[House Document 108-41]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-41
EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C.
1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c)
February 26, 2003.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by section 204(c) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), I
transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared by my
Administration on the national emergency with respect to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was declared
in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994.
George W. Bush.
The White House, February 25, 2003.
Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding
Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
This report to the Congress addresses the developments over
the past 6 months concerning the national emergency with
respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD)--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and the means
of delivering such weapons, that was declared in Executive
Order 12938 on November 14, 1994, as amended by Executive Order
13094 of July 28, 1998. This report is submitted pursuant to
section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) and section 401(c) of the
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c). It reports actions
taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency
declaration only during the period of May 15, 2002 through
November 12, 2002.
To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD
and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). On July 28, 1998, President Clinton,
pursuant to the provisions of IEEPA, issued E.O. 13094 to amend
E.O. 12938 in order to respond more effectively to the
worldwide threat of WMD proliferation. Under section 202(d) of
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration
unless, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary
date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register
and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national
emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996;
November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999;
November 12, 2000; November 9, 2001; and November 12, 2002.
Weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons--and their missile delivery systems in the
hands of potential adversary states and terrorists are among
the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War world. In
the hands of countries like those on the U.S. list of
terrorist-supporting states, these weapons would pose direct
threats to the United States and its forces, friends and
allies. Some of these rogue states are already working on
intercontinental-range missiles that would be able to deliver
WMD against our homeland directly.
This Administration has given high priority to dealing with
the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and
subsequent anthrax crimes reinforce the importance of efforts
to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, especially to
terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists.
Additional information on nuclear, missile and/or chemical
and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts may be found in
the following reports: (a) the most recent annual Report on the
Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear,
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant
to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as
the ``Nonproliferation Report;'' (b) the most recent semi-
annual Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced
Conventional Munitions, provided to Congress pursuant to
Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1997; (c) the most recent annual report entitled
``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,''
provided pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most recent report on
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided pursuant to
Section 585 of the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing, and
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-
208); (e) the most recent report on Nuclear Nonproliferation
Policy in South Asia, provided pursuant to Public Law 102-391,
Section 585; (f) the most recent Report on Regional
Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted pursuant to Section
620F(c) of Foreign Assistance Act; (g) the most recent Nuclear
Nonproliferation Report known as the ``section 601 Report,''
submitted pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242), as amended by
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; (h) the most
recent semiannual report on Proliferation-Related Transfers to
Iran, submitted pursuant to Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000;
(i) the most recent report on the Iran-Iraq Arms
Nonproliferation Act of 1992, sections 1604-1608; and (j) the
most recent report on Libya sanctions, provided pursuant to
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, section 5(b).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of
the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation. The first
meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT
Review Conference (RevCon) took place April 8-19, 2002, at U.N.
headquarters in New York. The PrepCom successfully completed
its work by issuing the Chairman's report--a factual summary
for transmission to PrepCom II, which will take place in Geneva
from April 28 to May 9, 2003, under the Chairmanship of
Hungarian Ambassador Laszlo Molnar.
The United States engaged in consultations with Ambassador
Molnar in June, August, and October of 2002. These
consultations focused on key procedural and substantive issues
relevant to PrepCom II. Wide-ranging bilateral discussions with
several key NPT parties were also held in Washington, Budapest,
Geneva, London, and New York. The five Nuclear Weapons States
of the NPT (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China) also met in
New York to discuss their approach to PrepCom II.
The United States continues to emphasize the importance of
compliance with the NPT and looks forward to PrepCom II as an
opportunity for further discussion of ways and means to
implement the Treaty. The United States will continue to meet
all of its obligations under the NPT and notes that the signing
on May 21, 2002 of the Moscow Treaty for the reduction of
deployed strategic offensive nuclear weapons demonstrates that
the United States continues to meet its obligations under the
nuclear disarmament-related provisions of Article VI of the
NPT.
Iraq's and North Korea's noncompliance with the NPT remains
of primary concern as set forth below. North Korea's admission
in October 2002 of a secret uranium enrichment project further
underscored the requirement to bring North Korea into
compliance with the NPT. Iran's nuclear program is also aimed
at the acquisition of nuclear weapons in violation of its NPT
undertakings.
Another significant development during the reporting period
was Cuba's announcement on September 14, 2002, that it intends
to become a party to the NPT.
International Atomic Energy Agency: The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the
compliance of non-nuclear weapons states with their NPT
safeguards obligations. The IAEA safeguards system helps deter
diversion of nuclear materials and provides a means to detect
diversions in a timely manner should any occur. During this
reporting period, the United States continued to provide
significant technical and financial resources to support IAEA
safeguards activities.
