[House Document 109-91]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




109th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 109-
91
 
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG 
                              TRAFFICKING

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  From

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              TRANSMITTING

  A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
   ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO 22 U.S.C. 2291-4




    February 28, 2006.--Referred to the Committee on International 
                  Relations and ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, February 22, 2006.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the authorities relating 
to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-
4), and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am 
providing a report prepared by my Administration. This report 
addresses the matter of assistance for interdiction of aircraft 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
 United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in 
                        Illicit Drug Trafficking

    Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the 
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4 in 
calendar year 2005. The President signed Presidential 
Determination 2005-32 on August 17, 2005, for Colombia and 
Presidential Determination 2006-02 on October 16, 2005, for 
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified that (1) 
interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia's and Brazil's 
airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed 
by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of 
Colombia and Brazil; and (2) Colombia and Brazil have 
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent 
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective 
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force 
is directed against the aircraft.

                                COLOMBIA

    (A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program 
in Colombia began operations. In making a third certification 
for Colombia in August 2005, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking continued to pose an extraordinary threat to 
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors, 
including: Colombia is still the world's largest producer of 
cocaine and a supplier of high quality heroin; Colombia faces a 
growing cocaine abuse problem; Colombian drug trafficking 
officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed 
groups to protect their organizations; illegal revenue from the 
Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy; and 
narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the democratic 
institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly, 
drug trafficking also serves as the primary source of funding 
for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and an 
important source of funding for the Colombian United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army 
(ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations by the Department of State.
    As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of 
Colombia (GOC) observed over 250 unidentified flights in its 
airspace in CY 2005. Although this number is approximately half 
the number of flights observed in CY 2005, the concerns raised 
in the President's determination for Colombia in previous 
reports are still valid and applicable.
    (B) United States Government safety oversight of Colombia's 
ABD program includes approved procedures, as outlined in a 
Bilateral Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety 
checklist; and three primary United States Government safety 
monitors: a ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor 
(ASM), and a Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) ABD 
watch officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD 
safety triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be 
involved in all events in which Phase I, II, and III actions 
(as described below) are taken against an unidentified, assumed 
suspect (UAS) flight in the air. The basic procedures for 
intercepting a UAS flight are as follows:
          Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the GOC 
        detects or is informed of an aircraft operating in a 
        defined zone of control that is a candidate for 
        possible ABD action (a ``track of interest''), 
        information on that aircraft shall be gathered by the 
        GOC from all reasonably available sources, including 
        radar systems, radio and visual contact with the 
        aircraft, electronic systems (which help determine 
        whether the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan 
        and what type of plane it is), and relevant air traffic 
        control centers, to begin to determine whether the 
        aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily 
        engaged in illicit drug trafficking. That determination 
        shall be made by the Battle Command Officer (BCO) in 
        the Colombian Air Force's Command and Control Center, 
        based upon certain factors set our elsewhere in the 
        Agreement, in conjunction with other information 
        provided to GOC and United States Government 
        participants in the ongoing action.
          Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has preliminary 
        reasons to believe that an aircraft is primarily 
        engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that aircraft 
        shall be tracked and monitored. If tracking is 
        intermittent, positive re-identification shall be made 
        with reasonable certainty before the ABD event may 
        continue. If the GOC has been unable to identify the 
        track of interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft 
        shall be considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force 
        (CAF) under CAF procedures and may be intercepted.
          Phase I--Interception. The interception phase (Phase 
        I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted 
        aircraft by radio and, if necessary, by visual signals 
        in order to determine the identity of the pilot or 
        intercepted aircraft. If, during this Phase, the GOC 
        determines that the aircraft is reasonably suspected to 
        be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking (on 
        the basis of several considered factors), the CAF may 
        order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated 
        place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being 
        intercepted, the aircraft does not comply with the 
