    [Senate Document 109-24]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    109th Congress, 2nd Session                                   S. Doc. 109-24

                             Committee on the Budget

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                         -------------------------------

                                    1974-2006

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
                                WASHINGTON : 2006

                                     An Act

      To establish a new congressional budget process; to establish
    Committees on the Budget in each House; to establish a Congressional
    Budget Office; to establish a procedure providing congressional control
    over the impoundment of funds by the executive branch; and for other
    purposes.

     _the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974
                               United States Senate

                             Committee on the Budget

                            ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

    Judd Gregg, New Hampshire, Chairman            Kent Conrad, North
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico                     Dakota, Ranking
    Charles E. Grassley, Iowa                        Member
    Wayne Allard, Colorado                         Paul S. Sarbanes,
    Michael B. Enzi, Wyoming                         Maryland
    Jeff Sessions, Alabama                         Patty Murray,
    Jim Bunning, Kentucky                            Washington
    Michael D. Crapo, Idaho                        Ron Wyden, Oregon
    John Ensign, Nevada                            Russell D. Feingold,
    John Cornyn, Texas                               Wisconsin
    Lamar Alexander, Tennessee                     Tim Johnson, South
    Lindsey O. Graham, South Carolina                Dakota
                                                     Robert C. Byrd, West
                                                       Virginia
                                                     Bill Nelson, Florida
                                                     Debbie Stabenow,
                                                       Michigan
                                                     Robert Menendez, New
                                                       Jersey

                     Scott B. Gudes, Majority Staff Director
                         Mary Ann Naylor, Staff Director

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.041

                                 Acknowledgments

      The publication of this history benefited from the contributions of a
    number of congressional offices and agencies, including the
    Congressional Research Service (CRS) of the Library of Congress, the
    United States Senate Historical Office, and the Senate Library. The
    United States Senate Committee on the Budget especially wishes to
    acknowledge the outstanding contributions of Robert Keith, budget
    process specialist, and Mary Frances Bley and Jerry V. Mansfield,
    librarians, of CRS; Tara J. Olivero, archivist and historian serving
    with the Committee; and Lynne Seymour, chief clerk of the Committee.
    This history would not have been possible without their significant
    expertise and effort.

      Integral to the success of this project was Suzanne Kayne of the
    Government Printing Office and Senate Budget Committee senior staff Jim
    Hearn, Lisa Konwinski, John Righter, and Cheri Reidy, who provided keen
    editorial support.

      Finally, the Committee wishes to express appreciation to the former
    professional staff who contributed to the production of this history
    through personal interviews and recollections. These public servants
    served the members of the Senate Budget Committee and the Nation with
    esprit and distinction. Their efforts and accomplishments furthered the
    field of financial management, and made tangible, lasting improvements
    to the budget of the United States Government and the congressional
    budget process.

                                  Introduction

      The following history of the Senate Budget Committee and the
    congressional budget process was created in a bipartisan effort.
    Significant contributions were made by Committee staff, the
    Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, and the
    Office of the Senate Historian. Several individuals are highlighted in
    the acknowledgments.

      The Budget Committee is one of the Senate's youngest committees,
    having been created by the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. The
    Committee, the budget resolution and reconciliation process, and
    enforcement authorities were created to enable Congress to create,
    enforce, and manage the annual Federal budget, including all types of
    Federal spending and revenues. From the outset under the first chairman
    and ranking member, Senators Edmund S. Muskie and Peter H. Dominick, the
    Committee has benefited from effective leadership and membership, and it
    has been supported by an outstanding professional staff.

      One responsibility of the Committee is to facilitate an understanding
    by the Congress and public of the policies, programs, financial
    resources, and estimates included in the budget, and how the
    congressional budget process works to enforce the budget blueprint. In
    that spirit, this history, including excerpts from interviews with
    former senior staff, is provided. We hope that the public, students, and
    employees of the three branches of government will find this volume
    informative and useful.

                         PREPARED UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF

                            JUDD GREGG, CHAIRMAN, AND

                           KENT CONRAD, RANKING MEMBER

                             COMMITTEE ON THE BUDGET

                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                                 109TH CONGRESS
                                    Contents

                                                                        Page
      Acknowledgments-------------------------------------------         VII
      Introduction----------------------------------------------          IX
      Principal Duties and Functions of the Senate Committee on
          the Budget--------------------------------------------           1
        Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget-------------------------------1
        Reconciliation Legislation-----------------------------------------7
        Budget Process Reform Proposals-----------------------------------11
        Executive Impoundment Proposals and Impoundment Legislation-------13
        Oversight of the Congressional Budget Office----------------------14
        Consideration of the Nomination of the Director and Deputy Director
          of the Office of Management and Budget--------------------------16
      History of the Congressional Budget Process and the Senate
          Committee on the Budget-------------------------------          19
        Background--------------------------------------------------------19
        Prelude to the 1974 Reform----------------------------------------24
        The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974------28
        The First Decade: From ``Dry Run'' to Reconciliation--------------39
        Coping with Deficits: the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and Related La47
        Moving Toward Balance: Budget Enforcement Laws in the 1990s and the
          Emergence of Surpluses------------------------------------------52
        Congressional Budgeting in the 21st Century-----------------------60
      Staff Recollections---------------------------------------          71
        Beginnings--------------------------------------------------------73

          People and Structure                                            73
          Carroll Arms                                                    74

                                                                        Page

    Sid Brown (the Committee's First Chief of Budget Review)              75

    Technology                                                            75
        Markups, Resolutions, and the Senate Floor------------------------76
        Tests of Budget Enforcement---------------------------------------80
        Committee Dynamics------------------------------------------------82
        Interaction with the Senate Leadership and the Executive Branch---83
        Reconciliation----------------------------------------------------86
        Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)---------------------------------------90
        Post-GRH Budget Agreements----------------------------------------92

           1987 Agreements: Omnibus Reconciliation (OBRA) and Balanced
               Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act     92
           1989 Agreement: OBRA                                           93
           1990 Agreements: Budget Enforcement Act, Andrews Air
               Force Base Summit                                          94
           1993 Agreement: OBRA                                           96
           1997 Agreement: Balanced Budget Act                            97
        The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)-----------------------------98
        Contemporary Budgeting--------------------------------------------99
        Reflections on the Budget Process and Committee Successes and
          Challenges-----------------------------------------------------102
      Leadership and Membership of the Senate Committee on the
          Budget------------------------------------------------         109
        Listing of Chairmen and Ranking Members--------------------------109
        Biographies of Chairmen and Ranking Members----------------------111
           Edmund S. Muskie, Maine                                       111
           Peter H. Dominick, Colorado                                   113
           Henry Bellmon, Oklahoma                                       115
           Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina                            117
           Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico                                  119
           Lawton Chiles, Florida                                        121
           Jim Sasser, Tennessee                                         123
           J. James Exon, Nebraska                                       125
           Frank R. Lautenberg, New Jersey                               127
           Kent Conrad, North Dakota                                     129

                                                                        Page

           Don Nickles, Oklahoma                                         131
           Judd Gregg, New Hampshire                                     133
        Committee Members Who Have Served in Other Elective or Appointive
          Positions------------------------------------------------------135
        Membership of the Committee by Congress--------------------------137
        Membership of the Committee by State-----------------------------147
        Alphabetical Listing of Members of the Committee-----------------155
        Majority Staff Directors to the Committee------------------------159
        Minority Staff Directors to the Committee------------------------160
        Majority Counsels to the Committee-------------------------------161
        Minority Counsels to the Committee-------------------------------162
        Chief Clerks to the Committee------------------------------------163
      Authorities Pertaining to the Jurisdiction and Duties of
          the Senate Committee on the Budget--------------------         165
        Statutory Provisions---------------------------------------------165
        Senate Rule XXV, Paragraph (e)-----------------------------------167
        S. Res. 445 (108th Congress)-------------------------------------168
        Standing Order on the Referral of Budget Process Legislation (197169
        S. Res. 45 (94th Congress)---------------------------------------170
        Committee Rules of Procedure-------------------------------------171
      Legislation Developed by the Senate Committee on the
          Budget------------------------------------------------         172
        Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget: Fiscal Years 1976-2007-----172
        Budget Reconciliation Acts---------------------------------------173
        Other Significant Legislation Enacted Into Law-------------------175
      Glossary of Budget Terms----------------------------------         179
      Bibliography----------------------------------------------         185
      Appendix--------------------------------------------------         189
        Opening Statements from First Committee Hearing, August 14, 1974-189
        Flow Chart of the Budget and Appropriations Process--------------192

                  Principal Duties and Functions of the Senate
                             Committee on the Budget

    The principal duties and functions of the Senate Committee on the Budget
    are set forth in the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
    1974 (the 1974 Act), the Standing Rules of the Senate, and other
    authorities (these authorities are identified and discussed in more detail
    in a later section). Over the years, the Committee's duties and functions
    have been modified or supplemented through the enactment of amendments to
    the 1974 Act, the enactment of new laws, the inclusion of procedural
    features in annual budget resolutions, changes in Senate rules, and through
    other means.

    In brief, the Senate Committee on the Budget's principal duties and
    functions include: (1) the development and enforcement each year of a
    concurrent resolution on the budget, which serves as a framework for
    subsequent congressional action on spending, revenue, and debt-limit
    legislation; (2) when the Committee so determines, the initiation and
    enforcement of the budget reconciliation process, which involves changing
    existing law through reconciliation legislation to bring spending, revenue,
    or debt-limit levels into conformity with budget resolution assumptions;
    (3) the development and implementation of budget process reform
    legislation; (4) the review of the broad economic and budgetary
    implications of executive impoundment proposals and compliance with
    impoundment control procedures; (5) the oversight of the Congressional
    Budget Office (CBO); and (6) the consideration of the nomination of the
    Director and Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).
    These duties and functions are discussed in more detail below.

                    Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget

    Section 301 (2 U.S.C. 632) of the 1974 Act requires Congress, by April 15
    of each year, to complete action on a concurrent resolution on the budget
    for the fiscal year beginning on October 1 of that year. The central
    purpose of a budget resolution is to set a blueprint for the overall fiscal
    and budgetary policy and to establish a framework for the subsequent
    consideration of spending, revenue, and debt-limit legislation during the
    session (and into the following session). The 1974 Act did not dictate that
    Congress annually approve a particular fiscal and budgetary policy (such as
    a balanced budget or restrictive/stimulative fiscal policy), but relies on
    the House and Senate to determine the appropriate mix of budget policies
    each year. Budget resolutions and other budgetary legislation are
    considered under a timetable set forth in Section 300 (2 U.S.C. 631) of the
    1974 Act. The timetable is meant to help coordinate the various
    congressional actions needed to implement annual fiscal and budgetary
    policy.

    In times of weak economic growth or recession, the fiscal policy reflected
    in the budget resolution may be expansionary, recommending revenue
    reductions, spending increases, or a combination of the two to spur the
    economy. When economic conditions change, the fiscal policy underlying the
    budget resolution may be adjusted or reversed, calling instead for revenue
    increases, spending reductions, or both. As a consequence of adopting
    different fiscal policies and economic goals for different circumstances,
    the budget resolution may project deficits in some years and surpluses in
    others.

    Furthermore, the budget resolution reflects changing national priorities.
    Spending for national defense, for example, may surge relative to
    nondefense spending during times of war, but constrict when conflict is
    ended. Spending for health care and income security, as another example,
    may accelerate more quickly compared to other domestic spending as the
    population ages.

    Concurrent resolutions, unlike bills or joint resolutions, are not sent to
    the President for his approval and do not become law. Instead, they
    represent the mutual agreement of the Senate and House of Representatives.
    In order to implement the fiscal and budgetary policy goals embodied in a
    budget resolution, Congress and the President must enact spending, revenue,
    and debt-limit legislation into law.

    In the case of budget resolutions, each Chamber originates its own
    concurrent resolution (as an S. Con. Res. or an H. Con. Res.). Through the
    late 1980s, the Senate and House alternated in the use of Senate and House
    concurrent resolutions as the final legislative vehicle for budget
    resolutions, but since then they have used House concurrent resolutions as
    the final vehicle in every instance of a conference report that was agreed
    to by both bodies.

    The 1974 Act originally required that the Senate and House adopt two budget
    resolutions each year--an advisory budget resolution in the spring (by May
    15) and a binding budget resolution in the fall (by September 15). Congress
    adopted the second required budget resolution from FY1976 through FY1982.
    For the following several years, through FY1986, Congress did not adopt a
    second budget resolution; instead it relied on a feature in the first
    budget resolution that automatically deemed it to be the second budget
    resolution on October 1 if a second budget resolution had not been adopted
    by that date. In 1985, Congress amended the 1974 Act to require only a
    single budget resolution each year, in the spring, and advanced its due
    date by 1 month, to April 15; this change first took effect for FY1987.

    Section 304 (2 U.S.C. 635) of the Act allows Congress to adopt a revised
    budget resolution at any time. Only once did Congress adopt a third budget
    resolution (FY1977). After Congress stopped using second budget resolutions
    (FY1982), whenever it wanted to make revisions in the budget resolution
    levels for the current year, it did so in the budget resolution for the
    following fiscal year.

    The budget resolution has several required elements, as set forth in
    Section 301 of the Act, encompassing ``budget aggregates,'' functional
    allocations of spending, and, for Senate enforcement purposes only, revenue
    and outlay levels of the off-budget Social Security trust funds.

    First, the resolution must set forth the following ``budget aggregates''
    for each fiscal year covered:

           total on-budget spending, in the form of both new
      budget authority (which provides legal authority for agencies to
      incur financial obligations) and outlays (which represents
      payments from the Treasury Department, usually in the form of
      electronic fund transfers or checks issued, to liquidate
      obligations);
           total on-budget revenues (which involves income to
      the Federal Government from such sources as individual and
      corporate income taxes, social insurance taxes, excise taxes and
      tariffs), and the amount by which revenues should be increased or
      decreased through legislative action;
           the on-budget surplus (an excess of revenues over
      outlays) or the deficit (an excess of outlays over revenues); and
           the public debt (which corresponds to the statutory
      level of debt, owed both to the public and to certain Federal
      trust funds, that would be necessary to accommodate the levels of
      spending and revenues assumed in the budget resolution).

    Second, the budget resolution is required to set forth the amounts of new
    budget authority and outlays for each major functional category. Although
    the 1974 Act does not define the term ``major functional category,'' the
    current practice followed by Congress is to include 20 functional
    categories of the budget, covering such categories as National Defense
    (050), International Affairs (150), Energy (270), Agriculture (350),
    Transportation (400), Health (550) and Income Security (600).

    Finally, the transactions of off-budget entities, which presently include
    the two Social Security trust funds (the Federal Old-Age and Survivors
    Insurance Trust Fund and the Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund) and
    the operations of the Postal Service, are not reflected in the aggregates
    and the functional allocations of spending in the budget resolution. For
    purposes of a Senate-only point of order intended to prevent legislative
    action that would erode the long-range balances in the Social Security
    trust funds, the budget resolution must also include revenue and outlay
    levels for those two funds.

    Section 301 also specifies several optional elements that may be included
    in a budget resolution and affords additional flexibility in budget
    resolution content by means of an ``elastic clause'' in Section 301(b)(4).
    The clause stipulates that a budget resolution may ``set forth such other
    matters, and require such other procedures, relating to the budget, as may
    be appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Act.''

    Development of the annual budget resolution is the responsibility of the
    Senate and House Budget Committees. Each year, the process followed by the
    Senate Budget Committee (which is similar to the process followed by the
    House Budget Committee) begins when it receives an annual report from CBO,
    usually in late January, on the budget and economic outlook, which, since
    1996, covers the next 10 years (including baseline budget projections that
    estimate future spending and revenue levels without any policy changes) and
    the President submits his budget to Congress, which is due no later than
    the first Monday in February. The Committee then holds hearings to solicit
    testimony from witnesses such as the Treasury Secretary, the Director of
    OMB, the Director of CBO, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve, and Cabinet
    secretaries, among others.

    In addition to the initial CBO report on the budget and economic outlook,
    which is updated later in the session, the Committee receives CBO reports
    on other budget topics, including options for savings; annual reports on
    unauthorized appropriations and expiring authorizations, which are
    distributed to all committees; and CBO's analysis of the President's
    budget, which is prepared at the request of the Senate Appropriations
    Committee. The Budget Committee also receives statements, as provided for
    under Section 301, from the other Senate committees presenting their views
    and estimates on budget matters within their jurisdiction.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.034

     2001, The Washington Post. Photo by Ray Lustig. Reprinted with
    Permission.

    Former Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan at his 17th
    appearance before the Senate Budget Committee in 2001.

    The Senate Budget Committee marks up the budget resolution in open session
    generally in the same manner that other Senate committees mark up
    legislation. The markup usually proceeds with a Chairman's Mark, which is
    open to the offering of amendments. Following the consideration of all
    amendments and motions, the Budget Committee votes on ordering the budget
    resolution reported. A reported budget resolution may or may not be
    accompanied by a written report; when a written report is not issued, the
    Budget Committee usually issues a committee print in lieu of a report to
    explain its recommendations.

    The chairman of the Budget Committee manages consideration of the budget
    resolution on the Senate floor, and heads the delegation of Senators
    appointed to a conference committee with Members from the House. The
    chairman also manages consideration of the conference report on the Senate
    floor and any other motions necessary to bring the Senate and House into
    final agreement on the measure.

    Most legislation considered in the Senate is not subject to debate
    limitations or restrictions on the subject matter of amendments; Senators
    may debate such legislation at length, even engaging in extended debate or
    a filibuster, and offer non-germane amendments dealing with topics other
    than those encompassed by the underlying measure. Even the issue of whether
    to take up legislation for consideration, as reflected in the motion to
    proceed to the consideration of a measure, generally may be debated at
    length.

    The consideration of a budget resolution, on the other hand, is governed by
    expedited procedures set forth in Section 305 (2 U.S.C. 636) of the 1974
    Act and under Senate precedents. First, the motion to proceed to the
    consideration of a budget resolution is not debatable. Second, the time for
    debate on a budget resolution is limited to 50 hours and is divided equally
    between the majority and minority. (While the 50-hour limitation includes
    time spent debating amendments, motions, and appeals, and time spent in
    quorum calls, it does not include time spent on roll call votes or on
    quorum calls immediately preceding a vote.) Additional time limits apply to
    the debate on amendments, motions, and appeals. A 10-hour limitation on
    debate applies to the consideration of conference reports on budget
    resolutions, and a 15-hour limitation applies to revised budget
    resolutions. Third, amendments offered from the floor must be germane.
    Other expediting procedures apply as well.

    Under the timetable of the congressional budget process (see table 1), the
    House and Senate are scheduled to reach final agreement on the budget
    resolution by April 15 (as previously mentioned, the deadline originally
    was set as May 15, but was moved forward beginning with FY1987). In
    practice, the budget resolution often is not agreed to until after the
    deadline. Because the deadline was established under the rulemaking
    authority of the House and Senate, no legal consequences ensue if
    congressional action is not completed by that time.

    The Budget Committee also plays a crucial role with respect to enforcing
    the parameters of the current budget resolution and the requirements under
    the 1974 Act and other authorities, when legislation is considered by the
    Senate. Enforcement relies upon the reconciliation process (discussed
    below), points of order, and the dissemination of ``scorekeeping'' data and
    other information.

    Various points of order are available under the 1974 Act, as well as
    procedural features included in budget resolutions under authority of the
    elastic clause and other authorities, which may make it more difficult to
    consider and enact measures, amendments, conference reports, or motions
    that violate budgetary parameters or requirements. Under Section 312 (2
    U.S.C. 643) of the 1974 Act, the chairman of the Budget Committee advises
    the Presiding Officer of the Senate as to the budgetary impacts associated
    with legislation subject to a point of order.

     TABLE 1.--TIMETABLE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET PROCESS (SECTION 300 OF
                      THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET ACT OF 1974)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   On or before                    Action to be completed
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    First Monday in February..................  President submits his
                                                 budget.
     February 15..............................  Congressional Budget Office
                                                 submits report to Budget
                                                 Committees.
     Not later than 6 weeks after President     Committees submit views and
     submits budget.                             estimates to Budget
                                                 Committees.
     April 1..................................  Senate Budget Committee
                                                 reports concurrent
                                                 resolution on the budget.
     April 15.................................  Congress completes action on
                                                 concurrent resolution on
                                                 the budget.
     May 15...................................  Annual appropriation bills
                                                 may be considered in the
                                                 House.
     June 10..................................   House Appropriations
                                                 Committee reports last
                                                 annual appropriation bill.
     June 15..................................  Congress completes action on
                                                 reconciliation legislation.
     June 30..................................  House completes action on
                                                 annual appropriation bills.
     October 1................................  Fiscal year begins.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As part of a broad scorekeeping process under Section 308 (2 U.S.C. 639) of
    the 1974 Act, the Budget Committee integrates information on the costs of
    legislation, as estimated by CBO (for spending measures) and the Joint
    Committee on Taxation (JCT) (for revenue measures), into a complete tally
    so that the status of spending and revenue levels under the current budget
    resolution may be evaluated at any time. (The requirement that revenue
    estimates of the JCT be used for these purposes is set forth in Section
    201(f) (2 U.S.C. 601(f)) of the 1974 Act.) The chairman of the Budget
    Committee inserts scorekeeping reports into the Congressional Record
    periodically to apprise Members of the current levels of spending and
    revenues, and the amounts still available for legislative action under
    budget resolution assumptions.

    Finally, the chairman of the Budget Committee notifies the Senate from time
    to time regarding adjustments made to budget resolution levels, as
    prescribed by Section 314 (2 U.S.C. 645) of the 1974 Act, or pursuant to
    authority under reserve funds or other procedural elements contained in
    budget resolutions.

                         Reconciliation Legislation

    A budget resolution typically reflects many different assumptions regarding
    legislative action expected to occur during a session that would cause
    revenue and spending levels to be changed from baseline amounts. (The
    Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 classified Federal spending into two types--
    discretionary spending, which is controlled in annual appropriation acts;
    and direct spending, which is controlled in authorizing legislation and
    often is used to fund entitlement programs, such as Medicare, unemployment
    compensation, and Federal retirement.) Most revenue collections and direct
    spending, however, occurs automatically each year under permanent law;
    therefore, if the committees with jurisdiction over the revenue and direct
    spending programs do not report legislation to carry out the budget
    resolution policies by amending existing law, revenue and direct spending
    for these programs likely will continue without change from baseline
    projections.

    The budget reconciliation process is an optional procedure, authorized
    under Section 310 (2 U.S.C. 641) of the 1974 Act, that operates as an
    adjunct to the budget resolution process. The reconciliation process
    enhances Congress's ability to change current law in order to bring
    revenue, spending, and debt-limit levels into conformity with the
    assumptions of the budget resolution. Discretionary spending levels can be
    addressed each year as Congress considers the annual appropriations acts;
    consequently, the reconciliation process focuses principally on direct
    spending and revenue levels.

     Reconciliation is a two-stage process. First, reconciliation instructions
    are included in the budget resolution, directing the appropriate committees
    to develop legislation achieving the desired budgetary outcomes.
    Reconciliation instructions take the form of numerical targets and are not
    program-specific. If the budget resolution instructs more than one
    committee in a Chamber, then the instructed committees submit their
    legislative recommendations to their respective Budget Committees by the
    deadline prescribed in the budget resolution. The Budget Committees
    incorporate the submissions into an omnibus budget reconciliation bill (see
    table 2) without making any substantive revisions. In cases where only one
    committee has been instructed, the process allows that committee to report
    its reconciliation legislation directly to its parent Chamber, thus
    bypassing the Budget Committee.

     The second step involves consideration of the resultant reconciliation
    legislation by the House and Senate under expedited procedures. As
    indicated previously, when the Senate considers most legislation, any
    Senator may speak at length (including engaging in a filibuster), and
    Senators may offer amendments that are not germane. Under reconciliation
    procedures, however, debate in the Senate on any reconciliation measure is
    limited to 20 hours (and 10 hours on a conference report), and amendments
    must be germane and not include extraneous matter. In the House, the Rules
    Committee typically recommends a special rule for the consideration of a
    reconciliation measure that places restrictions on debate time and the
    offering of amendments.

     In some years, budget resolutions include reconciliation instructions that
    afford the House and Senate the option of considering two or more types of
    reconciliation measures. Under current Senate practices, there can be only
    one revenue reconciliation measure, one spending reconciliation measure,
    and one debt-limit reconciliation measure, or some combination thereof.

                     TABLE 2.--SELECTED RECONCILIATION ACTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980
    P.L. 96-499 (December 5, 1980)
        This Act was the first reconciliation measure to be passed by the
     House and Senate. As signed into law by President Carter, the Act
     reduced the FY1981 deficit by about $9 billion, split roughly between
     spending reductions (including reductions in discretionary
     appropriations) and revenue increases.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981
    P.L. 97-35 (August 13, 1981)
        President Reagan used this Act, as well as a tax-cut bill considered
     outside of the reconciliation process, to advance much of his
     legislative agenda in his first year in office. The Act represented a
     significant expansion of the reconciliation process--the 3-year savings
     associated with the Act amounted to $130 billion, and many extraneous
     provisions were included. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 (P.L.
     97-34) reduced revenues by $282 billion over 3 years.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990
    P.L. 101-508 (November 5, 1990)
        After a lengthy budget summit at Andrews Air Force Base, Congress
     sent President George H.W. Bush a bill reducing the deficit by $482
     billion over 5 years, including $158 billion in revenue increases and
     $324 billion in spending cuts and debt service savings. The Act also
     included the Budget Enforcement Act, which established caps on
     appropriations and a pay-as-you-go (paygo) requirement.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
    P.L. 103-66 (August 10, 1993)
        This reconciliation measure, signed into law by President Clinton
     during his first year in office, reduced the deficit by $496 billion
     over 5 years, including $241 billion in revenue increases and $255
     billion in spending cuts and debt service savings. Additionally, it
     extended the statutory caps on appropriations and the paygo requirement
     through FY1998.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Balanced Budget Act of 1995
    H.R. 2491
        This reconciliation measure included policies to reduce the deficit
     by $363 billion over 7 years (1996-2002), including $577 billion in
     spending cuts and $214 billion in tax relief. The bill was vetoed by
     President Clinton on December 6, 1995.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                TABLE 2.--SELECTED RECONCILIATION ACTS--Continued
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997
    P.L. 105-33 (August 5, 1997) and P.L. 105-34 (August 5, 1997)
        Taken together, these two reconciliation acts reduced the deficit by
     $118 billion over 5 years, including spending cuts and debt service
     savings of $198 billion and $80 billion in revenue reductions. They
     represent one of three instances in which two separate reconciliation
     acts were enacted pursuant to a single budget resolution--the other two
     instances occurred in 1982 and 2005 (carrying over into 2006). The
     Balanced Budget Act of 1997 extended the statutory caps on
     appropriations and the paygo requirement though FY2002.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001
    P.L. 107-16 (June 7, 2001)
        Public Law 107-16 was signed by President George W. Bush and reduced
     revenues significantly; revenue reductions, together with outlay
     increases for refundable tax credits, reduced the projected surplus by
     $1.349 trillion over FY2001-FY2011. The tax cuts in the Act were
     scheduled to sunset in no more than 10 years in order to comply with
     the Senate's ``Byrd rule'' against extraneous matter in reconciliation
     legislation (Section 313 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

     Once the reconciliation legislation called for in the budget resolution
    has been approved or vetoed by the President, the process is concluded.
    Congress cannot develop another reconciliation bill in the wake of a veto
    without first adopting another budget resolution containing reconciliation
    instructions. On occasion, such as under the budget resolution for FY2006,
    final action on reconciliation legislation was not completed until the
    following session.

     As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year
    that the congressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with
    the first use of reconciliation by both the House and Senate in 1980,
    however, reconciliation has been used in most years. Congress has sent the
    President 21 reconciliation measures over the years; 18 were signed into
    law and 3 were vetoed (and the vetoes were not overridden).

     A special reconciliation process, applicable only in the Senate, was
    established as Section 258C (2 U.S.C. 907d) of the Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. The purpose of the process was to
    enable the Senate to quickly pass an alternate deficit-reduction measure
    whenever a sequestration report from the OMB Director indicated that a
    sequester under the pay-as-you-go requirement or the deficit targets
    otherwise would be necessary. The Senate never used the special
    reconciliation process under Section 258C.

    Budget Process Reform Proposals

     Each Congress, legislation is introduced on a wide variety of budget
    process reform proposals and referred to the Budget Committee. The Budget
    Committee's jurisdiction over budget process matters is established by the
    1974 Act, Senate Rule XXV, and especially S. Res. 445, which the Senate
    agreed to on October 9, 2004.\1\

    \1\ For many years, the Senate Budget Committee shared jurisdiction over
    the Federal budget process with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
    (the predecessor to the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    Committee) under the terms of a standing order reached by unanimous consent
    in 1977. In 2004, the Senate adopted S. Res. 445, which consolidated
    jurisdiction over the Federal budget process in the Budget Committee. These
    authorities pertaining to the jurisdiction of the Budget Committee are
    discussed in more detail in a later section of this document.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.038

    Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Photography Studio.

    Chairman Judd Gregg, Ranking Member Kent Conrad, Committee members, and
    staff during the markup for the Stop Over Spending Act of 2006. The Act
    proposed measures to reform the budget process.

     Some budget process reform legislation is comprehensive in scope, while
    other such legislation is targeted toward particular issues. During the
    109th Congress, for example, legislation was introduced and referred to the
    Budget Committee dealing with such specific matters as biennial budgeting,
    line-item veto, a Social Security lockbox, emergency reserve funds, pay-as-
    you-go procedures, and a Federal commission to examine proposals dealing
    with long-term budgetary challenges, as well as comprehensive legislation
    dealing with several of these matters, and more, in a single bill.

     The Budget Committee often works closely with other Senate committees on
    legislation including budget process reforms because of the significant
    range of issues that may be involved. In addition to the Budget Committee,
    which exercises jurisdiction over the Federal budget process, the Rules and
    Administration Committee has jurisdiction over the Standing Rules of the
    Senate, the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has
    jurisdiction over Federal accounting and management laws, and the
    Appropriations Committee has significant jurisdiction over impoundments
    proposed by the President. Further, the Senate may decide to include budget
    process reforms in legislation dealing with other, unrelated subjects.
    Legislation increasing the public debt limit (which is under the
    jurisdiction of the Finance Committee), for example, has been the vehicle
    in the past for important changes in the budget process. Other significant
    changes in the budget process have been included in omnibus reconciliation
    legislation.

     Examples of past budget process reforms that have been enacted into law,
    and in which the Budget Committee was involved extensively, include, among
    others: (1) the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985
    (also known as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act); (2) the Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987; (3) the Budget
    Enforcement Act of 1990; (4) budget process provisions in the Omnibus
    Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993; (5) the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
    1995; (6) the Line Item Veto Act (1996); and (7) the Budget Enforcement Act
    of 1997. A more detailed listing of budget process reform legislation is
    provided in a later section of this document.

     The Budget Committee's jurisdiction over budget process reform proposals
    is protected by Section 306 (2 U.S.C. 637) of the 1974 Act. Under Section
    306, no measure or motion dealing with matters under the Budget Committee's
    jurisdiction may be considered unless it has been reported by, or
    discharged from, the Committee (unless it is an amendment to such a
    measure). The prohibition is enforceable by a point of order that may be
    waived by the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60
    Senators, if no seats are vacant). The section reads as follows:

        Sec. 306.--Legislation Dealing With Congressional Budget Must Be
    Handled by Budget Committees.
          No bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference report,
    dealing with any matter which is within the jurisdiction of the
    Committee on the Budget of either House shall be considered in that
    House unless it is a bill or resolution which has been reported by
    the Committee on the Budget of that House (or from the consideration
    of which such committee has been discharged) or unless it is an
    amendment to such a bill or resolution.

         Executive Impoundment Proposals and Impoundment Legislation

     The Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (Title X of the 1974 Act) established
    procedures for the proposal by the President of impoundments and their
    consideration by Congress. The Act classifies impoundments into two types--
    rescissions, which cancel budget authority previously provided in law, and
    deferrals, which delay the obligation or expenditure of budget authority.

     In order to rescind or defer budget authority, the President is required
    to submit to Congress a message detailing his recommendations. In the case
    of rescissions, the President may withhold funds from obligation for 45
    days of ``continuous session'' while Congress considers the request. If
    Congress does not enact legislation approving the rescission during this
    period, then the funds must be released for obligation. The Impoundment
    Control Act establishes rescission bills as the vehicles for approving
    rescissions, and they are considered under expedited procedures in each
    Chamber. Deferrals take effect and remain in effect (only for a temporary
    period, so that the funds do not lapse) unless overturned by Congress. The
    legislative means for overturning deferrals provided for in the Impoundment
    Control Act, the one-House legislative veto, was invalidated by the Supreme
    Court in the INS v. Chadha case in 1986. The Comptroller General monitors
    the impoundment process for Congress, issuing a report evaluating
    Presidential impoundment messages and submitting messages to Congress when
    unreported impoundments are discovered.

     The Appropriations Committee historically has exercised jurisdiction in
    the Senate over the impoundment of appropriated funds. The Senate Budget
    Committee's involvement in impoundment matters is rooted in various
    authorities. Under the terms of a unanimous consent agreement reached in
    1975, the Senate Budget Committee was given jurisdiction over impoundment
    messages and legislation for the purpose of considering the ``macroeconomic
    implications, impact on priorities and aggregate spending levels, and the
    legality of the President's use of the deferral and rescission mechanism
    under title X.'' The agreement was modified on April 11, 1986, in the wake
    of the Chadha decision. A standing order established in 1977, and
    effectively superseded by the Senate's adoption of S. Res. 445 in 2004,
    assigns the Budget Committee responsibilities over definitions of
    impoundment and the process by which impoundments are reported to and
    considered by Congress.

     Although Presidents have from time to time proposed a significant level of
    impoundments, the curtailment of spending through impoundment generally has
    not been significant.

    Oversight of the Congressional Budget Office

     The Congressional Budget Office was created by Title II of the 1974 Act.
    Section 201 (2 U.S.C. 601) established CBO, Section 202 (2 U.S.C. 602)
    identified its duties and functions, and Section 203 (2 U.S.C. 603) set
    forth rules and guidelines for public access to budget data.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.031

     The New Yorker Collection 1996 Peter Steiner from cartoonbank.com. All
    Rights Reserved.

     The 1974 Act envisioned a close relationship between CBO and the Budget
    Committees, which is reflected mainly in the stated duties and functions of
    each entity.

     Section 202 establishes a hierarchy among the congressional clients that
    CBO serves. Section 202(a) identifies the primary duty and function of CBO
    as being:

    . . . to provide to the Committees on the Budget of both Houses
    information which will assist such committees in the discharge of all
    matters within their jurisdictions, including (1) information with
    respect to the budget, appropriations bills, and other bills authorizing
    or providing new budget authority or tax expenditures, (2) information
    with respect to revenues, receipts, estimated future revenues and
    receipts, and changing revenue conditions, and (3) such related
    information as such Committees may request.

     Following the Budget Committees, Section 202 directs CBO to provide
    assistance to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the House
    Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee, then to other
    House and Senate committees and joint committees, and Members of Congress.

     Title I of the 1974 Act created the two Budget Committees. In Section
    102(a), Senate Rule XXV was modified in part to impose on the Senate Budget
    Committee the duty ``to review, on a continuing basis, the conduct by the
    Congressional Budget Office of its functions and duties.'' Section 101(c)
    of the 1974 Act amended House Rule XI in part with identical language
    regarding the duty to continuously review CBO's conduct.

     The standing order established in 1977, and effectively superseded by S.
    Res. 445 in 2004, assigns jurisdiction over legislation affecting the
    functions, duties, and powers of CBO to the Senate Budget Committee.

     The Budget Committee reviews CBO's conduct in several ways, including
    through meetings and correspondence with the CBO Director and staff, and
    more formally, through periodic oversight hearings. Opportunities to review
    CBO's conduct indirectly occur as well, especially during hearings on
    Federal budgetary issues, including the CBO Director's annual testimony on
    the budget and economic outlook and the update later in the session, and
    hearings on budget process and budget concept issues.

     Finally, the Budget Committee plays a role in the process of selecting a
    CBO Director for each 4-year term. While the Speaker of the House and the
    President pro tempore of the Senate officially appoint the CBO Director,
    they are required under Section 201 of the 1974 Act to do so ``after
    considering recommendations received from the Committees on the Budget of
    the House and Senate.'' Under informal procedures that have been used in
    the past, the two Budget Committees have alternated in making
    recommendations to the leadership regarding who should be appointed to the
    position, and the leadership has concurred in their recommendations.

     Six persons have served as CBO Director and four Deputy Directors have
    served as Acting Director during periods when the Director's appointment
    was delayed or the Director left the position before the term ended (see
    table 3).

             TABLE 3.--DIRECTORS OF THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Alice M. Rivlin...........................  1975-1979 and 1979-1983
                                                 terms.
    Rudolph G. Penner.........................  1983-1987 term.
    Robert D. Reischauer......................  1987-1991 and 1991-1995
                                                 terms.
    June Ellenoff O'Neill.....................  1995-1999 term.
    Dan L. Crippen............................  1999-2003 term.
    Douglas Holtz-Eakin.......................  2003-2007 term.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, Deputy Directors Edward Gramlich, James Blum, Barry
      Anderson, and Donald Marron served as Acting Director when the
      Director's appointment was delayed or the Director left the position
      before the term ended.

     Funding for CBO is provided in annual appropriation acts. Accordingly,
    fiscal oversight of CBO is conducted by the House and Senate Appropriations
    Committees.

    Consideration of the Nomination of the Director and Deputy Director of the
    Office of Management and Budget

     For many years, nominations to the position of the Director of the Office
    of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Deputy Directors, had been referred
    exclusively to the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee. Late in the 108th
    Congress, the Senate considered S. Res. 445, a measure pertaining mainly to
    reform of congressional oversight of intelligence and jurisdictional
    changes relating to homeland security matters. Among other things, the
    Governmental Affairs Committee was renamed the Homeland Security and
    Governmental Affairs Committee and its jurisdiction over homeland security
    matters was consolidated. The jurisdiction of the renamed committee also
    was modified to provide joint jurisdiction with the Budget Committee
    regarding nominations to the positions of OMB Director and Deputy Director
    (the Budget Committee does not have any jurisdiction regarding nominations
    to the position of OMB Deputy Director for Management).

     Section 101(e) of S. Res. 445, as adopted by the Senate in 2004, reads as
    follows:

                 (e) OMB Nominees.--The Committee on the Budget and the
    Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs shall have
    joint jurisdiction over the nominations of persons nominated by the
    President to fill the positions of Director and Deputy Director for
    Budget within the Office of Management and Budget, and if one
    committee votes to order reported such a nomination, the other must
    report within 30 calendar days session, or be automatically
    discharged.

