[House Document 108-33]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



                                     

108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 
                                                           108-33
 
                           KOSOVO BENCHMARKS

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT 
  BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN 
                                 KOSOVO




  February 5, 2003.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
      Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and 
                Appropriations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    Pursuant to section 1212 of the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law 106-398, I 
hereby submit a report, prepared by my Administration, on the 
progress made in achieving the militarily significant 
benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable 
peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the 
United States military presence in Kosovo.
    The term ``militarily significant'' relates to tasks and 
objectives significant from a military standpoint that once 
accomplished, would allow for withdrawal of military forces 
from Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, 
four critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military 
stability; public security; border/boundary issues; and war 
crimes/support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia. Objectives for these tasks were drawn from 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO 
Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking.
    I anticipate that Kosovo Force--and U.S. participation in 
it--will gradually reduce in size as public security conditions 
improve and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their 
own self-government.

                                                    George W. Bush.
    The White House, January 31, 2003.
                           Kosovo Benchmarks

                              INTRODUCTION

    Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence, 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the 
Act), requires that ``The President shall develop militarily 
significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a 
sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the 
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.'' Pursuant 
to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing a report, 
prepared by my Administration, to Congress on progress in 
Kosovo toward achieving such militarily significant benchmarks. 
The report details developments from June 15 to December 31, 
2002.
    The Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took 
important decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials 
regarding a regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. 
As a result of those decisions, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was 
scheduled to be reduced from 36,000 as of June 2002 to 32,000 
by December 2002, and 29,400 by June 2003. In fact, KFOR actual 
troop strength has already dropped below the level of committed 
troop contributions. More recently, NATO Heads of State noted 
the Joint Operations Area Implementation Update at the Prague 
Summit in November 2002, and called for exploration of options 
for further rationalization and force restructuring.

                               BACKGROUND

    The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable 
peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from 
several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo 
(OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
between KFOR and the Governments of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia; and the 
Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).
    Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the 
establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military 
tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining 
tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for 
the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for 
minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and 
refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial 
progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-
advanced; free and fair elections held three times; more than 
5,200 multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed; and a 
new constitutional framework for provisional self-government 
promulgated.
    Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically 
oriented, politically extreme, and criminally motivated armed 
groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both 
through their actions in Kosovo and to a lesser extent in 
southern Serbia and Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian 
forces posing a continued risk, these internal factors are now 
the primary threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and 
UNMIK will have to continue to cooperate over the coming months 
to deter and disrupt the activities of these groups, and 
continue to ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the 
surrounding region. Increased refugee and Internally Displaced 
Persons returns, problems with the continued ethnic division of 
North Mitrovica, potential International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictments, arrests of high-
profile Kosovar political or criminal figures, demarcation of 
the Kosovo-Macedonia border, and decentralization of political 
power will present additional challenges. Kosovo's greatest 
challenge now is the development of governmental, economic, 
social, and security infrastructures capable of providing a 
safe, secure, and prosperous environment for all its 
inhabitants.

                            PROGRESS REVIEW

    The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks 
and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of 
U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; 
Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and War Crimes.
1. Task: Military stability
            Objectives:
     Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces 
from Kosovo.
     Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
     Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance 
and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.
    Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated 
with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from 
Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the KLA has 
been demilitarized and there are no ongoing hostilities in 
Kosovo.
            Benchmarks:

a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered to the MTA

    The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of spring 1999 
is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed 
military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the 
MTA. In 2001 and 2002, NATO oversaw reductions in the Air 
Safety Zone (ASZ); in 2001 FRY forces returned to the Ground 
Safety Zone (GSZ) in southern Serbia as part of a political 
agreement to end fighting between government forces and ethnic 
Albanian groups in southern Serbia. This benchmark is 
essentially accomplished although both the ASZ and GSZ remain 
under KFOR authority.

b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance with the 
        undertaking

    The KLA ceased to exist on September 20, 1999. Many former 
KLA members entered the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a 
civil emergency response force, or the Kosovo Police Service 
(KPS). This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer non-compliance