        procedures and instructions given by the CAF, the pilot 
        may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
          Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists of 
        the firing of warning shots, using ammunition 
        containing tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to 
        the pilot of the intercepted aircraft that he must 
        comply with the interceptor's order. If all of the 
        procedures required under the Agreement have been 
        followed, if the information gathered continues to 
        indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and if the 
        aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's order to 
        land, the GOC may, in accordance with the following, 
        move to Phase III.
          Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft 
        in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under 
        Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge 
        or follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian 
        interceptor aircraft may only fire weapons at the 
        intercepted aircraft if he requests and receives 
        permission to do so (Phase III). The Commander of the 
        Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such 
        requests. The COCAF may approve such request after 
        verifying that all procedures required under the 
        Agreement have been followed. Upon receipt of the 
        authorization, the interceptor aircraft shall warn the 
        intercepted aircraft, using ICAO radio communications 
        procedures and the appropriate frequencies, that it 
        will be fired upon if it refuses to comply.
    The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the 
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in 
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as 
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before 
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be 
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to 
follow the interceptor's directions. It is acknowledged that 
even the minimum level of force could result in loss of life. 
If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the 
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate 
notice to the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center of 
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
    The Agreement requires similar identification and warning 
procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been 
located on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains 
additional strictures on the use of force, including a 
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial 
aircraft, aircraft that have been filed and are not 
significantly deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose 
pilots appear to be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots 
genuinely appear to be under duress.
    The United States Government initially trained the GOC's 
pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft 
involved in the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as 
well as training of new Colombian personnel are ongoing as the 
program matures. Semiannual reviews of the program address any 
issues that arise in the program's implementation. Further, the 
United States Government receives weekly and monthly reports on 
program events.
    (C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program 
in Colombia consists of the following:
    The United States Government provides a number of positions 
to Colombia's ABD program. These positions include a DOD JIATF-
S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground Safety 
Monitor in the Colombia Air Force Command and Control Center 
(CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft; 
and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board U.S. tracking and 
detection/monitoring aircraft. Both Monitors and the Host 
Nation Rider Assistant are fluent in Spanish.
    JIATF-S, as Tactical Commander, exercises command and 
control of U.S. ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint Operations 
Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer is the Tactical 
Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The Ground Safety 
Monitor is the U.S. representative at the CAFCCC during ABD 
operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative 
on GOC tracking aircraft and is available to observe decisions 
made by GOC personnel, communicate with the U.S. Ground Safety 
Monitor and the JIATF-S Command Duty Officer, and report to 
themwhether the agreed-upon procedures are being followed. The 
Host Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. representative who assists the 
Host Nation Rider. The Counter Drug Operation and Coordination Center, 
which is located in the CAFCCC, assists in coordination, information 
exchange, and analysis between JIATF-S and CAFCCC. An employee of the 
Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted 
exclusively to overseeing implementation of this program.
    The United States Government has provided five Citation 
aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD 
program and provides ongoing radar information and 
intelligence. Additional United States Government assets (both 
aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security can provide support for this program under 
the conditions contained in the Agreement. Further, the GOC has 
agreed that the five United States Government-supported ground-
based radars and the Peace Panorama System (which is the 
airspace management system linking ground-based radars in 
Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute United States 
Government support for ABD.
    (D) From January 1, 2005, until December 31, 2005, the GOC, 
with the assistance of the United States Government as 
described in section (C), identified over 250 Unidentified 
Assumed Suspect (UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over 
27 of these flights were determined to be legal flights. The 
GOC was in a position to act upon approximately 200 of the 
remaining flights. The GOC forced four suspect drug trafficking 
aircraft to land, destroyed two of those aircraft on the 
ground, impounded five aircraft in Colombia, arrested six 
persons, and seized 1.5 metric tons of cocaine in connection 
with illegal aerial drug trafficking. Another three aircraft 
with 2.1 metric tons of cocaine were impounded in Guatemala as 
a result of Colombian coordination with JIATF-S and Honduran 
authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace heading 
toward Mexico. The United States Government is unaware of any 
deaths or injuries resulting from these actions.

