (1) the development and enforcement each year of a 
concurrent resolution on the budget, which serves as a framework for 
subsequent congressional action on spending, revenue, and debt-limit 
legislation; (2) when the Committee so determines, the initiation and 
enforcement of the budget reconciliation process, which involves changing 
existing law through reconciliation legislation to bring spending, revenue, 
or debt-limit levels into conformity with budget resolution assumptions; 
(3) the development and implementation of budget process reform 
legislation; (4) the review of the broad economic and budgetary 
implications of executive impoundment proposals and compliance with 
impoundment control procedures; (5) the oversight of the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO); and (6) the consideration of the nomination of the 
Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). 
These duties and functions are discussed in more detail below.

                Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget

Section 301 (2 U.S.C. 632) of the 1974 Act requires Congress, by April 15 
of each year, to complete action on a concurrent resolution on the budget 
for the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of that year. The central 
purpose of a budget resolution is to set a blueprint for the overall fiscal 
and budgetary policy and to establish a framework for the subsequent 
consideration of spending, revenue, and debt-limit legislation during the 
session (and into the following session). The 1974 Act did not dictate that 
Congress annually approve a particular fiscal and budgetary policy (such as 
a balanced budget or restrictive/stimulative fiscal policy), but relies on 
the House and Senate to determine the appropriate mix of budget policies 
each year. Budget resolutions and other budgetary legislation are 
considered under a timetable set forth in Section 300 (2 U.S.C. 631) of the 
1974 Act. The timetable is meant to help coordinate the various 
congressional actions needed to implement annual fiscal and budgetary 
policy.

In times of weak economic growth or recession, the fiscal policy reflected 
in the budget resolution may be expansionary, recommending revenue 
reductions, spending increases, or a combination of the two to spur the 
economy. When economic conditions change, the fiscal policy underlying the 
budget resolution may be adjusted or reversed, calling instead for revenue 
increases, spending reductions, or both. As a consequence of adopting 
different fiscal policies and economic goals for different circumstances, 
the budget resolution may project deficits in some years and surpluses in 
others.

Furthermore, the budget resolution reflects changing national priorities. 
Spending for national defense, for example, may surge relative to 
nondefense spending during times of war, but constrict when conflict is 
ended. Spending for health care and income security, as another example, 
may accelerate more quickly compared to other domestic spending as the 
population ages.

Concurrent resolutions, unlike bills or joint resolutions, are not sent to 
the President for his approval and do not become law. Instead, they 
represent the mutual agreement of the Senate and House of Representatives. 
In order to implement the fiscal and budgetary policy goals embodied in a 
budget resolution, Congress and the President must enact spending, revenue, 
and debt-limit legislation into law.

In the case of budget resolutions, each Chamber originates its own 
concurrent resolution (as an S. Con. Res. or an H. Con. Res.). Through the 
late 1980s, the Senate and House alternated in the use of Senate and House 
concurrent resolutions as the final legislative vehicle for budget 
resolutions, but since then they have used House concurrent resolutions as 
the final vehicle in every instance of a conference report that was agreed 
to by both bodies.

The 1974 Act originally required that the Senate and House adopt two budget 
resolutions each year--an advisory budget resolution in the spring (by May 
15) and a binding budget resolution in the fall (by September 15). Congress 
adopted the second required budget resolution from FY1976 through FY1982. 
For the following several years, through FY1986, Congress did not adopt a 
second budget resolution; instead it relied on a feature in the first 
budget resolution that automatically deemed it to be the second budget 
resolution on October 1 if a second budget resolution had not been adopted 
by that date. In 1985, Congress amended the 1974 Act to require only a 
single budget resolution each year, in the spring, and advanced its due 
date by 1 month, to April 15; this change first took effect for FY1987.

Section 304 (2 U.S.C. 635) of the Act allows Congress to adopt a revised 
budget resolution at any time. Only once did Congress adopt a third budget 
resolution (FY1977). After Congress stopped using second budget resolutions 
(FY1982), whenever it wanted to make revisions in the budget resolution 
levels for the current year, it did so in the budget resolution for the 
following fiscal year.

The budget resolution has several required elements, as set forth in 
Section 301 of the Act, encompassing ``budget aggregates,'' functional 
allocations of spending, and, for Senate enforcement purposes only, revenue 
and outlay levels of the off-budget Social Security trust funds.

First, the resolution must set forth the following ``budget aggregates'' 
for each fiscal year covered:

       total on-budget spending, in the form of both new 
  budget authority (which provides legal authority for agencies to 
  incur financial obligations) and outlays (which represents 
  payments from the Treasury Department, usually in the form of 
  electronic fund transfers or checks issued, to liquidate 
  obligations);
       total on-budget revenues (which involves income to 
  the Federal Government from such sources as individual and 
  corporate income taxes, social insurance taxes, excise taxes and 
  tariffs), and the amount by which revenues should be increased or 
  decreased through legislative action;
       the on-budget surplus (an excess of revenues over 
  outlays) or the deficit (an excess of outlays over revenues); and
       the public debt (which corresponds to the statutory 
  level of debt, owed both to the public and to certain Federal 
  trust funds, that would be necessary to accommodate the levels of 
  spending and revenues assumed in the budget resolution).

Second, the budget resolution is required to set forth the amounts of new 
budget authority and outlays for each major functional category. Although 
the 1974 Act does not define the term ``major functional category,'' the 
current practice followed by Congress is to include 20 functional 
categories of the budget, covering such categories as National Defense 
(050), International Affairs (150), Energy (270), Agriculture (350), 
Transportation (400), Health (550) and Income Security (600).

Finally, the transactions of off-budget entities, which presently include 
the two Social Security trust funds (the Federal Old-Age and Survivors 
Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund) and 
the operations of the Postal Service, are not reflected in the aggregates 
and the functional allocations of spending in the budget resolution. For 
purposes of a Senate-only point of order intended to prevent legislative 
action that would erode the long-range balances in the Social Security 
trust funds, the budget resolution must also include revenue and outlay 
levels for those two funds.

Section 301 also specifies several optional elements that may be included 
in a budget resolution and affords additional flexibility in budget 
resolution content by means of an ``elastic clause'' in Section 301(b)(4). 
The clause stipulates that a budget resolution may ``set forth such other 
matters, and require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may 
be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act.''

Development of the annual budget resolution is the responsibility of the 
Senate and House Budget Committees. Each year, the process followed by the 
Senate Budget Committee (which is similar to the process followed by the 
House Budget Committee) begins when it receives an annual report from CBO, 
usually in late January, on the budget and economic outlook, which, since 
1996, covers the next 10 years (including baseline budget projections that 
estimate future spending and revenue levels without any policy changes) and 
the President submits his budget to Congress, which is due no later than 
the first Monday in February. The Committee then holds hearings to solicit 
testimony from witnesses such as the Treasury Secretary, the Director of 
OMB, the Director of CBO, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Cabinet 
secretaries, among others.

In addition to the initial CBO report on the budget and economic outlook, 
which is updated later in the session, the Committee receives CBO reports 
on other budget topics, including options for savings; annual reports on 
unauthorized appropriations and expiring authorizations, which are 
distributed to all committees; and CBO's analysis of the President's 
budget, which is prepared at the request of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee. The Budget Committee also receives statements, as provided for 
under Section 301, from the other Senate committees presenting their views 
and estimates on budget matters within their jurisdiction.

  
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 2001, The Washington Post. Photo by Ray Lustig. Reprinted with 
Permission.

Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan at his 17th 
appearance before the Senate Budget Committee in 2001.

The Senate Budget Committee marks up the budget resolution in open session 
generally in the same manner that other Senate committees mark up 
legislation. The markup usually proceeds with a Chairman's Mark, which is 
open to the offering of amendments. Following the consideration of all 
amendments and motions, the Budget Committee votes on ordering the budget 
resolution reported. A reported budget resolution may or may not be 
accompanied by a written report; when a written report is not issued, the 
Budget Committee usually issues a committee print in lieu of a report to 
explain its recommendations.

The chairman of the Budget Committee manages consideration of the budget 
resolution on the Senate floor, and heads the delegation of Senators 
appointed to a conference committee with Members from the House. The 
chairman also manages consideration of the conference report on the Senate 
floor and any other motions necessary to bring the Senate and House into 
final agreement on the measure.

Most legislation considered in the Senate is not subject to debate 
limitations or restrictions on the subject matter of amendments; Senators 
may debate such legislation at length, even engaging in extended debate or 
a filibuster, and offer non-germane amendments dealing with topics other 
than those encompassed by the underlying measure. Even the issue of whether 
to take up legislation for consideration, as reflected in the motion to 
proceed to the consideration of a measure, generally may be debated at 
length.

The consideration of a budget resolution, on the other hand, is governed by 
expedited procedures set forth in Section 305 (2 U.S.C. 636) of the 1974 
Act and under Senate precedents. First, the motion to proceed to the 
consideration of a budget resolution is not debatable. Second, the time for 
debate on a budget resolution is limited to 50 hours and is divided equally 
between the majority and minority. (While the 50-hour limitation includes 
time spent debating amendments, motions, and appeals, and time spent in 
quorum calls, it does not include time spent on roll call votes or on 
quorum calls immediately preceding a vote.) Additional time limits apply to 
the debate on amendments, motions, and appeals. A 10-hour limitation on 
debate applies to the consideration of conference reports on budget 
resolutions, and a 15-hour limitation applies to revised budget 
resolutions. Third, amendments offered from the floor must be germane. 
Other expediting procedures apply as well.

Under the timetable of the congressional budget process (see table 1), the 
House and Senate are scheduled to reach final agreement on the budget 
resolution by April 15 (as previously mentioned, the deadline originally 
was set as May 15, but was moved forward beginning with FY1987). In 
practice, the budget resolution often is not agreed to until after the 
deadline. Because the deadline was established under the rulemaking 
authority of the House and Senate, no legal consequences ensue if 
congressional action is not completed by that time.

The Budget Committee also plays a crucial role with respect to enforcing 
the parameters of the current budget resolution and the requirements under 
the 1974 Act and other authorities, when legislation is considered by the 
Senate. Enforcement relies upon the reconciliation process (discussed 
below), points of order, and the dissemination of ``scorekeeping'' data and 
other information.

Various points of order are available under the 1974 Act, as well as 
procedural features included in budget resolutions under authority of the 
elastic clause and other authorities, which may make it more difficult to 
consider and enact measures, amendments, conference reports, or motions 
that violate budgetary parameters or requirements. Under Section 312 (2 
U.S.C. 643) of the 1974 Act, the chairman of the Budget Committee advises 
the Presiding Officer of the Senate as to the budgetary impacts associated 
with legislation subject to a point of order.


 TABLE 1.--TIMETABLE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS (SECTION 300 OF
                  THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               On or before                    Action to be completed
------------------------------------------------------------------------
First Monday in February..................  President submits his
                                             budget.
 February 15..............................  Congressional Budget Office
                                             submits report to Budget
                                             Committees.
 Not later than 6 weeks after President     Committees submit views and
 submits budget.                             estimates to Budget
                                             Committees.
 April 1..................................  Senate Budget Committee
                                             reports concurrent
                                             resolution on the budget.
 April 15.................................  Congress completes action on
                                             concurrent resolution on
                                             the budget.
 May 15...................................  Annual appropriation bills
                                             may be considered in the
                                             House.
 June 10..................................   House Appropriations
                                             Committee reports last
                                             annual appropriation bill.
 June 15..................................  Congress completes action on
                                             reconciliation legislation.
 June 30..................................  House completes action on
                                             annual appropriation bills.
 October 1................................  Fiscal year begins.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


As part of a broad scorekeeping process under Section 308 (2 U.S.C. 639) of 
the 1974 Act, the Budget Committee integrates information on the costs of 
legislation, as estimated by CBO (for spending measures) and the Joint 
Committee on Taxation (JCT) (for revenue measures), into a complete tally 
so that the status of spending and revenue levels under the current budget 
resolution may be evaluated at any time. (The requirement that revenue 
estimates of the JCT be used for these purposes is set forth in Section 
201(f) (2 U.S.C. 601(f)) of the 1974 Act.) The chairman of the Budget 
Committee inserts scorekeeping reports into the Congressional Record 
periodically to apprise Members of the current levels of spending and 
revenues, and the amounts still available for legislative action under 
budget resolution assumptions.

Finally, the chairman of the Budget Committee notifies the Senate from time 
to time regarding adjustments made to budget resolution levels, as 
prescribed by Section 314 (2 U.S.C. 645) of the 1974 Act, or pursuant to 
authority under reserve funds or other procedural elements contained in 
budget resolutions.

                     Reconciliation Legislation

A budget resolution typically reflects many different assumptions regarding 
legislative action expected to occur during a session that would cause 
revenue and spending levels to be changed from baseline amounts. (The 
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 classified Federal spending into two types--
discretionary spending, which is controlled in annual appropriation acts; 
and direct spending, which is controlled in authorizing legislation and 
often is used to fund entitlement programs, such as Medicare, unemployment 
compensation, and Federal retirement.) Most revenue collections and direct 
spending, however, occurs automatically each year under permanent law; 
therefore, if the committees with jurisdiction over the revenue and direct 
spending programs do not report legislation to carry out the budget 
resolution policies by amending existing law, revenue and direct spending 
for these programs likely will continue without change from baseline 
projections.

The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure, authorized 
under Section 310 (2 U.S.C. 641) of the 1974 Act, that operates as an 
adjunct to the budget resolution process. The reconciliation process 
enhances Congress's ability to change current law in order to bring 
revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the 
assumptions of the budget resolution. Discretionary spending levels can be 
addressed each year as Congress considers the annual appropriations acts; 
consequently, the reconciliation process focuses principally on direct 
spending and revenue levels.

 Reconciliation is a two-stage process. First, reconciliation instructions 
are included in the budget resolution, directing the appropriate committees 
to develop legislation achieving the desired budgetary outcomes. 
Reconciliation instructions take the form of numerical targets and are not 
program-specific. If the budget resolution instructs more than one 
committee in a Chamber, then the instructed committees submit their 
legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees by the 
deadline prescribed in the budget resolution. The Budget Committees 
incorporate the submissions into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill (see 
table 2) without making any substantive revisions. In cases where only one 
committee has been instructed, the process allows that committee to report 
its reconciliation legislation directly to its parent Chamber, thus 
bypassing the Budget Committee.

 The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation 
legislation by the House and Senate under expedited procedures. As 
indicated previously, when the Senate considers most legislation, any 
Senator may speak at length (including engaging in a filibuster), and 
Senators may offer amendments that are not germane. Under reconciliation 
procedures, however, debate in the Senate on any reconciliation measure is 
limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on a conference report), and amendments 
must be germane and not include extraneous matter. In the House, the Rules 
Committee typically recommends a special rule for the consideration of a 
reconciliation measure that places restrictions on debate time and the 
offering of amendments.

 In some years, budget resolutions include reconciliation instructions that 
afford the House and Senate the option of considering two or more types of 
reconciliation measures. Under current Senate practices, there can be only 
one revenue reconciliation measure, one spending reconciliation measure, 
and one debt-limit reconciliation measure, or some combination thereof.


                 TABLE 2.--SELECTED RECONCILIATION ACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980
P.L. 96-499 (December 5, 1980)
    This Act was the first reconciliation measure to be passed by the
 House and Senate. As signed into law by President Carter, the Act
 reduced the FY1981 deficit by about $9 billion, split roughly between
 spending reductions (including reductions in discretionary
 appropriations) and revenue increases.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
P.L. 97-35 (August 13, 1981)
    President Reagan used this Act, as well as a tax-cut bill considered
 outside of the reconciliation process, to advance much of his
 legislative agenda in his first year in office. The Act represented a
 significant expansion of the reconciliation process--the 3-year savings
 associated with the Act amounted to $130 billion, and many extraneous
 provisions were included. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L.
 97-34) reduced revenues by $282 billion over 3 years.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
P.L. 101-508 (November 5, 1990)
    After a lengthy budget summit at Andrews Air Force Base, Congress
 sent President George H.W. Bush a bill reducing the deficit by $482
 billion over 5 years, including $158 billion in revenue increases and
 $324 billion in spending cuts and debt service savings. The Act also
 included the Budget Enforcement Act, which established caps on
 appropriations and a pay-as-you-go (paygo) requirement.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
P.L. 103-66 (August 10, 1993)
    This reconciliation measure, signed into law by President Clinton
 during his first year in office, reduced the deficit by $496 billion
 over 5 years, including $241 billion in revenue increases and $255
 billion in spending cuts and debt service savings. Additionally, it
 extended the statutory caps on appropriations and the paygo requirement
 through FY1998.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Balanced Budget Act of 1995
H.R. 2491
    This reconciliation measure included policies to reduce the deficit
 by $363 billion over 7 years (1996-2002), including $577 billion in
 spending cuts and $214 billion in tax relief. The bill was vetoed by
 President Clinton on December 6, 1995.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


            TABLE 2.--SELECTED RECONCILIATION ACTS--Continued
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
P.L. 105-33 (August 5, 1997) and P.L. 105-34 (August 5, 1997)
    Taken together, these two reconciliation acts reduced the deficit by
 $118 billion over 5 years, including spending cuts and debt service
 savings of $198 billion and $80 billion in revenue reductions. They
 represent one of three instances in which two separate reconciliation
 acts were enacted pursuant to a single budget resolution--the other two
 instances occurred in 1982 and 2005 (carrying over into 2006). The
 Balanced Budget Act of 1997 extended the statutory caps on
 appropriations and the paygo requirement though FY2002.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
P.L. 107-16 (June 7, 2001)
    Public Law 107-16 was signed by President George W. Bush and reduced
 revenues significantly; revenue reductions, together with outlay
 increases for refundable tax credits, reduced the projected surplus by
 $1.349 trillion over FY2001-FY2011. The tax cuts in the Act were
 scheduled to sunset in no more than 10 years in order to comply with
 the Senate's ``Byrd rule'' against extraneous matter in reconciliation
 legislation (Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974).
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 Once the reconciliation legislation called for in the budget resolution 
has been approved or vetoed by the President, the process is concluded. 
Congress cannot develop another reconciliation bill in the wake of a veto 
without first adopting another budget resolution containing reconciliation 
instructions. On occasion, such as under the budget resolution for FY2006, 
final action on reconciliation legislation was not completed until the 
following session.

 As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year 
that the congressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with 
the first use of reconciliation by both the House and Senate in 1980, 
however, reconciliation has been used in most years. Congress has sent the 
President 21 reconciliation measures over the years; 18 were signed into 
law and 3 were vetoed (and the vetoes were not overridden).

 A special reconciliation process, applicable only in the Senate, was 
established as Section 258C (2 U.S.C. 907d) of the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The purpose of the process was to 
enable the Senate to quickly pass an alternate deficit-reduction measure 
whenever a sequestration report from the OMB Director indicated that a 
sequester under the pay-as-you-go requirement or the deficit targets 
otherwise would be necessary. The Senate never used the special 
reconciliation process under Section 258C.

Budget Process Reform Proposals

 Each Congress, legislation is introduced on a wide variety of budget 
process reform proposals and referred to the Budget Committee. The Budget 
Committee's jurisdiction over budget process matters is established by the 
1974 Act, Senate Rule XXV, and especially S. Res. 445, which the Senate 
agreed to on October 9, 2004.\1\

\1\ For many years, the Senate Budget Committee shared jurisdiction over 
the Federal budget process with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee 
(the predecessor to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee) under the terms of a standing order reached by unanimous consent 
in 1977. In 2004, the Senate adopted S. Res. 445, which consolidated 
jurisdiction over the Federal budget process in the Budget Committee. These 
authorities pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee are 
discussed in more detail in a later section of this document.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.038

Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Photography Studio.

Chairman Judd Gregg, Ranking Member Kent Conrad, Committee members, and 
staff during the markup for the Stop Over Spending Act of 2006. The Act 
proposed measures to reform the budget process.

 Some budget process reform legislation is comprehensive in scope, while 
other such legislation is targeted toward particular issues. During the 
109th Congress, for example, legislation was introduced and referred to the 
Budget Committee dealing with such specific matters as biennial budgeting, 
line-item veto, a Social Security lockbox, emergency reserve funds, pay-as-
you-go procedures, and a Federal commission to examine proposals dealing 
with long-term budgetary challenges, as well as comprehensive legislation 
dealing with several of these matters, and more, in a single bill.

 The Budget Committee often works closely with other Senate committees on 
legislation including budget process reforms because of the significant 
range of issues that may be involved. In addition to the Budget Committee, 
which exercises jurisdiction over the Federal budget process, the Rules and 
Administration Committee has jurisdiction over the Standing Rules of the 
Senate, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has 
jurisdiction over Federal accounting and management laws, and the 
Appropriations Committee has significant jurisdiction over impoundments 
proposed by the President. Further, the Senate may decide to include budget 
process reforms in legislation dealing with other, unrelated subjects. 
Legislation increasing the public debt limit (which is under the 
jurisdiction of the Finance Committee), for example, has been the vehicle 
in the past for important changes in the budget process. Other significant 
changes in the budget process have been included in omnibus reconciliation 
legislation.

 Examples of past budget process reforms that have been enacted into law, 
and in which the Budget Committee was involved extensively, include, among 
others: (1) the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
(also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); (2) the Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987; (3) the Budget 
Enforcement Act of 1990; (4) budget process provisions in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; (5) the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 
1995; (6) the Line Item Veto Act (1996); and (7) the Budget Enforcement Act 
of 1997. A more detailed listing of budget process reform legislation is 
provided in a later section of this document.

 The Budget Committee's jurisdiction over budget process reform proposals 
is protected by Section 306 (2 U.S.C. 637) of the 1974 Act. Under Section 
306, no measure or motion dealing with matters under the Budget Committee's 
jurisdiction may be considered unless it has been reported by, or 
discharged from, the Committee (unless it is an amendment to such a 
measure). The prohibition is enforceable by a point of order that may be 
waived by the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 
Senators, if no seats are vacant). The section reads as follows:

    Sec. 306.--Legislation Dealing With Congressional Budget Must Be 
Handled by Budget Committees.
      No bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report, 
dealing with any matter which is within the jurisdiction of the 
Committee on the Budget of either House shall be considered in that 
House unless it is a bill or resolution which has been reported by 
the Committee on the Budget of that House (or from the consideration 
of which such committee has been discharged) or unless it is an 
amendment to such a bill or resolution.

     Executive Impoundment Proposals and Impoundment Legislation

 The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Title X of the 1974 Act) established 
procedures for the proposal by the President of impoundments and their 
consideration by Congress. The Act classifies impoundments into two types--
rescissions, which cancel budget authority previously provided in law, and 
deferrals, which delay the obligation or expenditure of budget authority.

 In order to rescind or defer budget authority, the President is required 
to submit to Congress a message detailing his recommendations. In the case 
of rescissions, the President may withhold funds from obligation for 45 
days of ``continuous session'' while Congress considers the request. If 
Congress does not enact legislation approving the rescission during this 
period, then the funds must be released for obligation. The Impoundment 
Control Act establishes rescission bills as the vehicles for approving 
rescissions, and they are considered under expedited procedures in each 
Chamber. Deferrals take effect and remain in effect (only for a temporary 
period, so that the funds do not lapse) unless overturned by Congress. The 
legislative means for overturning deferrals provided for in the Impoundment 
Control Act, the one-House legislative veto, was invalidated by the Supreme 
Court in the INS v. Chadha case in 1986. The Comptroller General monitors 
the impoundment process for Congress, issuing a report evaluating 
Presidential impoundment messages and submitting messages to Congress when 
unreported impoundments are discovered.

 The Appropriations Committee historically has exercised jurisdiction in 
the Senate over the impoundment of appropriated funds. The Senate Budget 
Committee's involvement in impoundment matters is rooted in various 
authorities. Under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement reached in 
1975, the Senate Budget Committee was given jurisdiction over impoundment 
messages and legislation for the purpose of considering the ``macroeconomic 
implications, impact on priorities and aggregate spending levels, and the 
legality of the President's use of the deferral and rescission mechanism 
under title X.'' The agreement was modified on April 11, 1986, in the wake 
of the Chadha decision. A standing order established in 1977, and 
effectively superseded by the Senate's adoption of S. Res. 445 in 2004, 
assigns the Budget Committee responsibilities over definitions of 
impoundment and the process by which impoundments are reported to and 
considered by Congress.

 Although Presidents have from time to time proposed a significant level of 
impoundments, the curtailment of spending through impoundment generally has 
not been significant.

Oversight of the Congressional Budget Office

 The Congressional Budget Office was created by Title II of the 1974 Act. 
Section 201 (2 U.S.C. 601) established CBO, Section 202 (2 U.S.C. 602) 
identified its duties and functions, and Section 203 (2 U.S.C. 603) set 
forth rules and guidelines for public access to budget data.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.031

 The New Yorker Collection 1996 Peter Steiner from cartoonbank.com. All 
Rights Reserved.

 The 1974 Act envisioned a close relationship between CBO and the Budget 
Committees, which is reflected mainly in the stated duties and functions of 
each entity.

 Section 202 establishes a hierarchy among the congressional clients that 
CBO serves. Section 202(a) identifies the primary duty and function of CBO 
as being:

. . . to provide to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses 
information which will assist such committees in the discharge of all 
matters within their jurisdictions, including (1) information with 
respect to the budget, appropriations bills, and other bills authorizing 
or providing new budget authority or tax expenditures, (2) information 
with respect to revenues, receipts, estimated future revenues and 
receipts, and changing revenue conditions, and (3) such related 
information as such Committees may request.

 Following the Budget Committees, Section 202 directs CBO to provide 
assistance to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House 
Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee, then to other 
House and Senate committees and joint committees, and Members of Congress.

 Title I of the 1974 Act created the two Budget Committees. In Section 
102(a), Senate Rule XXV was modified in part to impose on the Senate Budget 
Committee the duty ``to review, on a continuing basis, the conduct by the 
Congressional Budget Office of its functions and duties.'' Section 101(c) 
of the 1974 Act amended House Rule XI in part with identical language 
regarding the duty to continuously review CBO's conduct.

 The standing order established in 1977, and effectively superseded by S. 
Res. 445 in 2004, assigns jurisdiction over legislation affecting the 
functions, duties, and powers of CBO to the Senate Budget Committee.

 The Budget Committee reviews CBO's conduct in several ways, including 
through meetings and correspondence with the CBO Director and staff, and 
more formally, through periodic oversight hearings. Opportunities to review 
CBO's conduct indirectly occur as well, especially during hearings on 
Federal budgetary issues, including the CBO Director's annual testimony on 
the budget and economic outlook and the update later in the session, and 
hearings on budget process and budget concept issues.

 Finally, the Budget Committee plays a role in the process of selecting a 
CBO Director for each 4-year term. While the Speaker of the House and the 
President pro tempore of the Senate officially appoint the CBO Director, 
they are required under Section 201 of the 1974 Act to do so ``after 
considering recommendations received from the Committees on the Budget of 
the House and Senate.'' Under informal procedures that have been used in 
the past, the two Budget Committees have alternated in making 
recommendations to the leadership regarding who should be appointed to the 
position, and the leadership has concurred in their recommendations.

 Six persons have served as CBO Director and four Deputy Directors have 
served as Acting Director during periods when the Director's appointment 
was delayed or the Director left the position before the term ended (see 
table 3).


         TABLE 3.--DIRECTORS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alice M. Rivlin...........................  1975-1979 and 1979-1983
                                             terms.
Rudolph G. Penner.........................  1983-1987 term.
Robert D. Reischauer......................  1987-1991 and 1991-1995
                                             terms.
June Ellenoff O'Neill.....................  1995-1999 term.
Dan L. Crippen............................  1999-2003 term.
Douglas Holtz-Eakin.......................  2003-2007 term.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, Deputy Directors Edward Gramlich, James Blum, Barry
  Anderson, and Donald Marron served as Acting Director when the
  Director's appointment was delayed or the Director left the position
  before the term ended.


 Funding for CBO is provided in annual appropriation acts. Accordingly, 
fiscal oversight of CBO is conducted by the House and Senate Appropriations 
Committees.

Consideration of the Nomination of the Director and Deputy Director of the 
Office of Management and Budget

 For many years, nominations to the position of the Director of the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Deputy Directors, had been referred 
exclusively to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Late in the 108th 
Congress, the Senate considered S. Res. 445, a measure pertaining mainly to 
reform of congressional oversight of intelligence and jurisdictional 
changes relating to homeland security matters. Among other things, the 
Governmental Affairs Committee was renamed the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee and its jurisdiction over homeland security 
matters was consolidated. The jurisdiction of the renamed committee also 
was modified to provide joint jurisdiction with the Budget Committee 
regarding nominations to the positions of OMB Director and Deputy Director 
(the Budget Committee does not have any jurisdiction regarding nominations 
to the position of OMB Deputy Director for Management).

 Section 101(e) of S. Res. 445, as adopted by the Senate in 2004, reads as 
follows:

             (e) OMB Nominees.--The Committee on the Budget and the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs shall have 
joint jurisdiction over the nominations of persons nominated by the 
President to fill the positions of Director and Deputy Director for 
Budget within the Office of Management and Budget, and if one 
committee votes to order reported such a nomination, the other must 
report within 30 calendar days session, or be automatically 
discharged.

 The new procedure became effective at the beginning of the 109th Congress. 
On April 27, 2006, during the second session of the 109th Congress, 
President George W. Bush nominated Robert J. Portman to succeed Joshua 
Bolten as the OMB Director. The nomination was referred jointly that day to 
the Budget Committee and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee. The Budget Committee held a hearing on the nomination on May 11 
and approved the nomination on May 23, by a vote of 22 to 0. The Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee approved the nomination by 
voice vote on May 22, and the full Senate approved the nomination by voice 
vote on May 26.

 On June 9, 2006, President Bush nominated Stephen S. McMillin to the 
position of OMB Deputy Director. The Budget Committee approved the 
nomination on July 13, by unanimous consent. On July 28, the full Senate 
approved the nomination, by unanimous consent.


            History of the Congressional Budget Process and 
                   the Senate Committee on the Budget

 The Senate Budget Committee was created more than 30 years ago under 
landmark reform legislation, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344; 88 Stat. 297-339; 2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.). 
The Act also created the parallel Budget Committee in the House of 
Representatives and established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The 
two Budget Committees and CBO were created for the primary purpose of 
assisting the Senate and House in developing and enforcing budgetary plans 
in the form of annual concurrent resolutions on the budget and any required 
reconciliation legislation. Following a background on the roots of the 
Federal budgeting system, this section recounts the circumstances that gave 
rise to budget reform in the early 1970s, examines the legislative history 
of the 1974 Act, and reviews the origin and development of the Senate 
Budget Committee, from 1974 to the present.

Background

 The Constitution of the United States vests the Congress with key 
budgetary powers. These powers, often referred to as ``the power of the 
purse,'' derive from several provisions in Article I of the Constitution. 
With respect to raising income through taxation and borrowing, Section 8 
declares that ``[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . .'' and ``[t]o borrow 
Money on the credit of the United States.'' In the case of spending, 
Section 9 states that ``[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in 
Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .'' The Constitution thus 
ensures a role of pivotal importance for Congress in Federal budgeting by 
requiring that funds can only be raised, borrowed, and spent through the 
enactment of legislation.

 James Madison, the primary architect of the Constitution and the fourth 
President of the United States, asserted that vesting budgetary powers in 
the Congress was a critical element in maintaining freedom and promoting 
fair government:

    This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most 
complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm 
the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress 
of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and 
salutary measure.\1\

\1\ Federalist No. 58 (Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be 
Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered), by James 
Madison. See the collection of the Federalist Papers at the Library of 
Congress Website at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_58.html.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.021

Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division [LC-
USZ62-87924].

James Madison, fourth President of the United States, wrote about the 
``power over the purse'' in the 58th essay of the Federalist Papers.

 While the Constitution assigns the principal role in Federal budgeting to 
Congress, it does not, for the most part, prescribe the procedures it 
should follow in exercising this role. Section 7 provides that ``All Bills 
for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but 
the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.'' 
Section 8 places a 2-year limit on the duration of certain military 
funding. Otherwise, the Constitution does not address how the House and 
Senate should organize themselves, or the procedures they should follow, 
for the consideration of budgetary legislation. Furthermore, the 
Constitution allows each Chamber to develop its own rules and procedures; 
Section 5 states in part that ``Each House may determine the Rules of its 
Proceedings . . . .''

 In the early years of the Nation, the House and Senate approached their 
budgetary responsibilities in a largely ad hoc fashion, establishing short-
lived committees to handle single issues. This was followed by a period in 
which budgetary responsibilities were concentrated mainly in two standing 
committees--the Senate Finance Committee, established in 1816, and the 
House Ways and Means Committee, established in 1802.\2\

\2\ The historical development of the two committees is discussed in: (1) 
History of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, S. Doc. 97-5, 
May 12, 1981, available on the Website of the Senate Finance Committee at 
http://finance.senate.gov/history.pdf; and (2) The Committee on Ways and 
Means; a Bicentennial History, 1780-1989, H. Doc. 100-244, [no date] 
available on the Website of the Government Printing Office at http://
www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cdocuments/100-244/browse.html.

 Following the surge in spending and debt levels associated with the Civil 
War, the House, in 1865, and the Senate, in 1867, each established a 
standing Appropriations Committee, thus dividing jurisdiction over spending 
and revenues between two committees in each Chamber (with the Senate 
Finance and House Ways and Means Committees retaining jurisdiction over 
revenues).\3\ During the 1880s, the jurisdiction of the House and Senate 
Appropriations Committees over Federal spending began to erode, until a 
sizeable portion was under the control of various legislative committees in 
each Chamber. This fragmentation of spending jurisdiction continued for 
several decades until reforms in the early 1920s reconsolidated the 
Appropriations Committees' jurisdiction.

\3\ The historical development of the two committees is discussed in: (1) 
Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 138th Anniversary, 1867-
2005, S. Doc. 109-5, 2005; and (2) Congressional Research Service, The 
House Appropriations Process, 1789-1993, by Louis Fisher, CRS Report 93-729 
S, Aug. 6, 1993.

 The Constitution confers many duties and powers on the President, but it 
does not explicitly give the President a role in Federal budgeting. 
Budgetary legislation, of course, like legislation on any other matter, 
must be presented to the President before it can become law (under Article 
I, Section 7), and he has the authority to approve or veto it. Among the 
different duties and powers of the President set forth in Title II, Section 
3 provides that ``[h]e shall from time to time give the Congress 
Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration 
such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . .''

 The decentralized and fragmented approach to budgeting employed by 
Congress over the years was mirrored in the executive branch. Agency 
requests for funds were compiled by the Secretary of the Treasury into a 
``book of estimates'' submitted annually to Congress, but there was little 
uniformity in the manner in which each agency prepared its requests. The 
President did not play a formal role in reviewing and coordinating the 
funding requests, and the funding requests were not considered in relation 
to requests for revenue.\4\

\4\ The early budget practices of the executive branch are summarized in 
Kimmel, Lewis H., Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789-1958 (The 
Brookings Institution: Washington, DC), 1959.

 In 1910, President William H. Taft appointed a Commission on Economy and 
Efficiency which focused attention on the need for a national budgeting 
system. Although the Commission's recommendations were not acted on, they 
helped to foster reform in the following decade, when concern about the 
Nation's fiscal condition spiked in response to the steep rise in spending 
and debt levels due to World War I and other matters.

 Select committees in the House and Senate examined the issue of a national 
budgeting system in 1919 and 1920, recommending legislation that would 
require the President to submit an annual budget for the entire Federal 
Government. President Woodrow Wilson vetoed the legislation in 1920, due to 
concerns regarding the constitutionality of his removal power over the 
proposed position of Comptroller General. Modified legislation was signed 
into law the following year by President Warren G. Harding, as the Budget 
and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 20 et seq.).

 In addition to requiring the President to submit a budget for the Federal 
Government annually to Congress, the 1921 Act created the Bureau of the 
Budget (as part of the Treasury Department) to assist with the President's 
budgetary role. The Budget Bureau was made part of the Executive Office of 
the President in 1939, and renamed the Office of Management and Budget in 
1970. The 1921 Act also created the General Accounting Office (later 
renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004), headed by the 
Comptroller General.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.029

 1921, 1922, The Washington Post. Reprinted with Permission.

Washington Post headlines from 1921 and 1922 concerning passage of the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the creation of the Bureau of the 
Budget, which became the Office of Management and Budget in 1970.

 The Federal budgeting system created by the Budget and Accounting Act of 
1921 continued in place for several decades without fundamental change. The 
1921 Act was revised on occasion, perhaps most notably by the Budget and 
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 2317 et seq.). The changes to 
the 1921 Act were given impetus, in part, by the reports of the first and 
second Hoover Commissions in 1949 and 1955, respectively. Although the 
changes expanded and refined Presidential authority and responsibilities in 
the area of budgeting, they did not alter the basic purpose and scope of 
the 1921 Act.\5\

\5\ The Federal budget process, as it existed in the middle of the 20th 
century, is described in: Smithies, Arthur. The Budgetary Process in the 
United States. McGraw-Hill (New York: 1955).

