[House Document 109-13]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




109th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 109-13

 
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG 
                              TRAFFICKING

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

  A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
  ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 107-108 22 
                             U.S.C. 2291-4




 March 3, 2005.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    Consistent with the authorities relating to official 
immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit 
drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-4), and in 
order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am providing a 
report prepared by my Administration. This report includes 
matters relating to the interdiction of aircraft engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking.

                                                    George W. Bush.
    The White House, March 2, 2005.
 United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in 
                        Illicit Drug Trafficking

    Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the 
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4 in 
calendar year 2004. The President signed Presidential 
Determination 2004-42 on August 17, 2004, for Colombia and 
Presidential Determination 2005-03 on October 16, 2004, for 
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified that: (1) 
interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia's and Brazil's 
airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed 
by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of 
Colombia and Brazil; and (2) Colombia and Brazil have 
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent 
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with 
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective 
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force 
is directed against the aircraft.

                                COLOMBIA

    (A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program 
in Colombia began operations. In making a second certification 
for Colombia in August 2004, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking continued to pose an extraordinary threat to 
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors, 
including: Colombia is still the world's largest producer of 
cocaine and a supplier of high quality heroin; Colombia faces a 
growing cocaine abuse problem; Colombian drug trafficking 
officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed 
groups to protect their organizations; illegal revenue from the 
Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy; and 
narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the democratic 
institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly, 
drug trafficking also serves as the primary source of funding 
for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and an 
important source of funding for the Colombian United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army 
(ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations by the Department of State.
    As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of 
Colombia (GOC) observed over 500 unidentified flights in its 
airspace in CY 2004. This aerial activity further supports the 
concerns raised in the President's determination for Colombia.
    (B) United States Government safety oversight of Colombia's 
ABD program includes approved procedures, as outlined in a 
Bilateral Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety 
checklist; and three primary United States Government safety 
monitors: a ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor 
(ASM), and a Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) ABD 
watch officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD 
safety triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be 
involved in all events in which Phase I, II, and III actions 
(as described below) are taken against an unidentified, assumed 
suspect (UAS) flight in the air. The basic procedures for 
intercepting a UAS flight are as follows:
     Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the 
GOC detects or is informed of an aircraft operating in a 
defined zone of control that is a candidate for possible ABD 
action (a ``track of interest''), information on that aircraft 
shall be gathered by the GOC from all reasonably available 
sources, including radar systems, radio and visual contact with 
the aircraft, electronic systems (which help determine whether 
the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan and what type of 
plane it is), and relevant air traffic control centers, to 
begin to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected 
to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. That 
determination shall be made by the Battle Command Officer (BCO) 
in the Colombian Air Force's Command and Control Center, based 
upon certain factors set out elsewhere in the Agreement, in 
conjunction with other information provided to GOC and United 
States Government participants in the ongoing action.
     Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has 
preliminary reasons to believe that an aircraft is primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that aircraft shall be 
tracked and monitored. If tracking is intermittent, positive 
reidentification shall be made with reasonable certainty before 
the ABD event may continue. If the GOC has been unable to 
identify the track of interest as a legitimate track, the 
aircraft shall be considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force 
(CAF) under CAF procedures and may be intercepted.
     Phase I--Interception. The interception phase 
(Phase I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft 
by radio and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to 
determine the identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft. 
If, during this Phase, the GOC determines that the aircraft is 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the 
CAF may order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated 
place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, 
the aircraft does not comply with the procedures and 
instructions given by the CAF, the pilot may request permission 