    The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorized the KPC to engage in 
disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure 
rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law 
enforcement, security, or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly 
supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the 
end of 2002 just under 2,000 had moved from active to reserve 
status. Ten percent of the KPC positions are reserved for 
ethnic minorities, although to date only some 100 Serbs and 
other minorities have joined. In 2002 UNMIK budgeted 11.16 
million for KPC salaries, operating expenses, and capital 
outlays. The United States has funded additional training for 
first aid, land navigation, fire fighting, and other 
activities. A goal of the United States and UNMIK for 2003 is 
to further reform the KPC through functional and structural 
changes.
    One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the 
KPC was to provide transparency to the process of 
demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the 
KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime, 
since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has 
declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, 
to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and 
ammunition and celebratory gunfire. Though additional work 
remains to be done to further professionalize the KPC as a 
civilian organization and broaden its ethnic and gender base, 
this benchmark is essentially accomplished.

d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation Commission

    The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established 
in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure 
compliance with the MTA; and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have 
been established at two echelons--at KFOR Headquarters and at 
each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings 
between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior 
Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee 
for the Red Cross and Border Police occur on a regular basis. 
Agendas range from administrative issues such as ID cards to 
security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact points on/near 
the administrative boundary. The JICs have facilitated training 
for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, land navigation, 
identification of unexploded ordnance, construction, and 
humanitarian relief. This benchmark is essentially 
accomplished.

e. End of offensive activities by armed groups

    Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, 
but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and 
in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for 
recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and UNMIK police have been 
active in apprehending members of these groups and their 
supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly 
reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any 
support for the insurgents' activities is notacceptable. This 
benchmark is essentially accomplished although it requires continued 
monitoring.

2. Task: Public security

            Objectives:
     Establishment and maintenance of a secure 
environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, and the safe return of a considerably 
increased number of refugees and displaced persons to their 
homes in 2003.
     Ensure protection and freedom of movement for 
KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
     Transfer responsibility for public safety and 
order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities 
can take responsibility for this function.
    Significant progress has been achieved toward the 
benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress 
in the area of public security will require a strong continued 
commitment by the international community to provide resources 
for rule of law and other security programs.
            Benchmarks:

a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission

    UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed 
by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of 
international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK 
offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success 
stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, 
holding of municipal elections twice and province-wide 
elections once, registration of and distribution of ID cards to 
nearly one million Kosovars, and issuance of over 345,000 
travel documents recognized in 29 countries. In all UNMIK 
endeavors (except North Mitrovica)--from travel to governance--
UNMIK has been able to safely conduct its mission.

b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities

    Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb 
residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established 
roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were 
available to IOs with little or no disruption of their 
activities. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.

C. Humanitarian relief delivered

    Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, 
led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as 
humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased 
operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the 
delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations 
through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers 
ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the 
goods and services they require. This benchmark is essentially 
accomplished.

d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility transferred 
        to requisite civilian authorities

    Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of 
unexploded ordnance (OXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) 
have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters 
of land have been cleared and returned to use. There have been 
16 different international demining organizations involved in 
mine awareness activities; and mine awareness has been 
incorporated into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While 
KFOR's mandate is concerned only with minefields that impede 
its mission, KFOR soldiers continue to mark newly discovered 
minefields for demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, 
the KPC has been trained to conduct emergency explosive 
ordinance disposal services and is primarily responsible for 
UXO deactivation or destruction. The overall result of this 
concentrated effort has been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/
CBU-related casualties although lethal incidents sometimes 
still occur. In light of these operating procedures, this 
benchmark is essentially accomplished.

e. Elections held in secure environment

    Local assemblies and governments have been established in 
all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, including most Serb-
dominated ones in the north. Kosovo municipal elections in 2000 
and again in 2002 were in accordance with international 
standards as were Kosovo-wide elections in 2001. Overall voter 
turnout within Kosovo has been high but with a downward trend. 
The absence of significant election-related violence indicates 
a general stabilization of the political environment in Kosovo. 
UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure 
these first-everdemocratic provincial elections were not marred 
by any significant violence. In spring 2002, the Assembly elected a 
President and a Prime Minister to head Kosovo's provisional government 
which will continue until new elections in 2004. This benchmark is 
essentially accomplished.

