[House Document 108-50]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document
108-50
A REPORT IN CONNECTION WITH PRESIDENTIAL DETERMINATION UNDER PUBLIC
LAW 107-243
__________
COMMUNICATION
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING
A REPORT CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 3(b) OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF
MILITARY FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002 (PUBLIC LAW 107-243)
March 19, 2003.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, March 18, 2003.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with section 3(b) of the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), and based on information
available to me, including that in the enclosed document, I
determine that:
(1) reliance by the United States on further
diplomatic and other peaceful means alone will neither
(A) adequately protect the national security of the
United States against the continuing threat posed by
Iraq nor (B) likely lead to enforcement of all relevant
United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding
Iraq; and
(2) acting pursuant to the Constitution and Public
Law 107-243 is consistent with the United States and
other countries continuing to take the necessary
actions against international terrorists and terrorist
organizations, including those nations, organizations,
or persons who planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11,
2001.
Sincerely,
George W. Bush.
Report in Connection With Presidential Determination Under Public Law
107-243
This report summarizes diplomatic and other peaceful means
pursued by the United States, working for more than a dozen
years with cooperating foreign countries and international
organizations such as the United Nations, in an intensive
effort (1) to protect the national security of the United
States, as well as the security of other countries, against the
continuing threat posed by Iraqi development and use of weapons
of mass destruction, and (2) to obtain Iraqi compliance with
all relevant United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions
regarding Iraq. Because of the intransigence and defiance of
the Iraqi regime, further continuation of these efforts will
neither adequately protect the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq nor likely
lead to enforcement of all relevant UNSC resolutions regarding
Iraq.
This report also explains that a determination to use force
against Iraq is fully consistent with the United States and
other countries continuing to take the necessary actions
against international terrorists and terrorist organizations,
including those nations, organizations, or persons who planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that
occurred on September 11, 2001. Indeed, as Congress found when
it passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against
Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243), Iraq continues to
harbor and aid international terrorists and terrorist
organizations, including organizations that threaten the safety
of United States citizens. The use of military force to remove
the Iraqi regime is therefore not only consistent with, but is
a vital part of, the international war on terrorism.
This document is summary in form rather than a
comprehensive and definitive rendition of actions taken and
related factual data that would constitute a complete
historical record. This document should be considered in light
of the information that has been, and will be, furnished to
Congress, including the period reports consistent with the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
(Public Law 102-1) and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).
1. THE GULF WAR AND CONDITIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE
On August 2, 1990, President Saddam Hussein of Iraq
initiated the brutal and unprovoked invasion and occupation of
Kuwait. The United States and many foreign governments, working
together and through the UN, sought by diplomatic and other
peaceful means to compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to
establish international peace and security in the region.
President George H.W. Bush's letter transmitted to Congress
on January 16, 1991, was accompanied by a report that
catalogued the extensive diplomatic, economic, and other
peaceful means pursued by the United States to achieve U.S. and
UNSC objectives. It details adoption by the UNSC of a dozen
resolutions, from Resolution 660 of August 2, 1990, demanding
that Iraw withdraw from Kuwait, to Resolution 678 on November
29, 1990, authorizing member states to use all necessary means
to ``implement Resolution 660,'' to implement ``all subsequent
relevant resolutions,'' and ``to restore international peace
and security in the area.''
Despite extraordinary and concerted efforts by the United
States, other countries, and international organizations
through diplomacy, multilateral economic sanctions, and other
peaceful means to bring about Iraqi compliance with UNSC
resolutions, and even after the UN and the United States
explicitly informed Iraq that its failure to comply with UNSC
resolutions would result in the use of armed force to eject
Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Saddam Hussein's regime remained
intransigent. The President ordered the U.S. armed forces,
working in a coalition with the armed forces of other
cooperating countries, to liberate Kuwait. The coalition forces
promptly drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait, set Kuwait free, and
moved into southern Iraq.
On April 3, 1991, the UNSC adopted Resolution 687, which
established conditions for a cease-fire to suspend hostilities.