The discovery of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities
after the Persian Gulf War led to an effort to strengthen the
IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear
material and activities. The United States, along with a large
number of other IAEA members, negotiated in the mid-1990s
substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the
use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the
information related to nuclear activities which States are
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Those
measures are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved
in 1997. With these tools, the IAEA's capability to detect and
assess a state's undeclared nuclear activity is substantially
enhanced. This Protocol has now been signed by 61 states and
has entered into force for 24 countries.
On May 9, 2002, the President submitted the U.S.-IAEA
Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification. In doing so, he emphasized that entry into force
of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts
to strengthen nuclear safeguards and therefore promote the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of
U.S. foreign and national security policy.
At the September 16-20, 2002 IAEA General Conference, the
IAEA's Director General reiterated the Agency's strong
commitment to stemming the proliferation of nuclear and
radiological weapons. He explained the Agency's continued
efforts in combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. A
resolution on countering nuclear terrorism, proposed by the
European Union (EU), was adopted, praising the IAEA for its
significantly greater efforts in nuclear security and urging
Member States to improve their national programs to secure
radioactive materials. A resolution was adopted charging the
IAEA to ascertain whether Iraq's nuclear activities and
capabilities had changed since December 1998. A resolution on
the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system was
adopted, urging States that have not yet done so to sign and
ratify Additional Protocols. A resolution on the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) NPT safeguards agreement was
adopted by consensus. More states cosponsored the resolution
than last year, indicating increased international concern over
the DPRK's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
The Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT
Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of
the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear
exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure
that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear
weapons states of (a) source or special fissionable material,
or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material. The Committee maintains and updates a list of
equipment and materials that may only be exported if safeguards
are applied to the recipient facility (called the ``Trigger
List'' because such exports trigger the requirement for
safeguards).
The Zangger Committee is informal and its decisions are not
legally binding upon its members. The relative informality of
the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the lead on
certain nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to
resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Zangger
Committee, by virtue of its link to the NPT, is in a better
position to represent the nuclear nonproliferation regimes in
dialogue with non-members critical of these regimes in NPT
meetings.
All of the NPT Nuclear Weapons States, including China, are
members of the Zangger Committee. However, China is the only
member of the Zangger Committee that is not also a member of
the NSG, which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a
condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states.
China has not been willing to accept the FSS policy, but its
export control lists are comparable, if not virtually
identical, to the NSG's.
At the October 2002 meeting, the Committee again discussed
the application of Belarus for membership. The United States is
still not prepared to join a consensus for acceptance of
Belarus because of concern regarding that Government's
commitment to nonproliferation.
The Committee also continued discussion of possible
outreach activities with non-member NPT Party countries,
particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries. The Committee also
considered proposals by the Chairman to engage in new areas of
activity in the post-9/11 environment, including: (1) serving
as a technical resource for non-member NPT Parties; (2)
encouraging early ratification by states of the Additional
Protocol to strengthen IAEA safeguards; and (3) adopting anti-
terrorism measures. Efforts will continue to reach agreement on
inclusion of plutonium isotope separation equipment on the
Trigger List, through technology-holders meetings chaired by
Sweden.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group: The NSG was formed in 1974
following the Indian nuclear explosion, which demonstrated how
nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful
purposes could be misused. With 40 member states, the NSG is a
widely accepted, mature, and effective export control
arrangement that contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear
weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of
nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of
the NSG through voluntary adherence to the NSG Guidelines,
which are adopted by consensus, and through exchanges of
information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.
Nuclear suppliers took note when the 1990 NPT RevCon
committee on implementation of Article III recommended that NPT
Parties: (a) consider further improvements in measures to
prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons;
(b) coordinate controls of exports of significant nuclear-
related items; and (c) require full-scope safeguards as a
condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states.
Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that nuclear export
controls had not prevented Iraq, a Party to the NPT, from
aiding its clandestine nuclear weapons program through
acquisition of significant dual-use items. In response to these
developments, the NSG decided in 1992 to: (a) establish
guidelines for control of transfers of nuclear-related dual-use
equipment, materials, and technology which could make a
significant contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or
nuclear explosive activities; and (b) adopt a policy of
requiring full scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply
for nuclear Trigger List items to non-nuclear weapons states.
