[House Document 108-33]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document
108-33
KOSOVO BENCHMARKS
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT
BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN
KOSOVO
February 5, 2003.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and
Appropriations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
Pursuant to section 1212 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law 106-398, I
hereby submit a report, prepared by my Administration, on the
progress made in achieving the militarily significant
benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable
peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the
United States military presence in Kosovo.
The term ``militarily significant'' relates to tasks and
objectives significant from a military standpoint that once
accomplished, would allow for withdrawal of military forces
from Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks,
four critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military
stability; public security; border/boundary issues; and war
crimes/support to the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia. Objectives for these tasks were drawn from
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO
Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the
Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking.
I anticipate that Kosovo Force--and U.S. participation in
it--will gradually reduce in size as public security conditions
improve and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their
own self-government.
George W. Bush.
The White House, January 31, 2003.
Kosovo Benchmarks
INTRODUCTION
Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence,
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the
Act), requires that ``The President shall develop militarily
significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a
sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.'' Pursuant
to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing a report,
prepared by my Administration, to Congress on progress in
Kosovo toward achieving such militarily significant benchmarks.
The report details developments from June 15 to December 31,
2002.
The Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took
important decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials
regarding a regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo.
As a result of those decisions, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was
scheduled to be reduced from 36,000 as of June 2002 to 32,000
by December 2002, and 29,400 by June 2003. In fact, KFOR actual
troop strength has already dropped below the level of committed
troop contributions. More recently, NATO Heads of State noted
the Joint Operations Area Implementation Update at the Prague
Summit in November 2002, and called for exploration of options
for further rationalization and force restructuring.
BACKGROUND
The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable
peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from
several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo
(OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA)
between KFOR and the Governments of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Serbia; and the
Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the
Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).
Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the
establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military
tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining
tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for
the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for
minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and
refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial
progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-
advanced; free and fair elections held three times; more than
5,200 multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed; and a
new constitutional framework for provisional self-government
promulgated.
Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically
oriented, politically extreme, and criminally motivated armed
groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both
through their actions in Kosovo and to a lesser extent in
southern Serbia and Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian
forces posing a continued risk, these internal factors are now
the primary threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and
UNMIK will have to continue to cooperate over the coming months
to deter and disrupt the activities of these groups, and
continue to ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the
surrounding region. Increased refugee and Internally Displaced
Persons returns, problems with the continued ethnic division of
North Mitrovica, potential International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indictments, arrests of high-
profile Kosovar political or criminal figures, demarcation of
the Kosovo-Macedonia border, and decentralization of political
power will present additional challenges. Kosovo's greatest
challenge now is the development of governmental, economic,
social, and security infrastructures capable of providing a
safe, secure, and prosperous environment for all its
inhabitants.
PROGRESS REVIEW
The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks
and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of
U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability;
Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and War Crimes.
1. Task: Military stability
Objectives:
Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces
from Kosovo.
Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance
and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.
Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated
with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from
Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the KLA has
been demilitarized and there are no ongoing hostilities in
Kosovo.
Benchmarks:
a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered to the MTA
The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of spring 1999
is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed
military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the
MTA. In 2001 and 2002, NATO oversaw reductions in the Air
Safety Zone (ASZ); in 2001 FRY forces returned to the Ground
Safety Zone (GSZ) in southern Serbia as part of a political
agreement to end fighting between government forces and ethnic
Albanian groups in southern Serbia. This benchmark is
essentially accomplished although both the ASZ and GSZ remain
under KFOR authority.
b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance with the
undertaking
The KLA ceased to exist on September 20, 1999. Many former
KLA members entered the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a
civil emergency response force, or the Kosovo Police Service
(KPS). This benchmark is essentially accomplished.
c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer non-compliance
The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops.
UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorized the KPC to engage in
disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure
rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law
enforcement, security, or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly
supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the
end of 2002 just under 2,000 had moved from active to reserve
status. Ten percent of the KPC positions are reserved for
ethnic minorities, although to date only some 100 Serbs and
other minorities have joined. In 2002 UNMIK budgeted 11.16
million for KPC salaries, operating expenses, and capital
outlays. The United States has funded additional training for
first aid, land navigation, fire fighting, and other
activities. A goal of the United States and UNMIK for 2003 is
to further reform the KPC through functional and structural
changes.