Prelude to the 1974 Reform

 The period from the end of World War II until the early 1970s was one in 
which Congress examined and reexamined its organization and procedures for 
budgeting. Although several different approaches to reform were tried (see 
table 1), they generally did not prove to be workable or durable.


                    TABLE 1.--PRE-1974 REFORM EFFORTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Legislative budgets of 1947, 1948, and 1949 under the
 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
 The Employment Act of 1946, which established the Joint
 Economic Committee
 The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950
 The President's Commission on Budget Concepts (1967)
 Statutory spending limits and reductions (1967-1972)
 Joint Study Committee on Budget Control (1972-1973)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 The first major congressional reform of the post-World War II era was the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The Act fundamentally restructured 
and modernized the committee system, among other things, scaling back the 
number of committees in both the House and Senate and boosting committee 
staff resources. One provision in the Act was aimed at establishing, for 
the first time, a requirement that the House and Senate agree to an overall 
budget plan early in the session to guide the subsequent consideration of 
budgetary legislation. Section 138 of the Act (60 Stat. 812) created a 
Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget, consisting of Members appointed 
from the House and Senate Appropriations Committee, the House Ways and 
Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee. The charter of the joint 
committee was to examine the President's budget at the beginning of each 
session and to report by February 15 of each year a legislative budget, 
including estimates of total spending and revenues.

 The first attempt to implement a legislative budget, in 1947, failed when 
the House and Senate could not reach agreement on the legislation. In 1948, 
the two Chambers agreed on a budget but then exceeded it. Finally, in 1949, 
the House and Senate again failed to agree on a legislative budget, despite 
extending the reporting deadline from February 15 to May 1. The legislative 
budget required by Section 138 was not pursued thereafter, and the section 
was repealed two decades later by Section 242 of the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1970.

 Many factors have been cited for the failure of the legislative budget in 
the late 1940s. In addition to its attempted implementation in a difficult 
political climate with sharp disagreement over budget policies, the 
legislative budget failed because the joint committee was hampered by an 
unrealistically tight timetable in which to complete its actions, a lack of 
useful budgetary information, insufficient staff resources, and its 
unwieldy size (at about 100 members).

 Another budgetary reform in 1946 was the enactment of the Employment Act 
of 1946. The Act recognized the important role the Federal Government plays 
in promoting economic growth and stabilization. The Act created the Joint 
Economic Committee to assist Congress in this role.

In 1950, the House and Senate undertook a one-time experiment in improving 
legislative efficiency by considering all of the regular appropriation acts 
for FY1951 in a single bill.\6\ Advocates of this approach had attempted 
for several years to mandate it through legislative action. On September 
27, 1949, the Senate adopted a resolution providing for an omnibus 
appropriations procedure, S. Con. Res. 18, but the House did not take 
comparable action. Instead, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees 
decided that during the next session they would combine the regular 
appropriations acts for FY1951 into a single measure. The two committees 
were able to accomplish this result without any changes in rules, but 
simply by exercising their own authority to determine the number of 
appropriation measures.

\6\ See ``The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950,'' by Dalmus H. Nelson, 
Journal of Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, May 1953.

 After lengthy consideration, the House and Senate completed action on the 
measure, which was signed into law on September 6, 1950 (more than 2 months 
after the fiscal year had begun) as the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950 
(81st Congress, P.L. 759). Although some aspects of the experience were 
viewed favorably, the House and Senate did not pass the legislation with 
any less time or effort than it took to pass appropriation acts 
individually in other years. Further, by virtue of being packaged into an 
omnibus measure, the enactment of some of the appropriation measures was 
delayed considerably compared to the usual practice.

 The following year, the House and Senate returned to the practice of 
considering the regular appropriation acts individually. Congressional 
action on omnibus appropriation acts would not recur for several decades.

 One enduring achievement in the area of budget reform during this period 
was the President's Commission on Budget Concepts, appointed by President 
Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. The membership of the commission was diverse, 
including Members of Congress (the chairmen and ranking members of the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees), the Secretary of the Treasury 
(Henry H. Fowler), the OMB Director (Charles L. Schultze), the Comptroller 
General (Elmer B. Staats), and representatives of the private sector and 
academia. The commission was chaired by David M. Kennedy, chairman of the 
board, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago.

 In its report later that year, the Commission set forth an overarching 
framework of budget concepts that largely underpins the budget process in 
use today.\7\ One of the most important recommendations of the commission 
centered on ending the use of multiple budget presentations, including the 
administrative budget, the consolidated cash budget, and the Federal sector 
of the national income accounts. Each of the three approaches to budget 
presentation had been criticized for deficiencies or drawbacks that 
impaired sound policymaking, and the Commission recommended replacing them 
with the ``unified budget.'' Under the unified budget, all Federal funds 
and trust funds of the government are melded together into a single 
document, thereby improving the understanding of the scope of the Federal 
budget and analysis of the budget's impact on, and interaction with, the 
economy.

\7\ President's Commission on Budget Concepts. Report of the President's 
Commission on Budget Concepts. U.S. Govt. Printing Office. (Washington: 
October 1967). Reprinted in 1987.

 During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a deteriorating budget picture led 
to clashes between Congress and the President. Toward the end of the 
Johnson administration, budgetary strains were created by the rising costs 
of the war in Vietnam, increased spending for the Great Society programs, 
and a Presidential request for a surtax, among other factors. The budgetary 
strains continued into the administration of President Richard M. Nixon, 
who clashed repeatedly with Congress over budget priorities.

         
        [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.025
        

Convened by President Lyndon Johnson, this commission, tasked with 
studying ways to modernize the Federal budget process, recommended 
creating a unified budget system to enhance congressional and public 
understanding of the Federal budget and provide a more useful instrument 
of public and financial policy.

 From 1967 through 1972, Congress acted five times on proposals to limit or 
reduce Federal spending.\8\ These proposals involved spending reductions 
included in a continuing appropriations act (1967), spending limits 
combined with tax legislation (1968), spending limits included in 
supplemental appropriations acts (1969 and 1970), and spending limits 
included in a measure increasing the limit on the public debt (1972).

\8\ Congressional actions in this regard are discussed in detail in: 
Schick, Allen. Congress and Money. The Urban Institute (Washington: 1980). 
See Chapter II (The Seven-Year Budget War: 1966-73), pp. 17-49. The five 
laws involved were: (1) P.L. 90-218; (2) P.L. 90-364; (3) P.L. 91-47; (4) 
P.L. 91-305; and (5) P.L. 92-599.

 The ad hoc nature of congressional actions to deal with spending control 
and other budgetary issues highlighted the inadequacy of House and Senate 
procedures for making budget policy. In order to resolve the many problems 
in budget process that beset the House and Senate during this period, the 
two Chambers included a provision in one of the last measures approved by 
the 92nd Congress intended to lead to reform in the following Congress. A 
bill temporarily increasing the public debt by $65 billion and providing 
for a 1-day limit of $250 billion on spending, H.R. 16810 was signed into 
law by President Nixon on October 27, 1972, as P.L. 92-599 (86 Stat. 1324-
1326). Section 301 of the Act established a joint committee which came to 
be known as the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control.

 The Joint Study Committee on Budget Control consisted of 32 members, 16 
from each Chamber, appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President 
pro tempore of the Senate. Seven House Members and seven Senate Members 
were appointed from the Appropriations Committees, the same number were 
appointed from the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and 
two additional Members from each Chamber were appointed. The main task of 
the Joint Study Committee, as set forth in Section 301(b) of P.L. 92-599, 
was to report by February 15, 1973 on a:

          . . . full study and review of . . . the procedures which 
should be adopted by the Congress for the purpose of improving 
congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals, 
including procedures for establishing and maintaining an overall 
view of each year's budgetary outlays which is fully coordinated 
with an overall view of the anticipated revenues for that year. . . 
                                                                 .''

The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974

 In 1973 and 1974, during the 93rd Congress, the House and Senate finally 
brought the issue of comprehensive budget process reform to a successful 
conclusion. During this period, the House and Senate pursued several broad-
scale reforms that encompassed fundamental issues in executive-legislative 
relations and the separation of powers. Among other things, congressional 
actions dealt with war powers as the war in Vietnam drew to a close; 
focused on intelligence oversight in the wake of disclosures of domestic 
spying and other abuses; and pursued charges of corruption in the Nixon 
administration and impeachment following revelations stemming from 
Watergate.

 With regard to budget process reform, Congress faced many different 
issues. Congressional actions in the preceding years had clearly 
demonstrated that it lacked an effective means of determining budget 
priorities and coordinating revenue and spending policies, both in terms of 
a legislative vehicle and committee structure. The deficiencies in 
procedure and structure contributed, in the view of many, to undesirable 
budget outcomes, such as persistent and growing deficits, excessive 
spending and a growing portion of outlays considered to be ``relatively 
uncontrollable,'' and an undue reliance upon the executive for budgetary 
information and analysis. Undesirable procedural outcomes were attributed 
to these deficiencies as well, including delays in the annual 
appropriations process, leading to funding gaps and excessive reliance on 
continuing appropriations acts.

 During his 1972 reelection campaign, in his FY1973 budget submission to 
Congress, and in other venues, President Nixon criticized the House and 
Senate for shortcomings in budget procedure. Their ``hoary and 
traditional'' procedures, he argued, impaired the enactment of sound 
budgetary policies.

 Another major concern centered around the large-scale impoundment of funds 
by the Nixon administration. In addition to the number and size of the 
Nixon impoundments, which in 1973 reached about $18 billion (far more than 
any previous President had impounded) and represented a sizeable share of 
the approximately $170 billion in appropriations enacted annually at that 
time, Congress was concerned that the purpose of most of the impoundments 
was to overturn congressional priorities established in appropriations 
acts, thereby undermining its power of the purse.

 The Joint Study Committee, created at the end of the 1972 session, was 
cochaired by Representative Jamie L. Whitten (chairman of the House 
Appropriations Committee) and Representative Al Ullman (chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee). The Joint Study Committee held eight 
hearings between January 18

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.030

 1972, 1973, The Washington Post. Reprinted with Permission.

During the early 1970s, Congress and the President clashed repeatedly 
over budget priorities as reflected in these Washington Post headlines 
from 1972 and 1973.

and March 15, 1973. On February 7, 1973, the Joint Study Committee issued 
an interim report, and, on April 18, 1973, it issued a final report.\9\

\9\ See the reports of the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control: (1) 
Improving Congressional Control Over Budgetary Outlay and Receipt Totals; 
Interim Report, H. Rept. 93-13, Feb. 7, 1973; and (2) Recommendations for 
Improving Congressional Control Over Budgetary Outlay and Receipt Totals, 
H. Rept. 93-147, Apr. 18, 1973.

 In its final report, the Joint Study Committee drew special attention to 
Congress's difficulty in controlling the deficit. The Joint Study Committee 
concluded that ``the failure to arrive at congressional budget decisions on 
an overall basis has been a contributory factor in this picture.'' Further, 
the Joint Study Committee noted:

        The fact that no committee has the responsibility to decide 
whether or not total outlays are appropriate in view of the current 
situation appears to be responsible for much of the problem. Perhaps 
still more critical for the process is the distribution of 
jurisdiction over components of the budget among several different 
congressional committees. As a result, each spending bill tends to 
be considered by Congress as a separate entity, and any assessment 
of relative priorities among spending programs for the most part is 
made solely within the context of the bill before Congress.\10\

\10\ Joint Study Committee, H. Rept. 93-147, ibid., p. 1.

 The Joint Study Committee recommended the establishment of a 21-member 
Budget Committee in the House and a 15-member Budget Committee in the 
Senate. One-third of each Committee's members would be appointed from the 
Appropriations Committee in that Chamber, one-third from the revenue 
committees (House Ways and Means and Senate Finance), and one-third from 
the House and Senate at large, with the chairmanships of each Budget 
Committee alternating between the appropriations and revenue committees.

 As proposed by the Joint Study Committee, the House and Senate Budget 
Committees would be responsible for developing and reporting an annual 
concurrent resolution on the budget, to be adopted by May 1 of each year, 
setting forth limitations on spending, revenues, the surplus or deficit, 
and debt. In conducting their activities, the House and Senate Budget 
Committees would be served by a joint staff, dedicated almost exclusively 
to supporting the two Committees. Floor consideration of the budget 
resolution would take place under procedures that in effect would 
significantly restrict a Member's ability to offer amendments.

 The recommendations of the Joint Study Committee were embodied in 
identical legislation introduced in each Chamber, H.R. 7130 and S. 1641 
(see table 2). While H.R. 7130 became the


  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.042


The final report of this bicameral committee, formed in 1972, 
recommended the formation of committees on the budget in both the House 
and Senate for budget review and provided a framework for what would 
become the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

principal vehicle for budget process reform in the House, the main vehicle 
in the Senate was S. 1541, a budget process reform measure introduced on 
April 11, 1973 (a week before the Joint Study Committee issued its final 
report) by Senator Sam Ervin, the chairman of the Senate Government 
Operations Committee. In addition, the House and Senate passed separate 
impoundment control legislation in 1973 (H.R. 8480 and S. 373, 
respectively), before the issue was merged into budget process reform 
legislation in 1974.


              TABLE 2.--LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1974 ACT
------------------------------------------------------------------------

-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 House Rules Committee reported H.R. 7130 by a vote of 15 to 0
 (H. Rept. 93-658, November 20, 1973)
 House considered H.R. 7130 on December 4 and 5, 1973, passing
 it by a vote of 386 to 23
 Senate Government Operations Committee reported S. 1541 by a
 vote of 10 to 0 (S. Rept. 93-579, November 28, 1973)
 Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported S. 1541 by a
 vote of 9 to 0 (S. Rept. 93-688, March 6, 1974)
 Senate considered S. 1541 on March 19-22, 1974, passing it by a
 vote of 80 to 0
 Conference agreement on H.R. 7130 reported (H. Rept. 93-1101,
 June 11, 1974, and S. Rept. 93-924, June 12, 1974)
 House agreed to conference report on June 18, 1974, by a vote
 of 401 to 6, and Senate agreed to it on June 21, by a vote of 75 to 0
 President Richard Nixon signed H.R. 7130 into law on July 12,
 1974, as P.L. 93-344
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 In the House, H.R. 7130 was referred to the House Rules Committee, which 
was chaired by Representative Ray J. Madden. Between July 19 and September 
20, 1973, the Rules Committee held 7 hearings on H.R. 7130 and other budget 
process reform legislation, receiving testimony from more than 20 
witnesses. During markup of H.R. 7130 in November, many modifications were 
made to the bill. On November 13, the Rules Committee voted unanimously (15 
to 0) to report the bill with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. 
The Committee's report (H. Rept. 93-658) was printed on November 20, 1973.

 For the most part, the House Rules Committee's recommendations 
corresponded with those made by the Joint Study Committee, but with several 
significant changes. Rather than a single budget resolution each year, the 
House and Senate would adopt a spring budget resolution (by May 1) setting 
targets and a fall budget resolution that would be binding. The House 
Budget Committee would consist of 23 members, with 10 members selected from 
the House Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees, 2 from the party 
leadership, and 11 members at large. Thus, the Rules Committee recommended 
both a slightly larger Budget Committee and one more representative of the 
House as a whole. A Legislative Budget Office would serve as a joint staff 
to the two Budget Committees, but would serve other congressional offices 
as well. The start of the fiscal year would be switched from July 1 to 
October 1 of each year, to allow more time for Congress to complete action 
on budgetary legislation. Finally, the Rules Committee added the issue of 
impoundment control, incorporating into H.R. 7130 the provisions of H.R. 
8480, with modifications, which the House had passed earlier in the year, 
on July 25.

 In the Senate, S. 1541 was referred to the Senate Government Operations 
Committee on April 11, 1973. The Committee referred budget process reform 
legislation to a newly created subcommittee chaired by Senator Lee Metcalf, 
the Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures. On April 2, 
1973, the Subcommittee held its first hearing, receiving testimony on nine 
Senate bills pertaining to budget process reform that had been referred to 
the Subcommittee at that point. Additional measures, including S. 1541, 
were referred to the Subcommittee as the session progressed. The 
Subcommittee held 7 additional hearings through August, receiving testimony 
from more than 30 witnesses, before reporting the measure to the Full 
Committee by a 5 to 4 vote.

 The Senate Government Operations Committee considered S. 1541 in October 
and November of 1973, and ordered the bill, as amended with an amendment in 
the nature of a substitute, reported on November 8 by a unanimous vote of 
10 to 0 (four other Committee members voted yea by proxy and the remaining 
two Committee members did not vote). The Committee's report on S. 1541 (S. 
Rept. 93-579) was filed on November 20 and printed on November 28.

 In view of the significant changes that S. 1541 proposed to make to the 
standing rules of the Senate, the bill was referred to the Senate Rules and 
Administration Committee on November 30, with instructions to report it by 
February 25, 1974. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on the 
Standing Rules of the Senate, chaired by Senator Robert C. Byrd. The 
Subcommittee held a hearing on the bill on January 15, 1974.

 After the hearing, Senators Sam Ervin and Charles Percy, chairman and 
ranking member, respectively, of the Government Operations Committee, 
suggested that the Rules and Administration Committee provide a forum for 
all interested parties to review the bill. A staff working group was 
convened by the Rules and Administration Committee, representing 10 Senate 
standing committees, 4 joint committees, the House Appropriations 
Committee, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Senate 
Legislative Counsel. Over the course of 16 days, the working group met for 
about 90 hours in 25 sessions. Their efforts resulted in significant 
changes in the bill. On February 20, 1974, the Rules and Administration 
Committee adopted the changes, with some further modifications, in the form 
of an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Committee's report on S. 
1541 (S. Rept. 93-688) was filed on February 21, 1974, and printed on March 
6.


==========================================================================
The true father of the budget process is neither Senator Muskie nor 
Senator Ervin, both of whom wrote the original bill, but Senator Robert 
Byrd, who was chairman of the Rules Committee at that time and looked at 
the bill that the Governmental Affairs Committee reported and said, 
``This won't work.'' He took it and rewrote it in the form it became 
law. He was instrumental both as whip and later as majority leader 
because he could have leaned against us and probably eviscerated the 
Committee, but he didn't. He stood with us, and as a result, the process 
became as established as it did.\11\
     _John McEvoy, Senate Budget Committee Staff Director, 1977-1980
==========================================================================


 The consensus measure recommended by the Senate Rules and Administration 
Committee generally maintained a correspondence with the House on many key 
issues, but with some significant differences. The Committee's 
recommendations envisioned two budget resolutions each year; the first (to 
be adopted by June 1) would establish targets for spending, revenues, the 
surplus or deficit, and debt, and the second (to be adopted in the fall) 
would be binding. A Congressional Office on the Budget would serve the 
Budget Committees and other congressional offices as well, but unlike the 
House, the Senate did not envision it serving as a joint staff for the 
Budget Committees. Instead, the Senate expected that each Budget Committee 
would have its own staff, as in the case of other House and Senate 
committees. A 15-member Senate Budget Committee would be established, as 
originally proposed. The Committee's recommendations did not encompass 
impoundment controls generally, but an amendment to the Antideficiency Act 
was included that more clearly restricted the President's authority to 
withhold funds.

\11\ Transcript, John McEvoy interview, August 21, 2006, U.S. Senate 
Historical Office.

 The House began initial consideration of H.R. 7130 on December 4, 1973, 
after adopting a special rule (H. Res. 715) providing for the bill's 
consideration. The next day, December 5, the House passed H.R. 7130 by a 
vote of 386 to 23. The House-passed bill reflected the Rules Committee's 
amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended by two relatively minor 
amendments. Nine other amendments to the Committee's substitute were 
rejected.

 The Senate considered S. 1541 from March 19 through March 22, 1974. On the 
first day of consideration, the Senate agreed to the amendment in the 
nature of a substitute proposed by the Rules and Administration Committee, 
which was subject to further amendment, and a series of technical and 
conforming amendments offered by Senator Ervin. During the ensuing 3 days, 
19 other amendments were adopted and 8 were rejected. On March 22, the 
Senate passed the House bill, H.R. 7130, after striking out the House-
passed text and inserting in lieu thereof the provisions of S. 1541 as 
amended. The vote on final passsage was 80 to 0.

 Conferees met on H.R. 7130 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment 
thereto, reached a compromise, and, on June 5, 1974, agreed to file a 
conference report. The conference report was printed on June 11 (as H. 
Rept. 93-1101) and on June 12 (as S. Rept. 93-924). On June 18, the House 
agreed to the conference report, by a vote of 401 to 6, clearing the 
measure for the Senate. The Senate agreed to the conference report, by a 
vote of 75 to 0, on June 21, clearing the measure for the President. 
President Nixon signed the bill into law, as the Congressional Budget and 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), on July 12, 1974.\12\

\12\ See the statement of President Nixon on the Act in the Weekly 
Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 10, no. 28, July 12, 1974.

 During Senate consideration of the conference report, several Senators 
with long service in the Chamber commented on the special importance of the 
legislation. Senator Sam Ervin, for example, noted:

        To my mind, this is the most important piece of legislation 
that I have worked on during the 20 years that I have served in the 
Senate. It is the finest example of the legislative process at work 
                                     that I have ever witnessed.\13\

\13\ The remarks of Senator Sam Ervin in the Congressional Record of June 
21, 1974, as reprinted in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government 
Operations. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974; 
Legislative History. Committee print (93rd Cong., 2nd sess.). December 
1974, pp. 1989-1990.

 Senator Charles Percy commented on the extraordinary efforts involved in 
the enactment of the 1974 Act:

         . . . when we set our minds to do something, we really can 
    accomplish something that is in the national interest, and that 
certainly will serve the interests of every taxpayer and citizen in 
    the country. . . . For such a bill to be passed within a single 
      Congress is a tribute to the dedication to which Senators and 
       Representatives have approached this very difficult task.\14\

\14\ Committee on Government Operations, ibid., pp. 2018-2019.

 Senator Lee Metcalf placed the challenge presented by the 1974 Act within 
the context of previous reform efforts:

         That challenge--stated plainly--was to find a mechanism by 
which 535 Members of Congress could determine an appropriate budget 
   for the Nation and conduct their legislative business within it. 
       Since 1921, attempts have been made by Congress to meet this 
 challenge. All have failed for a variety of reasons, not the least 
of which were political. The result has been increasing control over 
   fiscal policy by the executive branch, not provided in, nor even 
                                  contemplated by, the Constitution.
                  The mechanism created by this legislation is more 
comprehensive, more dynamic, than anything previously considered. It 
 is framed within the traditions and procedures of Congress, but at 
   the same time it provides a new set of rules which, if followed, 
                                                      will work.\15\

\15\ Committee on Government Operations, ibid., pp. 2002-2004.

 The 1974 Act is a lengthy and complex measure, consisting of 10 titles. 
The first nine titles of the Act are referred to as the Congressional 
Budget Act of 1974; the last title, Title X, is referred to as the 
Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Section 2 provides a declaration of 
purposes for the entire Act:

                Sec. 2. The Congress declares that it is essential--
        (1) to assure effective congressional control over the 
      budgetary process;
        (2) to provide for the congressional determination each year 
      of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures;
        (3) to provide a system of impoundment control;
        (4) to establish national budget priorities; and
        (5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the 
      executive branch in a manner that will assist the Congress in 
      discharging its duties.

 As enacted in 1974, Title I of the Act provided for a 23-member House 
Budget Committee and a 15-member Senate Budget Committee, with 
responsibility principally to develop and enforce annual budget 
resolutions.

 Title II of the Act created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), headed 
by a director appointed to a 4-year term, to provide Congress with 
budgetary information and analysis prepared on an independent, nonpartisan 
basis. The Act established a hierarchy regarding CBO's duties and functions 
in which its primary responsibility is to assist the House and Senate 
Budget Committees, followed by the appropriations and revenue committees, 
followed by other committees and Members.

 Title III set forth the timetable and procedures of the congressional 
budget process, including the requirement that an advisory budget 
resolution be adopted by May 15, and a binding budget resolution be adopted 
by September 15, and set forth reconciliation procedures to be used, if 
needed, in conjunction with the second budget resolution. Further, Title 
III specified the required contents of budget resolutions, including the 
total levels of spending, revenues, the surplus or deficit, and debt, a 
breakdown of spending by major functional categories, and provided for 
optional procedures and matters to be included, as appropriate. A provision 
also allowed for additional budget resolutions, if necessary.

 Title IV imposed new controls on entitlement legislation, as well as 
legislation involving contract authority and borrowing authority. 
Additionally, the title established May 15 as a reporting deadline for 
authorizing legislation.

 Title V changed the start of the fiscal year from July 1 to October 1 and 
provided for a 3-month transition quarter (July 1-September 30, 1976) to 
implement the change.

 Titles VI through IX made various changes in the budget process, including 
changes affecting the President's budget, the conduct of program evaluation 
by the Comptroller General, the availability of budgetary information to 
Congress, and technical and conforming matters.

 Title X established new procedures for impoundment control, defining 
impoundments as either rescissions or deferrals, requiring the submission 
of Presidential impoundment messages, setting forth House and Senate 
procedures for the expedited consideration of legislation dealing with 
rescission and deferral proposals, and imposing on the Comptroller General 
responsibilities for monitoring executive impoundments and reporting to 
Congress.

 The Senate Budget Committee was established shortly after the enactment of 
the 1974 Act. On July 25, 1974, the Senate adopted S. Res. 367, without 
objection, appointing nine Democratic members, and on August 7, the Senate 
adopted S. Res. 378, without objection, appointing six Republican members. 
Senator Edmund S. Muskie was chosen to be the chairman and Senator Peter H. 
Dominick was chosen to be the ranking member. (Senator Dominick lost his 
bid for reelection in 1974 and was replaced in that position in 1975 by 
Senator Henry Bellmon.)

 By any standard, the first Members of the Senate Budget Committee (see 
table 3) were an exceptional group, and several of them later served in 
other important elective or appointive positions. The chairman, Senator 
Edmund S. Muskie, served as Secretary of State under President Jimmy 
Carter, while Senator Walter F. Mondale served as Vice President to 
President Carter. Senators Er-



 TABLE 3.--FIRST MEMBERS OF THE SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE (93RD CONGRESS,
                           2ND SESSION, 1974)
               (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman                  Peter H. Dominick, Ranking
  Warren G. Magnuson                         Member
  Frank E. Moss                               Milton R. Young
  Walter F. Mondale                           Roman L. Hruska
  Ernest F. Hollings                          Jacob K. Javits
  Alan Cranston                               Paul J. Fannin
  Lawton Chiles                               Robert J. Dole
  James G. Abourezk
  Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


nest F. Hollings and Lawton Chiles each later served as chairman (and 
ranking member) of the Budget Committee. Senator Peter H. Dominick was 
appointed Ambassador to Switzerland by President Gerald Ford and Senator 
Robert J. Dole twice held the position of Senate majority leader.

 The first organizational meeting of the new Committee was held on August 
13, 1974. Although the Committee did not begin its legislative functions 
until the following year, it held a series of hearings beginning on August 
14 on the impact of the Federal budget on inflation. (See the Appendix for 
opening statements from the Committee's first hearing.) A funding 
resolution to cover the initial expenses of the Budget Committee through 
February 28, 1975, S. Res. 406, was agreed to by the Senate on October 10.

 The House Budget Committee also was established soon after the enactment 
of the 1974 Act. In August 1974, Representative Al Ullman was chosen to be 
the chairman, but he stepped down from the position a few months later to 
accept the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means Committee and was 
succeeded as chairman by Representative Brock Adams.

 As provided for in Section 905(b) (88 Stat. 331) of the 1974 Act, the 
Congressional Budget Office officially came into existence on the day that 
the first CBO Director was appointed. This occurred on February 24, 1975, 
with the appointment of Alice Rivlin.

The First Decade: From ``Dry Run'' to Reconciliation

 The first decade of the congressional budget process, covering the 94th 
Congress through the 98th Congress (1975-1984), was marked by many 
significant developments, including the maturation of the process from 
tentative and uncertain beginnings into an established routine of the House 
and Senate, the increased reliance on the new process to deal with mounting 
challenges in Federal budget policy, and procedural innovation that 
sometimes was dramatic.

 At the beginning of the 94th Congress, in 1975, the Senate Budget 
Committee began to carry out its legislative functions. Senator Edmund S. 
Muskie, the first chairman, served in that capacity for more than 5 years, 
stepping aside in May 1980 to serve as Secretary of State under President 
Jimmy Carter. He was succeeded as chairman by Senator Ernest F. Hollings. 
Senator Henry Bellmon became the ranking member of the Committee at the 
beginning of the 94th Congress, and continued to serve in that position 
through 1980 (see table 4).


          TABLE 4.--COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP: 94TH-98TH CONGRESSES
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
94th Congress (1975-1976).................  Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie
                                             (D)
                                            Ranking Member, Henry
                                             Bellmon (R)
95th Congress (1977-1978).................  Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie
                                             (D)
                                            Ranking Member, Henry
                                             Bellmon (R)
96th Congress (1979-1980).................  Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie
                                             (D) (through May 7, 1980)
                                            Chairman, Ernest F. Hollings
                                             (D) (from May 13, 1980)
                                            Ranking Member, Henry
                                             Bellmon (R)
97th Congress (1981-1982).................  Chairman, Pete V. Domenici
                                             (R)
                                            Ranking Member, Ernest F.
                                             Hollings (D)
98th Congress (1983-1984).................  Chairman, Pete V. Domenici
                                             (R)
                                            Ranking Member, Lawton
                                             Chiles (D)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                             [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.043
                                             
Courtesy of the Edmund S. Muskie Archives and Special Collections Library.

The first chairman, Edmund S. Muskie, and second ranking member, Henry 
Bellmon, at a Committee markup during the 94th Congress.

 The 1974 Act did not anticipate that the congressional budget process 
would be ready for full operation in 1975 for the FY1976 budget cycle. 
Section 906 of the Act (88 Stat. 332), however, allowed the two Budget 
Committees to decide to implement a scaled-back version of the process, a 
so-called dry run, if they both agreed that to do so was feasible and 
submitted reports of such agreement to their respective Chambers. The two 
Budget Committees agreed that action on budget resolutions for FY1976 was 
feasible and issued the required reports on their agreement.\16\

\16\ The report of the Senate Budget Committee on the agreement was 
Implementation of New Congressional Budget Procedures for Fiscal Year 1976, 
S. Rept. 94-27, Mar. 5, 1975; the report of the House Budget Committee, 
under the same title, was H. Rept. 94-25, Mar. 3, 1975. The Senate Budget 
Committee also issued a report with respect to a second budget resolution 
for that year, Implementation of New Congressional Budget Procedures for 
Fiscal Year 1976; Timetable for the Second Budget Resolution and 
Reconciliation Process, S. Rept. 94-422, Oct. 8, 1975.

 The first budget resolution to be considered under the 1974 Act was 
reported by the House Budget Committee on April 14, 1975 (H. Con. Res. 
218), and by the Senate Budget Committee on April 15 (S. Con. Res. 32).\17\ 
The Senate considered S. Con. Res. 32 on April 29 and April 30, and passed 
it on May 1, by a vote of 69 to 22. The House passed H. Con. Res. 218 on 
May 1, but only with a four-vote margin, 200 to 196. A conference report on 
H. Con. Res. 218 was filed on May 9 (H. Rept. 94-198 and S. Rept. 94-113), 
and the two Chambers agreed to it on May 14, 1 day before the deadline 
prescribed by the 1974 Act (see table 5). The Senate agreed to the 
conference report by a voice vote and the House agreed to it by a vote of 
230 to 193.

\17\ See the report of the Senate Budget Committee, First Concurrent 
Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1976, S. Rept. 94-77, Apr. 15, 1975. 
The Committee issued Part 2 to the report on Apr. 23 to provide the 
``Additional Views'' of two Senators that inadvertently had been omitted.


         TABLE 5.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1976-FY1985 \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1976...............................  H. Con. Res. 218.....    05-14-1975
1977...............................  S. Con. Res. 109.....    05-13-1976
1978...............................  S. Con. Res. 19......    05-17-1977
1979...............................  S. Con. Res. 80......    05-17-1978
1980...............................  H. Con. Res. 107.....    05-24-1979
1981...............................  H. Con. Res. 307.....    06-12-1980
1982...............................  H. Con. Res. 115.....    05-21-1981
1983...............................  S. Con. Res. 92......    06-23-1982
1984...............................  H. Con. Res. 91......    06-23-1983
1985...............................  H. Con. Res. 280.....   10-01-1984
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Excludes second budget resolutions for FY1976-FY1982 and a third
  budget resolution for FY1977.


 The text of the first budget resolution for FY1976, which under the dry 
run included only the budget aggregates and not the functional allocations 
of spending or other elements, read as follows:

    That the Congress hereby determines, pursuant to section 301(a) 
  of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, that for the fiscal year 
                                         beginning on July 1, 1975--
        (1) the appropriate level of total budget outlays is 
      $367,000,000,000;
        (2) the appropriate level of total new budget authority is 
      $395,800,000,000;
        (3) the amount of the deficit in the budget which is 
      appropriate in the light of economic conditions and all other 
      relevant factors is $68,820,000,000;
        (4) the recommended level of Federal revenues is 
      $298,180,000,000, and the amount by which the aggregate level 
      of Federal revenues should be decreased is $3,400,000,000; and
        (5) the appropriate level of the public debt is 
      $617,600,000,000 and the amount by which the temporary 
      statutory limit on such debt should accordingly be increased 
      is $86,600,000,000.

 The second budget resolution for FY1976, H. Con. Res. 466, was approved by 
the House and Senate in the fall without difficulty. The measure also 
recommended budget aggregates for the 3-month transition quarter (TQ) 
following FY1976, encompassing July 1-September 30, 1976. The transition 
quarter was necessary to accommodate the change in the fiscal year cycle, 
for FY1977 and thereafter, mandated by the 1974 Act (FY1977 started on 
October 1, 1976).

 The first full run of the congressional budget process occurred in 1976 
for the FY1977 budget cycle. Once again, the House and Senate adopted the 
first budget resolution for that year (S. Con. Res. 109), as well as the 
second budget resolution (S. Con. Res. 139), in a timely manner and without 
significant difficulty. The margins of approval in the Senate for the first 
and second budget resolutions (65 to 29 and 66 to 20, respectively) 
reflected the pattern of strong bipartisanship on budget resolutions that 
marked the early years of the congressional budget process in that Chamber. 
For the first time in many years, all of the regular appropriations acts 
for the fiscal year were enacted on time. (Despite the timely enactment of 
the regular appropriations acts for FY1977, two continuing appropriations 
acts were required to fund certain unauthorized activities that had been 
dropped from one of the bills.)

 The congressional budget process continued to operate relatively smoothly 
for the next several years, with the two annual budget resolutions being 
adopted largely in a timely manner and, in the Senate, by comfortable 
margins. This period in congressional budgeting has been described as ``the 
accommodating budgetary process,'' in which the two Budget Committees often 
acquiesced in the preferences of the leadership and other committees, 
``accommodating to the predominant pressures for increased spending.'' \18\

\18\ This characterization was made in: Penner, Rudolph G. and Alan J. 
Abramson. Broken Purse Strings; Congressional Budgeting, 1974-88. The Urban 
Institute Press. (Washington: 1988), p. 23.

 Despite this generally accommodative behavior, there were differences in 
the operation of the two Budget Committees:

        The Senate Budget Committee drew strength and some autonomy 
    from its bipartisan approach and cohesiveness and from the less 
   contentious atmosphere in the Senate. Chairman Edmund Muskie was 
      fairly aggressive in testing and stretching the limits of the 
      Committee's original mandate by challenging other committees. 
    Although Muskie and the Senate Budget Committee were not always 
successful in these fights, they often won larger margins in budget 
       votes than the House Committee and were consequently seen as 
                              stronger than the House Committee.\19\

\19\ Penner and Abramson, ibid., p. 28.

 One of the early successes of the Budget Committee in seeking greater 
control over spending was the assumption of the repeal in 1976 of the ``1-
percent kicker,'' which since 1969 had annually boosted the inflation 
adjustment in Federal employee retirement benefits by an additional 1 
percent whenever the underlying adjustment was at least 3 percent for 3 
consecutive months. By some estimates, the kicker had raised Federal 
annuities by 72 percent between 1969 and 1975, compared to a 56-percent 
increase in inflation during the same period; in future years, the 
``multiplier effect'' of the kicker was expected to add billions of dollars 
per year to Federal retirement costs beyond what was needed to keep pace 
with inflation. Repeal of the kicker, which had been assumed in the first 
budget resolution for FY1977, already had been included that year in acts 
for military and foreign service retirees, but was contingent upon repeal 
of the kicker for civilian retirees as well. In a bipartisan effort, Budget 
Committee members Ernest F. Hollings and Henry Bellmon successfully offered 
an amendment to repeal the kicker for Federal civilian employees to the 
Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for FY1977 (P.L. 94-440), thereby 
implementing repeal of the kicker in all Federal employee retirement 
programs. The Hollings-Bellmon amendment, as further amended by a 
perfecting amendment offered by Budget Committee members Lawton Chiles and 
Pete V. Domenici, was included in P.L. 94-440 as Section 1306.\20\

\20\ P.L. 94-440 was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on October 1, 
1976 (90 Stat. 1439-1464). For Senate consideration of the Hollings-Bellmon 
amendment (number 428), and the Chiles-Domenici perfecting amendment, see 
the Congressional Record of September 8, 1976 at pp. 29359-29366. Both 
amendments were adopted by voice vote.