The NSG Guidelines, first published in 1978, established
requirements for: (1) formal recipient government assurances
confirming safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2)
adequate physical protection; and (3) particular caution in the
transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-
useable materials. The Guidelines also strengthened retransfer
conditions. The first set of NSG Guidelines (Part 1) cover the
``Trigger List'' of nuclear materials and equipment whose
export requires the application of full-scope IAEA safeguards
in the recipient country. The second set of NSG Guidelines
(Part 2) governs exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment
and materials. The NSG Guidelines also control technology
related to both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports.
Both Parts 1 and 2 of the NSG Guidelines aim to ensure that
nuclear trade for peaceful purposes does not contribute to the
proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices while not
hindering such trade.
Chairmanship of the NSG rotates on an annual basis with the
host of the annual Plenary meetings assuming the Chair for that
year. As mandated by the 2001 Plenary, the NSG Consultative
Group (CG) meets at least twice a year to coordinate both Part
1 and Part 2 issues such as review of the Guidelines and
control lists, procedures, information sharing, transparency,
and outreach activities. The Permanent Mission of Japan in
Vienna serves as the NSG Point of Contact in providing
administrative support, including provision of meeting space
and distribution of documents.
The Czech Republic hosted the 2002 NSG Plenary and related
meetings in Prague, May 13-17, 2002. On May 13, the first
Licensing and Enforcement Exports Meeting (LEEM) was held as a
trial run under the chairmanship of the U.K. and under the
aegis of the Information Exchange Meeting (IEM). LEEM
participants made presentations on licensing and enforcement
infrastructure and coordination as well as case studies. NSG
members agreed that the LEEM was successful and should become a
regular part of Plenary week. The IEM was also very successful,
with 18 presentations by nine Participating Governments on
nuclear activities of concern, analyses of export denials, and
technical briefings.
The CG met on May 14 and 15, 2002 and discussed U.S. anti-
terrorism proposals, including amendments to the Guidelines and
expanded information sharing. There was broad support in
principle for addressing the issue of nuclear terrorism,
although some delegations suggested a cautious approach on any
amendments to the Guidelines. The CG recommended and the
Plenary agreed to continue discussion of the anti-terrorism
proposal.
The Plenary met on May 16 and 17, 2002. The Czech Republic
acceded to the Chair of the NSG. Kazakhstan was welcomed as a
newly admitted member. The U.S. Acting Outgoing NSG Chair
reported on activities and work of the NSG since May 2001,
including outreach contacts with non-member governments. The
Plenary authorized the new NSG Chair to continue outreach
contacts with China, Egypt, India, Iran, and Pakistan and
initiate contacts with Malaysia, Mexico, Indonesia, and Israel.
Many delegations expressed continued concern over differing
interpretations within the NSG of the NSG Guidelines,
particularly if such interpretations undermine the credibility
of the NSG and the objectives of the NPT (e.g., the situation
created by Russian nuclear supply to India). This issue will
continue to be discussed at future NSG meetings. The Plenary
welcomed the offer of the Republic of Korea to host the 2003
Plenary in May 2003.
In September 2002, the NSG held an informal Plenary meeting
in Vienna to discuss U.S. proposals to add anti-terrorism
language to the Guidelines. During its October 2002 meeting in
Vienna, the NSG CG continued discussion of the U.S. anti-
terrorism proposal and considered U.S. proposals to enhance
information sharing. The issue of differing interpretations
within the NSG of the full-scope safeguards provisions of the
Guidelines also was discussed. The NSG Chair reported on his
September 2002 outreach meetings with non-NSG members.
South Asia Nuclear: Since their May 1998 nuclear tests,
India and Pakistan have openly pursued their respective nuclear
weapon programs and have continued to increase their stockpiles
of fissile material. Both maintain active ballistic missile
programs and have flight-tested short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. Each could deploy nuclear weapons in a
short period of time. The United States has raised its WMD and
missile proliferation-related concerns with Indian and
Pakistani officials on many occasions, calling on them to:
maintain their nuclear testing moratoria; not assemble nuclear
weapons; bring an end to the production of fissile material;
return any missiles deployed during the current crisis to pre-
crisis status as soon as possible; limit flight-tests of
ballistic missiles; resume their bilateral dialogue; bring
their export controls in line with international standards;
prevent transfers to other countries related to missiles,
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons; and help prevent
proliferation globally. We seek a dialogue with both countries
on these issues that is collaborative and constructive.
