[House Document 108-6]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                     

108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-6


 
                           KOSOVO BENCHMARKS

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT 
  BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN 
                  KOSOVO, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 106-398




 January 7, 2003.--Referred jointly to the Committees on International 
Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, November 26, 2002.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to section 1212 of the Floyd D. 
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 
Public Law 106-398, I hereby submit a report, prepared by my 
Administration, on the progress made in achieving the 
militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would 
achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for 
the withdrawal of the United States military presence in 
Kosovo.
    The term ``militarily significant'' relates to tasks and 
objectives significant from a military standpoint that once 
accomplished would allow for withdrawal of military forces from 
Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, four 
critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military 
stability, public security, border/boundary issues, and war 
crimes/International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia support. Objectives for these tasks were drawn from 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO 
Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking.
    I anticipate that KFOR--and U.S. participation in it--will 
gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve 
and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own 
self-government.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
                           Kosovo Benchmarks

                              INTRODUCTION

    Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the 
Act), requires that ``The President shall develop militarily 
significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a 
sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the 
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.'' Pursuant 
to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing this report to 
Congress on progress in Kosovo toward achieving such militarily 
significant benchmarks.
    Every 6 months, NATO reviews the situation on the ground in 
Kosovo and Bosnia, and adjusts troop strengths in the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) accordingly. 
Reflecting a positive trend in the region, the Foreign 
Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important 
decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding a 
regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result 
of these decisions, KFOR will be reduced from 36,000 as of June 
2002, to 32,000 by December 2002, and 29,000 by June 2003. This 
latter figure represents about a 38 percent reduction from the 
initial KFOR commitment of 47,000 following Operation ALLIED 
FORCE in 1999. The U.S. contribution in KFOR will be reduced 
from 5,200 in June 2002 to approximately 4,000 in June 2003, 
thereby remaining at approximately 15 percent of the total 
force.

                               BACKGROUND

    The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable 
peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from 
several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo 
(OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
between the international Security Force (KFOR) and the 
governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking of Demilitarization and 
Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).
    Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the 
establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military 
tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining 
tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for 
the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for 
minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and 
refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial 
progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-
advanced, free and fair elections held twice, more than 4,900 
multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed, and a new 
constitutional framework for provisional self-government 
promulgated.
    Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically 
oriented, political extremist and criminally motivated armed 
groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both 
through their actions in Kosovo and in southern Serbia and 
Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a 
continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary 
threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will 
have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter 
and disrupt the activities of these groups, and continue to 
ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding 
region.

                            PROGRESS REVIEW

    The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks 
and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of 
U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; 
Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and, War Crimes.
1. Task: Military Stability
Objectives
     Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces 
from Kosovo.
     Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
     Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance 
and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.
    Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated 
with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from 
Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing 
hostilities in Kosovo.

Benchmarks

            a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered 
                    to the MTA
    The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of Spring 1999 
is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed 
military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the 
MTA. In 2001, NATO oversaw a reduction in the Air Safety Zone 
and the return of FRY forces to the GSZ in southern Serbia, as 
part of a political agreement to end fighting between 
government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern 
Serbia.
            b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance 
                    with the Undertaking
    The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ceased to exist on 
September 20, 1999. Many former KLA members chose to enter the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a civil emergency response 
force, or the Kosovo Police Service.
            c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer 
                    noncompliance
    The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorizes the KPC to engage in 
disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure 
rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law 
enforcement, security or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly 
supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the 
end of 2002 just under 2,000 will have moved from active to 
reserve status with an additional 2,000 projected to follow. 
Ten percent of the positions are reserved for minorities. The 
2001 KPC budget was approximately $11.8 million.
    One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the 
KPC was to provide transparency to the process of 
demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the 
KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime, 
since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has 
declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, 
to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and 
ammunition, and celebratory gunfire.
            d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation 
                    Commission
    The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established 
in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure 
compliance with the MTA and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have 
been established at two echelons--at KFOR Headquarters and at 
each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings 
between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior 
Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee 
for Red Cross (ICRC) and Border Police occur on a regular 
basis. Topical areas range from administrative issues such as 
ID cards to security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact 
points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have 
facilitated training for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, 
land navigation, identification of unexploded ordnance, 
construction, and humanitarian relief.
            e. End of Offensive Activities by armed groups
    Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, 
but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and 
in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for 
recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and U.N. police have been 
active in apprehending members of these groups and their 
supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly 
reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any 
support for the insurgents' activities is not acceptable.