 Greater signs of budgetary strain began to emerge in 1980, the last year 
of the Carter administration, following a period of ``stagflation'' (the 
combination of stagnation and inflation) that had persisted in the economy 
during the late 1970s. With renewed concerns about rising deficit 
projections, Congress and the President worked together in the first use of 
the budget reconciliation process. Instead of a quick ``last-minute'' 
procedure to adjust budgetary legislation in conjunction with the adoption 
of the second budget resolution in the fall, reconciliation was reoriented 
as an adjunct to the first budget resolution.

 The first budget resolution for FY1981, H. Con. Res. 307, which was not 
adopted by the House and Senate until June 12, 1980 (nearly a month past 
the then May 15 deadline), included reconciliation instructions to eight 
House and nine Senate authorizing committees to reduce outlays for FY1981 
by more than $6 billion. In addition, the House Ways and Means and Senate 
Finance Committees were instructed to raise revenues for FY1981 by more 
than $4 billion. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, signed into law on 
December 5, 1980, as P.L. 96-499, achieved most of the deficit reduction 
required by the budget resolution.

 The budget resolution also included budgetary levels for 2 ``out-years'' 
beyond the upcoming fiscal year, covering 3 fiscal years (FY1981-FY1983) 
all together (not counting revisions made for the fiscal year underway at 
that time, FY1980). The multiyear timeframe was intended to improve the 
budget resolution as a planning tool and to curb budget control evasions in 
the short term. The multiyear aspect of budget resolutions persisted in the 
following years as a matter of practice, and in 1985 was incorporated into 
the 1974 Act as a requirement. The Act presently requires a budget 
resolution to cover at least the upcoming fiscal year and the 4 following 
years, but some budget resolutions have covered up to 10 years (excluding 
revisions to the current fiscal year).

 The remaining 4 years of the first decade of the congressional budget 
process, covering 1981 through 1984, coincided with the first term of 
President Ronald Reagan and saw the Republicans gain control of the 
Committee. Senator Pete V. Domenici served as chairman of the Budget 
Committee during these 4 years. Senator Hollings served as ranking member 
in 1981 and 1982 (during the 97th Congress), and was succeeded by Senator 
Lawton Chiles in 1983 and 1984 (during the 98th Congress).

 Several important developments occurred during these 4 years. In 1981, 
President Reagan, aided by OMB Director David Stockman, urged the use of 
the budget reconciliation process to advance a sizeable portion of his 
legislative agenda. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, signed 
into law by President Reagan on August 13, 1981, as P.L. 97-35, represented 
a massive expansion of the reconciliation process. Most of the committees 
of the House and Senate were involved in the reconciliation process that 
year. Apart from cutting Federal spending by roughly 130 billion over a 3-
year period (FY1982-FY1984), the reconciliation act also encompassed a host 
of extraneous policy issues, involving such diverse matters as lawnmower 
standards and a maximum speed



[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.032


Signed into law by the President on August 13, 1981, H.R. 3982, the 
Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, was the second reconciliation act to 
pass the House and Senate and represented a significant expansion of the 
reconciliation process toward advancing certain policy goals.

limit. Coupled with action on the reconciliation measure, Congress and the 
President also enacted a significant tax-cut bill outside of the 
reconciliation process (which reduced revenues by $282 billion over FY1982-
FY1984).


==========================================================================
The first major challenge to this Committee began shortly after I 
arrived, when the Budget Committee took on a stronger policy role with 
Mr. David Stockman, Director of the OMB, and President Reagan, and 
particularly Mr. Stockman, who as a House Member understood this new 
process. While President Carter used reconciliation in the way it was 
probably meant to be used in the initial legislation, at the end of the 
calendar year, Mr. Stockman and the new Republican-controlled Senate 
pushed, for the first time in 7 years, with Senators Baker, Dole, and 
Domenici, using the reconciliation process as an opportunity to not only 
achieve the blueprint of a fiscal policy, but actually to carry through 
with the authorization process and have some real impact on policy.\21\
      _G. William Hoagland, Senate Budget Committee Staff Director, 
                                                           1986-2002
===========================================================================


 The actions in 1981 marked the beginning of a period in which budgetary 
considerations dominated the legislative agenda. As deficit projections 
rose and remained stubbornly high, the focus of most budgetary 
deliberations was deficit reduction. The seeming intractability of 
budgetary problems often led to legislative gridlock and political impasse. 
As a consequence, the timeframe for reaching agreement on budget 
resolutions lengthened considerably. In both 1982 and 1983, the budget 
resolution was not adopted until June 23. In 1984, action on the budget 
resolution was not completed until October 1, the first day of the new 
fiscal year. Other changes in the legislative process occurred as well, 
including greater reliance on continuing appropriations acts and the 
reemergence of omnibus appropriations measures to wrap up action at the end 
of a session.

\21\ Transcript, G. William Hoagland interview, August 30, 2006, U.S. 
Senate Historical Office.

 When action under the regular procedures of the congressional budget 
process was stymied, the contending sides searched for innovative means to 
resolve conflict. One important development in this regard was the budget 
summit, where administration and congressional negotiators could work 
directly together to broker deals to resolve protracted disputes over 
budgetary policy. Some budget summits or other types of negotiations were 
successful, while others were not. One of the first agreements negotiated 
in summit-like circumstances, in 1984, led to what was known as the Rose 
Garden agreement. While the administration and Republican leaders in the 
Senate reached an agreement between themselves, it took many more months 
for Republicans and Democrats in Congress to reach accord and pass the 
FY1985 budget resolution, which occurred on October 1, 1984.\22\

\22\ A history of budget summits and other types of negotiations during the 
1980s is presented in: Schick, Allen. The Capacity to Budget. The Urban 
Institute Press. (Washington: 1990), pp. 184-189.

Coping with Deficits: the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and Related Laws

 During the 99th Congress (1985 and 1986), Senator Domenici continued to 
serve as the Committee chairman and Senator Chiles continued to serve as 
the ranking member, while President Reagan began his second term. In the 
100th Congress (1987-1988), during the final 2 years of the Reagan 
Presidency, the Democrats gained control of the Senate. Senator Chiles took 
over as Committee chairman and Senator Domenici assumed the position of 
ranking member.

 In 1985, continuing turmoil over Federal budget policy brought another 
watershed development in the Federal budget process--enactment of the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. After a decade of experience with the 1974 Act, 
Congress and the President faced persistent high deficits and increasing 
budgetary deadlock. Legislation aimed at bringing the Federal budget into 
balance by the early 1990s was enacted. That legislation, the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, was included as Title II 
in a measure raising the public debt limit.\23\ President Reagan signed the 
measure into law on December 12 as P.L. 99-177 (2 U.S.C. 901 et seq.; 99 
Stat. 1037-1101). It is commonly referred to as the 1985 Balanced Budget 
Act or as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act, after its three primary 
sponsors in the Senate--Senators Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and Ernest F. 
Hollings. (Senator Hollings was a member of the Budget Committee in the 
99th Congress, when the GRH Act was enacted, and Senators Gramm and Rudman 
served on the Committee in later Congresses.)

\23\ This discussion is drawn from CRS Report RL30795, General Management 
Laws: A Compendium, Clinton T. Brass (coordinator), pp. 109-114. A more 
detailed explanation of the 1985 Balanced Budget Act is found in CRS Report 
85-1130 GOV, Explanation of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985, Public Law 99-177 (The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), by 
Allen Schick; and CRS Report 86-713 GOV, Changes in the Congressional 
Budget Process Made by the 1985 Balanced Budget Act (P.L. 99-177), by 
Robert Keith.

 The 1985 Act was the first of several major laws intended to ensure that 
the deficit was reduced and spending was controlled, even if Congress and 
the President failed to achieve these goals through the regular legislative 
process. Specifically, the 1985 Act required the Federal budget to be in 
balance by FY1991.

 The Act established new procedures involving deficit targets and 
sequestration to further these purposes. Under sequestration, across-the-
board spending cuts would be made automatically early in the fiscal year if 
needed to keep the estimated deficit within allowed limits. Discretionary 
spending would bear most of the brunt of any required sequestration, since 
most direct spending was exempt from reductions. Because implementation of 
a required sequester was automatic under these procedures, and perceived to 
be a drastic action, many regarded it as providing a strong incentive for 
Congress and the President to reach agreement through the regular process 
of legislation to meet the established budgetary goals.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.040

 The New Yorker Collection 1989 Robert Weber from cartoonbank.com. All 
Rights Reserved.

 In addition, the 1985 Act also made extensive changes in the 1974 Act, 
largely to incorporate in law changes in informal practices developed over 
prior years. First, the timetable for congressional budget actions was 
accelerated. Most notably, the deadline for adoption of the annual budget 
resolution was advanced 1 month to April 15. Second, certain practices used 
by Congress for several years were formally incorporated into the 1974 Act, 
including the expansion of budget resolutions to cover 3 fiscal years and 
the authority to initiate reconciliation procedures in the April budget 
resolution. Third, enforcement procedures were tightened, including new 
restrictions on legislation linked to committee spending allocations under 
the budget resolution, a requirement in the Senate that three-fifths of 
Members ``duly chosen and sworn'' vote to waive certain budget act points 
of order, and a requirement that the recommended deficit in the budget 
resolution not exceed the applicable deficit target. Fourth, the 
reconciliation process was modified in several ways, including a ban 
against using reconciliation to make changes in the Social Security Program 
and requirements in the House and Senate that amendments to reconciliation 
measures be deficit-neutral.

 With regard to other changes in the Federal budget process, the 1985 Act 
also required the President to submit an annual budget consistent with the 
deficit targets, placed existing off-budget entities on the budget, and 
placed the Social Security Program off-budget (except for calculating the 
deficit for purposes of sequestration).

 Several lawsuits contesting the constitutionality of the 1985 Act were 
filed immediately. On February 7, 1986, a special three-judge panel of the 
U.S. District Court declared that the procedure for triggering 
sequestration under the Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
vested executive power in an officer removable by Congress. (Sequestration 
would have been triggered pursuant to a report prepared by the Comptroller 
General, head of the General Accounting Office.) Further, the Court 
declared that a sequestration order for FY1986, issued on February 1, 1986, 
was ``without legal force and effect,'' but stayed its judgment (as 
required by Section 274(e) of the Act) pending appeal to the Supreme Court.

 The Supreme Court heard arguments in the case, Bowsher v. Synar (478 U.S. 
714), on April 23, 1986, and issued its ruling later that year on July 7. 
Affirming the ruling of the District Court by a vote of 7 to 2, the Supreme 
Court noted:

    To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws 
would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could 
 simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the 
   laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This 
kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha 
 makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible . . . . It is clear 
that Congress has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an 
                                  officer of the Legislative Branch.

 Anticipating the possibility of invalidation by the courts, Congress 
included ``fallback procedures'' in the Act, under which a Presidential 
sequestration order could be triggered upon the enactment of a joint 
resolution, reported by a Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction, 
setting forth the contents of a joint report of the Directors of OMB and 
CBO. The Supreme Court stayed its judgment for 60 days in order to allow 
Congress time to implement sequestration for FY1986 under the fallback 
procedures, which Congress did.

 Invalidation by the courts of the automatic triggering mechanism for 
sequestration and the size of the estimated deficit excess for FY1988 (more 
than $50 billion above the deficit target of $108 billion, according to 
CBO) prompted calls in 1987 for revision of the 1985 Act. Major revisions 
to the Act were enacted in 1987, again as a title in a measure raising the 
public debt limit. President Reagan signed the measure into law on 
September 29, 1987, as P.L. 100-119 (101 Stat. 754-788). Title I of this 
law is referred to as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control 
Reaffirmation Act of 1987. The main purposes of the 1987 Act were to extend 
the timeframe for achieving a balanced budget by 2 years, to FY1993, by 
means of revised deficit targets, and to restore the automatic triggering 
feature of sequestration in a constitutionally acceptable manner (which it 
did by vesting that authority in the OMB Director).

 During the interim between the enactment of the 1985 Act and its 
significant revision in 1987, Congress enacted several measures that 
modified the sequestration process, for the most part exempting programs 
from the reductions. Most notably, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1986 (P.L. 99-509) exempted from sequestration the cost-of-living 
adjustments (COLAs) of all Federal civilian and military retirement and 
disability programs so that they would be treated in the same manner as 
Social Security, which was already exempt from sequestration.

 Following enactment of the 1987 Act (and before significant changes made 
in 1990), Congress enacted several measures that further modified the 
sequestration process. In particular, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
of 1987 (P.L. 100-203) made several technical changes in the 1985 Act, and 
the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(P.L. 101-73) exempted certain Federal financial entities from 
sequestration.

 The law which contained the 1987 Act, P.L. 100-119, also included related 
provisions (in Title II) that affected the congressional budget process, 
the impoundment control process, and other matters. With respect to the 
congressional budget process, the 1974 Act was amended to clarify the 
application of time limits for the consideration of conference reports on 
budget resolutions and reconciliation measures, to require the House and 
Senate to use common economic and technical assumptions, to extend CBO 
duties under the State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act of 1981 
indefinitely, and for other purposes.

 The impoundment portion of the 1974 Act was amended to codify the Appeals 
Court decision in City of New Haven v. United States regarding restrictions 
on the President's deferral authority and to prohibit the resubmittal of 
rescission proposals that had been previously rejected by Congress.

 Ultimately, the 1985 Act, as amended, was critically viewed by some for 
its failure to achieve its principal objective, deficit reduction. During 
the period covering FY1986-FY1990, the actual deficit exceeded the deficit 
target every year. The overage ranged from about $5 billion to $205 billion 
and was greatest in the later years, despite the revision of the targets in 
1987. Further, the manner in which the sequestration process operated and 
the stringency of the goals generally were perceived as fostering budgetary 
gimmickry and disruption in the legislative process.

 As a result of these concerns, the sequestration process and the rationale 
for it were fundamentally restructured by the Budget Enforcement Act of 
1990 (discussed in the next section).

 Another change in Senate budget procedures was made at this time, apart 
from the changes made in the 1985 Act. During the first several years' 
experience with reconciliation, the legislation contained many provisions 
that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing policies assumed in the 
budget resolution. The reconciliation submissions of committees included 
such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased 
spending or reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called 
for reduced spending or increased revenues, or that dealt with matters in 
another committee's jurisdiction.

 Some Senators argued that such extraneous provisions, which could be quite 
contentious, had no place in reconciliation legislation, particularly in 
view of the restrictions on debate time and amendments that exist under 
reconciliation. In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule, named 
after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd, on a temporary basis 
as a means of curbing these practices.\24\ The Byrd rule was extended and 
modified several times over the years, and, in 1990, it was incorporated 
into the 1974 Act as Section 313 (2 U.S.C. 644) and made permanent.

\24\ The Byrd rule is discussed in detail in CRS Report RL30862, The Budget 
Reconciliation Process: The Senate's ``Byrd Rule,'' by Robert Keith.

 The House and Senate were able to reach final agreement on the annual 
budget resolutions for FY1986-FY1989, although in each case it took 
additional weeks or months beyond the prescribed deadline to complete 
action on the measures (see table 6).


           TABLE 6.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1986-FY1989
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  1986.............  S. Con. Res. 32......    08-01-1985
                  1987.............  S. Con. Res. 120.....    06-27-1986
                  1988.............  H. Con. Res. 93......    06-24-1987
                  1989.............  H. Con. Res. 268.....    06-06-1988
------------------------------------------------------------------------


Moving Toward Balance: Budget Enforcement Laws in the 1990s and the 
Emergence of Surpluses

For the next three Congresses, from 1989 through 1994, the Senate Budget 
Committee operated under Democratic leadership. During the 101st Congress 
(1989-1990), Senator Jim Sasser assumed the chairmanship of the Budget 
Committee and Senator Domenici continued to serve as the ranking member. 
President George H.W. Bush began his term. Senators Sasser and Domenici 
continued to serve as chairman and ranking member, respectively, in the 
102nd Congress (1991-1992), during the final 2 years of the George H.W. 
Bush Presidency, and in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), during the first 
half of President William J. Clinton's first term.

 Perhaps the single most important development in terms of the budget 
process during the early part of this period was the enactment of the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990), signed into law by 
President Bush on November 5, 1990, as P.L. 101-508 (104 Stat. 1388, 1-
630). In addition to dramatically reshaping Federal budget policy with 
approximately $482 billion in deficit reduction over 5 years (including 
$158 billion in revenue increases and $324 billion in spending cuts and 
debt service savings), the 1990 Act included extensive revisions in budget 
procedure in a title (Title XIII) referred to as the Budget Enforcement 
Act.\25\ The FY1991 budget resolution, H. Con. Res. 310, which included the 
reconciliation instructions that led to the enactment of P.L. 101-508, was 
the first budget resolution in years to envision attaining a balanced 
budget a few years out. In fact, the budget resolution envisioned a surplus 
of more than $150 billion by the fifth year (FY1995).

\25\ Information on the budgetary impact of P.L. 101-508 was provided by 
the Congressional Budget Office in The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal 
Years 1992-1996, January 1991, Table III-3, p. 66.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.022

Courtesy of the family of Jim Sasser.

Chairman Jim Sasser, House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta, and 
Ranking Member Bill Frenzel at a budget resolution conference during the 
101st Congress.

 As is often the case with important legislation, the enactment of OBRA 
1990 occurred in response to significant budgetary and economic challenges 
and followed a difficult legislative path. Several months after submitting 
his budget for FY1991, President Bush faced revised projections that showed 
a steep increase in the deficit if no legislative action was taken, which 
threatened to trigger a sequester under the GRH Act of about $100 billion 
toward the end of the year. In early May 1990, his representatives entered 
into budget summit negotiations with congressional leaders over a budget 
plan, which did not conclude until September 30. The summit was informally 
known as the Andrews summit because the negotiations were held at Andrews 
Air Force Base in Maryland, a short distance from Washington, DC.

 In order to obtain a budget agreement that sufficiently met the budgetary 
challenges, President Bush abandoned an earlier pledge of ``no new taxes.'' 
On June 26, 1990, President Bush issued a statement that he and 
congressional negotiators concurred that any bipartisan budget agreement 
would involve tax increases and should include budget process reform ``to 
assure that any Bipartisan agreement is enforceable and that the deficit 
problem is brought under responsible control.''

In early October, the House initially rejected the FY1991 budget 
resolution, which was based on the budget agreement, and President Bush 
vetoed a continuing appropriations act (causing a partial government 
shutdown for several days) in order to increase pressure to support the 
agreement. These obstacles were overcome and, within another month, OBRA 
1990, which implemented the major elements of the budget agreement, was 
enacted into law.

 The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA 1990) made numerous and 
significant changes in the Federal budget process by amending several laws, 
primarily the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. 
The main purpose of these changes, which revised the sequestration process 
established by the 1985 Act and altered other facets of the budget process, 
was to ensure that the substantial deficit savings of several measures 
enacted in 1990, particularly OBRA 1990, were maintained over the 5-year 
timeframe of the legislation (covering FY1991-FY1995).

BEA 1990, and later laws, changed the sequestration process substantially. 
The Act effectively replaced the fixed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit 
targets with two new budget enforcement procedures. First, adjustable 
limits were established for separate categories of discretionary spending. 
Second, ``pay-as-you-go'' (paygo) procedures were created to require that 
increases in direct spending or decreases in revenues due to legislative 
action be offset so that there would be no net increase in the deficit. 
Violations of the discretionary limits or the pay-as-you-go requirement 
would be enforced through sequestration. Further, BEA 1990 retained the 
exemption of Social Security from cuts under sequestration, and removed the 
trust fund surpluses from the deficit estimates and other sequestration 
calculations under the Act as well.

 The revised deficit targets, as initially set by BEA 1990, were 
substantially larger than earlier targets because they excluded the 
surpluses of the Social Security trust funds and reflected revised economic 
and technical assumptions. For example, the deficit target for FY1991 was 
set at $327 billion, and the deficit target for FY1995 was set at $83 
billion. The President was required to adjust the deficit targets for 
FY1991-FY1995, to reflect updated economic and technical assumptions and 
changes in budgetary concepts and definitions, as applicable, in his annual 
budget for FY1992 and FY1993. Further, he was authorized to adjust the 
deficit targets for FY1994 and FY1995 to reflect updated economic and 
technical assumptions, when he submitted his budget for these fiscal years. 
(President Clinton chose to use this authority, and made such adjustments 
in the deficit targets, thereby avoiding any sequesters due to violations 
of the deficit targets.)

 BEA 1990 retained sequestration as the means of enforcing the 
discretionary spending limits and the paygo requirement. Like the earlier 
deficit sequestration procedures, the new sequestration procedures were 
automatic and were triggered by a report from the OMB Director.

 The discretionary spending limits established by BEA 1990 varied in type 
over the period covered. For FY1991-FY1993, separate limits were set for 
new budget authority and outlays for three different categories--defense, 
international, and domestic. For FY1994-FY1995, the limits on new budget 
authority and outlays were established for a single category--total 
discretionary spending.

 Under the paygo process created by BEA 1990, the multiyear budget effects 
of enacted legislation changing direct spending, or legislation changing 
revenues, were recorded on a cumulative paygo ``scorecard.'' After the end 
of each congressional session, any balance (or net deficit increase) on the 
paygo scorecard for the new fiscal year was required to be eliminated 
through a special sequestration procedure. If a sequester under this 
process was required, it was required to occur within 15 calendar days 
after Congress adjourned at the end of a session and on the same day as any 
sequestration tied to enforcement of the discretionary spending limits (or, 
in earlier years, the deficit targets).

Emergency provisions were not required to be offset and were effectively 
exempt from sequestration under both the discretionary spending limits and 
the paygo requirement, so long as an emergency designation was made by the 
President, and the Congress concurred by so designating in the applicable 
act. Except for emergency spending associated with the Persian Gulf war 
(Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm) in 1990-1991, the use of such 
spending was relatively modest in the early and mid-1990s. The escalation 
of emergency spending in later years, however, made the use of such 
spending oftentimes controversial.

 The enforcement procedures for the paygo requirement, on the one hand, and 
the discretionary spending limits, on the other, were separated by a 
``firewall.'' Savings made on one side of the firewall could not be used to 
the advantage of programs on the other side.

 The sequestration procedures established under the 1985 Act, as modified 
by BEA 1990, were further modified and extended by several other laws, and 
were meant to preserve budget savings made under agreements reached by 
Congress and President Clinton in 1993 and 1997 and to establish new 
program categories for enforcement.

 In 1993, Congress and President Clinton reached a comprehensive budget 
agreement that included the enactment of reconciliation legislation 
achieving $496 billion in deficit reduction over 5 years (including $241 
billion in revenue increases and $255 billion in spending cuts and debt 
service savings).\26\ That measure, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act 
(OBRA) of 1993, was signed into law on August 10, 1993, as P.L. 103-66 (107 
Stat. 312-685). Action on OBRA 1993 was motivated by concern about the 
deficit, which for FY1992 reached $290 billion and had become a prominent 
issue during the 1992 Presidential campaign.

\26\ Information on alternative measures of the budgetary impact of P.L. 
103-66 was provided by the Congressional Budget Office in The Economic and 
Budget Outlook: An Update, September 1993, Table 2-2, p. 29 and Box 2-3, 
pp. 34-35. Electronically accessible at: http://www.cbo.gov/publications.

The conference report on OBRA 1993 was adopted by a narrow margin (by a 
vote of 218 to 216 in the House and 51 to 50 in the Senate, with Vice 
President Albert Gore breaking the tie), with no Republican Member 
supporting it in either Chamber.\27\

\27\ Aug. 5, conference report agreed to in House (218 to 216) by roll call 
vote 406 (139 CR 19438); Aug. 6, conference report agreed to in Senate (51 
to 50) by record vote 247 (139 CR 19871).

            The Act reflected compromises between the President and 
                                                           Congress:
     As Clinton had proposed, most of the tax revenue came from the 
  wealthiest taxpayers, and the spending cuts resulted largely from 
   cutbacks in defense, overall limits on appropriated spending and 
       reductions in the growth of Medicare payments to doctors and 
  hospitals. But the battle over the bill forced Clinton to give up 
other major features--most notably, his proposal for a $71.5 billion 
    tax on almost all forms of energy. The bill also contained less 
     spending than Clinton sought for social programs, such as food 
      stamps and the earned-income tax credit, and for `investment' 
         programs that he hoped would stimulate economic growth.\28\

\28\ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1993, ibid., p. 107.

 As part of the agreement, the procedures under BEA 1990 were extended for 
3 more fiscal years, through FY1998. The extension was included as Title 
XIV (Budget Process Provisions) of OBRA of 1993.

 In 1994, separate sequestration procedures for discretionary programs 
associated with the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund were added and 
funded by annual appropriations by Title XXXI of the Violent Crime Control 
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322).

 During the 6-year period ending in 1994, five of the budget resolutions 
were adopted by the House and Senate in a fairly timely manner. The 
exception was the budget resolution for FY1991, which was not adopted until 
October 9, 1990, following the conclusion of the Andrews summit (see table 
7).


           TABLE 7.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1990-FY1995
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  1990.............  H. Con. Res. 106.....    05-18-1989
                  1991.............  H. Con. Res. 310.....    10-09-1990
                  1992.............  H. Con. Res. 121.....    05-22-1991
                  1993.............  H. Con. Res. 287.....    05-21-1992
                  1994.............  H. Con. Res. 64......    04-01-1993
                  1995.............  H. Con. Res. 218.....    05-12-1994
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 At the beginning of the 104th Congress, in 1995, the Republicans regained 
control of the Senate (as well as the House), and Senator Domenici again 
was selected to chair the Budget Committee. The ranking member during the 
104th Congress was Senator J. James Exon. Senator Domenici continued to 
serve as chairman of the Budget Committee in the 105th and 106th Congresses 
(1997-2000), through the end of the Clinton Presidency. Senator Frank R. 
Lautenberg succeeded Senator Exon as ranking member in the 105th Congress, 
and continued to serve in that capacity during the 106th Congress.

 In 1995, the new Republican majorities in the House and Senate forged 
agreement on a budget resolution for FY1996 calling for a balanced budget 
in 7 years, by FY2002. The budget resolution assumed the enactment of 
sizeable tax cuts, which would be more than offset by reductions in 
discretionary spending and in Medicare, Medicaid, and other mandatory 
spending programs. President Clinton also endorsed balancing the budget, 
but differed from the Republican-controlled Congress on how to achieve that 
goal.

 In November 1995, the first of a series of government shutdowns occurred 
when Congress and President Clinton could not agree on a continuing 
appropriation act for FY1996. On December 6, President Clinton vetoed a 
reconciliation measure, referred to as the Balanced Budget Act of 1995 
(H.R. 2491), which was the main legislative vehicle for implementing 
congressional budget policies. In his veto message, the President indicated 
that the measure would have made cuts that he found unacceptable to 
Medicare, Medicaid, student loans, and other programs.

Following a longer government shutdown (from mid-December 1995 until 
January 6, 1996), the standoff between the President and Congress 
eventually came to an end when they agreed to a new continuing resolution. 
On January 9, 1996, President Clinton submitted a proposal to Congress for 
a projected balanced budget by FY2002, which recommended various tax cuts, 
tax increases, and reductions in mandatory spending to achieve this 
goal.\29\ The five remaining regular appropriation acts for FY1996 were 
incorporated into a single appropriation act, the Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, which President Clinton signed 
into law as P.L. 104-134 on April 26, 1996 (see table 8).

\29\ Deficit Reduction and Balanced Budget by Fiscal Year 2002; Message 
From the President of the United States, H. Doc. 104-160, Pt. 1 and 2, Jan. 
9, 1996.


           TABLE 8.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1996-FY2001
------------------------------------------------------------------------
            Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  1996.............  H. Con. Res. 67......    06-29-1995
                  1997.............  H. Con. Res. 178.....    06-13-1996
                  1998.............  H. Con. Res. 84......    06-05-1997
                  1999.............  no conference
                                      agreement \1\
                  2000.............  H. Con. Res. 68......    04-15-1999
                  2001.............  H. Con. Res. 290.....   04-13-2000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Senate version of the FY1999 budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 86
  (105th), passed the Senate on April 2, 1998.


Pursuant to the budget resolution for FY1998, Congress successfully 
completed action on a pair of reconciliation measures, the Balanced Budget 
Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-
34). The FY1998 budget resolution, H. Con. Res. 84, was the third 
consecutive budget resolution that projected a modest surplus by FY2002. 
Taken together, the 1997 reconciliation acts reduced the deficit by $118 
billion over 5 years. Unlike the reconciliation measures enacted in 1990 
and 1993, which included significant revenue increases as part of the 
overall deficit-reduction policies, the 1997 measures included tax cuts of 
$80 billion (which were more than offset by spending reductions and debt-
service savings of $198 billion).

 During the 6-year period covering the 104th-106th Congresses (1995-2000), 
the House and Senate compiled a mixed record in the timely adoption of 
budget resolutions, with the first three adopted behind schedule and the 
last two adopted on time. In addition, in 1998, the House and Senate for 
the first time did not reach final agreement on a budget resolution. The 
Senate passed the FY1999 budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 86, on April 2, 
1998. On June 5, the House passed its version of the budget resolution, H. 
Con. Res. 284. The two Chambers, however, were not able to reconcile their 
differences over budget policy.

 The long-sought balance in the Federal budget materialized more quickly 
than expected, well before the FY2002 target set forth in the budget 
resolutions for FY1996-FY1998. For the first time since FY1969, when the 
Federal Government ran a surplus of $3 billion, the Federal budget ran a 
surplus for FY1998, amounting to $69 billion. Even larger surpluses 
occurred for FY1999 ($126 billion) and FY2000 ($236 billion), before 
declining in FY2001 to $128 billion.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.033

Courtesy of the U.S. Committee on the Budget.

Pete Domenici, the Committee's longest serving chairman, and then-
ranking member, J. James Exon, during the May 9, 1996 markup for the 
FY1997 budget resolution.

 Significant modifications to the sequestration process were made by the 
Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1997, which was included as Title X of the 
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The procedural changes were intended largely 
to preserve the deficit reduction achieved by the two reconciliation acts 
so as to achieve budgetary balance several years in the future.

 BEA 1997 extended the discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go 
requirement through FY2002, modified their application, and made various 
``housekeeping'' and technical changes. New categories were established for 
defense and nondefense discretionary spending for FY1998 and FY1999; for 
FY2000-FY2002, all discretionary spending was merged into a single, general 
purpose category (except for the separate violent crime reduction category 
in effect through FY2000). In 1998, the discretionary spending limits and 
associated sequestration procedures were changed again, in this instance by 
the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178), 
in order to establish separate discretionary spending limits for highway 
and mass transit programs. In 2000, Section 801(a) of the Interior 
Appropriations Act for FY2001 established separate discretionary spending 
limits for FY2002-FY2006 under a new category for conservation spending and 
six related subcategories.

 From their inception in 1990, the discretionary spending limits were 
adjusted at several points during the year for various factors set in law, 
including changes in budgetary concepts and definitions, emergency 
requirements, and special allowances. Factors upon which adjustments were 
based changed from time to time. BEA 1990, for example, provided for an 
adjustment due to changes in inflation, but this adjustment was removed by 
BEA 1997.

Congressional Budgeting in the 21st Century

 The 6 most recent years of the congressional budget process, covering the 
107th Congress through the 109th Congress (2001-2006), coincided with the 
first term and half of the second term of President George W. Bush. As the 
107th Congress got underway, party control of the Senate, and therefore the 
chairmanship of the Budget Committee, changed several times.

 From the convening of the 107th Congress on January 3, 2001, until the 
inauguration of President Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney 17 days 
later on January 20, the Senate was evenly divided between the two parties 
(with 50 Democratic and 50 Republican Senators). Democrats held the 
majority, however, due to the deciding vote of outgoing Democratic Vice 
President Albert Gore. During this period, Senator Kent Conrad served as 
chairman and Senator Pete V. Domenici served as ranking member of the 
Budget Committee (see table 9). Beginning on January 20, the evenly-divided 
Senate came under the control of the Republicans due to the deciding vote 
of Vice President Cheney.

 Accordingly, the Committee leadership positions of Senators Conrad and 
Domenici were reversed, effective with Committee assignments announced on 
January 25. Finally, on May 24, 2001, Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont 
switched his party affiliation from Republican to Independent and began to 
caucus with the Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. At that point, the 50 
Democratic Senators, plus Senator Jeffords, held a 51 to 49 advantage over 
the Republicans, and the positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici were 
reversed again, effective with Committee assignments announced on July 10. 
Senator Conrad served as chairman and Senator Domenici served as ranking 
member for the remainder of the 107th Congress.


         TABLE 9.--COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP: 107TH-109TH CONGRESSES
------------------------------------------------------------------------

------------------------------------------------------------------------
107th Congress (2001-2002)................  Chairman, Kent Conrad (D),
                                             (January 3-January 25, 2001
                                             and July 10, 2001 through
                                             2002)
                                            Chairman, Pete V. Domenici
                                             (R), (January 25-July 10,
                                             2001)
                                            Ranking Member, Kent Conrad
                                             (D), (January 25-July 10,
                                             2001)
                                            Ranking Member, Pete V.
                                             Domenici (R) (January 3-
                                             January 25, 2001 and July
                                             10, 2001 through 2002)
108th Congress (2003-2004)................  Chairman, Don Nickles (R)
                                            Ranking Member, Kent Conrad
                                             (D)
109th Congress (2005-2006)................  Chairman, Judd Gregg (R)
                                            Ranking Member, Kent Conrad
                                             (D)
------------------------------------------------------------------------


 In 2003, the 108th Congress commenced with the Republicans in control of 
the Senate. Senator Pete V. Domenici decided to assume chairmanship of the 
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and Senator Don Nickles 
became chairman of the Budget Committee. Senator Conrad assumed the 
position of ranking member. The Republicans retained Senate control in the 
109th Congress, during 2005 and 2006. In 2004, Senator Don Nickles retired 
from the Senate, and Senator Judd Gregg assumed the chairmanship. Senator 
Conrad remained as ranking member during the 109th Congress.

 From the outset, President Bush made tax reductions the centerpiece of his 
budget policy. Congress responded to the President's revenue proposals, 
with significant modifications, largely through the enactment of 
reconciliation measures in 2001 (the Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L. 107-16) and 2003 (the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, P.L. 108-27).

 After 4 years of surpluses, the Federal Government recorded a deficit of 
$158 billion for FY2002, which climbed to $413 billion for FY2004 before 
falling to $318 billion for FY2005 and to $248 billion for FY2006.

 BEA 1990, and the related laws that followed it, generally were regarded 
as having been more successful than the 1985 Act (as amended) in 
controlling aggregate budget levels. During the period that the 
discretionary spending limits and the paygo requirement were in effect, the 
status of the Federal budget changed from relatively large deficits to 4 
years of surpluses (1998-2001).

 Beginning in 1999 and 2000, however, criticisms of the BEA procedures 
began to mount. While the threat of sequestration was viewed initially as 
giving the President and Congress a strong incentive to reach agreement on 
their budgetary goals, thereby avoiding the legislative deadlock that 
characterized the early 1980s, some Members began to regard the BEA 
procedures as an impediment to implementing desired budget policy in an era 
of large surpluses. These Members argued that the BEA procedures should be 
eliminated, or at least substantially modified, so that Congress and the 
President could ``use'' part of the surplus for tax cuts and new spending 
that otherwise would have been prohibited.

 Further, some Members asserted that discretionary spending limits for 
FY2000-FY2002 were unrealistically low, thereby promoting the use of budget 
``gimmicks,'' such as the excessive designation of emergency spending, to 
evade their constraints. In 2000, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act 
for FY2001, P.L. 106-429, raised the FY2001 discretionary spending limit 
for that year by $96 billion in new budget authority. In 2001, the Defense 
Appropriations Act for FY2002, P.L. 107-117, raised the FY2002 
discretionary spending limit for that year by $135 billion in new budget 
authority. In 1999, 2000, and 2001, legislation enacted into law required 
the OMB Director to change the balance on the paygo scorecard for certain 
years to zero. These actions by Congress and the President successfully 
prevented discretionary spending or paygo sequesters from occurring in 
those years. Some have argued that the paygo discipline may have been a 
deterrent to proposals that would have increased the deficit without an 
offset.