Some progress has been achieved in bringing Indian and
Pakistani export controls into closer conformity with
international standards. In April 2000, India instituted new,
more specific regulations on many categories of sensitive non-
nuclear equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-
related regulations will be forthcoming; in September 2000 it
agreed to strengthen its export control laws and practices. In
July 2001, Pakistan publicly announced regulations restricting
nuclear exports and has indicated that further measures are
being prepared. Even so, we are concerned about the potential
for Pakistani nuclear assistance to rogue nations. Both
countries' controls fall short of international standards. We
have offered to both India and Pakistan technical cooperation
activities designed to improve the effectiveness of their
export controls, and encourage further steps to bring controls
in line with international standards. In August of 2001 the
United States began such talks with India; Pakistan has
indicated interest in the U.S. offer.
U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework: In October 2002, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly advised the North Koreans that
we had recently acquired information that indicated North Korea
had embarked on a secret nuclear weapons program based on
uranium enrichment, which the DPRK then acknowledged. This
nuclear weapons program is a violation of the Agreed Framework,
the NPT, North Korea's IAEA Safeguards Agreement, and the Joint
North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula. The United States has called on the DPRK to take
immediate steps to eliminate verifiably its enrichment program
and is consulting closely with Congress, friends, and allies on
next steps to address this grave violation of North Korea's
international commitments.
In October 1994, the United States and North Korea signed
the Agreed Framework in an effort to resolve concerns about
North Korea's nuclear weapons program and bring the DPRK into
compliance with its NPT commitments. As part of the Agreed
Framework, North Korea undertook to freeze and dismantle its
graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related facilities at
Yongbyon and Taechon. It also undertook to remain party to the
NPT and come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards
agreement, including taking all steps deemed necessary by the
IAEA when a significant portion of the light-water reactor is
completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components.
During the reporting period, the freeze at the declared
facilities remained in place, but North Korea had not begun
safeguards cooperation with the IAEA despite knowing the IAEA's
estimate of 3-4 years to complete the process to verify North
Korea's nuclear past and the new target date for ``significant
portion'' completion of May 2005. Canning of all accessible
spent fuel rods and rod fragments from the DPRK's 5-megawatt
graphite-moderated nuclear reactor was completed in April 2000.
During the reporting period, the IAEA continued to monitor the
canned fuel pending its ultimate removal from the DPRK once key
nuclear components began to be delivered. A U.S. spent fuel
team has periodically visited the DPRK to perform routine
maintenance operations and repair suspected leaking canisters.
Because of several concerns, including over North Korea's
lack of cooperation with the IAEA in coming into compliance
with the DPRK's full-scope safeguards agreement, President Bush
waived the Congressional certification requirements for FY 2002
U.S. assistance (used primarily for heavy fuel oil (HFO)
shipments) to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization [KEDO]). Under the Agreed Framework, North Korea
is to receive 500,000 tons of HFO annually, purchased through
KEDO. The U.S. contribution covers HFO and KEDO's
administrative expenses. The United States and other members of
the KEDO board decided in November 2002 to suspend shipments of
HFO in light of North Korea's violation of the Agreed
Framework. The administration has requested $3.5 million for
contingency funds to cover some administrative costs for KEDO,
but is seeking no funds for HFO in 2003. The United States
continues consultations with other KEDO board members with
respect to the light water reactor project and the future of
KEDO.
After the reporting period, the DPRK announced it was
lifting the freeze on its nuclear facilities. It then began to
cut IAEA seals and disable IAEA cameras at the sites, and
expelled the IAEA inspectors. Subsequently, in January 2003,
the DPRK announced it was withdrawing from the NPT.
Iran Nuclear: Despite its status as an NPT party, Iran
maintains an active nuclear weapons development program. Among
the persistent indicators that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapons
is the fact that Iran is attempting to obtain capabilities to
enrich uranium and to produce plutonium--both critical
materials for a nuclear weapon. Neither of these capabilities
is necessary to meet Iran's declared desire to have a civil
nuclear power program to generate electricity, which is itself
suspicious in light of Iran's abundant oil and natural gas
resources.
For the time being, Iran's nuclear program remains
dependent on external sources of supply. The United States has
played the leading role in developing and maintaining a broad
international consensus against assisting Iran's foreign
procurement efforts. The United States denies Iran access to
U.S. nuclear technology and material, and all major Western
suppliers have agreed not to provide nuclear technology to
Iran. A number of supplier states have abandoned potentially
lucrative sales to Iran's nuclear program. Russia remains the
most significant, but not only, exception to this virtual
embargo on nuclear cooperation with Iran. The Administration is
actively engaged with Russia in an attempt to resolve
differences over the nature and scope of Russian cooperation
with Iran's nuclear programs.