f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to KFOR and/or 
        UNMIK authority

    The fledging Kosovo provisional government is working to 
govern the province with less assistance from UNMIK, KFOR, and 
the international community (IC). Programs to train government 
leaders and bolster efforts at effective administration have 
helped the provisional government to assume increased 
responsibility and demonstrate increasing effectiveness. 
However, the slow pace of legislation to date and remaining 
international influence in areas not reserved to UNMIK remain 
problematic. Considerably more needs to be done to ensure 
effective self-government at both the Kosovo and municipal 
levels and to achieve UNMIK benchmarks in the rule of law, 
returns, the economy, and other areas. Particularly in North 
Mitrovica, and elsewhere throughout Kosovo, UNMIK needs to 
implement its plan for decentralization to ensure effective 
administration and rights for Serbs and other minorities at the 
sub-municipal level. At the same time, Serbian parallel 
institutions primarily in the areas of health, education, and 
judiciary and law enforcement, need to cease functioning to 
allow UNMIK to fully establish their authority under UNSCR 
1244. While this is occurring, UNMIK acknowledges the continued 
need for Belgrade to supplement the salaries of health care 
workers and educators as an incentive for them to remain in 
Kosovo.

g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo Transitional 
        Government for investigation, prosecution, and detention; and 
        sufficient civilian prisons and detention facilities are 
        established

    UNMIK judicial officials and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct 
all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a 
suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under 
the Special Representative's ``executive detention'' authority 
pending UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under 
his own authority, the KFOR Commander can confine individuals 
on the basis that they pose a threat to a safe and secure 
environment. KFOR maintains detention facilities for 
individuals at Camp Bondsteel. UNMIK maintains eight detention 
facilities Kosovo-wide and one prison near Ishtok in northwest 
Kosovo.

h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to UNMIK

    Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme 
court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 ``minor 
offenses courts,'' one ``high court of minor offenses,'' one 
commercial court, and 13 prosecutor's offices. While UNMIK has 
appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, only 320 
are currently working in those positions. Additionally, a total 
of 28 international judges and prosecutors are assigned to the 
district courts and the supreme court. Trials are conducted in 
all five district courts, the supreme court, and lower courts. 
Thus, there is an embryonic court system in place; however, 
concerns continue over the ability of the criminal courts to 
apply the law fairly due to the inexperience of many of the 
judges and prosecutors, suspected intimidation, and the 
outdated socialist criminal code still applicable in Kosovo. 
Judicial training conducted by the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-run Kosovo Judicial Institute 
is beginning to address this problem. Some cases referred by 
KFOR to UNMIK are difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary 
problems. KFOR soldiers are not trained criminal investigators, 
and often the information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a 
result, some criminal cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a 
lack of prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working 
together to resolve these issues and UNMIK has made many 
notable arrests and convictions in 2002. Adequate witness 
protection is a problem as well.

i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective

    The OSCE administers the Kosovo Police Service School, 
which has graduated over 5,200 Kosovar police trainees. 
Graduate trainees go on to complete field training and assume 
independent patrol responsibilities (with UNMIK police 
oversight). The operational control of two police stations has 
been turned over to the KPS. Advanced training phases are being 
conducted at the KPS School to create specialized capacities, 
including training supervisors, criminal investigators, 
forensics specialists,traffic officers, and close protection 
specialists. The United States is initiating further specialized 
training in areas such as civil disorder management and advanced 
criminal investigations. Anti-Serb violence has shown an overall 
downward trend, although serious periodic incidents continue to mar 
progress and freedom of movement remains problematic without KFOR 
escort. UNMIK police and KPS have assumed full responsibility in 
Pristina, Prizren, Gniljane, and Peja regions and share responsibility 
with KFOR in Mitrovica. This benchmark is essentially accomplished 
although the KPS requires further expansion, experience, and training.

j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police responsibilities; 
        and, UNMIK Special Police Unit and KPS are capable to respond 
        to civil disturbances

    UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in 
Pristine, Prizren, Gjilan, and Peja regions; and shares primacy 
with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they have begun to assert more 
authority to address the remaining challenge from members of 
violent ``bridge gangs.'' UNMIK generally has been able to 
handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police 
Units (SPUs) that react to any civil disturbances throughout 
Kosovo. KPS has assumed primary responsibility for patrol 
functions. As part of two agreements with KFOR, UNMIK police 
have taken on greater responsibility for border functions and 
the roving patrols of patrimonial sites, and other 
infrastructure sites.

k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home safely

    Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes 
in June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into 
Kosovo. To date, over one million people have returned and 
begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant 
difficulties remain in the area of minority returns. More than 
200,000 Serbs, Roma, and other minorities remain displaced 
outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has 
been made to date, and in 2002 returns outpaced departures for 
the first time, UNMIK anticipates that there will be a 
significant increase in IC-facilitated returns beginning in 
spring 2003. Continued KFOR cooperation with UNHCR and UNMIK 
will play a key part in making these returns safe and 
sustainable. Freedom of movement remains a problem for many 
Serbs and Roma who remain in Kosovo, most of whom live in 
difficult circumstances in isolated enclaves. Most require KFOR 
escort each time they venture out to ensure their safety; 
however, for others freedom of movement has improved 
significantly and KFOR has removed a number of fixed 
checkpoints, particularly in the MNB-E area.

3. Task: Border and boundary issues

            Objectives:
     Monitor international and provincial boundaries.
     Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting 
insurgency and illegal goods.
     Transfer border responsibilities to local 
authorities.
            Benchmarks:

a. The FRY respects the GSZ and ASZ as stipulated in the MTA and at the 
        discretion of the KFOR commander

    The GSZ and ASZ, 5- and 25-kilometer ``buffer zones'' 
respectively around Kosovo, were established to prevent 
boundary incidents or reentry into Kosovo by FRY security 
forces. The FRY has respected the zones from their inception. 
Following the change of government in Yugoslavia and a 
concomitant improvement in the relationship with NATO and KFOR, 
FRY security forces were allowed to reenter the GSZ in the 
spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted successfully and in a 
professional manner. Similarly, the ASZ was reduced to 10-
kilometers and in Fall 2002 to 5-kilometers. This benchmark is 
essentially accomplished.

b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or indigenous border 
        service in place to monitor provincial and international border 
        crossings

    Kosovo's boundaries are generally unmarked and in many 
areas lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Attempts to demarcate 
the Kosovo-Macedonia border under the 2001 FRY-Macedonia Border 
Treaty in the near future could be particularly problematic as 
inhabitants traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely. 
UNMIK established five official border crossing points, 
including the Pristina airport, where UNMIK police control 
immigration and collecttariffs. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in 
this role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring 
technology. Also, a border-crossing section of the KPS has been 
established. Net assessment of combined efforts is that illegal border 
crossings have been significantly reduced, although much remains to be 
done. The installation at the airport and border points of entry of a 
positive identification and tracking system remains a high priority.

4. Task: War crimes

            Objective:
     Full cooperation of the international security 
presence with the ICTY.
    The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for 
the IC, continuing until the work of the ICTY is completed. 
ICTY chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has said publicly on 
several occasions that there will be indictments of senior 
former KLA figures in Kosovo. UNMIK is investigating possible 
prosecutions as well, and at the end of 2002 an UNMIK court 
consisting of three international judges convicted and 
sentenced five former KLA figures for war crimes against other 
Kosovar Albanians.
            Benchmark:

a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY

    KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY, 
and provides area security for exhumations. The United States 
deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a 
cost of $5 million, and provided an additional $8.5 million for 
ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In 
November 2002, SACEUR noted that NATO remains committed to 
supporting efforts to bring persons indicted for war crimes to 
justice and has stated that the physical presence of NATO in 
the Balkans is continuing to help deter hostilities. Should the 
ICTY issue indictments for Kosovars, KFOR will be called upon 
to help manage large and possible violent demonstrations that 
will almost certainly result, and might need to assist in the 
apprehension and transfer of indicted individuals.

                                
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