 The discretionary spending limits under the BEA expired on September 30, 
2002. In late 2002, the paygo scorecard was set at zero for FY2003 and each 
year thereafter through FY2006 by P.L. 107-312, thereby removing more than 
$100 billion in balances each year from the scorecard and preventing any 
future paygo sequesters. Consequently, the statutory enforcement mechanisms 
did not extend past the end of the 107th Congress.

 During the 108th and 109th Congresses, the Senate and the House wrestled 
with the issue of whether the expired BEA procedures should be restored or 
new budget constraints should be enacted. Considerable attention was 
focused on enforcement issues between June and October 2002 as the Senate 
addressed the need to extend certain other budget enforcement procedures 
slated to expire.

 On June 5, 2002, during consideration of an emergency supplemental 
appropriations act (H.R. 4775), the Senate rejected a Gregg-Feingold 
amendment, which would have extended certain budget enforcement procedures 
through FY2007. The next day, on June 6, a Daschle amendment, an extension 
of certain budget enforcement procedures through FY2007, also failed.\30\ 
On June 20, during consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act 
(S. 2514), the Senate rejected a Feingold amendment, as perfected by a 
modified Reid-Conrad amendment.\31\ It fell on a point of order when a 
motion to waive the point of order was rejected on a 59 to 40 vote, 1 short 
of the required 60 affirmative votes (roll call vote 159). The Feingold 
amendment, as perfected, would have extended the discretionary spending 
limits through FY2004 and certain other budget enforcement procedures 
through FY2007.

\30\ For the text and discussion of the Gregg-Feingold amendment (number 
3687), see pp. S5005- S5015 in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of June 
5, 2002. The Gregg-Feingold amendment fell on a point of order after a 
motion to waive the point of order was rejected on a 49 to 49 vote (roll 
call vote 133). For the text and discussion of the Daschle amendment 
(number 3764), see pp. S5015-S5022 and S5114-S5120 in the Congressional 
Record (daily ed.) of June 5 and 6, 2002, respectively. The amendment fell, 
after cloture had been invoked, on a point of order that it was nongermane.

\31\ For the text of the Feingold amendment (number 3915), as perfected by 
a modified Reid-Conrad amendment #3916, and its discussion, see pp. S5808-
S5821 in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of June 20, 2002.

On September 18, 2002, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad and 
Ranking Member Pete V. Domenici sent a letter to Majority Leader Daschle 
urging action on a resolution extending the Senate's pay-as-you-go point of 
order and the three-fifths vote requirement for certain waivers of the 1974 
Act. Majority Leader Daschle confirmed that the Senate would consider such 
legislation before adjournment. On October 16, the Senate considered S. 
Res. 304, a measure introduced earlier in the session encouraging the 
Senate Appropriations Committee to report the regular appropriations bills 
for FY2003 by July 31, 2002. The Senate agreed to the resolution by 
unanimous consent, after adopting by unanimous consent a Conrad amendment, 
a substitute amendment extending the Senate's pay-as-you-go point of order 
and the three-fifths vote requirement for certain waivers of the 1974 Act 
through April 15, 2003.\32\ The Senate resolution, because it is not a law, 
could not extend the statutory discretionary spending limits and the 
statutory pay-as-you-go enforcement procedure.

\32\ See the consideration of S. Res. 304 in the Congressional Record 
(daily ed.) of Oct. 16, 2002, at pp. S10527-S10531 and p. S10553. Also, see 
``In Late Deal, Senate Approves by Voice Vote Renewing Expiring Budget 
Enforcement Rules,'' by Bud Newman in BNA's Daily Report for Executives, 
Oct. 17, 2002.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.036

 2001, The Washington Post. Photo by Ray Lustig. Reprinted with 
Permission.

Chairman Kent Conrad refers to charts during the January 23, 2002 
hearing on the FY2003 budget and economic outlook.

In the absence of the expired statutory enforcement mechanisms, the two 
Chambers have relied on the existing budget procedures under the 1974 Act, 
as well as procedural mechanisms in annual budget resolutions, to enforce 
budget policy. In the case of mechanisms in annual budget resolutions used 
for enforcement by the Senate, the provisions have dealt with several key 
enforcement issues, including:

       The Senate's ``pay-as-you-go'' (paygo) point of 
  order.--Under the current paygo point of order, in effect since 
  2003, when Congress adopts a budget resolution, it simultaneously 
  establishes (in the Senate only) a scorecard that sets out the 
  total amount of deficit change assumed in the budget resolution. 
  This is sometimes referred to as post-policy paygo. The scorecard, 
  as maintained by the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, is 
  used to compare the budgetary effects of direct spending and 
  revenue legislation against those balances. As with previous 
  incarnations of the paygo point of order in the Senate, the 
  current rule covers the first year, and the first 5 years 
  (required to be included in the budget resolution), as well as the 
  5-year period after the first 5 years. First established in the 
  FY1994 budget resolution, the point of order has been modified 
  several times over the years, and there is considerable 
  controversy over whether it should be retained as is or returned 
  to its initial form, which required that new mandatory spending or 
  new tax cuts be offset or get 60 votes.
       Discretionary spending limits.--Limits on 
  discretionary new budget authority and outlays, enforceable only 
  in the Senate, have been carried in recent budget resolutions, 
  initially to supplement the statutory limits on discretionary 
  spending, and later to replace them (to some extent) after they 
  had expired. The statutory limits for FY2001, for example, were 
  enforced on the basis of several categories for outlays, but all 
  discretionary new budget authority fell under a single category. 
  Section 207 of H. Con. Res. 290, the FY2001 budget resolution, 
  further divided total discretionary new budget authority for that 
  year into defense and nondefense categories. The FY2006 budget 
  resolution, H. Con. Res. 95, set forth (in Section 404) 
  discretionary spending limits for 3 years--FY2006, FY2007, and 
  FY2008. The following year, a deeming resolution for FY2007 
  (contained in the Iraq-Afghanistan-Hurricane Supplemental 
  Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-234), effectively eliminated the 
  limits for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, and provided an allocation 
  to the Senate Appropriations Committee of $873 billion in new 
  discretionary budget authority for FY2007, a level consistent with 
  the President's discretionary spending request for that year.
       Procedures for emergency spending.--The House and 
  Senate have provided in recent budget resolutions procedures for 
  the designation of items in appropriations acts, direct spending 
  measures, and revenue legislation as emergencies, thereby 
  exempting them from various budget enforcement mechanisms. In 
  providing such a procedure in Section 402 of the FY2007 Senate-
  passed budget resolution (which was made effective by Section 7035 
  of P.L. 109-234), for example, the Senate has chosen to create a 
  point of order against nondefense emergency designations in 
  legislation and to establish criteria for determining what 
  constitutes an emergency, among other things.
       Restrictions on advance appropriation.--Advance 
  appropriations, which are provided in an annual appropriation act 
  for a fiscal year beyond the fiscal year to which the act applies, 
  have been used for many years. The amount of such appropriations 
  escalated sharply in recent years to more than $20 billion 
  annually. In view of concerns that to some degree this escalation 
  might reflect an evasion of budget control, recent budget 
  resolutions have included restrictions on the use of advance 
  appropriations. Section 401 of the FY2006 budget resolution, for 
  example, barred the consideration of measures providing advance 
  appropriations for FY2007 and FY2008, except for accounts 
  specifically identified in the joint managers' statement 
  accompanying the budget resolution, and subject to an overall cap 
  of $23.258 billion in each year.
       Limitation on long-term spending proposals in the 
  Senate.--One of the newest innovations in budget enforcement was 
  the inclusion of a limitation on long-term spending proposals in 
  the FY2006 budget resolution (in Section 407). The provision, 
  aimed mainly at curtailing the expansion of new entitlements 
  through legislative action (total entitlement spending already 
  increases each year under existing law), established a point of 
  order against a measure providing a net increase in direct 
  spending of more than $5 billion in any of four 10-year periods 
  covering FY2016-FY2055.

 All of the mechanisms discussed above are enforced by points of order. 
Like most of the points of order established in the 1974 Act, the points of 
order carried in budget resolutions generally may be waived by the 
affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators, if no 
seats are vacant). At the present time, the Senate's paygo point of order 
remains in effect through September 30, 2008, and three-fifths waiver 
requirements generally were extended through September 30, 2010, by Section 
403(a) of the FY2006 budget resolution (H. Con. Res. 95).

 In 2005, in action on the FY2006 budget resolution, the House and Senate 
agreed to use the budget reconciliation process to reduce the growth of 
mandatory spending by about $38 billion over 5 years. This was the first 
time that reconciliation had been used to reduce spending since 1997. 
Although congressional efforts carried over into 2006, Congress and the 
President ultimately enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which 
became P.L. 109-171. In addition, the Tax Increase Prevention and 
Reconciliation Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-222), a $70 billion revenue reduction 
measure to renew expiring tax cuts and to make other changes in tax law, 
also was enacted under reconciliation procedures stemming from the FY2006 
budget resolution. Opponents argue that, taken together, the two acts 
increased the deficit by about $32 billion over 5 years.

 During the 6 most recent years of the congressional budget process, the 
House and Senate were unable to reach final agreement on the budget 
resolutions for FY2003, FY2005, and FY2007, but the other three budget 
resolutions were adopted in a fairly timely manner.

 The FY2003 budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 100, was reported by the Budget 
Committee on March 22, 2002, but was not considered on the Senate floor. In 
2002, the House and Senate were controlled by different parties. In 2004, a 
conference agreement was reported on the FY2005 budget resolution, S. Con. 
Res. 95. The House agreed to the conference report on May 19, 2004, but the 
Senate did not consider it. In 2006, the House and Senate each passed their 
own versions of the FY2007 budget resolution (S. Con. Res. 83 and H. Con. 
Res. 376), but no conference was held to resolve the differences between 
the two Chambers.

 The inability of the House and Senate to reach final agreement on budget 
resolutions for these 3 years, and previously for FY1999, compelled the 
Budget Committees to develop innovative means of maintaining budget 
discipline for those budget cycles. In these instances, a device referred 
to as a ``deeming resolution'' was used by one or both Houses to establish 
enforceable budget levels (for discretionary spending because the budget 
resolution only provides a 1-year allocation for appropriations). Multiyear 
levels for revenues and direct spending set in the prior year's budget 
resolution remain in effect and afford some measure of budget discipline. 
The term ``deeming resolution'' is not officially defined, nor is there any 
specific statute or rule authorizing such legislation. Instead, the use of 
a deeming resolution simply represents the House and Senate employing 
legislative procedures to deal with the issue on an ad hoc basis.

 The form and content of a deeming resolution is not prescribed, so it may 
be shaped to meet the particular needs at hand. For example, the House and 
Senate have used simple resolutions as the legislative vehicle in the past, 
but a deeming resolution may be incorporated into a bill, such as an annual 
appropriations act, as a single provision. At a minimum, deeming 
resolutions have provided new spending allocations to the Appropriations 
Committees, but they also may provide new aggregate budget levels, revise 
spending allocations to other House and Senate committees, or provide for 
other budget enforcement mechanisms.

 For FY1999, the first year the two Chambers did not reach final agreement 
on a budget resolution, the Senate adopted two deeming resolutions (S. Res. 
209 on April 2, 1998 and S. Res. 312 on October 21, 1998), and the House 
included deeming provisions in two resolutions adopted (H. Res. 477 on June 
19, 1998 and H. Res. 5 on January 6, 1999). For FY2003, the House adopted 
on May 22, 2002 a deeming resolution provision in H. Res. 428, a special 
rule for H.R. 4775, a supplemental appropriations act. The Senate adopted 
S. Res. 304 on October 16, 2002, dealing with budget process matters; it 
extended certain expiring budget enforcement provisions and the Senate 
paygo rule, but did not set new budget levels.

 For FY2005, the House adopted on May 19, 2004, both the conference report 
on the FY2005 budget resolution and a special rule (H.R. 649) including a 
deeming resolution provision that put budget policies in the conference 
report into effect for the House. On August 5, 2004, H.R. 4613, the Defense 
Appropriations Act for FY2005, was signed into law and included Section 
14007 that deemed portions of the 2005 budget resolution conference report 
to be in effect for the Senate.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.035

Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Photography Studio.

Chairman Don Nickles and House Budget Committee Chairman Jim Nussle 
share a laugh during the FY2005 budget resolution conference on March 
31, 2004.

 For FY2007, the House adopted a deeming provision in H. Res. 818, a 
special rule providing for the consideration of the Interior Appropriations 
Act for FY2007. The Senate followed suit in June, adding a deeming 
resolution provision as Section 7035 in the conference report on H.R. 4939, 
an emergency supplemental appropriations act that was signed into law on 
June 15, 2006, as P.L. 109-234.

During the second session of the 109th Congress, in 2006, Chairman Judd 
Gregg, along with 26 cosponsors, introduced S. 3521, the Stop Over Spending 
(SOS) Act of 2006. Title I of the SOS Act was the Legislative Line Item 
Veto Act of 2006. Title I would have granted the President new authority to 
identify line items in discretionary and direct spending legislation, and 
targeted tax benefits in revenue legislation, and propose to Congress that 
they be rescinded or cancelled. Congress would have been compelled to 
consider the President's proposals under expedited procedures without 
amendments.

 In an effort to balance the budget by FY2012, the bill would have 
established a mechanism under which the deficit would be limited to a 
declining percentage of the gross domestic product (beginning with 2.75 
percent of GDP for FY2007 and dropping steadily to 0.5 percent of GDP for 
FY2012 and thereafter). The deficit targets would have been enforced by an 
automatic reconciliation process; if reconciliation legislation was not 
enacted or did not reduce the deficit by a sufficient amount, a 
sequestration involving automatic, largely across-the-board spending cuts 
would occur.

  
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.015

Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Photography Studio.       

     Chairman  Judd  Gregg  during  a  Budget  Committee  markup  in
     June 2006.

 Other elements of the SOS Act of 2006 included: (1) statutory caps on 
discretionary budget authority for FY2007-FY2009, also enforced by 
sequestration, and limits on the amount of spending that may be designated 
as an emergency each year; (2) a new point of order against direct spending 
triggered when the Medicare Program was projected to become insolvent in 7 
years or less; (3) biennial budgeting; (4) a bipartisan Commission on 
Congressional Budgetary Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies, to 
review government programs in a manner similar to the Base Realignment and 
Closure (BRAC) Commission, and a bipartisan National Commission on 
Entitlement Solvency, to examine and make recommendations regarding the 
growth of entitlement spending; and (5) various changes pertaining to the 
consideration of budget resolutions and reconciliation measures.

 The SOS Act of 2006 was marked up by the Budget Committee on June 20, 
2006. Eight amendments, including a substitute offered by Ranking Member 
Kent Conrad, were rejected. The Conrad substitute, among other things, 
would have restored statutory pay-as-you-go procedures applicable to 
revenue legislation as well as direct spending legislation and allowed the 
reconciliation process to be used only for deficit reduction. The Conrad 
alternative also would have required the President to budget for the cost 
of military operations, added new protections for Social Security, required 
conference reports to lay over for 48 hours and be scored prior to Senate 
consideration, and called on the President and Congress to undertake a 
bipartisan effort to solve the current and long-term fiscal challenges 
facing the Nation. An amendment making various modifications to the bill, 
offered by Chairman Gregg, was adopted. The Committee ordered the bill 
reported, as amended, by a vote of 12 to 10 (S. Rept. 109-283; July 14, 
2006).
Staff Recollections

The following recollections were excerpted from interviews conducted with 
former Senate Budget Committee staff during August and September 2006. The 
complete interview transcripts are available at the Senate Historical 
Office and the Library of Congress.\1\ Senior Committee staff members Jim 
Hearn, Cheri Reidy, and John Righter conducted the interviews. The 
Committee would like to thank the participants for their time and 
dedication to the project and for sharing their unique knowledge and 
insight to create an invaluable resource on the Senate Budget Committee and 
the Federal budget process. A list of interviewees along with their 
Committee affiliation follows.

\1\ Complete interview transcripts are available at the Senate Historical 
Office, 201 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510, (202) 224-
6900, and at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, 101 Independence 
Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20540, (202) 707-5387.

                           Stephen E. Bell

   Task Force Investigator (TFI), Senator Pete V. Domenici, 1979-1980
                  Majority Staff Director, 1981-1986

                              Jack Conway
              Senior Analyst for Budget Review, 1979-1983

                          William G. Dauster
                Majority Chief Counsel, 1987-1994
     Minority Staff Director and Minority Chief Counsel, 1995-1997

                          John L. Hilley
Assistant Staff Director for Economics, Trade, and Finance, 1985-1989
                Majority Staff Director, 1989-1990

                        G. William Hoagland
                     Senior Analyst, 1982-1983
             Majority Deputy Staff Director, 1984-1985
              Majority Staff Director, 1986, 1995-2000
         Minority Staff Director, 1987-1994, 2001-2002 \2\

                          Hazen Marshall
    TFI, Legislative Assistant, Senator Don Nickles, 1988-1996
  TFI, Economist, Assistant Majority Leader Don Nickles, 1997-1999
                    TFI, Deputy Chief of Staff,
        Assistant Majority Leader Don Nickles, 2000-2002 \2\
                  Majority Staff Director, 2003-2004

                           John T. McEvoy
                Majority Chief Counsel, 1974-1976
                Majority Staff Director, 1977-1980

                          Carole McGuire
                Staff Assistant, Analyst, 1976-1985
               Director of Appropriations, 1986-1994
Majority Deputy Staff Director and Director of Appropriations, 1995-2000
Minority Deputy Staff Director and Director of Appropriations, 2001-2002 
\2\

                           Larry Stein
              Communications Director, 1988-1990
              Majority Staff Director, 1991-1994



\2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several 
times (as discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109).

Beginnings

People and Structure

Mr. McEvoy: I've got to credit Doug Bennett [the Committee's first staff 
director] with the genius in creating staff. He knew what he was looking 
for. . . . These were people who ``got'' the process. That was the common 
denominator, with one or two exceptions who didn't last.

They somehow intuitively could fit into the Senate apparatus with a little 
coaching and didn't fight the system. We insisted, this was Doug's cardinal 
principle, mine as well, that we were going to be value-neutral on the 
budget. Our commitment was to the system. We were certainly Democrats, and 
the chairman was a Democrat, and that meant that you couldn't do much 
without the Democrats. The staff wasn't going to have an agenda. We thought 
policy was for the Senators to decide. We culled more than one staff person 
out of the Committee because we felt they had an agenda that they were 
pushing.

Mr. Conway: In those early days, there were three or four analysts who 
worked for a group leader. Each of these groups were called pods, and the 
leader of the group was the pod leader. I think the name ``pod'' came from 
the ``Invasion of the Body Snatchers'' movie. There was a national security 
pod, which was defense and international affairs, and a human resources 
pod, which was health, education, income, security, and veterans' affairs. 
There was also a natural resources pod, and a commerce and housing credit, 
and general government pod. Some of the group leaders did a function as 
well, and also oversaw the work of the other staffers. The major 
organizational elements would have been these pods covering the functional 
areas of the budget, and then a legal group and an administrative group.

Ms. McGuire: From the early days of the Committee there has been 
continuity. . . . When it was set up by the Democrats in the mid-1970s, 
they had no blueprint on how to do this. They had to make some very basic 
decisions. Do we have subcommittees or do we not? How do we get people to 
serve on the Committee? The Committee structure today is very much like it 
was when it was set up. You have your functional analysts, policy groups, 
your staff director, deputy staff director, chief counsel, and budget 
review people.

Task force investigators (TFIs), who are still around, came about in lieu 
of subcommittees. . . . They wanted to get them [members] involved in the 
budget and the budget process. So they set up policy task forces to work on 
budget issues. The members' staff were the TFIs. At one time, we tried to 
call them Senator's representatives, but they have always been TFIs.

Carroll Arms

Mr. McEvoy: The Carroll Arms was the occasion for an awful lot of staff 
lore. It started because all the Senate space was used up. There was no 
Hart Building. Every Committee had every inch, and every Senator had every 
inch. Somebody did propose giving us a room in the basement, and Chairman 
Muskie said no. We were without a home, so I was operating out of a dungeon 
I called the ``Muskie bunker,'' this really dark place that was his private 
lair over in the Senate before Senator Sam Ervin retired, and Senator 
Muskie got his office.

Doug [Bennett, the Committee's first staff director] and I would walk 
around the Hill in the afternoon looking at buildings. Well, the Carroll 
Arms Hotel had also been [acquired by the Senate] across the street, a big 
hotel, it was going to be torn down for a parking lot, but when was the 
question, because the parking lot itself had gotten caught in the 1973 
recession. Anyway, the Carroll Arms had been spared, but nobody knew for 
how long. So Doug and I made the case to Senator Muskie that we should try 
to get space in the Carroll Arms. I said to him, ``But even that won't work 
for the long term because one day it's going to be torn down.'' And he 
said, in his usual fashion, ``Don't worry. It'll be there longer than you 
are.'' He was right.

We got two floors of the Carroll Arms, the second and third floor--well, 
most of the first, too, but there wasn't much down there. Doug's office, 
and later mine, was in the space that the Quorum Club used to be in. It was 
wonderful. We all had bathrooms.

Ms. McGuire: The Budget Committee was assigned a hearing room in the 
Russell Building. We were physically located in the old Carroll Arms Hotel 
across the street which is now a parking lot. Because of staff limitations, 
and the fact that the Hart Building was not yet constructed, we were 
placed, much as CBO was, in an old building, which was a blessing and a 
curse: out of sight, out of mind. Any trip to see the Chairman, or to see 
one of the Members, or to go to a hearing, you had to walk across the 
street and into the Dirksen or Russell Buildings. Your chairman did not 
just drop by. One night about midnight when I was on the second floor of 
the Carroll Arms Annex, Chairman Muskie walked through, which just about 
freaked me out. I think that it was about the only time that the Chairman 
was ever in the building.

We had these old hotel rooms that everyone loved because they had a shower, 
so anyone that jogged could jog and come back and take a shower. It was 
kind of a quirky place to have your office, but we all loved the Carroll 
Arms Annex dearly until it was torn down. We had a big farewell party over 
there, and we moved across the street to the Dirksen Building.

Sid Brown (the Committee's First Chief of Budget Review)

Mr. Hoagland: The first day I walked into the Budget Committee . . . I'll 
never forget walking into Sid's office, and he had one of those calculators 
that had a roll of paper on it. That's the way the budget was put together. 
Sid was from the old Budget Office, the Bureau of the Budget, an old-time 
budgeteer, a great guy. Sid was that person who had integrity, nobody could 
challenge, and he could stand up to anyone in the early years and say, 
``Now, this is the way it is,'' and nobody was going to challenge Sid on 
it. There was this stature that Sid had. It's hard to find, in this very 
political town today, a career staff person on Capitol Hill that can 
maintain that kind of respect.

Mr. McEvoy: We had THE computer in the Senate. That was part of our 
mystique, see. We had a computer. These numbers that we used in our 
scorekeeping system came out of a computer! In fact, it was Sid massaging 
them. Sid had this assistant who reminded me of the far out scientist in 
the ``Back to the Future'' movie. He'd sit there at this little tabletop 
computer, one of the first desktops, and he'd say, ``Let's fire up Ol' 
Nelly.'' But you could never be sure that the damn thing was even going to 
go on, and you know, sparks would fly. . . .

Everybody respected Sid. They knew he didn't bend with the wind. And 
Chairman Muskie would never ask him to make a compromise. The numbers were 
the numbers. And Sid, because of his acumen, and his thorough understanding 
of the budget, commanded great respect at OMB [the Office of Management and 
Budget] among the professionals and at CBO [the Congressional Budget 
Office].

Technology

Mr. Conway: Everything was done in millions with an asterisk for $500,000 
or less, rather than, as we do today, billions and tenths of billions, with 
an asterisk for $50 million or less. In the beginning, there were no 
personal computers; everything was done on adding machines or calculators, 
and all the markup materials were done on paper that was put into a 
typewriter, and then you typed out all the numbers. The first time you put 
the piece of paper in, it looked pretty good, but then you made a mistake 
on the number or CBO changed the number between Tuesday and Wednesday and 
the original would have to be ``fixed.'' So you'd take the piece of paper, 
and then maybe use some Wite-Out, or if you were really good, you could fit 
the page back in and maybe use a correct-a-type typewriter or had the tape 
that could cover over the mistake. That would work maybe the first two 
times, and then there was Wite-Out slathered on it, and by the end, when we 
finally were in the position of putting together a markup book, there were 
many layers of tape. So you'd have the tape, plus the Wite-Out, plus 
everything else. Some of the pages were so thick, you didn't dare feed them 
through a copying machine. We did have copying machines. . . .



One thing that is no longer done is that every Saturday there was published 
and on the desk of every Senator on Monday morning, a Senate Budget 
Committee scorekeeping report. There would be a page for every committee 
and a page for every subcommittee of appropriations, and it would show the 
budget resolution, prior year spending, supplementals, current session 
spending, and the regular bills. So for an appropriation bill, it would 
start with the prior year outlays, then you would have, if there was a 
supplemental, any effect from the supplemental, and then if there was any 
action on the bill. If there was no action, it would just stop at that 
level. If it continued, you'd have comparisons to the budget resolution. 
Thank God I didn't have to come in to work on that, but Sid [Brown] did. 
This stuff was set in monotype. It was not done electronically. Every piece 
was set in hot lead. Sid would come in and send it to GPO on Friday, and 
he'd come in every Saturday to look at the galleys.

Markups, Resolutions, and the Senate Floor

Mr. McEvoy: Chairman Muskie was prodigious in his absorption of data. We 
used to prepare thick undigested briefing books and send them home with 
him, so that he came into the markup knowing more than most of the members 
of the Committee knew about how things added up. He was a brilliant man. He 
could make combinations in his mind that others could not. He wanted to 
achieve consensus on a budget resolution, which meant he couldn't have 
everything he wanted, but he also knew what was the minimum he, in 
conscience and politically, could settle for.

The staff never presented a mark, and we never had a Committee mark. The 
House did that all the time. The leadership had a mark. I remember the 
House in those days had leadership representation on the Committee, and 
they followed it very closely. We never did that. Muskie was zero based in 
budget resolutions. The only number we offered in the Committee in its 
documents was the current services budget. People would propose a number, 
plus or minus that starting point. Current services was what it would cost 
to run the government taking into account all the legislation on the books, 
adjusted for the current economic forecast. You could put it into the 
functional baskets and see it. And so that's kind of how it got started. I 
considered the President's budget dead on arrival.



One time we had a second resolution markup, or maybe it was a first 
resolution, going on for 3 or 4 weeks, and members stopped coming. We would 
meet all day. It would be between floor votes. We got down to about eight 
people in the Committee, and Chairman Muskie wouldn't stop because one of 
his negotiating techniques was that he just kept you going until you were 
ready to sign up. He would not let a final vote come on a resolution that 
he didn't think he was going to pick up Republicans on. So he had enormous 
patience.

If you got a consensus on every number, everybody in the Committee was 
smart enough and they had their own staffs to know what we were building up 
to, so if you had a consensus through to the end on all of the functions, 
chances are you were going to get to the end in a way that had consensus on 
the outcome.

Ms. McGuire: We prepared similar markup books to the type that you do now, 
although they were more extensive. The theory was that the members needed 
to have an education about what was in the Federal budget. So they were 
rather extensive markups to describe what a function was and what programs 
were in it, and what the funding patterns had been as well as the current 
services baseline, CBO's current policy baseline, and the President's 
budget request. Markups took 2, sometimes 3, weeks because we would walk 
through every function, and every functional analyst would give a 
presentation on what was in the function, and then entertain questions. In 
those days, we did not always have a Chairman's Mark. It was more putting 
together a budget resolution the old-fashioned way by offering amendments 
to the budget functions. We walked through every budget function, and 
members could offer amendments to the function, and the Committee would act 
on them.

Over time as things got more partisan, and there was less camaraderie on 
the Committee, we changed to the current system of markups where everybody 
has their own ideas of what they want in the resolution, and the better 
part of valor is to cut to the chase and do the Chairman's Mark. When 
people kind of recognized the writing on the wall and by the time that you 
were having one or two vote margins, you realized that you had to get all 
of your guys in line. The chairmen started to figure out that they had to 
put together a mark and get as much support as they could and then open it 
up for the amendment process. This did two things, it expedited the process 
and somewhat guaranteed you could get a budget resolution out of the 
Committee. I think the chairmen felt it was their responsibility to get a 
budget resolution to the floor. Somehow they had to get that done. That was 
the one thing that they were asked to do every year.



Out of those rather lengthy markups and back and forth negotiating 
sessions, I think, is where our ``no proxy'' rule came from. . . . Since 
the Budget Committee met for a very short period of time each year, certain 
chairmen thought that the members ought to be present and accounted for for 
the duration of the markup and that members using proxies slowed down the 
work of the Committee. Chairman Chiles was the one that really pushed 
extensively for the ``no proxy'' rule based on his experience over time 
with Chairman Muskie and as the ranking member trying to get the budget 
resolutions adopted in the Committee. I think that those lengthy markups 
and the fact that you had to herd members into the Committee to offer their 
amendments, eventually led to the adoption of the ``no proxy'' rule.

Mr. Conway: In those days, the analysts would sit at the table during 
markup and answer questions, and heaven help the analyst who stumbled in 
front of the members. You've all seen it, if members get a sense that you 
don't know what you're talking about. . . . I was always terrified of what 
questions they were going to ask because I was the functional analyst for 
function 900, interest, 920, allowances, and 950, undistributed offsetting 
receipts, which included Outer Continental Shelf rents and royalties. The 
Members who had written the laws on Outer Continental Shelf rents and 
royalties were sitting at the table. . . .



At that time, we did at least two budget resolutions a year. The first 
budget resolution was advisory, and the second budget resolution was 
binding. The binding part of the resolution was what we called ``the last 
piggy at the trough,'' the last appropriation bill or the first 
appropriation bill that would cause the 302(a) allocation to be breached 
and would be subject to a majority point of order. There were no points of 
order on each of the individual appropriation bills. It was only on the 
last one or the one that would cause a breach of the budget.

You would finish the first budget resolution. There would be a short period 
and then you would begin the second budget resolution. The second budget 
resolution basically was to incorporate CBO re-estimates from the time the 
first budget resolution was adopted. There were a number of different 
updates. There was the President's budget, then there was an April update 
where OMB would submit updated information similar to the midsession 
review, then they would do the midsession review in July.

As a staffer, the most difficult thing was, ``what set of numbers are we 
working on now?'' Depending on what stage of the process you were in, if 
you were scoring a bill, you would be doing it under the assumptions of the 
first budget resolution. If you were preparing things for the second budget 
resolution markup, you would be scoring the same bills, but under the 
assumptions of the second budget resolution, and they may be the 
assumptions that were from the OMB April update, or they may be further 
modified by the July midsession review.

Ms. McGuire: The second budget resolution was really more for fine tuning, 
but the farther we went in the process, and the longer it continued to take 
to get our appropriations work and tax work completed, it seemed to be 
almost irrelevant at the time we were supposed to do the second budget 
resolution. There were not a lot of things to fine tune. We were still in 
the middle of doing appropriation bills and tax bills and things of that 
nature. At some point, it became a housekeeping function and essentially 
irrelevant as we revised the budget resolution in the next cycle. We 
continued to update the past budget resolution when we did a new resolution 
and that practice essentially took the place of the second budget 
resolution.

Mr. Hearn [interviewer, to Mr. Dauster]: The purpose of this whole exercise 
of the Committee history is to put together a document that people can use, 
to research, to go back and draw on what might otherwise be lost to 
history. One product that already exists is what the small circle of 
potential scholars is going to call ``the blue book,'' \3\ which is what we 
call it, which you know a lot about since you wrote it. It really was, for 
the period that it covered in terms of the law at the time, it was ``the 
bible.''

\3\ Budget Process Law Annotated 1993 Edition: Including the Congressional 
Budget Act, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, 
Executive Order 12857, and Related Budget-Process Legislation. Committee on 
the Budget, United States Senate. Annotations by William G. Dauster, Chief 
Counsel. Senate Print 103-49, 103rd Congress, First Session. October 1993. 
Government Printing Office.

Mr. Dauster [in response to Mr. Hearn]: There have been three editions of 
the volume we're talking about. What started off as the ``Congressional 
Budget Act Annotated'' or ``Budget Process Annotated'' . . . started for 
two reasons. First, to have collected in one place all the things I'd need 
on the floor, and I'd want to argue with the Parliamentarian about what was 
the law on something. So, it was useful to have it and not have it in a 
large suitcase. It's better to have something small that you can carry with 
you at all times. Second, it helped me to understand the law better, and so 
it was a good, useful learning process for me.

Tests of Budget Enforcement

Mr. McEvoy: In July 1975, Chairman Muskie was confronted with his first 
challenge to that budget resolution because Senator McGovern, who was 
chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Hunger, had fought and lost to 
Senator Dole in Committee on an amendment to raise school lunch subsidies, 
I think by a nickel or something. The House had passed a bill that vastly 
exceeded what the Senate had allowed for it in our budget resolution. 
Senator Dole was standing by the budget resolution in opposing the McGovern 
amendment. Senator McGovern came to the floor and offered an amendment to 
put it back.

Now, Chairman Muskie's politics would have driven him in the past to vote 
for that [the McGovern amendment], and he took a lot of heat at home for 
failing to, but he and Ranking Member Bellmon thought their deal stood up 
and announced that they were opposing that amendment. We beat it something 
like 73 to 27, picking up a great number of Democrats whom Senator McGovern 
expected to vote with him. Then he [Senator McGovern] went to conference 
and accepted the much higher House number, so the conference report that 
came back to the Senate was at least as expensive as the one we had averted 
when we beat the McGovern amendment. So we're going to have to fight him 
again, and we knew we were going to win that.

As it happened--and this was blind luck and stupidity, I've apologized to 
the two guys who were staff director and counsel to the Armed Services 
Committee over and over again since then--the defense authorization bill 
had come out of conference over the levels presumed in the budget 
resolution and though it passed the Senate, it was pretty much what we 
putatively had attributed to it. We didn't enforce the budget resolution 
against authorization bills dependent upon subsequent appropriation, except 
that I was so, shall we say, naive or new to the process that it just 
seemed to me that the chance of nailing Senator McGovern and the Armed 
Services Committee together was overwhelming. So I suggested that we take 
on both conference reports as a package and make the liberals that were 
going to vote against the defense bill, choose between being against 
defense and for liberal priorities or for the budget on both. We were going 
to make the defense conservatives do the same thing.

Well, the only justification for my position arguing that this 
authorization bill spent money was that Senator John Stennis . . . was not 
only chairman of the Armed Services Committee, but also chairman of the 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, so he could make sure the 
appropriation equaled the authorization level.

Chairman Muskie sent a letter out the week before the two conference bills 
were coming to the floor saying they both broke the budget, and we're going 
to vote against them and urged everybody to do it. We beat both of them. 
The first one up was the defense bill. We won 48 to 41, but it was so hotly 
contested that Senator Tower, ranking Republican on the Armed Services 
Committee, called for a vote on Majority Leader Mansfield's motion to lay 
the motion to reconsider on the table. There was only one switch. That vote 
is what made the budget process in the Senate, because if you could beat 
Senator John Stennis, and if you could make the liberals face up to the 
fact that if they wanted to hold defense down, they had to hold their own 
stuff down, and that Chairman Muskie and Ranking Member Bellmon were a 
formidable force, and they'd kick you across the room on the Senate floor 
if you came to the floor with what we called a budget buster.

It was a package, that was the genius of it. You couldn't be for one and 
not the other and claim any fiscal responsibility. Senator Stennis went 
back dutifully and cut his bill in conference again, and Senator McGovern 
hated it, but he finally came into line, and we passed both conference 
reports later consistent with the budget. I told somebody when Senator 
McGovern first brought the bill to the floor, the first time we had to beat 
it before it went to conference, this was the great challenge for Chairman 
Muskie, and it was the most painful challenge coming from his own side and 
on one of his priorities.

Ms. McGuire: One of the biggest victories in the early days for Chairman 
Muskie was that he took on the aviation bill for excessive spending. 
Everyone thought that he was nuts to go down to the floor and make the 
budget arguments. He decided that he needed to go down and say, ``This is 
outside the budget resolution, and we need to re-think this bill.'' He 
actually won on one of the points of order, which was a huge boost of 
morale to the Budget Committee because it was hard to get these other 
committees to change their ways.

Committee Dynamics

Mr. McEvoy: What people didn't recognize was that Ranking Member Bellmon 
had been the first Republican Governor in Oklahoma since statehood, and he 
had to deal with a Democratic legislature and had to learn how to do it. 
Chairman Muskie had been the first Democratic Governor in Maine in 100 
years, and he had to deal with an entirely Republican legislature. So these 
two guys came together with a background that said if anything was going to 
be achieved, it had to be achieved with some compromise and on a bipartisan 
basis. . . .