In August 2002, an Iranian opposition group asserted
publicly that Iran is building a heavy water plant and a ``fuel
production plant.'' A review of commercially available imagery
adds credibility to the group's charge and suggests the ``fuel
production plant'' is actually a uranium enrichment facility.
Iran would not build a heavy water plant unless it had plans to
build a heavy water reactor. Iran's nuclear power program,
currently limited to the one reactor at Bushehr that Russia is
supplying, is based on light-water reactor design. Thus, a
heavy water production capability would be inconsistent with
such a program, but would be a critical element in Iran's
efforts to build and operate a reactor designed to maximize
plutonium production. Iran also does not need an indigenous
capability to produce enriched uranium for its power program;
Russia has contracts to supply the low-enriched uranium fuel
for Bushehr for the life of the reactor. An indigenous uranium
enrichment capability, however, would enable Iran to produce
highly enriched uranium for use in nuclear weapons.
Iraq Nuclear: President Bush, in his September 12, 2002
speech to the United Nations General Assembly, challenged the
international community to enforce a decade's worth of Security
Council resolutions and eliminate WMD, long-range missiles and
all related materials from Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The
Administration has successfully sought authorization from both
Houses of Congress to use force, if necessary, to defend U.S.
national security against the threat posed by Iraq and enforce
all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions
(UNSCR) regarding Iraq.
We continue to judge that Iraq retains its objective of
acquiring nuclear weapons. We believe that Iraq increased its
efforts to pursue some nuclear activity after U.N. inspections
stopped in December 1998. Iraq's recent aggressive attempts to
obtain proscribed high-strength aluminum tubes and other dual-
use equipment and materials are of significant concern. Iraq
also retains its cadre of nuclear scientists and technicians,
program documentation, and dual-use manufacturing capabilities
that could support a reconstituted nuclear weapons program. The
acquisition of highly-enriched uranium or weapons-grade
plutonium remains Iraq's biggest obstacle to a nuclear weapons
capability.
On November 8, 2002, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
passed UNSCR 1441, which gave Iraq a final opportunity to
comply with its disarmament obligations. UNSCR 1441 called for
Iraq to file a ``currently accurate, full, and complete''
declaration of its WMD and missile programs, and for ``full and
immediate'' cooperation by Iraq with weapons inspectors.
Finally, the resolution warned of ``serious consequences''
should Iraq fail to comply with its disarmament obligations.
Thus, UNSCR 1441 was designed to test the regime's commitment
to abandon WMD and illegal missile efforts. The activities
under UNSCR 1441 have occurred after the period of this report.
However, Iraq clearly has made no decision to disarm and is in
material breach of its UNSCR obligations.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI)
Regulations: The export control regulations issued under the
EPCI remain fully in force and continue to be administered by
the Department of Commerce, in consultation with other
agencies, in order to control the export of items with
potential use in WMD or missile programs. In particular, EPCI
is being applied to items with potential use in chemical or
biological weapons or unmanned delivery systems for WMD.
Chemical Weapons Convention: Chemical weapons continue to
pose a serious threat to the security of the United States and
our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) entered into force, with 87
of the CWC's 165 signatories as original States Parties--
including the United States, which ratified the Convention on
April 25, 1997. As of the end of this reporting period, 147
countries have become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--carries out the
verification provisions of the CWC, and its Technical
Secretariat presently has a staff of approximately 500
international civil servants, including about 200 inspectors
trained and equipped to inspect military and industrial
facilities throughout the world. To date, the OPCW has
conducted over 1,200 routine inspections at over 460 sites in
some 50 countries. No challenge inspections have yet taken
place. The OPCW maintains an inspector presence at operational
chemical weapon destruction facilities. United States
facilities have hosted approximately one-third of OPCW
inspections and two-thirds of total inspection days, due to the
significant level of chemical weapon destruction activity in
the United States.
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
of and compliance with the CWC. This includes submission of
accurate and complete declarations for all States Parties and
compliance with the CWC's inspection provisions. The United
States pursues compliance with the Convention through several
means, including bilateral consultations and site visits under
Article IX, with the State Parties that it believes may not be
meeting their commitments. In addition, the United States is
actively taking steps to strengthen the OPCW's ability to
implement effectively the CWC, including making a $2 million
voluntary contribution to the OPCW as a follow-up to the recent
much needed change in OPCW leadership.
We are continuing our work to ensure that countries that
refuse to become party to the CWC are increasingly isolated
politically. Under the CWC, such countries are denied access to
certain key chemicals from States Parties. The relevant treaty
provisions are specifically designed to penalize countries that
refuse to become party to the CWC.