Among other requirements, UNSCR 687 required Iraq to (1)
destroy its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic
missiles with ranges greater than 150 km; (2) not use, develop,
construct, or acquire biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems; (3) submit to international
inspections to verify compliance; and (4) not commit or support
any act of international terrorism or allow others who commit
such acts to operate in Iraqi territory. On April 6, 1991, Iraq
communicated to the UNSC its acceptance of the conditions for
the cease-fire.
2. IRAQ'S BREACH OF THE CEASE-FIRE CONDITIONS: THREATS TO PEACE AND
SECURITY
Since almost the moment it agreed to the conditions of the
cease-fire, Iraq has committed repeated and escalating breaches
of those conditions. Throughout the first seven years that Iraq
accepted inspections, it repeatedly obstructed access to sites
designated by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)
and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On two
occasions, in 1993 and 1998, Iraq's refusal to comply with its
international obligations under the cease-fire led to military
action by coalition forces. In 1998, under threat of ``severest
consequences,'' Iraq signed a Memorandum of Understanding
pledging full cooperation with UNSCOM and IAEA and ``immediate,
unconditional and unrestricted'' access for their inspections.
In a matter of months, however, the Iraqi regime suspended
cooperation, in part an effort to condition compliance on the
lifting of oil sanctions; it ultimately ceased all cooperation,
causing the inspectors to leave the country.
On December 17, 1999, after a year with no inspections in
Iraq, the UNSC established the United Nations Monitoring,
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) as a successor
to UNSCOM, to address unresolved disarmament issues and verify
Iraqi compliance with the disarmament required by UNSCR 687 and
related resolutions. Iraq refused to allow inspectors to return
for yet another three years.
3. RECENT DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER PEACEFUL MEANS REJECTED BY IRAQ
On September 12, 2002, the President addressed the United
Nations General Assembly on Iraq. He challenged the United
Nations to act decisively to deal with Iraq's systematic
twelve-year defiance and to compel Iraq's disarmament of the
weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems that continue
to threaten international peace and security. The White House
background paper, ``A Decade of Deception and Defiance: Saddam
Hussein's Defiance of the United Nations'' (September 12,
2002), summarized Iraq's actions as of the time the President
initiated intensified efforts to enforce all relevant UN
Resolutions and demonstrates the failure of diplomacy to affect
Iraq's conduct:
For more than a decade, Saddam Hussein has deceived and
defied the will and resolutions of the United Nations
Security Council by, among other things: continuing to
seek and develop chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons, and prohibited long-range missiles;
brutalizing the Iraqi people, including committing
gross human rights violations and crimes against
humanity; supporting international terrorism; refusing
to release or account for prisoners of war and other
missing individuals from the Gulf War era; refusing to
return stolen Kuwaiti property; and working to
circumvent the UN's economic sanctions.
The President also summarized Iraq's response to a decade
of diplomatic efforts and its breach of the cease-fire
conditions on October 7, 2002, in an address in Cincinnati,
Ohio:
Eleven years ago, as a condition for ending the
Persian Gulf War, the Iraqi regime was required to
destroy its weapons of mass destruction, to cease all
development of such weapons, and to stop all support
for terrorist groups. The Iraqi regime has violated all
of those obligations. It possesses and produces
chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear
weapons. It has given shelter and support to terrorism,
and practices terror against its own people. The entire
world has witnessed Iraq's eleven-year history of
defiance, deception and bad faith.
In response to the President's challenge of September 12,
2002, and after intensive negotiation and diplomacy, the UNSC
unanimously adopted UNSCR 1441 on November 8, 2002. The UNSC
declared that Iraq ``has been and remains in material breach''
of its disarmament obligations, but chose to afford Iraq one
``final opportunity'' to comply. The UNSC again placed the
burden on Iraq to comply and disarm and not on the inspectors
to try to find what Iraq is concealing. The UNSC made clear
that any false statements or omissions in declarations and any
failure by Iraq to comply with UNSCR 1441 would constitute a
further material breach of Iraq's obligations. Rather than
seizing this final opportunity for a peaceful solution by
giving full and immediate cooperation, the Hussein regime
responded with renewed defiance and deception.