One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the
KPC was to provide transparency to the process of
demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the
KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime,
since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has
declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month,
to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and
ammunition and celebratory gunfire. Though additional work
remains to be done to further professionalize the KPC as a
civilian organization and broaden its ethnic and gender base,
this benchmark is essentially accomplished.
d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation Commission
The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established
in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure
compliance with the MTA; and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have
been established at two echelons--at KFOR Headquarters and at
each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings
between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior
Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee
for the Red Cross and Border Police occur on a regular basis.
Agendas range from administrative issues such as ID cards to
security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact points on/near
the administrative boundary. The JICs have facilitated training
for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, land navigation,
identification of unexploded ordnance, construction, and
humanitarian relief. This benchmark is essentially
accomplished.
e. End of offensive activities by armed groups
Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper,
but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and
in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for
recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and UNMIK police have been
active in apprehending members of these groups and their
supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly
reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any
support for the insurgents' activities is notacceptable. This
benchmark is essentially accomplished although it requires continued
monitoring.
2. Task: Public security
Objectives:
Establishment and maintenance of a secure
environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of
humanitarian aid, and the safe return of a considerably
increased number of refugees and displaced persons to their
homes in 2003.
Ensure protection and freedom of movement for
KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
Transfer responsibility for public safety and
order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities
can take responsibility for this function.
Significant progress has been achieved toward the
benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress
in the area of public security will require a strong continued
commitment by the international community to provide resources
for rule of law and other security programs.
Benchmarks:
a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission
UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed
by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of
international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK
offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success
stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework,
holding of municipal elections twice and province-wide
elections once, registration of and distribution of ID cards to
nearly one million Kosovars, and issuance of over 345,000
travel documents recognized in 29 countries. In all UNMIK
endeavors (except North Mitrovica)--from travel to governance--
UNMIK has been able to safely conduct its mission.
b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities
Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb
residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established
roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were
available to IOs with little or no disruption of their
activities. This benchmark is essentially accomplished.
C. Humanitarian relief delivered
Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars,
led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as
humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased
operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the
delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations
through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers
ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the
goods and services they require. This benchmark is essentially
accomplished.
d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility transferred
to requisite civilian authorities
Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of
unexploded ordnance (OXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU)
have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters
of land have been cleared and returned to use. There have been
16 different international demining organizations involved in
mine awareness activities; and mine awareness has been
incorporated into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While
KFOR's mandate is concerned only with minefields that impede
its mission, KFOR soldiers continue to mark newly discovered
minefields for demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also,
the KPC has been trained to conduct emergency explosive
ordinance disposal services and is primarily responsible for
UXO deactivation or destruction. The overall result of this
concentrated effort has been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/
CBU-related casualties although lethal incidents sometimes
still occur. In light of these operating procedures, this
benchmark is essentially accomplished.
e. Elections held in secure environment
Local assemblies and governments have been established in
all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, including most Serb-
dominated ones in the north. Kosovo municipal elections in 2000
and again in 2002 were in accordance with international
standards as were Kosovo-wide elections in 2001. Overall voter
turnout within Kosovo has been high but with a downward trend.
The absence of significant election-related violence indicates
a general stabilization of the political environment in Kosovo.
UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure
these first-everdemocratic provincial elections were not marred
by any significant violence. In spring 2002, the Assembly elected a
President and a Prime Minister to head Kosovo's provisional government
which will continue until new elections in 2004. This benchmark is
essentially accomplished.
f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to KFOR and/or
UNMIK authority
The fledging Kosovo provisional government is working to
govern the province with less assistance from UNMIK, KFOR, and
the international community (IC). Programs to train government
leaders and bolster efforts at effective administration have
helped the provisional government to assume increased
responsibility and demonstrate increasing effectiveness.