Chairman Muskie made a deal with Ranking Member Bellmon that the process 
wasn't going to work if it fell into partisanship, and that the only way to 
make it work was for Senator Bellmon and he to agree that the process would 
be paramount in their work in the Committee and that they would each 
sacrifice, to the extent it was possible and necessary, their own 
priorities and views, in order to build the consensus for a resolution that 
could not just pass the Committee, but survive in the Senate. That was the 
deal that basically made the budget process in the Senate for 6 years.



Chairman Muskie had incredible patience, I mean such patience that it drove 
me nuts in formulating budget resolutions. They would take weeks. He would 
drive the rest of the Committee nuts because he almost always had all the 
Democratic votes he needed. But he was waiting to pick up the Republican 
side. He was waiting until everybody had run out of breath and energy and 
was willing to say, look, we've got to get a budget resolution done. 
Because when he went to the floor, he wanted to get 65, 75, 85 votes for 
it. I don't think we ever got, while I was here, fewer than that on a 
budget resolution. Most times over 70. So he had a commitment going into 
the Senate based on the commitment coming out of his Committee.

Mr. Conway: From the very beginning, Senators Muskie and Bellmon worked 
together in a bipartisan way to produce a bipartisan budget resolution. In 
those early years, the budget resolution was a bipartisan document. It was 
always a bipartisan amendment that would roll them on defense. Inevitably 
it was the Fritz Hollings-Pete Domenici defense amendment. Bob Sneed as the 
defense analyst would prepare Chairman Muskie's mark, and he would also 
prepare the Hollings-Domenici amendment. Sneed would get in the position 
where he would have to write talking points for the Chairman's Mark, and 
he'd then write the talking points for the Hollings-Domenici mark. Senator 
Muskie would present the mark. Then Senators Domenici and Hollings would do 
their counterproposal. So here was Sneed, who had prepared talking points 
for each of the amendments and against the other person's amendment. John 
McEvoy, the staff director, would say something like, ``Bob, I told you to 
give him help, but not that much help.'' Inevitably, the Hollings-Domenici 
defense mark would beat the Muskie-Bellmon defense mark.

Mr. Hoagland: Senator Domenici and Senator Chiles were personal friends. 
They hunted together; they fished together; they did other things together; 
and their wives socialized together. That kind of relationship outside of 
this institution, outside of these four walls, I think makes it easier. 
It's not that Senator Chiles and Senator Domenici didn't have differences 
of opinion, but they worked together.



It's my recollection that, first of all, it was a Committee in which in the 
early years, it wasn't clear that people wanted to be on it. . . . So it 
got down to the end, I won't say the leftover Committee, but you ended up 
with a lot of freshmen Senators.

As budgeting and fiscal policy became more of an issue and more attention 
was brought to it particularly during the Reagan and Stockman [Director of 
the OMB] years, there was a sense that this might be an exciting Committee 
to get on. I'll never forget Bill Dauster introducing me to Senator Clinton 
when she first came to the Senate and became a member of this Committee. 
She said to me, ``Bill, my husband, has told me that this is the Committee 
to get on, because if you want to learn the Federal budget quickly, this is 
the Committee.''

So there was a movement, a little bit more attention being paid to it, 
particularly during the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s, that it was an 
exciting Committee, it was a Committee that had attention brought to it.

Interaction with the Senate Leadership and the Executive Branch

Mr. McEvoy: President Carter asked Chairman Muskie, the congressional 
leadership, and the Budget Committee leadership to come down to the White 
House for a big breakfast. All of the heavy hitters from all of the 
committees were there. I suspect what they wanted to do was a combination 
of make peace and assert their supremacy as the President, as the executive 
branch. President Carter laid out the olive branch, and he talked about how 
important it was to do things together and so on. He asked if anybody had 
anything to say, and Senator Muskie got up and gave the President a civics 
lesson. He said he respected what the President said, but he had to 
understand that there were two distinct branches here. There was the 
administration, and there was the Congress, and Congress had the power of 
the purse and took it seriously. He gave him a ``little Dutch uncle'' in a 
polite way. That ended the discussion. We never had another one of those, 
and to my knowledge, Senator Muskie never dealt directly with President 
Carter again on the budget.



When I said the President's budget was dead on arrival up here, we never 
took it seriously--first, because we didn't think they could enforce it; 
and second, we knew our deal with the Republicans in this Committee was not 
going to be enhanced by starting with anything that looked like a 
Presidential budget.

Ms. McGuire: Another notable moment that I will never forget was while we 
were marking up a budget resolution in the early 1980s, and Senator 
Domenici was not enamored with President Reagan's tax cut. As we were in 
the middle of the markup, he got the tap on the shoulder to come out to the 
phone booth, and the President was on the other end of the line saying 
``Pete, I really need your vote on this, I really need my tax cut.'' They 
must have talked for 10 or 15 minutes. The Senator came back, and he was 
very serious looking, and he said that the clerk will call the roll, and he 
voted against the President. That was one of the more high drama moments 
that we had.

Mr. Dauster: Yes, it [the relationship between the Committee and 
leadership] has changed over time. When I started [in 1987], I was working 
for Senator Lawton Chiles. It's not often remembered, but he challenged 
Senator Byrd for majority leader, and therefore, the relations were not 
entirely warm at the beginning, and we strove to have a distinct and 
separate role from the leader.

As I mentioned, Chairman Sasser and Leader Mitchell were close, and 
therefore, it was a different relationship. And that was useful for both 
parties to be able to work together, because the budget relied so much on 
getting the caucus to get passed and because the leader could get so much 
of the agenda done through the budget.

Mr. Hoagland: Markups were not only by function but also by subfunctions, 
and they would go on for weeks and way into the night, and members really 
got into the details. But when it got down to it, what they found out, 
which is what we all knew at the time, was at the end of the day it's just 
a number, and you can say whatever policy assumption you like, but it's 
still a number. So the accounting nature of the process in those early 
years shifted when Stockman [Director of the OMB] started pushing the 
reconciliation process as a way not only to achieve the numbers, but to 
achieve the policy.

So those early years, and I realize they're contentious about how that has 
evolved over time in terms of reconciliation, but the early years, 1981, 
1982, 1983, the stories that are told about President Reagan calling in 
here as a vote was about to take place on his . . . [budget plan], and 
Domenici saying, no, we're voting the way we're voting and standing up to 
the President, you don't see that anymore. You don't see the chairmen, and 
I say that generically, you don't see the leadership saying this is an 
independent or this is a separate branch of government. In those early 
days, there was conflict. Even though Republicans controlled the Senate and 
the White House, there was an effort here to convey we actually did have 
something to say about fiscal policy.

Mr. Marshall: I spent a few years working for the leadership. When you're 
in leadership, you spend most of your time cursing the committees because 
they're not doing what you want, and I quickly found out, switching places, 
that the committees sit around and curse the leadership for trying to tell 
them what to do. There's always tension between leadership and the 
committees. I think it was less so when Senator Nickles was chairman just 
because he had such a great relationship with Leader Frist and because of 
his service in the leadership, he very much understood what they wanted and 
needed and vice versa.



The Committee over the last several years, at least in the tenure of this 
Bush administration, has been closer to the administration and their 
priorities than I've seen in the past. I think that was a reflection of 
Congress generally. The Republican Caucus in the House and the Senate over 
the last several years has been more deferential and more accepting of the 
administration's priorities than before. I'm a legislative branch snob, so 
that has always just bugged me a little bit. It wasn't just the Committee. 
It was a reflection of Congress as a whole. That didn't used to be the 
case; I can remember Senator Domenici (as chairman and ranking member) 
bucking Presidents in the past, and I think it happened on the other side 
as well.

Reconciliation

Mr. McEvoy: I walked into his [Chairman Muskie's] office, which was always 
kind of dark, and he's sitting at his big desk. He had never seen a second 
resolution report from CBO that made him happy, because it always had 
economic re-estimates, and he took a beating in Maine for it. Even if it 
was only a couple billion dollars, people would say he was betraying the 
process. The big high and mighty guy said they have to have integrity and 
then blows the budget by $2 billion.

He didn't say a word. I said, ``Senator, it's bad news.'' He looked at me 
like, ``What else?'' I handed him the piece of paper, and I said that CBO 
says. . . . He looked at that paper, and he said, ``What am I supposed to 
do about this?'' I said, ``Well, we could do a reconciliation bill.'' He 
said, ``You know that won't work.'' I said, ``Well, no, probably it won't, 
but at least you can bring a reconciliation bill to the floor. All these 
committees are going to have to come down and explain why you shouldn't do 
it and justify what they've done.'' Well, he loved that.

Chairman Muskie came up to the Committee during a markup, the second 
resolution, and he quietly suggested we do a reconciliation bill. Congress 
was about to leave town. Nobody had the slightest idea of what a 
reconciliation bill might be. I mean, it was a line in the budget process. 
It had not been discussed in 4 years. The Republicans loved it because, you 
know, why not? The Democrats were skeptical, but they were all worn out. It 
was one of those marathon markups, and they were going to be embarrassed by 
these numbers, too. We didn't have all the Democrats on board, but we had 
enough. Congress adjourns, and nobody knows we've done it. The press wasn't 
covering it. The Senate wasn't paying any attention.

Chris Matthews was at that time the press relations guy for the Committee. 
A very frustrated fellow because Chairman Muskie didn't like publicity. To 
get press, you had to make waves; making waves was not his style up here. 
So I was always having to sit on Chris to keep him from doing a press 
release or coming up with an angle that would make a story. He and I sat 
down, as most of the congressional staff was already on vacation, and we 
decided that we should make something of this.

Chris went to work on the press, which had nothing else to report during 
August [1979] about Congress. Bob Schieffer even did a piece on it from the 
Capitol lawn in late August, and papers all over the country started 
picking up on it in the editorial pages. Members were getting sandbagged. 
They didn't even know it happened, and here the papers are calling for them 
to do it.

So there was a real wildfire going in the Senate among Democratic Senators 
and chairmen about what this was all about, and Majority Leader Byrd held a 
meeting to decide what to do . . . He didn't want this fight on his hands. 
He wanted the flames put out before this resolution. It was Senator Abe 
Ribicoff, chairman of Governmental Operations, who wasn't a special friend 
of Muskie or vice versa, who said, according to this person who was there, 
``You know, there's something we have to recognize here. We don't like what 
Ed has done, and maybe we could have had some more notice.'' Of course, if 
they'd had notice, they'd have killed it. He said, ``But there is a thing 
in politics called `secondary identity,' in which people look at a 
politician, and they don't see the politician, they see his secondary 
identification. And in Ed Muskie's case, that is fiscal integrity. And I 
think we take on Ed on this one at our risk.''

That ended it. It quelled the rebellion. We [the Senate] passed the 
resolution with some grousing, mandating $4.2 billion [$3.6 billion in 
reconciliation savings]. . . . The House didn't want to take it. They 
fought us bitterly and said they wouldn't do it. In truth, the House wasn't 
prepared for what we had done and couldn't pass the Resolution [the 
conference report on the budget when] it contained reconciliation in that 
year. So we had to drop it in conference, but we warned we'd be back. The 
next year, we came back with something relatively the same size and passed 
it in both Houses.

Mr. Conway: Probably one of the early successes, from the Senate point of 
view, was basically forcing the House to accept reconciliation in the 
calendar year 1980 second budget resolution. Senator Hollings was the 
chairman. That was the first time that a full-blown reconciliation 
instruction on spending to both House and Senate Committees was included in 
the conference report on a budget resolution. There had been an earlier 
instance [FY1976 budget] of a reconciliation instruction that was before my 
time, but it was the one where there was a reconciliation instruction, and 
it was only to the Senate Finance Committee.

There was a great deal of resistance from the authorizing committees to 
that first reconciliation instruction [on the spending side] in 1980, but 
it was nothing compared to the resentment on the part of some committees to 
the reconciliation instruction in 1981 [in the FY1982 budget resolution].

Mr. Bell: In 1980, the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November, 
Minority Leader Howard Baker called me at 3 o'clock in the morning asking 
did I know where Senator Domenici was, and I said, ``Yes, sir,'' and he 
said that I better call him up because he was chairman of the Budget 
Committee. I tracked him down and told him, and like any sane person he was 
asleep and said, ``What?'' I said that Howard Baker just called me up and 
said that you were chairman of the Budget Committee. ``Now what are you 
going to do?'' He said, ``Hmm . . . gosh, I don't know. I have to think 
about that.''

[After the 1980 election], the two major questions were one, could 
Republicans govern, especially with . . . Ronald Reagan, now to the utter 
dismay of the Washington establishment in the White House, and two, this 
budget process, which . . . they really held down by putting it under the 
leadership of Senator Warren Magnuson, who was chairman of Appropriations, 
because the natural conflict which had to occur between the appropriations 
process and the budget process had been delayed in starting, so what was 
Domenici going to do with the budget process?

The year before we had taken a very important baby step on reconciliation, 
and I think that the first interview we gave was that the budget process 
has crawled, and it has walked, now it is time to run. Our main challenge, 
therefore, was not only could we govern, but could we carry out the mandate 
that people felt Republicans had after the 1980 elections. So, internally, 
there were some serious challenges.

People forget there was a reconciliation instruction in 1980, in the lame 
duck session, it passed. It was in the $8 billion range. That sounds tiny, 
but remember we were dealing with much smaller budgets back then. The fact 
that it was done, the fact that there was no serious parliamentary 
challenges to it . . . gave us the freedom. That was important, I can't 
stress how important a step that was because it was not challenged. . . .

You had the precedent. Reconciliation was in order; it was legal, signed 
into law by the President. It [expanding the reach of reconciliation] 
evolved from the underlying statute [the Congressional Budget Act]; it [the 
requirement to do reconciliation] did not emerge from the committees of 
jurisdiction. It emerged as an instruction from the Budget Committee. The 
fact that you [the Budget Committee] could do that meant that the only 
thing left to the Senate and House to decide was the extent of 
reconciliation. We had the foot in the door, and the next thing you know, 
the whole damn elephant was in there. So you should not underestimate the 
combination of that vote and our interpretation of what I call the elastic 
clause where it says, ``any other such actions to carry out the purpose of 
that Act'', never put that in a bill, let me give you some advice.



David Stockman, Director of the OMB, wanted to do the Reagan program as an 
amendment fully debatable on the debt ceiling extension. He had been a 
House Member, and so he did not really understand Senate procedure that 
well, especially when it came to such things as reconciliation and what I 
called the ``elastic clause'' in the 1974 Budget Act. It was the day before 
Christmas, in his office, I explained reconciliation to him and what I 
thought we could do. I pointed out that if we did what we wanted to do, it 
would be the most dramatic change in the way the Senate did business in 
about 150 years.

It was essentially truncating Rule XXII and expanding the restrictions on 
filibuster and debate and that he could expect that while nobody in the 
White House would care one damn way or the other, it would be a highly 
controversial time on the Hill. This is the subject of all sorts of books 
that have been written.

Senator Baker established that precedent on the floor with more than 50 
votes in the first half of 1981 which he won every one by 53 to 47 which 
was the majority that Republicans held in the Senate. When people write his 
biography and such [they] may overlook that, it was one of the great 
leadership feats in the 35 years I have been here--unprecedented and people 
just could not believe it.

In February, we had a reconciliation bill introduced by Senators Hollings 
and Domenici. By midyear, we were able to pass a budget resolution with 
reconciliation, second resolution later in the year, and by the end of the 
year, we had been able to establish in the Senate, not only a brand new way 
of doing business in the Senate, as far as deficits and spending, but it 
turned out because of the expanded use of reconciliation over the years, we 
were able to do most of the important changes and most of the important 
things that are happening in the Senate.

So we were in a situation in the 1980s where we were kind of the stepchild, 
where a bunch of guys had to impose in 1974 the Budget Act and the budget 
process on the Senate and the House, and where the Act was a peculiar 
amalgam of changes in the Senate rules and changes in statute law. . . . It 
was clear that unless we had the confrontation between the Budget Committee 
and the other committees, the budget process was not going to work the way 
that some of the original authors had intended.

Mr. Conway: The first time that reconciliation was used full bore was in 
1981, right after the Senate flipped. Senator Domenici became the new 
chairman of the Budget Committee. . . . The Senate Republicans wanted to 
demonstrate that they were there to make the changes that were part of the 
Reagan victory.

The Republicans were then in a position of saying, well, we've been calling 
President Carter weak on defense all this time, we have got to put an even 
bigger defense number in there. So they had 5 percent real growth in 
defense. To me, this was kind of a problem. It was like their politics got 
in the way, so they came up with a ridiculously large number for defense 
relative to what it had been. So they got a big change. They changed the 
slope on defense unbelievably, and part of that was driven purely by 
politics. They said, after the election, ``We can't say that we're no 
stronger on defense than the 3 percent real growth of Jimmy Carter.'' So 
that was the first step in going off the precipice of having far more 
spending than you could support with everything else.

The goal was, OK, well, what's a way that we can get a quick vote on 
spending priorities? So in 1981 they decided to do what became S. Con. Res. 
9, and it was a revision. It was revising the second budget resolution for 
fiscal year 1980 . . . , and it was all reconciliation [instructions]. . . 


So the Senate passed S. Con. Res. 9 and went back and did a complete full-
blown budget resolution, incorporated the decisions that had been in the 
reconciliation instructions of the first one and then proceeded ahead. The 
goal there was to get a marker out there and get the Members on the record 
of supporting reductions in nondefense spending.

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)

Mr. Stein: The fundamental contradiction in the Reagan agenda, and all 
Presidents have contradiction, this is not intended to be an attack on the 
Reagan administration, but the fundamental contradiction was that you could 
cut taxes and fund a military that was going to defeat the evil empire. I 
believe history will look back at it that way. Also, he did not live up to 
the domestic policy cuts that he hoped to achieve for a variety of reasons. 
When we took over, the budgetary consequences of that contradiction were 
self-evident. You had the big tax cuts. You had Senator Dole's efforts to 
kind of ameliorate them in I guess it would be 1983 that were somewhat 
effectual, but not effectual enough. Then you had the reaction to that, 
which really took the form of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.

Mr. Bell: In 1985, we kind of set in concrete the budget process and its 
ascendancy. We had something called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. With no 
disrespect to those three Senators, it was a strange idea. It essentially 
said the House and Senate can't do their business, or don't do it the way 
we like, and therefore we're going to penalize the House and Senate by some 
mechanistic measures if they don't behave the way we want them to behave. I 
was dead set against this, and I would see Senator Gramm and say, ``God 
Almighty!''

Fortunately, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was so contrary to the culture and the 
Constitution and whole flow of legislative history, the first thing we did 
was to ignore it. . . . I think any mechanistic approach in which you say 
if you don't do A, B, C by a time certain, then deus ex machina . . . some 
god will come down from the heavens, resolve the problem, and do for you 
what you cannot or will not do for yourself. I think that is absolutely, 
utterly going to fail. I think it is just such, at least in our tradition 
for the last 200-plus years, it is such a radical departure from the notion 
of participatory democracy and judgments that Senators and Congressmen are 
supposed to make and the free marketplace of ideas. . . .



All I wanted to do was put in the 60-vote point of order, make the 302(b)s 
mandatory, say no appropriation bill can come to the floor of the Senate 
without 302(b)s being filed. I wanted to institutionalize and put into 
concrete the supremacy of the budget process. Because nobody else cared, 
they all thought that it wasn't very sexy. . . .Sec. 

When it was done the chief clerk of the Appropriations Committee came to me 
and said, ``Is it true that these are all new, these are 60 vote points of 
order?'' And I said, ``They are.'' He asked, ``Well, did you check with the 
Appropriations Committee staff?'' I said, ``Well, I don't think I did.'' 
He's a personal friend of mine. We had a strained friendship for a while 
because of this. ``Well, what's going to happen?'' I said, ``Well, it's 
going to be signed into law, a new law, it's going to be 60-vote points of 
order since this is a hybrid bill that changes both the rules of the Senate 
and statutory law at the same time'' (except nobody but me, Sid Brown, and 
Senator Domenici probably realized that). ``That's the way we're going to 
do business from now on, and it's going to be 60 votes for most 
everything.'' That was the one positive outcome in my view of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings event, that we were able to change the rules of the Senate.

Mr. Hoagland: Once we established our credentials that we really had a role 
in formulating fiscal policy, then I think the next major challenge from a 
policy perspective really, as I think back on it, was when we passed that 
$2 trillion public debt figure, and now the process shifted from setting 
the blueprint, setting the goals, setting the direction, to one of actually 
forcing an outcome, and forcing an outcome through the mechanisms of Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings. The process changed, that was a pivotal point in the 
history of this Committee where you move from setting a goal to actually 
enforcing that goal. The result--process became an issue.

Post-GRH Budget Agreements

Mr. Dauster: The Gramm-Rudman era was one in which we had a deficit target 
that we all had to try and meet, but nobody in particular was responsible 
for the deficit. It was the function of exogenous economic variables as 
much as legislative action. So we felt that it was sometimes an irrational 
process. So to move away from Gramm-Rudman toward a system where particular 
actors would be responsible for their own actions was an important goal of 
that era. Some people criticized that as no-fault budgeting, but it's 
responsibility-for-what-you-can-control budgeting. And that was an 
important and hard-fought change.

1987 Agreements: Omnibus Reconciliation (OBRA) and Balanced Budget and 
Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act

Mr. Dauster: Chairman Lawton Chiles wanted to enforce fiscal 
responsibility. He was a fiscally conservative Democrat and believed that 
it was important to the credibility of the newly majority Democratic Party 
that we would be fiscally responsible as well and, therefore, thought it 
was important to make the Gramm-Rudman law work now that it had been ruled 
unconstitutional in the Synar v. Bowsher decision. So he set about trying 
to build that consensus, and Senator Domenici was a good participant in 
that, and Senator Gramm himself, too.



We did little changes to try and put our fingers in the dike and stop leaks 
of deficit-increasing actions. Along those lines, Rick Brandon [staff 
director] and Chairman Chiles had me write something to prevent sales of 
assets being counted as budget authority, because we didn't want to sell 
the garage in order to pay the mortgage. We tried to prevent shifting money 
from one time period to another. These are sort of little patches on the 
fabric of the budget process. Every time somebody would find a little 
gimmick, we would try to make it out of order and fix that, which added to 
the complexity of the business, but occasionally stopped a leak for a 
while.

1989 Agreement: OBRA

Mr. Hilley: President George H.W. Bush's first year in office was 1989, and 
his budget director was Dick Darman. They came in and were interested in 
trying to reach a bipartisan solution to the budget, trying to reduce the 
deficit and trying to hit the Gramm-Rudman targets that were in effect 
during that time. So our year started on a bipartisan note of a negotiation 
to reduce the deficit, by a very piddly amount, to tell the truth. As you 
recall, President George H.W. Bush won the Presidency in 1988 largely on 
the ``no new taxes'' pledge, and so when they came in, the budget agreement 
they were seeking on a bipartisan basis did not include taxes as a major 
component. That sort of doomed the effort to really take a large bite out 
of it in that particular year. In any case, there was a very bipartisan and 
quick agreement about reducing the deficit. Nineteen-eighty-nine was a year 
of bipartisanship, of positive, but meager accomplishment in terms of 
dealing with the deficit reduction problem, but the year came to be 
dominated in the end by the fight over capital gains tax reduction.



The year 1989 was the high point for the virtue of reconciliation, because 
that virtue came out of a political standoff. . . . In that particular 
year, there was a plug or number for $5.3 billion of revenue increases. Now 
that fit extremely well with President George H.W. Bush's desire for 
capital gains tax cuts because, they had a transparent and convoluted way 
to use the capital gains rate reduction to make the Treasury flush with 
revenue in the short term. Majority Leader Mitchell and the Democratic 
caucus were dead set against that though. . . . The Democratic leadership 
in both Houses strongly opposed the capital gains rate reduction because 
they saw it as a budget buster in the long run, and of course, given our 
theology, felt that it distributed benefits to the well-to-do. So that was 
the setting. Now, where reconciliation comes in is that Senator Dole, 
having lost in the Finance Committee, decided it would be a good idea to 
try and attach the capital gains tax cuts on the floor . . . to the 
reconciliation bill.

He had a majority of votes to do that because there were five or six 
Democratic Senators, who for various reasons decided capital gains tax cuts 
were appropriate. So that's where the issue of reconciliation came to the 
floor. The Democratic majority didn't have the votes to defeat on a 
straight up or down vote. The tack that we took, which I am proud to say I 
am the person that suggested this to Majority Leader Mitchell, was to strip 
the reconciliation bill of all extraneous provisions. So Mitchell went to 
the Senate floor and said listen, this reconciliation process has gotten 
out of hand in the sense that all the committees are now loading it up with 
not just stark budget savings but with all these extraneous provisions, 
let's return reconciliation process to its intended view or purpose and 
strip every extraneous provision. . . . We stripped literally hundreds of 
extraneous provisions out of the reconciliation bill. . . .

So we had the Byrd Rule which without it we were toast in terms of 
stripping the reconciliation bill and beating capital gains. . . . We had 
the votes, but our strategy, which I think was the right one, is rather 
than let the issue be capital gains . . . it was to subsume that issue 
under the broader one of reconciliation.

1990 Agreements: Budget Enforcement Act, Andrews Air Force Base Summit

Mr. Stein: The debate out at Andrews was largely partisan. You had Ranking 
Member Domenici really wanting to control entitlements. You had Chairman 
Sasser thinking that we were spending too much on defense. You had Senator 
Byrd adamantly feeling as though the nondefense discretionary portion of 
the budget was taking the biggest hit for no particular reason. Then you 
had a variety of people who really wanted to improve the process.

There were members and key staff. You have CBO Director Robert D. 
Reischauer down in the bowels of the thing, with his computer contingent 
that would crunch numbers. There were long days and nights. The meetings 
that everyone was going to were not the meetings where everything was 
happening. You would have Dick Darman, Director of the OMB, getting 
together with Senator Byrd, Darman getting together with Representative Dan 
Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Darman 
getting together with Senator Leon Panetta, chairman of the House Budget 
Committee, and that is where the real work was done.



The capital gains tax cut was what Senator Gingrich and the crowd wanted to 
do. Capital gains was where the Republican Party wanted to go. The belief 
was that if you cut capital gains the revenue influx and the stimulative 
effect would be such that it would essentially wash out all of the 
budgetary problems. So, those were kind of the four corners of the debate 
out there. Process was anything but subtle. We would find that we would 
debate entitlements. We would debate defense. We would debate tax cuts. And 
then, when everyone was too tired to do anything else, we would talk about 
the budget process. Curiously enough, I think it was the budget process 
improvements that had the most lasting effect.

What we did relative to GRH was to do some things that were real 
refinements and that actually ended up working. So, instead of having the 
appropriators take the hit for what the Finance Committee did, we had pay-
as-you-go, which was, I think, the most critical element of the whole 
endeavor. You had the separate caps.

 That [pay-as-you-go] to my mind, was the most significant accomplishment. 
It took what had been a crude macro approach to the mechanisms of control, 
refined those mechanisms and focused them specifically so that the 
committees that did something would get punished for doing it or rewarded 
for doing it. And that, I think, worked.

Mr. Dauster: The 1990 agreement was different because the budget process 
was consciously adapted to the agreement that we had reached on the 
substance. It was the Budget Enforcement Act. It was a process set up to 
enforce the agreement that we reached on the substance, and it was intended 
to be linked together. So there was a philosophy involved in linking the 
two and making them relate to each other.

It was a bipartisan deal. The essential parties, meaning no disrespect to 
congressional Republicans, were the President and the Democratic 
leadership. And it could not have been done without either of the two. And 
Darman, therefore, took on a great deal of authority in negotiating and 
would do some deals without full congressional Republican backing. I think 
that is, I guess, one reason why Senator Newt Gingrich felt the way that he 
did. And at the very end of the negotiations, Darman did some of the 
negotiating directly with Senator Byrd on how the appropriation process 
would work, and it was just the two of them working it out.

Mr. Hilley: Without the political leadership of President H.W. Bush [in 
1990], it would not have happened. He stood his ground and passed a $500 
billion 5-year deficit reduction agreement. He stood his ground even as his 
House Republican caucus split wide open, and Senator Newt Gingrich 
[minority whip] led a rebellion from the right and swept away the votes in 
the House to support it. The first time, they had to come back and then 
they passed it with largely Democratic votes. Senator Gingrich did not 
bring his guys back. A tremendous amount of credit belongs to George H.W. 
Bush. . . .

The dynamic was this--Darman was a smart man. Senators Domenici and Dole 
were smart guys, and everyone knew the score. We passed the budget 
resolution out of the Committee and Senator Leon Panetta, who was chairman 
of the House Budget Committee, was able to pass it out of his committee and 
across the floor, which was easier considering the votes--how the House 
works. We were demonstrating that we could move a budget resolution, and it 
was a very clear signal to the administration that we are on our own. It 
was 3 or 4 days after that Leaders Tom Foley, George Mitchell, and Dick 
Gephardt went to the White House for a meeting with the President and Dick 
Darman, and they agreed to this, quite transparent, at least according to 
the headlines, they agreed to this paragraph that said that everything was 
on the table--the need for entitlement reform and all of the legitimate 
things, but also enhanced revenues. That was code word that you would go 
along as part of an agreement and increase taxes.

1993 Agreement: OBRA

Mr. Hilley: Just as I want to credit George H.W. Bush with doing the right 
thing and taking a political slam, President Clinton and the Democrats did 
the right thing [in 1993, in terms of deficit reduction], but the timing 
was worse for the Congress . . . the health care meltdown and other issues 
were largely at play too. If you had to point to the number one event for 
the loss of the House and the Senate in 1994, it was the tax increase. I 
don't think that it could have been done in a bipartisan way. They did the 
right substantive thing, but paid an enormous political price for it.

Mr. Stein: The Clinton budget was probably much more, in a lot of ways, 
interesting than Andrews because it was the most partisan thing that had 
happened up in the Congress in my lifetime here. It was pretty amazing. You 
had Vice President Gore breaking a tie twice to get it passed. Every 
Democrat who looked at President Clinton's budget understood the political 
damage that it was going to do to them when they voted for it. . . .

That was the toughest thing I have ever worked on in my life, holding that 
together. It was extremely difficult. I was not in the room when it 
happened, but Senator Bob Kerrey could have sunk it and knew it. There were 
a variety of reasons that he did not. I think Senator Tom Daschle and 
Senator Harry Reid talked him out of it, for one thing, but it was Senator 
Byrd who really talked him out of it.



I am the only one who has this recollection, but it was about 3 o'clock in 
the morning after we passed the reconciliation bill, because the other one, 
when we passed it (not the conference report but the Senate version) was 
about 4 o'clock in the morning, but we got President Clinton on the phone. 
Vice President Gore was in there and had just made the tie breaking vote. 
Senator Mitchell, Chairman Sasser, and Senator Moynihan, who was not very 
helpful, and they got President Clinton on the line. I think the first 
thing out of his mouth was, ``I really appreciate this. I can govern now.'' 
Now, I am the only one who remembers it that way, but I am almost certain 
that he said that. I think he was right.



Chairman Sasser thought he was doing the right thing [voting for the 1993 
Clinton budget]. The electorate performed as expected. You stand up for 
principle, and they stand up and knock you down. I think the mythology 
became, or maybe it is not mythology, that the reason President Bush lost 
was that he violated his no new tax pledge. The whole class that came in 
subsequent to 1990 was steeped in that version of history, right or wrong. 
You had the belief that Democrats had more or less suborned Bush into 
violating his pledge. There was almost a continuous rising trend of 
bitterness between the two parties that really predated that.



We considered trying to find a way to use reconciliation to do the Clinton 
health plan. Chairman Sasser went over with Dauster [majority counsel] to 
talk to Senator Byrd about it. Byrd was initially interested and then said, 
flatly, ``No. It is a violation of the process. We will regret it. It will 
be misused later on.'' We folded up our tents and left. In reflection, I 
thought that was an act of courage on his part.

1997 Agreement: Balanced Budget Act

Mr. Stein: The way it was done was very artful, but what really happened is 
that you had divided government, and each side had its own interests that 
could be satisfied by a deal. President Clinton needed to be able to put 
his stamp on balancing the budget and so did Speaker Newt Gingrich and 
Leader Trent Lott, who were actually really good during that period. I 
mean, they were fun to work with. That may have been one bright, shining 
moment. . . .



There were three significant events, in terms of getting to a point of 
balance. . . . There was Andrews, which was more important for some of the 
process changes that it made than anything else. A lot of policy 
determinations were pretty crude. What we spend our time deliberatively 
considering was tossed out and revamped in the House after that agreement 
failed. Then there was the Clinton 1994 budget, which, in my judgment, 
probably carried the greatest weight, other than the macro economy, which 
was, obviously, the most important thing. Then the 1997 agreement, that 
people actually say, we might have gotten a balance without it. That is the 
way it looks in hindsight. All three of those things were extremely 
important.

Mr. Hoagland: The real success was the 1997 Balanced Budget Agreement with 
Chairman Domenici, Chairman Kasich, Senator Lautenberg, and Representative 
Spratt. The Balanced Budget Agreement was the major success of this 
Committee. When we were working with the Clinton administration and John 
Hilley, White House Legislative Director; Bob Rubin, Treasury Secretary; 
Franklin Raines, OMB Director; Jack Lew, OMB Deputy Director; Senator 
Lautenberg, the ranking member at the time; Bruce King, minority staff 
director; and myself, there was a free flow of information. We kept each 
other informed.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

Ms. McGuire: The relationship with CBO has always been excellent. Sometimes 
the Members do not like what CBO has to say, but they always respect them 
and almost without exception, feel that they are nonpartisan. Alice Rivlin 
was the first Director and worked hard to build good relationships with the 
Budget Committee and the leadership. She paved the way for CBO, and it is 
much the same as when she set it up long ago. People that were at the 
formative stage really thought it through and wanted to establish something 
that would be effective and last.

Mr. Bell: The Budget Act has worked in ways that most of its authors had 
not anticipated or envisioned. You know now you can't hide. If you bring a 
bill to the floor you have to get a CBO score. Then it goes to the Budget 
Committee chairman [to compare it to the budget resolution, and if it 
exceeds the budget resolution, any Member may raise a point of order 
against the bill]. Then the Parliamentarian tells the Presiding Officer 
this is a violation of the Budget Act. The guy in the chair says, ``Point 
of order, well founded.'' During the first reconciliation conference 
[1981], the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee was 
Representative Dan Rostenkowski. He decided he was going to break up this 
Budget Committee bill. So during the conference related to items of Finance 
and Ways and Means, Representative Rostenkowski turned to Senator Domenici 
and said ``You know, we don't agree with the CBO numbers.''

Sid Brown [chief of budget review] and I looked at each other, quizzically. 
Senator Domenici said ``Well, what do you mean?'' Representative 
Rostenkowski replied, ``Well this one should be $1 billion instead of $2 
billion.'' So he decided to use his own numbers. Senator Domenici replied 
``No, we use the numbers that CBO came out with because that's what the law 
says.'' Representative Rostenkowski replied, ``This isn't a matter of law 
this is a matter of convention. My numbers are just as good as CBO's, and I 
want to use mine, and I have the votes.'' Now remember this is Gramm-Latta 
so the Democrats had a majority in the House. They also held a huge 
majority in the conference because they stacked the deck. Senator Domenici 
said, ``You have the votes?'' Representative Rostenkowski replied, ``Why 
yes, I do.''

So Senator Domenici turned to me and said ``Would you go poll the Senate 
conferees tonight? Mr. Rostenkowski says he has the votes and that 
sufficiently worries me because I know the reputation of the gentleman from 
Illinois.'' That night I called up all of the conferees on the House and 
Senate side, both Republican and Democratic, to deliver the message. So the 
next day Domenici started off by saying ``I've asked all my conferees to be 
here to take a vote.''

At that point Representative Rostenkowski knew he messed with the wrong 
Italian. Domenici said, ``Last evening you made a motion as chairman of the 
conference, and today we are having a vote.'' He went down the line from 
the most junior to senior and all were on Senator Domenici's side. [Senator 
Domenici says] ``Now if you wish to make another offer that you can get 
your conferees to agree on, we could entertain it. Otherwise this subject 
is closed.''

Contemporary Budgeting

Mr. Hoagland: The globalization of the economy has changed our ability to 
impact fiscal policy . . . ; it seems to me you could almost track the 
history of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act with 
economic theory and globalization, and I think you would find that we're 
less certain about what decisions we make here, how that will impact 
inflation, employment, and growth, at least in the short term, than we used 
to be.

Early on we thought we were certain that if we reduced the deficit 
everything would be fine. That's not certain today, and as time has gone 
on, and it's lessened the impact of the decisions that we make here in this 
Committee, because people say, ``What do you care? We're in deficits. You 
got low interest rates. The economy's growing. Why do you care, Hoagland?'' 
And my fear with that, of course, is that's in the current time period, not 
looking into the future.