For example, while UNSCR 1441 required that Iraq provide a
``currently accurate, full and complete'' declaration of all
aspects of its weapons of mass destruction (``WMD'') and
delivery programs, Iraq's Declaration of December 7, 2002,
failed to comply with that requirement. The 12,000-page
document that Iraq provided was little more than a restatement
of old and discredited material. It was incomplete, inaccurate,
and composed mostly of recycled information that failed to
address any of the outstanding disarmament questions inspectors
had previously identified.
In addition, since the passage of UNSCR 1441, Iraq has
failed to cooperate fully with inspectors. It delayed until
two-and-a-half months after the resumption of inspections
UNMOVIC's use of aerial surveillance flights; failed to provide
private access to officials for interview by inspectors;
intimidated witnesses with threats; undertook massive efforts
to deceive and defeat inspectors, including cleanup and
transshipment activities at nearly 30 sites; failed to provide
numerous documents requested by UNMOVIC; repeatedly provided
incomplete or outdated listings of its WMD personnel; and hid
documents in homes, including over 2000 pages of Iraqi
documents regarding past uranium enrichment programs. In a
report dated March 6, 2003, UNMOVIC described over 600
instances in which Iraq had failed to declare fully activities
related to its chemical, biological, or missile procurement.
Dr. Hans Blix, Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, reported to
the UNSC on January 27, 2003 that ``Iraq appears not to have
come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the
disarmament which was demanded of it.'' Dr. Mohamed El Baradei,
Director General of the IAEA, reported that Iraq's declaration
of December 7 ``did not provide any new information relevant to
certain questions that have been outstanding since 1998.'' Both
demonstrated that there was no evidence that Iraq had decided
to comply with disarmament obligations. Diplomatic efforts have
not affected Iraq's conduct positively. Any temporary changes
in Iraq's approach that have occurred over the years have been
in response to the threat of use of force.
On February 5, 2003, the Secretary of State delivered a
comprehensive presentation to the UNSC using declassified
information, including human intelligence reports,
communications intercepts and overhead imagery, which
demonstrated Iraq's ongoing efforts to pursue WMD programs and
conceal them from UN inspectors. The Secretary of State updated
that presentation one month later by detailing intelligence
reports on continuing efforts by Iraq to maintain and conceal
proscribed materials.
Despite the continued resistance by Iraq, the United States
has continued to use diplomatic and other peaceful means to
achieve complete and total disarmament that would adequately
protect the national security of the United States from the
threat posed by Iraq and which is required by all relevant UNSC
resolutions. On March 7, 2003, the United States, United
Kingdom, and Spain presented a draft resolution that would have
established for Iraq a March 17 deadline to cooperate fully
with disarmament demands. Since the adoption of UNSCR 1441 in
November 2002, there have been numerous calls and meetings by
President Bush and the Secretary of State with other world
leaders to try to find a diplomatic or other peaceful way to
disarm Iraq. On March 13, 2003, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN
asked for members of the UNSC to consider seriously a British
proposal to establish six benchmarks that would be used to
measure whether or not the regime in Iraq is coming into full,
immediate, and unconditional compliance with the pertinent UN
resolutions. On March 16, 2003, the President traveled to the
Azores to meet with Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Manuel Durao
Barroso, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and Spanish Prime
Minister Jose Maria Aznar to assess the situation and confirm
that diplomatic and other peaceful means have been attempted to
achieve Iraqi compliance with all relevant UNSC resolutions.
Despite these diplomatic and peaceful efforts, Iraq remains in
breach of relevant UNSC resolutions and a threat to the United
States and other countries. Further diplomatic efforts were
suspended reluctantly after, as the President observed on March
17, ``some permanent members of the Security Council ha[d]
publicly announced they will veto any resolution that compels
the disarmament of Iraq.''