Biological Weapons Convention: The United States agreed in
1994 to participate in an Ad Hoc Group to negotiate a Protocol
to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that would
``strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation
of the Convention.'' On July 25, 2001, after a thorough United
States Government Policy review, the United States announced
that the draft Protocol test was unacceptable and unfixable. At
the opening of the Fifth BWC Review Conference in November
2001, the Administration offered a number of alternative
approaches that would be effective in combating the threat of
biological weapons proliferation and in strengthening the BWC.
The resumed RevCon in November 2002 adopted a work program for
the period until the next RevCon in 2006. Under that work
program, the BWC States Parties will discuss, and promote
effective action on, several of the practical measures proposed
by the President.
Australia Group: The United States continues to be a
leading participant in the 33-member Australia Group (AG)
chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. At the
most recent annual AG Plenary Session June 3-6 in Paris, the
Group significantly expanded its export controls and
strengthened its ability to counter both nation-state and
terrorist chemical and biological weapons efforts. Responding
to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, AG participants
adopted common export control guidelines that include chemical
and biological terrorism as an explicit focus of the regime.
Participants also adopted the U.S.-proposed gameplan on
regional nonproliferation and the Group agreed to require its
members to have ``catch-all'' controls, the first multilateral
nonproliferation regime to do so. The AG control lists were
amended to include technology for the development and
production of listed biological agents and equipment, and to
add eight new biological toxins. To better combat biological
weapons proliferation, the Group reduced the control level for
listed fermenters from 100 to 20 liters and to require licenses
for exports of biological agents to all countries, including
other AG members (except for intra-EU trade).
Participants also continued to agree that full adherence to
the CWC and BWC by all governments will be a key to achieving a
permanent global ban on chemical and biological weapons, and
that the states adhering to these Conventions must take steps
to ensure that their national activities support these goals.
The Group reaffirmed its commitment to continue its active
outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, and to
promote regional consultations on export controls and
nonproliferation to further raise awareness and understanding
of national policies in these areas. No new members were
admitted to the AG during the reporting period.
Sanctions/Interdictions: During the reporting period, we
continued to examine closely intelligence and other information
concerning trade in material and technology, related to
chemical and biological weapons. In July 2002, pursuant to the
Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992 and the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of
1991, the United States impose mandatory sanctions on eight
Chinese companies, one Chinese citizen, and one Indian citizen
for knowingly and materially contributing to a foreign chemical
weapons program. Also, penalties were imposed in June 2001,
January 2002, and May 2002, pursuant to the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000, on a total of nine Chinese and
two Armenian entities for their involvement in the transfer of
AG-controlled items to Iran. The United States continues to
cooperate with its AG partners and other countries in stopping
shipments of chemical and biological weapons proliferation
concern.
Country Issues: Iran continues to seek precursors and
production technology to create a more advanced and self-
sufficient CW infrastructure, and continues actively to pursue
BW capabilities. Iraq is reconstituting its chemical and
biological weapons programs. Syria and Libya continue to make
improvements to their chemical weapons infrastructure and both
are pursuing offensive biological weapons research and
development. North Korea has a dedicated, national-level effort
to achieve a biological weapons capability and has developed
and produced, and may have weaponized, biological weapons
agents. North Korea is also assessed as having a long-standing
offensive chemical weapons program, which includes the ability
to produce bulk quantities of nerve, blister, blood, and
choking agents. Sudan has received foreign assistance in the
development of a chemical weapons program and may be actively
pursuing a more advanced capability.
MISSILES FOR DELIVERY OF WMD
Export Controls: The United States rigorously controls
exports that could contribute to unmanned delivery systems for
WMD, and monitors closely activities of potential missile
proliferation concern.
Missile Technology Control Regime: The Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Partners continued to share information
about proliferation problems with each other and with other
potential supplies, consumer, and transshipment states.
Partners also emphasized the need for implementing effective
export control systems. This cooperation has resulted in the
interdiction of missile-related materials intended for use in
missile programs of concern.
The MTCR held its annual Plenary in Warsaw, September 24-
27, 2002. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared information
about activities and programs of missile proliferation concern
and reiterated that the proliferation of WMD and their means of
delivery poses a serious threat to international and regional
peace and security. In addition, the Plenary re-emphasized the
important role played by export controls, the need for their
strict implementation and enforcement, and the importance of
strengthening existing controls to respond to technological
developments and the evolving security environment. To this
end, the Plenary agreed to a number of substantive changes to
the Regime's Annex (control list). The Partners also agreed to
a range of continuing contacts with non-members concerning MTCR
goals and activities. The Partners also adopted a Joint Action
that stressed the need for further efforts to limit the risk of
controlled items and their technologies falling into the hands
of terrorist groups and individuals.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: The United States was one of 99 counties that
participated in a meeting hosted by Spain June 17-18, 2002 on
the draft International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic
Missile Proliferation (ICOC). The meeting resulted in a
productive exchange of views, which helped the
multilateralization of the ICOC. In September 2002, The
Netherlands, on behalf of the EU, distributed the final ICOC
text to all counties and invited them to subscribe to the ICOC.