Mr. Marshall: I was sitting at my desk watching the Senate floor one 
morning, and the Homeland Security/Governmental Affairs Committee was 
considering a resolution to change their name to Homeland Security and grab 
all this authority from other committees. It just hit me like a lightning 
bolt, listening to Senator Collins [chairman of the Governmental Affairs 
Committee] speak, ``This is our opportunity!'' I immediately dialed Mary 
Naylor [minority staff director] and said (I don't even remember if I told 
any of my own staff), ``Let's go down and take back our jurisdiction.'' It 
was just bing, bam, boom, everybody decided, yeah, let's go do it.

 Frankly, to his credit, Ranking Member Conrad is the one who pulled that 
off for us in the end. Senators Voinovich and Collins were very much 
opposed to us. It was the one hook Senator Voinovich had to play in budget 
policy because he wasn't on the Budget Committee, and he didn't want to 
lose that venue.

They held our amendment over to have a vote the next morning, and Chairman 
Nickles had some other commitment, and he was not going to be able to 
arrive at the vote until after it had started. I knew that it was going to 
be critical that he and Ranking Member Conrad be in the well to grab 
Senators when they came down to explain it, because it wasn't the easiest 
thing for people to grasp. Most people had no idea that the Government 
Affairs Committee had this jurisdiction to start with.

Chairman Nickles got there late, and I sat and watched Members come in, and 
as the Republicans came in, Senators Voinovich or Collins would grab them 
and talk them into voting against our amendment. I was sitting there 
thinking we're going to lose this because we don't have anybody to work the 
well on our side. Meanwhile, on the other side, Senator Conrad was working 
his guys and because of the efforts he made, we passed the amendment.



That [the Iraq War] was one of the biggest things that dominated the budget 
process and the Committee's work in general. We were going through a big 
transition already due to the homeland security issue, and we had just 
created the new department. People were still trying to figure out how do 
you fund this new agency, how is it accounted for, and the horror of trying 
to figure out how are we going to compare spending to prior years? We all 
know a big thing for Chairman Nickles was, ``I want to be able to compare 
this year to last year.'' He didn't like the answer, ``We can't do that.'' 
Some people wanted to create a homeland security budget function. So we 
were already wrestling with that and its impact on the budget process, and 
we had big expenditures for that.



Many Members were frustrated over the years with the process of considering 
budget resolutions, the vote-a-ramas, with every amendment a set-up for a 
political ad. I absolutely have to give Eric Ueland, who's now chief of 
staff for the majority leader, who at that time was in the whip office with 
me, the credit for the idea of getting rid of precatory amendments on 
budget resolutions. We tried to do it by fiat, by just telling the 
Parliamentarian, ``Rule these out of order,'' and discovered that wouldn't 
work. There was eventually an amendment to the budget resolution on the 
floor.

It was an effort to try to influence what Senators can do on the floor. I 
think the reason why we've seen it [the prohibition of precatory 
amendments] be somewhat ineffective is because of the very basic nature of 
the Senate. It's very difficult to make Senators do something they don't 
want to do, or to change the basic nature of the Senate, which is unlimited 
debate, unlimited amendments. You can try and draw boxes around them, which 
the budget process does, but it's very hard to do. Efforts to both do away 
with vote-a-rama or come up with ways to curtail vote-a-rama or amendments 
which don't really have any meaning are worthwhile. I don't think that's a 
bad thing to try to do. You should never go into it thinking that you're 
going to be supremely successful, because people will find a way to get 
around it. There's too many clever staff that can use the basic rules of 
the Senate to get around it one way or the other.

What I think we discovered, even with all our frustration with those types 
of amendments and vote-a-rama, in 2004 working on the FY2005 resolution, 
was that a much more effective way to get at that is to do a better job of 
cooperating with your minority floor manager. We were able to do a 
resolution that year in a short period of time with no vote-a-rama and for 
the most part, most of the amendments being substantive, good amendments, 
because both Senator Nickles and Senator Conrad decided that they were 
going to actively manage the guys on their side of the aisle with the help 
of their leaders on both sides as well. They said let's get up priority 
amendments, let's not hang around here just staring at one another for 
hours. Let's start to get them up and get votes early in the process so 
that you don't wait until the last day and get them considered. So, you can 
try to create procedural ways to control the situation, or you can actively 
try and manage it better, and I think we found that year that managing it 
works better.

Reflections on the Budget Process and Committee Successes and Challenges

Mr. Hoagland: I have to be bold as to say, we survived, the Committee 
survived. It was not a given that this new, and I still refer to it as the 
``new congressional budget appropriation process,'' would make it. There 
had been efforts before that had failed. You've survived these many years, 
and you've established yourself, there is a raison d'etre, and we're still 
here and the fact that we haven't been disbanded is somewhat a success in 
and of itself for the Committee.

The successes of the Committee over the years have been that you have 
become a focal point. It's hard for any of us who weren't here before, to 
appreciate that legislation would come to the Senate floor, authorize, 
appropriate, who cared? There wasn't a good way to account for the various 
decisions. Today, at least, there is a recognition in the Congress that 
spending does matter or taxes do matter, that fiscal policy still has a 
basis in policy formulation.

We never were the popular Committee particularly when we started to use our 
tools of enforcement. That has made people recognize the importance and the 
consequences of the decision that they make. Whether they want to go ahead 
with it or not, that's their decision. They are the elected officials, and 
they can go ahead or not, but to me the big success is that we at least 
made it clear that their decisions do have consequences, governing is 
budgeting and budgeting is governing, and now it's an integral part of the 
process.

Mr. McEvoy: Nobody knew what the budget process was, and there was a 
considerable portion of the Senate, and even more so in the House, that 
profoundly distrusted it or didn't distrust it so much as they were worried 
about ceding their own power to it. As it was, they saw the potential for 
the budget process to become what it has, an instrumentality for the 
executive branch to implement its will through the budget process. Nobody 
dreamed of doing it through reconciliation then. It was more fear of kind 
of the House of Lords, that the Budget Committee majority would go on 
retreat with the President, and they'd decide between themselves what the 
priorities were going to be and then they'd come up and impose them on the 
Congress. The House dealt with that and their own institutional 
prerogatives by profoundly weakening the process over there by creating a 
two-term limit on the chair and on the Committee. That Committee turned 
over faster than a roulette wheel.

Mr. Dauster: The budget process, in its defense, must be described as 
complex, partly because it has developed like sediment, one layer upon 
another, never digging up the other layers. We had a simple budget process 
in 1816 when the Finance Committee did it, and then with the 
unfortunateness of 1867, half of the Finance Committee's jurisdiction was 
wrested away from it. There was this other Budget Committee formed, 
subsequently called the Appropriations Committee. And yet they kept the 
Finance Committee.

In the 1974 Act, they layered on again this thing that they didn't think 
would really get in their way, the Budget Committee, and the budget 
process, and left the Appropriations Committee and the Finance Committee. 
Notwithstanding our efforts, all these different layers are on there, so 
it's probably because of the history that it is as complex as it is.



I think there have been three eras in the budget process under the 
Congressional Budget Act. There was the period in which the process was one 
of budget neutrality between enactment of the Budget Act and 1981, and it's 
remarkable that they made it work. And there was a period from 1981 through 
1996 when there was a thumb on the scale toward deficit reduction, and I 
think that's necessary and useful. It was necessary in the initial instance 
because the Reagan tax cuts were so large, and we were not beginning to 
offset them as Reagan wanted us to, so we had to figure out a way to bring 
balance. Gramm-Rudman was a crude effort to do that, and I think that the 
Budget Enforcement Act was a more effective way of doing that. So it is 
useful to have structures that make it more difficult to cut taxes or spend 
money. Since 1996, we've had a system that's tilted toward tax cuts, that 
allows tax cuts but doesn't allow spending, and that's led to the fiscal 
results that we have.

So, I think that it's useful as well to structure reconciliation back the 
way that it was in the 1980s where it could only be used in one direction, 
toward deficit reduction. It's arguable whether it would be better not to 
have reconciliation at all because it does such violence to the basic idea 
of the Senate. I've played reconciliation from both sides, so I can make 
the argument either way. The question then is: is the fiscal policy of the 
Nation so important that we want to ensure that it happens to the exclusion 
of other values that the Senate maintains, values of deliberative process? 
And I'm not sure that fiscal policy is that important. One could make the 
argument, for example, that national security policy is just as important; 
why don't we do national security policy through fast-track mechanisms as 
opposed to fully debating defense bills?

In the end, we have a question of how responsive a government we want. Do 
we want a responsive government that can react quickly and change with the 
times, but change dramatically with the times? In which case you want to 
empower the reconciliation process and leave it as it is . . . or do we 
want to constrain these processes so that we force consensus more and have 
a less responsive government and have more checks on what the government is 
doing? Having done both sides, I've come to view the deliberative process 
as the more important goal. If I were to do it all over, I'd try to find 
ways to constrain the ability of the Senate to use reconciliation wherever 
possible. And so my recommendation would be to expand the Byrd rule.

Ms. McGuire: The Budget Committee still thinks that it is the outsider. The 
other committees still have not accepted the budget process or the Budget 
Committee's role in that process, as hard as we have tried. I don't think 
that the budget process has been integrated into the other congressional 
processes as it should be. That has been resisted by the Members. As I told 
Scott Gudes when he became the staff director of the Budget Committee [in 
2005], ``Congratulations on your appointment. Now you will know what it is 
like to be loved and hated. When you were an appropriator you were loved 
when you said yes and hated when you said no. Now you will just be hated 
because you will always have to say no.''

It is not the most fun Committee to be on because generally you have to 
keep people on the straight and narrow, and they resent that. It is 
uncomfortable for them. At times, the Committee is seen as the skunk at the 
garden party. Often we don't have the most positive message that people 
want to hear, so it is hard to integrate the Budget Committee fully into 
the other congressional processes. The other would be just the fact that it 
is hard to make the public policy stands sometimes. Even though most of the 
chairmen have been willing to go out and wage the good fight, oftentimes 
they come back bruised and bloodied. It is a function of the way that 
Congress works. The good news is that we have always had chairmen who are 
willing to wage the good fight.

Mr. Hoagland: . . . somehow I might have allowed the reconciliation process 
to become something much greater than what we had initially planned it to 
be, that it has become, particularly in a divided Senate, the tool, the 
preferred tool for legislating, which I think is not what it was intended 
to be; and failure, yes, that I still believe that reconciliation, even 
though I'm sure I will be judged harshly on this, that reconciliation 
should be used only for deficit reduction. . . .

Why isn't reconciliation used only for deficit reduction? Well, if it's for 
deficit reduction, why do you have those tax cuts? Don't get me wrong, I do 
not believe the answer to our long-term fiscal challenges is to simply 
increase taxes, but I think you end up making it harder to formulate that 
consensus with the non-tax committees. ``Why should I cut agriculture 
programs if you guys are going to go over there and reduce taxes for 
millionaires?'' And whether the rhetoric is right or wrong, I think it's 
difficult to formulate broad-based consensus.

Mr. Marshall: The Committee allocations are the heart and soul of a 
resolution, and if the Budget Committee, working in cooperation and with 
the other committees, can come up with realistic committee allocations and 
then aggressively enforce them, that's all you need.

I've become disenchanted over the many years I've watched the process 
evolve with anything that tries to say, you can't do this no matter what, 
which is why I don't really like the old-style paygo. If the Members of 
Congress agree that we're going to do something like a Medicare drug 
benefit or we all agree in the budget resolution that we're going to cut 
taxes, then I hate having an arbitrary rule that says, despite the fact 
that you agree to that, you have to have a super majority. I would rather 
just see more involvement in the beginning of the budget process and, 
again, all the other committees being involved to write a budget and then 
live with it. Let the process of writing that budget involve all your 
fights about what you're going to do, how much you're going to do, but then 
once you agree on something, that's it. Hardcore enforcement above that and 
live with it.

Most of the other process things that we dream up are just duplicative 
often of the committee allocations. You don't really need three different 
points of order to enforce the same thing. They're either duplicative of 
it, or they are ways to try to keep people from gaming the system. We now 
have whole titles of the budget resolution dedicated to shutting down games 
the appropriators have dreamed up year in and year out to get around their 
committee allocation.

The other thing I would mention is Section 306 of the Budget Act. We are 
the only committee in the Senate that has a point of order protecting our 
jurisdiction, and that is critical. If somebody ever tries to get rid of 
that or that ever goes away, that would likely be the death of the Budget 
Committee because, we have a unique role as the enforcer over the other 
committees, and if they ever get a chance to change our underlying rules 
themselves willy-nilly, anytime they want to on the floor, we're toast. . . 
. So Sections 302 and 306, that's all you need. Get rid of all the rest of 
it.



Even people who live the budget process for years and years can still, on 
an almost daily basis, have brand new issues come up about its 
interpretation that nobody ever thought of before and that require 
extensive discussions with the Parliamentarians and with the majority and 
minority and the other body. So it is a constantly evolving thing.

It's very difficult when everybody has their interpretation that fits what 
they want to do. The Parliamentarians are the ones who have to be the 
referees and say, ``Well, you can do this'' or ``You can't do that.'' 
Sometimes they make you happy when they agree with you, and sometimes they 
make you very mad when they do not. And you most often remember the times 
that they made you mad, but it's a job that you couldn't pay me enough to 
do. I wouldn't want to have to make those calls.

Mr. Bell: The most important thing we ever did was to make sure that you 
could not amend the Budget Act on the floor of the U.S. Senate unless it 
was in response to something that had been reported out of the Budget 
Committee. As long as the Committee understood its fragile history and its 
fragile existence, then we would be in good shape.

Mr. Hilley: The saddest thing that we did not do [as part of the 1997 
Balanced Budget Act] was to only extend the paygo and the caps for 5 years 
instead of 10. . . . If there is one thing that I would suggest . . . [it] 
would be to reinstate paygo and the caps [on discretionary spending]. If we 
ever get to a bipartisan agreement again, those should be set in stone. 
They can't fill the hole, but they can keep it from getting bigger. That is 
something that the  Budget  Committee  on  a  bipartisan  basis  should  be 
 in  favor of . . . .



The other problem is that reconciliation has lost its true sense which is 
to go back to the days where it was really for deficit reduction rather 
than the train for everything else that people want to do. . . . It is very 
disruptive to the institution at large.

Mr. Hoagland: One of those images that will always stick in my mind, the 
image I want to retain about this institution when I leave is we were on 
the floor late one night, one of those typical 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock in the 
mornings, in the early days, Senator Dole didn't have any problem going all 
night. Coming down those elevators, nobody else was around, I was leaving 
by myself. As I came down the elevators and getting to the escalators to 
get onto the tram, there were two elderly Senators in front of me, Senator 
Helms and Senator Pell, about as far apart politically as anyone could be 
on the political spectrum. They were both having difficulty walking, and 
Senator Helms was helping Senator Pell, with his arm around him, to get 
onto the tram. I thought to myself, you know, he didn't have to do that. He 
didn't have to do it for the public. He didn't know I was behind them. But 
it's that kind of image I want to retain, that despite the political 
differences, they're still human beings, and they respected one another, as 
human beings.
                 Listing of Chairmen and Ranking Members

(Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

                             CHAIRMAN

Edmund S. Muskie, Maine                  July 25, 1974-May 7, 1980 \1\
Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina       May 13, 1980-January 5, 1981 \1\
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 5, 1981-January 6, 1987
Lawton Chiles, Florida                   January 6, 1987-January 3, 1989
Jim Sasser, Tennessee                    February 2, 1989-January 4, 1995
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 6, 1995-January 3, 2001
Kent Conrad, North Dakota                January 3, 2001-January 20, 2001 \2\
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 20, 2001-June 6, 2001 \2\
Kent Conrad, North Dakota                June 6, 2001-January 15, 2003 \2\
Don Nickles, Oklahoma                    January 15, 2003-January 4, 2005
Judd Gregg, New Hampshire                January 6, 2005-January 4, 2007


                         RANKING MEMBER

Peter H. Dominick, Colorado              August 7, 1974-January 14, 1975
Henry Bellmon, Oklahoma                  January 23, 1975-January 5, 1981
Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina       January 5, 1981-January 3, 1983
Lawton Chiles, Florida                   January 3, 1983-January 6, 1987
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 6, 1987-January 6, 1995
J. James Exon, Nebraska                  January 6, 1995-January 7, 1997
Frank R. Lautenberg, New Jersey          January 9, 1997-January 3, 2001
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 3, 2001-January 20, 2001 \2\
Kent Conrad, North Dakota                January 20, 2001-June 6, 2001 \2\
Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             June 6, 2001-January 15, 2003 \2\
Kent Conrad, North Dakota                January 15, 2003-January 4, 2007

\1\ Senator Muskie resigned on May 7, 1980, to become Secretary of 
State. Pursuant to S. Res. 429, adopted by the Senate on May 13, 1980, 
Senator Hollings became chair.
\2\ From the convening of the 107th Congress on January 3, 2001, until 
the inauguration of President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard 
B. Cheney 17 days later on January 20, the Senate was evenly divided 
between the two parties (with 50 Democratic and 50 Republican Senators). 
Democrats held the majority, however, due to the deciding vote of 
outgoing Democratic Vice President Albert Gore. During this period, 
Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman and Senator Pete V. Domenici 
served as ranking member of the Budget Committee. Beginning on January 
20, the evenly-divided Senate came under the control of the Republican 
Party due to the deciding vote of Vice President Cheney. Accordingly, 
the Committee leadership positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici were 
reversed, effective with Committee assignments announced on January 25. 
On May 24, 2001, Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont switched his party 
affiliation from Republican to Independent and began to caucus with the 
Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. At that point, the 50 Democratic 
Senators, plus Senator Jeffords, held a 51 to 49 advantage over the 
Republicans, and the positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici were 
reversed again, effective with Committee assignments announced on July 
10. Senator Conrad served as chairman and Senator Domenici served as 
ranking member for the remainder of the 107th Congress.

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.002


                            EDMUND S. MUSKIE

                                of Maine

                                Chairman


               Biographies of Chairmen and Ranking Members


                            EDMUND S. MUSKIE

  A Democrat from Maine, Edmund Sixtus Muskie was the Committee's first 
chairman, serving from July 25, 1974 to May 7, 1980, when he was 
appointed Secretary of State.

  Born in Rumford, ME, on March 28, 1914, Muskie attended public school 
and graduated from Bates College, ME, in 1936, and Cornell University 
Law School, NY, in 1939. Admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1939 and 
the Maine bar in 1940, Muskie commenced law practice in Waterville, ME. 
During the Second World War, Muskie enlisted in the U.S. Navy and served 
in the Atlantic and Asiatic-Pacific Theaters from 1942 to 1945. Elected 
to the Maine House of Representatives in 1946, 1948, and 1950, Muskie 
was the Democratic floor leader from 1949 through 1951. In 1954, he was 
elected Governor of the heavily Republican State and served until 1959.

  In 1958, Muskie was the first Democrat elected to the U.S. Senate by 
Maine voters. He was reelected in 1964, 1970, and 1976, and served from 
January 3, 1959 until his resignation on May 7, 1980 to enter the 
Cabinet of President Jimmy Carter as Secretary of State. Muskie, an 
environmentalist and sponsor of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts of 
the 1970s, gained national prominence in 1968 when he ran as the 
unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Vice President of the United 
States. In 1972, he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic 
Presidential nomination. Awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom on 
January 16, 1981, Muskie was a member of the President's Special Review 
Board (known as the Tower Commission) that investigated the Iran-Contra 
scandal in 1987. He practiced law while a resident of Washington, DC, 
until his death on March 26, 1996. He is interred at Arlington National 
Cemetery in Virginia.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.001
  

                            PETER H. DOMINICK

                               of Colorado

                             Ranking Member



                            PETER H. DOMINICK

  Peter Hoyt Dominick, a Republican from Colorado, served as the first 
ranking member from August 7, 1974 to January 14, 1975.

  Born in Stamford, CT, on July 7, 1915, Dominick, the nephew of former 
Senator Howard Alexander Smith, attended public schools and graduated 
from St. Mark's School in 1933, Yale University in 1937, and Yale Law 
School in 1940. During the Second World War, Dominick entered the Army 
Air Corps as an aviation cadet and served until 1945 when discharged as 
a captain. He engaged in law practice in New York City from 1940 to 
1942, and 1946, and in Denver, CO, from 1946 to 1961. Dominick served as 
a member of the Colorado House of Representatives from 1957 to 1961 and 
the National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, 
and Cultural Organization from 1960 to 1961.

  Elected U.S. Representative in 1960, Dominick served from 1961 to 1963 
and was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1962. Reelected in 1968, Dominick 
served from 1963 to 1975 and was an unsuccessful candidate for 
reelection in 1974. In 1975, Dominick served as Ambassador Extraordinary 
and Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. A resident of Cherry Hills, CO, 
until his death in Hobe Sound, FL, March 18, 1981, Dominick is interred 
in Fairmount Cemetery, Denver, CO.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.017
  

                              HENRY BELLMON

                               of Oklahoma

                             Ranking Member



                              HENRY BELLMON

  Henry Louis Bellmon, a Republican from Oklahoma, served as ranking 
member during his entire service on the Committee, from January 23, 1975 
to January 5, 1981.

  Born on a farm near Tonkawa, OK, on September 3, 1921, Bellmon 
attended Noble County public schools and graduated from Oklahoma State 
University and then Oklahoma A&M College in 1942. A farmer and rancher, 
Bellmon served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942 to 1946 and the 
Oklahoma House of Representatives from 1946 to 1948. The State 
Republican chairman in 1960, Bellmon was elected Oklahoma's first 
Republican Governor in 1962 and served from 1963 to 1967. While in 
office, Bellmon was chairman of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission 
and a member of the executive committee of the National Governors 
Conference.

  Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1968 and reelected in 1974, Bellmon 
served from January 3, 1969 to January 5, 1981, and was not a candidate 
for reelection in 1980. Cofounder and cochairman of the Committee for a 
Responsible Federal Budget, Bellmon was appointed director of the 
Oklahoma Department of Human Services in 1983 and elected Governor of 
Oklahoma for a second time in 1986. He is a resident of Red Rock, OK.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.016
  

                           ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

                            of South Carolina

                       Chairman and Ranking Member



                           ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

  A Democrat from South Carolina, Ernest Frederick ``Fritz'' Hollings 
served as chairman from May 13, 1980 to January 5, 1981 and ranking 
member from January 5, 1981 to January 3, 1983. A member for 30 years, 
from 1974 to 2005, Hollings has the second longest term of Committee 
service.

  Born in Charleston, SC, on January 1, 1922, Hollings attended the 
public schools of Charleston, and graduated from The Citadel in 1942, 
and the University of South Carolina Law School in 1947. Hollings was 
admitted to the bar in 1947 and commenced law practice in Charleston. He 
served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945 and was elected to the South 
Carolina General Assembly in 1948, 1950, and 1952. In 1954, Hollings was 
elected Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, and in 1958 he was 
elected Governor, serving from 1959 to 1963.

  A Presidential appointee to several Federal commissions, Hollings was 
elected in a special election on November 8, 1966, to the U.S. Senate to 
complete the remaining term of Olin D. Johnston. Reelected in 1968, 
1974, 1980, 1986, 1992, and 1998, serving from November 9, 1966 to 
January 3, 2005, Hollings chaired the Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation for the 100th through 103rd and 107th (January 3-20, 
2001; June 6, 2001-January 3, 2003) Congresses. Serving for 37 years, 
the seventh longest term of service in the Senate, Hollings was a fiscal 
conservative, and one of the namesakes for the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act, an attempt to bring the Federal budget deficit under control. An 
unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination for President of 
the United States in 1984, Hollings was not a candidate for reelection 
to the Senate in 2004.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.018
  

                            PETE V. DOMENICI

                              of New Mexico

                       Chairman and Ranking Member



                            PETE V. DOMENICI

  A Republican from New Mexico, Pete Vichi Domenici has the distinction 
of holding the record for the longest service in all positions on the 
Committee. Domenici served as chairman from 1981 to 1987 and from 1995 
to 2001,\1\ ranking member from 1987 to 1995 and 2001 \1\ to 2003, and 
member for 31 years, serving from 1975 to the present.

  Born in Albuquerque, NM, on May 7, 1932, Domenici graduated from the 
University of New Mexico in 1954 and the University of Denver Law School 
in 1958. Admitted to the New Mexico bar in 1958, Domenici commenced 
practice in Albuquerque and was elected to the Albuquerque City 
Commission in 1966 and chairman (ex-officio mayor) in 1967.

  After an unsuccessful bid for Governor in 1970, Domenici was elected 
to the U.S. Senate in 1972, the first New Mexico Republican to be 
elected to the position in 38 years. Reelected in 1978, 1984, 1990, 
1996, and again in 2002 for the term ending January 3, 2009, Domenici 
has served longer than any other New Mexican Senator in history and is 
currently ranked fifth in seniority in the Senate and is second among 
Republican Senators. An expert on budget and energy matters, Domenici 
has served as chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources 
for the 108th and 109th Congresses and chairman of the Energy and Water 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations for the 104th through 
109th Congresses.

   \1\ In 2001, Senator Domenici served as ranking member from January 
3, 2001 to January 25, 2001 and from July 10, 2001 on (through the end 
of the 107th Congress), and served as chairman from January 25, 2001 to 
July 10, 2001.
                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.028
  

                              LAWTON CHILES

                               of Florida

                       Chairman and Ranking Member



                              LAWTON CHILES

  A Democrat from Florida, Lawton Mainor Chiles, Jr. served as chairman 
from January 6, 1987 to January 3, 1989, when he retired from the 
Senate. A member of the Committee for 15 years, beginning in 1974, 
Chiles also served as ranking member from 1983 to 1987.

  Born in Lakeland, FL, on April 3, 1930, Chiles attended public schools 
and graduated from the University of Florida in 1952 and from the law 
school of the same university in 1955. Chiles served in the U.S. Army as 
an artillery officer during the Korean conflict from 1953 to 1954, and 
was later admitted to the Florida bar and commenced practice in Lakeland 
in 1955. A businessman, banker, and industrial developer, Chiles served 
as a member of the Florida House of Representatives from 1958 to 1966, 
the Florida State Senate from 1966 to 1970, and was chairman of the 
Florida Law Revision Commission from 1968 to 1970.

  With strong grassroots popularity, Chiles was elected to the U.S. 
Senate in 1970, reelected in 1976, and again in 1982 for the term ending 
January 3, 1989. He was not a candidate for reelection in 1988. A health 
care and children's advocate, Chiles served as chairman of the Special 
Committee on Aging from 1979 to 1980, and was elected Governor of 
Florida in 1990 and reelected in 1994; he was not a candidate for 
reelection in 1998. A resident of Tallahassee, FL, until his death on 
December 12, 1998, Chiles is interred in Roselawn Cemetery, Tallahassee, 
FL.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.026
  

                               JIM SASSER

                              of Tennessee

                                Chairman



                               JIM SASSER

  James Ralph Sasser, a Democrat from Tennessee, served as chairman of 
the Committee from February 2, 1989 to January 4, 1995 and was a member 
for 18 years, from 1977 to 1995.

  Born in Memphis, TN, on September 30, 1936, Sasser attended the public 
schools of Nashville, the University of Tennessee from 1954 to 1955, and 
graduated from Vanderbilt University in 1958 and Vanderbilt Law School 
in 1961. Admitted to the Tennessee bar in 1961 and commenced practice in 
Nashville, Sasser served in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve from 1957 to 
1963.

  In 1976, Sasser was elected to the U.S. Senate and reelected in 1982 
and 1988, serving from January 3, 1977 to January 3, 1995. He was an 
unsuccessful candidate for reelection in 1994.

  A fellow at the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, 1995, Sasser was appointed Ambassador to 
the People's Republic of China by President William Jefferson Clinton 
and served from 1996 to 2001.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.019
  

                              J. JAMES EXON

                               of Nebraska

                             Ranking Member



                              J. JAMES EXON

  J. James Exon, a Democrat from Nebraska, served as ranking member from 
1995 to 1997 and member for 18 years, from 1979 to 1997, when he retired 
from the Senate.

  Born in Geddes, SD, on August 9, 1921, Exon attended the public 
schools and the University of Omaha, NE, from 1939 to 1941. Exon served 
in the U.S. Army Signal Corps from 1942 to 1945, and the U.S. Army 
Reserve from 1945 to 1949. A branch manager of a financial corporation, 
Exon founded an office equipment firm and served as president from 1953 
to 1971. In 1964, Exon was delegate to the Democratic National 
Convention and served every year through 2004. Exon was chair of the 
Nebraska Democratic Party when he was elected Governor in 1971, a 
position he held until 1979.

  In 1978, Exon was elected to the U.S. Senate and then reelected in 
1984 and 1990, serving until his retirement in January 1997. After 
retirement, Exon served on a committee established by Congress to study 
the threat of weapons of mass destruction. A resident of Lincoln, NE, 
until his death on June 10, 2005, Exon is interred in Wyuka Cemetery, 
Lincoln, NE.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.048
  

                           FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

                              of New Jersey

                             Ranking Member



                           FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

  Frank Raleigh Lautenberg, a Democrat from New Jersey, served as 
ranking member from January 9, 1997 to January 3, 2001 and member for 16 
years, from 1985 to 2001.

  Born in Paterson, NJ, on January 23, 1924, Lautenberg graduated from 
the Columbia University School of Business, NY, in 1949 and served in 
the U.S. Army Signal Corps from 1942 to 1946. Cofounder of the Nation's 
first payroll company and commissioner of the Port Authority of New York 
and New Jersey from 1978 to 1982, Lautenberg was elected to the U.S. 
Senate in 1982. In December 1982, he was appointed by the Governor to 
complete the unexpired term of Nicholas F. Brady. Lautenberg was 
reelected in 1988 and 1994 and served from December 27, 1982 to January 
3, 2001, and chose not to run for reelection in 2000. Lautenberg was 
again elected to the U.S. Senate in 2002 for the term ending January 3, 
2009.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.027
  

                               KENT CONRAD

                             of North Dakota

                       Chairman and Ranking Member



                               KENT CONRAD

  A Democrat from North Dakota, Kent Conrad served as chairman for the 
107th Congress \1\ and ranking member for the 108th and 109th 
Congresses. He joined the Committee in 1987.

  Born in Bismarck, ND, on March 12, 1948, Conrad attended the public 
schools of Bismarck, high school in Tripoli, Libya, the University of 
Missouri, Columbia, 1967, and graduated from Stanford University in 1971 
and George Washington University's School of Business in 1975. Conrad 
served as an assistant to the North Dakota tax commissioner from 1974 to 
1980, and then won his first statewide race for tax commissioner in 
1980, serving from 1981 to 1986, when he was elected to the U.S. Senate 
for the term ending January 3, 1993. Conrad was not a candidate for 
reelection in 1992, but was elected in a special election on December 4, 
1992, to the unexpired portion of the term ending January 4, 1995, left 
vacant by the death of Quentin N. Burdick. Conrad was reelected in 1994, 
2000, and again in 2006 for the term ending January 3, 2013.

   \1\ In 2001, Senator Conrad served as chairman from January 3, 2001 
to January 25, 2001 and from July 10, 2001 on (through the end of the 
107th Congress), and served as ranking member from January 25, 2001 to 
July 10, 2001.
                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.014
  

                               DON NICKLES

                               of Oklahoma

                                Chairman



                               DON NICKLES

  A Republican from Oklahoma, Donald Lee Nickles served as chairman for 
2003 and 2004 and member for 18 years, from 1987 to 2005.

  Born in Ponca City, OK, on December 6, 1948, Nickles attended public 
schools, graduated from Oklahoma State University in Stillwater in 1971 
and served in the National Guard from 1970 to 1976. A machine company 
executive and member of the Oklahoma State Senate from 1979 to 1980, 
when at age 31, he was the youngest Republican ever elected to the U.S. 
Senate. Reelected in 1986, 1992, and 1998, and serving from January 3, 
1981 to January 3, 2005, Nickles was not a candidate for reelection in 
2004. Nickles quickly rose in the Senate Republican leadership and 
served as the Republican whip from June 1996 until December 31, 2002; 
chair of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, 101st Congress; 
and the Republican Policy Committee from the 102nd to 104th Congresses. 
Upon retirement from the Senate, Nickles founded The Nickles Group, a 
consulting firm.

                                                                    


    
  [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.047
  

                               JUDD GREGG

                            of New Hampshire

                                Chairman



                               JUDD GREGG

  Judd Alan Gregg, a Republican from New Hampshire, served as chairman 
for the 109th Congress. He joined the Committee in 1993.

  Born in Nashua, NH, on February 14, 1947, Gregg attended public 
schools and graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy, NH, in 1965, 
Columbia University in 1969, and earned a J.D. degree in 1972 and an 
LL.M. in 1975 respectively from Boston University. Admitted to the New 
Hampshire bar in 1972, Gregg commenced practice in Nashua and served as 
a member of the Governor's executive council from 1978 to 1980.

  In 1980, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and 
served four terms from 1981 to 1989. Gregg was elected Governor of New 
Hampshire for two terms serving from 1989 through 1992 when he was 
elected to the U.S. Senate. Reelected in 1998 and in 2004 for the term 
ending January 3, 2011, Gregg served as chairman of the Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions for the 108th Congress and 
chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security for the 
109th Congress.
   Committee Members Who Have Served in Other Elective or Appointive 
                                Positions

(Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)





                             VICE PRESIDENTS

Walter F. Mondale, Minnesota....  Vice President to   1977-1981
                                   Jimmy Carter.
Dan Quayle, Indiana.............  Vice President to   1989-1993
                                   George H.W. Bush.


                                GOVERNORS

Lamar Alexander.................  Governor of         1979-1987
                                   Tennessee.
Wendell R. Anderson.............  Governor of         1971-1976
                                   Minnesota.
Henry Bellmon...................  Governor of         1987-1991
                                   Oklahoma.
Christopher S. Bond.............  Governor of         1973-1977 and 1980-
                                   Missouri.           1985
John H. Chafee..................  Governor of Rhode   1963-1969
                                   Island.
Lawton Chiles...................  Governor of         1990-1998
                                   Florida.
Jon Corzine.....................  Governor of New     2006-
                                   Jersey.
J. James Exon...................  Governor of         1971-1979
                                   Nebraska.
Paul J. Fannin..................  Governor of         1958-1964
                                   Arizona.
Judd Gregg......................  Governor of New     1989-1992
                                   Hampshire.
Ernest F. Hollings..............  Governor of South   1959-1963
                                   Carolina.
Edmund S. Muskie................  Governor of Maine.  1955-1959
Charles S. Robb.................  Governor of         1982-1986
                                   Virginia.
Terry Sanford...................  Governor of North   1961-1965
                                   Carolina.


                           CABINET SECRETARIES

Lamar Alexander, Tennessee......  Secretary of        1991-1993
                                   Education.
Spencer Abraham, Michigan.......  Secretary of        2001-2004
                                   Energy.
Edmund S. Muskie, Maine.........  Secretary of State  1980-1981


                               AMBASSADORS

John C. Danforth, Missouri......  Ambassador to       2004-2005
                                   United Nations.
Peter H. Dominick, Colorado.....  Ambassador          1975
                                   Extraordinary and
                                   Plenipotentiary
                                   to Switzerland.
Wyche Fowler, Jr., Georgia......  Ambassador to       1996-2001
                                   Saudi Arabia.
Walter F. Mondale, Minnesota....  Ambassador          1993-1996
                                   Extraordinary and
                                   Plenipotentiary
                                   to Japan.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan,          Ambassador to       1973-1975
  New York......................   India.             1975-1976
                                  United States
                                   Permanent
                                   Representative to
                                   the United
                                   Nations.
Jim Sasser, Tennessee...........  Ambassador to the   1995-2001
                                   People's Republic
                                   of China.


                              FIRST LADIES

Hillary Rodham Clinton,           First Lady of the   1993-2001
  New York......................   United States.
Hillary Rodham Clinton,           First Lady of       1979-1981 and 1983-
  New York......................   Arkansas.           1993


                  SENATE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADERS

Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia...  Majority Leader...  1977-1980 and 1987-
                                  Minority Leader...   1988
                                                      1981-1986
Robert J. Dole, Kansas..........  Majority Leader...  1985-1987 and 1995-
                                                       1996
                                  Minority Leader...  1987-1995
William H. Frist, Tennessee.....  Majority Leader...  2003-2006
Trent Lott, Mississippi.........  Majority Leader...  1996-January 3,
                                                       2001 and
                                                        January 20, 2001-

                                                        June 6, 2001
                                  Minority Leader...  January 3, 2001-
                                                       January 20, 2001
                                                       and
                                                        June 6, 2001-
                                                        January 6, 2003
George J. Mitchell, Maine.......  Majority Leader...  1989-1995


                 Membership of the Committee by Congress

Created as a standing committee on July 12, 1974.

(Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

Second Session--January 21, 1974-December 20, 1974

Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie

Majority
S. Res. 367 (July 25, 1974)
  
Warren G. Magnuson
Frank E. Moss
Walter F. Mondale
Ernest F. Hollings
Alan Cranston
Lawton Chiles
James G. Abourezk
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

Minority
S. Res. 378 (August 7, 1974)
  
Peter H. Dominick (Ranking Member)
Milton R. Young
Roman L. Hruska
Jacob K. Javits
Paul J. Fannin
Robert J. Dole

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 14, 1975-December 19, 1975

Second Session--January 19, 1976-October 1, 1976

Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie

Majority
S. Res. 18 (January 17, 1975)
  
Warren G. Magnuson
Frank E. Moss
Walter F. Mondale \1\
Ernest F. Hollings
Alan Cranston
Lawton Chiles
James G. Abourezk
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Sam Nunn

Minority
S. Res. 24 (January 23, 1975)
  
Henry Bellmon (Ranking Member)
Robert J. Dole
J. Glenn Beall, Jr.
James L. Buckley (Conservative Party)
James A. McClure
Pete V. Domenici

\1\ Senator Mondale resigned on December 30, 1976, to become Vice 
President.

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 4, 1977-December 15, 1977

Second Session--January 19, 1978-October 15, 1978

Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie

Majority
S. Res. 20 (January 10, 1977)
  
Warren G. Magnuson
Ernest F. Hollings
Alan Cranston
Lawton Chiles
James G. Abourezk
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
Sam Nunn \1\
Wendell R. Anderson \2\
Daniel Patrick Moynihan 1, 2
J. Bennett Johnston \1\
Jim Sasser \1\

Minority
S. Res. 21 (January 10, 1977)
  
Henry Bellmon (Ranking Member)
Robert J. Dole
James A. McClure
Pete V. Domenici
John H. Chafee \3\
Richard G. Lugar \3\
Samuel I. Hayakawa \3\
H. John Heinz III \3\

\1\ Pursuant to S. Res. 84, adopted by the Senate on February 11, 1977, 
Senators Johnston and Sasser joined the Committee, and Senators Nunn and 
Moynihan left the Committee.
\2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 29, adopted by the Senate on January 11, 1977, 
Senators Anderson and Moynihan were added as temporary Members to the 
Committee.
\3\ Pursuant to S. Res. 90, adopted by the Senate on February 22, 1977, 
Senators Hayakawa and Heinz joined the Committee, and Senators Chafee 
and Lugar left the Committee.

NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 15, 1979-January 3, 1980

Second Session--January 3, 1980-December 16, 1980

Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie \1\

Majority
S. Res. 22 (January 23, 1979)
  
Warren G. Magnuson
Ernest F. Hollings \1\
Lawton Chiles
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
J. Bennett Johnston
Jim Sasser
Gary W. Hart
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
J. James Exon
George J. Mitchell \2\

Minority
S. Res. 23 (January 23, 1979)
  
Henry Bellmon (Ranking Member)
Pete V. Domenici
Bob Packwood
William L. Armstrong
Nancy Landon Kassebaum
Rudy Boschwitz
Orrin G. Hatch
Larry Pressler

\1\ Senator Muskie resigned on May 7, 1980, to become Secretary of 
State. Pursuant to S. Res. 429, adopted by the Senate on May 13, 1980, 
Senator Hollings became chair.
\2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 439, adopted by the Senate on May 19, 1980, 
George J. Mitchell joined the Committee.

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 5, 1981-December 16, 1981

Second Session--January 25, 1982-December 23, 1982

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
S. Res. 14 (January 5, 1981)
  
William L. Armstrong
Nancy Landon Kassebaum
Rudy Boschwitz
Orrin G. Hatch
John G. Tower
Mark Andrews
Steven D. Symms
Charles E. Grassley
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Dan Quayle
Slade Gorton

Minority
S. Res. 15 (January 5, 1981)
  
Ernest F. Hollings (Ranking Member)
Lawton Chiles
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
J. Bennett Johnston
Jim Sasser
Gary W. Hart
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
J. James Exon

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 3, 1983-November 18, 1983

Second Session--January 23, 1984-October 12, 1984

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
S. Res. 8 (January 3, 1983)
  
William L. Armstrong
Nancy Landon Kassebaum
Rudy Boschwitz
Orrin G. Hatch
John G. Tower
Mark Andrews
Steven D. Symms
Charles E. Grassley
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Dan Quayle
Slade Gorton

Minority
S. Res. 9 (January 3, 1983)
  
Lawton Chiles (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
J. Bennett Johnston
Jim Sasser
Gary W. Hart
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
J. James Exon

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 3, 1985-December 20, 1985

Second Session--January 21, 1986-October 18, 1986

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
S. Res. 75 (February 21, 1985)
  
William L. Armstrong
Nancy Landon Kassebaum
Rudy Boschwitz
Orrin G. Hatch
Mark Andrews
Steven D. Symms
Charles E. Grassley
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Dan Quayle
Slade Gorton
John C. Danforth

Minority
S. Res. 87 (March 5, 1985)
  
Lawton Chiles (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
J. Bennett Johnston
Jim Sasser
Gary W. Hart
Howard M. Metzenbaum
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
J. James Exon
Frank R. Lautenberg

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 6, 1987-December 22, 1987

Second Session--January 25, 1988-October 22, 1988

Chairman, Lawton Chiles \1\

Majority
S. Res. 19 (January 6, 1987)
  
Ernest F. Hollings
J. Bennett Johnston
Jim Sasser
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
J. James Exon
Frank R. Lautenberg
Paul Simon
Terry Sanford
Timothy E. Wirth
Wyche Fowler, Jr.
Kent Conrad
Christopher J. Dodd

Minority
S. Res. 20 (January 6, 1987)
  
Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
William L. Armstrong
Nancy Landon Kassebaum
Rudy Boschwitz
Steven D. Symms
Charles E. Grassley
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Dan Quayle \2\
John C. Danforth
Don Nickles
Warren Rudman

\1\ Senator Chiles was not a candidate for reelection in 1988. He was 
elected Governor of Florida in 1990.
\2\ Senator Quayle resigned on January 3, 1989, to become Vice 
President.

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

First Session--January 3, 1989-November 22, 1989

Second Session--January 23, 1990-October 28, 1990

Chairman, Jim Sasser

Majority
S. Res. 46 (February 2, 1989)
  
Ernest F. Hollings
J. Bennett Johnston
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
J. James Exon
Frank R. Lautenberg
Paul Simon
Terry Sanford
Timothy E. Wirth
Wyche Fowler, Jr.
Kent Conrad
Christopher J. Dodd
Charles S. Robb

Minority
S. Res. 47 (February 2, 1989)
  
Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
William L. Armstrong
Rudy Boschwitz
Steven D. Symms
Charles E. Grassley
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Don Nickles
Warren Rudman
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond

ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

First Session--January 3, 1991-January 3, 1992

Second Session--January 3, 1992-October 9, 1992

Chairman, Jim Sasser

Majority
S. Res. 86 (March 19, 1991)
  
Ernest F. Hollings
J. Bennett Johnston
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
J. James Exon
Frank R. Lautenberg
Paul Simon
Terry Sanford
Timothy E. Wirth
Wyche Fowler, Jr.
Kent Conrad
Christopher J. Dodd

Minority
S. Res. 88 (March 19, 1991)
  
Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
Steven D. Symms
Charles E. Grassley
Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Trent Lott
Hank Brown

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

First Session--January 5, 1993-November 26, 1993

Second Session--January 25, 1994-December 1, 1994

Chairman, Jim Sasser

Majority
S. Res. 19 (January 21, 1993)
  
Ernest F. Hollings
J. Bennett Johnston
Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
J. James Exon
Frank R. Lautenberg
Paul Simon
Kent Conrad
Christopher J. Dodd
Paul S. Sarbanes
Barbara Boxer
Patty Murray

Minority
S. Res. 22 (January 21, 1993)
  
Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
Charles E. Grassley
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Trent Lott
Hank Brown
Slade Gorton
Judd Gregg

ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 4, 1995-January 3, 1996

Second Session--January 3, 1996-October 4, 1996

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
S. Res. 33 (January 6, 1995)
  
Charles E. Grassley
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Trent Lott \1\
Hank Brown
Slade Gorton
Judd Gregg
Olympia J. Snowe
Spencer Abraham
William H. Frist
Rod Grams \2\
Connie Mack III \1\

Minority
S. Res. 32 (January 6, 1995)
  
J. James Exon (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
J. Bennett Johnston
Frank R. Lautenberg
Paul Simon
Kent Conrad
Christopher J. Dodd
Paul S. Sarbanes
Barbara Boxer
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden \2\

\1\ Pursuant to S. Res. 267, adopted by the Senate on June 20, 1996, 
Senator Mack joined the Committee, and Senator Lott left the Committee 
to become majority leader.
\2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 236, adopted by the Senate on March 29, 1996, 
Senators Grams and Wyden joined the Committee.

ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 7, 1997-November 13, 1997

Second Session--January 27, 1998-December 19, 1998

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
S. Res. 14 (January 9, 1997)
  
Charles E. Grassley
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Slade Gorton
Judd Gregg
Olympia J. Snowe
Spencer Abraham
William H. Frist
Rod Grams
Gordon H. Smith

Minority
S. Res. 12 (January 9, 1997)
  
Frank R. Lautenberg (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
Kent Conrad
Paul S. Sarbanes
Barbara Boxer
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden
Russell D. Feingold
Tim Johnson
Richard J. Durbin

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 6, 1999-November 22, 1999

Second Session--January 24, 2000-December 15, 2000

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
S. Res. 18 (January 14, 1999)
  
Charles E. Grassley
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Slade Gorton
Judd Gregg
Olympia J. Snowe
Spencer Abraham
William H. Frist
Rod Grams
Gordon H. Smith

Minority
S. Res. 15 (January 7, 1999)
  
Frank R. Lautenberg (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
Kent Conrad
Paul S. Sarbanes
Barbara Boxer
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden
Russell D. Feingold
Tim Johnson
Richard J. Durbin

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 3, 2001-December 20, 2001

Second Session--January 23, 2002-November 22, 2002

From the convening of the 107th Congress on January 3, 2001, until the 
inauguration of President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B. 
Cheney 17 days later on January 20, the Senate was evenly divided 
between the two parties (with 50 Democratic and 50 Republican 
Senators).\1\ Democrats held the majority, however, due to the deciding 
vote of outgoing Democratic Vice President Albert Gore. During this 
period, Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman \2\ and Senator Pete V. 
Domenici served as ranking member of the Budget Committee. Beginning on 
January 20, the evenly-divided Senate came under the control of the 
Republican Party due to the deciding vote of Vice President Cheney. 
Accordingly, the Committee leadership positions of Senators Conrad and 
Domenici were reversed, effective with Committee assignments announced 
on January 25. On May 24, 2001, Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont 
switched his party affiliation from Republican to Independent and began 
to caucus with the Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. At that point, the 
50 Democratic Senators, plus Senator Jeffords, held a 51 to 49 advantage 
over the Republicans, and the positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici 
were reversed again, effective with Committee assignments announced on 
July 10. Senator Conrad served as chairman and Senator Domenici served 
as ranking member for the remainder of the 107th Congress.

January 25, 2001-July 10, 2001

Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

Majority
Congressional Record, January 25, 2001, p. S558-559
  
Charles E. Grassley
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Judd Gregg
Olympia J. Snowe
William H. Frist
Gordon H. Smith
Wayne Allard
Chuck Hagel

Minority
Congressional Record, January 25, 2001, p. S559
  
Kent Conrad (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
Paul S. Sarbanes
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden
Russell D. Feingold
Tim Johnson
Robert C. Byrd
Bill Nelson
Debbie Stabenow
Hillary Rodham Clinton

July 10, 2001-November 22, 2002

Chairman, Kent Conrad

Majority
Congressional Record, July 10, 2001, p. S7417-7418
  
Ernest F. Hollings
Paul S. Sarbanes
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden
Russell D. Feingold
Tim Johnson
Robert C. Byrd
Bill Nelson
Debbie Stabenow
Hillary Rodham Clinton
Jon Corzine

Minority
Congressional Record, July 10, 2001, p. S7418
  
Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
Charles E. Grassley
Don Nickles
Phil Gramm
Christopher S. Bond
Judd Gregg
Olympia J. Snowe
William H. Frist \3\
Gordon H. Smith
Wayne Allard
Chuck Hagel

\1\ S. Res. 8, on Senate procedures, as adopted by the Senate on January 
5, 2001.
\2\ S. Res. 7, designating chairmen of committees, as adopted by the 
Senate on January 3, 2001.
\3\ Senator Frist was elected majority leader on December 23, 2002, and 
began service as leader on January 7, 2003.

ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 7, 2003-December 9, 2003

Second Session--January 20, 2004-December 8, 2004

Chairman, Don Nickles

Majority
S. Res. 18 (January 15, 2003)
  
Pete V. Domenici
Charles E. Grassley
Judd Gregg
Wayne Allard
Conrad Burns
Michael B. Enzi
Jeff Sessions
Jim Bunning
Michael D. Crapo
John Ensign
John Cornyn

Minority
S. Res. 20 (January 15, 2003)
  
Kent Conrad (Ranking Member)
Ernest F. Hollings
Paul S. Sarbanes
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden
Russell D. Feingold
Tim Johnson
Robert C. Byrd
Bill Nelson
Debbie Stabenow
Jon Corzine

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

First Session--January 4, 2005-December 8, 2005

Second Session--January 4, 2006-December 9, 2006

Chairman, Judd Gregg

Majority
S. Res. 5 (January 6, 2005)
  
Pete V. Domenici
Charles E. Grassley
Wayne Allard
Michael B. Enzi
Jeff Sessions
Jim Bunning
Michael D. Crapo
John Ensign
John Cornyn
Lamar Alexander
Lindsey O. Graham

Minority
S. Res. 6 (January 6, 2005)
  
Kent Conrad (Ranking Member)
Paul S. Sarbanes
Patty Murray
Ron Wyden
Russell D. Feingold
Tim Johnson
Robert C. Byrd
Bill Nelson
Debbie Stabenow
Jon Corzine \1\
Robert Menendez \2\

\1\ Senator Corzine resigned from the Senate on January 17, 2006, to 
become Governor of New Jersey.
\2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 348, adopted by the Senate on January 18, 2006, 
Robert Menendez replaced Jon Corzine.
                  Membership of the Committee by State

(Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

Name

Service on Committee

ALABAMA

Jeff Sessions

January 15, 2003-    

ALASKA

(None)

ARIZONA

Paul J. Fannin

August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

ARKANSAS

(None)

CALIFORNIA

Barbara Boxer

January 21, 1993-January 25, 2001

Alan Cranston

July 25, 1974-January 23, 1979

Samuel I. Hayakawa

February 22, 1977-January 23, 1979

COLORADO

Wayne Allard

January 25, 2001-    

William L. Armstrong

January 23, 1979-January 3, 1991

Hank Brown

March 19, 1991-January 7, 1997

Peter H. Dominick

August 7, 1974-January 14, 1975

Gary W. Hart

January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

Timothy E. Wirth

January 6, 1987-January 5, 1993

CONNECTICUT

Christopher J. Dodd

January 6, 1987-January 9, 1997

DELAWARE

Joseph R. Biden, Jr

July 25, 1974-March 5, 1985

FLORIDA

Lawton Chiles

July 25, 1974-January 3, 1989

Connie Mack III

June 20, 1996-January 9, 1997

Bill Nelson

January 25, 2001-    

GEORGIA

Wyche Fowler, Jr

January 6, 1987-January 5, 1993

Sam Nunn

January 17, 1975-February 11, 1977

HAWAII

(None)

IDAHO

Michael D. Crapo

January 15, 2003-    

James A. McClure

January 23, 1975-January 23, 1979

Steven D. Symms

January 5, 1981-January 5, 1993

ILLINOIS

Richard J. Durbin

January 9, 1997-January 25, 2001

Paul Simon

January 6, 1987-January 7, 1997

INDIANA

Richard G. Lugar

January 10, 1977-February 22, 1977

Dan Quayle

January 5, 1981-January 3, 1989

IOWA

Charles E. Grassley

January 5, 1981-    

KANSAS

Robert J. Dole

August 7, 1974-January 23, 1979

Nancy Landon Kassebaum

January 23, 1979-February 2, 1989

KENTUCKY

Jim Bunning

January 15, 2003-    

LOUISIANA

J. Bennett Johnston

February 11, 1977-January 7, 1997

MAINE

George J. Mitchell

May 19, 1980-January 5, 1981

Edmund S. Muskie

July 25, 1974-May 7, 1980

Olympia J. Snowe

January 6, 1995-January 15, 2003

MARYLAND

J. Glenn Beall, Jr

January 23, 1975-January 4, 1977

Paul S. Sarbanes

January 21, 1993-January 4, 2007

MASSACHUSETTS

(None)

MICHIGAN

Spencer Abraham

January 6, 1995-January 3, 2001

Donald W. Riegle, Jr

January 23, 1979-January 4, 1995

Debbie Stabenow

January 25, 2001-    

MINNESOTA

Wendell R. Anderson

January 11, 1977-December 29, 1978

Rudy Boschwitz

January 23, 1979-January 3, 1991

Rod Grams

March 29, 1996-January 3, 2001

Walter F. Mondale

July 25, 1974-December 30, 1976

MISSISSIPPI

Trent Lott

March 19, 1991-June 20, 1996

MISSOURI

Christopher S. Bond

February 2, 1989-January 15, 2003

John C. Danforth

February 21, 1985-February 2, 1989

MONTANA

Conrad Burns

January 15, 2003-January 6, 2005

NEBRASKA

J. James Exon

January 23, 1979-January 7, 1997

Chuck Hagel

January 25, 2001-January 15, 2003

Roman L. Hruska

August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

NEVADA

John Ensign

January 15, 2003-    

NEW HAMPSHIRE

Judd Gregg

January 21, 1993-    

Warren Rudman

January 6, 1987-March 19, 1991

NEW JERSEY

Jon Corzine

July 10, 2001-January 17, 2006

Frank R. Lautenberg

March 5, 1985-January 3, 2001

Robert Menendez

January 18, 2006-    

NEW MEXICO

Pete V. Domenici

January 23, 1975-    

NEW YORK

James L. Buckley (Conservative Party)

January 23, 1975-January 4, 1977

Hillary Rodham Clinton

January 25, 2001-January 15, 2003

Jacob K. Javits

August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

Daniel Patrick Moynihan

January 11, 1977-February 11, 1977 and

January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

NORTH CAROLINA

Terry Sanford

January 6, 1987-January 5, 1993

NORTH DAKOTA

Mark Andrews

January 5, 1981-January 6, 1987

Kent Conrad

January 6, 1987-    

Milton R. Young

August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

OHIO

Howard M. Metzenbaum

January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

OKLAHOMA

Henry Bellmon

January 23, 1975-January 5, 1981

Don Nickles

January 6, 1987-January 4, 2005

OREGON

Bob Packwood

January 23, 1979-January 5, 1981

Gordon H. Smith

January 9, 1997-January 15, 2003

Ron Wyden

March 29, 1996-    

PENNSYLVANIA

H. John Heinz III

February 22, 1977-January 23, 1979

RHODE ISLAND

John H. Chafee

January 10, 1977-February 22, 1977

SOUTH CAROLINA

Lindsey O. Graham

January 6, 2005-    

Ernest F. Hollings

July 25, 1974-January 4, 2005

SOUTH DAKOTA

James G. Abourezk

July 25, 1974-January 15, 1979

Tim Johnson

January 9, 1997-    

Larry Pressler

January 23, 1979-January 5, 1981

TENNESSEE

Lamar Alexander

January 6, 2005-January 4, 2007

William H. Frist

January 6, 1995-January 7, 2003

Jim Sasser

February 11, 1977-January 4, 1995

TEXAS

John Cornyn

January 15, 2003-    

Phil Gramm

February 2, 1989-January 7, 2003

John G. Tower

January 5, 1981-January 3, 1985

UTAH

Orrin G. Hatch

January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

Frank E. Moss

July 25, 1974-January 4, 1977

VERMONT

(None)

VIRGINIA

Charles S. Robb

February 2, 1989-March 19, 1991

WASHINGTON

Slade Gorton

January 5, 1981-January 6, 1987 and

January 21, 1993-January 3, 2001

Warren G. Magnuson

July 25, 1974-January 5, 1981

Patty Murray

January 21, 1993-    

WEST VIRGINIA

Robert C. Byrd

January 25, 2001-    

WISCONSIN

Robert W. Kasten, Jr

January 5, 1981-January 5, 1993

Russell D. Feingold

January 9, 1997-    

WYOMING

Michael B. Enzi

January 15, 2003-    


            Alphabetical Listing of Members of the Committee

(Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)



             Name                    State         Service on Committee

                                    A

Abourezk, James G ...........   South Dakota...  July 25, 1974-January
                                                  15, 1979
Abraham, Spencer.............   Michigan.......  January 6, 1995-January
                                                  3, 2001
Alexander, Lamar.............   Tennessee......  January 6, 2005-January
                                                  4, 2007
Allard, Wayne................   Colorado.......  January 25, 2001-
Anderson, Wendell R .........   Minnesota......  January 11, 1977-
                                                  December 29, 1978
Andrews, Mark................   North Dakota...  January 5, 1981-January
                                                  6, 1987
Armstrong, William L.........   Colorado.......  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 3, 1991


                                    B

Beall, J. Glenn, Jr..........   Maryland.......  January 23, 1975-
                                                  January 4, 1977
Bellmon, Henry...............   Oklahoma.......  January 23, 1975-
                                                  January 5, 1981
Biden, Joseph R., Jr ........   Delaware.......  July 25, 1974-March 5,
                                                  1985
Bond, Christopher S..........   Missouri.......  February 2, 1989-
                                                  January 15, 2003
Boschwitz, Rudy..............   Minnesota......  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 3, 1991
Boxer, Barbara ..............   California.....  January 21, 1993-
                                                  January 25, 2001
Brown, Hank..................   Colorado.......  March 19, 1991-January
                                                  7, 1997
Buckley, James L.              New York........  January 23, 1975-
 (Conservative Party).                            January 4, 1977
Bunning, Jim.................   Kentucky.......  January 15, 2003-
Burns, Conrad................   Montana........  January 15, 2003-
                                                  January 6, 2005
Byrd, Robert C ..............   West Virginia..  January 25, 2001-


                                    C

Chafee, John H...............   Rhode Island...  January 10, 1977-
                                                  February 22, 1977
Chiles, Lawton ..............   Florida........  July 25, 1974-January
                                                  3, 1989
Clinton, Hillary Rodham .....   New York.......  January 25, 2001-
                                                  January 15, 2003
Conrad, Kent.................  North Dakota....  January 6, 1987-
Cornyn, John.................   Texas..........  January 15, 2003-
Corzine, Jon ................   New Jersey.....  July 10, 2001-January
                                                  17, 2006
Cranston, Alan ..............   California.....  July 25, 1974-January
                                                  23, 1979
Crapo, Michael D.............   Idaho..........  January 15, 2003-


                                    D

Danforth, John C.............   Missouri.......  February 21, 1985-
                                                  February 2, 1989
Dodd, Christopher J..........   Connecticut....  January 6, 1987-January
                                                  9, 1997
Dole, Robert J...............   Kansas.........  August 7, 1974-January
                                                  23, 1979
Domenici, Pete V.............   New Mexico.....  January 23, 1975-
Dominick, Peter H............   Colorado.......  August 7, 1974-January
                                                  14, 1975
Durbin, Richard J ...........   Illinois.......  January 9, 1997-January
                                                  25, 2001


                                    E

Ensign, John.................   Nevada.........  January 15, 2003-
Enzi, Michael B..............   Wyoming........  January 15, 2003-
Exon, J. James ..............   Nebraska.......  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 7, 1997


                                    F

Fannin, Paul J...............   Arizona........  August 7, 1974-January
                                                  23, 1975
Feingold, Russell D .........   Wisconsin......  January 9, 1997-
Fowler, Wyche, Jr ...........   Georgia........  January 6, 1987-January
                                                  5, 1993
Frist, William H.............   Tennessee......  January 6, 1995-January
                                                  7, 2003


                                    G

Gorton, Slade................   Washington.....  January 5, 1981-January
                                                  6, 1987 and
                                                 January 21, 1993-
                                                  January 3, 2001
Graham, Lindsey O............   South Carolina.  January 6, 2005-
Gramm, Phil..................   Texas..........  February 2, 1989-
                                                  January 7, 2003
Grams, Rod...................  Minnesota.......  March 29, 1996-January
                                                  3, 2001
Grassley, Charles E..........   Iowa...........  January 5, 1981-
Gregg, Judd..................  New Hampshire...  January 21, 1993-


                                    H

Hagel, Chuck.................  Nebraska........  January 25, 2001-
                                                  January 15, 2003
Hart, Gary W ................  Colorado........  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 6, 1987
Hatch, Orrin G...............   Utah...........  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 6, 1987
Hayakawa, Samuel I...........   California.....  February 22, 1977-
                                                  January 23, 1979
Heinz, H. John, III..........   Pennsylvania...  February 22, 1977-
                                                  January 23, 1979
Hollings, Ernest F ..........   South Carolina.  July 25, 1974-January
                                                  4, 2005
Hruska, Roman L..............   Nebraska.......  August 7, 1974-January
                                                  23, 1975


                                    J

Javits, Jacob K..............   New York.......  August 7, 1974-January
                                                  23, 1975
Johnson, Tim ................   South Dakota...  January 9, 1997-
Johnston, J. Bennett ........   Louisiana......  February 11, 1977-
                                                  January 7, 1997


                                    K

Kassebaum, Nancy Landon......   Kansas.........  January 23, 1979-
                                                  February 2, 1989
Kasten, Robert W., Jr........   Wisconsin......  January 5, 1981-January
                                                  5, 1993


                                    L

Lautenberg, Frank R .........   New Jersey.....  March 5, 1985-January
                                                  3, 2001
Lott, Trent..................   Mississippi....  March 19, 1991-June 20,
                                                  1996
Lugar, Richard G.............   Indiana........  January 10, 1977-
                                                  February 22, 1977


                                    M

Mack, Connie, III............   Florida........  June 20, 1996-January
                                                  9, 1997
Magnuson, Warren G ..........   Washington.....  July 25, 1974-January
                                                  5, 1981
McClure, James A.............   Idaho..........  January 23, 1975-
                                                  January 23, 1979
Menendez, Robert ............   New Jersey.....  January 18, 2006-
Metzenbaum, Howard M ........   Ohio...........  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 6, 1987
Mitchell, George J ..........   Maine..........  May 19, 1980-January 5,
                                                  1981
Mondale, Walter F ...........   Minnesota......  July 25, 1974-December
                                                  30, 1976
Moss, Frank E ...............   Utah...........  July 25, 1974-January
                                                  4, 1977
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick ....   New York.......  January 11, 1977-
                                                  February 11, 1977 and
                                                 January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 6, 1987
Murray, Patty ...............   Washington.....  January 21, 1993-
Muskie, Edmund S.............  Maine...........  July 25, 1974-May 7,
                                                  1980


                                    N

Nelson, Bill ................   Florida........  January 25, 2001-
Nickles, Don.................   Oklahoma.......  January 6, 1987-January
                                                  4, 2005
Nunn, Sam ...................   Georgia........  January 17, 1975-
                                                  February 11, 1977


                                    P

Packwood, Bob................   Oregon.........  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 5, 1981
Pressler, Larry..............   South Dakota...  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 5, 1981


                                    Q

Quayle, Dan..................   Indiana........  January 5, 1981-January
                                                  3, 1989


                                    R

Riegle, Donald W., Jr .......   Michigan.......  January 23, 1979-
                                                  January 4, 1995
Robb, Charles S..............   Virginia.......  February 2, 1989-March
                                                  19, 1991
Rudman, Warren...............   New Hampshire..  January 6, 1987-March
                                                  19, 1991


                                    S

Sanford, Terry ..............   North Carolina.  January 6, 1987-January
                                                  5, 1993
Sarbanes, Paul S.............   Maryland.......  January 21, 1993-
                                                  January 4, 2007
Sasser, Jim .................   Tennessee......  February 11, 1977-
                                                  January 4, 1995
Sessions, Jeff...............   Alabama........  January 15, 2003-
Simon, Paul .................   Illinois.......  January 6, 1987-January
                                                  7, 1997
Smith, Gordon H..............   Oregon.........  January 9, 1997-January
                                                  15, 2003
Snowe, Olympia J.............   Maine..........  January 6, 1995-January
                                                  15, 2003
Stabenow, Debbie ............   Michigan.......  January 25, 2001-
Symms, Steven D..............   Idaho..........  January 5, 1981-January
                                                  5, 1993


                                    T

Tower, John G................   Texas..........  January 5, 1981-January
                                                  3, 1985


                                    W

Wirth, Timothy E ............   Colorado.......  January 6, 1987-January
                                                  5, 1993
Wyden, Ron ..................   Oregon.........  March 29, 1996-


                                    Y

Young, Milton R..............   North Dakota...  August 7, 1974-January
                                                  23, 1975


                Majority Staff Directors to the Committee




Douglas J. Bennet Jr......................  1974-1976 \1\
John T. McEvoy............................  1977-1980
Stephen E. Bell...........................  1981-1986
G. William Hoagland.......................  1986
Richard N. Brandon........................  1987-1988
John L. Hilley............................  1989-1990
Larry Stein...............................  1991-1994
G. William Hoagland.......................  1995-2000
Mary Ann Naylor...........................  2001-2002 \2\
Hazen Marshall............................  2003-2004
Scott B. Gudes............................  2005-2006


\1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.
\2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
  times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
  discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
  months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
  Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
  Congress.

                Minority Staff Directors to the Committee




Robert S. Boyd............................  1975-1980
Lizabeth Tankersley.......................  1981-1982
Richard N. Brandon........................  1983-1986
G. William Hoagland.......................  1987-1994
William G. Dauster........................  1995-1997
Bruce King................................  1997-2000
G. William Hoagland.......................  2001-2002 \1\
Mary Ann Naylor...........................  2003-2006


\1\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
  times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
  discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
  months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
  Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
  Congress.

                   Majority Counsels to the Committee




John T. McEvoy............................  1974-1976 \1\
Karen H. Williams.........................  1977-1979
Lizabeth Tankersley.......................  1980
Robert Fulton.............................  1981-1982
Gail Millar...............................  1983
Nell Payne................................  1984-1986
William G. Dauster........................  1987-1994
Jennifer Smith............................  1995
Beth Smerko Felder........................  1996-2000
Lisa Konwinski............................  2001-2002 \2\
Beth Smerko Felder........................  2003-2004
Gail Millar...............................  2005-2006


\1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.
\2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
  times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
  discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
  months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
  Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
  Congress.

                   Minority Counsels to the Committee




Robert Z. Bohan...........................  1974 \1\
Francis A. Hennigan.......................  1975-1976
Robert Fulton.............................  1980
Lizabeth Tankersley.......................  1981-1982
William G. Dauster........................  1983-1986
Nell Payne................................  1987
William G. Dauster........................  1995-1997
Lisa Konwinski............................  1999-2000
Beth Smerko Felder........................  2001-2002 \2\
Lisa Konwinski............................  2003-2006


\1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.
\2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
  times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
  discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
  months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
  Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
  Congress.

                      Chief Clerks to the Committee




Maria P. Durelli..........................  1974-1975 \1\
Harry T. Martin...........................  1976
Harry T. Martin/Joan A. Leach.............  1977
Joan A. Leach.............................  1978-1980
Lynne Seymour.............................  1981
Laurie E. Greene..........................  1982-1983
Deborah S. Paul...........................  1984-1986
Anne Willis Hill..........................  1987-1994
Lynne Seymour.............................  1995-


\1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.

Authorities Pertaining to the Jurisdiction and Duties of the Senate 
Committee on the Budget

Statutory Provisions

The key statute pertaining to the jurisdiction and duties of the Senate 
Budget Committee is the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 (P.L. 93-344; July 12, 1974; 88 Stat. 297-339), as amended. The 1974 
Act has been amended many times over the years, and these changes have 
modified the Committee's jurisdiction and duties in many ways. The 
provisions of the 1974 Act relating to congressional organization and 
procedure are codified in Title 2 (The Congress) of the United States Code.

 Title II of the Act established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). 
Section 201(f) (2 U.S.C. 601(f)), which requires CBO to use revenue 
estimates prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, also provides that 
``[t]he Budget Committees of the Senate and House shall determine all 
estimates with respect to scoring points of order and with respect to the 
execution of the purposes of this Act.''

 Title III of the Act sets forth the procedures and requirements relating 
to the congressional budget process generally, including budget resolutions 
and reconciliation. Various sections within the title require the Budget 
Committee to report annual budget resolutions and omnibus budget 
reconciliation legislation, make allocations of spending to committees, 
provide periodic scorekeeping reports on legislative action, provide 
estimates of the budget impact of legislation for purposes of determining 
points of order, submit for the record lists of possibly extraneous 
provisions in reconciliation legislation, and make periodic adjustments in 
various budget levels for specified purposes.

 Title IV of the Act sets forth additional provisions dealing with the 
congressional budget process, including procedures to curb the use of 
unfunded Federal mandates. Section 425(e) (2 U.S.C. 658d) provides that 
``[f]or purposes of this section, in the Senate, the levels of Federal 
mandates for a fiscal year shall be determined based on estimates made by 
the Committee on the Budget.''

 Title VII of the Act pertains to program review and evaluation. Section 
703 (2 U.S.C. 623), in subsections (a) and (b), directs the House and 
Senate Budget Committees to ``study on a continuing basis proposals 
designed to improve and facilitate methods of congressional budgetmaking'' 
and to make recommendations from time to time. Section 703 (a) and (b) 
reads as follows:

                   (a) The Committees on the Budget of the House of 
   Representatives and the Senate shall study on a continuing basis 
            proposals designed to improve and facilitate methods of 
      congressional budgetmaking. The proposals to be studied shall 
                    include, but are not limited to, proposals for--

 (1) improving the information base required for determining the 
effectiveness of new programs by such means as pilot testing survey 
research, and other experimental and analytical techniques;

 (2) improving analytical and systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of 
existing programs;

 (3) establishing maximum and minimum time limitations for program 
authorization; and

 (4) developing techniques of human resource accounting and other means of 
providing noneconomic as well as economic evaluation measures.

     (b) The Committee on the Budget of each House shall, from time 
to time, report to its House the results of the study carried on by 
         it under subsection (a) of this section, together with its 
                                                    recommendations.

 The second major statute that has affected the jurisdiction and duties of 
the Senate Budget Committee is the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (Title II of P.L. 99- 177; December 12, 1985; 99 Stat. 
1038-1101), as amended. Provisions of the Act are codified beginning with 2 
U.S.C. 900. The Act required that the Office of Management and Budget 
consult with the Budget Committees regarding various calculations used in 
the sequestration process (Sections 251 and 252), authorized the Budget 
Committees to request a compliance report on sequestration activities from 
the Comptroller General (Section 254(h)), and directed that Budget 
Committee scoring with respect to certain new direct spending programs be 
used in preparation of the sequestration baseline (Section 257(b)(2)).

 In addition, the Budget Committee is required to report resolutions 
suspending certain budget enforcement procedures triggered by a ``low 
economic growth'' report issued by CBO (Section 258(a)), determine the cost 
of amendments to a resolution dealing with a proposal from the President to 
modify the application of a sequester of defense spending (Section 258B), 
and report a resolution initiating a special reconciliation process 
providing an alternative to an anticipated sequestration order (Section 
258C).

 Although these provisions in the 1985 Act have not been repealed, 
generally they are treated as inactive due to the expiration of the deficit 
targets, the discretionary spending limits, and the paygo requirement.

Senate Rule XXV, Paragraph (e)

 Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate establishes the jurisdiction 
and duties of the committees of the Senate. The rule, in paragraph 1, 
enumerates the standing committees, which ``shall be appointed at the 
commencement of each Congress, and shall continue and have the power to Act 
until their successors are appointed, with leave to report by bill or 
otherwise on matters within their respective jurisdictions.''

 Section 102 (88 Stat. 300-302) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974 amended paragraph 1 of Rule XXV, as well as other 
paragraphs of the rule, to establish the Senate Budget Committee, fix its 
membership, specify exceptions from a general requirement that committee 
meetings be open to the public, and for other purposes. Rule XXV has been 
revised over the years, including the redesignation of paragraphs and 
subparagraphs.

Paragraph 1(e), which pertains to the Budget Committee, presently reads as 
follows:

       1(e)(1) Committee on the Budget, to which committee shall be 
   referred all concurrent resolutions on the budget (as defined in 
   section 3(a)(4) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) and all 
other matters required to be referred to that committee under titles 
    III and IV of that Act, and messages, petitions, memorials, and 
                                     other matters relating thereto.
                            (2) Such committee shall have the duty--

 (A) to report the matters required to be reported by it under titles III 
and IV of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974;

 (B) to make continuing studies of the effect on budget outlays of relevant 
existing and proposed legislation and to report the results of such studies 
to the Senate on a recurring basis;

 (C) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax expenditures, to 
devise methods of coordinating tax expenditures, policies, and programs 
with direct budget outlays, and to report the results of such studies to 
the Senate on a recurring basis; and

 (D) to review, on a continuing basis, the conduct by the Congressional 
Budget Office of its functions and duties.