The lesson learned after twelve years of Iraqi defiance is
that the appearance of progress on process is meaningless--what
is necessary is immediate, active, and unconditional
cooperation in the complete disarmament of Iraq's prohibited
weapons. As a result of its repeated failure to cooperate with
efforts aimed at actual disarmament, Iraq has retained weapons
of mass destruction that it agreed, as an essential condition
of the cease-fire in 1991, not to develop or possess. The
Secretary of State's February 5, 2003, presentation cited
examples, such as Iraq's biological weapons based on anthrax
and botulinum toxin, chemical weapons based on mustard and
nerve agents, proscribed missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles
to deliver weapons of mass destruction, and mobile biological
weapons factories. The Secretary of State also discussed with
the Security Council Saddam Hussein's efforts to reconstitute
Iraq's nuclear weapons program.
The dangers posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and
long-range missiles are clear. Saddam Hussein has already used
such weapons, repeatedly. He used them against Iranian troops
in the 1980s. He used ballistic missiles against civilians
during the Gulf War, firing Scud missiles into Israel and Saudi
Arabia. He used chemical weapons against the Iraqi people in
Northern Iraq. As Congress stated in 1998 in Public Law 105-
235, ``Iraq's continuing weapons of mass destruction programs
threaten vital United States interests and international peace
and security.'' Congress concluded in Public Law 105-388 that
``[i]t should be the policy of the United States to support
efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from
power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic
government to replace that regime.''
In addition, Congress states in the Authorization for Use
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law
107-243), that:
Iraq both poses a continuing threat to the national
security of the United States and international peace
and security in the Persian Gulf region and remains in
material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations by, among other things, continuing to
possess and develop a significant chemical and
biological weapons capability, actively seeking a
nuclear weapons capability, and supporting and
harboring terrorist organizations.
Nothing that has occurred in the past twelve years, the
past twelve months, the past twelve weeks, or the past twelve
days provides any basis for concluding that further diplomatic
or other peaceful means will adequately protect the national
security of the United States from the continuing threat posed
by Iraq or are likely to lead to enforcement of all relevant
UNSC resolutions regarding Iraq and the restoration of peace
and security in the area.
As the President stated on March 17, ``[t]he Iraqi regime
has used diplomacy as a ploy to gain time and advantage.''
Further delay in taking action against Iraq will only serve to
give Saddam Hussein's regime additional time to further develop
WMD to use against the United States, its citizens, and its
allies. The United States and the UN have long demanded
immediate, active, and unconditional cooperation by Iraq in the
disarmament of its weapons of mass destruction. There is no
reason to believe that Iraq will disarm, and cooperate with
inspections to verify such disarmament, if the U.S. and the UN
employ only diplomacy and other peaceful means.
4. USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ IS CONSISTENT WITH THE WAR ON TERROR
In Public Law 107-243, Congress made a number of findings
concerning Iraq's support for international terrorism. Among
other things, Congress determined that:
Members of al Qaida, an organization bearing
responsibility for attacks on the United States, its citizens,
and interests, including the attacks that occurred on September
11, 2001, are known to be in Iraq.
Iraq continues to aid and harbor other
international terrorist organizations, including organizations
that threaten the lives and safety of United States citizens.
It is in the national security interests of the
United States and in furtherance of the war on terrorism that
all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions be
enforced, including through the use of force if necessary.
In addition, the Secretary of State's address to the UN on
February 5, 2003 revealed a terrorist training area in
northeastern Iraq with ties to Iraqi intelligence and
activities of al Qaida affiliates in Baghdad. Public reports
indicate that Iraq is currently harboring senior members of a
terrorist network led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a close al Qaida
associate. In addition, Iraq has provided training in document
forgery and explosives to al Qaida. Other terrorist groups have
been supported by Iraq over past years.