to proceed to Phase II.
     Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists 
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing 
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the 
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's 
order. If all of the procedures required under the Agreement 
have been followed, if the information gathered continues to 
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and if the aircraft fails 
to respond to the interceptor's order to land, the GOC may, in 
accordance with the following, move to Phase III.
     Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted 
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under 
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or 
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor 
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if 
he requests and receives permission to do so (Phase III). The 
Commander of the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all 
such requests. The COCAF may approve such request after 
verifying that all procedures required under the Agreement have 
been followed. Upon receipt of the authorization, the 
interceptor aircraft shall warn the intercepted aircraft, using 
ICAO radio communications procedures and using the appropriate 
frequencies, that it will be fired upon if it refuses to 
comply.
    The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the 
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in 
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as 
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before 
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be 
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to 
follow the interceptor's directions. It is acknowledged that 
even the minimum level of force could result in loss of life. 
If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the 
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate 
notice to the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center of 
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
    The Agreement requires similar identification and warning 
procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been 
located on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains 
additional strictures on the use of force, including a 
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial 
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly 
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to 
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to 
be under duress.
    The United States Government initially trained the GOC's 
pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft 
involved in the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as 
well as training of new Colombian personnel are ongoing as the 
program matures. Semiannual reviews of the program address any 
issues that arise in the program's implementation. Further, the 
United States Government receives weekly and monthly reports on 
program events.
    (C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program 
in Colombia consists of the following:
    The United States Government provides a number of positions 
to Colombia's ABD program. These positions include a DOD JIATF-
S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground Safety 
Monitor in the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center 
(CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft; 
and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board U.S. tracking and 
detection/monitoring aircraft. Both Monitors and the Host 
Nation Rider Assistant are fluent in Spanish.
    JIATF-S, as Tactical Commander, exercises command and 
control of U.S. ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint Operations 
Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer is the Tactical 
Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The Ground Safety 
Monitor is the U.S. representative at the CAFCCC during ABD 
operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative 
on GOC tracking aircraft and is available to observe decisions 
made by GOC personnel, communicate with the U.S. Ground Safety 
Monitor and the JIATF-S Command Duty Officer, and report to 
them whether the agreed-upon procedures are being followed. The 
Host Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. representative who 
assists the Host Nation Rider. The Counter Drug Operation and 
Coordination Center, which is located in the CAFCCC, assists in 
coordination, information exchange, and analysis between JIATF-
S and CAFCCC. An employee of the Narcotics Affairs Section in 
the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted exclusively to overseeing 
implementation of this program.
    The United States Government has provided five Citation 
aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD 
program, and provides ongoing radar information and 
intelligence. Additional United States Government assets (both 
aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security can provide support for this program under 
the conditions contained in the Agreement. Further, the GOC has 
agreed that the five United States Government-supported ground-
based radars and the Peace Panorama System (which is the 
airspace management system linking ground-based radars in 
Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute United States 
Government support for ABD.
    (D) From January 1, 2004, until December 31, 2004, the GOC, 
with the assistance of the United States Government as 
described in section (C), identified over 500 Unidentified 
Assumed Suspect (UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over 
150 of these unidentified flights were determined to be legal 
flights. The GOC was in a position to act upon approximately 
100 of the remaining UAS flights. The GOC forced 15 suspect 
drug trafficking aircraft to land, destroyed 13 of those 
aircraft on the ground, damaged one aircraft and impounded 
three aircraft in Colombia. Another eight aircraft with 2.8 
metric tons of cocaine were impounded in Central America as a 
result of Colombian coordination with JIATF-S and Central 
American authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace 
heading towards Central America. The United States Government 
is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from these 
actions.