     The new procedure became effective at the beginning of the 109th Congress.
    On April 27, 2006, during the second session of the 109th Congress,
    President George W. Bush nominated Robert J. Portman to succeed Joshua
    Bolten as the OMB Director. The nomination was referred jointly that day to
    the Budget Committee and the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    Committee. The Budget Committee held a hearing on the nomination on May 11
    and approved the nomination on May 23, by a vote of 22 to 0. The Homeland
    Security and Governmental Affairs Committee approved the nomination by
    voice vote on May 22, and the full Senate approved the nomination by voice
    vote on May 26.

     On June 9, 2006, President Bush nominated Stephen S. McMillin to the
    position of OMB Deputy Director. The Budget Committee approved the
    nomination on July 13, by unanimous consent. On July 28, the full Senate
    approved the nomination, by unanimous consent.

                History of the Congressional Budget Process and
                       the Senate Committee on the Budget

     The Senate Budget Committee was created more than 30 years ago under
    landmark reform legislation, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
    Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344; 88 Stat. 297-339; 2 U.S.C. 621 et seq.).
    The Act also created the parallel Budget Committee in the House of
    Representatives and established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO). The
    two Budget Committees and CBO were created for the primary purpose of
    assisting the Senate and House in developing and enforcing budgetary plans
    in the form of annual concurrent resolutions on the budget and any required
    reconciliation legislation. Following a background on the roots of the
    Federal budgeting system, this section recounts the circumstances that gave
    rise to budget reform in the early 1970s, examines the legislative history
    of the 1974 Act, and reviews the origin and development of the Senate
    Budget Committee, from 1974 to the present.

    Background

     The Constitution of the United States vests the Congress with key
    budgetary powers. These powers, often referred to as ``the power of the
    purse,'' derive from several provisions in Article I of the Constitution.
    With respect to raising income through taxation and borrowing, Section 8
    declares that ``[t]he Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
    Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
    Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . .'' and ``[t]o borrow
    Money on the credit of the United States.'' In the case of spending,
    Section 9 states that ``[n]o Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
    Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .'' The Constitution thus
    ensures a role of pivotal importance for Congress in Federal budgeting by
    requiring that funds can only be raised, borrowed, and spent through the
    enactment of legislation.

     James Madison, the primary architect of the Constitution and the fourth
    President of the United States, asserted that vesting budgetary powers in
    the Congress was a critical element in maintaining freedom and promoting
    fair government:

        This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most
    complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm
    the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress
    of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and
    salutary measure.\1\

    \1\ Federalist No. 58 (Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be
    Augmented as the Progress of Population Demands Considered), by James
    Madison. See the collection of the Federalist Papers at the Library of
    Congress Website at http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_58.html.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.021

    Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division [LC-
    USZ62-87924].

    James Madison, fourth President of the United States, wrote about the
    ``power over the purse'' in the 58th essay of the Federalist Papers.

     While the Constitution assigns the principal role in Federal budgeting to
    Congress, it does not, for the most part, prescribe the procedures it
    should follow in exercising this role. Section 7 provides that ``All Bills
    for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but
    the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.''
    Section 8 places a 2-year limit on the duration of certain military
    funding. Otherwise, the Constitution does not address how the House and
    Senate should organize themselves, or the procedures they should follow,
    for the consideration of budgetary legislation. Furthermore, the
    Constitution allows each Chamber to develop its own rules and procedures;
    Section 5 states in part that ``Each House may determine the Rules of its
    Proceedings . . . .''

     In the early years of the Nation, the House and Senate approached their
    budgetary responsibilities in a largely ad hoc fashion, establishing short-
    lived committees to handle single issues. This was followed by a period in
    which budgetary responsibilities were concentrated mainly in two standing
    committees--the Senate Finance Committee, established in 1816, and the
    House Ways and Means Committee, established in 1802.\2\

    \2\ The historical development of the two committees is discussed in: (1)
    History of the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, S. Doc. 97-5,
    May 12, 1981, available on the Website of the Senate Finance Committee at
    http://finance.senate.gov/history.pdf; and (2) The Committee on Ways and
    Means; a Bicentennial History, 1780-1989, H. Doc. 100-244, [no date]
    available on the Website of the Government Printing Office at http://
    www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/cdocuments/100-244/browse.html.

     Following the surge in spending and debt levels associated with the Civil
    War, the House, in 1865, and the Senate, in 1867, each established a
    standing Appropriations Committee, thus dividing jurisdiction over spending
    and revenues between two committees in each Chamber (with the Senate
    Finance and House Ways and Means Committees retaining jurisdiction over
    revenues).\3\ During the 1880s, the jurisdiction of the House and Senate
    Appropriations Committees over Federal spending began to erode, until a
    sizeable portion was under the control of various legislative committees in
    each Chamber. This fragmentation of spending jurisdiction continued for
    several decades until reforms in the early 1920s reconsolidated the
    Appropriations Committees' jurisdiction.

    \3\ The historical development of the two committees is discussed in: (1)
    Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 138th Anniversary, 1867-
    2005, S. Doc. 109-5, 2005; and (2) Congressional Research Service, The
    House Appropriations Process, 1789-1993, by Louis Fisher, CRS Report 93-729
    S, Aug. 6, 1993.

     The Constitution confers many duties and powers on the President, but it
    does not explicitly give the President a role in Federal budgeting.
    Budgetary legislation, of course, like legislation on any other matter,
    must be presented to the President before it can become law (under Article
    I, Section 7), and he has the authority to approve or veto it. Among the
    different duties and powers of the President set forth in Title II, Section
    3 provides that ``[h]e shall from time to time give the Congress
    Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration
    such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient . . .''

     The decentralized and fragmented approach to budgeting employed by
    Congress over the years was mirrored in the executive branch. Agency
    requests for funds were compiled by the Secretary of the Treasury into a
    ``book of estimates'' submitted annually to Congress, but there was little
    uniformity in the manner in which each agency prepared its requests. The
    President did not play a formal role in reviewing and coordinating the
    funding requests, and the funding requests were not considered in relation
    to requests for revenue.\4\

    \4\ The early budget practices of the executive branch are summarized in
    Kimmel, Lewis H., Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy, 1789-1958 (The
    Brookings Institution: Washington, DC), 1959.

     In 1910, President William H. Taft appointed a Commission on Economy and
    Efficiency which focused attention on the need for a national budgeting
    system. Although the Commission's recommendations were not acted on, they
    helped to foster reform in the following decade, when concern about the
    Nation's fiscal condition spiked in response to the steep rise in spending
    and debt levels due to World War I and other matters.

     Select committees in the House and Senate examined the issue of a national
    budgeting system in 1919 and 1920, recommending legislation that would
    require the President to submit an annual budget for the entire Federal
    Government. President Woodrow Wilson vetoed the legislation in 1920, due to
    concerns regarding the constitutionality of his removal power over the
    proposed position of Comptroller General. Modified legislation was signed
    into law the following year by President Warren G. Harding, as the Budget
    and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 20 et seq.).

     In addition to requiring the President to submit a budget for the Federal
    Government annually to Congress, the 1921 Act created the Bureau of the
    Budget (as part of the Treasury Department) to assist with the President's
    budgetary role. The Budget Bureau was made part of the Executive Office of
    the President in 1939, and renamed the Office of Management and Budget in
    1970. The 1921 Act also created the General Accounting Office (later
    renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004), headed by the
    Comptroller General.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.029

     1921, 1922, The Washington Post. Reprinted with Permission.

    Washington Post headlines from 1921 and 1922 concerning passage of the
    Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and the creation of the Bureau of the
    Budget, which became the Office of Management and Budget in 1970.

     The Federal budgeting system created by the Budget and Accounting Act of
    1921 continued in place for several decades without fundamental change. The
    1921 Act was revised on occasion, perhaps most notably by the Budget and
    Accounting Procedures Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 2317 et seq.). The changes to
    the 1921 Act were given impetus, in part, by the reports of the first and
    second Hoover Commissions in 1949 and 1955, respectively. Although the
    changes expanded and refined Presidential authority and responsibilities in
    the area of budgeting, they did not alter the basic purpose and scope of
    the 1921 Act.\5\

    \5\ The Federal budget process, as it existed in the middle of the 20th
    century, is described in: Smithies, Arthur. The Budgetary Process in the
    United States. McGraw-Hill (New York: 1955).

    Prelude to the 1974 Reform

     The period from the end of World War II until the early 1970s was one in
    which Congress examined and reexamined its organization and procedures for
    budgeting. Although several different approaches to reform were tried (see
    table 1), they generally did not prove to be workable or durable.

                        TABLE 1.--PRE-1974 REFORM EFFORTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Legislative budgets of 1947, 1948, and 1949 under the
     Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946
     The Employment Act of 1946, which established the Joint
     Economic Committee
     The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950
     The President's Commission on Budget Concepts (1967)
     Statutory spending limits and reductions (1967-1972)
     Joint Study Committee on Budget Control (1972-1973)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

     The first major congressional reform of the post-World War II era was the
    Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. The Act fundamentally restructured
    and modernized the committee system, among other things, scaling back the
    number of committees in both the House and Senate and boosting committee
    staff resources. One provision in the Act was aimed at establishing, for
    the first time, a requirement that the House and Senate agree to an overall
    budget plan early in the session to guide the subsequent consideration of
    budgetary legislation. Section 138 of the Act (60 Stat. 812) created a
    Joint Committee on the Legislative Budget, consisting of Members appointed
    from the House and Senate Appropriations Committee, the House Ways and
    Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee. The charter of the joint
    committee was to examine the President's budget at the beginning of each
    session and to report by February 15 of each year a legislative budget,
    including estimates of total spending and revenues.

     The first attempt to implement a legislative budget, in 1947, failed when
    the House and Senate could not reach agreement on the legislation. In 1948,
    the two Chambers agreed on a budget but then exceeded it. Finally, in 1949,
    the House and Senate again failed to agree on a legislative budget, despite
    extending the reporting deadline from February 15 to May 1. The legislative
    budget required by Section 138 was not pursued thereafter, and the section
    was repealed two decades later by Section 242 of the Legislative
    Reorganization Act of 1970.

     Many factors have been cited for the failure of the legislative budget in
    the late 1940s. In addition to its attempted implementation in a difficult
    political climate with sharp disagreement over budget policies, the
    legislative budget failed because the joint committee was hampered by an
    unrealistically tight timetable in which to complete its actions, a lack of
    useful budgetary information, insufficient staff resources, and its
    unwieldy size (at about 100 members).

     Another budgetary reform in 1946 was the enactment of the Employment Act
    of 1946. The Act recognized the important role the Federal Government plays
    in promoting economic growth and stabilization. The Act created the Joint
    Economic Committee to assist Congress in this role.

    In 1950, the House and Senate undertook a one-time experiment in improving
    legislative efficiency by considering all of the regular appropriation acts
    for FY1951 in a single bill.\6\ Advocates of this approach had attempted
    for several years to mandate it through legislative action. On September
    27, 1949, the Senate adopted a resolution providing for an omnibus
    appropriations procedure, S. Con. Res. 18, but the House did not take
    comparable action. Instead, the House and Senate Appropriations Committees
    decided that during the next session they would combine the regular
    appropriations acts for FY1951 into a single measure. The two committees
    were able to accomplish this result without any changes in rules, but
    simply by exercising their own authority to determine the number of
    appropriation measures.

    \6\ See ``The Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950,'' by Dalmus H. Nelson,
    Journal of Politics, vol. 15, no. 2, May 1953.

     After lengthy consideration, the House and Senate completed action on the
    measure, which was signed into law on September 6, 1950 (more than 2 months
    after the fiscal year had begun) as the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1950
    (81st Congress, P.L. 759). Although some aspects of the experience were
    viewed favorably, the House and Senate did not pass the legislation with
    any less time or effort than it took to pass appropriation acts
    individually in other years. Further, by virtue of being packaged into an
    omnibus measure, the enactment of some of the appropriation measures was
    delayed considerably compared to the usual practice.

     The following year, the House and Senate returned to the practice of
    considering the regular appropriation acts individually. Congressional
    action on omnibus appropriation acts would not recur for several decades.

     One enduring achievement in the area of budget reform during this period
    was the President's Commission on Budget Concepts, appointed by President
    Lyndon B. Johnson in 1967. The membership of the commission was diverse,
    including Members of Congress (the chairmen and ranking members of the
    House and Senate Appropriations Committees), the Secretary of the Treasury
    (Henry H. Fowler), the OMB Director (Charles L. Schultze), the Comptroller
    General (Elmer B. Staats), and representatives of the private sector and
    academia. The commission was chaired by David M. Kennedy, chairman of the
    board, Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago.

     In its report later that year, the Commission set forth an overarching
    framework of budget concepts that largely underpins the budget process in
    use today.\7\ One of the most important recommendations of the commission
    centered on ending the use of multiple budget presentations, including the
    administrative budget, the consolidated cash budget, and the Federal sector
    of the national income accounts. Each of the three approaches to budget
    presentation had been criticized for deficiencies or drawbacks that
    impaired sound policymaking, and the Commission recommended replacing them
    with the ``unified budget.'' Under the unified budget, all Federal funds
    and trust funds of the government are melded together into a single
    document, thereby improving the understanding of the scope of the Federal
    budget and analysis of the budget's impact on, and interaction with, the
    economy.

    \7\ President's Commission on Budget Concepts. Report of the President's
    Commission on Budget Concepts. U.S. Govt. Printing Office. (Washington:
    October 1967). Reprinted in 1987.

     During the late 1960s and early 1970s, a deteriorating budget picture led
    to clashes between Congress and the President. Toward the end of the
    Johnson administration, budgetary strains were created by the rising costs
    of the war in Vietnam, increased spending for the Great Society programs,
    and a Presidential request for a surtax, among other factors. The budgetary
    strains continued into the administration of President Richard M. Nixon,
    who clashed repeatedly with Congress over budget priorities.

            [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.025

    Convened by President Lyndon Johnson, this commission, tasked with
    studying ways to modernize the Federal budget process, recommended
    creating a unified budget system to enhance congressional and public
    understanding of the Federal budget and provide a more useful instrument
    of public and financial policy.

     From 1967 through 1972, Congress acted five times on proposals to limit or
    reduce Federal spending.\8\ These proposals involved spending reductions
    included in a continuing appropriations act (1967), spending limits
    combined with tax legislation (1968), spending limits included in
    supplemental appropriations acts (1969 and 1970), and spending limits
    included in a measure increasing the limit on the public debt (1972).

    \8\ Congressional actions in this regard are discussed in detail in:
    Schick, Allen. Congress and Money. The Urban Institute (Washington: 1980).
    See Chapter II (The Seven-Year Budget War: 1966-73), pp. 17-49. The five
    laws involved were: (1) P.L. 90-218; (2) P.L. 90-364; (3) P.L. 91-47; (4)
    P.L. 91-305; and (5) P.L. 92-599.

     The ad hoc nature of congressional actions to deal with spending control
    and other budgetary issues highlighted the inadequacy of House and Senate
    procedures for making budget policy. In order to resolve the many problems
    in budget process that beset the House and Senate during this period, the
    two Chambers included a provision in one of the last measures approved by
    the 92nd Congress intended to lead to reform in the following Congress. A
    bill temporarily increasing the public debt by $65 billion and providing
    for a 1-day limit of $250 billion on spending, H.R. 16810 was signed into
    law by President Nixon on October 27, 1972, as P.L. 92-599 (86 Stat. 1324-
    1326). Section 301 of the Act established a joint committee which came to
    be known as the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control.

     The Joint Study Committee on Budget Control consisted of 32 members, 16
    from each Chamber, appointed by the Speaker of the House and the President
    pro tempore of the Senate. Seven House Members and seven Senate Members
    were appointed from the Appropriations Committees, the same number were
    appointed from the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees, and
    two additional Members from each Chamber were appointed. The main task of
    the Joint Study Committee, as set forth in Section 301(b) of P.L. 92-599,
    was to report by February 15, 1973 on a:

              . . . full study and review of . . . the procedures which
    should be adopted by the Congress for the purpose of improving
    congressional control of budgetary outlay and receipt totals,
    including procedures for establishing and maintaining an overall
    view of each year's budgetary outlays which is fully coordinated
    with an overall view of the anticipated revenues for that year. . .
                                                                     .''

    The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974

     In 1973 and 1974, during the 93rd Congress, the House and Senate finally
    brought the issue of comprehensive budget process reform to a successful
    conclusion. During this period, the House and Senate pursued several broad-
    scale reforms that encompassed fundamental issues in executive-legislative
    relations and the separation of powers. Among other things, congressional
    actions dealt with war powers as the war in Vietnam drew to a close;
    focused on intelligence oversight in the wake of disclosures of domestic
    spying and other abuses; and pursued charges of corruption in the Nixon
    administration and impeachment following revelations stemming from
    Watergate.

     With regard to budget process reform, Congress faced many different
    issues. Congressional actions in the preceding years had clearly
    demonstrated that it lacked an effective means of determining budget
    priorities and coordinating revenue and spending policies, both in terms of
    a legislative vehicle and committee structure. The deficiencies in
    procedure and structure contributed, in the view of many, to undesirable
    budget outcomes, such as persistent and growing deficits, excessive
    spending and a growing portion of outlays considered to be ``relatively
    uncontrollable,'' and an undue reliance upon the executive for budgetary
    information and analysis. Undesirable procedural outcomes were attributed
    to these deficiencies as well, including delays in the annual
    appropriations process, leading to funding gaps and excessive reliance on
    continuing appropriations acts.

     During his 1972 reelection campaign, in his FY1973 budget submission to
    Congress, and in other venues, President Nixon criticized the House and
    Senate for shortcomings in budget procedure. Their ``hoary and
    traditional'' procedures, he argued, impaired the enactment of sound
    budgetary policies.

     Another major concern centered around the large-scale impoundment of funds
    by the Nixon administration. In addition to the number and size of the
    Nixon impoundments, which in 1973 reached about $18 billion (far more than
    any previous President had impounded) and represented a sizeable share of
    the approximately $170 billion in appropriations enacted annually at that
    time, Congress was concerned that the purpose of most of the impoundments
    was to overturn congressional priorities established in appropriations
    acts, thereby undermining its power of the purse.

     The Joint Study Committee, created at the end of the 1972 session, was
    cochaired by Representative Jamie L. Whitten (chairman of the House
    Appropriations Committee) and Representative Al Ullman (chairman of the
    House Ways and Means Committee). The Joint Study Committee held eight
    hearings between January 18

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.030

     1972, 1973, The Washington Post. Reprinted with Permission.

    During the early 1970s, Congress and the President clashed repeatedly
    over budget priorities as reflected in these Washington Post headlines
    from 1972 and 1973.

    and March 15, 1973. On February 7, 1973, the Joint Study Committee issued
    an interim report, and, on April 18, 1973, it issued a final report.\9\

    \9\ See the reports of the Joint Study Committee on Budget Control: (1)
    Improving Congressional Control Over Budgetary Outlay and Receipt Totals;
    Interim Report, H. Rept. 93-13, Feb. 7, 1973; and (2) Recommendations for
    Improving Congressional Control Over Budgetary Outlay and Receipt Totals,
    H. Rept. 93-147, Apr. 18, 1973.

     In its final report, the Joint Study Committee drew special attention to
    Congress's difficulty in controlling the deficit. The Joint Study Committee
    concluded that ``the failure to arrive at congressional budget decisions on
    an overall basis has been a contributory factor in this picture.'' Further,
    the Joint Study Committee noted:

            The fact that no committee has the responsibility to decide
    whether or not total outlays are appropriate in view of the current
    situation appears to be responsible for much of the problem. Perhaps
    still more critical for the process is the distribution of
    jurisdiction over components of the budget among several different
    congressional committees. As a result, each spending bill tends to
    be considered by Congress as a separate entity, and any assessment
    of relative priorities among spending programs for the most part is
    made solely within the context of the bill before Congress.\10\

    \10\ Joint Study Committee, H. Rept. 93-147, ibid., p. 1.

     The Joint Study Committee recommended the establishment of a 21-member
    Budget Committee in the House and a 15-member Budget Committee in the
    Senate. One-third of each Committee's members would be appointed from the
    Appropriations Committee in that Chamber, one-third from the revenue
    committees (House Ways and Means and Senate Finance), and one-third from
    the House and Senate at large, with the chairmanships of each Budget
    Committee alternating between the appropriations and revenue committees.

     As proposed by the Joint Study Committee, the House and Senate Budget
    Committees would be responsible for developing and reporting an annual
    concurrent resolution on the budget, to be adopted by May 1 of each year,
    setting forth limitations on spending, revenues, the surplus or deficit,
    and debt. In conducting their activities, the House and Senate Budget
    Committees would be served by a joint staff, dedicated almost exclusively
    to supporting the two Committees. Floor consideration of the budget
    resolution would take place under procedures that in effect would
    significantly restrict a Member's ability to offer amendments.

     The recommendations of the Joint Study Committee were embodied in
    identical legislation introduced in each Chamber, H.R. 7130 and S. 1641
    (see table 2). While H.R. 7130 became the

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.042

    The final report of this bicameral committee, formed in 1972,
    recommended the formation of committees on the budget in both the House
    and Senate for budget review and provided a framework for what would
    become the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

    principal vehicle for budget process reform in the House, the main vehicle
    in the Senate was S. 1541, a budget process reform measure introduced on
    April 11, 1973 (a week before the Joint Study Committee issued its final
    report) by Senator Sam Ervin, the chairman of the Senate Government
    Operations Committee. In addition, the House and Senate passed separate
    impoundment control legislation in 1973 (H.R. 8480 and S. 373,
    respectively), before the issue was merged into budget process reform
    legislation in 1974.

                  TABLE 2.--LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1974 ACT
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
     House Rules Committee reported H.R. 7130 by a vote of 15 to 0
     (H. Rept. 93-658, November 20, 1973)
     House considered H.R. 7130 on December 4 and 5, 1973, passing
     it by a vote of 386 to 23
     Senate Government Operations Committee reported S. 1541 by a
     vote of 10 to 0 (S. Rept. 93-579, November 28, 1973)
     Senate Rules and Administration Committee reported S. 1541 by a
     vote of 9 to 0 (S. Rept. 93-688, March 6, 1974)
     Senate considered S. 1541 on March 19-22, 1974, passing it by a
     vote of 80 to 0
     Conference agreement on H.R. 7130 reported (H. Rept. 93-1101,
     June 11, 1974, and S. Rept. 93-924, June 12, 1974)
     House agreed to conference report on June 18, 1974, by a vote
     of 401 to 6, and Senate agreed to it on June 21, by a vote of 75 to 0
     President Richard Nixon signed H.R. 7130 into law on July 12,
     1974, as P.L. 93-344
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In the House, H.R. 7130 was referred to the House Rules Committee, which
    was chaired by Representative Ray J. Madden. Between July 19 and September
    20, 1973, the Rules Committee held 7 hearings on H.R. 7130 and other budget
    process reform legislation, receiving testimony from more than 20
    witnesses. During markup of H.R. 7130 in November, many modifications were
    made to the bill. On November 13, the Rules Committee voted unanimously (15
    to 0) to report the bill with an amendment in the nature of a substitute.
    The Committee's report (H. Rept. 93-658) was printed on November 20, 1973.

     For the most part, the House Rules Committee's recommendations
    corresponded with those made by the Joint Study Committee, but with several
    significant changes. Rather than a single budget resolution each year, the
    House and Senate would adopt a spring budget resolution (by May 1) setting
    targets and a fall budget resolution that would be binding. The House
    Budget Committee would consist of 23 members, with 10 members selected from
    the House Appropriations and Ways and Means Committees, 2 from the party
    leadership, and 11 members at large. Thus, the Rules Committee recommended
    both a slightly larger Budget Committee and one more representative of the
    House as a whole. A Legislative Budget Office would serve as a joint staff
    to the two Budget Committees, but would serve other congressional offices
    as well. The start of the fiscal year would be switched from July 1 to
    October 1 of each year, to allow more time for Congress to complete action
    on budgetary legislation. Finally, the Rules Committee added the issue of
    impoundment control, incorporating into H.R. 7130 the provisions of H.R.
    8480, with modifications, which the House had passed earlier in the year,
    on July 25.

     In the Senate, S. 1541 was referred to the Senate Government Operations
    Committee on April 11, 1973. The Committee referred budget process reform
    legislation to a newly created subcommittee chaired by Senator Lee Metcalf,
    the Subcommittee on Budgeting, Management, and Expenditures. On April 2,
    1973, the Subcommittee held its first hearing, receiving testimony on nine
    Senate bills pertaining to budget process reform that had been referred to
    the Subcommittee at that point. Additional measures, including S. 1541,
    were referred to the Subcommittee as the session progressed. The
    Subcommittee held 7 additional hearings through August, receiving testimony
    from more than 30 witnesses, before reporting the measure to the Full
    Committee by a 5 to 4 vote.

     The Senate Government Operations Committee considered S. 1541 in October
    and November of 1973, and ordered the bill, as amended with an amendment in
    the nature of a substitute, reported on November 8 by a unanimous vote of
    10 to 0 (four other Committee members voted yea by proxy and the remaining
    two Committee members did not vote). The Committee's report on S. 1541 (S.
    Rept. 93-579) was filed on November 20 and printed on November 28.

     In view of the significant changes that S. 1541 proposed to make to the
    standing rules of the Senate, the bill was referred to the Senate Rules and
    Administration Committee on November 30, with instructions to report it by
    February 25, 1974. The bill was referred to the Subcommittee on the
    Standing Rules of the Senate, chaired by Senator Robert C. Byrd. The
    Subcommittee held a hearing on the bill on January 15, 1974.

     After the hearing, Senators Sam Ervin and Charles Percy, chairman and
    ranking member, respectively, of the Government Operations Committee,
    suggested that the Rules and Administration Committee provide a forum for
    all interested parties to review the bill. A staff working group was
    convened by the Rules and Administration Committee, representing 10 Senate
    standing committees, 4 joint committees, the House Appropriations
    Committee, the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Senate
    Legislative Counsel. Over the course of 16 days, the working group met for
    about 90 hours in 25 sessions. Their efforts resulted in significant
    changes in the bill. On February 20, 1974, the Rules and Administration
    Committee adopted the changes, with some further modifications, in the form
    of an amendment in the nature of a substitute. The Committee's report on S.
    1541 (S. Rept. 93-688) was filed on February 21, 1974, and printed on March
    6.

    ==========================================================================
    The true father of the budget process is neither Senator Muskie nor
    Senator Ervin, both of whom wrote the original bill, but Senator Robert
    Byrd, who was chairman of the Rules Committee at that time and looked at
    the bill that the Governmental Affairs Committee reported and said,
    ``This won't work.'' He took it and rewrote it in the form it became
    law. He was instrumental both as whip and later as majority leader
    because he could have leaned against us and probably eviscerated the
    Committee, but he didn't. He stood with us, and as a result, the process
    became as established as it did.\11\
         _John McEvoy, Senate Budget Committee Staff Director, 1977-1980
    ==========================================================================

     The consensus measure recommended by the Senate Rules and Administration
    Committee generally maintained a correspondence with the House on many key
    issues, but with some significant differences. The Committee's
    recommendations envisioned two budget resolutions each year; the first (to
    be adopted by June 1) would establish targets for spending, revenues, the
    surplus or deficit, and debt, and the second (to be adopted in the fall)
    would be binding. A Congressional Office on the Budget would serve the
    Budget Committees and other congressional offices as well, but unlike the
    House, the Senate did not envision it serving as a joint staff for the
    Budget Committees. Instead, the Senate expected that each Budget Committee
    would have its own staff, as in the case of other House and Senate
    committees. A 15-member Senate Budget Committee would be established, as
    originally proposed. The Committee's recommendations did not encompass
    impoundment controls generally, but an amendment to the Antideficiency Act
    was included that more clearly restricted the President's authority to
    withhold funds.

    \11\ Transcript, John McEvoy interview, August 21, 2006, U.S. Senate
    Historical Office.

     The House began initial consideration of H.R. 7130 on December 4, 1973,
    after adopting a special rule (H. Res. 715) providing for the bill's
    consideration. The next day, December 5, the House passed H.R. 7130 by a
    vote of 386 to 23. The House-passed bill reflected the Rules Committee's
    amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended by two relatively minor
    amendments. Nine other amendments to the Committee's substitute were
    rejected.

     The Senate considered S. 1541 from March 19 through March 22, 1974. On the
    first day of consideration, the Senate agreed to the amendment in the
    nature of a substitute proposed by the Rules and Administration Committee,
    which was subject to further amendment, and a series of technical and
    conforming amendments offered by Senator Ervin. During the ensuing 3 days,
    19 other amendments were adopted and 8 were rejected. On March 22, the
    Senate passed the House bill, H.R. 7130, after striking out the House-
    passed text and inserting in lieu thereof the provisions of S. 1541 as
    amended. The vote on final passsage was 80 to 0.

     Conferees met on H.R. 7130 as passed by the House and the Senate amendment
    thereto, reached a compromise, and, on June 5, 1974, agreed to file a
    conference report. The conference report was printed on June 11 (as H.
    Rept. 93-1101) and on June 12 (as S. Rept. 93-924). On June 18, the House
    agreed to the conference report, by a vote of 401 to 6, clearing the
    measure for the Senate. The Senate agreed to the conference report, by a
    vote of 75 to 0, on June 21, clearing the measure for the President.
    President Nixon signed the bill into law, as the Congressional Budget and
    Impoundment Control Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-344), on July 12, 1974.\12\

    \12\ See the statement of President Nixon on the Act in the Weekly
    Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 10, no. 28, July 12, 1974.

     During Senate consideration of the conference report, several Senators
    with long service in the Chamber commented on the special importance of the
    legislation. Senator Sam Ervin, for example, noted:

            To my mind, this is the most important piece of legislation
    that I have worked on during the 20 years that I have served in the
    Senate. It is the finest example of the legislative process at work
                                         that I have ever witnessed.\13\

    \13\ The remarks of Senator Sam Ervin in the Congressional Record of June
    21, 1974, as reprinted in: U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Government
    Operations. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974;
    Legislative History. Committee print (93rd Cong., 2nd sess.). December
    1974, pp. 1989-1990.

     Senator Charles Percy commented on the extraordinary efforts involved in
    the enactment of the 1974 Act:

             . . . when we set our minds to do something, we really can
        accomplish something that is in the national interest, and that
    certainly will serve the interests of every taxpayer and citizen in
        the country. . . . For such a bill to be passed within a single
          Congress is a tribute to the dedication to which Senators and
           Representatives have approached this very difficult task.\14\

    \14\ Committee on Government Operations, ibid., pp. 2018-2019.

     Senator Lee Metcalf placed the challenge presented by the 1974 Act within
    the context of previous reform efforts:

             That challenge--stated plainly--was to find a mechanism by
    which 535 Members of Congress could determine an appropriate budget
       for the Nation and conduct their legislative business within it.
           Since 1921, attempts have been made by Congress to meet this
     challenge. All have failed for a variety of reasons, not the least
    of which were political. The result has been increasing control over
       fiscal policy by the executive branch, not provided in, nor even
                                      contemplated by, the Constitution.
                      The mechanism created by this legislation is more
    comprehensive, more dynamic, than anything previously considered. It
     is framed within the traditions and procedures of Congress, but at
       the same time it provides a new set of rules which, if followed,
                                                          will work.\15\

    \15\ Committee on Government Operations, ibid., pp. 2002-2004.

     The 1974 Act is a lengthy and complex measure, consisting of 10 titles.
    The first nine titles of the Act are referred to as the Congressional
    Budget Act of 1974; the last title, Title X, is referred to as the
    Impoundment Control Act of 1974. Section 2 provides a declaration of
    purposes for the entire Act:

                    Sec. 2. The Congress declares that it is essential--
            (1) to assure effective congressional control over the
          budgetary process;
            (2) to provide for the congressional determination each year
          of the appropriate level of Federal revenues and expenditures;
            (3) to provide a system of impoundment control;
            (4) to establish national budget priorities; and
            (5) to provide for the furnishing of information by the
          executive branch in a manner that will assist the Congress in
          discharging its duties.

     As enacted in 1974, Title I of the Act provided for a 23-member House
    Budget Committee and a 15-member Senate Budget Committee, with
    responsibility principally to develop and enforce annual budget
    resolutions.

     Title II of the Act created the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), headed
    by a director appointed to a 4-year term, to provide Congress with
    budgetary information and analysis prepared on an independent, nonpartisan
    basis. The Act established a hierarchy regarding CBO's duties and functions
    in which its primary responsibility is to assist the House and Senate
    Budget Committees, followed by the appropriations and revenue committees,
    followed by other committees and Members.

     Title III set forth the timetable and procedures of the congressional
    budget process, including the requirement that an advisory budget
    resolution be adopted by May 15, and a binding budget resolution be adopted
    by September 15, and set forth reconciliation procedures to be used, if
    needed, in conjunction with the second budget resolution. Further, Title
    III specified the required contents of budget resolutions, including the
    total levels of spending, revenues, the surplus or deficit, and debt, a
    breakdown of spending by major functional categories, and provided for
    optional procedures and matters to be included, as appropriate. A provision
    also allowed for additional budget resolutions, if necessary.

     Title IV imposed new controls on entitlement legislation, as well as
    legislation involving contract authority and borrowing authority.
    Additionally, the title established May 15 as a reporting deadline for
    authorizing legislation.

     Title V changed the start of the fiscal year from July 1 to October 1 and
    provided for a 3-month transition quarter (July 1-September 30, 1976) to
    implement the change.

     Titles VI through IX made various changes in the budget process, including
    changes affecting the President's budget, the conduct of program evaluation
    by the Comptroller General, the availability of budgetary information to
    Congress, and technical and conforming matters.

     Title X established new procedures for impoundment control, defining
    impoundments as either rescissions or deferrals, requiring the submission
    of Presidential impoundment messages, setting forth House and Senate
    procedures for the expedited consideration of legislation dealing with
    rescission and deferral proposals, and imposing on the Comptroller General
    responsibilities for monitoring executive impoundments and reporting to
    Congress.

     The Senate Budget Committee was established shortly after the enactment of
    the 1974 Act. On July 25, 1974, the Senate adopted S. Res. 367, without
    objection, appointing nine Democratic members, and on August 7, the Senate
    adopted S. Res. 378, without objection, appointing six Republican members.
    Senator Edmund S. Muskie was chosen to be the chairman and Senator Peter H.
    Dominick was chosen to be the ranking member. (Senator Dominick lost his
    bid for reelection in 1974 and was replaced in that position in 1975 by
    Senator Henry Bellmon.)

     By any standard, the first Members of the Senate Budget Committee (see
    table 3) were an exceptional group, and several of them later served in
    other important elective or appointive positions. The chairman, Senator
    Edmund S. Muskie, served as Secretary of State under President Jimmy
    Carter, while Senator Walter F. Mondale served as Vice President to
    President Carter. Senators Er-

     TABLE 3.--FIRST MEMBERS OF THE SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE (93RD CONGRESS,
                               2ND SESSION, 1974)
                   (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Edmund S. Muskie, Chairman                  Peter H. Dominick, Ranking
      Warren G. Magnuson                         Member
      Frank E. Moss                               Milton R. Young
      Walter F. Mondale                           Roman L. Hruska
      Ernest F. Hollings                          Jacob K. Javits
      Alan Cranston                               Paul J. Fannin
      Lawton Chiles                               Robert J. Dole
      James G. Abourezk
      Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    nest F. Hollings and Lawton Chiles each later served as chairman (and
    ranking member) of the Budget Committee. Senator Peter H. Dominick was
    appointed Ambassador to Switzerland by President Gerald Ford and Senator
    Robert J. Dole twice held the position of Senate majority leader.

     The first organizational meeting of the new Committee was held on August
    13, 1974. Although the Committee did not begin its legislative functions
    until the following year, it held a series of hearings beginning on August
    14 on the impact of the Federal budget on inflation. (See the Appendix for
    opening statements from the Committee's first hearing.) A funding
    resolution to cover the initial expenses of the Budget Committee through
    February 28, 1975, S. Res. 406, was agreed to by the Senate on October 10.

     The House Budget Committee also was established soon after the enactment
    of the 1974 Act. In August 1974, Representative Al Ullman was chosen to be
    the chairman, but he stepped down from the position a few months later to
    accept the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means Committee and was
    succeeded as chairman by Representative Brock Adams.

     As provided for in Section 905(b) (88 Stat. 331) of the 1974 Act, the
    Congressional Budget Office officially came into existence on the day that
    the first CBO Director was appointed. This occurred on February 24, 1975,
    with the appointment of Alice Rivlin.

    The First Decade: From ``Dry Run'' to Reconciliation

     The first decade of the congressional budget process, covering the 94th
    Congress through the 98th Congress (1975-1984), was marked by many
    significant developments, including the maturation of the process from
    tentative and uncertain beginnings into an established routine of the House
    and Senate, the increased reliance on the new process to deal with mounting
    challenges in Federal budget policy, and procedural innovation that
    sometimes was dramatic.

     At the beginning of the 94th Congress, in 1975, the Senate Budget
    Committee began to carry out its legislative functions. Senator Edmund S.
    Muskie, the first chairman, served in that capacity for more than 5 years,
    stepping aside in May 1980 to serve as Secretary of State under President
    Jimmy Carter. He was succeeded as chairman by Senator Ernest F. Hollings.
    Senator Henry Bellmon became the ranking member of the Committee at the
    beginning of the 94th Congress, and continued to serve in that position
    through 1980 (see table 4).

              TABLE 4.--COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP: 94TH-98TH CONGRESSES
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    94th Congress (1975-1976).................  Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie
                                                 (D)
                                                Ranking Member, Henry
                                                 Bellmon (R)
    95th Congress (1977-1978).................  Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie
                                                 (D)
                                                Ranking Member, Henry
                                                 Bellmon (R)
    96th Congress (1979-1980).................  Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie
                                                 (D) (through May 7, 1980)
                                                Chairman, Ernest F. Hollings
                                                 (D) (from May 13, 1980)
                                                Ranking Member, Henry
                                                 Bellmon (R)
    97th Congress (1981-1982).................  Chairman, Pete V. Domenici
                                                 (R)
                                                Ranking Member, Ernest F.
                                                 Hollings (D)
    98th Congress (1983-1984).................  Chairman, Pete V. Domenici
                                                 (R)
                                                Ranking Member, Lawton
                                                 Chiles (D)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.043

    Courtesy of the Edmund S. Muskie Archives and Special Collections Library.

    The first chairman, Edmund S. Muskie, and second ranking member, Henry
    Bellmon, at a Committee markup during the 94th Congress.