2. Task: Public Security

Objectives

     Establishment and maintenance of a secure 
environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, and the safe return of refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes.
     Ensure protection and freedom of movement for 
KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
     Transfer responsibility for public safety and 
order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities 
can take responsibility for this function.
    Significant progress has been achieved toward the 
benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress 
in the area of public security will require a strong continued 
commitment by the international community to provide resources 
for rule of law and other security programs.

Benchmarks

            a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission
    UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed 
by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of 
international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK 
offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success 
stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, 
municipal and province-wide elections, registration of and 
distribution of ID cards to nearly one million Kosovars, and 
issuance of over 30,000 travel documents recognized in 20 
countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North Mitrovica)--
from travel to governance--UNMIK has been able to safely 
conduct its mission.
            b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities
    Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb 
residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established 
roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were 
available to IOs with little or no disruption of their 
activities.
            c. Humanitarian relief delivered
    Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, 
led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as 
humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased 
operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the 
delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations 
through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers 
ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the 
goods and services they require. UNHCR also remains active in 
its core protection functions, including minority stabilization 
and returns.
            d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility 
                    transferred to requisite civilian authorities
    Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) 
have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters 
of land have been cleared and returned to use. There are 16 
different international demining organizations involved in mine 
awareness activities; and mine awareness has been incorporated 
into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR's mandate 
is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR 
soldiers continue to mark newly discovered minefields for 
demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has 
been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordinance disposal 
services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or 
destruction. The overall result of this concentrated effort has 
been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties. In 
light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is 
essentially accomplished.
            e. Elections held in secure environment
    UNMIK held elections for Municipal Assemblies in October 
2000. Kosovars endured long lines to vote in municipal 
elections that were deemed free and fair, and that were 
unmarred by violence. Local assemblies and governments have 
been established in almost all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, 
including most Serb-dominated ones in the north. Province-wide 
elections for a Provincial Assembly were held in November 2001. 
UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure 
these first-ever democratic provincial elections were not 
marred by any significant violence. In Spring 2002, the 
Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to head 
Kosovo's provisional government.
            f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to 
                    KFOR and/or UNMIK authority
    There were two parallel sets of institutions initially 
operating in Kosovo. The Provisional Government of Kosovo 
(PGOK), led by former KLA elements, installed officials in 27 
of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. These officials exercised 
varying amounts of power and influence, in some cases 
collecting taxes and regulating business and property. The 
second set of parallel institutions was a ``shadow government'' 
organized by the Democratic League of Kosovo following the 
unofficial elections of March 1998. The ``shadow government'' 
consisted of a president, prime minister and parliament. The 
PGOK and the ``shadow government'' were peacefully dissolved in 
January 2000, when the Joint Interim Administrative Structure 
(JIAS) was implemented by UNMIK. However, Serbian parallel 
institutions, primarily in the areas of health, education to 
some extent, and the judiciary, continue to exist with support 
from some elements in the FRY Government. In North Mitrovica, 
to date, UNMIK and KFOR have not yet effectively fully 
established their authority under UNSCR 1244.
            g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo 
                    Transitional Government for investigation, 
                    prosecution, and detention; and sufficient civilian 
                    prisons and detention facilities are established
    UNMIK judicial officials and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct 
all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a 
suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under 
the Special Representative's ``executive detention'' authority 
pending UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under 
his own authority, COMKFOR can confine individuals on the basis 
that they pose a threat to a safe and secure environment. KFOR 
maintains detention facilities for individuals at Camp 
Bondsteel. Owing to a lack of capacity, UNMIK normally only 
provides pretrial detention facilities for individuals charged 
with very serious crimes, such as murder.
            h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to 
                    UNMIK
    Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme 
court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 ``minor 
offenses courts,'' one ``high court of minor offense,'' one 
commercial court, and 13 prosecutors offices. UNMIK has 
appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors (only 320 
are currently working in those positions), as well as 12 
international judges and 12 international prosecutors to the 
district courts and two international judges to the supreme 
court. UNMIK approved the addition of seven international 
judges and prosecutors. Trials are conducted in all five 
district courts and lower courts. Thus, there is an embryonic 
court system in place; however, concerns continue over the 
ability of the criminal courts to apply judges and prosecutors, 
suspected intimidation, as well as the outdated socialist 
criminal code still applicable in Kosovo. Judicial training 
conducted by the Kosovo Judicial Institute is beginning to 
address this problem. Some cases referred by KFOR to UNMIK are 
difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary problems. KFOR 
soldiers are not trained criminal investigators, and often the 
information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a result, some 
criminal cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a lack of 
prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working together to 
resolve these issues. Adequate witness protection is a problem 
in some cases as well.
            i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective
    The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) administers the Kosovo Police Service School, which has 
graduated over 4,000 Kosovar police trainees. Graduate trainees 
go on to complete field training and assume independent patrol 
responsibilities (with UNMIK police oversight). Advanced 
training phases have been added to the KPS School curriculum to 
create specialized capacities, including training supervisors, 
criminal investigators, traffic officers, and close protection 
specialists. The United States is initiating further 
specialized training in areas such as civil disorder management 
and advanced criminal investigators. Major crime has dropped 
substantially (by 27 percent) with the murder rate for 2001 
down 51.8 percent from the previous year. Anti-Serb violence 
has shown a similar downward trend, although periodic incidents 
continue to mar progress. Violence in Mitrovica continues to be 
a problem, with numerous UNMIK Civilian Police having been 
injured in an April 8, 2002 incident.
            j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police 
                    responsibilities; and, UNMIK Special Police Unit 
                    and KPS are capable to respond to civil 
                    disturbances.
    UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in 
Pristine, Prizren, Gjilan, and Peja regions; and shares primacy 
with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they recently have begun to 
assert more authority to address the continuing challenge from 
violent ``bridge gangs.'' UNMIK generally has been able to 
handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police 
Units (SPUs) that react to any civil disturbances throughout 
Kosovo.
            k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home 
                    safely
    Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes 
in June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into 
Kosovo. To date, over one million people have returned and 
begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant 
difficulties remain in the area of minority returns. More than 
200,000 Serbs, Roma, and other minorities remain displaced 
outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has 
been made to date, UNMIK has predicted that the next twelve 
months will be marked by a significant increase in 
international community facilitated returns. KFOR cooperation 
with UNHCR and UNMIK officials will be a key part of making 
these returns safe and sustainable.
    Freedom of movement remains a problem for many Serbs and 
Roma who remain in Kosovo, living in difficult circumstances in 
isolated enclaves. Some even require KFOR escort each time they 
venture out. For others, freedom of movement has improved 
significantly and KFOR has removed a number of checkpoints, 
particularly in the MNB-E area.