Iraq has a long history of supporting terrorism and
continues to be a safe haven, transit point, and operational
node for groups and individuals who direct violence against the
United States and our allies. These actions violate Iraq's
obligations under the UNSCR 687 cease-fire not to commit or
support any act of international terrorism or allow others who
commit such acts to operate in Iraqi territory. Iraq has also
failed to comply with its cease-fire obligations to disarm and
submit to international inspections to verify compliance. In
light of these Iraqi activities, the use of force by the United
States and other countries against the current Iraqi regime is
fully consistent with--indeed, it is an integral part of--the
war against international terrorists and terrorist
organizations.
Both because Iraq harbors terrorists and because Iraq could
share weapons of mass destruction with terrorists who seek them
for use against the United States, the use of force to bring
Iraq into compliance with its obligations under UNSC
resolutions would be a significant contribution to the war on
terrorists of global reach. A change in the current Iraqi
regime would eliminate an important source of support for
international terrorist activities. It would likely also assist
efforts to disrupt terrorist networks and capture terrorists
around the globe. United States Government personnel operating
in Iraq may discover information through Iraqi government
documents and interviews with detained Iraqi officials that
would identify individuals currently in the United States and
abroad who are linked to terrorist organizations.
The use of force against Iraq will directly advance the war
on terror, and will be consistent with continuing efforts
against international terrorists residing and operating
elsewhere in the world. The U.S. armed forces remain engaged in
key areas around the world in the prosecution of the war on
terrorism. The necessary preparations for and conduct of
military operations in Iraq have not diminished the resolve,
capability, or activities of the United States to pursue
international terrorists to protect our homeland. Nor will the
use of military force against Iraq distract civilian
departments and agencies of the United States Government from
continuing aggressive efforts in combating terrorism, or divert
resources from the overall world-wide counter-terrorism effort.
Current counter-terrorism investigations and activities will
continue during any military conflict, and winning the war on
terrorism will remain the top priority for our Government.
Indeed, the United States has made significant progress on
other fronts in the war on terror even while Iraq and its
threat to the United States and other countries have been a
focus of concern. Since November 2002, when deployments of
forces to the Gulf were substantially increased, the United
States, in cooperation with our allies, has arrested or
captured several terrorists and frustrated several terrorist
plots. For example, on March 1, 2003, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
was captured in Rawalpindi, Pakistan by Pakistani authorities,
with U.S. cooperation. The capture of Sheikh Mohammed, the al
Qaida ``mastermind'' of the September 11th attacks and Usama
Bin Laden's senior terrorist attack planner, is a severe blow
to al Qaida that will destabilize the terrorist network
worldwide. This and other successes make clear that the United.
States Government remains focused on the war on terror, and
that use of force in Iraq is fully consistent with continuing
to take necessary actions against terrorists and terrorist
organizations.
5. CONCLUSION
In the circumstances described above, the President of the
United States has the authority--indeed, given the dangers
involved, the duty--to use force against Iraq to protect the
security of the American people and to compel compliance with
UNSC resolutions.
The President has full authority to use the armed forces in
Iraq under the U.S. Constitution, including his authority as
Commander in Chief of the U.S. armed forces. This authority is
supported by explicit statutory authorizations contained in the
Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution
(Public Law 102-1) and the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-243).
In addition, U.S. action is consistent with the UN Charter.
The UNSC, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, provided
that member states, including the United States, have the right
to use force in Iraq to maintain or restore international peace
and security. The Council authorized the use of force in UNSCR
678 with respect to Iraq in 1990. This resolution--on which the
United States has relied continuously and with the full
knowledge of the UNSC to use force in 1993, 1996, and 1998 and
to enforce the no-fly zones--remains in effect today. In UNSCR
1441, the UNSC unanimously decided again that Iraq has been and
remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant
resolutions and would face serious consequences if it failed
immediately to disarm. And, of course, based on existing facts,
including the nature and type of the threats posed by Iraq, the
United States may always proceed in the exercise of its
inherent right of self defense, recognized in Article 51 of the
UN Charter.
Accordingly, the United States has clear authority to use
military force against Iraq to assure its national security and
to compel Iraq's compliance with applicable UNSC resolutions.