     The 1974 Act did not anticipate that the congressional budget process
    would be ready for full operation in 1975 for the FY1976 budget cycle.
    Section 906 of the Act (88 Stat. 332), however, allowed the two Budget
    Committees to decide to implement a scaled-back version of the process, a
    so-called dry run, if they both agreed that to do so was feasible and
    submitted reports of such agreement to their respective Chambers. The two
    Budget Committees agreed that action on budget resolutions for FY1976 was
    feasible and issued the required reports on their agreement.\16\

    \16\ The report of the Senate Budget Committee on the agreement was
    Implementation of New Congressional Budget Procedures for Fiscal Year 1976,
    S. Rept. 94-27, Mar. 5, 1975; the report of the House Budget Committee,
    under the same title, was H. Rept. 94-25, Mar. 3, 1975. The Senate Budget
    Committee also issued a report with respect to a second budget resolution
    for that year, Implementation of New Congressional Budget Procedures for
    Fiscal Year 1976; Timetable for the Second Budget Resolution and
    Reconciliation Process, S. Rept. 94-422, Oct. 8, 1975.

     The first budget resolution to be considered under the 1974 Act was
    reported by the House Budget Committee on April 14, 1975 (H. Con. Res.
    218), and by the Senate Budget Committee on April 15 (S. Con. Res. 32).\17\
    The Senate considered S. Con. Res. 32 on April 29 and April 30, and passed
    it on May 1, by a vote of 69 to 22. The House passed H. Con. Res. 218 on
    May 1, but only with a four-vote margin, 200 to 196. A conference report on
    H. Con. Res. 218 was filed on May 9 (H. Rept. 94-198 and S. Rept. 94-113),
    and the two Chambers agreed to it on May 14, 1 day before the deadline
    prescribed by the 1974 Act (see table 5). The Senate agreed to the
    conference report by a voice vote and the House agreed to it by a vote of
    230 to 193.

    \17\ See the report of the Senate Budget Committee, First Concurrent
    Resolution on the Budget--Fiscal Year 1976, S. Rept. 94-77, Apr. 15, 1975.
    The Committee issued Part 2 to the report on Apr. 23 to provide the
    ``Additional Views'' of two Senators that inadvertently had been omitted.

             TABLE 5.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1976-FY1985 \1\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1976...............................  H. Con. Res. 218.....    05-14-1975
    1977...............................  S. Con. Res. 109.....    05-13-1976
    1978...............................  S. Con. Res. 19......    05-17-1977
    1979...............................  S. Con. Res. 80......    05-17-1978
    1980...............................  H. Con. Res. 107.....    05-24-1979
    1981...............................  H. Con. Res. 307.....    06-12-1980
    1982...............................  H. Con. Res. 115.....    05-21-1981
    1983...............................  S. Con. Res. 92......    06-23-1982
    1984...............................  H. Con. Res. 91......    06-23-1983
    1985...............................  H. Con. Res. 280.....   10-01-1984
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Excludes second budget resolutions for FY1976-FY1982 and a third
      budget resolution for FY1977.

     The text of the first budget resolution for FY1976, which under the dry
    run included only the budget aggregates and not the functional allocations
    of spending or other elements, read as follows:

        That the Congress hereby determines, pursuant to section 301(a)
      of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, that for the fiscal year
                                             beginning on July 1, 1975--
            (1) the appropriate level of total budget outlays is
          $367,000,000,000;
            (2) the appropriate level of total new budget authority is
          $395,800,000,000;
            (3) the amount of the deficit in the budget which is
          appropriate in the light of economic conditions and all other
          relevant factors is $68,820,000,000;
            (4) the recommended level of Federal revenues is
          $298,180,000,000, and the amount by which the aggregate level
          of Federal revenues should be decreased is $3,400,000,000; and
            (5) the appropriate level of the public debt is
          $617,600,000,000 and the amount by which the temporary
          statutory limit on such debt should accordingly be increased
          is $86,600,000,000.

     The second budget resolution for FY1976, H. Con. Res. 466, was approved by
    the House and Senate in the fall without difficulty. The measure also
    recommended budget aggregates for the 3-month transition quarter (TQ)
    following FY1976, encompassing July 1-September 30, 1976. The transition
    quarter was necessary to accommodate the change in the fiscal year cycle,
    for FY1977 and thereafter, mandated by the 1974 Act (FY1977 started on
    October 1, 1976).

     The first full run of the congressional budget process occurred in 1976
    for the FY1977 budget cycle. Once again, the House and Senate adopted the
    first budget resolution for that year (S. Con. Res. 109), as well as the
    second budget resolution (S. Con. Res. 139), in a timely manner and without
    significant difficulty. The margins of approval in the Senate for the first
    and second budget resolutions (65 to 29 and 66 to 20, respectively)
    reflected the pattern of strong bipartisanship on budget resolutions that
    marked the early years of the congressional budget process in that Chamber.
    For the first time in many years, all of the regular appropriations acts
    for the fiscal year were enacted on time. (Despite the timely enactment of
    the regular appropriations acts for FY1977, two continuing appropriations
    acts were required to fund certain unauthorized activities that had been
    dropped from one of the bills.)

     The congressional budget process continued to operate relatively smoothly
    for the next several years, with the two annual budget resolutions being
    adopted largely in a timely manner and, in the Senate, by comfortable
    margins. This period in congressional budgeting has been described as ``the
    accommodating budgetary process,'' in which the two Budget Committees often
    acquiesced in the preferences of the leadership and other committees,
    ``accommodating to the predominant pressures for increased spending.'' \18\

    \18\ This characterization was made in: Penner, Rudolph G. and Alan J.
    Abramson. Broken Purse Strings; Congressional Budgeting, 1974-88. The Urban
    Institute Press. (Washington: 1988), p. 23.

     Despite this generally accommodative behavior, there were differences in
    the operation of the two Budget Committees:

            The Senate Budget Committee drew strength and some autonomy
        from its bipartisan approach and cohesiveness and from the less
       contentious atmosphere in the Senate. Chairman Edmund Muskie was
          fairly aggressive in testing and stretching the limits of the
          Committee's original mandate by challenging other committees.
        Although Muskie and the Senate Budget Committee were not always
    successful in these fights, they often won larger margins in budget
           votes than the House Committee and were consequently seen as
                                  stronger than the House Committee.\19\

    \19\ Penner and Abramson, ibid., p. 28.

     One of the early successes of the Budget Committee in seeking greater
    control over spending was the assumption of the repeal in 1976 of the ``1-
    percent kicker,'' which since 1969 had annually boosted the inflation
    adjustment in Federal employee retirement benefits by an additional 1
    percent whenever the underlying adjustment was at least 3 percent for 3
    consecutive months. By some estimates, the kicker had raised Federal
    annuities by 72 percent between 1969 and 1975, compared to a 56-percent
    increase in inflation during the same period; in future years, the
    ``multiplier effect'' of the kicker was expected to add billions of dollars
    per year to Federal retirement costs beyond what was needed to keep pace
    with inflation. Repeal of the kicker, which had been assumed in the first
    budget resolution for FY1977, already had been included that year in acts
    for military and foreign service retirees, but was contingent upon repeal
    of the kicker for civilian retirees as well. In a bipartisan effort, Budget
    Committee members Ernest F. Hollings and Henry Bellmon successfully offered
    an amendment to repeal the kicker for Federal civilian employees to the
    Legislative Branch Appropriations Act for FY1977 (P.L. 94-440), thereby
    implementing repeal of the kicker in all Federal employee retirement
    programs. The Hollings-Bellmon amendment, as further amended by a
    perfecting amendment offered by Budget Committee members Lawton Chiles and
    Pete V. Domenici, was included in P.L. 94-440 as Section 1306.\20\

    \20\ P.L. 94-440 was signed into law by President Gerald Ford on October 1,
    1976 (90 Stat. 1439-1464). For Senate consideration of the Hollings-Bellmon
    amendment (number 428), and the Chiles-Domenici perfecting amendment, see
    the Congressional Record of September 8, 1976 at pp. 29359-29366. Both
    amendments were adopted by voice vote.

     Greater signs of budgetary strain began to emerge in 1980, the last year
    of the Carter administration, following a period of ``stagflation'' (the
    combination of stagnation and inflation) that had persisted in the economy
    during the late 1970s. With renewed concerns about rising deficit
    projections, Congress and the President worked together in the first use of
    the budget reconciliation process. Instead of a quick ``last-minute''
    procedure to adjust budgetary legislation in conjunction with the adoption
    of the second budget resolution in the fall, reconciliation was reoriented
    as an adjunct to the first budget resolution.

     The first budget resolution for FY1981, H. Con. Res. 307, which was not
    adopted by the House and Senate until June 12, 1980 (nearly a month past
    the then May 15 deadline), included reconciliation instructions to eight
    House and nine Senate authorizing committees to reduce outlays for FY1981
    by more than $6 billion. In addition, the House Ways and Means and Senate
    Finance Committees were instructed to raise revenues for FY1981 by more
    than $4 billion. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, signed into law on
    December 5, 1980, as P.L. 96-499, achieved most of the deficit reduction
    required by the budget resolution.

     The budget resolution also included budgetary levels for 2 ``out-years''
    beyond the upcoming fiscal year, covering 3 fiscal years (FY1981-FY1983)
    all together (not counting revisions made for the fiscal year underway at
    that time, FY1980). The multiyear timeframe was intended to improve the
    budget resolution as a planning tool and to curb budget control evasions in
    the short term. The multiyear aspect of budget resolutions persisted in the
    following years as a matter of practice, and in 1985 was incorporated into
    the 1974 Act as a requirement. The Act presently requires a budget
    resolution to cover at least the upcoming fiscal year and the 4 following
    years, but some budget resolutions have covered up to 10 years (excluding
    revisions to the current fiscal year).

     The remaining 4 years of the first decade of the congressional budget
    process, covering 1981 through 1984, coincided with the first term of
    President Ronald Reagan and saw the Republicans gain control of the
    Committee. Senator Pete V. Domenici served as chairman of the Budget
    Committee during these 4 years. Senator Hollings served as ranking member
    in 1981 and 1982 (during the 97th Congress), and was succeeded by Senator
    Lawton Chiles in 1983 and 1984 (during the 98th Congress).

     Several important developments occurred during these 4 years. In 1981,
    President Reagan, aided by OMB Director David Stockman, urged the use of
    the budget reconciliation process to advance a sizeable portion of his
    legislative agenda. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, signed
    into law by President Reagan on August 13, 1981, as P.L. 97-35, represented
    a massive expansion of the reconciliation process. Most of the committees
    of the House and Senate were involved in the reconciliation process that
    year. Apart from cutting Federal spending by roughly 130 billion over a 3-
    year period (FY1982-FY1984), the reconciliation act also encompassed a host
    of extraneous policy issues, involving such diverse matters as lawnmower
    standards and a maximum speed

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.032

    Signed into law by the President on August 13, 1981, H.R. 3982, the
    Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, was the second reconciliation act to
    pass the House and Senate and represented a significant expansion of the
    reconciliation process toward advancing certain policy goals.

    limit. Coupled with action on the reconciliation measure, Congress and the
    President also enacted a significant tax-cut bill outside of the
    reconciliation process (which reduced revenues by $282 billion over FY1982-
    FY1984).

    ==========================================================================
    The first major challenge to this Committee began shortly after I
    arrived, when the Budget Committee took on a stronger policy role with
    Mr. David Stockman, Director of the OMB, and President Reagan, and
    particularly Mr. Stockman, who as a House Member understood this new
    process. While President Carter used reconciliation in the way it was
    probably meant to be used in the initial legislation, at the end of the
    calendar year, Mr. Stockman and the new Republican-controlled Senate
    pushed, for the first time in 7 years, with Senators Baker, Dole, and
    Domenici, using the reconciliation process as an opportunity to not only
    achieve the blueprint of a fiscal policy, but actually to carry through
    with the authorization process and have some real impact on policy.\21\
          _G. William Hoagland, Senate Budget Committee Staff Director,
                                                               1986-2002
    ===========================================================================

     The actions in 1981 marked the beginning of a period in which budgetary
    considerations dominated the legislative agenda. As deficit projections
    rose and remained stubbornly high, the focus of most budgetary
    deliberations was deficit reduction. The seeming intractability of
    budgetary problems often led to legislative gridlock and political impasse.
    As a consequence, the timeframe for reaching agreement on budget
    resolutions lengthened considerably. In both 1982 and 1983, the budget
    resolution was not adopted until June 23. In 1984, action on the budget
    resolution was not completed until October 1, the first day of the new
    fiscal year. Other changes in the legislative process occurred as well,
    including greater reliance on continuing appropriations acts and the
    reemergence of omnibus appropriations measures to wrap up action at the end
    of a session.

    \21\ Transcript, G. William Hoagland interview, August 30, 2006, U.S.
    Senate Historical Office.

     When action under the regular procedures of the congressional budget
    process was stymied, the contending sides searched for innovative means to
    resolve conflict. One important development in this regard was the budget
    summit, where administration and congressional negotiators could work
    directly together to broker deals to resolve protracted disputes over
    budgetary policy. Some budget summits or other types of negotiations were
    successful, while others were not. One of the first agreements negotiated
    in summit-like circumstances, in 1984, led to what was known as the Rose
    Garden agreement. While the administration and Republican leaders in the
    Senate reached an agreement between themselves, it took many more months
    for Republicans and Democrats in Congress to reach accord and pass the
    FY1985 budget resolution, which occurred on October 1, 1984.\22\

    \22\ A history of budget summits and other types of negotiations during the
    1980s is presented in: Schick, Allen. The Capacity to Budget. The Urban
    Institute Press. (Washington: 1990), pp. 184-189.

    Coping with Deficits: the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act and Related Laws

     During the 99th Congress (1985 and 1986), Senator Domenici continued to
    serve as the Committee chairman and Senator Chiles continued to serve as
    the ranking member, while President Reagan began his second term. In the
    100th Congress (1987-1988), during the final 2 years of the Reagan
    Presidency, the Democrats gained control of the Senate. Senator Chiles took
    over as Committee chairman and Senator Domenici assumed the position of
    ranking member.

     In 1985, continuing turmoil over Federal budget policy brought another
    watershed development in the Federal budget process--enactment of the
    Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act. After a decade of experience with the 1974 Act,
    Congress and the President faced persistent high deficits and increasing
    budgetary deadlock. Legislation aimed at bringing the Federal budget into
    balance by the early 1990s was enacted. That legislation, the Balanced
    Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, was included as Title II
    in a measure raising the public debt limit.\23\ President Reagan signed the
    measure into law on December 12 as P.L. 99-177 (2 U.S.C. 901 et seq.; 99
    Stat. 1037-1101). It is commonly referred to as the 1985 Balanced Budget
    Act or as the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) Act, after its three primary
    sponsors in the Senate--Senators Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and Ernest F.
    Hollings. (Senator Hollings was a member of the Budget Committee in the
    99th Congress, when the GRH Act was enacted, and Senators Gramm and Rudman
    served on the Committee in later Congresses.)

    \23\ This discussion is drawn from CRS Report RL30795, General Management
    Laws: A Compendium, Clinton T. Brass (coordinator), pp. 109-114. A more
    detailed explanation of the 1985 Balanced Budget Act is found in CRS Report
    85-1130 GOV, Explanation of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
    Control Act of 1985, Public Law 99-177 (The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act), by
    Allen Schick; and CRS Report 86-713 GOV, Changes in the Congressional
    Budget Process Made by the 1985 Balanced Budget Act (P.L. 99-177), by
    Robert Keith.

     The 1985 Act was the first of several major laws intended to ensure that
    the deficit was reduced and spending was controlled, even if Congress and
    the President failed to achieve these goals through the regular legislative
    process. Specifically, the 1985 Act required the Federal budget to be in
    balance by FY1991.

     The Act established new procedures involving deficit targets and
    sequestration to further these purposes. Under sequestration, across-the-
    board spending cuts would be made automatically early in the fiscal year if
    needed to keep the estimated deficit within allowed limits. Discretionary
    spending would bear most of the brunt of any required sequestration, since
    most direct spending was exempt from reductions. Because implementation of
    a required sequester was automatic under these procedures, and perceived to
    be a drastic action, many regarded it as providing a strong incentive for
    Congress and the President to reach agreement through the regular process
    of legislation to meet the established budgetary goals.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.040

     The New Yorker Collection 1989 Robert Weber from cartoonbank.com. All
    Rights Reserved.

     In addition, the 1985 Act also made extensive changes in the 1974 Act,
    largely to incorporate in law changes in informal practices developed over
    prior years. First, the timetable for congressional budget actions was
    accelerated. Most notably, the deadline for adoption of the annual budget
    resolution was advanced 1 month to April 15. Second, certain practices used
    by Congress for several years were formally incorporated into the 1974 Act,
    including the expansion of budget resolutions to cover 3 fiscal years and
    the authority to initiate reconciliation procedures in the April budget
    resolution. Third, enforcement procedures were tightened, including new
    restrictions on legislation linked to committee spending allocations under
    the budget resolution, a requirement in the Senate that three-fifths of
    Members ``duly chosen and sworn'' vote to waive certain budget act points
    of order, and a requirement that the recommended deficit in the budget
    resolution not exceed the applicable deficit target. Fourth, the
    reconciliation process was modified in several ways, including a ban
    against using reconciliation to make changes in the Social Security Program
    and requirements in the House and Senate that amendments to reconciliation
    measures be deficit-neutral.

     With regard to other changes in the Federal budget process, the 1985 Act
    also required the President to submit an annual budget consistent with the
    deficit targets, placed existing off-budget entities on the budget, and
    placed the Social Security Program off-budget (except for calculating the
    deficit for purposes of sequestration).

     Several lawsuits contesting the constitutionality of the 1985 Act were
    filed immediately. On February 7, 1986, a special three-judge panel of the
    U.S. District Court declared that the procedure for triggering
    sequestration under the Act was unconstitutional on the grounds that it
    vested executive power in an officer removable by Congress. (Sequestration
    would have been triggered pursuant to a report prepared by the Comptroller
    General, head of the General Accounting Office.) Further, the Court
    declared that a sequestration order for FY1986, issued on February 1, 1986,
    was ``without legal force and effect,'' but stayed its judgment (as
    required by Section 274(e) of the Act) pending appeal to the Supreme Court.

     The Supreme Court heard arguments in the case, Bowsher v. Synar (478 U.S.
    714), on April 23, 1986, and issued its ruling later that year on July 7.
    Affirming the ruling of the District Court by a vote of 7 to 2, the Supreme
    Court noted:

        To permit an officer controlled by Congress to execute the laws
    would be, in essence, to permit a congressional veto. Congress could
     simply remove, or threaten to remove, an officer for executing the
       laws in any fashion found to be unsatisfactory to Congress. This
    kind of congressional control over the execution of the laws, Chadha
     makes clear, is constitutionally impermissible . . . . It is clear
    that Congress has consistently viewed the Comptroller General as an
                                      officer of the Legislative Branch.

     Anticipating the possibility of invalidation by the courts, Congress
    included ``fallback procedures'' in the Act, under which a Presidential
    sequestration order could be triggered upon the enactment of a joint
    resolution, reported by a Temporary Joint Committee on Deficit Reduction,
    setting forth the contents of a joint report of the Directors of OMB and
    CBO. The Supreme Court stayed its judgment for 60 days in order to allow
    Congress time to implement sequestration for FY1986 under the fallback
    procedures, which Congress did.

     Invalidation by the courts of the automatic triggering mechanism for
    sequestration and the size of the estimated deficit excess for FY1988 (more
    than $50 billion above the deficit target of $108 billion, according to
    CBO) prompted calls in 1987 for revision of the 1985 Act. Major revisions
    to the Act were enacted in 1987, again as a title in a measure raising the
    public debt limit. President Reagan signed the measure into law on
    September 29, 1987, as P.L. 100-119 (101 Stat. 754-788). Title I of this
    law is referred to as the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
    Reaffirmation Act of 1987. The main purposes of the 1987 Act were to extend
    the timeframe for achieving a balanced budget by 2 years, to FY1993, by
    means of revised deficit targets, and to restore the automatic triggering
    feature of sequestration in a constitutionally acceptable manner (which it
    did by vesting that authority in the OMB Director).

     During the interim between the enactment of the 1985 Act and its
    significant revision in 1987, Congress enacted several measures that
    modified the sequestration process, for the most part exempting programs
    from the reductions. Most notably, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
    1986 (P.L. 99-509) exempted from sequestration the cost-of-living
    adjustments (COLAs) of all Federal civilian and military retirement and
    disability programs so that they would be treated in the same manner as
    Social Security, which was already exempt from sequestration.

     Following enactment of the 1987 Act (and before significant changes made
    in 1990), Congress enacted several measures that further modified the
    sequestration process. In particular, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
    of 1987 (P.L. 100-203) made several technical changes in the 1985 Act, and
    the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989
    (P.L. 101-73) exempted certain Federal financial entities from
    sequestration.

     The law which contained the 1987 Act, P.L. 100-119, also included related
    provisions (in Title II) that affected the congressional budget process,
    the impoundment control process, and other matters. With respect to the
    congressional budget process, the 1974 Act was amended to clarify the
    application of time limits for the consideration of conference reports on
    budget resolutions and reconciliation measures, to require the House and
    Senate to use common economic and technical assumptions, to extend CBO
    duties under the State and Local Government Cost Estimate Act of 1981
    indefinitely, and for other purposes.

     The impoundment portion of the 1974 Act was amended to codify the Appeals
    Court decision in City of New Haven v. United States regarding restrictions
    on the President's deferral authority and to prohibit the resubmittal of
    rescission proposals that had been previously rejected by Congress.

     Ultimately, the 1985 Act, as amended, was critically viewed by some for
    its failure to achieve its principal objective, deficit reduction. During
    the period covering FY1986-FY1990, the actual deficit exceeded the deficit
    target every year. The overage ranged from about $5 billion to $205 billion
    and was greatest in the later years, despite the revision of the targets in
    1987. Further, the manner in which the sequestration process operated and
    the stringency of the goals generally were perceived as fostering budgetary
    gimmickry and disruption in the legislative process.

     As a result of these concerns, the sequestration process and the rationale
    for it were fundamentally restructured by the Budget Enforcement Act of
    1990 (discussed in the next section).

     Another change in Senate budget procedures was made at this time, apart
    from the changes made in the 1985 Act. During the first several years'
    experience with reconciliation, the legislation contained many provisions
    that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing policies assumed in the
    budget resolution. The reconciliation submissions of committees included
    such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased
    spending or reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called
    for reduced spending or increased revenues, or that dealt with matters in
    another committee's jurisdiction.

     Some Senators argued that such extraneous provisions, which could be quite
    contentious, had no place in reconciliation legislation, particularly in
    view of the restrictions on debate time and amendments that exist under
    reconciliation. In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule, named
    after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd, on a temporary basis
    as a means of curbing these practices.\24\ The Byrd rule was extended and
    modified several times over the years, and, in 1990, it was incorporated
    into the 1974 Act as Section 313 (2 U.S.C. 644) and made permanent.

    \24\ The Byrd rule is discussed in detail in CRS Report RL30862, The Budget
    Reconciliation Process: The Senate's ``Byrd Rule,'' by Robert Keith.

     The House and Senate were able to reach final agreement on the annual
    budget resolutions for FY1986-FY1989, although in each case it took
    additional weeks or months beyond the prescribed deadline to complete
    action on the measures (see table 6).

               TABLE 6.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1986-FY1989
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      1986.............  S. Con. Res. 32......    08-01-1985
                      1987.............  S. Con. Res. 120.....    06-27-1986
                      1988.............  H. Con. Res. 93......    06-24-1987
                      1989.............  H. Con. Res. 268.....    06-06-1988
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Moving Toward Balance: Budget Enforcement Laws in the 1990s and the
    Emergence of Surpluses

    For the next three Congresses, from 1989 through 1994, the Senate Budget
    Committee operated under Democratic leadership. During the 101st Congress
    (1989-1990), Senator Jim Sasser assumed the chairmanship of the Budget
    Committee and Senator Domenici continued to serve as the ranking member.
    President George H.W. Bush began his term. Senators Sasser and Domenici
    continued to serve as chairman and ranking member, respectively, in the
    102nd Congress (1991-1992), during the final 2 years of the George H.W.
    Bush Presidency, and in the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), during the first
    half of President William J. Clinton's first term.

     Perhaps the single most important development in terms of the budget
    process during the early part of this period was the enactment of the
    Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (OBRA 1990), signed into law by
    President Bush on November 5, 1990, as P.L. 101-508 (104 Stat. 1388, 1-
    630). In addition to dramatically reshaping Federal budget policy with
    approximately $482 billion in deficit reduction over 5 years (including
    $158 billion in revenue increases and $324 billion in spending cuts and
    debt service savings), the 1990 Act included extensive revisions in budget
    procedure in a title (Title XIII) referred to as the Budget Enforcement
    Act.\25\ The FY1991 budget resolution, H. Con. Res. 310, which included the
    reconciliation instructions that led to the enactment of P.L. 101-508, was
    the first budget resolution in years to envision attaining a balanced
    budget a few years out. In fact, the budget resolution envisioned a surplus
    of more than $150 billion by the fifth year (FY1995).

    \25\ Information on the budgetary impact of P.L. 101-508 was provided by
    the Congressional Budget Office in The Economic and Budget Outlook: Fiscal
    Years 1992-1996, January 1991, Table III-3, p. 66.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.022

    Courtesy of the family of Jim Sasser.

    Chairman Jim Sasser, House Budget Committee Chairman Leon Panetta, and
    Ranking Member Bill Frenzel at a budget resolution conference during the
    101st Congress.

     As is often the case with important legislation, the enactment of OBRA
    1990 occurred in response to significant budgetary and economic challenges
    and followed a difficult legislative path. Several months after submitting
    his budget for FY1991, President Bush faced revised projections that showed
    a steep increase in the deficit if no legislative action was taken, which
    threatened to trigger a sequester under the GRH Act of about $100 billion
    toward the end of the year. In early May 1990, his representatives entered
    into budget summit negotiations with congressional leaders over a budget
    plan, which did not conclude until September 30. The summit was informally
    known as the Andrews summit because the negotiations were held at Andrews
    Air Force Base in Maryland, a short distance from Washington, DC.

     In order to obtain a budget agreement that sufficiently met the budgetary
    challenges, President Bush abandoned an earlier pledge of ``no new taxes.''
    On June 26, 1990, President Bush issued a statement that he and
    congressional negotiators concurred that any bipartisan budget agreement
    would involve tax increases and should include budget process reform ``to
    assure that any Bipartisan agreement is enforceable and that the deficit
    problem is brought under responsible control.''

    In early October, the House initially rejected the FY1991 budget
    resolution, which was based on the budget agreement, and President Bush
    vetoed a continuing appropriations act (causing a partial government
    shutdown for several days) in order to increase pressure to support the
    agreement. These obstacles were overcome and, within another month, OBRA
    1990, which implemented the major elements of the budget agreement, was
    enacted into law.

     The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA 1990) made numerous and
    significant changes in the Federal budget process by amending several laws,
    primarily the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.
    The main purpose of these changes, which revised the sequestration process
    established by the 1985 Act and altered other facets of the budget process,
    was to ensure that the substantial deficit savings of several measures
    enacted in 1990, particularly OBRA 1990, were maintained over the 5-year
    timeframe of the legislation (covering FY1991-FY1995).

    BEA 1990, and later laws, changed the sequestration process substantially.
    The Act effectively replaced the fixed Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit
    targets with two new budget enforcement procedures. First, adjustable
    limits were established for separate categories of discretionary spending.
    Second, ``pay-as-you-go'' (paygo) procedures were created to require that
    increases in direct spending or decreases in revenues due to legislative
    action be offset so that there would be no net increase in the deficit.
    Violations of the discretionary limits or the pay-as-you-go requirement
    would be enforced through sequestration. Further, BEA 1990 retained the
    exemption of Social Security from cuts under sequestration, and removed the
    trust fund surpluses from the deficit estimates and other sequestration
    calculations under the Act as well.

     The revised deficit targets, as initially set by BEA 1990, were
    substantially larger than earlier targets because they excluded the
    surpluses of the Social Security trust funds and reflected revised economic
    and technical assumptions. For example, the deficit target for FY1991 was
    set at $327 billion, and the deficit target for FY1995 was set at $83
    billion. The President was required to adjust the deficit targets for
    FY1991-FY1995, to reflect updated economic and technical assumptions and
    changes in budgetary concepts and definitions, as applicable, in his annual
    budget for FY1992 and FY1993. Further, he was authorized to adjust the
    deficit targets for FY1994 and FY1995 to reflect updated economic and
    technical assumptions, when he submitted his budget for these fiscal years.
    (President Clinton chose to use this authority, and made such adjustments
    in the deficit targets, thereby avoiding any sequesters due to violations
    of the deficit targets.)

     BEA 1990 retained sequestration as the means of enforcing the
    discretionary spending limits and the paygo requirement. Like the earlier
    deficit sequestration procedures, the new sequestration procedures were
    automatic and were triggered by a report from the OMB Director.

     The discretionary spending limits established by BEA 1990 varied in type
    over the period covered. For FY1991-FY1993, separate limits were set for
    new budget authority and outlays for three different categories--defense,
    international, and domestic. For FY1994-FY1995, the limits on new budget
    authority and outlays were established for a single category--total
    discretionary spending.

     Under the paygo process created by BEA 1990, the multiyear budget effects
    of enacted legislation changing direct spending, or legislation changing
    revenues, were recorded on a cumulative paygo ``scorecard.'' After the end
    of each congressional session, any balance (or net deficit increase) on the
    paygo scorecard for the new fiscal year was required to be eliminated
    through a special sequestration procedure. If a sequester under this
    process was required, it was required to occur within 15 calendar days
    after Congress adjourned at the end of a session and on the same day as any
    sequestration tied to enforcement of the discretionary spending limits (or,
    in earlier years, the deficit targets).

    Emergency provisions were not required to be offset and were effectively
    exempt from sequestration under both the discretionary spending limits and
    the paygo requirement, so long as an emergency designation was made by the
    President, and the Congress concurred by so designating in the applicable
    act. Except for emergency spending associated with the Persian Gulf war
    (Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm) in 1990-1991, the use of such
    spending was relatively modest in the early and mid-1990s. The escalation
    of emergency spending in later years, however, made the use of such
    spending oftentimes controversial.

     The enforcement procedures for the paygo requirement, on the one hand, and
    the discretionary spending limits, on the other, were separated by a
    ``firewall.'' Savings made on one side of the firewall could not be used to
    the advantage of programs on the other side.

     The sequestration procedures established under the 1985 Act, as modified
    by BEA 1990, were further modified and extended by several other laws, and
    were meant to preserve budget savings made under agreements reached by
    Congress and President Clinton in 1993 and 1997 and to establish new
    program categories for enforcement.

     In 1993, Congress and President Clinton reached a comprehensive budget
    agreement that included the enactment of reconciliation legislation
    achieving $496 billion in deficit reduction over 5 years (including $241
    billion in revenue increases and $255 billion in spending cuts and debt
    service savings).\26\ That measure, the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
    (OBRA) of 1993, was signed into law on August 10, 1993, as P.L. 103-66 (107
    Stat. 312-685). Action on OBRA 1993 was motivated by concern about the
    deficit, which for FY1992 reached $290 billion and had become a prominent
    issue during the 1992 Presidential campaign.

    \26\ Information on alternative measures of the budgetary impact of P.L.
    103-66 was provided by the Congressional Budget Office in The Economic and
    Budget Outlook: An Update, September 1993, Table 2-2, p. 29 and Box 2-3,
    pp. 34-35. Electronically accessible at: http://www.cbo.gov/publications.

    The conference report on OBRA 1993 was adopted by a narrow margin (by a
    vote of 218 to 216 in the House and 51 to 50 in the Senate, with Vice
    President Albert Gore breaking the tie), with no Republican Member
    supporting it in either Chamber.\27\

    \27\ Aug. 5, conference report agreed to in House (218 to 216) by roll call
    vote 406 (139 CR 19438); Aug. 6, conference report agreed to in Senate (51
    to 50) by record vote 247 (139 CR 19871).

                The Act reflected compromises between the President and
                                                               Congress:
         As Clinton had proposed, most of the tax revenue came from the
      wealthiest taxpayers, and the spending cuts resulted largely from
       cutbacks in defense, overall limits on appropriated spending and
           reductions in the growth of Medicare payments to doctors and
      hospitals. But the battle over the bill forced Clinton to give up
    other major features--most notably, his proposal for a $71.5 billion
        tax on almost all forms of energy. The bill also contained less
         spending than Clinton sought for social programs, such as food
          stamps and the earned-income tax credit, and for `investment'
             programs that he hoped would stimulate economic growth.\28\

    \28\ Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1993, ibid., p. 107.

     As part of the agreement, the procedures under BEA 1990 were extended for
    3 more fiscal years, through FY1998. The extension was included as Title
    XIV (Budget Process Provisions) of OBRA of 1993.

     In 1994, separate sequestration procedures for discretionary programs
    associated with the Violent Crime Reduction Trust Fund were added and
    funded by annual appropriations by Title XXXI of the Violent Crime Control
    and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (P.L. 103-322).

     During the 6-year period ending in 1994, five of the budget resolutions
    were adopted by the House and Senate in a fairly timely manner. The
    exception was the budget resolution for FY1991, which was not adopted until
    October 9, 1990, following the conclusion of the Andrews summit (see table
    7).

               TABLE 7.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1990-FY1995
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      1990.............  H. Con. Res. 106.....    05-18-1989
                      1991.............  H. Con. Res. 310.....    10-09-1990
                      1992.............  H. Con. Res. 121.....    05-22-1991
                      1993.............  H. Con. Res. 287.....    05-21-1992
                      1994.............  H. Con. Res. 64......    04-01-1993
                      1995.............  H. Con. Res. 218.....    05-12-1994
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

     At the beginning of the 104th Congress, in 1995, the Republicans regained
    control of the Senate (as well as the House), and Senator Domenici again
    was selected to chair the Budget Committee. The ranking member during the
    104th Congress was Senator J. James Exon. Senator Domenici continued to
    serve as chairman of the Budget Committee in the 105th and 106th Congresses
    (1997-2000), through the end of the Clinton Presidency. Senator Frank R.
    Lautenberg succeeded Senator Exon as ranking member in the 105th Congress,
    and continued to serve in that capacity during the 106th Congress.

     In 1995, the new Republican majorities in the House and Senate forged
    agreement on a budget resolution for FY1996 calling for a balanced budget
    in 7 years, by FY2002. The budget resolution assumed the enactment of
    sizeable tax cuts, which would be more than offset by reductions in
    discretionary spending and in Medicare, Medicaid, and other mandatory
    spending programs. President Clinton also endorsed balancing the budget,
    but differed from the Republican-controlled Congress on how to achieve that
    goal.

     In November 1995, the first of a series of government shutdowns occurred
    when Congress and President Clinton could not agree on a continuing
    appropriation act for FY1996. On December 6, President Clinton vetoed a
    reconciliation measure, referred to as the Balanced Budget Act of 1995
    (H.R. 2491), which was the main legislative vehicle for implementing
    congressional budget policies. In his veto message, the President indicated
    that the measure would have made cuts that he found unacceptable to
    Medicare, Medicaid, student loans, and other programs.

    Following a longer government shutdown (from mid-December 1995 until
    January 6, 1996), the standoff between the President and Congress
    eventually came to an end when they agreed to a new continuing resolution.
    On January 9, 1996, President Clinton submitted a proposal to Congress for
    a projected balanced budget by FY2002, which recommended various tax cuts,
    tax increases, and reductions in mandatory spending to achieve this
    goal.\29\ The five remaining regular appropriation acts for FY1996 were
    incorporated into a single appropriation act, the Omnibus Consolidated
    Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996, which President Clinton signed
    into law as P.L. 104-134 on April 26, 1996 (see table 8).

    \29\ Deficit Reduction and Balanced Budget by Fiscal Year 2002; Message
    From the President of the United States, H. Doc. 104-160, Pt. 1 and 2, Jan.
    9, 1996.

               TABLE 8.--ANNUAL BUDGET RESOLUTIONS: FY1996-FY2001
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                Fiscal year                Budget resolution    Date adopted
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      1996.............  H. Con. Res. 67......    06-29-1995
                      1997.............  H. Con. Res. 178.....    06-13-1996
                      1998.............  H. Con. Res. 84......    06-05-1997
                      1999.............  no conference
                                          agreement \1\
                      2000.............  H. Con. Res. 68......    04-15-1999
                      2001.............  H. Con. Res. 290.....   04-13-2000
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Senate version of the FY1999 budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 86
      (105th), passed the Senate on April 2, 1998.

    Pursuant to the budget resolution for FY1998, Congress successfully
    completed action on a pair of reconciliation measures, the Balanced Budget
    Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) and the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-
    34). The FY1998 budget resolution, H. Con. Res. 84, was the third
    consecutive budget resolution that projected a modest surplus by FY2002.
    Taken together, the 1997 reconciliation acts reduced the deficit by $118
    billion over 5 years. Unlike the reconciliation measures enacted in 1990
    and 1993, which included significant revenue increases as part of the
    overall deficit-reduction policies, the 1997 measures included tax cuts of
    $80 billion (which were more than offset by spending reductions and debt-
    service savings of $198 billion).

     During the 6-year period covering the 104th-106th Congresses (1995-2000),
    the House and Senate compiled a mixed record in the timely adoption of
    budget resolutions, with the first three adopted behind schedule and the
    last two adopted on time. In addition, in 1998, the House and Senate for
    the first time did not reach final agreement on a budget resolution. The
    Senate passed the FY1999 budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 86, on April 2,
    1998. On June 5, the House passed its version of the budget resolution, H.
    Con. Res. 284. The two Chambers, however, were not able to reconcile their
    differences over budget policy.

     The long-sought balance in the Federal budget materialized more quickly
    than expected, well before the FY2002 target set forth in the budget
    resolutions for FY1996-FY1998. For the first time since FY1969, when the
    Federal Government ran a surplus of $3 billion, the Federal budget ran a
    surplus for FY1998, amounting to $69 billion. Even larger surpluses
    occurred for FY1999 ($126 billion) and FY2000 ($236 billion), before
    declining in FY2001 to $128 billion.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.033

    Courtesy of the U.S. Committee on the Budget.

    Pete Domenici, the Committee's longest serving chairman, and then-
    ranking member, J. James Exon, during the May 9, 1996 markup for the
    FY1997 budget resolution.

     Significant modifications to the sequestration process were made by the
    Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1997, which was included as Title X of the
    Balanced Budget Act of 1997. The procedural changes were intended largely
    to preserve the deficit reduction achieved by the two reconciliation acts
    so as to achieve budgetary balance several years in the future.

     BEA 1997 extended the discretionary spending limits and pay-as-you-go
    requirement through FY2002, modified their application, and made various
    ``housekeeping'' and technical changes. New categories were established for
    defense and nondefense discretionary spending for FY1998 and FY1999; for
    FY2000-FY2002, all discretionary spending was merged into a single, general
    purpose category (except for the separate violent crime reduction category
    in effect through FY2000). In 1998, the discretionary spending limits and
    associated sequestration procedures were changed again, in this instance by
    the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21; P.L. 105-178),
    in order to establish separate discretionary spending limits for highway
    and mass transit programs. In 2000, Section 801(a) of the Interior
    Appropriations Act for FY2001 established separate discretionary spending
    limits for FY2002-FY2006 under a new category for conservation spending and
    six related subcategories.