However, the slow pace of legislation to date and remaining
international influence in areas not reserved to UNMIK remain
problematic. Considerably more needs to be done to ensure
effective self-government at both the Kosovo and municipal
levels and to achieve UNMIK benchmarks in the rule of law,
returns, the economy, and other areas. Particularly in North
Mitrovica, and elsewhere throughout Kosovo, UNMIK needs to
implement its plan for decentralization to ensure effective
administration and rights for Serbs and other minorities at the
sub-municipal level. At the same time, Serbian parallel
institutions primarily in the areas of health, education, and
judiciary and law enforcement, need to cease functioning to
allow UNMIK to fully establish their authority under UNSCR
1244. While this is occurring, UNMIK acknowledges the continued
need for Belgrade to supplement the salaries of health care
workers and educators as an incentive for them to remain in
Kosovo.
g. KFOR transfers criminal cases to UNMIK/Kosovo Transitional
Government for investigation, prosecution, and detention; and
sufficient civilian prisons and detention facilities are
established
UNMIK judicial officials and UNMIK CIVPOL and KPS, conduct
all criminal investigations in Kosovo. When KFOR apprehends a
suspect, he/she can be turned over to UNMIK for action under
the Special Representative's ``executive detention'' authority
pending UNMIK (or local) criminal charges being filed. Under
his own authority, the KFOR Commander can confine individuals
on the basis that they pose a threat to a safe and secure
environment. KFOR maintains detention facilities for
individuals at Camp Bondsteel. UNMIK maintains eight detention
facilities Kosovo-wide and one prison near Ishtok in northwest
Kosovo.
h. Adequate court system for criminal cases transferred to UNMIK
Since June 1999, UNMIK has established a Kosovo supreme
court, five district courts, 18 municipal courts, 23 ``minor
offenses courts,'' one ``high court of minor offenses,'' one
commercial court, and 13 prosecutor's offices. While UNMIK has
appointed more than 400 local judges and prosecutors, only 320
are currently working in those positions. Additionally, a total
of 28 international judges and prosecutors are assigned to the
district courts and the supreme court. Trials are conducted in
all five district courts, the supreme court, and lower courts.
Thus, there is an embryonic court system in place; however,
concerns continue over the ability of the criminal courts to
apply the law fairly due to the inexperience of many of the
judges and prosecutors, suspected intimidation, and the
outdated socialist criminal code still applicable in Kosovo.
Judicial training conducted by the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)-run Kosovo Judicial Institute
is beginning to address this problem. Some cases referred by
KFOR to UNMIK are difficult to prosecute due to evidentiary
problems. KFOR soldiers are not trained criminal investigators,
and often the information gathered by KFOR is classified. As a
result, some criminal cases are dismissed by UNMIK due to a
lack of prosecutable evidence. UNMIK and KFOR are working
together to resolve these issues and UNMIK has made many
notable arrests and convictions in 2002. Adequate witness
protection is a problem as well.
i. Core KPS police training is completed and effective
The OSCE administers the Kosovo Police Service School,
which has graduated over 5,200 Kosovar police trainees.
Graduate trainees go on to complete field training and assume
independent patrol responsibilities (with UNMIK police
oversight). The operational control of two police stations has
been turned over to the KPS. Advanced training phases are being
conducted at the KPS School to create specialized capacities,
including training supervisors, criminal investigators,
forensics specialists,traffic officers, and close protection
specialists. The United States is initiating further specialized
training in areas such as civil disorder management and advanced
criminal investigations. Anti-Serb violence has shown an overall
downward trend, although serious periodic incidents continue to mar
progress and freedom of movement remains problematic without KFOR
escort. UNMIK police and KPS have assumed full responsibility in
Pristina, Prizren, Gniljane, and Peja regions and share responsibility
with KFOR in Mitrovica. This benchmark is essentially accomplished
although the KPS requires further expansion, experience, and training.
j. UNMIK and KPS assume primacy for tactical police responsibilities;
and, UNMIK Special Police Unit and KPS are capable to respond
to civil disturbances
UNMIK Police, working with KPS, has assumed full primacy in
Pristine, Prizren, Gjilan, and Peja regions; and shares primacy
with KFOR in Mitrovica, where they have begun to assert more
authority to address the remaining challenge from members of
violent ``bridge gangs.'' UNMIK generally has been able to
handle civil disturbances through the use of its Special Police
Units (SPUs) that react to any civil disturbances throughout
Kosovo. KPS has assumed primary responsibility for patrol
functions. As part of two agreements with KFOR, UNMIK police
have taken on greater responsibility for border functions and
the roving patrols of patrimonial sites, and other
infrastructure sites.