 Paragraph 3(a) of the rule fixes the number of Members authorized to serve 
on the Budget Committee. Originally, the membership of the Committee was 
set at 15 members; it currently is set at 22 members.

 Another rule, Senate Rule XXVI, sets forth procedures that the standing 
committees, including the Budget Committee, are required to follow. 
Explicit exemptions from these procedures are provided for the Budget 
Committee in several instances.

S. Res. 445 (108th Congress)

On October 7 through October 9, 2004, during the second session of the 
108th Congress, the Senate considered an internal reform measure, S. Res. 
445, that in part responded to recommendations on congressional 
reorganization made by the President's National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the ``9/11 Commission''). On 
October 9, the Senate agreed to the measure, as amended, by a vote of 79 to 
6.

The primary purpose of the resolution, as stated in Section 100, was:

to improve the effectiveness of the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, especially with regard to its oversight of the 
Intelligence Community of the United States Government, and to improve 
the Senate's oversight of homeland security.

 In addition to provisions dealing with intelligence oversight reform, the 
measure renamed the Governmental Affairs Committee as the Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee and consolidated jurisdiction over 
matters relating to homeland security under the committee.

 While shared jurisdiction is an unusual feature in the Senate committee 
system, the Senate Budget Committee had shared jurisdiction for many years 
with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee over legislation pertaining 
to the congressional budget process under the terms of a standing order 
adopted by the Senate in 1977 (see discussion below).

 During consideration of S. Res. 445, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Don 
Nickles and Ranking Member Kent Conrad offered a first-degree amendment 
(number 4027), which assigned exclusive jurisdiction over congressional 
budget process legislation to the Senate Budget Committee. The elements of 
the congressional budget process identified in the amendment were patterned 
closely on the standing order of 1977. In addition, the two Senators 
offered a second-degree amendment thereto (number 4041), which provided for 
shared jurisdiction with the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
Committee over nominations to the positions of Director and Deputy Director 
for Budget within the Office of Management and Budget. The Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's longstanding jurisdiction 
over management and accounting matters was not affected. The Senate adopted 
the second-degree amendment on October 9, by a vote of 50 to 31, and 
adopted the first-degree amendment the same day by a voice vote.

 Section 101(d) and 101(e) of the resolution, which pertain to the Budget 
Committee, read as follows:

    (d) Jurisdiction of Budget Committee.--Notwithstanding paragraph 
    (b)(3) of this section, and except as otherwise provided in the 
Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee on the Budget shall 
            have exclusive jurisdiction over measures affecting the 
                           congressional budget process, which are--

 (1) the functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee;

 (2) the functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional Budget Office;

 (3) the process by which Congress annually establishes the appropriate 
levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or surpluses, and 
public debt--including subdivisions thereof--and including the 
establishment of mandatory ceilings on spending and appropriations, a floor 
on revenues, timetables for congressional action on concurrent resolutions, 
on the reporting of authorization bills, and on the enactment of 
appropriation bills, and enforcement mechanisms for budgetary limits and 
timetables;

 (4) the limiting of backdoor spending devices;

 (5) the timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations and 
authorization requests;

 (6) the definitions of what constitutes impoundment--such as 
``rescissions'' and ``deferrals'';

 (7) the process and determination by which impoundments must be reported 
to and considered by Congress;

 (8) the mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the provisions of 
the Impoundment Control Act, title X--such as GAO review and lawsuits; and

 (9) the provisions which affect the content or determination of amounts 
included in or excluded from the congressional budget or the calculation of 
such amounts, including the definition of terms provided by the Budget Act.

             (e) OMB Nominees.--The Committee on the Budget and the 
 Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs shall have 
joint jurisdiction over the nominations of persons nominated by the 
President to fill the positions of Director and Deputy Director for 
      Budget within the Office of Management and Budget, and if one 
committee votes to order reported such a nomination, the other must 
        report within 30 calendar days session, or be automatically 
                                                         discharged.

Standing Order on the Referral of Budget Process Legislation (1977)

On August 4, 1977, the Senate by unanimous consent established a standing 
order regarding the joint referral of congressional budget process 
legislation to the Budget Committee and the Governmental Affairs 
Committee.\1\ In 2004 (as discussed above), the Senate adopted S. Res. 445, 
which, among other things, consolidated jurisdiction over legislation 
dealing with the congressional budget process under the Budget Committee. 
The adoption of S. Res. 445 effectively superseded the joint referral 
process established in the 1977 standing order.

\1\ See the Congressional Record of August 4, 1977, vol. 123, p. 26709.

The 1977 standing order read as follows:

       [L]egislation affecting the congressional budget process, as 
  described below, [shall] be referred jointly to the Committees on 
   the Budget and on Governmental Affairs. If one committee acts to 
    report a jointly-referred measure, the other must act within 30 
      calendar days of continuous possession, or be automati[c]ally 
                                                         discharged.
           Legislative proposals affecting the congressional budget 
                            process to which this order applies are:

 First. The functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee--as 
described in title I of the act [the Congressional Budget and Impoundment 
Control Act of 1974];

 Second. The functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional Budget 
Office--as described in title[s] II and IV of the act[;]

 Third. The process by which Congress annually establishes the appropriate 
levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or surpluses, and 
public debt--including subdivisions thereof. That process includes the 
establishment [of]:

mandatory ceilings on spending and appropriations;

a floor on revenues;

timetables for congressional action on concurrent resolutions, on the 
reporting of authorization bills, and on the enactment of appropriation 
bills; and

enforcement mechanisms for the limits and timetables,

                 all as described in titles III and IV of the act[;]

 Fourth. The limiting of backdoor spending device[s]--as described in title 
IV of the act;

 Fifth. The timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations and 
authorization requests--as described in title VI of the act;

 Sixth. The definitions of what constitutes impoundment--such as 
``rescissions'' and ``deferrals,'' as provided in the Impoundment Control 
Act, title X;

 Seventh. The process and determination by which impoundments must be 
reported to and considered by Congress--as provided in the Impoundment 
Control Act, title X;

 Eighth. The mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the provisions 
of the Impoundment Control Act, title X--such as GAO review and lawsuits; 
and

 Ninth. The provisions which affect the content or determination of amounts 
included in or excluded from the congressional budget or the calculation of 
such amounts, including the definition of terms provided by the Budget 
Act--as set forth in title I thereof.

S. Res. 45 (94th Congress)

 On January 30, 1975, the Senate reached a unanimous consent agreement that 
had the effect of adopting S. Res. 45, a measure providing for joint 
referral of impoundment messages from the President under Title X of the 
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and legislation 
pertaining to impoundments. In addition to the referral of impoundment 
messages and legislation to the Appropriations Committee or appropriate 
authorizing committee, the Budget Committee was given referral of such 
matters to consider the ``macroeconomic implications, impact on priorities 
and aggregate spending levels, and the legality of the President's use of 
the deferral and rescission mechanism under title X.'' The agreement was 
modified on April 11, 1986, in the wake of the Chadha decision. The current 
text of the agreement reads as follows:

     Resolved, (1) That messages received pursuant to title X of the 
       Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act be referred 
        concurrently to the Appropriations Committee, to the Budget 
      Committee, and to any other appropriate authorizing committee.
      (2) That bills, resolutions, and joint resolutions introduced 
 with respect to rescissions and deferrals shall be referred to the 
        Appropriations Committee, the Budget Committee, and pending 
    implementation of section 410 of the Congressional Budget [and] 
Impoundment Control Act and subject to section 401(d), to any other 
      committee exercising jurisdiction over contract and borrowing 
authority programs as defined by section 401(c)(2) (A) and (B). The 
Budget Committee and such other committees shall report their views, 
   if any, to the Appropriations Committee within 20 days following 
referral of such messages, bills, resolutions, or joint resolutions. 
          The Budget Committee's consideration shall extend only to 
     macroeconomic implications, impact on priorities and aggregate 
    spending levels, and the legality of the President's use of the 
deferral and rescission mechanism under title X. The Appropriations 
             and authorizing committees shall exercise their normal 
                      responsibilities over programs and priorities.
        (3) If any committee to which a bill or resolution has been 
referred recommends its passage, the Appropriations Committee shall 
 report that bill or resolution together with its views and reports 
    of the Budget and any appropriate authorizing committees to the 
                                                     Senate within--

(A) the time remaining under the Act in the case of rescissions, or

(B) within 20 days in the case of deferrals.

     (4) The 20 day period referred to herein means twenty calendar 
days; and for the purposes of computing the twenty days, recesses or 
   adjournments of the Senate for more than 3 days to a day certain 
shall not be counted; and for recesses and adjournments of more than 
30 calendar days continuous duration or the sine die adjournment of 
 a session, the 20 day period shall begin anew on the day following 
                                      the reconvening of the Senate.

Committee Rules of Procedure

 Senate Rule XXVI, Paragraph 2, requires each committee to adopt rules 
(``not inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate'') for its internal 
procedure and to publish them in the Congressional Record by March 1 of the 
first year of each Congress. Further, any amendment to a committee's rules 
may not take effect until the amendment is published in the Congressional 
Record.

 The Budget Committee's rules of procedure for the 109th Congress were 
published in the Congressional Record on February 14, 2005.\2\ The rules 
are divided into seven sections dealing with: (1) meetings; (2) quorums and 
voting; (3) proxies; (4) hearings and hearing procedures; (5) committee 
reports; (6) use of display materials in committee; and (7) confirmation 
standards and procedures.

\2\ See the remarks of Senator Judd Gregg in the Congressional Record 
(daily ed.), Feb. 14, 2005, p. S1337-S1338.

Legislation Developed by the Senate Committee on the Budget

Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget: Fiscal Years 1976-2007

 During the 32-year period from 1975 (for the FY1976 budget cycle) through 
2006 (for the FY2007 budget cycle), the House and Senate adopted a total of 
36 budget resolutions (see table 1).


      TABLE 1.--CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS ON THE BUDGET: FY1976-FY2007
------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Fiscal                                        U.S. Statutes-at-
Congress   year        Type \1\      Budget resolution   Large citation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
   94th     1976  First............  H. Con. Res. 218.  89 Stat. 1197-
                  Second...........  H. Con. Res. 466.   1198
                                                        89 Stat. 1209-
                                                         1210
            1977  First............  S. Con. Res. 109.  90 Stat. 3029-
                  Second...........  S. Con. Res. 139.   3030
                                                        90 Stat. 3044-
                                                         3045
   95th     1977  Third............  S. Con. Res. 10..  91 Stat. 1666-
                                                         1667
            1978  First............  S. Con. Res. 19..  91 Stat. 1670-
                  Second...........  H. Con. Res. 341.   1673
                                                        91 Stat. 1683-
                                                         1684
            1979  First............  S. Con. Res. 80..  92 Stat. 3870-
                  Second...........  H. Con. Res. 683.   3872
                                                        92 Stat. 3878-
                                                         3879
   96th     1980  First............  H. Con. Res. 107.  93 Stat. 1413-
                  Second...........  S. Con. Res. 53..   1416
                                                        93 Stat. 1428-
                                                         1433
            1981  First............  H. Con. Res. 307.  94 Stat. 3655-
                  Second...........  H. Con. Res. 448.   3668
                                                        94 Stat. 3680-
                                                         3688
   97th     1982  First............  H. Con. Res. 115.  95 Stat. 1743-
                  Second...........  S. Con. Res. 50..   1759
                                                        95 Stat. 1778
            1983  .................  S. Con. Res. 92..  96 Stat. 2647-
                                                         2661
   98th     1984  .................  H. Con. Res. 91..  97 Stat. 1501-
                                                         1523
            1985  .................  H. Con. Res. 280.  98 Stat. 3484-
                                                         3498
   99th     1986  .................  S. Con. Res. 32..  99 Stat. 1941-
                                                         1959
            1987  .................  S. Con. Res. 120.  100 Stat. 4354-
                                                         4370
  100th     1988  .................  H. Con. Res. 93..  101 Stat. 1986-
                                                         2003
            1989  .................  H. Con. Res. 268.  102 Stat. 4875-
                                                         4886
  101st     1990  .................  H. Con. Res. 106.  103 Stat. 2540-
                                                         2554
            1991  .................  H. Con. Res. 310.  104 Stat. 5163-
                                                         5181
  102nd     1992  .................  H. Con. Res. 121.  105 Stat. 2414-
                                                         2433
            1993  .................  H. Con. Res. 287.  106 Stat. 5165-
                                                         5189
  103rd     1994  .................  H. Con. Res. 64..  107 Stat. 2508-
                                                         2538
            1995  .................  H. Con. Res. 218.  108 Stat. 5075-
                                                         5103
  104th     1996  .................  H. Con. Res. 67..  109 Stat. 996-
                                                         1030
            1997  .................  H. Con. Res. 178.  110 Stat. 4434-
                                                         4482
  105th     1998  .................  H. Con. Res. 84..  111 Stat. 2710-
                                                         2760
            1999       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                 resolution for this year]
  106th     2000  .................  H. Con. Res. 68..  113 Stat. 1968-
                                                         1999
            2001  .................  H. Con. Res. 290.  114 Stat. 3139-
                                                         3173
  107th     2002  .................  H. Con. Res. 83..  115 Stat. 2486-
                                                         2516
            2003       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                 resolution for this year]
  108th     2004  .................  H. Con. Res. 95..  117 Stat. 2910-
                                                         2942
            2005       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                 resolution for this year]
  109th     2006  .................  H. Con. Res. 95..  [not yet
                                                         available]
            2007       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                 resolution for this year]
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Type'' refers to whether the budget resolution was the first,
  second, or third for the fiscal year. For the first 7 years of the
  congressional budget process, the House and Senate adopted at least
  two budget resolutions each year. Beginning with the FY1983 budget
  resolution, the House and Senate have not adopted more than one budget
  resolution a year.
Note: Although budget resolutions, as concurrent resolutions, do not
  become law, they are compiled in a special section of the U.S.
  Statutes-at-Large.
Source: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL30297,
  Congressional Budget Resolutions: Selected Statistics and Information
  Guide, by Bill Heniff, Jr. and Justin Murray, Appendix B, pp. 20-21.


 The 1974 Act originally required that the Senate and House adopt two 
budget resolutions each year--an advisory budget resolution in the spring 
(by May 15) and a binding budget resolution in the fall (by September 15). 
Congress adopted the second required budget resolution from FY1976 through 
FY1982. For the following several years, through FY1986, Congress did not 
adopt a second budget resolution, instead relying on a feature in the first 
budget resolution that automatically deemed it to be the second budget 
resolution on October 1 if a second budget resolution had not been adopted 
by that date. In 1985, Congress amended the 1974 Act to require only a 
single budget resolution each year, in the spring, and advanced its due 
date by 1 month, to April 15 (first effective for FY1987). Section 304 (2 
U.S.C. 635) of the Act allows Congress to adopt a revised budget resolution 
at any time. Congress adopted a third budget resolution for FY1977.

 Of the 36 budget resolutions adopted during this period, 7 were first 
budget resolutions, 7 were second budget resolutions, 1 was a third budget 
resolution, and 21 were single budget resolutions.

 The House and Senate were not able to reach final agreement on a budget 
resolution in four instances, for FY1999, FY2003, FY2005, and FY2007.

Budget Reconciliation Acts

 As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year 
that the congressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with 
the first use of reconciliation by both the House and Senate in 1980, 
however, reconciliation has been used in most years (see table 2).\3\ 
Congress has sent the President 21 reconciliation acts over the years; 18 
were signed into law and 3 were vetoed (and the vetoes not overridden).

\3\ On December 15, 1975, the Senate considered, amended, and passed H.R. 
5559, the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, which reduced revenues by about 
$6.4 billion pursuant to a directive in the second budget resolution for 
FY1976. The measure was not regarded as a reconciliation bill when it was 
considered by the House, but it was considered under reconciliation 
procedures in the Senate. President Gerald Ford vetoed the measure later in 
the year and the House sustained his veto. See the remarks of Senator 
Russell Long and the Presiding Officer, on page 40540, and the remarks of 
Senator Edmund Muskie and others, on pages 40544-40550, in the 
Congressional Record, vol. 121, Dec. 15, 1975, regarding the status of H.R. 
5559 as a reconciliation bill.

Thirteen of the 21 acts were omnibus reconciliation measures reported by 
the Budget Committee (in which submissions from the instructed committees 
were incorporated by the Budget Committee without any substantive revision, 
as required by the 1974 Act) and 7 were revenue reconciliation measures 
reported by the Finance Committee. In the one remaining instance, involving 
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, the final 
legislation merged together separate reconciliation measures reported by 
the Budget and Finance Committees.


 TABLE 2.--BUDGET RESOLUTIONS AND ASSOCIATED BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACTS:
                              FY1981-FY2006
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                     Budget
Fiscal    Budget resolution      reconciliation       Date enacted (or
 year                                act(s)                vetoed)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
  1981  H. Con. Res. 307....  Omnibus               December 5, 1980
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1980 (P.L. 96-
                               499).
  1982  H. Con. Res. 115....  Omnibus Budget        August 13, 1981
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1981 (P.L. 97-
                               35).
  1983  S. Con. Res. 92.....  Tax Equity and        September 3, 1982
                               Fiscal
                               Responsibility Act
                               of 1982 (P.L. 97-
                               248).
                              Omnibus Budget        September 8, 1982
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1982 (P.L. 97-
                               253).
  1984  H. Con. Res. 91.....  Omnibus Budget        April 18, 1984
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1983 (P.L. 98-
                               270).
  1986  S. Con. Res. 32.....  Consolidated Omnibus  April 7, 1986
                               Budget
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1985 (P.L. 99-
                               272).
  1987  S. Con. Res. 120....  Omnibus Budget        October 21, 1986
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1986 (P.L. 99-
                               509).
  1988  S. Con. Res. 93.....  Omnibus Budget        December 22, 1987
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1987 (P.L. 100-
                               203).
  1990  H. Con. Res. 106....  Omnibus Budget        December 19, 1989
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1989 (P.L. 101-
                               239).
  1991  H. Con. Res. 310....  Omnibus Budget        November 5, 1990
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1990 (P.L. 101-
                               508).
  1994  H. Con. Res. 64.....  Omnibus Budget        August 10, 1993
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1993 (P.L. 103-
                               66).
  1996  H. Con. Res. 67.....  Balanced Budget Act   December 6, 1995
                               of 1995 (H.R. 2491).  (vetoed)
  1997  H. Con. Res. 178....  Personal              August 22, 1996
                               Responsibility and
                               Work Opportunity
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 1996 (P.L. 104-
                               193).
  1998  H. Con. Res. 84.....  Balanced Budget Act   August 5, 1997
                               of 1997 (P.L. 105-
                               33).
                              Taxpayer Relief Act   August 5, 1997
                               of 1997 (P.L. 105-
                               34).
  2000  H. Con. Res. 68.....  Taxpayer Refund and   September 23, 1999
                               Relief Act of 1999    (vetoed)
                               (H.R. 2488).
  2001  H. Con. Res. 290....  Marriage Tax Relief   August 5, 2000
                               Reconciliation Act    (vetoed)
                               of 2000 (H.R. 4810).
  2002  H. Con. Res. 83.....  Economic Growth and   June 7, 2001
                               Tax Relief
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 2001 (P.L. 107-
                               16).
  2004  H. Con. Res. 95.....  Jobs and Growth Tax   May 28, 2003
                               Relief
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 2003 (P.L. 108-
                               27).
  2006  H. Con. Res. 95.....  Deficit Reduction     February 8, 2006
                               Act of 2005 (P.L.
                               109-171).
                              Tax Increase          May 17, 2006
                               Prevention and
                               Reconciliation Act
                               of 2005 (P.L. 109-
                               222).
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Congressional Research Service: (1) CRS Report RL33030, The
  Budget Reconciliation Process: House and Senate Procedures, by Robert
  Keith and Bill Heniff, Jr., Table 1, p. 4-5; and (2) CRS Report
  RL33132, Budget Reconciliation Legislation in 2005-2006 Under the
  FY2006 Budget Resolution, by Robert Keith, p. 2.

Other Significant Legislation Enacted Into Law

The Budget Committee has been involved in the development of significant 
measures other than budget resolutions and reconciliation measures. For the 
most part, these measures have pertained to changes in the Federal budget 
process. Major examples of such legislation that was enacted into law are 
listed and described below. In cases where important budget process changes 
were made as a separate act within omnibus reconciliation legislation or 
legislation raising the statutory limit on the public debt, the separate 
act is included in the list.

Some of the measures listed below were not referred to or reported by the 
Budget Committee, and some originated as floor amendments. The Budget 
Committee, nonetheless, was centrally involved in formulating the 
legislation. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
for example, was carried in a measure increasing the statutory limit on the 
public debt (such legislation is under the jurisdiction of the House Ways 
and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee). It originated on October 
9, 1985, as a floor amendment offered by Committee Chairman Pete Domenici 
and Ranking Member Lawton Chiles (modified Domenici-Chiles amendment number 
771).

Some of the measures developed by the Budget Committee were considered by 
the Senate but did not become law. While most of these measures dealt with 
budget process reform, others involved specialized aspects of Federal 
budgeting. Certain budget enforcement procedures, for example, may be 
suspended pursuant to Section 258 of the 1985 Act during periods when low 
economic growth occurs, as determined by a ``low growth report'' issued by 
the CBO Director. Whenever the CBO Director issues such a report, the 
Senate Budget Committee must report a suspension resolution, in the form of 
a Senate joint resolution, that is considered under expedited procedures 
(the House does not have comparable procedures). In three instances in 1991 
and two in 2002, the Budget Committee reported the required suspension 
resolution unfavorably and the Senate rejected it in each instance.

Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985

Title II of P.L. 99-177 (Increasing the Statutory Limit on the Public 
Debt); December 12, 1985; 99 Stat. 1038-1101.

 The Act established deficit targets intended to lead to a balanced budget 
by FY1991; created a sequestration process to enforce the targets, 
triggered by a report issued by the Comptroller General, involving 
automatic, largely across-the-board spending cuts; and made many changes in 
the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, mainly ratifying recent changes in 
practice (such as requiring only a single budget resolution each year). The 
1985 Act is also known as the ``Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act'' after its three 
primary sponsors in the Senate--Senators Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and 
Ernest Hollings (all of whom served on the Budget Committee at different 
times).

Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987

Title I of P.L. 100-119 (Increasing the Statutory Limit on the Public 
Debt); September 29, 1987; 101 Stat. 754-784.

The Act revised and extended the deficit targets set in 1985, requiring a 
balanced budget by FY1993. In addition, in response to court action 
invalidating the role of the Comptroller General in triggering 
sequestration, the Act placed that authority in the OMB Director, and made 
changes in the congressional budget process under the 1974 Act.

Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

Title XIII of P.L. 101-508 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990); 
November 5, 1990; 104 Stat. 1388-573 through 630.

 In the wake of dissatisfaction with experiences under the deficit targets 
set in 1985 and revised in 1987, the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990 
effectively replaced them with discretionary spending limits and a ``pay-
as-you-go'' (paygo) requirement through FY1995. Sequestration was retained 
as the means of enforcing the new mechanisms; both temporary and permanent 
changes were made in the congressional budget process under the 1974 Act, 
including making the Byrd rule on extraneous matter in reconciliation 
measures part of the Act (Section 313); and special procedures were 
established to protect the long-term balances in the Social Security trust 
funds.

Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990

Section 13201 (104 Stat. 1388-609 through 615) of the Budget Enforcement 
Act of 1990.

 The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 provided for the more accurate 
measurement of the costs of direct loans and loan guarantees, placed the 
costs of credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other spending 
programs, and improved the methods of allocating resources among credit 
programs and between credit programs and other spending programs. This was 
achieved in part by defining the cost of credit programs to be the long-
term cost to the government on a net present value basis, excluding 
administrative costs and certain incidental effects. The Act was 
incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as a new Title V.

Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993

P.L. 103-66; August 10, 1993; 107 Stat. 683-685 (Title XIV).

 Title XIV (Budget Process Provisions) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation 
Act of 1993 extended the discretionary spending limits and paygo 
requirement, first established by the BEA of 1990, for legislation enacted 
through the end of FY1998. The House and Senate initially considered more 
extensive budget process changes in this legislation, but ultimately 
decided to confine it to this more narrow purpose.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

P.L. 104-4; March 22, 1995; 109 Stat. 48-71.

 The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 established procedures 
designed to curb the imposition of unfunded Federal mandates on State, 
local, and tribal governments and private sector entities; required Federal 
agencies to foster greater participation by such governments and entities 
in the development of regulations; and directed the Advisory Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations to study and make recommendations on issues 
pertaining to unfunded mandates. The Congressional Budget Office is 
required to prepare cost estimates with respect to mandates exceeding a 
threshold (that is adjusted periodically) and an intergovernmental point of 
order may be raised against legislation imposing unfunded mandates that 
exceed the threshold. UMRA was incorporated into the Congressional Budget 
Act of 1974 as Part B (Federal Mandates) of Title IV (Sections 421-428), 
and was amended in 1999 by the State Flexibility Clarification Act (P.L. 
106-141; December 7, 1999; 113 Stat. 1699-1700).

Line Item Veto Act

P.L. 104-130; April 9, 1996; 110 Stat. 1200-1212.

 The Line Item Veto Act augmented the rescission authority of the President 
in the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 by authorizing him to put line-item 
cancellations into effect upon the enactment of a law and providing that 
they could be overturned only if Congress enacted a law disapproving them 
within 30 days. Further, the authority was extended to items of direct 
spending (i.e., for entitlement programs) and certain limited tax benefits, 
as well as discretionary spending provided in annual appropriations acts. 
The Line Item Veto Act was incorporated into the Impoundment Control Act of 
1974 as Part C (Line Item Veto), Title X (Sections 1021-1027). On June 25, 
1998, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Clinton v. City of New York, held that the 
Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment Clause of the 
Constitution (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2).

Budget Enforcement Act of 1997

Title X of P.L. 105-33 (Balanced Budget Act of 1997); August 5, 1997; 111 
Stat. 677-712.

 The BEA of 1997 extended the discretionary spending limits and paygo 
requirement, first established under the BEA of 1990, for legislation 
enacted through the end of FY2002. In addition, it made permanent several 
changes in the 1974 Act that had been made on a temporary basis in the BEA 
of 1990, including the requirement that budget resolutions cover at least 
5, rather than 3, fiscal years; and made many other, mostly minor, changes 
in the sequestration and congressional budget processes.
Glossary of Budget Terms

    Allocation.--For congressional budget purposes, an allocation is 
  the distribution of budget authority and outlays to relevant 
  committees (and subcommittees) based on the levels contained in 
  the Congressional Budget Resolution.
    Appropriation Act.--A statute, under the jurisdiction of the 
  House and Senate Appropriations Committees, that generally 
  provides authority for Federal agencies to incur obligations and 
  to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes. 
  Examples of appropriation acts are regular, supplemental, and 
  continuing.
    Authorizing Committee.--A committee of the House or Senate, 
  other than the Appropriations Committee, which has legislative 
  jurisdiction over the operations of Federal programs and provides 
  the authorizing legislation that is usually a prerequisite for 
  making appropriations for those programs. Authorizing committees 
  also have jurisdiction over the administration and collection of 
  revenues and spending for mandatory programs since the 
  government's obligation to make payments for such programs is 
  contained in the authorizing legislation.
    Authorizing Legislation.--Substantive legislation proposed by a 
  committee of jurisdiction other than the Appropriations Committees 
  that establishes or continues the operation of a Federal program 
  or agency for a specific period of time or indefinitely. 
  Authorizing legislation may provide new budget authority or 
  authorize the future appropriation of either a fixed amount or 
  such sums as are necessary for a program.
    Baseline.--A benchmark for measuring the budgetary effects of 
  proposed changes in revenues or spending. The baseline is a 
  projection of spending, revenues, and deficits into the budget 
  year and out-years based on current laws and policies.
    Budget Authority.--The legal authority to enter into obligations 
  which will result in immediate or future outlays, including 
  appropriations, borrowing authority, contracting authority, and 
  the authority to spend offsetting receipts and collections.
    Budget Deficit.--For unified deficit, the amount by which the 
  government's total outlays exceed its total revenues for a given 
  fiscal year. For on-budget deficit, the amount by which the 
  government's on-budget (which excludes the two Social Security 
  trust funds and the transactions of the U.S. Postal Service) 
  outlays exceeds its on-budget revenues.
    Budget Resolution.--A concurrent resolution adopted by both 
  Houses of Congress as part of the annual budget and appropriations 
  process, setting forth an overall budget plan for Congress against 
  which individual appropriation bills, other spending bills, and 
  revenue measures are to be evaluated. As a plan of Congress, the 
  resolution is not presented to the President for signature and 
  does not have the force of law. The concurrent resolution must 
  contain budget levels for at least 5 fiscal years and may contain 
  reconciliation instructions to specified committees.
    Budget Surplus.--For the unified budget, the amount by which the 
  government's total revenues exceed its total outlays for a given 
  fiscal year. For on-budget, the amount by which the government's 
  on-budget (which excludes the two Social Security trust funds and 
  the transactions of the U.S. Postal Service) revenues exceeds its 
  on-budget outlays.
    Continuing Resolution.--An appropriation act that provides 
  spending authority for Federal agencies and programs to continue 
  in operation when action on the regular appropriation acts has not 
  been completed by the beginning of the fiscal year.
    Cost Estimates.--Estimates of the impact legislation under 
  consideration by Congress would have on the Federal budget if the 
  legislation became law. Costs estimates are provided to Congress 
  by the Congressional Budget Office.
    Credit Reform.--The method of controlling and accounting for 
  credit programs (loans and loan guarantees) in the Federal budget. 
  Unlike the rest of the budget, loans and loan guarantees are 
  accounted for on an accrual basis.
    Direct Spending.--Also known as mandatory spending. As defined 
  in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
  entitlement authority, the Food Stamp Program, and budget 
  authority provided by law other than in appropriation acts.
    Discretionary Spending.--A category of spending (budget 
  authority and outlays) provided in and controlled by annual 
  appropriation acts. (See also Appropriation Acts.)
    Entitlement.--A legal obligation of the Federal Government to 
  make payments to a person(s) or entity that meets the eligibility 
  criteria set in law and for which the budget authority is not 
  provided in advance in an appropriation act. Spending for 
  entitlement programs is controlled through the eligibility 
  criteria and benefit or payment rules. Examples of entitlements 
  are Social Security and Medicare.
    Emergency Spending.--Budget authority, designated by Congress as 
  emergency spending, is exempt (along with the outlays that flow 
  from it) from spending limits set forth in a concurrent resolution 
  on the budget.
    Federal Debt, Gross.--The total amount borrowed by the 
  government from the public or from government accounts.

Debt subject to limit.--A subset of gross Federal debt, debt subject to 
limit is Federal debt that is subject to a statutory limit on its issuance. 
The limit applies to Federal debt, excluding a small portion of the debt 
issued by the Department of the Treasury and all of the small amount of 
debt issued by other Federal agencies (primarily the Tennessee Valley 
Authority and the Postal Service). It has two components.--debt held by the 
government and debt held by the public.

Debt held by the government.--Represents the holdings of debt by Federal 
trust funds and other special government funds.

Debt held by the public.--Represents the holdings of debt by individuals, 
institutions, other buyers outside the Federal Government and the Federal 
Reserve System. The change in debt held by the public in any given year 
closely tracks the unified budget deficit for that year.

    Fiscal Policy.--Federal Government policies with respect to 
  taxes and spending that affect the amount of government debt as 
  well as the level, composition, and distribution of national 
  output and income.
    Fiscal Year.--A fiscal year is a 12-month accounting period. The 
  fiscal year for the Federal Government begins October 1 and ends 
  September 30. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year 
  in which it ends; for example, fiscal year 2007 is the year 
  beginning October 1, 2006 and ending September 30, 2007.
    Functional Classification.--A system of classifying budget 
  resources by major purpose so that budget authority and outlays 
  can be related in terms of the national needs being addressed (for 
  example, national defense, health) regardless of the agency 
  administering the program. There are currently 20 functions. A 
  function may be divided into two or more subfunctions depending 
  upon the complexity of the national need addressed by that 
  function.
    Impoundment.--A generic term referring to any action or inaction 
  by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government that defers or 
  precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority.
    Mandatory Spending.--Also known as direct spending. As defined 
  in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, 
  entitlement authority, the Food Stamp Program, and budget 
  authority provided by law other than in appropriation acts.
    Markup.--Meetings where congressional committees work on 
  language of bills or resolutions. At Budget Committee markups, the 
  House and Senate Budget Committees work on the language and 
  numbers contained in budget resolutions and legislation affecting 
  the congressional budget process.
    Obligation.--A legally binding commitment by the Federal 
  Government that will result in outlays, immediately or in the 
  future.
    Off-Budget.--Those budgetary accounts designated by law as 
  excluded from the unified budget totals. As of 2007, the revenues 
  and outlays of the two Social Security trust funds (the Old-Age 
  and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance 
  Trust Fund) and the transactions of the Postal Service are the 
  only off-budget accounts. Budget documents routinely report the 
  on-budget and off-budget amounts separately and then add them 
  together to arrive at the consolidated or unified government 
  totals.
    On-Budget.--All budgetary accounts other than those designated 
  by law as off-budget. (See also Off-Budget)
    Outlays.--Outlays are disbursements by the Treasury in the form 
  of checks, cash, or electronic funds transfers to liquidate a 
  Federal obligation. Outlays flow in part from budget authority 
  granted in prior years (outlays prior) and in part from budget 
  authority provided for the year in which the disbursements occur 
  (outlays new).
    Pay-As-You-Go (paygo).--A budgetary enforcement mechanism 
  originally set forth in the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), which 
  expired at the end of fiscal year 2002. Under this mechanism, 
  proposed changes in, or new permanent, law affecting direct 
  spending and revenues were expected to be deficit neutral. 
  Statutory paygo was enforced through sequestration (across-the-
  board cuts in certain direct spending programs). In addition to 
  statutory paygo, the Senate, in the concurrent resolution on the 
  budget, has also established various internal paygo rules, 
  enforced by a 60-vote point of order which is still in effect.
    President's Budget.--The document sent to Congress by the 
  President typically on the first Monday in February of each year, 
  requesting new budget authority for Federal programs and 
  estimating Federal revenues and outlays for the upcoming fiscal 
  year.
    Revenues.--Collections from the public arising from the 
  government's sovereign power to tax. Revenues include individual 
  and corporate income taxes, social insurance taxes (such as Social 
  Security payroll taxes), excise taxes, estate and gift taxes, 
  customs duties and the like.
    Reconciliation Process.--A special, fast-track process by which 
  Congress, in its budget resolution, includes reconciliation 
  instructions to specific committees, directing them to report 
  legislation by a certain date that changes spending and/or 
  revenues. Reconciliation legislation may also contain a change in 
  the debt limit. Reconciliation is governed by special rules that 
  limit debate and the ability of Senators to offer amendments.
    Rescission.--Legislation enacted by Congress that cancels the 
  availability of previously enacted budget authority before the 
  authority expires.
    Reserve Fund.--A provision in a budget resolution that grants 
  the chairman of the Budget Committee the authority to make changes 
  in budget aggregates and committee allocations once some condition 
  or conditions have been met.
    Scoring or Scorekeeping.--The process for estimating budget 
  authority, outlay, revenue and deficit levels that result from 
  legislative actions. The Committees on the Budget of the House and 
  Senate determine all estimates for congressional purposes. The 
  committees are assisted in the process by the Congressional Budget 
  Office (CBO) and, for legislation dealing with the Internal 
  Revenue Code, by the Joint Committee on Taxation, which provides 
  revenue estimates of such legislation through CBO. Scorekeeping 
  data prepared by the CBO include status reports on the effect of 
  congressional actions and comparisons of these actions to targets 
  and ceilings set by Congress. These reports are submitted by the 
  Budget Committees for printing in the Congressional Record on a 
  regular basis.
    Sequester or Sequestration.--Under Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) 
  provisions, which expired in 2002, the cancellation of budgetary 
  resources provided by discretionary appropriations or direct 
  spending laws. New budget authority, unobligated balances, direct 
  spending authority, and obligation limitations were 
  ``sequestrable'' resources; that is, they were subject to 
  reduction or cancellation under a Presidential sequester order.
    Supplemental Appropriation.--An act appropriating funds in 
  addition to those in the regular annual appropriations acts. 
  Supplemental appropriations are often designated as emergency 
  requirements and are for unexpected and non-recurring purposes.
    Unfunded Mandates.--In general, Federal statutes and regulations 
  that require State, local, or tribal governments or the private 
  sector to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without 
  being provided Federal funding to cover the costs.
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Appendix

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