     From their inception in 1990, the discretionary spending limits were
    adjusted at several points during the year for various factors set in law,
    including changes in budgetary concepts and definitions, emergency
    requirements, and special allowances. Factors upon which adjustments were
    based changed from time to time. BEA 1990, for example, provided for an
    adjustment due to changes in inflation, but this adjustment was removed by
    BEA 1997.

    Congressional Budgeting in the 21st Century

     The 6 most recent years of the congressional budget process, covering the
    107th Congress through the 109th Congress (2001-2006), coincided with the
    first term and half of the second term of President George W. Bush. As the
    107th Congress got underway, party control of the Senate, and therefore the
    chairmanship of the Budget Committee, changed several times.

     From the convening of the 107th Congress on January 3, 2001, until the
    inauguration of President Bush and Vice President Richard B. Cheney 17 days
    later on January 20, the Senate was evenly divided between the two parties
    (with 50 Democratic and 50 Republican Senators). Democrats held the
    majority, however, due to the deciding vote of outgoing Democratic Vice
    President Albert Gore. During this period, Senator Kent Conrad served as
    chairman and Senator Pete V. Domenici served as ranking member of the
    Budget Committee (see table 9). Beginning on January 20, the evenly-divided
    Senate came under the control of the Republicans due to the deciding vote
    of Vice President Cheney.

     Accordingly, the Committee leadership positions of Senators Conrad and
    Domenici were reversed, effective with Committee assignments announced on
    January 25. Finally, on May 24, 2001, Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont
    switched his party affiliation from Republican to Independent and began to
    caucus with the Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. At that point, the 50
    Democratic Senators, plus Senator Jeffords, held a 51 to 49 advantage over
    the Republicans, and the positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici were
    reversed again, effective with Committee assignments announced on July 10.
    Senator Conrad served as chairman and Senator Domenici served as ranking
    member for the remainder of the 107th Congress.

             TABLE 9.--COMMITTEE LEADERSHIP: 107TH-109TH CONGRESSES
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    107th Congress (2001-2002)................  Chairman, Kent Conrad (D),
                                                 (January 3-January 25, 2001
                                                 and July 10, 2001 through
                                                 2002)
                                                Chairman, Pete V. Domenici
                                                 (R), (January 25-July 10,
                                                 2001)
                                                Ranking Member, Kent Conrad
                                                 (D), (January 25-July 10,
                                                 2001)
                                                Ranking Member, Pete V.
                                                 Domenici (R) (January 3-
                                                 January 25, 2001 and July
                                                 10, 2001 through 2002)
    108th Congress (2003-2004)................  Chairman, Don Nickles (R)
                                                Ranking Member, Kent Conrad
                                                 (D)
    109th Congress (2005-2006)................  Chairman, Judd Gregg (R)
                                                Ranking Member, Kent Conrad
                                                 (D)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------

     In 2003, the 108th Congress commenced with the Republicans in control of
    the Senate. Senator Pete V. Domenici decided to assume chairmanship of the
    Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, and Senator Don Nickles
    became chairman of the Budget Committee. Senator Conrad assumed the
    position of ranking member. The Republicans retained Senate control in the
    109th Congress, during 2005 and 2006. In 2004, Senator Don Nickles retired
    from the Senate, and Senator Judd Gregg assumed the chairmanship. Senator
    Conrad remained as ranking member during the 109th Congress.

     From the outset, President Bush made tax reductions the centerpiece of his
    budget policy. Congress responded to the President's revenue proposals,
    with significant modifications, largely through the enactment of
    reconciliation measures in 2001 (the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
    Reconciliation Act of 2001, P.L. 107-16) and 2003 (the Jobs and Growth Tax
    Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, P.L. 108-27).

     After 4 years of surpluses, the Federal Government recorded a deficit of
    $158 billion for FY2002, which climbed to $413 billion for FY2004 before
    falling to $318 billion for FY2005 and to $248 billion for FY2006.

     BEA 1990, and the related laws that followed it, generally were regarded
    as having been more successful than the 1985 Act (as amended) in
    controlling aggregate budget levels. During the period that the
    discretionary spending limits and the paygo requirement were in effect, the
    status of the Federal budget changed from relatively large deficits to 4
    years of surpluses (1998-2001).

     Beginning in 1999 and 2000, however, criticisms of the BEA procedures
    began to mount. While the threat of sequestration was viewed initially as
    giving the President and Congress a strong incentive to reach agreement on
    their budgetary goals, thereby avoiding the legislative deadlock that
    characterized the early 1980s, some Members began to regard the BEA
    procedures as an impediment to implementing desired budget policy in an era
    of large surpluses. These Members argued that the BEA procedures should be
    eliminated, or at least substantially modified, so that Congress and the
    President could ``use'' part of the surplus for tax cuts and new spending
    that otherwise would have been prohibited.

     Further, some Members asserted that discretionary spending limits for
    FY2000-FY2002 were unrealistically low, thereby promoting the use of budget
    ``gimmicks,'' such as the excessive designation of emergency spending, to
    evade their constraints. In 2000, the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act
    for FY2001, P.L. 106-429, raised the FY2001 discretionary spending limit
    for that year by $96 billion in new budget authority. In 2001, the Defense
    Appropriations Act for FY2002, P.L. 107-117, raised the FY2002
    discretionary spending limit for that year by $135 billion in new budget
    authority. In 1999, 2000, and 2001, legislation enacted into law required
    the OMB Director to change the balance on the paygo scorecard for certain
    years to zero. These actions by Congress and the President successfully
    prevented discretionary spending or paygo sequesters from occurring in
    those years. Some have argued that the paygo discipline may have been a
    deterrent to proposals that would have increased the deficit without an
    offset.

     The discretionary spending limits under the BEA expired on September 30,
    2002. In late 2002, the paygo scorecard was set at zero for FY2003 and each
    year thereafter through FY2006 by P.L. 107-312, thereby removing more than
    $100 billion in balances each year from the scorecard and preventing any
    future paygo sequesters. Consequently, the statutory enforcement mechanisms
    did not extend past the end of the 107th Congress.

     During the 108th and 109th Congresses, the Senate and the House wrestled
    with the issue of whether the expired BEA procedures should be restored or
    new budget constraints should be enacted. Considerable attention was
    focused on enforcement issues between June and October 2002 as the Senate
    addressed the need to extend certain other budget enforcement procedures
    slated to expire.

     On June 5, 2002, during consideration of an emergency supplemental
    appropriations act (H.R. 4775), the Senate rejected a Gregg-Feingold
    amendment, which would have extended certain budget enforcement procedures
    through FY2007. The next day, on June 6, a Daschle amendment, an extension
    of certain budget enforcement procedures through FY2007, also failed.\30\
    On June 20, during consideration of the National Defense Authorization Act
    (S. 2514), the Senate rejected a Feingold amendment, as perfected by a
    modified Reid-Conrad amendment.\31\ It fell on a point of order when a
    motion to waive the point of order was rejected on a 59 to 40 vote, 1 short
    of the required 60 affirmative votes (roll call vote 159). The Feingold
    amendment, as perfected, would have extended the discretionary spending
    limits through FY2004 and certain other budget enforcement procedures
    through FY2007.

    \30\ For the text and discussion of the Gregg-Feingold amendment (number
    3687), see pp. S5005- S5015 in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of June
    5, 2002. The Gregg-Feingold amendment fell on a point of order after a
    motion to waive the point of order was rejected on a 49 to 49 vote (roll
    call vote 133). For the text and discussion of the Daschle amendment
    (number 3764), see pp. S5015-S5022 and S5114-S5120 in the Congressional
    Record (daily ed.) of June 5 and 6, 2002, respectively. The amendment fell,
    after cloture had been invoked, on a point of order that it was nongermane.

    \31\ For the text of the Feingold amendment (number 3915), as perfected by
    a modified Reid-Conrad amendment #3916, and its discussion, see pp. S5808-
    S5821 in the Congressional Record (daily ed.) of June 20, 2002.

    On September 18, 2002, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Kent Conrad and
    Ranking Member Pete V. Domenici sent a letter to Majority Leader Daschle
    urging action on a resolution extending the Senate's pay-as-you-go point of
    order and the three-fifths vote requirement for certain waivers of the 1974
    Act. Majority Leader Daschle confirmed that the Senate would consider such
    legislation before adjournment. On October 16, the Senate considered S.
    Res. 304, a measure introduced earlier in the session encouraging the
    Senate Appropriations Committee to report the regular appropriations bills
    for FY2003 by July 31, 2002. The Senate agreed to the resolution by
    unanimous consent, after adopting by unanimous consent a Conrad amendment,
    a substitute amendment extending the Senate's pay-as-you-go point of order
    and the three-fifths vote requirement for certain waivers of the 1974 Act
    through April 15, 2003.\32\ The Senate resolution, because it is not a law,
    could not extend the statutory discretionary spending limits and the
    statutory pay-as-you-go enforcement procedure.

    \32\ See the consideration of S. Res. 304 in the Congressional Record
    (daily ed.) of Oct. 16, 2002, at pp. S10527-S10531 and p. S10553. Also, see
    ``In Late Deal, Senate Approves by Voice Vote Renewing Expiring Budget
    Enforcement Rules,'' by Bud Newman in BNA's Daily Report for Executives,
    Oct. 17, 2002.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.036

     2001, The Washington Post. Photo by Ray Lustig. Reprinted with
    Permission.

    Chairman Kent Conrad refers to charts during the January 23, 2002
    hearing on the FY2003 budget and economic outlook.

    In the absence of the expired statutory enforcement mechanisms, the two
    Chambers have relied on the existing budget procedures under the 1974 Act,
    as well as procedural mechanisms in annual budget resolutions, to enforce
    budget policy. In the case of mechanisms in annual budget resolutions used
    for enforcement by the Senate, the provisions have dealt with several key
    enforcement issues, including:

           The Senate's ``pay-as-you-go'' (paygo) point of
      order.--Under the current paygo point of order, in effect since
      2003, when Congress adopts a budget resolution, it simultaneously
      establishes (in the Senate only) a scorecard that sets out the
      total amount of deficit change assumed in the budget resolution.
      This is sometimes referred to as post-policy paygo. The scorecard,
      as maintained by the chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, is
      used to compare the budgetary effects of direct spending and
      revenue legislation against those balances. As with previous
      incarnations of the paygo point of order in the Senate, the
      current rule covers the first year, and the first 5 years
      (required to be included in the budget resolution), as well as the
      5-year period after the first 5 years. First established in the
      FY1994 budget resolution, the point of order has been modified
      several times over the years, and there is considerable
      controversy over whether it should be retained as is or returned
      to its initial form, which required that new mandatory spending or
      new tax cuts be offset or get 60 votes.
           Discretionary spending limits.--Limits on
      discretionary new budget authority and outlays, enforceable only
      in the Senate, have been carried in recent budget resolutions,
      initially to supplement the statutory limits on discretionary
      spending, and later to replace them (to some extent) after they
      had expired. The statutory limits for FY2001, for example, were
      enforced on the basis of several categories for outlays, but all
      discretionary new budget authority fell under a single category.
      Section 207 of H. Con. Res. 290, the FY2001 budget resolution,
      further divided total discretionary new budget authority for that
      year into defense and nondefense categories. The FY2006 budget
      resolution, H. Con. Res. 95, set forth (in Section 404)
      discretionary spending limits for 3 years--FY2006, FY2007, and
      FY2008. The following year, a deeming resolution for FY2007
      (contained in the Iraq-Afghanistan-Hurricane Supplemental
      Appropriations Act, P.L. 109-234), effectively eliminated the
      limits for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, and provided an allocation
      to the Senate Appropriations Committee of $873 billion in new
      discretionary budget authority for FY2007, a level consistent with
      the President's discretionary spending request for that year.
           Procedures for emergency spending.--The House and
      Senate have provided in recent budget resolutions procedures for
      the designation of items in appropriations acts, direct spending
      measures, and revenue legislation as emergencies, thereby
      exempting them from various budget enforcement mechanisms. In
      providing such a procedure in Section 402 of the FY2007 Senate-
      passed budget resolution (which was made effective by Section 7035
      of P.L. 109-234), for example, the Senate has chosen to create a
      point of order against nondefense emergency designations in
      legislation and to establish criteria for determining what
      constitutes an emergency, among other things.
           Restrictions on advance appropriation.--Advance
      appropriations, which are provided in an annual appropriation act
      for a fiscal year beyond the fiscal year to which the act applies,
      have been used for many years. The amount of such appropriations
      escalated sharply in recent years to more than $20 billion
      annually. In view of concerns that to some degree this escalation
      might reflect an evasion of budget control, recent budget
      resolutions have included restrictions on the use of advance
      appropriations. Section 401 of the FY2006 budget resolution, for
      example, barred the consideration of measures providing advance
      appropriations for FY2007 and FY2008, except for accounts
      specifically identified in the joint managers' statement
      accompanying the budget resolution, and subject to an overall cap
      of $23.258 billion in each year.
           Limitation on long-term spending proposals in the
      Senate.--One of the newest innovations in budget enforcement was
      the inclusion of a limitation on long-term spending proposals in
      the FY2006 budget resolution (in Section 407). The provision,
      aimed mainly at curtailing the expansion of new entitlements
      through legislative action (total entitlement spending already
      increases each year under existing law), established a point of
      order against a measure providing a net increase in direct
      spending of more than $5 billion in any of four 10-year periods
      covering FY2016-FY2055.

     All of the mechanisms discussed above are enforced by points of order.
    Like most of the points of order established in the 1974 Act, the points of
    order carried in budget resolutions generally may be waived by the
    affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators, if no
    seats are vacant). At the present time, the Senate's paygo point of order
    remains in effect through September 30, 2008, and three-fifths waiver
    requirements generally were extended through September 30, 2010, by Section
    403(a) of the FY2006 budget resolution (H. Con. Res. 95).

     In 2005, in action on the FY2006 budget resolution, the House and Senate
    agreed to use the budget reconciliation process to reduce the growth of
    mandatory spending by about $38 billion over 5 years. This was the first
    time that reconciliation had been used to reduce spending since 1997.
    Although congressional efforts carried over into 2006, Congress and the
    President ultimately enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, which
    became P.L. 109-171. In addition, the Tax Increase Prevention and
    Reconciliation Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-222), a $70 billion revenue reduction
    measure to renew expiring tax cuts and to make other changes in tax law,
    also was enacted under reconciliation procedures stemming from the FY2006
    budget resolution. Opponents argue that, taken together, the two acts
    increased the deficit by about $32 billion over 5 years.

     During the 6 most recent years of the congressional budget process, the
    House and Senate were unable to reach final agreement on the budget
    resolutions for FY2003, FY2005, and FY2007, but the other three budget
    resolutions were adopted in a fairly timely manner.

     The FY2003 budget resolution, S. Con. Res. 100, was reported by the Budget
    Committee on March 22, 2002, but was not considered on the Senate floor. In
    2002, the House and Senate were controlled by different parties. In 2004, a
    conference agreement was reported on the FY2005 budget resolution, S. Con.
    Res. 95. The House agreed to the conference report on May 19, 2004, but the
    Senate did not consider it. In 2006, the House and Senate each passed their
    own versions of the FY2007 budget resolution (S. Con. Res. 83 and H. Con.
    Res. 376), but no conference was held to resolve the differences between
    the two Chambers.

     The inability of the House and Senate to reach final agreement on budget
    resolutions for these 3 years, and previously for FY1999, compelled the
    Budget Committees to develop innovative means of maintaining budget
    discipline for those budget cycles. In these instances, a device referred
    to as a ``deeming resolution'' was used by one or both Houses to establish
    enforceable budget levels (for discretionary spending because the budget
    resolution only provides a 1-year allocation for appropriations). Multiyear
    levels for revenues and direct spending set in the prior year's budget
    resolution remain in effect and afford some measure of budget discipline.
    The term ``deeming resolution'' is not officially defined, nor is there any
    specific statute or rule authorizing such legislation. Instead, the use of
    a deeming resolution simply represents the House and Senate employing
    legislative procedures to deal with the issue on an ad hoc basis.

     The form and content of a deeming resolution is not prescribed, so it may
    be shaped to meet the particular needs at hand. For example, the House and
    Senate have used simple resolutions as the legislative vehicle in the past,
    but a deeming resolution may be incorporated into a bill, such as an annual
    appropriations act, as a single provision. At a minimum, deeming
    resolutions have provided new spending allocations to the Appropriations
    Committees, but they also may provide new aggregate budget levels, revise
    spending allocations to other House and Senate committees, or provide for
    other budget enforcement mechanisms.

     For FY1999, the first year the two Chambers did not reach final agreement
    on a budget resolution, the Senate adopted two deeming resolutions (S. Res.
    209 on April 2, 1998 and S. Res. 312 on October 21, 1998), and the House
    included deeming provisions in two resolutions adopted (H. Res. 477 on June
    19, 1998 and H. Res. 5 on January 6, 1999). For FY2003, the House adopted
    on May 22, 2002 a deeming resolution provision in H. Res. 428, a special
    rule for H.R. 4775, a supplemental appropriations act. The Senate adopted
    S. Res. 304 on October 16, 2002, dealing with budget process matters; it
    extended certain expiring budget enforcement provisions and the Senate
    paygo rule, but did not set new budget levels.

     For FY2005, the House adopted on May 19, 2004, both the conference report
    on the FY2005 budget resolution and a special rule (H.R. 649) including a
    deeming resolution provision that put budget policies in the conference
    report into effect for the House. On August 5, 2004, H.R. 4613, the Defense
    Appropriations Act for FY2005, was signed into law and included Section
    14007 that deemed portions of the 2005 budget resolution conference report
    to be in effect for the Senate.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.035

    Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Photography Studio.

    Chairman Don Nickles and House Budget Committee Chairman Jim Nussle
    share a laugh during the FY2005 budget resolution conference on March
    31, 2004.

     For FY2007, the House adopted a deeming provision in H. Res. 818, a
    special rule providing for the consideration of the Interior Appropriations
    Act for FY2007. The Senate followed suit in June, adding a deeming
    resolution provision as Section 7035 in the conference report on H.R. 4939,
    an emergency supplemental appropriations act that was signed into law on
    June 15, 2006, as P.L. 109-234.

    During the second session of the 109th Congress, in 2006, Chairman Judd
    Gregg, along with 26 cosponsors, introduced S. 3521, the Stop Over Spending
    (SOS) Act of 2006. Title I of the SOS Act was the Legislative Line Item
    Veto Act of 2006. Title I would have granted the President new authority to
    identify line items in discretionary and direct spending legislation, and
    targeted tax benefits in revenue legislation, and propose to Congress that
    they be rescinded or cancelled. Congress would have been compelled to
    consider the President's proposals under expedited procedures without
    amendments.

     In an effort to balance the budget by FY2012, the bill would have
    established a mechanism under which the deficit would be limited to a
    declining percentage of the gross domestic product (beginning with 2.75
    percent of GDP for FY2007 and dropping steadily to 0.5 percent of GDP for
    FY2012 and thereafter). The deficit targets would have been enforced by an
    automatic reconciliation process; if reconciliation legislation was not
    enacted or did not reduce the deficit by a sufficient amount, a
    sequestration involving automatic, largely across-the-board spending cuts
    would occur.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.015

    Courtesy of the U.S. Senate Photography Studio.

         Chairman  Judd  Gregg  during  a  Budget  Committee  markup  in
         June 2006.

     Other elements of the SOS Act of 2006 included: (1) statutory caps on
    discretionary budget authority for FY2007-FY2009, also enforced by
    sequestration, and limits on the amount of spending that may be designated
    as an emergency each year; (2) a new point of order against direct spending
    triggered when the Medicare Program was projected to become insolvent in 7
    years or less; (3) biennial budgeting; (4) a bipartisan Commission on
    Congressional Budgetary Accountability and Review of Federal Agencies, to
    review government programs in a manner similar to the Base Realignment and
    Closure (BRAC) Commission, and a bipartisan National Commission on
    Entitlement Solvency, to examine and make recommendations regarding the
    growth of entitlement spending; and (5) various changes pertaining to the
    consideration of budget resolutions and reconciliation measures.

     The SOS Act of 2006 was marked up by the Budget Committee on June 20,
    2006. Eight amendments, including a substitute offered by Ranking Member
    Kent Conrad, were rejected. The Conrad substitute, among other things,
    would have restored statutory pay-as-you-go procedures applicable to
    revenue legislation as well as direct spending legislation and allowed the
    reconciliation process to be used only for deficit reduction. The Conrad
    alternative also would have required the President to budget for the cost
    of military operations, added new protections for Social Security, required
    conference reports to lay over for 48 hours and be scored prior to Senate
    consideration, and called on the President and Congress to undertake a
    bipartisan effort to solve the current and long-term fiscal challenges
    facing the Nation. An amendment making various modifications to the bill,
    offered by Chairman Gregg, was adopted. The Committee ordered the bill
    reported, as amended, by a vote of 12 to 10 (S. Rept. 109-283; July 14,
    2006).
    Staff Recollections

    The following recollections were excerpted from interviews conducted with
    former Senate Budget Committee staff during August and September 2006. The
    complete interview transcripts are available at the Senate Historical
    Office and the Library of Congress.\1\ Senior Committee staff members Jim
    Hearn, Cheri Reidy, and John Righter conducted the interviews. The
    Committee would like to thank the participants for their time and
    dedication to the project and for sharing their unique knowledge and
    insight to create an invaluable resource on the Senate Budget Committee and
    the Federal budget process. A list of interviewees along with their
    Committee affiliation follows.

    \1\ Complete interview transcripts are available at the Senate Historical
    Office, 201 Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC 20510, (202) 224-
    6900, and at the Library of Congress Manuscript Division, 101 Independence
    Avenue, SE, Washington, DC 20540, (202) 707-5387.

                               Stephen E. Bell

       Task Force Investigator (TFI), Senator Pete V. Domenici, 1979-1980
                      Majority Staff Director, 1981-1986

                                  Jack Conway
                  Senior Analyst for Budget Review, 1979-1983

                              William G. Dauster
                    Majority Chief Counsel, 1987-1994
         Minority Staff Director and Minority Chief Counsel, 1995-1997

                              John L. Hilley
    Assistant Staff Director for Economics, Trade, and Finance, 1985-1989
                    Majority Staff Director, 1989-1990

                            G. William Hoagland
                         Senior Analyst, 1982-1983
                 Majority Deputy Staff Director, 1984-1985
                  Majority Staff Director, 1986, 1995-2000
             Minority Staff Director, 1987-1994, 2001-2002 \2\

                              Hazen Marshall
        TFI, Legislative Assistant, Senator Don Nickles, 1988-1996
      TFI, Economist, Assistant Majority Leader Don Nickles, 1997-1999
                        TFI, Deputy Chief of Staff,
            Assistant Majority Leader Don Nickles, 2000-2002 \2\
                      Majority Staff Director, 2003-2004

                               John T. McEvoy
                    Majority Chief Counsel, 1974-1976
                    Majority Staff Director, 1977-1980

                              Carole McGuire
                    Staff Assistant, Analyst, 1976-1985
                   Director of Appropriations, 1986-1994
    Majority Deputy Staff Director and Director of Appropriations, 1995-2000
    Minority Deputy Staff Director and Director of Appropriations, 2001-2002
    \2\

                               Larry Stein
                  Communications Director, 1988-1990
                  Majority Staff Director, 1991-1994

    \2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
    times (as discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109).

    Beginnings

    People and Structure

    Mr. McEvoy: I've got to credit Doug Bennett [the Committee's first staff
    director] with the genius in creating staff. He knew what he was looking
    for. . . . These were people who ``got'' the process. That was the common
    denominator, with one or two exceptions who didn't last.

    They somehow intuitively could fit into the Senate apparatus with a little
    coaching and didn't fight the system. We insisted, this was Doug's cardinal
    principle, mine as well, that we were going to be value-neutral on the
    budget. Our commitment was to the system. We were certainly Democrats, and
    the chairman was a Democrat, and that meant that you couldn't do much
    without the Democrats. The staff wasn't going to have an agenda. We thought
    policy was for the Senators to decide. We culled more than one staff person
    out of the Committee because we felt they had an agenda that they were
    pushing.

    Mr. Conway: In those early days, there were three or four analysts who
    worked for a group leader. Each of these groups were called pods, and the
    leader of the group was the pod leader. I think the name ``pod'' came from
    the ``Invasion of the Body Snatchers'' movie. There was a national security
    pod, which was defense and international affairs, and a human resources
    pod, which was health, education, income, security, and veterans' affairs.
    There was also a natural resources pod, and a commerce and housing credit,
    and general government pod. Some of the group leaders did a function as
    well, and also oversaw the work of the other staffers. The major
    organizational elements would have been these pods covering the functional
    areas of the budget, and then a legal group and an administrative group.

    Ms. McGuire: From the early days of the Committee there has been
    continuity. . . . When it was set up by the Democrats in the mid-1970s,
    they had no blueprint on how to do this. They had to make some very basic
    decisions. Do we have subcommittees or do we not? How do we get people to
    serve on the Committee? The Committee structure today is very much like it
    was when it was set up. You have your functional analysts, policy groups,
    your staff director, deputy staff director, chief counsel, and budget
    review people.

    Task force investigators (TFIs), who are still around, came about in lieu
    of subcommittees. . . . They wanted to get them [members] involved in the
    budget and the budget process. So they set up policy task forces to work on
    budget issues. The members' staff were the TFIs. At one time, we tried to
    call them Senator's representatives, but they have always been TFIs.

    Carroll Arms

    Mr. McEvoy: The Carroll Arms was the occasion for an awful lot of staff
    lore. It started because all the Senate space was used up. There was no
    Hart Building. Every Committee had every inch, and every Senator had every
    inch. Somebody did propose giving us a room in the basement, and Chairman
    Muskie said no. We were without a home, so I was operating out of a dungeon
    I called the ``Muskie bunker,'' this really dark place that was his private
    lair over in the Senate before Senator Sam Ervin retired, and Senator
    Muskie got his office.

    Doug [Bennett, the Committee's first staff director] and I would walk
    around the Hill in the afternoon looking at buildings. Well, the Carroll
    Arms Hotel had also been [acquired by the Senate] across the street, a big
    hotel, it was going to be torn down for a parking lot, but when was the
    question, because the parking lot itself had gotten caught in the 1973
    recession. Anyway, the Carroll Arms had been spared, but nobody knew for
    how long. So Doug and I made the case to Senator Muskie that we should try
    to get space in the Carroll Arms. I said to him, ``But even that won't work
    for the long term because one day it's going to be torn down.'' And he
    said, in his usual fashion, ``Don't worry. It'll be there longer than you
    are.'' He was right.

    We got two floors of the Carroll Arms, the second and third floor--well,
    most of the first, too, but there wasn't much down there. Doug's office,
    and later mine, was in the space that the Quorum Club used to be in. It was
    wonderful. We all had bathrooms.

    Ms. McGuire: The Budget Committee was assigned a hearing room in the
    Russell Building. We were physically located in the old Carroll Arms Hotel
    across the street which is now a parking lot. Because of staff limitations,
    and the fact that the Hart Building was not yet constructed, we were
    placed, much as CBO was, in an old building, which was a blessing and a
    curse: out of sight, out of mind. Any trip to see the Chairman, or to see
    one of the Members, or to go to a hearing, you had to walk across the
    street and into the Dirksen or Russell Buildings. Your chairman did not
    just drop by. One night about midnight when I was on the second floor of
    the Carroll Arms Annex, Chairman Muskie walked through, which just about
    freaked me out. I think that it was about the only time that the Chairman
    was ever in the building.

    We had these old hotel rooms that everyone loved because they had a shower,
    so anyone that jogged could jog and come back and take a shower. It was
    kind of a quirky place to have your office, but we all loved the Carroll
    Arms Annex dearly until it was torn down. We had a big farewell party over
    there, and we moved across the street to the Dirksen Building.

    Sid Brown (the Committee's First Chief of Budget Review)

    Mr. Hoagland: The first day I walked into the Budget Committee . . . I'll
    never forget walking into Sid's office, and he had one of those calculators
    that had a roll of paper on it. That's the way the budget was put together.
    Sid was from the old Budget Office, the Bureau of the Budget, an old-time
    budgeteer, a great guy. Sid was that person who had integrity, nobody could
    challenge, and he could stand up to anyone in the early years and say,
    ``Now, this is the way it is,'' and nobody was going to challenge Sid on
    it. There was this stature that Sid had. It's hard to find, in this very
    political town today, a career staff person on Capitol Hill that can
    maintain that kind of respect.

    Mr. McEvoy: We had THE computer in the Senate. That was part of our
    mystique, see. We had a computer. These numbers that we used in our
    scorekeeping system came out of a computer! In fact, it was Sid massaging
    them. Sid had this assistant who reminded me of the far out scientist in
    the ``Back to the Future'' movie. He'd sit there at this little tabletop
    computer, one of the first desktops, and he'd say, ``Let's fire up Ol'
    Nelly.'' But you could never be sure that the damn thing was even going to
    go on, and you know, sparks would fly. . . .

    Everybody respected Sid. They knew he didn't bend with the wind. And
    Chairman Muskie would never ask him to make a compromise. The numbers were
    the numbers. And Sid, because of his acumen, and his thorough understanding
    of the budget, commanded great respect at OMB [the Office of Management and
    Budget] among the professionals and at CBO [the Congressional Budget
    Office].

    Technology

    Mr. Conway: Everything was done in millions with an asterisk for $500,000
    or less, rather than, as we do today, billions and tenths of billions, with
    an asterisk for $50 million or less. In the beginning, there were no
    personal computers; everything was done on adding machines or calculators,
    and all the markup materials were done on paper that was put into a
    typewriter, and then you typed out all the numbers. The first time you put
    the piece of paper in, it looked pretty good, but then you made a mistake
    on the number or CBO changed the number between Tuesday and Wednesday and
    the original would have to be ``fixed.'' So you'd take the piece of paper,
    and then maybe use some Wite-Out, or if you were really good, you could fit
    the page back in and maybe use a correct-a-type typewriter or had the tape
    that could cover over the mistake. That would work maybe the first two
    times, and then there was Wite-Out slathered on it, and by the end, when we
    finally were in the position of putting together a markup book, there were
    many layers of tape. So you'd have the tape, plus the Wite-Out, plus
    everything else. Some of the pages were so thick, you didn't dare feed them
    through a copying machine. We did have copying machines. . . .

    One thing that is no longer done is that every Saturday there was published
    and on the desk of every Senator on Monday morning, a Senate Budget
    Committee scorekeeping report. There would be a page for every committee
    and a page for every subcommittee of appropriations, and it would show the
    budget resolution, prior year spending, supplementals, current session
    spending, and the regular bills. So for an appropriation bill, it would
    start with the prior year outlays, then you would have, if there was a
    supplemental, any effect from the supplemental, and then if there was any
    action on the bill. If there was no action, it would just stop at that
    level. If it continued, you'd have comparisons to the budget resolution.
    Thank God I didn't have to come in to work on that, but Sid [Brown] did.
    This stuff was set in monotype. It was not done electronically. Every piece
    was set in hot lead. Sid would come in and send it to GPO on Friday, and
    he'd come in every Saturday to look at the galleys.

    Markups, Resolutions, and the Senate Floor

    Mr. McEvoy: Chairman Muskie was prodigious in his absorption of data. We
    used to prepare thick undigested briefing books and send them home with
    him, so that he came into the markup knowing more than most of the members
    of the Committee knew about how things added up. He was a brilliant man. He
    could make combinations in his mind that others could not. He wanted to
    achieve consensus on a budget resolution, which meant he couldn't have
    everything he wanted, but he also knew what was the minimum he, in
    conscience and politically, could settle for.

    The staff never presented a mark, and we never had a Committee mark. The
    House did that all the time. The leadership had a mark. I remember the
    House in those days had leadership representation on the Committee, and
    they followed it very closely. We never did that. Muskie was zero based in
    budget resolutions. The only number we offered in the Committee in its
    documents was the current services budget. People would propose a number,
    plus or minus that starting point. Current services was what it would cost
    to run the government taking into account all the legislation on the books,
    adjusted for the current economic forecast. You could put it into the
    functional baskets and see it. And so that's kind of how it got started. I
    considered the President's budget dead on arrival.

    One time we had a second resolution markup, or maybe it was a first
    resolution, going on for 3 or 4 weeks, and members stopped coming. We would
    meet all day. It would be between floor votes. We got down to about eight
    people in the Committee, and Chairman Muskie wouldn't stop because one of
    his negotiating techniques was that he just kept you going until you were
    ready to sign up. He would not let a final vote come on a resolution that
    he didn't think he was going to pick up Republicans on. So he had enormous
    patience.

    If you got a consensus on every number, everybody in the Committee was
    smart enough and they had their own staffs to know what we were building up
    to, so if you had a consensus through to the end on all of the functions,
    chances are you were going to get to the end in a way that had consensus on
    the outcome.

    Ms. McGuire: We prepared similar markup books to the type that you do now,
    although they were more extensive. The theory was that the members needed
    to have an education about what was in the Federal budget. So they were
    rather extensive markups to describe what a function was and what programs
    were in it, and what the funding patterns had been as well as the current
    services baseline, CBO's current policy baseline, and the President's
    budget request. Markups took 2, sometimes 3, weeks because we would walk
    through every function, and every functional analyst would give a
    presentation on what was in the function, and then entertain questions. In
    those days, we did not always have a Chairman's Mark. It was more putting
    together a budget resolution the old-fashioned way by offering amendments
    to the budget functions. We walked through every budget function, and
    members could offer amendments to the function, and the Committee would act
    on them.

    Over time as things got more partisan, and there was less camaraderie on
    the Committee, we changed to the current system of markups where everybody
    has their own ideas of what they want in the resolution, and the better
    part of valor is to cut to the chase and do the Chairman's Mark. When
    people kind of recognized the writing on the wall and by the time that you
    were having one or two vote margins, you realized that you had to get all
    of your guys in line. The chairmen started to figure out that they had to
    put together a mark and get as much support as they could and then open it
    up for the amendment process. This did two things, it expedited the process
    and somewhat guaranteed you could get a budget resolution out of the
    Committee. I think the chairmen felt it was their responsibility to get a
    budget resolution to the floor. Somehow they had to get that done. That was
    the one thing that they were asked to do every year.

    Out of those rather lengthy markups and back and forth negotiating
    sessions, I think, is where our ``no proxy'' rule came from. . . . Since
    the Budget Committee met for a very short period of time each year, certain
    chairmen thought that the members ought to be present and accounted for for
    the duration of the markup and that members using proxies slowed down the
    work of the Committee. Chairman Chiles was the one that really pushed
    extensively for the ``no proxy'' rule based on his experience over time
    with Chairman Muskie and as the ranking member trying to get the budget
    resolutions adopted in the Committee. I think that those lengthy markups
    and the fact that you had to herd members into the Committee to offer their
    amendments, eventually led to the adoption of the ``no proxy'' rule.

    Mr. Conway: In those days, the analysts would sit at the table during
    markup and answer questions, and heaven help the analyst who stumbled in
    front of the members. You've all seen it, if members get a sense that you
    don't know what you're talking about. . . . I was always terrified of what
    questions they were going to ask because I was the functional analyst for
    function 900, interest, 920, allowances, and 950, undistributed offsetting
    receipts, which included Outer Continental Shelf rents and royalties. The
    Members who had written the laws on Outer Continental Shelf rents and
    royalties were sitting at the table. . . .

    At that time, we did at least two budget resolutions a year. The first
    budget resolution was advisory, and the second budget resolution was
    binding. The binding part of the resolution was what we called ``the last
    piggy at the trough,'' the last appropriation bill or the first
    appropriation bill that would cause the 302(a) allocation to be breached
    and would be subject to a majority point of order. There were no points of
    order on each of the individual appropriation bills. It was only on the
    last one or the one that would cause a breach of the budget.

    You would finish the first budget resolution. There would be a short period
    and then you would begin the second budget resolution. The second budget
    resolution basically was to incorporate CBO re-estimates from the time the
    first budget resolution was adopted. There were a number of different
    updates. There was the President's budget, then there was an April update
    where OMB would submit updated information similar to the midsession
    review, then they would do the midsession review in July.

    As a staffer, the most difficult thing was, ``what set of numbers are we
    working on now?'' Depending on what stage of the process you were in, if
    you were scoring a bill, you would be doing it under the assumptions of the
    first budget resolution. If you were preparing things for the second budget
    resolution markup, you would be scoring the same bills, but under the
    assumptions of the second budget resolution, and they may be the
    assumptions that were from the OMB April update, or they may be further
    modified by the July midsession review.

    Ms. McGuire: The second budget resolution was really more for fine tuning,
    but the farther we went in the process, and the longer it continued to take
    to get our appropriations work and tax work completed, it seemed to be
    almost irrelevant at the time we were supposed to do the second budget
    resolution. There were not a lot of things to fine tune. We were still in
    the middle of doing appropriation bills and tax bills and things of that
    nature. At some point, it became a housekeeping function and essentially
    irrelevant as we revised the budget resolution in the next cycle. We
    continued to update the past budget resolution when we did a new resolution
    and that practice essentially took the place of the second budget
    resolution.

    Mr. Hearn [interviewer, to Mr. Dauster]: The purpose of this whole exercise
    of the Committee history is to put together a document that people can use,
    to research, to go back and draw on what might otherwise be lost to
    history. One product that already exists is what the small circle of
    potential scholars is going to call ``the blue book,'' \3\ which is what we
    call it, which you know a lot about since you wrote it. It really was, for
    the period that it covered in terms of the law at the time, it was ``the
    bible.''

    \3\ Budget Process Law Annotated 1993 Edition: Including the Congressional
    Budget Act, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,
    Executive Order 12857, and Related Budget-Process Legislation. Committee on
    the Budget, United States Senate. Annotations by William G. Dauster, Chief
    Counsel. Senate Print 103-49, 103rd Congress, First Session. October 1993.
    Government Printing Office.

    Mr. Dauster [in response to Mr. Hearn]: There have been three editions of
    the volume we're talking about. What started off as the ``Congressional
    Budget Act Annotated'' or ``Budget Process Annotated'' . . . started for
    two reasons. First, to have collected in one place all the things I'd need
    on the floor, and I'd want to argue with the Parliamentarian about what was
    the law on something. So, it was useful to have it and not have it in a
    large suitcase. It's better to have something small that you can carry with
    you at all times. Second, it helped me to understand the law better, and so
    it was a good, useful learning process for me.

    Tests of Budget Enforcement

    Mr. McEvoy: In July 1975, Chairman Muskie was confronted with his first
    challenge to that budget resolution because Senator McGovern, who was
    chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Hunger, had fought and lost to
    Senator Dole in Committee on an amendment to raise school lunch subsidies,
    I think by a nickel or something. The House had passed a bill that vastly
    exceeded what the Senate had allowed for it in our budget resolution.
    Senator Dole was standing by the budget resolution in opposing the McGovern
    amendment. Senator McGovern came to the floor and offered an amendment to
    put it back.

