[House Document 108-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-6
KOSOVO BENCHMARKS
__________
COMMUNICATION
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN
KOSOVO, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 106-398
January 7, 2003.--Referred jointly to the Committees on International
Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, November 26, 2002.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to section 1212 of the Floyd D.
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001,
Public Law 106-398, I hereby submit a report, prepared by my
Administration, on the progress made in achieving the
militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would
achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for
the withdrawal of the United States military presence in
Kosovo.
The term ``militarily significant'' relates to tasks and
objectives significant from a military standpoint that once
accomplished would allow for withdrawal of military forces from
Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, four
critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military
stability, public security, border/boundary issues, and war
crimes/International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia support. Objectives for these tasks were drawn from
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO
Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the
Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking.
I anticipate that KFOR--and U.S. participation in it--will
gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve
and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own
self-government.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush.
Kosovo Benchmarks
INTRODUCTION
Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the
Act), requires that ``The President shall develop militarily
significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a
sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.'' Pursuant
to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing this report to
Congress on progress in Kosovo toward achieving such militarily
significant benchmarks.
Every 6 months, NATO reviews the situation on the ground in
Kosovo and Bosnia, and adjusts troop strengths in the NATO-led
Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) accordingly.
Reflecting a positive trend in the region, the Foreign
Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important
decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding a
regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result
of these decisions, KFOR will be reduced from 36,000 as of June
2002, to 32,000 by December 2002, and 29,000 by June 2003. This
latter figure represents about a 38 percent reduction from the
initial KFOR commitment of 47,000 following Operation ALLIED
FORCE in 1999. The U.S. contribution in KFOR will be reduced
from 5,200 in June 2002 to approximately 4,000 in June 2003,
thereby remaining at approximately 15 percent of the total
force.
BACKGROUND
The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable
peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from
several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo
(OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA)
between the international Security Force (KFOR) and the
governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the
Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking of Demilitarization and
Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).
Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the
establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military
tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining
tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for
the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for
minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and
refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial
progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-
advanced, free and fair elections held twice, more than 4,900
multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed, and a new
constitutional framework for provisional self-government
promulgated.
Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically
oriented, political extremist and criminally motivated armed
groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both
through their actions in Kosovo and in southern Serbia and
Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a
continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary
threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will
have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter
and disrupt the activities of these groups, and continue to
ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding
region.
PROGRESS REVIEW
The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks
and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of
U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability;
Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and, War Crimes.
1. Task: Military Stability
Objectives
Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces
from Kosovo.
Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance
and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.
Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated
with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from
Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the Kosovo
Liberation Army has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing
hostilities in Kosovo.
Benchmarks
a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered
to the MTA
The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of Spring 1999
is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed
military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the
MTA. In 2001, NATO oversaw a reduction in the Air Safety Zone
and the return of FRY forces to the GSZ in southern Serbia, as
part of a political agreement to end fighting between
government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern
Serbia.
b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance
with the Undertaking
The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ceased to exist on
September 20, 1999. Many former KLA members chose to enter the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a civil emergency response
force, or the Kosovo Police Service.
c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer
noncompliance
The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops.
UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorizes the KPC to engage in
disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure
rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law
enforcement, security or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly
supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the
end of 2002 just under 2,000 will have moved from active to
reserve status with an additional 2,000 projected to follow.
Ten percent of the positions are reserved for minorities. The
2001 KPC budget was approximately $11.8 million.
One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the
KPC was to provide transparency to the process of
demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the
KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime,
since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has
declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month,
to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and
ammunition, and celebratory gunfire.
d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation
Commission
The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established
in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure
compliance with the MTA and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have
been established at two echelons--at KFOR Headquarters and at
each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings
between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior
Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee
for Red Cross (ICRC) and Border Police occur on a regular
basis. Topical areas range from administrative issues such as
ID cards to security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact
points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have
facilitated training for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting,
land navigation, identification of unexploded ordnance,
construction, and humanitarian relief.
e. End of Offensive Activities by armed groups
Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper,
but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and
in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for
recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and U.N. police have been
active in apprehending members of these groups and their
supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly
reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any
support for the insurgents' activities is not acceptable.
