[House Document 109-91]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 109-
91
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING
__________
COMMUNICATION
From
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4
February 28, 2006.--Referred to the Committee on International
Relations and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, February 22, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the authorities relating
to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in
illicit drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-
4), and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am
providing a report prepared by my Administration. This report
addresses the matter of assistance for interdiction of aircraft
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush.
United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in
Illicit Drug Trafficking
Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4 in
calendar year 2005. The President signed Presidential
Determination 2005-32 on August 17, 2005, for Colombia and
Presidential Determination 2006-02 on October 16, 2005, for
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified that (1)
interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia's and Brazil's
airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed
by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of
Colombia and Brazil; and (2) Colombia and Brazil have
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force
is directed against the aircraft.
COLOMBIA
(A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program
in Colombia began operations. In making a third certification
for Colombia in August 2005, the President determined that
narcotrafficking continued to pose an extraordinary threat to
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors,
including: Colombia is still the world's largest producer of
cocaine and a supplier of high quality heroin; Colombia faces a
growing cocaine abuse problem; Colombian drug trafficking
officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed
groups to protect their organizations; illegal revenue from the
Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy; and
narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the democratic
institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly,
drug trafficking also serves as the primary source of funding
for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and an
important source of funding for the Colombian United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army
(ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations by the Department of State.
As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of
Colombia (GOC) observed over 250 unidentified flights in its
airspace in CY 2005. Although this number is approximately half
the number of flights observed in CY 2005, the concerns raised
in the President's determination for Colombia in previous
reports are still valid and applicable.
(B) United States Government safety oversight of Colombia's
ABD program includes approved procedures, as outlined in a
Bilateral Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety
checklist; and three primary United States Government safety
monitors: a ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor
(ASM), and a Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) ABD
watch officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD
safety triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be
involved in all events in which Phase I, II, and III actions
(as described below) are taken against an unidentified, assumed
suspect (UAS) flight in the air. The basic procedures for
intercepting a UAS flight are as follows:
Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the GOC
detects or is informed of an aircraft operating in a
defined zone of control that is a candidate for
possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''),
information on that aircraft shall be gathered by the
GOC from all reasonably available sources, including
radar systems, radio and visual contact with the
aircraft, electronic systems (which help determine
whether the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan
and what type of plane it is), and relevant air traffic
control centers, to begin to determine whether the
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. That determination
shall be made by the Battle Command Officer (BCO) in
the Colombian Air Force's Command and Control Center,
based upon certain factors set our elsewhere in the
Agreement, in conjunction with other information
provided to GOC and United States Government
participants in the ongoing action.
Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has preliminary
reasons to believe that an aircraft is primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that aircraft
shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is
intermittent, positive re-identification shall be made
with reasonable certainty before the ABD event may
continue. If the GOC has been unable to identify the
track of interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft
shall be considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force
(CAF) under CAF procedures and may be intercepted.
Phase I--Interception. The interception phase (Phase
I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted
aircraft by radio and, if necessary, by visual signals
in order to determine the identity of the pilot or
intercepted aircraft. If, during this Phase, the GOC
determines that the aircraft is reasonably suspected to
be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking (on
the basis of several considered factors), the CAF may
order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated
place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being
intercepted, the aircraft does not comply with the
procedures and instructions given by the CAF, the pilot
may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists of
the firing of warning shots, using ammunition
containing tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to
the pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he must
comply with the interceptor's order. If all of the
procedures required under the Agreement have been
followed, if the information gathered continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and if the
aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's order to
land, the GOC may, in accordance with the following,
move to Phase III.
Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft
in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge
or follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian
interceptor aircraft may only fire weapons at the
intercepted aircraft if he requests and receives
permission to do so (Phase III). The Commander of the
Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such
requests. The COCAF may approve such request after
verifying that all procedures required under the
Agreement have been followed. Upon receipt of the
authorization, the interceptor aircraft shall warn the
intercepted aircraft, using ICAO radio communications
procedures and the appropriate frequencies, that it
will be fired upon if it refuses to comply.