    Now, Chairman Muskie's politics would have driven him in the past to vote
    for that [the McGovern amendment], and he took a lot of heat at home for
    failing to, but he and Ranking Member Bellmon thought their deal stood up
    and announced that they were opposing that amendment. We beat it something
    like 73 to 27, picking up a great number of Democrats whom Senator McGovern
    expected to vote with him. Then he [Senator McGovern] went to conference
    and accepted the much higher House number, so the conference report that
    came back to the Senate was at least as expensive as the one we had averted
    when we beat the McGovern amendment. So we're going to have to fight him
    again, and we knew we were going to win that.

    As it happened--and this was blind luck and stupidity, I've apologized to
    the two guys who were staff director and counsel to the Armed Services
    Committee over and over again since then--the defense authorization bill
    had come out of conference over the levels presumed in the budget
    resolution and though it passed the Senate, it was pretty much what we
    putatively had attributed to it. We didn't enforce the budget resolution
    against authorization bills dependent upon subsequent appropriation, except
    that I was so, shall we say, naive or new to the process that it just
    seemed to me that the chance of nailing Senator McGovern and the Armed
    Services Committee together was overwhelming. So I suggested that we take
    on both conference reports as a package and make the liberals that were
    going to vote against the defense bill, choose between being against
    defense and for liberal priorities or for the budget on both. We were going
    to make the defense conservatives do the same thing.

    Well, the only justification for my position arguing that this
    authorization bill spent money was that Senator John Stennis . . . was not
    only chairman of the Armed Services Committee, but also chairman of the
    Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, so he could make sure the
    appropriation equaled the authorization level.

    Chairman Muskie sent a letter out the week before the two conference bills
    were coming to the floor saying they both broke the budget, and we're going
    to vote against them and urged everybody to do it. We beat both of them.
    The first one up was the defense bill. We won 48 to 41, but it was so hotly
    contested that Senator Tower, ranking Republican on the Armed Services
    Committee, called for a vote on Majority Leader Mansfield's motion to lay
    the motion to reconsider on the table. There was only one switch. That vote
    is what made the budget process in the Senate, because if you could beat
    Senator John Stennis, and if you could make the liberals face up to the
    fact that if they wanted to hold defense down, they had to hold their own
    stuff down, and that Chairman Muskie and Ranking Member Bellmon were a
    formidable force, and they'd kick you across the room on the Senate floor
    if you came to the floor with what we called a budget buster.

    It was a package, that was the genius of it. You couldn't be for one and
    not the other and claim any fiscal responsibility. Senator Stennis went
    back dutifully and cut his bill in conference again, and Senator McGovern
    hated it, but he finally came into line, and we passed both conference
    reports later consistent with the budget. I told somebody when Senator
    McGovern first brought the bill to the floor, the first time we had to beat
    it before it went to conference, this was the great challenge for Chairman
    Muskie, and it was the most painful challenge coming from his own side and
    on one of his priorities.

    Ms. McGuire: One of the biggest victories in the early days for Chairman
    Muskie was that he took on the aviation bill for excessive spending.
    Everyone thought that he was nuts to go down to the floor and make the
    budget arguments. He decided that he needed to go down and say, ``This is
    outside the budget resolution, and we need to re-think this bill.'' He
    actually won on one of the points of order, which was a huge boost of
    morale to the Budget Committee because it was hard to get these other
    committees to change their ways.

    Committee Dynamics

    Mr. McEvoy: What people didn't recognize was that Ranking Member Bellmon
    had been the first Republican Governor in Oklahoma since statehood, and he
    had to deal with a Democratic legislature and had to learn how to do it.
    Chairman Muskie had been the first Democratic Governor in Maine in 100
    years, and he had to deal with an entirely Republican legislature. So these
    two guys came together with a background that said if anything was going to
    be achieved, it had to be achieved with some compromise and on a bipartisan
    basis. . . .

    Chairman Muskie made a deal with Ranking Member Bellmon that the process
    wasn't going to work if it fell into partisanship, and that the only way to
    make it work was for Senator Bellmon and he to agree that the process would
    be paramount in their work in the Committee and that they would each
    sacrifice, to the extent it was possible and necessary, their own
    priorities and views, in order to build the consensus for a resolution that
    could not just pass the Committee, but survive in the Senate. That was the
    deal that basically made the budget process in the Senate for 6 years.

    Chairman Muskie had incredible patience, I mean such patience that it drove
    me nuts in formulating budget resolutions. They would take weeks. He would
    drive the rest of the Committee nuts because he almost always had all the
    Democratic votes he needed. But he was waiting to pick up the Republican
    side. He was waiting until everybody had run out of breath and energy and
    was willing to say, look, we've got to get a budget resolution done.
    Because when he went to the floor, he wanted to get 65, 75, 85 votes for
    it. I don't think we ever got, while I was here, fewer than that on a
    budget resolution. Most times over 70. So he had a commitment going into
    the Senate based on the commitment coming out of his Committee.

    Mr. Conway: From the very beginning, Senators Muskie and Bellmon worked
    together in a bipartisan way to produce a bipartisan budget resolution. In
    those early years, the budget resolution was a bipartisan document. It was
    always a bipartisan amendment that would roll them on defense. Inevitably
    it was the Fritz Hollings-Pete Domenici defense amendment. Bob Sneed as the
    defense analyst would prepare Chairman Muskie's mark, and he would also
    prepare the Hollings-Domenici amendment. Sneed would get in the position
    where he would have to write talking points for the Chairman's Mark, and
    he'd then write the talking points for the Hollings-Domenici mark. Senator
    Muskie would present the mark. Then Senators Domenici and Hollings would do
    their counterproposal. So here was Sneed, who had prepared talking points
    for each of the amendments and against the other person's amendment. John
    McEvoy, the staff director, would say something like, ``Bob, I told you to
    give him help, but not that much help.'' Inevitably, the Hollings-Domenici
    defense mark would beat the Muskie-Bellmon defense mark.

    Mr. Hoagland: Senator Domenici and Senator Chiles were personal friends.
    They hunted together; they fished together; they did other things together;
    and their wives socialized together. That kind of relationship outside of
    this institution, outside of these four walls, I think makes it easier.
    It's not that Senator Chiles and Senator Domenici didn't have differences
    of opinion, but they worked together.

    It's my recollection that, first of all, it was a Committee in which in the
    early years, it wasn't clear that people wanted to be on it. . . . So it
    got down to the end, I won't say the leftover Committee, but you ended up
    with a lot of freshmen Senators.

    As budgeting and fiscal policy became more of an issue and more attention
    was brought to it particularly during the Reagan and Stockman [Director of
    the OMB] years, there was a sense that this might be an exciting Committee
    to get on. I'll never forget Bill Dauster introducing me to Senator Clinton
    when she first came to the Senate and became a member of this Committee.
    She said to me, ``Bill, my husband, has told me that this is the Committee
    to get on, because if you want to learn the Federal budget quickly, this is
    the Committee.''

    So there was a movement, a little bit more attention being paid to it,
    particularly during the latter part of the 1980s and 1990s, that it was an
    exciting Committee, it was a Committee that had attention brought to it.

    Interaction with the Senate Leadership and the Executive Branch

    Mr. McEvoy: President Carter asked Chairman Muskie, the congressional
    leadership, and the Budget Committee leadership to come down to the White
    House for a big breakfast. All of the heavy hitters from all of the
    committees were there. I suspect what they wanted to do was a combination
    of make peace and assert their supremacy as the President, as the executive
    branch. President Carter laid out the olive branch, and he talked about how
    important it was to do things together and so on. He asked if anybody had
    anything to say, and Senator Muskie got up and gave the President a civics
    lesson. He said he respected what the President said, but he had to
    understand that there were two distinct branches here. There was the
    administration, and there was the Congress, and Congress had the power of
    the purse and took it seriously. He gave him a ``little Dutch uncle'' in a
    polite way. That ended the discussion. We never had another one of those,
    and to my knowledge, Senator Muskie never dealt directly with President
    Carter again on the budget.

    When I said the President's budget was dead on arrival up here, we never
    took it seriously--first, because we didn't think they could enforce it;
    and second, we knew our deal with the Republicans in this Committee was not
    going to be enhanced by starting with anything that looked like a
    Presidential budget.

    Ms. McGuire: Another notable moment that I will never forget was while we
    were marking up a budget resolution in the early 1980s, and Senator
    Domenici was not enamored with President Reagan's tax cut. As we were in
    the middle of the markup, he got the tap on the shoulder to come out to the
    phone booth, and the President was on the other end of the line saying
    ``Pete, I really need your vote on this, I really need my tax cut.'' They
    must have talked for 10 or 15 minutes. The Senator came back, and he was
    very serious looking, and he said that the clerk will call the roll, and he
    voted against the President. That was one of the more high drama moments
    that we had.

    Mr. Dauster: Yes, it [the relationship between the Committee and
    leadership] has changed over time. When I started [in 1987], I was working
    for Senator Lawton Chiles. It's not often remembered, but he challenged
    Senator Byrd for majority leader, and therefore, the relations were not
    entirely warm at the beginning, and we strove to have a distinct and
    separate role from the leader.

    As I mentioned, Chairman Sasser and Leader Mitchell were close, and
    therefore, it was a different relationship. And that was useful for both
    parties to be able to work together, because the budget relied so much on
    getting the caucus to get passed and because the leader could get so much
    of the agenda done through the budget.

    Mr. Hoagland: Markups were not only by function but also by subfunctions,
    and they would go on for weeks and way into the night, and members really
    got into the details. But when it got down to it, what they found out,
    which is what we all knew at the time, was at the end of the day it's just
    a number, and you can say whatever policy assumption you like, but it's
    still a number. So the accounting nature of the process in those early
    years shifted when Stockman [Director of the OMB] started pushing the
    reconciliation process as a way not only to achieve the numbers, but to
    achieve the policy.

    So those early years, and I realize they're contentious about how that has
    evolved over time in terms of reconciliation, but the early years, 1981,
    1982, 1983, the stories that are told about President Reagan calling in
    here as a vote was about to take place on his . . . [budget plan], and
    Domenici saying, no, we're voting the way we're voting and standing up to
    the President, you don't see that anymore. You don't see the chairmen, and
    I say that generically, you don't see the leadership saying this is an
    independent or this is a separate branch of government. In those early
    days, there was conflict. Even though Republicans controlled the Senate and
    the White House, there was an effort here to convey we actually did have
    something to say about fiscal policy.

    Mr. Marshall: I spent a few years working for the leadership. When you're
    in leadership, you spend most of your time cursing the committees because
    they're not doing what you want, and I quickly found out, switching places,
    that the committees sit around and curse the leadership for trying to tell
    them what to do. There's always tension between leadership and the
    committees. I think it was less so when Senator Nickles was chairman just
    because he had such a great relationship with Leader Frist and because of
    his service in the leadership, he very much understood what they wanted and
    needed and vice versa.

    The Committee over the last several years, at least in the tenure of this
    Bush administration, has been closer to the administration and their
    priorities than I've seen in the past. I think that was a reflection of
    Congress generally. The Republican Caucus in the House and the Senate over
    the last several years has been more deferential and more accepting of the
    administration's priorities than before. I'm a legislative branch snob, so
    that has always just bugged me a little bit. It wasn't just the Committee.
    It was a reflection of Congress as a whole. That didn't used to be the
    case; I can remember Senator Domenici (as chairman and ranking member)
    bucking Presidents in the past, and I think it happened on the other side
    as well.

    Reconciliation

    Mr. McEvoy: I walked into his [Chairman Muskie's] office, which was always
    kind of dark, and he's sitting at his big desk. He had never seen a second
    resolution report from CBO that made him happy, because it always had
    economic re-estimates, and he took a beating in Maine for it. Even if it
    was only a couple billion dollars, people would say he was betraying the
    process. The big high and mighty guy said they have to have integrity and
    then blows the budget by $2 billion.

    He didn't say a word. I said, ``Senator, it's bad news.'' He looked at me
    like, ``What else?'' I handed him the piece of paper, and I said that CBO
    says. . . . He looked at that paper, and he said, ``What am I supposed to
    do about this?'' I said, ``Well, we could do a reconciliation bill.'' He
    said, ``You know that won't work.'' I said, ``Well, no, probably it won't,
    but at least you can bring a reconciliation bill to the floor. All these
    committees are going to have to come down and explain why you shouldn't do
    it and justify what they've done.'' Well, he loved that.

    Chairman Muskie came up to the Committee during a markup, the second
    resolution, and he quietly suggested we do a reconciliation bill. Congress
    was about to leave town. Nobody had the slightest idea of what a
    reconciliation bill might be. I mean, it was a line in the budget process.
    It had not been discussed in 4 years. The Republicans loved it because, you
    know, why not? The Democrats were skeptical, but they were all worn out. It
    was one of those marathon markups, and they were going to be embarrassed by
    these numbers, too. We didn't have all the Democrats on board, but we had
    enough. Congress adjourns, and nobody knows we've done it. The press wasn't
    covering it. The Senate wasn't paying any attention.

    Chris Matthews was at that time the press relations guy for the Committee.
    A very frustrated fellow because Chairman Muskie didn't like publicity. To
    get press, you had to make waves; making waves was not his style up here.
    So I was always having to sit on Chris to keep him from doing a press
    release or coming up with an angle that would make a story. He and I sat
    down, as most of the congressional staff was already on vacation, and we
    decided that we should make something of this.

    Chris went to work on the press, which had nothing else to report during
    August [1979] about Congress. Bob Schieffer even did a piece on it from the
    Capitol lawn in late August, and papers all over the country started
    picking up on it in the editorial pages. Members were getting sandbagged.
    They didn't even know it happened, and here the papers are calling for them
    to do it.

    So there was a real wildfire going in the Senate among Democratic Senators
    and chairmen about what this was all about, and Majority Leader Byrd held a
    meeting to decide what to do . . . He didn't want this fight on his hands.
    He wanted the flames put out before this resolution. It was Senator Abe
    Ribicoff, chairman of Governmental Operations, who wasn't a special friend
    of Muskie or vice versa, who said, according to this person who was there,
    ``You know, there's something we have to recognize here. We don't like what
    Ed has done, and maybe we could have had some more notice.'' Of course, if
    they'd had notice, they'd have killed it. He said, ``But there is a thing
    in politics called `secondary identity,' in which people look at a
    politician, and they don't see the politician, they see his secondary
    identification. And in Ed Muskie's case, that is fiscal integrity. And I
    think we take on Ed on this one at our risk.''

    That ended it. It quelled the rebellion. We [the Senate] passed the
    resolution with some grousing, mandating $4.2 billion [$3.6 billion in
    reconciliation savings]. . . . The House didn't want to take it. They
    fought us bitterly and said they wouldn't do it. In truth, the House wasn't
    prepared for what we had done and couldn't pass the Resolution [the
    conference report on the budget when] it contained reconciliation in that
    year. So we had to drop it in conference, but we warned we'd be back. The
    next year, we came back with something relatively the same size and passed
    it in both Houses.

    Mr. Conway: Probably one of the early successes, from the Senate point of
    view, was basically forcing the House to accept reconciliation in the
    calendar year 1980 second budget resolution. Senator Hollings was the
    chairman. That was the first time that a full-blown reconciliation
    instruction on spending to both House and Senate Committees was included in
    the conference report on a budget resolution. There had been an earlier
    instance [FY1976 budget] of a reconciliation instruction that was before my
    time, but it was the one where there was a reconciliation instruction, and
    it was only to the Senate Finance Committee.

    There was a great deal of resistance from the authorizing committees to
    that first reconciliation instruction [on the spending side] in 1980, but
    it was nothing compared to the resentment on the part of some committees to
    the reconciliation instruction in 1981 [in the FY1982 budget resolution].

    Mr. Bell: In 1980, the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November,
    Minority Leader Howard Baker called me at 3 o'clock in the morning asking
    did I know where Senator Domenici was, and I said, ``Yes, sir,'' and he
    said that I better call him up because he was chairman of the Budget
    Committee. I tracked him down and told him, and like any sane person he was
    asleep and said, ``What?'' I said that Howard Baker just called me up and
    said that you were chairman of the Budget Committee. ``Now what are you
    going to do?'' He said, ``Hmm . . . gosh, I don't know. I have to think
    about that.''

    [After the 1980 election], the two major questions were one, could
    Republicans govern, especially with . . . Ronald Reagan, now to the utter
    dismay of the Washington establishment in the White House, and two, this
    budget process, which . . . they really held down by putting it under the
    leadership of Senator Warren Magnuson, who was chairman of Appropriations,
    because the natural conflict which had to occur between the appropriations
    process and the budget process had been delayed in starting, so what was
    Domenici going to do with the budget process?

    The year before we had taken a very important baby step on reconciliation,
    and I think that the first interview we gave was that the budget process
    has crawled, and it has walked, now it is time to run. Our main challenge,
    therefore, was not only could we govern, but could we carry out the mandate
    that people felt Republicans had after the 1980 elections. So, internally,
    there were some serious challenges.

    People forget there was a reconciliation instruction in 1980, in the lame
    duck session, it passed. It was in the $8 billion range. That sounds tiny,
    but remember we were dealing with much smaller budgets back then. The fact
    that it was done, the fact that there was no serious parliamentary
    challenges to it . . . gave us the freedom. That was important, I can't
    stress how important a step that was because it was not challenged. . . .

    You had the precedent. Reconciliation was in order; it was legal, signed
    into law by the President. It [expanding the reach of reconciliation]
    evolved from the underlying statute [the Congressional Budget Act]; it [the
    requirement to do reconciliation] did not emerge from the committees of
    jurisdiction. It emerged as an instruction from the Budget Committee. The
    fact that you [the Budget Committee] could do that meant that the only
    thing left to the Senate and House to decide was the extent of
    reconciliation. We had the foot in the door, and the next thing you know,
    the whole damn elephant was in there. So you should not underestimate the
    combination of that vote and our interpretation of what I call the elastic
    clause where it says, ``any other such actions to carry out the purpose of
    that Act'', never put that in a bill, let me give you some advice.

    David Stockman, Director of the OMB, wanted to do the Reagan program as an
    amendment fully debatable on the debt ceiling extension. He had been a
    House Member, and so he did not really understand Senate procedure that
    well, especially when it came to such things as reconciliation and what I
    called the ``elastic clause'' in the 1974 Budget Act. It was the day before
    Christmas, in his office, I explained reconciliation to him and what I
    thought we could do. I pointed out that if we did what we wanted to do, it
    would be the most dramatic change in the way the Senate did business in
    about 150 years.

    It was essentially truncating Rule XXII and expanding the restrictions on
    filibuster and debate and that he could expect that while nobody in the
    White House would care one damn way or the other, it would be a highly
    controversial time on the Hill. This is the subject of all sorts of books
    that have been written.

    Senator Baker established that precedent on the floor with more than 50
    votes in the first half of 1981 which he won every one by 53 to 47 which
    was the majority that Republicans held in the Senate. When people write his
    biography and such [they] may overlook that, it was one of the great
    leadership feats in the 35 years I have been here--unprecedented and people
    just could not believe it.

    In February, we had a reconciliation bill introduced by Senators Hollings
    and Domenici. By midyear, we were able to pass a budget resolution with
    reconciliation, second resolution later in the year, and by the end of the
    year, we had been able to establish in the Senate, not only a brand new way
    of doing business in the Senate, as far as deficits and spending, but it
    turned out because of the expanded use of reconciliation over the years, we
    were able to do most of the important changes and most of the important
    things that are happening in the Senate.

    So we were in a situation in the 1980s where we were kind of the stepchild,
    where a bunch of guys had to impose in 1974 the Budget Act and the budget
    process on the Senate and the House, and where the Act was a peculiar
    amalgam of changes in the Senate rules and changes in statute law. . . . It
    was clear that unless we had the confrontation between the Budget Committee
    and the other committees, the budget process was not going to work the way
    that some of the original authors had intended.

    Mr. Conway: The first time that reconciliation was used full bore was in
    1981, right after the Senate flipped. Senator Domenici became the new
    chairman of the Budget Committee. . . . The Senate Republicans wanted to
    demonstrate that they were there to make the changes that were part of the
    Reagan victory.

    The Republicans were then in a position of saying, well, we've been calling
    President Carter weak on defense all this time, we have got to put an even
    bigger defense number in there. So they had 5 percent real growth in
    defense. To me, this was kind of a problem. It was like their politics got
    in the way, so they came up with a ridiculously large number for defense
    relative to what it had been. So they got a big change. They changed the
    slope on defense unbelievably, and part of that was driven purely by
    politics. They said, after the election, ``We can't say that we're no
    stronger on defense than the 3 percent real growth of Jimmy Carter.'' So
    that was the first step in going off the precipice of having far more
    spending than you could support with everything else.

    The goal was, OK, well, what's a way that we can get a quick vote on
    spending priorities? So in 1981 they decided to do what became S. Con. Res.
    9, and it was a revision. It was revising the second budget resolution for
    fiscal year 1980 . . . , and it was all reconciliation [instructions]. . .

    So the Senate passed S. Con. Res. 9 and went back and did a complete full-
    blown budget resolution, incorporated the decisions that had been in the
    reconciliation instructions of the first one and then proceeded ahead. The
    goal there was to get a marker out there and get the Members on the record
    of supporting reductions in nondefense spending.

    Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH)

    Mr. Stein: The fundamental contradiction in the Reagan agenda, and all
    Presidents have contradiction, this is not intended to be an attack on the
    Reagan administration, but the fundamental contradiction was that you could
    cut taxes and fund a military that was going to defeat the evil empire. I
    believe history will look back at it that way. Also, he did not live up to
    the domestic policy cuts that he hoped to achieve for a variety of reasons.
    When we took over, the budgetary consequences of that contradiction were
    self-evident. You had the big tax cuts. You had Senator Dole's efforts to
    kind of ameliorate them in I guess it would be 1983 that were somewhat
    effectual, but not effectual enough. Then you had the reaction to that,
    which really took the form of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.

    Mr. Bell: In 1985, we kind of set in concrete the budget process and its
    ascendancy. We had something called Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. With no
    disrespect to those three Senators, it was a strange idea. It essentially
    said the House and Senate can't do their business, or don't do it the way
    we like, and therefore we're going to penalize the House and Senate by some
    mechanistic measures if they don't behave the way we want them to behave. I
    was dead set against this, and I would see Senator Gramm and say, ``God
    Almighty!''

    Fortunately, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was so contrary to the culture and the
    Constitution and whole flow of legislative history, the first thing we did
    was to ignore it. . . . I think any mechanistic approach in which you say
    if you don't do A, B, C by a time certain, then deus ex machina . . . some
    god will come down from the heavens, resolve the problem, and do for you
    what you cannot or will not do for yourself. I think that is absolutely,
    utterly going to fail. I think it is just such, at least in our tradition
    for the last 200-plus years, it is such a radical departure from the notion
    of participatory democracy and judgments that Senators and Congressmen are
    supposed to make and the free marketplace of ideas. . . .

    All I wanted to do was put in the 60-vote point of order, make the 302(b)s
    mandatory, say no appropriation bill can come to the floor of the Senate
    without 302(b)s being filed. I wanted to institutionalize and put into
    concrete the supremacy of the budget process. Because nobody else cared,
    they all thought that it wasn't very sexy. . . .Sec.

    When it was done the chief clerk of the Appropriations Committee came to me
    and said, ``Is it true that these are all new, these are 60 vote points of
    order?'' And I said, ``They are.'' He asked, ``Well, did you check with the
    Appropriations Committee staff?'' I said, ``Well, I don't think I did.''
    He's a personal friend of mine. We had a strained friendship for a while
    because of this. ``Well, what's going to happen?'' I said, ``Well, it's
    going to be signed into law, a new law, it's going to be 60-vote points of
    order since this is a hybrid bill that changes both the rules of the Senate
    and statutory law at the same time'' (except nobody but me, Sid Brown, and
    Senator Domenici probably realized that). ``That's the way we're going to
    do business from now on, and it's going to be 60 votes for most
    everything.'' That was the one positive outcome in my view of the Gramm-
    Rudman-Hollings event, that we were able to change the rules of the Senate.

    Mr. Hoagland: Once we established our credentials that we really had a role
    in formulating fiscal policy, then I think the next major challenge from a
    policy perspective really, as I think back on it, was when we passed that
    $2 trillion public debt figure, and now the process shifted from setting
    the blueprint, setting the goals, setting the direction, to one of actually
    forcing an outcome, and forcing an outcome through the mechanisms of Gramm-
    Rudman-Hollings. The process changed, that was a pivotal point in the
    history of this Committee where you move from setting a goal to actually
    enforcing that goal. The result--process became an issue.

    Post-GRH Budget Agreements

    Mr. Dauster: The Gramm-Rudman era was one in which we had a deficit target
    that we all had to try and meet, but nobody in particular was responsible
    for the deficit. It was the function of exogenous economic variables as
    much as legislative action. So we felt that it was sometimes an irrational
    process. So to move away from Gramm-Rudman toward a system where particular
    actors would be responsible for their own actions was an important goal of
    that era. Some people criticized that as no-fault budgeting, but it's
    responsibility-for-what-you-can-control budgeting. And that was an
    important and hard-fought change.

    1987 Agreements: Omnibus Reconciliation (OBRA) and Balanced Budget and
    Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act

    Mr. Dauster: Chairman Lawton Chiles wanted to enforce fiscal
    responsibility. He was a fiscally conservative Democrat and believed that
    it was important to the credibility of the newly majority Democratic Party
    that we would be fiscally responsible as well and, therefore, thought it
    was important to make the Gramm-Rudman law work now that it had been ruled
    unconstitutional in the Synar v. Bowsher decision. So he set about trying
    to build that consensus, and Senator Domenici was a good participant in
    that, and Senator Gramm himself, too.

    We did little changes to try and put our fingers in the dike and stop leaks
    of deficit-increasing actions. Along those lines, Rick Brandon [staff
    director] and Chairman Chiles had me write something to prevent sales of
    assets being counted as budget authority, because we didn't want to sell
    the garage in order to pay the mortgage. We tried to prevent shifting money
    from one time period to another. These are sort of little patches on the
    fabric of the budget process. Every time somebody would find a little
    gimmick, we would try to make it out of order and fix that, which added to
    the complexity of the business, but occasionally stopped a leak for a
    while.

    1989 Agreement: OBRA

    Mr. Hilley: President George H.W. Bush's first year in office was 1989, and
    his budget director was Dick Darman. They came in and were interested in
    trying to reach a bipartisan solution to the budget, trying to reduce the
    deficit and trying to hit the Gramm-Rudman targets that were in effect
    during that time. So our year started on a bipartisan note of a negotiation
    to reduce the deficit, by a very piddly amount, to tell the truth. As you
    recall, President George H.W. Bush won the Presidency in 1988 largely on
    the ``no new taxes'' pledge, and so when they came in, the budget agreement
    they were seeking on a bipartisan basis did not include taxes as a major
    component. That sort of doomed the effort to really take a large bite out
    of it in that particular year. In any case, there was a very bipartisan and
    quick agreement about reducing the deficit. Nineteen-eighty-nine was a year
    of bipartisanship, of positive, but meager accomplishment in terms of
    dealing with the deficit reduction problem, but the year came to be
    dominated in the end by the fight over capital gains tax reduction.

    The year 1989 was the high point for the virtue of reconciliation, because
    that virtue came out of a political standoff. . . . In that particular
    year, there was a plug or number for $5.3 billion of revenue increases. Now
    that fit extremely well with President George H.W. Bush's desire for
    capital gains tax cuts because, they had a transparent and convoluted way
    to use the capital gains rate reduction to make the Treasury flush with
    revenue in the short term. Majority Leader Mitchell and the Democratic
    caucus were dead set against that though. . . . The Democratic leadership
    in both Houses strongly opposed the capital gains rate reduction because
    they saw it as a budget buster in the long run, and of course, given our
    theology, felt that it distributed benefits to the well-to-do. So that was
    the setting. Now, where reconciliation comes in is that Senator Dole,
    having lost in the Finance Committee, decided it would be a good idea to
    try and attach the capital gains tax cuts on the floor . . . to the
    reconciliation bill.

    He had a majority of votes to do that because there were five or six
    Democratic Senators, who for various reasons decided capital gains tax cuts
    were appropriate. So that's where the issue of reconciliation came to the
    floor. The Democratic majority didn't have the votes to defeat on a
    straight up or down vote. The tack that we took, which I am proud to say I
    am the person that suggested this to Majority Leader Mitchell, was to strip
    the reconciliation bill of all extraneous provisions. So Mitchell went to
    the Senate floor and said listen, this reconciliation process has gotten
    out of hand in the sense that all the committees are now loading it up with
    not just stark budget savings but with all these extraneous provisions,
    let's return reconciliation process to its intended view or purpose and
    strip every extraneous provision. . . . We stripped literally hundreds of
    extraneous provisions out of the reconciliation bill. . . .

    So we had the Byrd Rule which without it we were toast in terms of
    stripping the reconciliation bill and beating capital gains. . . . We had
    the votes, but our strategy, which I think was the right one, is rather
    than let the issue be capital gains . . . it was to subsume that issue
    under the broader one of reconciliation.

    1990 Agreements: Budget Enforcement Act, Andrews Air Force Base Summit

    Mr. Stein: The debate out at Andrews was largely partisan. You had Ranking
    Member Domenici really wanting to control entitlements. You had Chairman
    Sasser thinking that we were spending too much on defense. You had Senator
    Byrd adamantly feeling as though the nondefense discretionary portion of
    the budget was taking the biggest hit for no particular reason. Then you
    had a variety of people who really wanted to improve the process.

    There were members and key staff. You have CBO Director Robert D.
    Reischauer down in the bowels of the thing, with his computer contingent
    that would crunch numbers. There were long days and nights. The meetings
    that everyone was going to were not the meetings where everything was
    happening. You would have Dick Darman, Director of the OMB, getting
    together with Senator Byrd, Darman getting together with Representative Dan
    Rostenkowski, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Darman
    getting together with Senator Leon Panetta, chairman of the House Budget
    Committee, and that is where the real work was done.

    The capital gains tax cut was what Senator Gingrich and the crowd wanted to
    do. Capital gains was where the Republican Party wanted to go. The belief
    was that if you cut capital gains the revenue influx and the stimulative
    effect would be such that it would essentially wash out all of the
    budgetary problems. So, those were kind of the four corners of the debate
    out there. Process was anything but subtle. We would find that we would
    debate entitlements. We would debate defense. We would debate tax cuts. And
    then, when everyone was too tired to do anything else, we would talk about
    the budget process. Curiously enough, I think it was the budget process
    improvements that had the most lasting effect.

    What we did relative to GRH was to do some things that were real
    refinements and that actually ended up working. So, instead of having the
    appropriators take the hit for what the Finance Committee did, we had pay-
    as-you-go, which was, I think, the most critical element of the whole
    endeavor. You had the separate caps.

     That [pay-as-you-go] to my mind, was the most significant accomplishment.
    It took what had been a crude macro approach to the mechanisms of control,
    refined those mechanisms and focused them specifically so that the
    committees that did something would get punished for doing it or rewarded
    for doing it. And that, I think, worked.

    Mr. Dauster: The 1990 agreement was different because the budget process
    was consciously adapted to the agreement that we had reached on the
    substance. It was the Budget Enforcement Act. It was a process set up to
    enforce the agreement that we reached on the substance, and it was intended
    to be linked together. So there was a philosophy involved in linking the
    two and making them relate to each other.

    It was a bipartisan deal. The essential parties, meaning no disrespect to
    congressional Republicans, were the President and the Democratic
    leadership. And it could not have been done without either of the two. And
    Darman, therefore, took on a great deal of authority in negotiating and
    would do some deals without full congressional Republican backing. I think
    that is, I guess, one reason why Senator Newt Gingrich felt the way that he
    did. And at the very end of the negotiations, Darman did some of the
    negotiating directly with Senator Byrd on how the appropriation process
    would work, and it was just the two of them working it out.

    Mr. Hilley: Without the political leadership of President H.W. Bush [in
    1990], it would not have happened. He stood his ground and passed a $500
    billion 5-year deficit reduction agreement. He stood his ground even as his
    House Republican caucus split wide open, and Senator Newt Gingrich
    [minority whip] led a rebellion from the right and swept away the votes in
    the House to support it. The first time, they had to come back and then
    they passed it with largely Democratic votes. Senator Gingrich did not
    bring his guys back. A tremendous amount of credit belongs to George H.W.
    Bush. . . .

    The dynamic was this--Darman was a smart man. Senators Domenici and Dole
    were smart guys, and everyone knew the score. We passed the budget
    resolution out of the Committee and Senator Leon Panetta, who was chairman
    of the House Budget Committee, was able to pass it out of his committee and
    across the floor, which was easier considering the votes--how the House
    works. We were demonstrating that we could move a budget resolution, and it
    was a very clear signal to the administration that we are on our own. It
    was 3 or 4 days after that Leaders Tom Foley, George Mitchell, and Dick
    Gephardt went to the White House for a meeting with the President and Dick
    Darman, and they agreed to this, quite transparent, at least according to
    the headlines, they agreed to this paragraph that said that everything was
    on the table--the need for entitlement reform and all of the legitimate
    things, but also enhanced revenues. That was code word that you would go
    along as part of an agreement and increase taxes.

    1993 Agreement: OBRA

    Mr. Hilley: Just as I want to credit George H.W. Bush with doing the right
    thing and taking a political slam, President Clinton and the Democrats did
    the right thing [in 1993, in terms of deficit reduction], but the timing
    was worse for the Congress . . . the health care meltdown and other issues
    were largely at play too. If you had to point to the number one event for
    the loss of the House and the Senate in 1994, it was the tax increase. I
    don't think that it could have been done in a bipartisan way. They did the
    right substantive thing, but paid an enormous political price for it.

    Mr. Stein: The Clinton budget was probably much more, in a lot of ways,
    interesting than Andrews because it was the most partisan thing that had
    happened up in the Congress in my lifetime here. It was pretty amazing. You
    had Vice President Gore breaking a tie twice to get it passed. Every
    Democrat who looked at President Clinton's budget understood the political
    damage that it was going to do to them when they voted for it. . . .

    That was the toughest thing I have ever worked on in my life, holding that
    together. It was extremely difficult. I was not in the room when it
    happened, but Senator Bob Kerrey could have sunk it and knew it. There were
    a variety of reasons that he did not. I think Senator Tom Daschle and
    Senator Harry Reid talked him out of it, for one thing, but it was Senator
    Byrd who really talked him out of it.

    I am the only one who has this recollection, but it was about 3 o'clock in
    the morning after we passed the reconciliation bill, because the other one,
    when we passed it (not the conference report but the Senate version) was
    about 4 o'clock in the morning, but we got President Clinton on the phone.
    Vice President Gore was in there and had just made the tie breaking vote.
    Senator Mitchell, Chairman Sasser, and Senator Moynihan, who was not very
    helpful, and they got President Clinton on the line. I think the first
    thing out of his mouth was, ``I really appreciate this. I can govern now.''
    Now, I am the only one who remembers it that way, but I am almost certain
    that he said that. I think he was right.

    Chairman Sasser thought he was doing the right thing [voting for the 1993
    Clinton budget]. The electorate performed as expected. You stand up for
    principle, and they stand up and knock you down. I think the mythology
    became, or maybe it is not mythology, that the reason President Bush lost
    was that he violated his no new tax pledge. The whole class that came in
    subsequent to 1990 was steeped in that version of history, right or wrong.
    You had the belief that Democrats had more or less suborned Bush into
    violating his pledge. There was almost a continuous rising trend of
    bitterness between the two parties that really predated that.

    We considered trying to find a way to use reconciliation to do the Clinton
    health plan. Chairman Sasser went over with Dauster [majority counsel] to
    talk to Senator Byrd about it. Byrd was initially interested and then said,
    flatly, ``No. It is a violation of the process. We will regret it. It will
    be misused later on.'' We folded up our tents and left. In reflection, I
    thought that was an act of courage on his part.

    1997 Agreement: Balanced Budget Act

    Mr. Stein: The way it was done was very artful, but what really happened is
    that you had divided government, and each side had its own interests that
    could be satisfied by a deal. President Clinton needed to be able to put
    his stamp on balancing the budget and so did Speaker Newt Gingrich and
    Leader Trent Lott, who were actually really good during that period. I
    mean, they were fun to work with. That may have been one bright, shining
    moment. . . .

    There were three significant events, in terms of getting to a point of
    balance. . . . There was Andrews, which was more important for some of the
    process changes that it made than anything else. A lot of policy
    determinations were pretty crude. What we spend our time deliberatively
    considering was tossed out and revamped in the House after that agreement
    failed. Then there was the Clinton 1994 budget, which, in my judgment,
    probably carried the greatest weight, other than the macro economy, which
    was, obviously, the most important thing. Then the 1997 agreement, that
    people actually say, we might have gotten a balance without it. That is the
    way it looks in hindsight. All three of those things were extremely
    important.

    Mr. Hoagland: The real success was the 1997 Balanced Budget Agreement with
    Chairman Domenici, Chairman Kasich, Senator Lautenberg, and Representative
    Spratt. The Balanced Budget Agreement was the major success of this
    Committee. When we were working with the Clinton administration and John
    Hilley, White House Legislative Director; Bob Rubin, Treasury Secretary;
    Franklin Raines, OMB Director; Jack Lew, OMB Deputy Director; Senator
    Lautenberg, the ranking member at the time; Bruce King, minority staff
    director; and myself, there was a free flow of information. We kept each
    other informed.

    The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

    Ms. McGuire: The relationship with CBO has always been excellent. Sometimes
    the Members do not like what CBO has to say, but they always respect them
    and almost without exception, feel that they are nonpartisan. Alice Rivlin
    was the first Director and worked hard to build good relationships with the
    Budget Committee and the leadership. She paved the way for CBO, and it is
    much the same as when she set it up long ago. People that were at the
    formative stage really thought it through and wanted to establish something
    that would be effective and last.

    Mr. Bell: The Budget Act has worked in ways that most of its authors had
    not anticipated or envisioned. You know now you can't hide. If you bring a
    bill to the floor you have to get a CBO score. Then it goes to the Budget
    Committee chairman [to compare it to the budget resolution, and if it
    exceeds the budget resolution, any Member may raise a point of order
    against the bill]. Then the Parliamentarian tells the Presiding Officer
    this is a violation of the Budget Act. The guy in the chair says, ``Point
    of order, well founded.'' During the first reconciliation conference
    [1981], the chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee was
    Representative Dan Rostenkowski. He decided he was going to break up this
    Budget Committee bill. So during the conference related to items of Finance
    and Ways and Means, Representative Rostenkowski turned to Senator Domenici
    and said ``You know, we don't agree with the CBO numbers.''