k. Some displaced persons and refugees able to return home safely
Displaced Kosovo Albanians began returning to their homes
in June 1999, concomitant with the entry of NATO forces into
Kosovo. To date, over one million people have returned and
begun rebuilding their lives. By contrast, significant
difficulties remain in the area of minority returns. More than
200,000 Serbs, Roma, and other minorities remain displaced
outside of Kosovo, most in Serbia. While modest progress has
been made to date, and in 2002 returns outpaced departures for
the first time, UNMIK anticipates that there will be a
significant increase in IC-facilitated returns beginning in
spring 2003. Continued KFOR cooperation with UNHCR and UNMIK
will play a key part in making these returns safe and
sustainable. Freedom of movement remains a problem for many
Serbs and Roma who remain in Kosovo, most of whom live in
difficult circumstances in isolated enclaves. Most require KFOR
escort each time they venture out to ensure their safety;
however, for others freedom of movement has improved
significantly and KFOR has removed a number of fixed
checkpoints, particularly in the MNB-E area.
3. Task: Border and boundary issues
Objectives:
Monitor international and provincial boundaries.
Inhibit traffic of persons or materials supporting
insurgency and illegal goods.
Transfer border responsibilities to local
authorities.
Benchmarks:
a. The FRY respects the GSZ and ASZ as stipulated in the MTA and at the
discretion of the KFOR commander
The GSZ and ASZ, 5- and 25-kilometer ``buffer zones''
respectively around Kosovo, were established to prevent
boundary incidents or reentry into Kosovo by FRY security
forces. The FRY has respected the zones from their inception.
Following the change of government in Yugoslavia and a
concomitant improvement in the relationship with NATO and KFOR,
FRY security forces were allowed to reenter the GSZ in the
spring of 2001. Reentry was conducted successfully and in a
professional manner. Similarly, the ASZ was reduced to 10-
kilometers and in Fall 2002 to 5-kilometers. This benchmark is
essentially accomplished.
b. Illegal border crossings inhibited; and UNMIK or indigenous border
service in place to monitor provincial and international border
crossings
Kosovo's boundaries are generally unmarked and in many
areas lie in rough, mountainous terrain. Attempts to demarcate
the Kosovo-Macedonia border under the 2001 FRY-Macedonia Border
Treaty in the near future could be particularly problematic as
inhabitants traditionally have crisscrossed the borders freely.
UNMIK established five official border crossing points,
including the Pristina airport, where UNMIK police control
immigration and collecttariffs. KFOR actively supports UNMIK in
this role, regularly patrolling borders and employing monitoring
technology. Also, a border-crossing section of the KPS has been
established. Net assessment of combined efforts is that illegal border
crossings have been significantly reduced, although much remains to be
done. The installation at the airport and border points of entry of a
positive identification and tracking system remains a high priority.
4. Task: War crimes
Objective:
Full cooperation of the international security
presence with the ICTY.
The objective of this benchmark is of an ongoing nature for
the IC, continuing until the work of the ICTY is completed.
ICTY chief prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has said publicly on
several occasions that there will be indictments of senior
former KLA figures in Kosovo. UNMIK is investigating possible
prosecutions as well, and at the end of 2002 an UNMIK court
consisting of three international judges convicted and
sentenced five former KLA figures for war crimes against other
Kosovar Albanians.
Benchmark:
a. KFOR assists and supports ICTY
KFOR actively supports the collection of evidence by ICTY,
and provides area security for exhumations. The United States
deployed two FBI forensic investigative teams to Kosovo at a
cost of $5 million, and provided an additional $8.5 million for
ICTY investigative costs associated with Kosovo war crimes. In
November 2002, SACEUR noted that NATO remains committed to
supporting efforts to bring persons indicted for war crimes to
justice and has stated that the physical presence of NATO in
the Balkans is continuing to help deter hostilities. Should the
ICTY issue indictments for Kosovars, KFOR will be called upon
to help manage large and possible violent demonstrations that
will almost certainly result, and might need to assist in the
apprehension and transfer of indicted individuals.