[House Document 109-13]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
109th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 109-13
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG
TRAFFICKING
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT
ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 107-108 22
U.S.C. 2291-4
March 3, 2005.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
Consistent with the authorities relating to official
immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in illicit
drug trafficking (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-4), and in
order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am providing a
report prepared by my Administration. This report includes
matters relating to the interdiction of aircraft engaged in
illicit drug trafficking.
George W. Bush.
The White House, March 2, 2005.
United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in
Illicit Drug Trafficking
Colombia and Brazil are the only countries for which the
President made a certification under 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4 in
calendar year 2004. The President signed Presidential
Determination 2004-42 on August 17, 2004, for Colombia and
Presidential Determination 2005-03 on October 16, 2004, for
Brazil. In doing so, the President certified that: (1)
interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia's and Brazil's
airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed
by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of
Colombia and Brazil; and (2) Colombia and Brazil have
appropriate procedures in place to protect against innocent
loss of life in the air and on the ground in connection with
such interdiction, which shall at a minimum include effective
means to identify and warn an aircraft before the use of force
is directed against the aircraft.
COLOMBIA
(A) On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program
in Colombia began operations. In making a second certification
for Colombia in August 2004, the President determined that
narcotrafficking continued to pose an extraordinary threat to
Colombia's national security on the basis of several factors,
including: Colombia is still the world's largest producer of
cocaine and a supplier of high quality heroin; Colombia faces a
growing cocaine abuse problem; Colombian drug trafficking
officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed
groups to protect their organizations; illegal revenue from the
Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian economy; and
narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat to the democratic
institutions of government and law enforcement. Significantly,
drug trafficking also serves as the primary source of funding
for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and an
important source of funding for the Colombian United Self-
Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian National Liberation Army
(ELN), all of which are classified as Foreign Terrorist
Organizations by the Department of State.
As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of
Colombia (GOC) observed over 500 unidentified flights in its
airspace in CY 2004. This aerial activity further supports the
concerns raised in the President's determination for Colombia.
(B) United States Government safety oversight of Colombia's
ABD program includes approved procedures, as outlined in a
Bilateral Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety
checklist; and three primary United States Government safety
monitors: a ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor
(ASM), and a Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) ABD
watch officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD
safety triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be
involved in all events in which Phase I, II, and III actions
(as described below) are taken against an unidentified, assumed
suspect (UAS) flight in the air. The basic procedures for
intercepting a UAS flight are as follows:
Detection, Sorting, and Identification. When the
GOC detects or is informed of an aircraft operating in a
defined zone of control that is a candidate for possible ABD
action (a ``track of interest''), information on that aircraft
shall be gathered by the GOC from all reasonably available
sources, including radar systems, radio and visual contact with
the aircraft, electronic systems (which help determine whether
the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan and what type of
plane it is), and relevant air traffic control centers, to
begin to determine whether the aircraft is reasonably suspected
to be primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking. That
determination shall be made by the Battle Command Officer (BCO)
in the Colombian Air Force's Command and Control Center, based
upon certain factors set out elsewhere in the Agreement, in
conjunction with other information provided to GOC and United
States Government participants in the ongoing action.
Monitoring. If the GOC determines or has
preliminary reasons to believe that an aircraft is primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking, that aircraft shall be
tracked and monitored. If tracking is intermittent, positive
reidentification shall be made with reasonable certainty before
the ABD event may continue. If the GOC has been unable to
identify the track of interest as a legitimate track, the
aircraft shall be considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force
(CAF) under CAF procedures and may be intercepted.
Phase I--Interception. The interception phase
(Phase I) includes attempts to contact the intercepted aircraft
by radio and, if necessary, by visual signals in order to
determine the identity of the pilot or intercepted aircraft.
If, during this Phase, the GOC determines that the aircraft is
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the
CAF may order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated
place suitable for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted,
the aircraft does not comply with the procedures and
instructions given by the CAF, the pilot may request permission
to proceed to Phase II.
Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II consists
of the firing of warning shots, using ammunition containing
tracer rounds, in order to demonstrate to the pilot of the
intercepted aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's
order. If all of the procedures required under the Agreement
have been followed, if the information gathered continues to
indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and if the aircraft fails
to respond to the interceptor's order to land, the GOC may, in
accordance with the following, move to Phase III.
Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted
Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired under
Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not acknowledge or
follow the interceptor's directions, the Colombian interceptor
aircraft may only fire weapons at the intercepted aircraft if
he requests and receives permission to do so (Phase III). The
Commander of the Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all
such requests. The COCAF may approve such request after
verifying that all procedures required under the Agreement have
been followed. Upon receipt of the authorization, the
interceptor aircraft shall warn the intercepted aircraft, using
ICAO radio communications procedures and using the appropriate
frequencies, that it will be fired upon if it refuses to
comply.
The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to
follow the interceptor's directions. It is acknowledged that
even the minimum level of force could result in loss of life.
If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate
notice to the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center of
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
The Agreement requires similar identification and warning
procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been
located on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains
additional strictures on the use of force, including a
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to
be under duress.
The United States Government initially trained the GOC's
pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft
involved in the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as
well as training of new Colombian personnel are ongoing as the
program matures. Semiannual reviews of the program address any
issues that arise in the program's implementation. Further, the
United States Government receives weekly and monthly reports on
program events.
(C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program
in Colombia consists of the following:
The United States Government provides a number of positions
to Colombia's ABD program. These positions include a DOD JIATF-
S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground Safety
Monitor in the Colombian Air Force Command and Control Center
(CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking aircraft;
and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board U.S. tracking and
detection/monitoring aircraft. Both Monitors and the Host
Nation Rider Assistant are fluent in Spanish.
JIATF-S, as Tactical Commander, exercises command and
control of U.S. ABD assets through JIATF-S's Joint Operations
Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty Officer is the Tactical
Commander's senior watch officer at the JOC. The Ground Safety
Monitor is the U.S. representative at the CAFCCC during ABD
operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative
on GOC tracking aircraft and is available to observe decisions
made by GOC personnel, communicate with the U.S. Ground Safety
Monitor and the JIATF-S Command Duty Officer, and report to
them whether the agreed-upon procedures are being followed. The
Host Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. representative who
assists the Host Nation Rider. The Counter Drug Operation and
Coordination Center, which is located in the CAFCCC, assists in
coordination, information exchange, and analysis between JIATF-
S and CAFCCC. An employee of the Narcotics Affairs Section in
the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is devoted exclusively to overseeing
implementation of this program.
The United States Government has provided five Citation
aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD
program, and provides ongoing radar information and
intelligence. Additional United States Government assets (both
aircraft and personnel) from the Departments of Defense and
Homeland Security can provide support for this program under
the conditions contained in the Agreement. Further, the GOC has
agreed that the five United States Government-supported ground-
based radars and the Peace Panorama System (which is the
airspace management system linking ground-based radars in
Colombia to a central radar picture) constitute United States
Government support for ABD.
(D) From January 1, 2004, until December 31, 2004, the GOC,
with the assistance of the United States Government as
described in section (C), identified over 500 Unidentified
Assumed Suspect (UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over
150 of these unidentified flights were determined to be legal
flights. The GOC was in a position to act upon approximately
100 of the remaining UAS flights. The GOC forced 15 suspect
drug trafficking aircraft to land, destroyed 13 of those
aircraft on the ground, damaged one aircraft and impounded
three aircraft in Colombia. Another eight aircraft with 2.8
metric tons of cocaine were impounded in Central America as a
result of Colombian coordination with JIATF-S and Central
American authorities on flights departing Colombian airspace
heading towards Central America. The United States Government
is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from these
actions.
BRAZIL
(A) In making a certification for Brazil pursuant to 22
U.S.C. Sec. 2291-4, the President determined that
narcotrafficking poses an extraordinary threat to Brazil's
national security. Aerial drug shipments are a key component of
this threat, as demonstrated by radar surveillance confirming
that narcotraffickers are making widespread use of aerial
routes to bring cocaine and other narcotics into Brazil. The
amount of cocaine shipped through Brazil has increased over the
last decade. It is estimated that well over 100 metric tons of
cocaine enter Brazil annually, with one-third to one-half of it
remaining in-country. In addition, there are suspected ties
between drug traffickers and those involved in illegal arms
trafficking. The resulting domestic drug trade has fueled
widespread urban violence in Brazil, notably in Sao Paulo and
Rio de Janeiro, as organized criminal gangs fight to control a
share of the lucrative enterprise.