    Sid Brown [chief of budget review] and I looked at each other, quizzically.
    Senator Domenici said ``Well, what do you mean?'' Representative
    Rostenkowski replied, ``Well this one should be $1 billion instead of $2
    billion.'' So he decided to use his own numbers. Senator Domenici replied
    ``No, we use the numbers that CBO came out with because that's what the law
    says.'' Representative Rostenkowski replied, ``This isn't a matter of law
    this is a matter of convention. My numbers are just as good as CBO's, and I
    want to use mine, and I have the votes.'' Now remember this is Gramm-Latta
    so the Democrats had a majority in the House. They also held a huge
    majority in the conference because they stacked the deck. Senator Domenici
    said, ``You have the votes?'' Representative Rostenkowski replied, ``Why
    yes, I do.''

    So Senator Domenici turned to me and said ``Would you go poll the Senate
    conferees tonight? Mr. Rostenkowski says he has the votes and that
    sufficiently worries me because I know the reputation of the gentleman from
    Illinois.'' That night I called up all of the conferees on the House and
    Senate side, both Republican and Democratic, to deliver the message. So the
    next day Domenici started off by saying ``I've asked all my conferees to be
    here to take a vote.''

    At that point Representative Rostenkowski knew he messed with the wrong
    Italian. Domenici said, ``Last evening you made a motion as chairman of the
    conference, and today we are having a vote.'' He went down the line from
    the most junior to senior and all were on Senator Domenici's side. [Senator
    Domenici says] ``Now if you wish to make another offer that you can get
    your conferees to agree on, we could entertain it. Otherwise this subject
    is closed.''

    Contemporary Budgeting

    Mr. Hoagland: The globalization of the economy has changed our ability to
    impact fiscal policy . . . ; it seems to me you could almost track the
    history of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act with
    economic theory and globalization, and I think you would find that we're
    less certain about what decisions we make here, how that will impact
    inflation, employment, and growth, at least in the short term, than we used
    to be.

    Early on we thought we were certain that if we reduced the deficit
    everything would be fine. That's not certain today, and as time has gone
    on, and it's lessened the impact of the decisions that we make here in this
    Committee, because people say, ``What do you care? We're in deficits. You
    got low interest rates. The economy's growing. Why do you care, Hoagland?''
    And my fear with that, of course, is that's in the current time period, not
    looking into the future.

    Mr. Marshall: I was sitting at my desk watching the Senate floor one
    morning, and the Homeland Security/Governmental Affairs Committee was
    considering a resolution to change their name to Homeland Security and grab
    all this authority from other committees. It just hit me like a lightning
    bolt, listening to Senator Collins [chairman of the Governmental Affairs
    Committee] speak, ``This is our opportunity!'' I immediately dialed Mary
    Naylor [minority staff director] and said (I don't even remember if I told
    any of my own staff), ``Let's go down and take back our jurisdiction.'' It
    was just bing, bam, boom, everybody decided, yeah, let's go do it.

     Frankly, to his credit, Ranking Member Conrad is the one who pulled that
    off for us in the end. Senators Voinovich and Collins were very much
    opposed to us. It was the one hook Senator Voinovich had to play in budget
    policy because he wasn't on the Budget Committee, and he didn't want to
    lose that venue.

    They held our amendment over to have a vote the next morning, and Chairman
    Nickles had some other commitment, and he was not going to be able to
    arrive at the vote until after it had started. I knew that it was going to
    be critical that he and Ranking Member Conrad be in the well to grab
    Senators when they came down to explain it, because it wasn't the easiest
    thing for people to grasp. Most people had no idea that the Government
    Affairs Committee had this jurisdiction to start with.

    Chairman Nickles got there late, and I sat and watched Members come in, and
    as the Republicans came in, Senators Voinovich or Collins would grab them
    and talk them into voting against our amendment. I was sitting there
    thinking we're going to lose this because we don't have anybody to work the
    well on our side. Meanwhile, on the other side, Senator Conrad was working
    his guys and because of the efforts he made, we passed the amendment.

    That [the Iraq War] was one of the biggest things that dominated the budget
    process and the Committee's work in general. We were going through a big
    transition already due to the homeland security issue, and we had just
    created the new department. People were still trying to figure out how do
    you fund this new agency, how is it accounted for, and the horror of trying
    to figure out how are we going to compare spending to prior years? We all
    know a big thing for Chairman Nickles was, ``I want to be able to compare
    this year to last year.'' He didn't like the answer, ``We can't do that.''
    Some people wanted to create a homeland security budget function. So we
    were already wrestling with that and its impact on the budget process, and
    we had big expenditures for that.

    Many Members were frustrated over the years with the process of considering
    budget resolutions, the vote-a-ramas, with every amendment a set-up for a
    political ad. I absolutely have to give Eric Ueland, who's now chief of
    staff for the majority leader, who at that time was in the whip office with
    me, the credit for the idea of getting rid of precatory amendments on
    budget resolutions. We tried to do it by fiat, by just telling the
    Parliamentarian, ``Rule these out of order,'' and discovered that wouldn't
    work. There was eventually an amendment to the budget resolution on the
    floor.

    It was an effort to try to influence what Senators can do on the floor. I
    think the reason why we've seen it [the prohibition of precatory
    amendments] be somewhat ineffective is because of the very basic nature of
    the Senate. It's very difficult to make Senators do something they don't
    want to do, or to change the basic nature of the Senate, which is unlimited
    debate, unlimited amendments. You can try and draw boxes around them, which
    the budget process does, but it's very hard to do. Efforts to both do away
    with vote-a-rama or come up with ways to curtail vote-a-rama or amendments
    which don't really have any meaning are worthwhile. I don't think that's a
    bad thing to try to do. You should never go into it thinking that you're
    going to be supremely successful, because people will find a way to get
    around it. There's too many clever staff that can use the basic rules of
    the Senate to get around it one way or the other.

    What I think we discovered, even with all our frustration with those types
    of amendments and vote-a-rama, in 2004 working on the FY2005 resolution,
    was that a much more effective way to get at that is to do a better job of
    cooperating with your minority floor manager. We were able to do a
    resolution that year in a short period of time with no vote-a-rama and for
    the most part, most of the amendments being substantive, good amendments,
    because both Senator Nickles and Senator Conrad decided that they were
    going to actively manage the guys on their side of the aisle with the help
    of their leaders on both sides as well. They said let's get up priority
    amendments, let's not hang around here just staring at one another for
    hours. Let's start to get them up and get votes early in the process so
    that you don't wait until the last day and get them considered. So, you can
    try to create procedural ways to control the situation, or you can actively
    try and manage it better, and I think we found that year that managing it
    works better.

    Reflections on the Budget Process and Committee Successes and Challenges

    Mr. Hoagland: I have to be bold as to say, we survived, the Committee
    survived. It was not a given that this new, and I still refer to it as the
    ``new congressional budget appropriation process,'' would make it. There
    had been efforts before that had failed. You've survived these many years,
    and you've established yourself, there is a raison d'etre, and we're still
    here and the fact that we haven't been disbanded is somewhat a success in
    and of itself for the Committee.

    The successes of the Committee over the years have been that you have
    become a focal point. It's hard for any of us who weren't here before, to
    appreciate that legislation would come to the Senate floor, authorize,
    appropriate, who cared? There wasn't a good way to account for the various
    decisions. Today, at least, there is a recognition in the Congress that
    spending does matter or taxes do matter, that fiscal policy still has a
    basis in policy formulation.

    We never were the popular Committee particularly when we started to use our
    tools of enforcement. That has made people recognize the importance and the
    consequences of the decision that they make. Whether they want to go ahead
    with it or not, that's their decision. They are the elected officials, and
    they can go ahead or not, but to me the big success is that we at least
    made it clear that their decisions do have consequences, governing is
    budgeting and budgeting is governing, and now it's an integral part of the
    process.

    Mr. McEvoy: Nobody knew what the budget process was, and there was a
    considerable portion of the Senate, and even more so in the House, that
    profoundly distrusted it or didn't distrust it so much as they were worried
    about ceding their own power to it. As it was, they saw the potential for
    the budget process to become what it has, an instrumentality for the
    executive branch to implement its will through the budget process. Nobody
    dreamed of doing it through reconciliation then. It was more fear of kind
    of the House of Lords, that the Budget Committee majority would go on
    retreat with the President, and they'd decide between themselves what the
    priorities were going to be and then they'd come up and impose them on the
    Congress. The House dealt with that and their own institutional
    prerogatives by profoundly weakening the process over there by creating a
    two-term limit on the chair and on the Committee. That Committee turned
    over faster than a roulette wheel.

    Mr. Dauster: The budget process, in its defense, must be described as
    complex, partly because it has developed like sediment, one layer upon
    another, never digging up the other layers. We had a simple budget process
    in 1816 when the Finance Committee did it, and then with the
    unfortunateness of 1867, half of the Finance Committee's jurisdiction was
    wrested away from it. There was this other Budget Committee formed,
    subsequently called the Appropriations Committee. And yet they kept the
    Finance Committee.

    In the 1974 Act, they layered on again this thing that they didn't think
    would really get in their way, the Budget Committee, and the budget
    process, and left the Appropriations Committee and the Finance Committee.
    Notwithstanding our efforts, all these different layers are on there, so
    it's probably because of the history that it is as complex as it is.

    I think there have been three eras in the budget process under the
    Congressional Budget Act. There was the period in which the process was one
    of budget neutrality between enactment of the Budget Act and 1981, and it's
    remarkable that they made it work. And there was a period from 1981 through
    1996 when there was a thumb on the scale toward deficit reduction, and I
    think that's necessary and useful. It was necessary in the initial instance
    because the Reagan tax cuts were so large, and we were not beginning to
    offset them as Reagan wanted us to, so we had to figure out a way to bring
    balance. Gramm-Rudman was a crude effort to do that, and I think that the
    Budget Enforcement Act was a more effective way of doing that. So it is
    useful to have structures that make it more difficult to cut taxes or spend
    money. Since 1996, we've had a system that's tilted toward tax cuts, that
    allows tax cuts but doesn't allow spending, and that's led to the fiscal
    results that we have.

    So, I think that it's useful as well to structure reconciliation back the
    way that it was in the 1980s where it could only be used in one direction,
    toward deficit reduction. It's arguable whether it would be better not to
    have reconciliation at all because it does such violence to the basic idea
    of the Senate. I've played reconciliation from both sides, so I can make
    the argument either way. The question then is: is the fiscal policy of the
    Nation so important that we want to ensure that it happens to the exclusion
    of other values that the Senate maintains, values of deliberative process?
    And I'm not sure that fiscal policy is that important. One could make the
    argument, for example, that national security policy is just as important;
    why don't we do national security policy through fast-track mechanisms as
    opposed to fully debating defense bills?

    In the end, we have a question of how responsive a government we want. Do
    we want a responsive government that can react quickly and change with the
    times, but change dramatically with the times? In which case you want to
    empower the reconciliation process and leave it as it is . . . or do we
    want to constrain these processes so that we force consensus more and have
    a less responsive government and have more checks on what the government is
    doing? Having done both sides, I've come to view the deliberative process
    as the more important goal. If I were to do it all over, I'd try to find
    ways to constrain the ability of the Senate to use reconciliation wherever
    possible. And so my recommendation would be to expand the Byrd rule.

    Ms. McGuire: The Budget Committee still thinks that it is the outsider. The
    other committees still have not accepted the budget process or the Budget
    Committee's role in that process, as hard as we have tried. I don't think
    that the budget process has been integrated into the other congressional
    processes as it should be. That has been resisted by the Members. As I told
    Scott Gudes when he became the staff director of the Budget Committee [in
    2005], ``Congratulations on your appointment. Now you will know what it is
    like to be loved and hated. When you were an appropriator you were loved
    when you said yes and hated when you said no. Now you will just be hated
    because you will always have to say no.''

    It is not the most fun Committee to be on because generally you have to
    keep people on the straight and narrow, and they resent that. It is
    uncomfortable for them. At times, the Committee is seen as the skunk at the
    garden party. Often we don't have the most positive message that people
    want to hear, so it is hard to integrate the Budget Committee fully into
    the other congressional processes. The other would be just the fact that it
    is hard to make the public policy stands sometimes. Even though most of the
    chairmen have been willing to go out and wage the good fight, oftentimes
    they come back bruised and bloodied. It is a function of the way that
    Congress works. The good news is that we have always had chairmen who are
    willing to wage the good fight.

    Mr. Hoagland: . . . somehow I might have allowed the reconciliation process
    to become something much greater than what we had initially planned it to
    be, that it has become, particularly in a divided Senate, the tool, the
    preferred tool for legislating, which I think is not what it was intended
    to be; and failure, yes, that I still believe that reconciliation, even
    though I'm sure I will be judged harshly on this, that reconciliation
    should be used only for deficit reduction. . . .

    Why isn't reconciliation used only for deficit reduction? Well, if it's for
    deficit reduction, why do you have those tax cuts? Don't get me wrong, I do
    not believe the answer to our long-term fiscal challenges is to simply
    increase taxes, but I think you end up making it harder to formulate that
    consensus with the non-tax committees. ``Why should I cut agriculture
    programs if you guys are going to go over there and reduce taxes for
    millionaires?'' And whether the rhetoric is right or wrong, I think it's
    difficult to formulate broad-based consensus.

    Mr. Marshall: The Committee allocations are the heart and soul of a
    resolution, and if the Budget Committee, working in cooperation and with
    the other committees, can come up with realistic committee allocations and
    then aggressively enforce them, that's all you need.

    I've become disenchanted over the many years I've watched the process
    evolve with anything that tries to say, you can't do this no matter what,
    which is why I don't really like the old-style paygo. If the Members of
    Congress agree that we're going to do something like a Medicare drug
    benefit or we all agree in the budget resolution that we're going to cut
    taxes, then I hate having an arbitrary rule that says, despite the fact
    that you agree to that, you have to have a super majority. I would rather
    just see more involvement in the beginning of the budget process and,
    again, all the other committees being involved to write a budget and then
    live with it. Let the process of writing that budget involve all your
    fights about what you're going to do, how much you're going to do, but then
    once you agree on something, that's it. Hardcore enforcement above that and
    live with it.

    Most of the other process things that we dream up are just duplicative
    often of the committee allocations. You don't really need three different
    points of order to enforce the same thing. They're either duplicative of
    it, or they are ways to try to keep people from gaming the system. We now
    have whole titles of the budget resolution dedicated to shutting down games
    the appropriators have dreamed up year in and year out to get around their
    committee allocation.

    The other thing I would mention is Section 306 of the Budget Act. We are
    the only committee in the Senate that has a point of order protecting our
    jurisdiction, and that is critical. If somebody ever tries to get rid of
    that or that ever goes away, that would likely be the death of the Budget
    Committee because, we have a unique role as the enforcer over the other
    committees, and if they ever get a chance to change our underlying rules
    themselves willy-nilly, anytime they want to on the floor, we're toast. . .
    . So Sections 302 and 306, that's all you need. Get rid of all the rest of
    it.

    Even people who live the budget process for years and years can still, on
    an almost daily basis, have brand new issues come up about its
    interpretation that nobody ever thought of before and that require
    extensive discussions with the Parliamentarians and with the majority and
    minority and the other body. So it is a constantly evolving thing.

    It's very difficult when everybody has their interpretation that fits what
    they want to do. The Parliamentarians are the ones who have to be the
    referees and say, ``Well, you can do this'' or ``You can't do that.''
    Sometimes they make you happy when they agree with you, and sometimes they
    make you very mad when they do not. And you most often remember the times
    that they made you mad, but it's a job that you couldn't pay me enough to
    do. I wouldn't want to have to make those calls.

    Mr. Bell: The most important thing we ever did was to make sure that you
    could not amend the Budget Act on the floor of the U.S. Senate unless it
    was in response to something that had been reported out of the Budget
    Committee. As long as the Committee understood its fragile history and its
    fragile existence, then we would be in good shape.

    Mr. Hilley: The saddest thing that we did not do [as part of the 1997
    Balanced Budget Act] was to only extend the paygo and the caps for 5 years
    instead of 10. . . . If there is one thing that I would suggest . . . [it]
    would be to reinstate paygo and the caps [on discretionary spending]. If we
    ever get to a bipartisan agreement again, those should be set in stone.
    They can't fill the hole, but they can keep it from getting bigger. That is
    something that the  Budget  Committee  on  a  bipartisan  basis  should  be
     in  favor of . . . .

    The other problem is that reconciliation has lost its true sense which is
    to go back to the days where it was really for deficit reduction rather
    than the train for everything else that people want to do. . . . It is very
    disruptive to the institution at large.

    Mr. Hoagland: One of those images that will always stick in my mind, the
    image I want to retain about this institution when I leave is we were on
    the floor late one night, one of those typical 1 o'clock, 2 o'clock in the
    mornings, in the early days, Senator Dole didn't have any problem going all
    night. Coming down those elevators, nobody else was around, I was leaving
    by myself. As I came down the elevators and getting to the escalators to
    get onto the tram, there were two elderly Senators in front of me, Senator
    Helms and Senator Pell, about as far apart politically as anyone could be
    on the political spectrum. They were both having difficulty walking, and
    Senator Helms was helping Senator Pell, with his arm around him, to get
    onto the tram. I thought to myself, you know, he didn't have to do that. He
    didn't have to do it for the public. He didn't know I was behind them. But
    it's that kind of image I want to retain, that despite the political
    differences, they're still human beings, and they respected one another, as
    human beings.
                     Listing of Chairmen and Ranking Members

    (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

                                 CHAIRMAN

    Edmund S. Muskie, Maine                  July 25, 1974-May 7, 1980 \1\
    Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina       May 13, 1980-January 5, 1981 \1\
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 5, 1981-January 6, 1987
    Lawton Chiles, Florida                   January 6, 1987-January 3, 1989
    Jim Sasser, Tennessee                    February 2, 1989-January 4, 1995
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 6, 1995-January 3, 2001
    Kent Conrad, North Dakota                January 3, 2001-January 20, 2001 \2\
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 20, 2001-June 6, 2001 \2\
    Kent Conrad, North Dakota                June 6, 2001-January 15, 2003 \2\
    Don Nickles, Oklahoma                    January 15, 2003-January 4, 2005
    Judd Gregg, New Hampshire                January 6, 2005-January 4, 2007

                             RANKING MEMBER

    Peter H. Dominick, Colorado              August 7, 1974-January 14, 1975
    Henry Bellmon, Oklahoma                  January 23, 1975-January 5, 1981
    Ernest F. Hollings, South Carolina       January 5, 1981-January 3, 1983
    Lawton Chiles, Florida                   January 3, 1983-January 6, 1987
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 6, 1987-January 6, 1995
    J. James Exon, Nebraska                  January 6, 1995-January 7, 1997
    Frank R. Lautenberg, New Jersey          January 9, 1997-January 3, 2001
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             January 3, 2001-January 20, 2001 \2\
    Kent Conrad, North Dakota                January 20, 2001-June 6, 2001 \2\
    Pete V. Domenici, New Mexico             June 6, 2001-January 15, 2003 \2\
    Kent Conrad, North Dakota                January 15, 2003-January 4, 2007

    \1\ Senator Muskie resigned on May 7, 1980, to become Secretary of
    State. Pursuant to S. Res. 429, adopted by the Senate on May 13, 1980,
    Senator Hollings became chair.
    \2\ From the convening of the 107th Congress on January 3, 2001, until
    the inauguration of President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard
    B. Cheney 17 days later on January 20, the Senate was evenly divided
    between the two parties (with 50 Democratic and 50 Republican Senators).
    Democrats held the majority, however, due to the deciding vote of
    outgoing Democratic Vice President Albert Gore. During this period,
    Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman and Senator Pete V. Domenici
    served as ranking member of the Budget Committee. Beginning on January
    20, the evenly-divided Senate came under the control of the Republican
    Party due to the deciding vote of Vice President Cheney. Accordingly,
    the Committee leadership positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici were
    reversed, effective with Committee assignments announced on January 25.
    On May 24, 2001, Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont switched his party
    affiliation from Republican to Independent and began to caucus with the
    Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. At that point, the 50 Democratic
    Senators, plus Senator Jeffords, held a 51 to 49 advantage over the
    Republicans, and the positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici were
    reversed again, effective with Committee assignments announced on July
    10. Senator Conrad served as chairman and Senator Domenici served as
    ranking member for the remainder of the 107th Congress.

    [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.002

                                EDMUND S. MUSKIE

                                    of Maine

                                    Chairman

                   Biographies of Chairmen and Ranking Members

                                EDMUND S. MUSKIE

      A Democrat from Maine, Edmund Sixtus Muskie was the Committee's first
    chairman, serving from July 25, 1974 to May 7, 1980, when he was
    appointed Secretary of State.

      Born in Rumford, ME, on March 28, 1914, Muskie attended public school
    and graduated from Bates College, ME, in 1936, and Cornell University
    Law School, NY, in 1939. Admitted to the Massachusetts bar in 1939 and
    the Maine bar in 1940, Muskie commenced law practice in Waterville, ME.
    During the Second World War, Muskie enlisted in the U.S. Navy and served
    in the Atlantic and Asiatic-Pacific Theaters from 1942 to 1945. Elected
    to the Maine House of Representatives in 1946, 1948, and 1950, Muskie
    was the Democratic floor leader from 1949 through 1951. In 1954, he was
    elected Governor of the heavily Republican State and served until 1959.

      In 1958, Muskie was the first Democrat elected to the U.S. Senate by
    Maine voters. He was reelected in 1964, 1970, and 1976, and served from
    January 3, 1959 until his resignation on May 7, 1980 to enter the
    Cabinet of President Jimmy Carter as Secretary of State. Muskie, an
    environmentalist and sponsor of the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts of
    the 1970s, gained national prominence in 1968 when he ran as the
    unsuccessful Democratic candidate for Vice President of the United
    States. In 1972, he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic
    Presidential nomination. Awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom on
    January 16, 1981, Muskie was a member of the President's Special Review
    Board (known as the Tower Commission) that investigated the Iran-Contra
    scandal in 1987. He practiced law while a resident of Washington, DC,
    until his death on March 26, 1996. He is interred at Arlington National
    Cemetery in Virginia.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.001

                                PETER H. DOMINICK

                                   of Colorado

                                 Ranking Member

                                PETER H. DOMINICK

      Peter Hoyt Dominick, a Republican from Colorado, served as the first
    ranking member from August 7, 1974 to January 14, 1975.

      Born in Stamford, CT, on July 7, 1915, Dominick, the nephew of former
    Senator Howard Alexander Smith, attended public schools and graduated
    from St. Mark's School in 1933, Yale University in 1937, and Yale Law
    School in 1940. During the Second World War, Dominick entered the Army
    Air Corps as an aviation cadet and served until 1945 when discharged as
    a captain. He engaged in law practice in New York City from 1940 to
    1942, and 1946, and in Denver, CO, from 1946 to 1961. Dominick served as
    a member of the Colorado House of Representatives from 1957 to 1961 and
    the National Commission for the United Nations Educational, Scientific,
    and Cultural Organization from 1960 to 1961.

      Elected U.S. Representative in 1960, Dominick served from 1961 to 1963
    and was elected to the U.S. Senate in 1962. Reelected in 1968, Dominick
    served from 1963 to 1975 and was an unsuccessful candidate for
    reelection in 1974. In 1975, Dominick served as Ambassador Extraordinary
    and Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. A resident of Cherry Hills, CO,
    until his death in Hobe Sound, FL, March 18, 1981, Dominick is interred
    in Fairmount Cemetery, Denver, CO.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.017

                                  HENRY BELLMON

                                   of Oklahoma

                                 Ranking Member

                                  HENRY BELLMON

      Henry Louis Bellmon, a Republican from Oklahoma, served as ranking
    member during his entire service on the Committee, from January 23, 1975
    to January 5, 1981.

      Born on a farm near Tonkawa, OK, on September 3, 1921, Bellmon
    attended Noble County public schools and graduated from Oklahoma State
    University and then Oklahoma A&M College in 1942. A farmer and rancher,
    Bellmon served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942 to 1946 and the
    Oklahoma House of Representatives from 1946 to 1948. The State
    Republican chairman in 1960, Bellmon was elected Oklahoma's first
    Republican Governor in 1962 and served from 1963 to 1967. While in
    office, Bellmon was chairman of the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
    and a member of the executive committee of the National Governors
    Conference.

      Elected to the U.S. Senate in 1968 and reelected in 1974, Bellmon
    served from January 3, 1969 to January 5, 1981, and was not a candidate
    for reelection in 1980. Cofounder and cochairman of the Committee for a
    Responsible Federal Budget, Bellmon was appointed director of the
    Oklahoma Department of Human Services in 1983 and elected Governor of
    Oklahoma for a second time in 1986. He is a resident of Red Rock, OK.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.016

                               ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

                                of South Carolina

                           Chairman and Ranking Member

                               ERNEST F. HOLLINGS

      A Democrat from South Carolina, Ernest Frederick ``Fritz'' Hollings
    served as chairman from May 13, 1980 to January 5, 1981 and ranking
    member from January 5, 1981 to January 3, 1983. A member for 30 years,
    from 1974 to 2005, Hollings has the second longest term of Committee
    service.

      Born in Charleston, SC, on January 1, 1922, Hollings attended the
    public schools of Charleston, and graduated from The Citadel in 1942,
    and the University of South Carolina Law School in 1947. Hollings was
    admitted to the bar in 1947 and commenced law practice in Charleston. He
    served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945 and was elected to the South
    Carolina General Assembly in 1948, 1950, and 1952. In 1954, Hollings was
    elected Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, and in 1958 he was
    elected Governor, serving from 1959 to 1963.

      A Presidential appointee to several Federal commissions, Hollings was
    elected in a special election on November 8, 1966, to the U.S. Senate to
    complete the remaining term of Olin D. Johnston. Reelected in 1968,
    1974, 1980, 1986, 1992, and 1998, serving from November 9, 1966 to
    January 3, 2005, Hollings chaired the Committee on Commerce, Science and
    Transportation for the 100th through 103rd and 107th (January 3-20,
    2001; June 6, 2001-January 3, 2003) Congresses. Serving for 37 years,
    the seventh longest term of service in the Senate, Hollings was a fiscal
    conservative, and one of the namesakes for the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
    Act, an attempt to bring the Federal budget deficit under control. An
    unsuccessful candidate for the Democratic nomination for President of
    the United States in 1984, Hollings was not a candidate for reelection
    to the Senate in 2004.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.018

                                PETE V. DOMENICI

                                  of New Mexico

                           Chairman and Ranking Member

                                PETE V. DOMENICI

      A Republican from New Mexico, Pete Vichi Domenici has the distinction
    of holding the record for the longest service in all positions on the
    Committee. Domenici served as chairman from 1981 to 1987 and from 1995
    to 2001,\1\ ranking member from 1987 to 1995 and 2001 \1\ to 2003, and
    member for 31 years, serving from 1975 to the present.

      Born in Albuquerque, NM, on May 7, 1932, Domenici graduated from the
    University of New Mexico in 1954 and the University of Denver Law School
    in 1958. Admitted to the New Mexico bar in 1958, Domenici commenced
    practice in Albuquerque and was elected to the Albuquerque City
    Commission in 1966 and chairman (ex-officio mayor) in 1967.

      After an unsuccessful bid for Governor in 1970, Domenici was elected
    to the U.S. Senate in 1972, the first New Mexico Republican to be
    elected to the position in 38 years. Reelected in 1978, 1984, 1990,
    1996, and again in 2002 for the term ending January 3, 2009, Domenici
    has served longer than any other New Mexican Senator in history and is
    currently ranked fifth in seniority in the Senate and is second among
    Republican Senators. An expert on budget and energy matters, Domenici
    has served as chairman of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
    for the 108th and 109th Congresses and chairman of the Energy and Water
    Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations for the 104th through
    109th Congresses.

       \1\ In 2001, Senator Domenici served as ranking member from January
    3, 2001 to January 25, 2001 and from July 10, 2001 on (through the end
    of the 107th Congress), and served as chairman from January 25, 2001 to
    July 10, 2001.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.028

                                  LAWTON CHILES

                                   of Florida

                           Chairman and Ranking Member

                                  LAWTON CHILES

      A Democrat from Florida, Lawton Mainor Chiles, Jr. served as chairman
    from January 6, 1987 to January 3, 1989, when he retired from the
    Senate. A member of the Committee for 15 years, beginning in 1974,
    Chiles also served as ranking member from 1983 to 1987.

      Born in Lakeland, FL, on April 3, 1930, Chiles attended public schools
    and graduated from the University of Florida in 1952 and from the law
    school of the same university in 1955. Chiles served in the U.S. Army as
    an artillery officer during the Korean conflict from 1953 to 1954, and
    was later admitted to the Florida bar and commenced practice in Lakeland
    in 1955. A businessman, banker, and industrial developer, Chiles served
    as a member of the Florida House of Representatives from 1958 to 1966,
    the Florida State Senate from 1966 to 1970, and was chairman of the
    Florida Law Revision Commission from 1968 to 1970.

      With strong grassroots popularity, Chiles was elected to the U.S.
    Senate in 1970, reelected in 1976, and again in 1982 for the term ending
    January 3, 1989. He was not a candidate for reelection in 1988. A health
    care and children's advocate, Chiles served as chairman of the Special
    Committee on Aging from 1979 to 1980, and was elected Governor of
    Florida in 1990 and reelected in 1994; he was not a candidate for
    reelection in 1998. A resident of Tallahassee, FL, until his death on
    December 12, 1998, Chiles is interred in Roselawn Cemetery, Tallahassee,
    FL.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.026

                                   JIM SASSER

                                  of Tennessee

                                    Chairman

                                   JIM SASSER

      James Ralph Sasser, a Democrat from Tennessee, served as chairman of
    the Committee from February 2, 1989 to January 4, 1995 and was a member
    for 18 years, from 1977 to 1995.

      Born in Memphis, TN, on September 30, 1936, Sasser attended the public
    schools of Nashville, the University of Tennessee from 1954 to 1955, and
    graduated from Vanderbilt University in 1958 and Vanderbilt Law School
    in 1961. Admitted to the Tennessee bar in 1961 and commenced practice in
    Nashville, Sasser served in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve from 1957 to
    1963.

      In 1976, Sasser was elected to the U.S. Senate and reelected in 1982
    and 1988, serving from January 3, 1977 to January 3, 1995. He was an
    unsuccessful candidate for reelection in 1994.

      A fellow at the Institute of Politics, John F. Kennedy School of
    Government, Harvard University, 1995, Sasser was appointed Ambassador to
    the People's Republic of China by President William Jefferson Clinton
    and served from 1996 to 2001.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.019

                                  J. JAMES EXON

                                   of Nebraska

                                 Ranking Member

                                  J. JAMES EXON

      J. James Exon, a Democrat from Nebraska, served as ranking member from
    1995 to 1997 and member for 18 years, from 1979 to 1997, when he retired
    from the Senate.

      Born in Geddes, SD, on August 9, 1921, Exon attended the public
    schools and the University of Omaha, NE, from 1939 to 1941. Exon served
    in the U.S. Army Signal Corps from 1942 to 1945, and the U.S. Army
    Reserve from 1945 to 1949. A branch manager of a financial corporation,
    Exon founded an office equipment firm and served as president from 1953
    to 1971. In 1964, Exon was delegate to the Democratic National
    Convention and served every year through 2004. Exon was chair of the
    Nebraska Democratic Party when he was elected Governor in 1971, a
    position he held until 1979.

      In 1978, Exon was elected to the U.S. Senate and then reelected in
    1984 and 1990, serving until his retirement in January 1997. After
    retirement, Exon served on a committee established by Congress to study
    the threat of weapons of mass destruction. A resident of Lincoln, NE,
    until his death on June 10, 2005, Exon is interred in Wyuka Cemetery,
    Lincoln, NE.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.048

                               FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

                                  of New Jersey

                                 Ranking Member

                               FRANK R. LAUTENBERG

      Frank Raleigh Lautenberg, a Democrat from New Jersey, served as
    ranking member from January 9, 1997 to January 3, 2001 and member for 16
    years, from 1985 to 2001.

      Born in Paterson, NJ, on January 23, 1924, Lautenberg graduated from
    the Columbia University School of Business, NY, in 1949 and served in
    the U.S. Army Signal Corps from 1942 to 1946. Cofounder of the Nation's
    first payroll company and commissioner of the Port Authority of New York
    and New Jersey from 1978 to 1982, Lautenberg was elected to the U.S.
    Senate in 1982. In December 1982, he was appointed by the Governor to
    complete the unexpired term of Nicholas F. Brady. Lautenberg was
    reelected in 1988 and 1994 and served from December 27, 1982 to January
    3, 2001, and chose not to run for reelection in 2000. Lautenberg was
    again elected to the U.S. Senate in 2002 for the term ending January 3,
    2009.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.027

                                   KENT CONRAD

                                 of North Dakota

                           Chairman and Ranking Member

                                   KENT CONRAD

      A Democrat from North Dakota, Kent Conrad served as chairman for the
    107th Congress \1\ and ranking member for the 108th and 109th
    Congresses. He joined the Committee in 1987.

      Born in Bismarck, ND, on March 12, 1948, Conrad attended the public
    schools of Bismarck, high school in Tripoli, Libya, the University of
    Missouri, Columbia, 1967, and graduated from Stanford University in 1971
    and George Washington University's School of Business in 1975. Conrad
    served as an assistant to the North Dakota tax commissioner from 1974 to
    1980, and then won his first statewide race for tax commissioner in
    1980, serving from 1981 to 1986, when he was elected to the U.S. Senate
    for the term ending January 3, 1993. Conrad was not a candidate for
    reelection in 1992, but was elected in a special election on December 4,
    1992, to the unexpired portion of the term ending January 4, 1995, left
    vacant by the death of Quentin N. Burdick. Conrad was reelected in 1994,
    2000, and again in 2006 for the term ending January 3, 2013.

       \1\ In 2001, Senator Conrad served as chairman from January 3, 2001
    to January 25, 2001 and from July 10, 2001 on (through the end of the
    107th Congress), and served as ranking member from January 25, 2001 to
    July 10, 2001.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.014

                                   DON NICKLES

                                   of Oklahoma

                                    Chairman

                                   DON NICKLES

      A Republican from Oklahoma, Donald Lee Nickles served as chairman for
    2003 and 2004 and member for 18 years, from 1987 to 2005.

      Born in Ponca City, OK, on December 6, 1948, Nickles attended public
    schools, graduated from Oklahoma State University in Stillwater in 1971
    and served in the National Guard from 1970 to 1976. A machine company
    executive and member of the Oklahoma State Senate from 1979 to 1980,
    when at age 31, he was the youngest Republican ever elected to the U.S.
    Senate. Reelected in 1986, 1992, and 1998, and serving from January 3,
    1981 to January 3, 2005, Nickles was not a candidate for reelection in
    2004. Nickles quickly rose in the Senate Republican leadership and
    served as the Republican whip from June 1996 until December 31, 2002;
    chair of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, 101st Congress;
    and the Republican Policy Committee from the 102nd to 104th Congresses.
    Upon retirement from the Senate, Nickles founded The Nickles Group, a
    consulting firm.

      [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8749.047

                                   JUDD GREGG

                                of New Hampshire

                                    Chairman

                                   JUDD GREGG

      Judd Alan Gregg, a Republican from New Hampshire, served as chairman
    for the 109th Congress. He joined the Committee in 1993.

      Born in Nashua, NH, on February 14, 1947, Gregg attended public
    schools and graduated from Phillips Exeter Academy, NH, in 1965,
    Columbia University in 1969, and earned a J.D. degree in 1972 and an
    LL.M. in 1975 respectively from Boston University. Admitted to the New
    Hampshire bar in 1972, Gregg commenced practice in Nashua and served as
    a member of the Governor's executive council from 1978 to 1980.

      In 1980, he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives and
    served four terms from 1981 to 1989. Gregg was elected Governor of New
    Hampshire for two terms serving from 1989 through 1992 when he was
    elected to the U.S. Senate. Reelected in 1998 and in 2004 for the term
    ending January 3, 2011, Gregg served as chairman of the Committee on
    Health, Education, Labor and Pensions for the 108th Congress and
    chairman of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security for the
    109th Congress.
       Committee Members Who Have Served in Other Elective or Appointive
                                    Positions

    (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

                                 VICE PRESIDENTS

    Walter F. Mondale, Minnesota....  Vice President to   1977-1981
                                       Jimmy Carter.
    Dan Quayle, Indiana.............  Vice President to   1989-1993
                                       George H.W. Bush.

                                    GOVERNORS

    Lamar Alexander.................  Governor of         1979-1987
                                       Tennessee.
    Wendell R. Anderson.............  Governor of         1971-1976
                                       Minnesota.
    Henry Bellmon...................  Governor of         1987-1991
                                       Oklahoma.
    Christopher S. Bond.............  Governor of         1973-1977 and 1980-
                                       Missouri.           1985
    John H. Chafee..................  Governor of Rhode   1963-1969
                                       Island.
    Lawton Chiles...................  Governor of         1990-1998
                                       Florida.
    Jon Corzine.....................  Governor of New     2006-
                                       Jersey.
    J. James Exon...................  Governor of         1971-1979
                                       Nebraska.
    Paul J. Fannin..................  Governor of         1958-1964
                                       Arizona.
    Judd Gregg......................  Governor of New     1989-1992
                                       Hampshire.
    Ernest F. Hollings..............  Governor of South   1959-1963
                                       Carolina.
    Edmund S. Muskie................  Governor of Maine.  1955-1959
    Charles S. Robb.................  Governor of         1982-1986
                                       Virginia.
    Terry Sanford...................  Governor of North   1961-1965
                                       Carolina.

                               CABINET SECRETARIES

    Lamar Alexander, Tennessee......  Secretary of        1991-1993
                                       Education.
    Spencer Abraham, Michigan.......  Secretary of        2001-2004
                                       Energy.
    Edmund S. Muskie, Maine.........  Secretary of State  1980-1981

                                   AMBASSADORS

    John C. Danforth, Missouri......  Ambassador to       2004-2005
                                       United Nations.
    Peter H. Dominick, Colorado.....  Ambassador          1975
                                       Extraordinary and
                                       Plenipotentiary
                                       to Switzerland.
    Wyche Fowler, Jr., Georgia......  Ambassador to       1996-2001
                                       Saudi Arabia.
    Walter F. Mondale, Minnesota....  Ambassador          1993-1996
                                       Extraordinary and
                                       Plenipotentiary
                                       to Japan.
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan,          Ambassador to       1973-1975
      New York......................   India.             1975-1976
                                      United States
                                       Permanent
                                       Representative to
                                       the United
                                       Nations.
    Jim Sasser, Tennessee...........  Ambassador to the   1995-2001
                                       People's Republic
                                       of China.