The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to
follow the interceptor's directions. It is acknowledged that
even the minimum level of force could result in loss of life.
If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate
notice to the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center of
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
The Agreement requires similar identification and warning
procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been
located on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains
additional strictures on the use of force, including a
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial
aircraft, aircraft that have been filed and are not
significantly deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose
pilots appear to be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots
genuinely appear to be under duress.
The United States Government initially trained the GOC's
pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft
involved in the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as
well as training of new Colombian personnel are ongoing as the
program matures. Semiannual reviews of the program address any
issues that arise in the program's implementation. Further, the
United States Government receives weekly and monthly reports on
program events.
(C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program
in Colombia consists of the following:
The United States Government provides a number of positions
to Colombia's ABD program. These positions include a DOD JIATF-
S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground Safety
Monitor in the Colombia Air Force Command and Control Center
(CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft;
and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board U.S. tracking and
detection/monitoring aircraft. Both Monitors and the Host
Nation Rider Assistant are fluent in Spanish.
JIATF-S, as Tactical Commander, exercises command and
control of U.S. ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint Operations
Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer is the Tactical
Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The Ground Safety
Monitor is the U.S. representative at the CAFCCC during ABD
operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative
on GOC tracking aircraft and is available to observe decisions
made by GOC personnel, communicate with the U.S. Ground Safety
Monitor and the JIATF-S Command Duty Officer, and report to
themwhether the agreed-upon procedures are being followed. The
Host Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. representative who assists the
Host Nation Rider. The Counter Drug Operation and Coordination Center,
which is located in the CAFCCC, assists in coordination, information
exchange, and analysis between JIATF-S and CAFCCC. An employee of the
Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted
exclusively to overseeing implementation of this program.
The United States Government has provided five Citation
aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD
program and provides ongoing radar information and
intelligence. Additional United States Government assets (both
aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security can provide support for this program under
the conditions contained in the Agreement. Further, the GOC has
agreed that the five United States Government-supported ground-
based radars and the Peace Panorama System (which is the
airspace management system linking ground-based radars in
Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute United States
Government support for ABD.
(D) From January 1, 2005, until December 31, 2005, the GOC,
with the assistance of the United States Government as
described in section (C), identified over 250 Unidentified
Assumed Suspect (UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over
27 of these flights were determined to be legal flights. The
GOC was in a position to act upon approximately 200 of the
remaining flights. The GOC forced four suspect drug trafficking
aircraft to land, destroyed two of those aircraft on the
ground, impounded five aircraft in Colombia, arrested six
persons, and seized 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in connection
with illegal aerial drug trafficking. Another three aircraft
with 2.1 metric tons of cocaine were impounded in Guatemala as
a result of Colombian coordination with JIATF-S and Honduran
authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace heading
toward Mexico. The United States Government is unaware of any
deaths or injuries resulting from these actions.
BRAZIL
(A) Brazil's ABD program began operations on October 17,
2004. In making a second certification for Brazil pursuant to
22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined that
narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of
this threat, as demonstrated by radar surveillance confirming
that narcotraffickers are making widespread use of aerial
routes to bring cocaine and other narcotics into Brazil. The
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the
last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons of
cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it
remaining in-country. In addition, there are suspected ties
between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms
trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled
widespread urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal gangs fight to control a
share of the lucrative enterprise.