                                 BRAZIL

    (A) In making a certification for Brazil pursuant to 22 
U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined that 
narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's 
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of 
this threat, as demonstrated by radar surveillance confirming 
that narcotraffickers are making widespread use of aerial 
routes to bring cocaine and other narcotics into Brazil. The 
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the 
last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons of 
cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it 
remaining in-country. In addition, there are suspected ties 
between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms 
trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled 
widespread urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and 
Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal gangs fight to control a 
share of the lucrative enterprise.
    (B) The Government of Brazil (GOB) possesses an 
infrastructure that is capable of independently implementing 
its aerial interdiction program. The goal of Brazil's 
interdiction program is to facilitate the safe landing of 
intercepted aircraft so that law enforcement personnel may take 
control of the aircraft on the ground. As a last resort, 
however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may authorize the 
use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if it refuses to 
respond to the full range of program actions taken by the 
Brazilian Air Force. The GOB has established a multi-stage 
procedure to identify, intercept, warn, and, if necessary, take 
action against an aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The basic procedures are 
as follows:
     Identification. When the GOB detects an aircraft 
that displays irregular air traffic traits, it will consider 
that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' and a candidate for 
possible aerial interception. The GOB will proceed to gather 
information on that aircraft to determine whether the aircraft 
is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking. If the GOB is unable to identify the aircraft as 
legitimate, the aircraft will be considered ``suspect'' by the 
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
     Interception. During interception, the GOB will 
attempt to determine with greater certainty the identity of the 
intercepted aircraft. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will 
take all reasonable measures to identify the intercepted 
aircraft by visual or electronic observation of the nationality 
markings, registration number, license number, or identifying 
features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will further 
attempt to gather information regarding the intercepted 
aircraft that may help determine whether the intercepted 
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking. The tracker or interceptor aircraft 
will attempt to establish communications with the intercepted 
aircraft through radio communications or visual signals and 
order the intercepted aircraft to change its routing or to land 
if factors continue to support a determination that the 
aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
     Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the firing of 
warning shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted 
aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's order if 
the gathered information continues to indicate that an aircraft 
is suspect and the aircraft fails to respond to the 
interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may only be ordered 
and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior Authority or the 
Air Operations Commander after verification that all requisite 
procedures have been satisfied The intercepting aircraft will 
fire the warning shots from abeam of the intercepted aircraft, 
in a position that will permit the intercepted aircraft to see 
the intercepting aircraft but that will avoid damage to the 
intercepted aircraft. Intercepted aircraft that comply with the 
orders of the interceptor aircraft after warning shots have 
been fired will be escorted to land at a designated airfield, 
where law enforcement authorities will subject it to ground 
control measures.
     Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the 
Air. If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted 
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's 
directions, the aircraft will be designated as ``hostile'' and 
will, after appropriate authorization from Brazilian 
authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian Air 
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal 
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been 
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted 
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably without 
using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the 
first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft 
will relay information regarding the effect of the fire to the 
Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted 
aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to 
fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian 
federal police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for 
law enforcement purposes.
    (C) Brazil's interdiction program differs from Colombia's 
in that Brazil independently administers its program. The GOB 
is solely responsible for all actions relating to each aerial 
interdiction event, but has committed to share pertinent 
operational information about such events after the fact with 
the United States in a timely and transparent manner. Although 
the GOB neither requires nor has requested a direct U.S. role 
in support of its program, various agencies of the United 
States Government currently provide assistance to Brazil that 
could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction program, such 
as cooperative law enforcement programs, intelligence-sharing, 
and approvals of military sales. Additionally, U.S. companies 
such as Raytheon are positioned to provide relevant assistance 
in the future.
    (D) According to open source information, Brazil's 
interdiction program has produced a deterrent effect, with the 
number of unauthorized flights in the border areas reported to 
have decreased by as much as 60 percent since the program 
became operational on October 17, 2004. The number of irregular 
flights (flights without a registered flight plan) in Brazilian 
airspace decreased by 32 percent after implementation of the 
interdiction program. In 2004, before the program came into 
force, the Brazilian Airspace Command registered a total of 
3,585 irregular flights with a daily average of 12.3. In the 
first thirty days of the program, the daily average fell to 
8.3. The United States Government is unaware of any incidents 
of lethal force being used against aircraft under Brazil's 
interdiction program or any deaths or injuries resulting from 
other program actions. The GOB has shared its official 
statistics for the operation of its interdiction program 
between October 17 and December 31 with the United States 
Government on the condition that the information is treated 
confidentially. This data is not included in this report, but 
can be made available upon request to Members and staff.

                                  
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