                                  FIRST LADIES

    Hillary Rodham Clinton,           First Lady of the   1993-2001
      New York......................   United States.
    Hillary Rodham Clinton,           First Lady of       1979-1981 and 1983-
      New York......................   Arkansas.           1993

                      SENATE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADERS

    Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia...  Majority Leader...  1977-1980 and 1987-
                                      Minority Leader...   1988
                                                          1981-1986
    Robert J. Dole, Kansas..........  Majority Leader...  1985-1987 and 1995-
                                                           1996
                                      Minority Leader...  1987-1995
    William H. Frist, Tennessee.....  Majority Leader...  2003-2006
    Trent Lott, Mississippi.........  Majority Leader...  1996-January 3,
                                                           2001 and
                                                            January 20, 2001-

                                                            June 6, 2001
                                      Minority Leader...  January 3, 2001-
                                                           January 20, 2001
                                                           and
                                                            June 6, 2001-
                                                            January 6, 2003
    George J. Mitchell, Maine.......  Majority Leader...  1989-1995

                     Membership of the Committee by Congress

    Created as a standing committee on July 12, 1974.

    (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

    NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

    Second Session--January 21, 1974-December 20, 1974

    Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie

    Majority
    S. Res. 367 (July 25, 1974)

    Warren G. Magnuson
    Frank E. Moss
    Walter F. Mondale
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Alan Cranston
    Lawton Chiles
    James G. Abourezk
    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

    Minority
    S. Res. 378 (August 7, 1974)

    Peter H. Dominick (Ranking Member)
    Milton R. Young
    Roman L. Hruska
    Jacob K. Javits
    Paul J. Fannin
    Robert J. Dole

    NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 14, 1975-December 19, 1975

    Second Session--January 19, 1976-October 1, 1976

    Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie

    Majority
    S. Res. 18 (January 17, 1975)

    Warren G. Magnuson
    Frank E. Moss
    Walter F. Mondale \1\
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Alan Cranston
    Lawton Chiles
    James G. Abourezk
    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    Sam Nunn

    Minority
    S. Res. 24 (January 23, 1975)

    Henry Bellmon (Ranking Member)
    Robert J. Dole
    J. Glenn Beall, Jr.
    James L. Buckley (Conservative Party)
    James A. McClure
    Pete V. Domenici

    \1\ Senator Mondale resigned on December 30, 1976, to become Vice
    President.

    NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 4, 1977-December 15, 1977

    Second Session--January 19, 1978-October 15, 1978

    Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie

    Majority
    S. Res. 20 (January 10, 1977)

    Warren G. Magnuson
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Alan Cranston
    Lawton Chiles
    James G. Abourezk
    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    Sam Nunn \1\
    Wendell R. Anderson \2\
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan 1, 2
    J. Bennett Johnston \1\
    Jim Sasser \1\

    Minority
    S. Res. 21 (January 10, 1977)

    Henry Bellmon (Ranking Member)
    Robert J. Dole
    James A. McClure
    Pete V. Domenici
    John H. Chafee \3\
    Richard G. Lugar \3\
    Samuel I. Hayakawa \3\
    H. John Heinz III \3\

    \1\ Pursuant to S. Res. 84, adopted by the Senate on February 11, 1977,
    Senators Johnston and Sasser joined the Committee, and Senators Nunn and
    Moynihan left the Committee.
    \2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 29, adopted by the Senate on January 11, 1977,
    Senators Anderson and Moynihan were added as temporary Members to the
    Committee.
    \3\ Pursuant to S. Res. 90, adopted by the Senate on February 22, 1977,
    Senators Hayakawa and Heinz joined the Committee, and Senators Chafee
    and Lugar left the Committee.

    NINETY-SIXTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 15, 1979-January 3, 1980

    Second Session--January 3, 1980-December 16, 1980

    Chairman, Edmund S. Muskie \1\

    Majority
    S. Res. 22 (January 23, 1979)

    Warren G. Magnuson
    Ernest F. Hollings \1\
    Lawton Chiles
    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Jim Sasser
    Gary W. Hart
    Howard M. Metzenbaum
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    J. James Exon
    George J. Mitchell \2\

    Minority
    S. Res. 23 (January 23, 1979)

    Henry Bellmon (Ranking Member)
    Pete V. Domenici
    Bob Packwood
    William L. Armstrong
    Nancy Landon Kassebaum
    Rudy Boschwitz
    Orrin G. Hatch
    Larry Pressler

    \1\ Senator Muskie resigned on May 7, 1980, to become Secretary of
    State. Pursuant to S. Res. 429, adopted by the Senate on May 13, 1980,
    Senator Hollings became chair.
    \2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 439, adopted by the Senate on May 19, 1980,
    George J. Mitchell joined the Committee.

    NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 5, 1981-December 16, 1981

    Second Session--January 25, 1982-December 23, 1982

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    S. Res. 14 (January 5, 1981)

    William L. Armstrong
    Nancy Landon Kassebaum
    Rudy Boschwitz
    Orrin G. Hatch
    John G. Tower
    Mark Andrews
    Steven D. Symms
    Charles E. Grassley
    Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
    Dan Quayle
    Slade Gorton

    Minority
    S. Res. 15 (January 5, 1981)

    Ernest F. Hollings (Ranking Member)
    Lawton Chiles
    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Jim Sasser
    Gary W. Hart
    Howard M. Metzenbaum
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    J. James Exon

    NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 3, 1983-November 18, 1983

    Second Session--January 23, 1984-October 12, 1984

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    S. Res. 8 (January 3, 1983)

    William L. Armstrong
    Nancy Landon Kassebaum
    Rudy Boschwitz
    Orrin G. Hatch
    John G. Tower
    Mark Andrews
    Steven D. Symms
    Charles E. Grassley
    Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
    Dan Quayle
    Slade Gorton

    Minority
    S. Res. 9 (January 3, 1983)

    Lawton Chiles (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Jim Sasser
    Gary W. Hart
    Howard M. Metzenbaum
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    J. James Exon

    NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 3, 1985-December 20, 1985

    Second Session--January 21, 1986-October 18, 1986

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    S. Res. 75 (February 21, 1985)

    William L. Armstrong
    Nancy Landon Kassebaum
    Rudy Boschwitz
    Orrin G. Hatch
    Mark Andrews
    Steven D. Symms
    Charles E. Grassley
    Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
    Dan Quayle
    Slade Gorton
    John C. Danforth

    Minority
    S. Res. 87 (March 5, 1985)

    Lawton Chiles (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Jim Sasser
    Gary W. Hart
    Howard M. Metzenbaum
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    Daniel Patrick Moynihan
    J. James Exon
    Frank R. Lautenberg

    ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 6, 1987-December 22, 1987

    Second Session--January 25, 1988-October 22, 1988

    Chairman, Lawton Chiles \1\

    Majority
    S. Res. 19 (January 6, 1987)

    Ernest F. Hollings
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Jim Sasser
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    J. James Exon
    Frank R. Lautenberg
    Paul Simon
    Terry Sanford
    Timothy E. Wirth
    Wyche Fowler, Jr.
    Kent Conrad
    Christopher J. Dodd

    Minority
    S. Res. 20 (January 6, 1987)

    Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
    William L. Armstrong
    Nancy Landon Kassebaum
    Rudy Boschwitz
    Steven D. Symms
    Charles E. Grassley
    Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
    Dan Quayle \2\
    John C. Danforth
    Don Nickles
    Warren Rudman

    \1\ Senator Chiles was not a candidate for reelection in 1988. He was
    elected Governor of Florida in 1990.
    \2\ Senator Quayle resigned on January 3, 1989, to become Vice
    President.

    ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

    First Session--January 3, 1989-November 22, 1989

    Second Session--January 23, 1990-October 28, 1990

    Chairman, Jim Sasser

    Majority
    S. Res. 46 (February 2, 1989)

    Ernest F. Hollings
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    J. James Exon
    Frank R. Lautenberg
    Paul Simon
    Terry Sanford
    Timothy E. Wirth
    Wyche Fowler, Jr.
    Kent Conrad
    Christopher J. Dodd
    Charles S. Robb

    Minority
    S. Res. 47 (February 2, 1989)

    Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
    William L. Armstrong
    Rudy Boschwitz
    Steven D. Symms
    Charles E. Grassley
    Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
    Don Nickles
    Warren Rudman
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond

    ONE HUNDRED SECOND CONGRESS

    First Session--January 3, 1991-January 3, 1992

    Second Session--January 3, 1992-October 9, 1992

    Chairman, Jim Sasser

    Majority
    S. Res. 86 (March 19, 1991)

    Ernest F. Hollings
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    J. James Exon
    Frank R. Lautenberg
    Paul Simon
    Terry Sanford
    Timothy E. Wirth
    Wyche Fowler, Jr.
    Kent Conrad
    Christopher J. Dodd

    Minority
    S. Res. 88 (March 19, 1991)

    Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
    Steven D. Symms
    Charles E. Grassley
    Robert W. Kasten, Jr.
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Trent Lott
    Hank Brown

    ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

    First Session--January 5, 1993-November 26, 1993

    Second Session--January 25, 1994-December 1, 1994

    Chairman, Jim Sasser

    Majority
    S. Res. 19 (January 21, 1993)

    Ernest F. Hollings
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Donald W. Riegle, Jr.
    J. James Exon
    Frank R. Lautenberg
    Paul Simon
    Kent Conrad
    Christopher J. Dodd
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Barbara Boxer
    Patty Murray

    Minority
    S. Res. 22 (January 21, 1993)

    Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
    Charles E. Grassley
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Trent Lott
    Hank Brown
    Slade Gorton
    Judd Gregg

    ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 4, 1995-January 3, 1996

    Second Session--January 3, 1996-October 4, 1996

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    S. Res. 33 (January 6, 1995)

    Charles E. Grassley
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Trent Lott \1\
    Hank Brown
    Slade Gorton
    Judd Gregg
    Olympia J. Snowe
    Spencer Abraham
    William H. Frist
    Rod Grams \2\
    Connie Mack III \1\

    Minority
    S. Res. 32 (January 6, 1995)

    J. James Exon (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    J. Bennett Johnston
    Frank R. Lautenberg
    Paul Simon
    Kent Conrad
    Christopher J. Dodd
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Barbara Boxer
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden \2\

    \1\ Pursuant to S. Res. 267, adopted by the Senate on June 20, 1996,
    Senator Mack joined the Committee, and Senator Lott left the Committee
    to become majority leader.
    \2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 236, adopted by the Senate on March 29, 1996,
    Senators Grams and Wyden joined the Committee.

    ONE HUNDRED FIFTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 7, 1997-November 13, 1997

    Second Session--January 27, 1998-December 19, 1998

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    S. Res. 14 (January 9, 1997)

    Charles E. Grassley
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Slade Gorton
    Judd Gregg
    Olympia J. Snowe
    Spencer Abraham
    William H. Frist
    Rod Grams
    Gordon H. Smith

    Minority
    S. Res. 12 (January 9, 1997)

    Frank R. Lautenberg (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Kent Conrad
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Barbara Boxer
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden
    Russell D. Feingold
    Tim Johnson
    Richard J. Durbin

    ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 6, 1999-November 22, 1999

    Second Session--January 24, 2000-December 15, 2000

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    S. Res. 18 (January 14, 1999)

    Charles E. Grassley
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Slade Gorton
    Judd Gregg
    Olympia J. Snowe
    Spencer Abraham
    William H. Frist
    Rod Grams
    Gordon H. Smith

    Minority
    S. Res. 15 (January 7, 1999)

    Frank R. Lautenberg (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Kent Conrad
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Barbara Boxer
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden
    Russell D. Feingold
    Tim Johnson
    Richard J. Durbin

    ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 3, 2001-December 20, 2001

    Second Session--January 23, 2002-November 22, 2002

    From the convening of the 107th Congress on January 3, 2001, until the
    inauguration of President George W. Bush and Vice President Richard B.
    Cheney 17 days later on January 20, the Senate was evenly divided
    between the two parties (with 50 Democratic and 50 Republican
    Senators).\1\ Democrats held the majority, however, due to the deciding
    vote of outgoing Democratic Vice President Albert Gore. During this
    period, Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman \2\ and Senator Pete V.
    Domenici served as ranking member of the Budget Committee. Beginning on
    January 20, the evenly-divided Senate came under the control of the
    Republican Party due to the deciding vote of Vice President Cheney.
    Accordingly, the Committee leadership positions of Senators Conrad and
    Domenici were reversed, effective with Committee assignments announced
    on January 25. On May 24, 2001, Senator James M. Jeffords of Vermont
    switched his party affiliation from Republican to Independent and began
    to caucus with the Democrats, effective June 6, 2001. At that point, the
    50 Democratic Senators, plus Senator Jeffords, held a 51 to 49 advantage
    over the Republicans, and the positions of Senators Conrad and Domenici
    were reversed again, effective with Committee assignments announced on
    July 10. Senator Conrad served as chairman and Senator Domenici served
    as ranking member for the remainder of the 107th Congress.

    January 25, 2001-July 10, 2001

    Chairman, Pete V. Domenici

    Majority
    Congressional Record, January 25, 2001, p. S558-559

    Charles E. Grassley
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Judd Gregg
    Olympia J. Snowe
    William H. Frist
    Gordon H. Smith
    Wayne Allard
    Chuck Hagel

    Minority
    Congressional Record, January 25, 2001, p. S559

    Kent Conrad (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden
    Russell D. Feingold
    Tim Johnson
    Robert C. Byrd
    Bill Nelson
    Debbie Stabenow
    Hillary Rodham Clinton

    July 10, 2001-November 22, 2002

    Chairman, Kent Conrad

    Majority
    Congressional Record, July 10, 2001, p. S7417-7418

    Ernest F. Hollings
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden
    Russell D. Feingold
    Tim Johnson
    Robert C. Byrd
    Bill Nelson
    Debbie Stabenow
    Hillary Rodham Clinton
    Jon Corzine

    Minority
    Congressional Record, July 10, 2001, p. S7418

    Pete V. Domenici (Ranking Member)
    Charles E. Grassley
    Don Nickles
    Phil Gramm
    Christopher S. Bond
    Judd Gregg
    Olympia J. Snowe
    William H. Frist \3\
    Gordon H. Smith
    Wayne Allard
    Chuck Hagel

    \1\ S. Res. 8, on Senate procedures, as adopted by the Senate on January
    5, 2001.
    \2\ S. Res. 7, designating chairmen of committees, as adopted by the
    Senate on January 3, 2001.
    \3\ Senator Frist was elected majority leader on December 23, 2002, and
    began service as leader on January 7, 2003.

    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 7, 2003-December 9, 2003

    Second Session--January 20, 2004-December 8, 2004

    Chairman, Don Nickles

    Majority
    S. Res. 18 (January 15, 2003)

    Pete V. Domenici
    Charles E. Grassley
    Judd Gregg
    Wayne Allard
    Conrad Burns
    Michael B. Enzi
    Jeff Sessions
    Jim Bunning
    Michael D. Crapo
    John Ensign
    John Cornyn

    Minority
    S. Res. 20 (January 15, 2003)

    Kent Conrad (Ranking Member)
    Ernest F. Hollings
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden
    Russell D. Feingold
    Tim Johnson
    Robert C. Byrd
    Bill Nelson
    Debbie Stabenow
    Jon Corzine

    ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

    First Session--January 4, 2005-December 8, 2005

    Second Session--January 4, 2006-December 9, 2006

    Chairman, Judd Gregg

    Majority
    S. Res. 5 (January 6, 2005)

    Pete V. Domenici
    Charles E. Grassley
    Wayne Allard
    Michael B. Enzi
    Jeff Sessions
    Jim Bunning
    Michael D. Crapo
    John Ensign
    John Cornyn
    Lamar Alexander
    Lindsey O. Graham

    Minority
    S. Res. 6 (January 6, 2005)

    Kent Conrad (Ranking Member)
    Paul S. Sarbanes
    Patty Murray
    Ron Wyden
    Russell D. Feingold
    Tim Johnson
    Robert C. Byrd
    Bill Nelson
    Debbie Stabenow
    Jon Corzine \1\
    Robert Menendez \2\

    \1\ Senator Corzine resigned from the Senate on January 17, 2006, to
    become Governor of New Jersey.
    \2\ Pursuant to S. Res. 348, adopted by the Senate on January 18, 2006,
    Robert Menendez replaced Jon Corzine.
                      Membership of the Committee by State

    (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

    Name

    Service on Committee

    ALABAMA

    Jeff Sessions

    January 15, 2003-

    ALASKA

    (None)

    ARIZONA

    Paul J. Fannin

    August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

    ARKANSAS

    (None)

    CALIFORNIA

    Barbara Boxer

    January 21, 1993-January 25, 2001

    Alan Cranston

    July 25, 1974-January 23, 1979

    Samuel I. Hayakawa

    February 22, 1977-January 23, 1979

    COLORADO

    Wayne Allard

    January 25, 2001-

    William L. Armstrong

    January 23, 1979-January 3, 1991

    Hank Brown

    March 19, 1991-January 7, 1997

    Peter H. Dominick

    August 7, 1974-January 14, 1975

    Gary W. Hart

    January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

    Timothy E. Wirth

    January 6, 1987-January 5, 1993

    CONNECTICUT

    Christopher J. Dodd

    January 6, 1987-January 9, 1997

    DELAWARE

    Joseph R. Biden, Jr

    July 25, 1974-March 5, 1985

    FLORIDA

    Lawton Chiles

    July 25, 1974-January 3, 1989

    Connie Mack III

    June 20, 1996-January 9, 1997

    Bill Nelson

    January 25, 2001-

    GEORGIA

    Wyche Fowler, Jr

    January 6, 1987-January 5, 1993

    Sam Nunn

    January 17, 1975-February 11, 1977

    HAWAII

    (None)

    IDAHO

    Michael D. Crapo

    January 15, 2003-

    James A. McClure

    January 23, 1975-January 23, 1979

    Steven D. Symms

    January 5, 1981-January 5, 1993

    ILLINOIS

    Richard J. Durbin

    January 9, 1997-January 25, 2001

    Paul Simon

    January 6, 1987-January 7, 1997

    INDIANA

    Richard G. Lugar

    January 10, 1977-February 22, 1977

    Dan Quayle

    January 5, 1981-January 3, 1989

    IOWA

    Charles E. Grassley

    January 5, 1981-

    KANSAS

    Robert J. Dole

    August 7, 1974-January 23, 1979

    Nancy Landon Kassebaum

    January 23, 1979-February 2, 1989

    KENTUCKY

    Jim Bunning

    January 15, 2003-

    LOUISIANA

    J. Bennett Johnston

    February 11, 1977-January 7, 1997

    MAINE

    George J. Mitchell

    May 19, 1980-January 5, 1981

    Edmund S. Muskie

    July 25, 1974-May 7, 1980

    Olympia J. Snowe

    January 6, 1995-January 15, 2003

    MARYLAND

    J. Glenn Beall, Jr

    January 23, 1975-January 4, 1977

    Paul S. Sarbanes

    January 21, 1993-January 4, 2007

    MASSACHUSETTS

    (None)

    MICHIGAN

    Spencer Abraham

    January 6, 1995-January 3, 2001

    Donald W. Riegle, Jr

    January 23, 1979-January 4, 1995

    Debbie Stabenow

    January 25, 2001-

    MINNESOTA

    Wendell R. Anderson

    January 11, 1977-December 29, 1978

    Rudy Boschwitz

    January 23, 1979-January 3, 1991

    Rod Grams

    March 29, 1996-January 3, 2001

    Walter F. Mondale

    July 25, 1974-December 30, 1976

    MISSISSIPPI

    Trent Lott

    March 19, 1991-June 20, 1996

    MISSOURI

    Christopher S. Bond

    February 2, 1989-January 15, 2003

    John C. Danforth

    February 21, 1985-February 2, 1989

    MONTANA

    Conrad Burns

    January 15, 2003-January 6, 2005

    NEBRASKA

    J. James Exon

    January 23, 1979-January 7, 1997

    Chuck Hagel

    January 25, 2001-January 15, 2003

    Roman L. Hruska

    August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

    NEVADA

    John Ensign

    January 15, 2003-

    NEW HAMPSHIRE

    Judd Gregg

    January 21, 1993-

    Warren Rudman

    January 6, 1987-March 19, 1991

    NEW JERSEY

    Jon Corzine

    July 10, 2001-January 17, 2006

    Frank R. Lautenberg

    March 5, 1985-January 3, 2001

    Robert Menendez

    January 18, 2006-

    NEW MEXICO

    Pete V. Domenici

    January 23, 1975-

    NEW YORK

    James L. Buckley (Conservative Party)

    January 23, 1975-January 4, 1977

    Hillary Rodham Clinton

    January 25, 2001-January 15, 2003

    Jacob K. Javits

    August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

    Daniel Patrick Moynihan

    January 11, 1977-February 11, 1977 and

    January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

    NORTH CAROLINA

    Terry Sanford

    January 6, 1987-January 5, 1993

    NORTH DAKOTA

    Mark Andrews

    January 5, 1981-January 6, 1987

    Kent Conrad

    January 6, 1987-

    Milton R. Young

    August 7, 1974-January 23, 1975

    OHIO

    Howard M. Metzenbaum

    January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

    OKLAHOMA

    Henry Bellmon

    January 23, 1975-January 5, 1981

    Don Nickles

    January 6, 1987-January 4, 2005

    OREGON

    Bob Packwood

    January 23, 1979-January 5, 1981

    Gordon H. Smith

    January 9, 1997-January 15, 2003

    Ron Wyden

    March 29, 1996-

    PENNSYLVANIA

    H. John Heinz III

    February 22, 1977-January 23, 1979

    RHODE ISLAND

    John H. Chafee

    January 10, 1977-February 22, 1977

    SOUTH CAROLINA

    Lindsey O. Graham

    January 6, 2005-

    Ernest F. Hollings

    July 25, 1974-January 4, 2005

    SOUTH DAKOTA

    James G. Abourezk

    July 25, 1974-January 15, 1979

    Tim Johnson

    January 9, 1997-

    Larry Pressler

    January 23, 1979-January 5, 1981

    TENNESSEE

    Lamar Alexander

    January 6, 2005-January 4, 2007

    William H. Frist

    January 6, 1995-January 7, 2003

    Jim Sasser

    February 11, 1977-January 4, 1995

    TEXAS

    John Cornyn

    January 15, 2003-

    Phil Gramm

    February 2, 1989-January 7, 2003

    John G. Tower

    January 5, 1981-January 3, 1985

    UTAH

    Orrin G. Hatch

    January 23, 1979-January 6, 1987

    Frank E. Moss

    July 25, 1974-January 4, 1977

    VERMONT

    (None)

    VIRGINIA

    Charles S. Robb

    February 2, 1989-March 19, 1991

    WASHINGTON

    Slade Gorton

    January 5, 1981-January 6, 1987 and

    January 21, 1993-January 3, 2001

    Warren G. Magnuson

    July 25, 1974-January 5, 1981

    Patty Murray

    January 21, 1993-

    WEST VIRGINIA

    Robert C. Byrd

    January 25, 2001-

    WISCONSIN

    Robert W. Kasten, Jr

    January 5, 1981-January 5, 1993

    Russell D. Feingold

    January 9, 1997-

    WYOMING

    Michael B. Enzi

    January 15, 2003-

                Alphabetical Listing of Members of the Committee

    (Democrats in italic; Republicans in roman)

                 Name                    State         Service on Committee

                                        A

    Abourezk, James G ...........   South Dakota...  July 25, 1974-January
                                                      15, 1979
    Abraham, Spencer.............   Michigan.......  January 6, 1995-January
                                                      3, 2001
    Alexander, Lamar.............   Tennessee......  January 6, 2005-January
                                                      4, 2007
    Allard, Wayne................   Colorado.......  January 25, 2001-
    Anderson, Wendell R .........   Minnesota......  January 11, 1977-
                                                      December 29, 1978
    Andrews, Mark................   North Dakota...  January 5, 1981-January
                                                      6, 1987
    Armstrong, William L.........   Colorado.......  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 3, 1991

                                        B

    Beall, J. Glenn, Jr..........   Maryland.......  January 23, 1975-
                                                      January 4, 1977
    Bellmon, Henry...............   Oklahoma.......  January 23, 1975-
                                                      January 5, 1981
    Biden, Joseph R., Jr ........   Delaware.......  July 25, 1974-March 5,
                                                      1985
    Bond, Christopher S..........   Missouri.......  February 2, 1989-
                                                      January 15, 2003
    Boschwitz, Rudy..............   Minnesota......  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 3, 1991
    Boxer, Barbara ..............   California.....  January 21, 1993-
                                                      January 25, 2001
    Brown, Hank..................   Colorado.......  March 19, 1991-January
                                                      7, 1997
    Buckley, James L.              New York........  January 23, 1975-
     (Conservative Party).                            January 4, 1977
    Bunning, Jim.................   Kentucky.......  January 15, 2003-
    Burns, Conrad................   Montana........  January 15, 2003-
                                                      January 6, 2005
    Byrd, Robert C ..............   West Virginia..  January 25, 2001-

                                        C

    Chafee, John H...............   Rhode Island...  January 10, 1977-
                                                      February 22, 1977
    Chiles, Lawton ..............   Florida........  July 25, 1974-January
                                                      3, 1989
    Clinton, Hillary Rodham .....   New York.......  January 25, 2001-
                                                      January 15, 2003
    Conrad, Kent.................  North Dakota....  January 6, 1987-
    Cornyn, John.................   Texas..........  January 15, 2003-
    Corzine, Jon ................   New Jersey.....  July 10, 2001-January
                                                      17, 2006
    Cranston, Alan ..............   California.....  July 25, 1974-January
                                                      23, 1979
    Crapo, Michael D.............   Idaho..........  January 15, 2003-

                                        D

    Danforth, John C.............   Missouri.......  February 21, 1985-
                                                      February 2, 1989
    Dodd, Christopher J..........   Connecticut....  January 6, 1987-January
                                                      9, 1997
    Dole, Robert J...............   Kansas.........  August 7, 1974-January
                                                      23, 1979
    Domenici, Pete V.............   New Mexico.....  January 23, 1975-
    Dominick, Peter H............   Colorado.......  August 7, 1974-January
                                                      14, 1975
    Durbin, Richard J ...........   Illinois.......  January 9, 1997-January
                                                      25, 2001

                                        E

    Ensign, John.................   Nevada.........  January 15, 2003-
    Enzi, Michael B..............   Wyoming........  January 15, 2003-
    Exon, J. James ..............   Nebraska.......  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 7, 1997

                                        F

    Fannin, Paul J...............   Arizona........  August 7, 1974-January
                                                      23, 1975
    Feingold, Russell D .........   Wisconsin......  January 9, 1997-
    Fowler, Wyche, Jr ...........   Georgia........  January 6, 1987-January
                                                      5, 1993
    Frist, William H.............   Tennessee......  January 6, 1995-January
                                                      7, 2003

                                        G

    Gorton, Slade................   Washington.....  January 5, 1981-January
                                                      6, 1987 and
                                                     January 21, 1993-
                                                      January 3, 2001
    Graham, Lindsey O............   South Carolina.  January 6, 2005-
    Gramm, Phil..................   Texas..........  February 2, 1989-
                                                      January 7, 2003
    Grams, Rod...................  Minnesota.......  March 29, 1996-January
                                                      3, 2001
    Grassley, Charles E..........   Iowa...........  January 5, 1981-
    Gregg, Judd..................  New Hampshire...  January 21, 1993-

                                        H

    Hagel, Chuck.................  Nebraska........  January 25, 2001-
                                                      January 15, 2003
    Hart, Gary W ................  Colorado........  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 6, 1987
    Hatch, Orrin G...............   Utah...........  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 6, 1987
    Hayakawa, Samuel I...........   California.....  February 22, 1977-
                                                      January 23, 1979
    Heinz, H. John, III..........   Pennsylvania...  February 22, 1977-
                                                      January 23, 1979
    Hollings, Ernest F ..........   South Carolina.  July 25, 1974-January
                                                      4, 2005
    Hruska, Roman L..............   Nebraska.......  August 7, 1974-January
                                                      23, 1975

                                        J

    Javits, Jacob K..............   New York.......  August 7, 1974-January
                                                      23, 1975
    Johnson, Tim ................   South Dakota...  January 9, 1997-
    Johnston, J. Bennett ........   Louisiana......  February 11, 1977-
                                                      January 7, 1997

                                        K

    Kassebaum, Nancy Landon......   Kansas.........  January 23, 1979-
                                                      February 2, 1989
    Kasten, Robert W., Jr........   Wisconsin......  January 5, 1981-January
                                                      5, 1993

                                        L

    Lautenberg, Frank R .........   New Jersey.....  March 5, 1985-January
                                                      3, 2001
    Lott, Trent..................   Mississippi....  March 19, 1991-June 20,
                                                      1996
    Lugar, Richard G.............   Indiana........  January 10, 1977-
                                                      February 22, 1977

                                        M

    Mack, Connie, III............   Florida........  June 20, 1996-January
                                                      9, 1997
    Magnuson, Warren G ..........   Washington.....  July 25, 1974-January
                                                      5, 1981
    McClure, James A.............   Idaho..........  January 23, 1975-
                                                      January 23, 1979
    Menendez, Robert ............   New Jersey.....  January 18, 2006-
    Metzenbaum, Howard M ........   Ohio...........  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 6, 1987
    Mitchell, George J ..........   Maine..........  May 19, 1980-January 5,
                                                      1981
    Mondale, Walter F ...........   Minnesota......  July 25, 1974-December
                                                      30, 1976
    Moss, Frank E ...............   Utah...........  July 25, 1974-January
                                                      4, 1977
    Moynihan, Daniel Patrick ....   New York.......  January 11, 1977-
                                                      February 11, 1977 and
                                                     January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 6, 1987
    Murray, Patty ...............   Washington.....  January 21, 1993-
    Muskie, Edmund S.............  Maine...........  July 25, 1974-May 7,
                                                      1980

                                        N

    Nelson, Bill ................   Florida........  January 25, 2001-
    Nickles, Don.................   Oklahoma.......  January 6, 1987-January
                                                      4, 2005
    Nunn, Sam ...................   Georgia........  January 17, 1975-
                                                      February 11, 1977

                                        P

    Packwood, Bob................   Oregon.........  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 5, 1981
    Pressler, Larry..............   South Dakota...  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 5, 1981

                                        Q

    Quayle, Dan..................   Indiana........  January 5, 1981-January
                                                      3, 1989

                                        R

    Riegle, Donald W., Jr .......   Michigan.......  January 23, 1979-
                                                      January 4, 1995
    Robb, Charles S..............   Virginia.......  February 2, 1989-March
                                                      19, 1991
    Rudman, Warren...............   New Hampshire..  January 6, 1987-March
                                                      19, 1991

                                        S

    Sanford, Terry ..............   North Carolina.  January 6, 1987-January
                                                      5, 1993
    Sarbanes, Paul S.............   Maryland.......  January 21, 1993-
                                                      January 4, 2007
    Sasser, Jim .................   Tennessee......  February 11, 1977-
                                                      January 4, 1995
    Sessions, Jeff...............   Alabama........  January 15, 2003-
    Simon, Paul .................   Illinois.......  January 6, 1987-January
                                                      7, 1997
    Smith, Gordon H..............   Oregon.........  January 9, 1997-January
                                                      15, 2003
    Snowe, Olympia J.............   Maine..........  January 6, 1995-January
                                                      15, 2003
    Stabenow, Debbie ............   Michigan.......  January 25, 2001-
    Symms, Steven D..............   Idaho..........  January 5, 1981-January
                                                      5, 1993

                                        T

    Tower, John G................   Texas..........  January 5, 1981-January
                                                      3, 1985

                                        W

    Wirth, Timothy E ............   Colorado.......  January 6, 1987-January
                                                      5, 1993
    Wyden, Ron ..................   Oregon.........  March 29, 1996-

                                        Y

    Young, Milton R..............   North Dakota...  August 7, 1974-January
                                                      23, 1975

                    Majority Staff Directors to the Committee

    Douglas J. Bennet Jr......................  1974-1976 \1\
    John T. McEvoy............................  1977-1980
    Stephen E. Bell...........................  1981-1986
    G. William Hoagland.......................  1986
    Richard N. Brandon........................  1987-1988
    John L. Hilley............................  1989-1990
    Larry Stein...............................  1991-1994
    G. William Hoagland.......................  1995-2000
    Mary Ann Naylor...........................  2001-2002 \2\
    Hazen Marshall............................  2003-2004
    Scott B. Gudes............................  2005-2006

    \1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.
    \2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
      times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
      discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
      months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
      Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
      Congress.

                    Minority Staff Directors to the Committee

    Robert S. Boyd............................  1975-1980
    Lizabeth Tankersley.......................  1981-1982
    Richard N. Brandon........................  1983-1986
    G. William Hoagland.......................  1987-1994
    William G. Dauster........................  1995-1997
    Bruce King................................  1997-2000
    G. William Hoagland.......................  2001-2002 \1\
    Mary Ann Naylor...........................  2003-2006

    \1\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
      times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
      discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
      months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
      Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
      Congress.

                       Majority Counsels to the Committee

    John T. McEvoy............................  1974-1976 \1\
    Karen H. Williams.........................  1977-1979
    Lizabeth Tankersley.......................  1980
    Robert Fulton.............................  1981-1982
    Gail Millar...............................  1983
    Nell Payne................................  1984-1986
    William G. Dauster........................  1987-1994
    Jennifer Smith............................  1995
    Beth Smerko Felder........................  1996-2000
    Lisa Konwinski............................  2001-2002 \2\
    Beth Smerko Felder........................  2003-2004
    Gail Millar...............................  2005-2006

    \1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.
    \2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
      times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
      discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
      months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
      Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
      Congress.

                       Minority Counsels to the Committee

    Robert Z. Bohan...........................  1974 \1\
    Francis A. Hennigan.......................  1975-1976
    Robert Fulton.............................  1980
    Lizabeth Tankersley.......................  1981-1982
    William G. Dauster........................  1983-1986
    Nell Payne................................  1987
    William G. Dauster........................  1995-1997
    Lisa Konwinski............................  1999-2000
    Beth Smerko Felder........................  2001-2002 \2\
    Lisa Konwinski............................  2003-2006

    \1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.
    \2\ In the 107th Congress, party control of the Senate changed several
      times, resulting in changes in leadership of the Committee (as
      discussed more fully in footnote 2 on page 109); following about 6
      months with Senator Pete Domenici serving as Committee chairman,
      Senator Kent Conrad served as chairman for the remainder of the
      Congress.

                          Chief Clerks to the Committee

    Maria P. Durelli..........................  1974-1975 \1\
    Harry T. Martin...........................  1976
    Harry T. Martin/Joan A. Leach.............  1977
    Joan A. Leach.............................  1978-1980
    Lynne Seymour.............................  1981
    Laurie E. Greene..........................  1982-1983
    Deborah S. Paul...........................  1984-1986
    Anne Willis Hill..........................  1987-1994
    Lynne Seymour.............................  1995-

    \1\ The Committee was established on July 12, 1974.

    Authorities Pertaining to the Jurisdiction and Duties of the Senate
    Committee on the Budget

    Statutory Provisions

    The key statute pertaining to the jurisdiction and duties of the Senate
    Budget Committee is the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
    1974 (P.L. 93-344; July 12, 1974; 88 Stat. 297-339), as amended. The 1974
    Act has been amended many times over the years, and these changes have
    modified the Committee's jurisdiction and duties in many ways. The
    provisions of the 1974 Act relating to congressional organization and
    procedure are codified in Title 2 (The Congress) of the United States Code.

     Title II of the Act established the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
    Section 201(f) (2 U.S.C. 601(f)), which requires CBO to use revenue
    estimates prepared by the Joint Committee on Taxation, also provides that
    ``[t]he Budget Committees of the Senate and House shall determine all
    estimates with respect to scoring points of order and with respect to the
    execution of the purposes of this Act.''

     Title III of the Act sets forth the procedures and requirements relating
    to the congressional budget process generally, including budget resolutions
    and reconciliation. Various sections within the title require the Budget
    Committee to report annual budget resolutions and omnibus budget
    reconciliation legislation, make allocations of spending to committees,
    provide periodic scorekeeping reports on legislative action, provide
    estimates of the budget impact of legislation for purposes of determining
    points of order, submit for the record lists of possibly extraneous
    provisions in reconciliation legislation, and make periodic adjustments in
    various budget levels for specified purposes.

     Title IV of the Act sets forth additional provisions dealing with the
    congressional budget process, including procedures to curb the use of
    unfunded Federal mandates. Section 425(e) (2 U.S.C. 658d) provides that
    ``[f]or purposes of this section, in the Senate, the levels of Federal
    mandates for a fiscal year shall be determined based on estimates made by
    the Committee on the Budget.''

     Title VII of the Act pertains to program review and evaluation. Section
    703 (2 U.S.C. 623), in subsections (a) and (b), directs the House and
    Senate Budget Committees to ``study on a continuing basis proposals
    designed to improve and facilitate methods of congressional budgetmaking''
    and to make recommendations from time to time. Section 703 (a) and (b)
    reads as follows:

                       (a) The Committees on the Budget of the House of
       Representatives and the Senate shall study on a continuing basis
                proposals designed to improve and facilitate methods of
          congressional budgetmaking. The proposals to be studied shall
                        include, but are not limited to, proposals for--

     (1) improving the information base required for determining the
    effectiveness of new programs by such means as pilot testing survey
    research, and other experimental and analytical techniques;

     (2) improving analytical and systematic evaluation of the effectiveness of
    existing programs;

     (3) establishing maximum and minimum time limitations for program
    authorization; and

     (4) developing techniques of human resource accounting and other means of
    providing noneconomic as well as economic evaluation measures.

         (b) The Committee on the Budget of each House shall, from time
    to time, report to its House the results of the study carried on by
             it under subsection (a) of this section, together with its
                                                        recommendations.

     The second major statute that has affected the jurisdiction and duties of
    the Senate Budget Committee is the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit
    Control Act of 1985 (Title II of P.L. 99- 177; December 12, 1985; 99 Stat.
    1038-1101), as amended. Provisions of the Act are codified beginning with 2
    U.S.C. 900. The Act required that the Office of Management and Budget
    consult with the Budget Committees regarding various calculations used in
    the sequestration process (Sections 251 and 252), authorized the Budget
    Committees to request a compliance report on sequestration activities from
    the Comptroller General (Section 254(h)), and directed that Budget
    Committee scoring with respect to certain new direct spending programs be
    used in preparation of the sequestration baseline (Section 257(b)(2)).

     In addition, the Budget Committee is required to report resolutions
    suspending certain budget enforcement procedures triggered by a ``low
    economic growth'' report issued by CBO (Section 258(a)), determine the cost
    of amendments to a resolution dealing with a proposal from the President to
    modify the application of a sequester of defense spending (Section 258B),
    and report a resolution initiating a special reconciliation process
    providing an alternative to an anticipated sequestration order (Section
    258C).

     Although these provisions in the 1985 Act have not been repealed,
    generally they are treated as inactive due to the expiration of the deficit
    targets, the discretionary spending limits, and the paygo requirement.

    Senate Rule XXV, Paragraph (e)

     Rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate establishes the jurisdiction
    and duties of the committees of the Senate. The rule, in paragraph 1,
    enumerates the standing committees, which ``shall be appointed at the
    commencement of each Congress, and shall continue and have the power to Act
    until their successors are appointed, with leave to report by bill or
    otherwise on matters within their respective jurisdictions.''