(B) The Government of Brazil (GOB) possesses an
infrastructure that is capable of independently implementing
its aerial interdiction program. The goal of Brazil's
interdiction program is to facilitate the safe landing of
intercepted aircraft so that law enforcement personnel may take
control of the aircraft on the ground. As a last resort,
however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may authorize the
use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if it refuses to
respond to the full range of program actions taken by the
Brazilian Air Force. The GOB has established a multi-stage
procedure to identify, intercept, warn, and, if necessary, take
action against an aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The basic procedures are
as follows:
Identification. When the GOB detects an aircraft that
displays irregular air traffic traits, it will consider
that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' and a candidate
for possible aerial interception. The GOB will proceed
to gather information on that aircraft to determine
whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the
GOB is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate,
the aircraft will be considered ``suspect'' by the
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
Interception. During interception, the GOB will
attempt to determine with greater certainty the
identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures
to identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or
electronic observation of the nationality markings,
registration number, license number, or identifying
features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will
further attempt to gather information regarding the
intercepted aircraft that may help determine whether
the intercepted aircraft isreasonably suspected to be
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The tracker or
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications with the
intercepted aircraft through radio communications or visual signals and
order the intercepted aircraft to change its routing or to land if
factors continue to support a determination that the aircraft is
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the firing of
warning shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the
interceptor's order if the gathered information
continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect and
the aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's
order to land. Warning shots may only be ordered and
authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior Authority or
the Air Operations Commander after verification that
all requisite procedures have been satisfied. The
intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from
a position that will permit the intercepted aircraft to
see the intercepting aircraft, but that will avoid
damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted
aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor
aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be
escorted to land at a designated airfield where law
enforcement authorities will subject it to ground
control measures.
Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air.
If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the
interceptor's directions, the aircraft will be
designated as ``hostile'' and will, after appropriate
authorization from Brazilian authorities, be subject to
being shot down. The Brazilian Air Force Commander-in-
Chief may only authorize the use of lethal force after
verifying that all requisite procedures have been
followed. The first burst of fire used against the
intercepted aircraft will be as brief as possible and
preferably without using ammunition capable of causing
a tank explosion. After the first burst of fire, the
pilot of the intercepting aircraft will relay
information regarding the effect of the fire to the Air
Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the
intercepted aircraft again, if possible, before
requesting authorization to fire again. Once an
intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian federal
police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for
law enforcement purposes.
(C) Brazil's interdiction program differs from Colombia's
in that Brazil independently administers its program. The GOB
is solely responsible for all actions relating to each aerial
interdiciton event, but has agreed to share pertinent
operational information about such events after the fact with
the United States in a timely and transparent manner. Although
the GOB neither requires nor has requested a direct U.S. role
in support of its program, various agencies of the United
States Government currently provide assistance to Brazil that
could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction program, such
as cooperative law enforcement programs, intelligence-sharing,
and approvals of military sales. Additionally, U.S. companies
such as Raytheon are positioned to provide relevant assistance
in the future.
(D) Brazilian authorities publicly claim that the combined
resources of the System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM)
monitoring system and the Air Force have virtually eliminated
trafficker flights through national airspace. They explain that
the continued flow of drugs and weapons through Brazil is due
to smugglers responding to the aerial interdiction deterrent by
converting to overland routes. While Brazil's ABD program
appears to have caused some traffickers to change their routes
and methods of transshipment, airborne drug trafficking remains
a viable threat.
U.S. interaction with Brazil on aerial interdicition issues
has focused primarily on the role of the Brazilian Air Force.
The United States Government is unaware of any incidents in
which the Air Force used lethal force against aircraft under
Brazil's interdiction program or any deaths or injuries
resulted from action related to this program. However, in April
2005, the Brazilian police fired on a civil aircraft, suspected
of narcotrafficking, as it attempted to take off, resulting in
the death of the pilot. The GOB reported that the police were
acting in self-defense. In response to United States government
questions regarding the incident, the GOB further indicated
that the police: (1) are permitted to use force against civil
aircraft only in self-defense; (2) have been informed of their
role in pursuit of aircraft suspected of narcotrafficking and
of procedures to be adopted to minimize loss of innocent life;
and (3) are aware of the prohibition of the destruction of
civil aircraft in service, established in the Convention on
Suppression of Illegal Acts Against the Security of Civil
Aviation, signed in Montreal on September 23, 1971.
The GOB has shared its official statistics for the
operation of its interdiction program between January and
September 2005 with the United States Government on the
condition that the information is treated confidentially. This
data is not included in this report, but can be made available
upon request to Members and staff. The U.S. Embassy in Brasilia
is also seeking the operational statistics for the remainder of
2005 from the GOB and will make that information available upon
request as well.