The ICOC entered into effect at a ``Launching Conference'' in
The Hague on November 25-26, 2002.
The ICOC is intended to create a widely-subscribed
international predisposition against ballistic missile
proliferation. It consists of a broad set of principles,
general commitments, and modest confidence building measures.
It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment, not a
treaty, and will be open for subscription by all counties. The
ICOC will supplement, not supplant, the important work of the
MTCR.
Sanctions: In May 2002, the United Stated imposed penalties
on two Armenian, two Moldovan, and seven Chinese entities
pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, for the
transfer of MTCR-controlled items to Iran. In August 2002, the
United States imposed Category II missile sanctions on a North
Korean entity.
South Asia Missile: India has an extensive, largely
indigenous ballistic missile development and production
program. Nevertheless, India's ballistic missile programs have
benefited from the acquisition of foreign equipment and
technology, which it continues to seek.
Pakistan has an active ballistic missile program and,
during the last several years, has received considerable
assistance from Chinese and North Korean entities in these
efforts. Continued development of nuclear-capable ballistic
missiles by both India and Pakistan raises the prospect that
more sophisticated and possibly destabilizing capabilities will
be fielded in the coming years. Such a race constitutes a
threat to regional and international security. After three
years of not conducting a flight test of a ballistic missile,
Pakistan conducted five ballistic missile tests during the
reporting period.
DPRK Missile: Although the DPRK has maintained its
September 1999, self-imposed, long-range missile flight test
moratorium, it has, during the last several years, been
extremely active in the research, development, testing,
deployment, and export of ballistic missiles and related
materials, equipment, and technology. The DPRK also is working
to increase the capability of its missile systems. During a
September 2002 meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, DPRK President Kim Jong-il stated that North Korea
would maintain its missile flight test moratorium until after
2003. We are concerned, however, that North Korea may try to
circumvent its promise by cooperating in testing and
development with foreign missile programs.
During his October 2002 visit to North Korea, Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly expressed serious U.S. concerns
about the negative impact of the DPRK's missile- and WMD-
related activities on regional and global peace and stability,
for the North's relations with the United States and its
neighbors, and for its own future.
Iran Missile: Iran has substantial missile inventories and
an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. In
recent years, North Korean, Russian, and Chinese entities have
continued to supply Iran with a wide variety of missile-related
goods, technology, and expertise. In response to Iranian
efforts to acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for
use in Iran's missile and nuclear development programs, the
United States has pursued a high-level dialogue with Russia
aimed at finding ways to cut off the flow of sensitive goods
and expertise to Iran's ballistic missile development and
nuclear weapons programs. Russia's Government has created
institutional foundations to implement its nonproliferation
commitments and passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has
passed new export control legislation and adopted implementing
regulations to tighten government control over sensitive
technologies and continued a dialogue with the United States
aimed at strengthening export control practices at Russian
aerospace firms. However, while there has been some movement,
we remain concerned that Russian entities continue to supply
missile technology and equipment to Iran.
Other Countries: Other countries, in addition to the above,
are pursuing missile programs. Iraq has exceeded the U.N. range
limit of 150 km with its existing ballistic missiles and is
developing specialized facilities, which would suggest that it
intends to develop a medium-range ballistic missile capability,
largely through foreign assistance in rebuilding its missile
production capability. Iraq is also developing its unmanned
aerial vehicle capability as a delivery system for biological
and, less likely, chemical agents. Libya's limited success with
its indigenous missile production effort may renew its focus on
purchasing a complete ballistic missile system. Syria continues
to acquire missile-related equipment and materials and has
received considerable foreign production assistance.
VALUE OF NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. national export controls--both those implemented
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those
implemented unilaterally--play an important part in impeding
the proliferation of WMD and missiles.
As noted in this report, however, export controls are one
of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation treaties
and norms, multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdiction
of shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, export
control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and
robust U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities
all work in conjunction with export controls as part of our
overall nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation
because every emerging WMD and missile program seeks equipment
and technology from other countries. Proliferators look to
other sources because needed items are unavailable within their
country, because indigenously produced items are of substandard
quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported items
can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than domestically-
produced ones.