     Section 102 (88 Stat. 300-302) of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
    Control Act of 1974 amended paragraph 1 of Rule XXV, as well as other
    paragraphs of the rule, to establish the Senate Budget Committee, fix its
    membership, specify exceptions from a general requirement that committee
    meetings be open to the public, and for other purposes. Rule XXV has been
    revised over the years, including the redesignation of paragraphs and
    subparagraphs.

    Paragraph 1(e), which pertains to the Budget Committee, presently reads as
    follows:

           1(e)(1) Committee on the Budget, to which committee shall be
       referred all concurrent resolutions on the budget (as defined in
       section 3(a)(4) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974) and all
    other matters required to be referred to that committee under titles
        III and IV of that Act, and messages, petitions, memorials, and
                                         other matters relating thereto.
                                (2) Such committee shall have the duty--

     (A) to report the matters required to be reported by it under titles III
    and IV of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974;

     (B) to make continuing studies of the effect on budget outlays of relevant
    existing and proposed legislation and to report the results of such studies
    to the Senate on a recurring basis;

     (C) to request and evaluate continuing studies of tax expenditures, to
    devise methods of coordinating tax expenditures, policies, and programs
    with direct budget outlays, and to report the results of such studies to
    the Senate on a recurring basis; and

     (D) to review, on a continuing basis, the conduct by the Congressional
    Budget Office of its functions and duties.

     Paragraph 3(a) of the rule fixes the number of Members authorized to serve
    on the Budget Committee. Originally, the membership of the Committee was
    set at 15 members; it currently is set at 22 members.

     Another rule, Senate Rule XXVI, sets forth procedures that the standing
    committees, including the Budget Committee, are required to follow.
    Explicit exemptions from these procedures are provided for the Budget
    Committee in several instances.

    S. Res. 445 (108th Congress)

    On October 7 through October 9, 2004, during the second session of the
    108th Congress, the Senate considered an internal reform measure, S. Res.
    445, that in part responded to recommendations on congressional
    reorganization made by the President's National Commission on Terrorist
    Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the ``9/11 Commission''). On
    October 9, the Senate agreed to the measure, as amended, by a vote of 79 to
    6.

    The primary purpose of the resolution, as stated in Section 100, was:

    to improve the effectiveness of the Senate Select Committee on
    Intelligence, especially with regard to its oversight of the
    Intelligence Community of the United States Government, and to improve
    the Senate's oversight of homeland security.

     In addition to provisions dealing with intelligence oversight reform, the
    measure renamed the Governmental Affairs Committee as the Homeland Security
    and Governmental Affairs Committee and consolidated jurisdiction over
    matters relating to homeland security under the committee.

     While shared jurisdiction is an unusual feature in the Senate committee
    system, the Senate Budget Committee had shared jurisdiction for many years
    with the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee over legislation pertaining
    to the congressional budget process under the terms of a standing order
    adopted by the Senate in 1977 (see discussion below).

     During consideration of S. Res. 445, Senate Budget Committee Chairman Don
    Nickles and Ranking Member Kent Conrad offered a first-degree amendment
    (number 4027), which assigned exclusive jurisdiction over congressional
    budget process legislation to the Senate Budget Committee. The elements of
    the congressional budget process identified in the amendment were patterned
    closely on the standing order of 1977. In addition, the two Senators
    offered a second-degree amendment thereto (number 4041), which provided for
    shared jurisdiction with the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
    Committee over nominations to the positions of Director and Deputy Director
    for Budget within the Office of Management and Budget. The Homeland
    Security and Governmental Affairs Committee's longstanding jurisdiction
    over management and accounting matters was not affected. The Senate adopted
    the second-degree amendment on October 9, by a vote of 50 to 31, and
    adopted the first-degree amendment the same day by a voice vote.

     Section 101(d) and 101(e) of the resolution, which pertain to the Budget
    Committee, read as follows:

        (d) Jurisdiction of Budget Committee.--Notwithstanding paragraph
        (b)(3) of this section, and except as otherwise provided in the
    Congressional Budget Act of 1974, the Committee on the Budget shall
                have exclusive jurisdiction over measures affecting the
                               congressional budget process, which are--

     (1) the functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee;

     (2) the functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional Budget Office;

     (3) the process by which Congress annually establishes the appropriate
    levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or surpluses, and
    public debt--including subdivisions thereof--and including the
    establishment of mandatory ceilings on spending and appropriations, a floor
    on revenues, timetables for congressional action on concurrent resolutions,
    on the reporting of authorization bills, and on the enactment of
    appropriation bills, and enforcement mechanisms for budgetary limits and
    timetables;

     (4) the limiting of backdoor spending devices;

     (5) the timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations and
    authorization requests;

     (6) the definitions of what constitutes impoundment--such as
    ``rescissions'' and ``deferrals'';

     (7) the process and determination by which impoundments must be reported
    to and considered by Congress;

     (8) the mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the provisions of
    the Impoundment Control Act, title X--such as GAO review and lawsuits; and

     (9) the provisions which affect the content or determination of amounts
    included in or excluded from the congressional budget or the calculation of
    such amounts, including the definition of terms provided by the Budget Act.

                 (e) OMB Nominees.--The Committee on the Budget and the
     Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs shall have
    joint jurisdiction over the nominations of persons nominated by the
    President to fill the positions of Director and Deputy Director for
          Budget within the Office of Management and Budget, and if one
    committee votes to order reported such a nomination, the other must
            report within 30 calendar days session, or be automatically
                                                             discharged.

    Standing Order on the Referral of Budget Process Legislation (1977)

    On August 4, 1977, the Senate by unanimous consent established a standing
    order regarding the joint referral of congressional budget process
    legislation to the Budget Committee and the Governmental Affairs
    Committee.\1\ In 2004 (as discussed above), the Senate adopted S. Res. 445,
    which, among other things, consolidated jurisdiction over legislation
    dealing with the congressional budget process under the Budget Committee.
    The adoption of S. Res. 445 effectively superseded the joint referral
    process established in the 1977 standing order.

    \1\ See the Congressional Record of August 4, 1977, vol. 123, p. 26709.

    The 1977 standing order read as follows:

           [L]egislation affecting the congressional budget process, as
      described below, [shall] be referred jointly to the Committees on
       the Budget and on Governmental Affairs. If one committee acts to
        report a jointly-referred measure, the other must act within 30
          calendar days of continuous possession, or be automati[c]ally
                                                             discharged.
               Legislative proposals affecting the congressional budget
                                process to which this order applies are:

     First. The functions, duties, and powers of the Budget Committee--as
    described in title I of the act [the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
    Control Act of 1974];

     Second. The functions, duties, and powers of the Congressional Budget
    Office--as described in title[s] II and IV of the act[;]

     Third. The process by which Congress annually establishes the appropriate
    levels of budget authority, outlays, revenues, deficits or surpluses, and
    public debt--including subdivisions thereof. That process includes the
    establishment [of]:

    mandatory ceilings on spending and appropriations;

    a floor on revenues;

    timetables for congressional action on concurrent resolutions, on the
    reporting of authorization bills, and on the enactment of appropriation
    bills; and

    enforcement mechanisms for the limits and timetables,

                     all as described in titles III and IV of the act[;]

     Fourth. The limiting of backdoor spending device[s]--as described in title
    IV of the act;

     Fifth. The timetables for Presidential submission of appropriations and
    authorization requests--as described in title VI of the act;

     Sixth. The definitions of what constitutes impoundment--such as
    ``rescissions'' and ``deferrals,'' as provided in the Impoundment Control
    Act, title X;

     Seventh. The process and determination by which impoundments must be
    reported to and considered by Congress--as provided in the Impoundment
    Control Act, title X;

     Eighth. The mechanisms to insure Executive compliance with the provisions
    of the Impoundment Control Act, title X--such as GAO review and lawsuits;
    and

     Ninth. The provisions which affect the content or determination of amounts
    included in or excluded from the congressional budget or the calculation of
    such amounts, including the definition of terms provided by the Budget
    Act--as set forth in title I thereof.

    S. Res. 45 (94th Congress)

     On January 30, 1975, the Senate reached a unanimous consent agreement that
    had the effect of adopting S. Res. 45, a measure providing for joint
    referral of impoundment messages from the President under Title X of the
    Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 and legislation
    pertaining to impoundments. In addition to the referral of impoundment
    messages and legislation to the Appropriations Committee or appropriate
    authorizing committee, the Budget Committee was given referral of such
    matters to consider the ``macroeconomic implications, impact on priorities
    and aggregate spending levels, and the legality of the President's use of
    the deferral and rescission mechanism under title X.'' The agreement was
    modified on April 11, 1986, in the wake of the Chadha decision. The current
    text of the agreement reads as follows:

         Resolved, (1) That messages received pursuant to title X of the
           Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act be referred
            concurrently to the Appropriations Committee, to the Budget
          Committee, and to any other appropriate authorizing committee.
          (2) That bills, resolutions, and joint resolutions introduced
     with respect to rescissions and deferrals shall be referred to the
            Appropriations Committee, the Budget Committee, and pending
        implementation of section 410 of the Congressional Budget [and]
    Impoundment Control Act and subject to section 401(d), to any other
          committee exercising jurisdiction over contract and borrowing
    authority programs as defined by section 401(c)(2) (A) and (B). The
    Budget Committee and such other committees shall report their views,
       if any, to the Appropriations Committee within 20 days following
    referral of such messages, bills, resolutions, or joint resolutions.
              The Budget Committee's consideration shall extend only to
         macroeconomic implications, impact on priorities and aggregate
        spending levels, and the legality of the President's use of the
    deferral and rescission mechanism under title X. The Appropriations
                 and authorizing committees shall exercise their normal
                          responsibilities over programs and priorities.
            (3) If any committee to which a bill or resolution has been
    referred recommends its passage, the Appropriations Committee shall
     report that bill or resolution together with its views and reports
        of the Budget and any appropriate authorizing committees to the
                                                         Senate within--

    (A) the time remaining under the Act in the case of rescissions, or

    (B) within 20 days in the case of deferrals.

         (4) The 20 day period referred to herein means twenty calendar
    days; and for the purposes of computing the twenty days, recesses or
       adjournments of the Senate for more than 3 days to a day certain
    shall not be counted; and for recesses and adjournments of more than
    30 calendar days continuous duration or the sine die adjournment of
     a session, the 20 day period shall begin anew on the day following
                                          the reconvening of the Senate.

    Committee Rules of Procedure

     Senate Rule XXVI, Paragraph 2, requires each committee to adopt rules
    (``not inconsistent with the Rules of the Senate'') for its internal
    procedure and to publish them in the Congressional Record by March 1 of the
    first year of each Congress. Further, any amendment to a committee's rules
    may not take effect until the amendment is published in the Congressional
    Record.

     The Budget Committee's rules of procedure for the 109th Congress were
    published in the Congressional Record on February 14, 2005.\2\ The rules
    are divided into seven sections dealing with: (1) meetings; (2) quorums and
    voting; (3) proxies; (4) hearings and hearing procedures; (5) committee
    reports; (6) use of display materials in committee; and (7) confirmation
    standards and procedures.

    \2\ See the remarks of Senator Judd Gregg in the Congressional Record
    (daily ed.), Feb. 14, 2005, p. S1337-S1338.

    Legislation Developed by the Senate Committee on the Budget

    Concurrent Resolutions on the Budget: Fiscal Years 1976-2007

     During the 32-year period from 1975 (for the FY1976 budget cycle) through
    2006 (for the FY2007 budget cycle), the House and Senate adopted a total of
    36 budget resolutions (see table 1).

          TABLE 1.--CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS ON THE BUDGET: FY1976-FY2007
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
              Fiscal                                        U.S. Statutes-at-
    Congress   year        Type \1\      Budget resolution   Large citation
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
       94th     1976  First............  H. Con. Res. 218.  89 Stat. 1197-
                      Second...........  H. Con. Res. 466.   1198
                                                            89 Stat. 1209-
                                                             1210
                1977  First............  S. Con. Res. 109.  90 Stat. 3029-
                      Second...........  S. Con. Res. 139.   3030
                                                            90 Stat. 3044-
                                                             3045
       95th     1977  Third............  S. Con. Res. 10..  91 Stat. 1666-
                                                             1667
                1978  First............  S. Con. Res. 19..  91 Stat. 1670-
                      Second...........  H. Con. Res. 341.   1673
                                                            91 Stat. 1683-
                                                             1684
                1979  First............  S. Con. Res. 80..  92 Stat. 3870-
                      Second...........  H. Con. Res. 683.   3872
                                                            92 Stat. 3878-
                                                             3879
       96th     1980  First............  H. Con. Res. 107.  93 Stat. 1413-
                      Second...........  S. Con. Res. 53..   1416
                                                            93 Stat. 1428-
                                                             1433
                1981  First............  H. Con. Res. 307.  94 Stat. 3655-
                      Second...........  H. Con. Res. 448.   3668
                                                            94 Stat. 3680-
                                                             3688
       97th     1982  First............  H. Con. Res. 115.  95 Stat. 1743-
                      Second...........  S. Con. Res. 50..   1759
                                                            95 Stat. 1778
                1983  .................  S. Con. Res. 92..  96 Stat. 2647-
                                                             2661
       98th     1984  .................  H. Con. Res. 91..  97 Stat. 1501-
                                                             1523
                1985  .................  H. Con. Res. 280.  98 Stat. 3484-
                                                             3498
       99th     1986  .................  S. Con. Res. 32..  99 Stat. 1941-
                                                             1959
                1987  .................  S. Con. Res. 120.  100 Stat. 4354-
                                                             4370
      100th     1988  .................  H. Con. Res. 93..  101 Stat. 1986-
                                                             2003
                1989  .................  H. Con. Res. 268.  102 Stat. 4875-
                                                             4886
      101st     1990  .................  H. Con. Res. 106.  103 Stat. 2540-
                                                             2554
                1991  .................  H. Con. Res. 310.  104 Stat. 5163-
                                                             5181
      102nd     1992  .................  H. Con. Res. 121.  105 Stat. 2414-
                                                             2433
                1993  .................  H. Con. Res. 287.  106 Stat. 5165-
                                                             5189
      103rd     1994  .................  H. Con. Res. 64..  107 Stat. 2508-
                                                             2538
                1995  .................  H. Con. Res. 218.  108 Stat. 5075-
                                                             5103
      104th     1996  .................  H. Con. Res. 67..  109 Stat. 996-
                                                             1030
                1997  .................  H. Con. Res. 178.  110 Stat. 4434-
                                                             4482
      105th     1998  .................  H. Con. Res. 84..  111 Stat. 2710-
                                                             2760
                1999       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                     resolution for this year]
      106th     2000  .................  H. Con. Res. 68..  113 Stat. 1968-
                                                             1999
                2001  .................  H. Con. Res. 290.  114 Stat. 3139-
                                                             3173
      107th     2002  .................  H. Con. Res. 83..  115 Stat. 2486-
                                                             2516
                2003       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                     resolution for this year]
      108th     2004  .................  H. Con. Res. 95..  117 Stat. 2910-
                                                             2942
                2005       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                     resolution for this year]
      109th     2006  .................  H. Con. Res. 95..  [not yet
                                                             available]
                2007       [Congress did not complete action on a budget
                                     resolution for this year]
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Type'' refers to whether the budget resolution was the first,
      second, or third for the fiscal year. For the first 7 years of the
      congressional budget process, the House and Senate adopted at least
      two budget resolutions each year. Beginning with the FY1983 budget
      resolution, the House and Senate have not adopted more than one budget
      resolution a year.
    Note: Although budget resolutions, as concurrent resolutions, do not
      become law, they are compiled in a special section of the U.S.
      Statutes-at-Large.
    Source: Congressional Research Service, CRS Report RL30297,
      Congressional Budget Resolutions: Selected Statistics and Information
      Guide, by Bill Heniff, Jr. and Justin Murray, Appendix B, pp. 20-21.

     The 1974 Act originally required that the Senate and House adopt two
    budget resolutions each year--an advisory budget resolution in the spring
    (by May 15) and a binding budget resolution in the fall (by September 15).
    Congress adopted the second required budget resolution from FY1976 through
    FY1982. For the following several years, through FY1986, Congress did not
    adopt a second budget resolution, instead relying on a feature in the first
    budget resolution that automatically deemed it to be the second budget
    resolution on October 1 if a second budget resolution had not been adopted
    by that date. In 1985, Congress amended the 1974 Act to require only a
    single budget resolution each year, in the spring, and advanced its due
    date by 1 month, to April 15 (first effective for FY1987). Section 304 (2
    U.S.C. 635) of the Act allows Congress to adopt a revised budget resolution
    at any time. Congress adopted a third budget resolution for FY1977.

     Of the 36 budget resolutions adopted during this period, 7 were first
    budget resolutions, 7 were second budget resolutions, 1 was a third budget
    resolution, and 21 were single budget resolutions.

     The House and Senate were not able to reach final agreement on a budget
    resolution in four instances, for FY1999, FY2003, FY2005, and FY2007.

    Budget Reconciliation Acts

     As an optional procedure, reconciliation has not been used in every year
    that the congressional budget process has been in effect. Beginning with
    the first use of reconciliation by both the House and Senate in 1980,
    however, reconciliation has been used in most years (see table 2).\3\
    Congress has sent the President 21 reconciliation acts over the years; 18
    were signed into law and 3 were vetoed (and the vetoes not overridden).

    \3\ On December 15, 1975, the Senate considered, amended, and passed H.R.
    5559, the Revenue Adjustment Act of 1975, which reduced revenues by about
    $6.4 billion pursuant to a directive in the second budget resolution for
    FY1976. The measure was not regarded as a reconciliation bill when it was
    considered by the House, but it was considered under reconciliation
    procedures in the Senate. President Gerald Ford vetoed the measure later in
    the year and the House sustained his veto. See the remarks of Senator
    Russell Long and the Presiding Officer, on page 40540, and the remarks of
    Senator Edmund Muskie and others, on pages 40544-40550, in the
    Congressional Record, vol. 121, Dec. 15, 1975, regarding the status of H.R.
    5559 as a reconciliation bill.

    Thirteen of the 21 acts were omnibus reconciliation measures reported by
    the Budget Committee (in which submissions from the instructed committees
    were incorporated by the Budget Committee without any substantive revision,
    as required by the 1974 Act) and 7 were revenue reconciliation measures
    reported by the Finance Committee. In the one remaining instance, involving
    the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, the final
    legislation merged together separate reconciliation measures reported by
    the Budget and Finance Committees.

     TABLE 2.--BUDGET RESOLUTIONS AND ASSOCIATED BUDGET RECONCILIATION ACTS:
                                  FY1981-FY2006
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                         Budget
    Fiscal    Budget resolution      reconciliation       Date enacted (or
     year                                act(s)                vetoed)
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
      1981  H. Con. Res. 307....  Omnibus               December 5, 1980
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1980 (P.L. 96-
                                   499).
      1982  H. Con. Res. 115....  Omnibus Budget        August 13, 1981
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1981 (P.L. 97-
                                   35).
      1983  S. Con. Res. 92.....  Tax Equity and        September 3, 1982
                                   Fiscal
                                   Responsibility Act
                                   of 1982 (P.L. 97-
                                   248).
                                  Omnibus Budget        September 8, 1982
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1982 (P.L. 97-
                                   253).
      1984  H. Con. Res. 91.....  Omnibus Budget        April 18, 1984
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1983 (P.L. 98-
                                   270).
      1986  S. Con. Res. 32.....  Consolidated Omnibus  April 7, 1986
                                   Budget
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1985 (P.L. 99-
                                   272).
      1987  S. Con. Res. 120....  Omnibus Budget        October 21, 1986
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1986 (P.L. 99-
                                   509).
      1988  S. Con. Res. 93.....  Omnibus Budget        December 22, 1987
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1987 (P.L. 100-
                                   203).
      1990  H. Con. Res. 106....  Omnibus Budget        December 19, 1989
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1989 (P.L. 101-
                                   239).
      1991  H. Con. Res. 310....  Omnibus Budget        November 5, 1990
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1990 (P.L. 101-
                                   508).
      1994  H. Con. Res. 64.....  Omnibus Budget        August 10, 1993
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1993 (P.L. 103-
                                   66).
      1996  H. Con. Res. 67.....  Balanced Budget Act   December 6, 1995
                                   of 1995 (H.R. 2491).  (vetoed)
      1997  H. Con. Res. 178....  Personal              August 22, 1996
                                   Responsibility and
                                   Work Opportunity
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 1996 (P.L. 104-
                                   193).
      1998  H. Con. Res. 84.....  Balanced Budget Act   August 5, 1997
                                   of 1997 (P.L. 105-
                                   33).
                                  Taxpayer Relief Act   August 5, 1997
                                   of 1997 (P.L. 105-
                                   34).
      2000  H. Con. Res. 68.....  Taxpayer Refund and   September 23, 1999
                                   Relief Act of 1999    (vetoed)
                                   (H.R. 2488).
      2001  H. Con. Res. 290....  Marriage Tax Relief   August 5, 2000
                                   Reconciliation Act    (vetoed)
                                   of 2000 (H.R. 4810).
      2002  H. Con. Res. 83.....  Economic Growth and   June 7, 2001
                                   Tax Relief
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 2001 (P.L. 107-
                                   16).
      2004  H. Con. Res. 95.....  Jobs and Growth Tax   May 28, 2003
                                   Relief
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 2003 (P.L. 108-
                                   27).
      2006  H. Con. Res. 95.....  Deficit Reduction     February 8, 2006
                                   Act of 2005 (P.L.
                                   109-171).
                                  Tax Increase          May 17, 2006
                                   Prevention and
                                   Reconciliation Act
                                   of 2005 (P.L. 109-
                                   222).
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Source: Congressional Research Service: (1) CRS Report RL33030, The
      Budget Reconciliation Process: House and Senate Procedures, by Robert
      Keith and Bill Heniff, Jr., Table 1, p. 4-5; and (2) CRS Report
      RL33132, Budget Reconciliation Legislation in 2005-2006 Under the
      FY2006 Budget Resolution, by Robert Keith, p. 2.

    Other Significant Legislation Enacted Into Law

    The Budget Committee has been involved in the development of significant
    measures other than budget resolutions and reconciliation measures. For the
    most part, these measures have pertained to changes in the Federal budget
    process. Major examples of such legislation that was enacted into law are
    listed and described below. In cases where important budget process changes
    were made as a separate act within omnibus reconciliation legislation or
    legislation raising the statutory limit on the public debt, the separate
    act is included in the list.

    Some of the measures listed below were not referred to or reported by the
    Budget Committee, and some originated as floor amendments. The Budget
    Committee, nonetheless, was centrally involved in formulating the
    legislation. The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
    for example, was carried in a measure increasing the statutory limit on the
    public debt (such legislation is under the jurisdiction of the House Ways
    and Means Committee and Senate Finance Committee). It originated on October
    9, 1985, as a floor amendment offered by Committee Chairman Pete Domenici
    and Ranking Member Lawton Chiles (modified Domenici-Chiles amendment number
    771).

    Some of the measures developed by the Budget Committee were considered by
    the Senate but did not become law. While most of these measures dealt with
    budget process reform, others involved specialized aspects of Federal
    budgeting. Certain budget enforcement procedures, for example, may be
    suspended pursuant to Section 258 of the 1985 Act during periods when low
    economic growth occurs, as determined by a ``low growth report'' issued by
    the CBO Director. Whenever the CBO Director issues such a report, the
    Senate Budget Committee must report a suspension resolution, in the form of
    a Senate joint resolution, that is considered under expedited procedures
    (the House does not have comparable procedures). In three instances in 1991
    and two in 2002, the Budget Committee reported the required suspension
    resolution unfavorably and the Senate rejected it in each instance.

    Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985

    Title II of P.L. 99-177 (Increasing the Statutory Limit on the Public
    Debt); December 12, 1985; 99 Stat. 1038-1101.

     The Act established deficit targets intended to lead to a balanced budget
    by FY1991; created a sequestration process to enforce the targets,
    triggered by a report issued by the Comptroller General, involving
    automatic, largely across-the-board spending cuts; and made many changes in
    the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, mainly ratifying recent changes in
    practice (such as requiring only a single budget resolution each year). The
    1985 Act is also known as the ``Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act'' after its three
    primary sponsors in the Senate--Senators Phil Gramm, Warren Rudman, and
    Ernest Hollings (all of whom served on the Budget Committee at different
    times).

    Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987

    Title I of P.L. 100-119 (Increasing the Statutory Limit on the Public
    Debt); September 29, 1987; 101 Stat. 754-784.

    The Act revised and extended the deficit targets set in 1985, requiring a
    balanced budget by FY1993. In addition, in response to court action
    invalidating the role of the Comptroller General in triggering
    sequestration, the Act placed that authority in the OMB Director, and made
    changes in the congressional budget process under the 1974 Act.

    Budget Enforcement Act of 1990

    Title XIII of P.L. 101-508 (Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990);
    November 5, 1990; 104 Stat. 1388-573 through 630.

     In the wake of dissatisfaction with experiences under the deficit targets
    set in 1985 and revised in 1987, the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) of 1990
    effectively replaced them with discretionary spending limits and a ``pay-
    as-you-go'' (paygo) requirement through FY1995. Sequestration was retained
    as the means of enforcing the new mechanisms; both temporary and permanent
    changes were made in the congressional budget process under the 1974 Act,
    including making the Byrd rule on extraneous matter in reconciliation
    measures part of the Act (Section 313); and special procedures were
    established to protect the long-term balances in the Social Security trust
    funds.

    Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990

    Section 13201 (104 Stat. 1388-609 through 615) of the Budget Enforcement
    Act of 1990.

     The Federal Credit Reform Act of 1990 provided for the more accurate
    measurement of the costs of direct loans and loan guarantees, placed the
    costs of credit programs on a budgetary basis equivalent to other spending
    programs, and improved the methods of allocating resources among credit
    programs and between credit programs and other spending programs. This was
    achieved in part by defining the cost of credit programs to be the long-
    term cost to the government on a net present value basis, excluding
    administrative costs and certain incidental effects. The Act was
    incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as a new Title V.

    Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993

    P.L. 103-66; August 10, 1993; 107 Stat. 683-685 (Title XIV).

     Title XIV (Budget Process Provisions) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
    Act of 1993 extended the discretionary spending limits and paygo
    requirement, first established by the BEA of 1990, for legislation enacted
    through the end of FY1998. The House and Senate initially considered more
    extensive budget process changes in this legislation, but ultimately
    decided to confine it to this more narrow purpose.

    Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995

    P.L. 104-4; March 22, 1995; 109 Stat. 48-71.

     The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) of 1995 established procedures
    designed to curb the imposition of unfunded Federal mandates on State,
    local, and tribal governments and private sector entities; required Federal
    agencies to foster greater participation by such governments and entities
    in the development of regulations; and directed the Advisory Commission on
    Intergovernmental Relations to study and make recommendations on issues
    pertaining to unfunded mandates. The Congressional Budget Office is
    required to prepare cost estimates with respect to mandates exceeding a
    threshold (that is adjusted periodically) and an intergovernmental point of
    order may be raised against legislation imposing unfunded mandates that
    exceed the threshold. UMRA was incorporated into the Congressional Budget
    Act of 1974 as Part B (Federal Mandates) of Title IV (Sections 421-428),
    and was amended in 1999 by the State Flexibility Clarification Act (P.L.
    106-141; December 7, 1999; 113 Stat. 1699-1700).

    Line Item Veto Act

    P.L. 104-130; April 9, 1996; 110 Stat. 1200-1212.

     The Line Item Veto Act augmented the rescission authority of the President
    in the Impoundment Control Act of 1974 by authorizing him to put line-item
    cancellations into effect upon the enactment of a law and providing that
    they could be overturned only if Congress enacted a law disapproving them
    within 30 days. Further, the authority was extended to items of direct
    spending (i.e., for entitlement programs) and certain limited tax benefits,
    as well as discretionary spending provided in annual appropriations acts.
    The Line Item Veto Act was incorporated into the Impoundment Control Act of
    1974 as Part C (Line Item Veto), Title X (Sections 1021-1027). On June 25,
    1998, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Clinton v. City of New York, held that the
    Act was unconstitutional as a violation of the Presentment Clause of the
    Constitution (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2).

    Budget Enforcement Act of 1997

    Title X of P.L. 105-33 (Balanced Budget Act of 1997); August 5, 1997; 111
    Stat. 677-712.

     The BEA of 1997 extended the discretionary spending limits and paygo
    requirement, first established under the BEA of 1990, for legislation
    enacted through the end of FY2002. In addition, it made permanent several
    changes in the 1974 Act that had been made on a temporary basis in the BEA
    of 1990, including the requirement that budget resolutions cover at least
    5, rather than 3, fiscal years; and made many other, mostly minor, changes
    in the sequestration and congressional budget processes.
    Glossary of Budget Terms

        Allocation.--For congressional budget purposes, an allocation is
      the distribution of budget authority and outlays to relevant
      committees (and subcommittees) based on the levels contained in
      the Congressional Budget Resolution.
        Appropriation Act.--A statute, under the jurisdiction of the
      House and Senate Appropriations Committees, that generally
      provides authority for Federal agencies to incur obligations and
      to make payments out of the Treasury for specified purposes.
      Examples of appropriation acts are regular, supplemental, and
      continuing.
        Authorizing Committee.--A committee of the House or Senate,
      other than the Appropriations Committee, which has legislative
      jurisdiction over the operations of Federal programs and provides
      the authorizing legislation that is usually a prerequisite for
      making appropriations for those programs. Authorizing committees
      also have jurisdiction over the administration and collection of
      revenues and spending for mandatory programs since the
      government's obligation to make payments for such programs is
      contained in the authorizing legislation.
        Authorizing Legislation.--Substantive legislation proposed by a
      committee of jurisdiction other than the Appropriations Committees
      that establishes or continues the operation of a Federal program
      or agency for a specific period of time or indefinitely.
      Authorizing legislation may provide new budget authority or
      authorize the future appropriation of either a fixed amount or
      such sums as are necessary for a program.
        Baseline.--A benchmark for measuring the budgetary effects of
      proposed changes in revenues or spending. The baseline is a
      projection of spending, revenues, and deficits into the budget
      year and out-years based on current laws and policies.
        Budget Authority.--The legal authority to enter into obligations
      which will result in immediate or future outlays, including
      appropriations, borrowing authority, contracting authority, and
      the authority to spend offsetting receipts and collections.
        Budget Deficit.--For unified deficit, the amount by which the
      government's total outlays exceed its total revenues for a given
      fiscal year. For on-budget deficit, the amount by which the
      government's on-budget (which excludes the two Social Security
      trust funds and the transactions of the U.S. Postal Service)
      outlays exceeds its on-budget revenues.
        Budget Resolution.--A concurrent resolution adopted by both
      Houses of Congress as part of the annual budget and appropriations
      process, setting forth an overall budget plan for Congress against
      which individual appropriation bills, other spending bills, and
      revenue measures are to be evaluated. As a plan of Congress, the
      resolution is not presented to the President for signature and
      does not have the force of law. The concurrent resolution must
      contain budget levels for at least 5 fiscal years and may contain
      reconciliation instructions to specified committees.
        Budget Surplus.--For the unified budget, the amount by which the
      government's total revenues exceed its total outlays for a given
      fiscal year. For on-budget, the amount by which the government's
      on-budget (which excludes the two Social Security trust funds and
      the transactions of the U.S. Postal Service) revenues exceeds its
      on-budget outlays.
        Continuing Resolution.--An appropriation act that provides
      spending authority for Federal agencies and programs to continue
      in operation when action on the regular appropriation acts has not
      been completed by the beginning of the fiscal year.
        Cost Estimates.--Estimates of the impact legislation under
      consideration by Congress would have on the Federal budget if the
      legislation became law. Costs estimates are provided to Congress
      by the Congressional Budget Office.
        Credit Reform.--The method of controlling and accounting for
      credit programs (loans and loan guarantees) in the Federal budget.
      Unlike the rest of the budget, loans and loan guarantees are
      accounted for on an accrual basis.
        Direct Spending.--Also known as mandatory spending. As defined
      in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
      entitlement authority, the Food Stamp Program, and budget
      authority provided by law other than in appropriation acts.
        Discretionary Spending.--A category of spending (budget
      authority and outlays) provided in and controlled by annual
      appropriation acts. (See also Appropriation Acts.)
        Entitlement.--A legal obligation of the Federal Government to
      make payments to a person(s) or entity that meets the eligibility
      criteria set in law and for which the budget authority is not
      provided in advance in an appropriation act. Spending for
      entitlement programs is controlled through the eligibility
      criteria and benefit or payment rules. Examples of entitlements
      are Social Security and Medicare.
        Emergency Spending.--Budget authority, designated by Congress as
      emergency spending, is exempt (along with the outlays that flow
      from it) from spending limits set forth in a concurrent resolution
      on the budget.
        Federal Debt, Gross.--The total amount borrowed by the
      government from the public or from government accounts.

    Debt subject to limit.--A subset of gross Federal debt, debt subject to
    limit is Federal debt that is subject to a statutory limit on its issuance.
    The limit applies to Federal debt, excluding a small portion of the debt
    issued by the Department of the Treasury and all of the small amount of
    debt issued by other Federal agencies (primarily the Tennessee Valley
    Authority and the Postal Service). It has two components.--debt held by the
    government and debt held by the public.

    Debt held by the government.--Represents the holdings of debt by Federal
    trust funds and other special government funds.

    Debt held by the public.--Represents the holdings of debt by individuals,
    institutions, other buyers outside the Federal Government and the Federal
    Reserve System. The change in debt held by the public in any given year
    closely tracks the unified budget deficit for that year.

        Fiscal Policy.--Federal Government policies with respect to
      taxes and spending that affect the amount of government debt as
      well as the level, composition, and distribution of national
      output and income.
        Fiscal Year.--A fiscal year is a 12-month accounting period. The
      fiscal year for the Federal Government begins October 1 and ends
      September 30. The fiscal year is designated by the calendar year
      in which it ends; for example, fiscal year 2007 is the year
      beginning October 1, 2006 and ending September 30, 2007.
        Functional Classification.--A system of classifying budget
      resources by major purpose so that budget authority and outlays
      can be related in terms of the national needs being addressed (for
      example, national defense, health) regardless of the agency
      administering the program. There are currently 20 functions. A
      function may be divided into two or more subfunctions depending
      upon the complexity of the national need addressed by that
      function.
        Impoundment.--A generic term referring to any action or inaction
      by an officer or employee of the U.S. Government that defers or
      precludes the obligation or expenditure of budget authority.
        Mandatory Spending.--Also known as direct spending. As defined
      in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985,
      entitlement authority, the Food Stamp Program, and budget
      authority provided by law other than in appropriation acts.
        Markup.--Meetings where congressional committees work on
      language of bills or resolutions. At Budget Committee markups, the
      House and Senate Budget Committees work on the language and
      numbers contained in budget resolutions and legislation affecting
      the congressional budget process.
        Obligation.--A legally binding commitment by the Federal
      Government that will result in outlays, immediately or in the
      future.
        Off-Budget.--Those budgetary accounts designated by law as
      excluded from the unified budget totals. As of 2007, the revenues
      and outlays of the two Social Security trust funds (the Old-Age
      and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance
      Trust Fund) and the transactions of the Postal Service are the
      only off-budget accounts. Budget documents routinely report the
      on-budget and off-budget amounts separately and then add them
      together to arrive at the consolidated or unified government
      totals.
        On-Budget.--All budgetary accounts other than those designated
      by law as off-budget. (See also Off-Budget)
        Outlays.--Outlays are disbursements by the Treasury in the form
      of checks, cash, or electronic funds transfers to liquidate a
      Federal obligation. Outlays flow in part from budget authority
      granted in prior years (outlays prior) and in part from budget
      authority provided for the year in which the disbursements occur
      (outlays new).
        Pay-As-You-Go (paygo).--A budgetary enforcement mechanism
      originally set forth in the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), which
      expired at the end of fiscal year 2002. Under this mechanism,
      proposed changes in, or new permanent, law affecting direct
      spending and revenues were expected to be deficit neutral.
      Statutory paygo was enforced through sequestration (across-the-
      board cuts in certain direct spending programs). In addition to
      statutory paygo, the Senate, in the concurrent resolution on the
      budget, has also established various internal paygo rules,
      enforced by a 60-vote point of order which is still in effect.
        President's Budget.--The document sent to Congress by the
      President typically on the first Monday in February of each year,
      requesting new budget authority for Federal programs and
      estimating Federal revenues and outlays for the upcoming fiscal
      year.
        Revenues.--Collections from the public arising from the
      government's sovereign power to tax. Revenues include individual
      and corporate income taxes, social insurance taxes (such as Social
      Security payroll taxes), excise taxes, estate and gift taxes,
      customs duties and the like.
        Reconciliation Process.--A special, fast-track process by which
      Congress, in its budget resolution, includes reconciliation
      instructions to specific committees, directing them to report
      legislation by a certain date that changes spending and/or
      revenues. Reconciliation legislation may also contain a change in
      the debt limit. Reconciliation is governed by special rules that
      limit debate and the ability of Senators to offer amendments.
        Rescission.--Legislation enacted by Congress that cancels the
      availability of previously enacted budget authority before the
      authority expires.
        Reserve Fund.--A provision in a budget resolution that grants
      the chairman of the Budget Committee the authority to make changes
      in budget aggregates and committee allocations once some condition
      or conditions have been met.
        Scoring or Scorekeeping.--The process for estimating budget
      authority, outlay, revenue and deficit levels that result from
      legislative actions. The Committees on the Budget of the House and
      Senate determine all estimates for congressional purposes. The
      committees are assisted in the process by the Congressional Budget
      Office (CBO) and, for legislation dealing with the Internal
      Revenue Code, by the Joint Committee on Taxation, which provides
      revenue estimates of such legislation through CBO. Scorekeeping
      data prepared by the CBO include status reports on the effect of
      congressional actions and comparisons of these actions to targets
      and ceilings set by Congress. These reports are submitted by the
      Budget Committees for printing in the Congressional Record on a
      regular basis.
        Sequester or Sequestration.--Under Budget Enforcement Act (BEA)
      provisions, which expired in 2002, the cancellation of budgetary
      resources provided by discretionary appropriations or direct
      spending laws. New budget authority, unobligated balances, direct
      spending authority, and obligation limitations were
      ``sequestrable'' resources; that is, they were subject to
      reduction or cancellation under a Presidential sequester order.
        Supplemental Appropriation.--An act appropriating funds in
      addition to those in the regular annual appropriations acts.
      Supplemental appropriations are often designated as emergency
      requirements and are for unexpected and non-recurring purposes.
        Unfunded Mandates.--In general, Federal statutes and regulations
      that require State, local, or tribal governments or the private
      sector to expend resources to achieve legislative goals without
      being provided Federal funding to cover the costs.
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