2. Task: Public Security
Objectives
Establishment and maintenance of a secure
environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of
humanitarian aid, and the safe return of refugees and displaced
persons to their homes.
Ensure protection and freedom of movement for
KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
Transfer responsibility for public safety and
order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities
can take responsibility for this function.
Significant progress has been achieved toward the
benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress
in the area of public security will require a strong continued
commitment by the international community to provide resources
for rule of law and other security programs.
Benchmarks
a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission
UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed
by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of
international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK
offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success
stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework,
municipal and province-wide elections, registration of and
distribution of ID cards to nearly one million Kosovars, and
issuance of over 30,000 travel documents recognized in 20
countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North Mitrovica)--
from travel to governance--UNMIK has been able to safely
conduct its mission.
b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities
Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb
residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established
roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were
available to IOs with little or no disruption of their
activities.
c. Humanitarian relief delivered
Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars,
led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as
humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased
operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the
delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations
through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers
ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the
goods and services they require. UNHCR also remains active in
its core protection functions, including minority stabilization
and returns.
d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility
transferred to requisite civilian authorities
Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU)
have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters
of land have been cleared and returned to use. There are 16
different international demining organizations involved in mine
awareness activities; and mine awareness has been incorporated
into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR's mandate
is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR
soldiers continue to mark newly discovered minefields for
demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has
been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordinance disposal
services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or
destruction. The overall result of this concentrated effort has
been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties. In
light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is
essentially accomplished.
e. Elections held in secure environment
UNMIK held elections for Municipal Assemblies in October
2000. Kosovars endured long lines to vote in municipal
elections that were deemed free and fair, and that were
unmarred by violence. Local assemblies and governments have
been established in almost all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities,
including most Serb-dominated ones in the north. Province-wide
elections for a Provincial Assembly were held in November 2001.
UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure
these first-ever democratic provincial elections were not
marred by any significant violence. In Spring 2002, the
Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to head
Kosovo's provisional government.
f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to
KFOR and/or UNMIK authority
There were two parallel sets of institutions initially
operating in Kosovo. The Provisional Government of Kosovo
(PGOK), led by former KLA elements, installed officials in 27
of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. These officials exercised
varying amounts of power and influence, in some cases
collecting taxes and regulating business and property. The
second set of parallel institutions was a ``shadow government''
organized by the Democratic League of Kosovo following the
unofficial elections of March 1998. The ``shadow government''
consisted of a president, prime minister and parliament. The
PGOK and the ``shadow government'' were peacefully dissolved in
January 2000, when the Joint Interim Administrative Structure
(JIAS) was implemented by UNMIK. However, Serbian parallel
institutions, primarily in the areas of health, education to
some extent, and the judiciary, continue to exist with support
from some elements in the FRY Government. In North Mitrovica,
to date, UNMIK and KFOR have not yet effectively fully
established their authority under UNSCR 1244.
g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo
Transitional Government for investigation,
prosecution, and detention; and sufficient civilian
prisons and detention facilities are established
UNMIK judicial officials and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct
all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a
suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under
the Special Representative's ``executive detention'' authority
pending UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under
his own authority, COMKFOR can confine individuals on the basis
that they pose a threat to a safe and secure environment. KFOR
maintains detention facilities for individuals at Camp
Bondsteel. Owing to a lack of capacity, UNMIK normally only
provides pretrial detention facilities for individuals charged
with very serious crimes, such as murder.
h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to
UNMIK
Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme
court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 ``minor
offenses courts,'' one ``high court of minor offense,'' one
commercial court, and 13 prosecutors offices. UNMIK has
appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors (only 320
are currently working in those positions), as well as 12
international judges and 12 international prosecutors to the
district courts and two international judges to the supreme
court. UNMIK approved the addition of seven international
judges and prosecutors. Trials are conducted in all five
district courts and lower courts. Thus, there is an embryonic
court system in place; however, concerns continue over the
ability of the criminal courts to apply judges and prosecutors,
suspected intimidation, as well as the outdated socialist
criminal code still applicable in Kosovo. Judicial training
conducted by the Kosovo Judicial Institute is beginning to
address this problem. Some cases referred by KFOR to UNMIK are
difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary problems. KFOR
soldiers are not trained criminal investigators, and often the
information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a result, some
criminal cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a lack of
prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working together to
resolve these issues. Adequate witness protection is a problem
in some cases as well.