3. Task: Border and Boundary Issues

Objectives

     Monitor international and provincial boundaries.
     Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting 
insurgency and illegal goods.
     Transfer border responsibilities to local 
authorities.

Benchmarks

            a. The FRY respects the Ground and Air Safety Zones as 
                    stipulated in the MTA and at the discretion of the 
                    KFOR commander
    The Ground Safety Zone (GSZ) and Air Safety Zone (ASZ), 5- 
and 25-kilometer ``buffer zones'' respectively around Kosovo, 
were established to prevent boundary incidents or reentry into 
Kosovo by FRY security forces. The FRY has respected the zones 
from their inception. Following the change of government in 
Yugoslavia and a concomitant improvement in the relationship 
with NATO and KFOR, FRY security forces were allowed to reenter 
the GSZ in the Spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted 
successfully and in a professional manner. Similarly, the Air 
Safety Zone was reduced to 10-kilometers.
            b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or 
                    indigenous border service in place to monitor 
                    provincial and international border crossings
    Kosovo's boundaries are generally unmarked and in many 
areas lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Inhabitants 
traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely. UNMIK 
established five official border crossing points, including the 
Pristina airport, where UNMIK policy control immigration and 
tariffs are collected. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in this 
role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring 
technology. Also, a border police section of the Kosovo Police 
Service has been established. Net assessment of combined 
efforts is that illegal border crossings have been 
significantly reduced, although much remains to be done.

4. Task: War Crimes

Objective

     Full cooperation of the international security 
presence with the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY).
    The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for 
the international community, continuing until the work of the 
ICTY is completed.

Benchmark

            a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY
    KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY, 
and provides area security for exhumations. The United States 
deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a 
cost of $5 million, and provided an additional $8.5 million for 
ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In 
Spring 2001 UNMIK arrested three Kosovo Albanians for war 
crimes. They remain in detention pending UNMIK judicial 
proceedings.

                                SUMMARY

    NATO has adopted a regional approach to the Balkans, with a 
view towards providing a smaller, lighter, more mobile and 
flexible force posture. This regional approach, in conjunction 
with progress in Kosovo as detailed above, has allowed a 
continued reduction in KFOR levels with no weakening of NATO 
engagement.

                                
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