It is important to note that proliferators seek for their
WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral lists (like
gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas
precursors controlled on the AG list) and unlisted items (like
lower-level machine tools and very basic chemicals). In
addition, many of the items of interest to proliferators are
inherently dual-use. For example, key precursors and
technologies used in the production of fertilizers or
pesticides also can be used to make missile propellant and
chemical weapons; vaccine production technology can be used to
produce biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or
denying proliferators and terrorists access to key pieces of
equipment or technology for use in their WMD and/or missile
programs. In large part, U.S. national export controls--and
similar controls of our partners in the AG, MTCR, and NSG--
strive to deny proliferators and terrorists access to the
largest sources of the best equipment and technology. If
denied, proliferators might then turn to non-regime suppliers
to seek less capable items. Moreover, in many instances, U.S.
and regime controls and associated efforts have forced
proliferators to engage in complex clandestine procurements,
taking time and money away from their WMD and missile programs.
United States national export controls and those of our
regime partners also have played an important role in
increasing over time the critical mass of countries applying
nonproliferation export controls. For example: the seven-member
MTCR of 1987 has grown to 33 member countries; the NSG adopted
full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new
controls to nuclear-related dual-use items; several non-member
countries have committed unilaterally to apply export controls
consistent with one or more of the regimes; and most of the
members of the nonproliferation regimes have applied national
``catch-all'' controls similar to those under the U.S. EPCI.
(Export controls normally are tied to a specific list of items,
such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all'' controls provide a legal
basis to control exports of items not on a list, when it is
believed that those items could be destined for WMD and/or
missile programs.)
The United States maintains a global program to assist some
30 countries to strengthen their export control systems.
Assistance is focused on helping weapons-source countries and
countries along potential smuggling routes to develop effective
export control regimes, including effective capabilities to
control illicit weapons trafficking across their borders; to
establish the necessary legal and regulatory basis for
effective export controls; to improve licensing procedures and
practices; to coordinate, train, and equip export enforcement
agencies, including customs agents and border security and
enforcement authorities; to develop and install automated
information systems for licensing and enforcement; and to
foster effective interaction between government and industry on
export controls.
This program has placed 21 advisors in countries around the
world to coordinate export control/border security activities.
The program continues to register successes: new cooperative
relationships have been established with key transshipment and
potential supplier states; a number of countries have adopted,
or are adopting, export and transshipment control laws and
regulations, including ``catch-all'' controls and controls on
arms brokering, largely based on U.S. advice; the program has
contributed to a significant strengthening of border security
capabilities in former Soviet states, notable Central Asia, the
Caucasus, and in Eastern Europe; and various countries'
enforcement agencies have used U.S. equipment and training to
interdict the movement of arms, related items, and radioactive
materials across the borders.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit
duel-use exports to proceed under circumstances where, without
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased
trade. Each of the WMD and missile nonproliferation regimes,
for example, has a ``no undercut'' policy committing each
member not to make an export that another has denied for
nonproliferation reasons and notified to the rest--unless it
first consults with the original denying country. Not only does
this policy make it more difficult for proliferators to get
items from regime members, it also establishes a ``level
playing field'' for exporters.
THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE TO THE FORMER SOVIET
STATES
The President has made clear repeatedly that his
Administration is committed to strong, effective cooperation
with Russia and the other former Soviet states to reduce WMD
and prevent their proliferation. To ensure that the promise of
these programs is fully realized, the Administration undertook
in 2001 a detailed review of U.S. nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance to the Russian Federation. The review was
completed in December 2001. It found that most U.S. programs in
this area work well, are focused on priority tasks, and are
well managed. The review further identified some programs for
expansion and others for adjustment. In keeping with the
President's commitment, and the results of the review, the
President's FY 2003 budget included historically high requests
to the Congress for nonproliferation and threat reduction
assistance to the former Soviet states.
On June 27, 2002, the President and his G-8 colleagues
launched a new major effort to expand threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance. Under the G-8 Global Partnership
Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction,
the G-8 will commit up to $20 billion for this purpose over the
next ten years. The United States intends to provide half of
that total. The initial focus will be on projects in Russia,
but the initiative is also open to other states, including
other former Soviet states.
EXPENDITURES
Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), there was no specific expenditures
incurred, which are directly attributable to the exercise of
authorities conferred by the declaration of the national
emergency in Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the
reporting period from May 15, 2002 through November 12, 2002.