i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) administers the Kosovo Police Service School, which has
graduated over 4,000 Kosovar police trainees. Graduate trainees
go on to complete field training and assume independent patrol
responsibilities (with UNMIK police oversight). Advanced
training phases have been added to the KPS School curriculum to
create specialized capacities, including training supervisors,
criminal investigators, traffic officers, and close protection
specialists. The United States is initiating further
specialized training in areas such as civil disorder management
and advanced criminal investigators. Major crime has dropped
substantially (by 27 percent) with the murder rate for 2001
down 51.8 percent from the previous year. Anti-Serb violence
has shown a similar downward trend, although periodic incidents
continue to mar progress. Violence in Mitrovica continues to be
a problem, with numerous UNMIK Civilian Police having been
injured in an April 8, 2002 incident.
j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police
responsibilities; and, UNMIK Special Police Unit
and KPS are capable to respond to civil
disturbances.
UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in
Pristine, Prizren, Gjilan, and Peja regions; and shares primacy
with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they recently have begun to
assert more authority to address the continuing challenge from
violent ``bridge gangs.'' UNMIK generally has been able to
handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police
Units (SPUs) that react to any civil disturbances throughout
Kosovo.
k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home
safely
Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes
in June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into
Kosovo. To date, over one million people have returned and
begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant
difficulties remain in the area of minority returns. More than
200,000 Serbs, Roma, and other minorities remain displaced
outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has
been made to date, UNMIK has predicted that the next twelve
months will be marked by a significant increase in
international community facilitated returns. KFOR cooperation
with UNHCR and UNMIK officials will be a key part of making
these returns safe and sustainable.
Freedom of movement remains a problem for many Serbs and
Roma who remain in Kosovo, living in difficult circumstances in
isolated enclaves. Some even require KFOR escort each time they
venture out. For others, freedom of movement has improved
significantly and KFOR has removed a number of checkpoints,
particularly in the MNB-E area.
3. Task: Border and Boundary Issues
Objectives
Monitor international and provincial boundaries.
Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting
insurgency and illegal goods.
Transfer border responsibilities to local
authorities.
Benchmarks
a. The FRY respects the Ground and Air Safety Zones as
stipulated in the MTA and at the discretion of the
KFOR commander
The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and Air Safety Zone (ASZ), 5-
and 25-kilometer ``buffer zones'' respectively around Kosovo,
were established to prevent boundary incidents or reentry into
Kosovo by FRY security forces. The FRY has respected the zones
from their inception. Following the change of government in
Yugoslavia and a concomitant improvement in the relationship
with NATO and KFOR, FRY security forces were allowed to reenter
the GSZ in the Spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted
successfully and in a professional manner. Similarly, the Air
Safety Zone was reduced to 10-kilometers.
b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or
indigenous border service in place to monitor
provincial and international border crossings
Kosovo's boundaries are generally unmarked and in many
areas lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Inhabitants
traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely. UNMIK
established five official border crossing points, including the
Pristina airport, where UNMIK policy control immigration and
tariffs are collected. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in this
role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring
technology. Also, a border police section of the Kosovo Police
Service has been established. Net assessment of combined
efforts is that illegal border crossings have been
significantly reduced, although much remains to be done.
4. Task: War Crimes
Objective
Full cooperation of the international security
presence with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for
the international community, continuing until the work of the
ICTY is completed.
Benchmark
a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY
KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY,
and provides area security for exhumations. The United States
deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a
cost of $5 million, and provided an additional $8.5 million for
ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In
Spring 2001 UNMIK arrested three Kosovo Albanians for war
crimes. They remain in detention pending UNMIK judicial
proceedings.
SUMMARY
NATO has adopted a regional approach to the Balkans, with a
view towards providing a smaller, lighter, more mobile and
flexible force posture. This regional approach, in conjunction
with progress in Kosovo as detailed above, has allowed a
continued reduction in KFOR levels with no weakening of NATO
engagement.