                                 BRAZIL

    (A) Brazil's ABD program began operations on October 17, 
2004. In making a second certification for Brazil pursuant to 
22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's 
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of 
this threat, as demonstrated by radar surveillance confirming 
that narcotraffickers are making widespread use of aerial 
routes to bring cocaine and other narcotics into Brazil. The 
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the 
last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons of 
cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it 
remaining in-country. In addition, there are suspected ties 
between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms 
trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled 
widespread urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal gangs fight to control a 
share of the lucrative enterprise.
    (B) The Government of Brazil (GOB) possesses an 
infrastructure that is capable of independently implementing 
its aerial interdiction program. The goal of Brazil's 
interdiction program is to facilitate the safe landing of 
intercepted aircraft so that law enforcement personnel may take 
control of the aircraft on the ground. As a last resort, 
however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may authorize the 
use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if it refuses to 
respond to the full range of program actions taken by the 
Brazilian Air Force. The GOB has established a multi-stage 
procedure to identify, intercept, warn, and, if necessary, take 
action against an aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The basic procedures are 
as follows:
          Identification. When the GOB detects an aircraft that 
        displays irregular air traffic traits, it will consider 
        that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' and a candidate 
        for possible aerial interception. The GOB will proceed 
        to gather information on that aircraft to determine 
        whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected to be 
        primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. If the 
        GOB is unable to identify the aircraft as legitimate, 
        the aircraft will be considered ``suspect'' by the 
        Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
          Interception. During interception, the GOB will 
        attempt to determine with greater certainty the 
        identity of the intercepted aircraft. The tracker or 
        interceptor aircraft will take all reasonable measures 
        to identify the intercepted aircraft by visual or 
        electronic observation of the nationality markings, 
        registration number, license number, or identifying 
        features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will 
        further attempt to gather information regarding the 
        intercepted aircraft that may help determine whether 
        the intercepted aircraft isreasonably suspected to be 
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The tracker or 
interceptor aircraft will attempt to establish communications with the 
intercepted aircraft through radio communications or visual signals and 
order the intercepted aircraft to change its routing or to land if 
factors continue to support a determination that the aircraft is 
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
          Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the firing of 
        warning shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the 
        intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the 
        interceptor's order if the gathered information 
        continues to indicate that an aircraft is suspect and 
        the aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's 
        order to land. Warning shots may only be ordered and 
        authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior Authority or 
        the Air Operations Commander after verification that 
        all requisite procedures have been satisfied. The 
        intercepting aircraft will fire the warning shots from 
        a position that will permit the intercepted aircraft to 
        see the intercepting aircraft, but that will avoid 
        damage to the intercepted aircraft. Intercepted 
        aircraft that comply with the orders of the interceptor 
        aircraft after warning shots have been fired will be 
        escorted to land at a designated airfield where law 
        enforcement authorities will subject it to ground 
        control measures.
          Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the Air. 
        If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted 
        aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the 
        interceptor's directions, the aircraft will be 
        designated as ``hostile'' and will, after appropriate 
        authorization from Brazilian authorities, be subject to 
        being shot down. The Brazilian Air Force Commander-in-
        Chief may only authorize the use of lethal force after 
        verifying that all requisite procedures have been 
        followed. The first burst of fire used against the 
        intercepted aircraft will be as brief as possible and 
        preferably without using ammunition capable of causing 
        a tank explosion. After the first burst of fire, the 
        pilot of the intercepting aircraft will relay 
        information regarding the effect of the fire to the Air 
        Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the 
        intercepted aircraft again, if possible, before 
        requesting authorization to fire again. Once an 
        intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian federal 
        police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for 
        law enforcement purposes.
    (C) Brazil's interdiction program differs from Colombia's 
in that Brazil independently administers its program. The GOB 
is solely responsible for all actions relating to each aerial 
interdiciton event, but has agreed to share pertinent 
operational information about such events after the fact with 
the United States in a timely and transparent manner. Although 
the GOB neither requires nor has requested a direct U.S. role 
in support of its program, various agencies of the United 
States Government currently provide assistance to Brazil that 
could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction program, such 
as cooperative law enforcement programs, intelligence-sharing, 
and approvals of military sales. Additionally, U.S. companies 
such as Raytheon are positioned to provide relevant assistance 
in the future.
    (D) Brazilian authorities publicly claim that the combined 
resources of the System for the Vigilance of the Amazon (SIVAM) 
monitoring system and the Air Force have virtually eliminated 
trafficker flights through national airspace. They explain that 
the continued flow of drugs and weapons through Brazil is due 
to smugglers responding to the aerial interdiction deterrent by 
converting to overland routes. While Brazil's ABD program 
appears to have caused some traffickers to change their routes 
and methods of transshipment, airborne drug trafficking remains 
a viable threat.
    U.S. interaction with Brazil on aerial interdicition issues 
has focused primarily on the role of the Brazilian Air Force. 
The United States Government is unaware of any incidents in 
which the Air Force used lethal force against aircraft under 
Brazil's interdiction program or any deaths or injuries 
resulted from action related to this program. However, in April 
2005, the Brazilian police fired on a civil aircraft, suspected 
of narcotrafficking, as it attempted to take off, resulting in 
the death of the pilot. The GOB reported that the police were 
acting in self-defense. In response to United States government 
questions regarding the incident, the GOB further indicated 
that the police: (1) are permitted to use force against civil 
aircraft only in self-defense; (2) have been informed of their 
role in pursuit of aircraft suspected of narcotrafficking and 
of procedures to be adopted to minimize loss of innocent life; 
and (3) are aware of the prohibition of the destruction of 
civil aircraft in service, established in the Convention on 
Suppression of Illegal Acts Against the Security of Civil 
Aviation, signed in Montreal on September 23, 1971.
    The GOB has shared its official statistics for the 
operation of its interdiction program between January and 
September 2005 with the United States Government on the 
condition that the information is treated confidentially. This 
data is not included in this report, but can be made available 
upon request to Members and staff. The U.S. Embassy in Brasilia 
is also seeking the operational statistics for the remainder of 
2005 from the GOB and will make that information available upon 
request as well.

                                  
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