(B) The Government of Brazil (GOB) possesses an
infrastructure that is capable of independently implementing
its aerial interdiction program. The goal of Brazil's
interdiction program is to facilitate the safe landing of
intercepted aircraft so that law enforcement personnel may take
control of the aircraft on the ground. As a last resort,
however, the Brazilian Air Force Commander may authorize the
use of lethal force to bring down the aircraft if it refuses to
respond to the full range of program actions taken by the
Brazilian Air Force. The GOB has established a multi-stage
procedure to identify, intercept, warn, and, if necessary, take
action against an aircraft reasonably suspected to be primarily
engaged in illicit drug trafficking. The basic procedures are
as follows:
Identification. When the GOB detects an aircraft
that displays irregular air traffic traits, it will consider
that aircraft to be ``unidentified'' and a candidate for
possible aerial interception. The GOB will proceed to gather
information on that aircraft to determine whether the aircraft
is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug
trafficking. If the GOB is unable to identify the aircraft as
legitimate, the aircraft will be considered ``suspect'' by the
Brazilian Air Force and may be intercepted.
Interception. During interception, the GOB will
attempt to determine with greater certainty the identity of the
intercepted aircraft. The tracker or interceptor aircraft will
take all reasonable measures to identify the intercepted
aircraft by visual or electronic observation of the nationality
markings, registration number, license number, or identifying
features of the intercepted aircraft. The GOB will further
attempt to gather information regarding the intercepted
aircraft that may help determine whether the intercepted
aircraft is reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in
illicit drug trafficking. The tracker or interceptor aircraft
will attempt to establish communications with the intercepted
aircraft through radio communications or visual signals and
order the intercepted aircraft to change its routing or to land
if factors continue to support a determination that the
aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
Warning Shots. The GOB will move to the firing of
warning shots to demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted
aircraft that he must comply with the interceptor's order if
the gathered information continues to indicate that an aircraft
is suspect and the aircraft fails to respond to the
interceptor's order to land. Warning shots may only be ordered
and authorized by the Airspace Defense Senior Authority or the
Air Operations Commander after verification that all requisite
procedures have been satisfied The intercepting aircraft will
fire the warning shots from abeam of the intercepted aircraft,
in a position that will permit the intercepted aircraft to see
the intercepting aircraft but that will avoid damage to the
intercepted aircraft. Intercepted aircraft that comply with the
orders of the interceptor aircraft after warning shots have
been fired will be escorted to land at a designated airfield,
where law enforcement authorities will subject it to ground
control measures.
Firing of Weapons at Intercepted Aircraft in the
Air. If, after warning shots are fired, the intercepted
aircraft does not acknowledge or follow the interceptor's
directions, the aircraft will be designated as ``hostile'' and
will, after appropriate authorization from Brazilian
authorities, be subject to being shot down. The Brazilian Air
Force Commander-in-Chief may only authorize the use of lethal
force after verifying that all requisite procedures have been
followed. The first burst of fire used against the intercepted
aircraft will be as brief as possible and preferably without
using ammunition capable of causing a tank explosion. After the
first burst of fire, the pilot of the intercepting aircraft
will relay information regarding the effect of the fire to the
Air Force Commander-in-Chief and try to contact the intercepted
aircraft again, if possible, before requesting authorization to
fire again. Once an intercepted aircraft lands, the Brazilian
federal police will attempt to take control of the aircraft for
law enforcement purposes.
(C) Brazil's interdiction program differs from Colombia's
in that Brazil independently administers its program. The GOB
is solely responsible for all actions relating to each aerial
interdiction event, but has committed to share pertinent
operational information about such events after the fact with
the United States in a timely and transparent manner. Although
the GOB neither requires nor has requested a direct U.S. role
in support of its program, various agencies of the United
States Government currently provide assistance to Brazil that
could be relevant to the Brazilian interdiction program, such
as cooperative law enforcement programs, intelligence-sharing,
and approvals of military sales. Additionally, U.S. companies
such as Raytheon are positioned to provide relevant assistance
in the future.
(D) According to open source information, Brazil's
interdiction program has produced a deterrent effect, with the
number of unauthorized flights in the border areas reported to
have decreased by as much as 60 percent since the program
became operational on October 17, 2004. The number of irregular
flights (flights without a registered flight plan) in Brazilian
airspace decreased by 32 percent after implementation of the
interdiction program. In 2004, before the program came into
force, the Brazilian Airspace Command registered a total of
3,585 irregular flights with a daily average of 12.3. In the
first thirty days of the program, the daily average fell to
8.3. The United States Government is unaware of any incidents
of lethal force being used against aircraft under Brazil's
interdiction program or any deaths or injuries resulting from
other program actions. The GOB has shared its official
statistics for the operation of its interdiction program
between October 17 and December 31 with the United States
Government on the condition that the information is treated
confidentially. This data is not included in this report, but
can be made available upon request to Members and staff.