[House Document 108-23]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 
108-23
 
 REPORT ON MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY 
                 FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 A REPORT ON MATTERS RELEVANT TO THE AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY 
       FORCE AGAINST IRAQ RESOLUTION OF 2002, PUBLIC LAW 107-243

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


January 28, 2003.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed








                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, January 20, 2003.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-
243) and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully 
informed, I am providing a report prepared by my Administration 
on matters relevant to that Resolution including on the status 
of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the resolutions 
adopted by the United Nations Security Council. Information 
required by section 3 of the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) is and will be 
included in this and subsequent reports.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.







Report to Congress on Matters Relevant to the Authorization for Use of 
             Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002

                                 SCOPE

    This report is made pursuant to the Authorization for the 
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public 
Law 107-243). It reports on matters relevant to that Resolution 
including on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance 
with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security 
Council. Information required by section 3 of the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 
102-1) is included in this report. The report covers events up 
to December 15, 2002.

                                OVERVIEW

    As long as Saddam Hussein remains remains in power and in 
defiance of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, 
he threatens the well-being of the Iraqi people, the peace and 
security of the region, and vital U.S. interests. Before the 
United Nations General Assembly on September 12, the President 
challenged the U.N. to address Iraq's systematic violations of 
UNSC resolutions and to compel Iraq's disarmament of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).
    In response to the President's address, on November 8, the 
UNSC unanimously adopted Resolution 1441, which declares that 
``Iraq has been and remains in materials breach of its 
obligations under relevant resolutions,'' sets up ``an enhanced 
inspection regime with the aim of bringing to full and verified 
completion the disarmament process,'' affords Iraq a ``final 
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations,'' and 
recalls that the UNSC has repeatedly ``warned Iraq that it will 
face serious consequences as a result of its continued 
violations of its obligations.''
    Under UNSCR 1441, weapons inspections resumed in Iraq on 
November 27, the first inspections since 1998, when Iraqi 
noncompliance made it impossible for them to carry out their 
duties. If is not, however, the United Nations' burden to prove 
Iraq's non-compliance. On the contrary, the burden is on Iraq 
to provide verifiable evidence of its disarmament as required 
by numerous UNSC resolutions. As UNMOVIC Executive Director 
Hans Blix has said, ``I have consistently taken the view that 
Iraq must either present existing proscribed items and 
programmes for elimination or provide credible evidence that 
they have been eliminated. It is not enough just to open doors 
to inspectors.'' Thus, the United Nations Monitoring 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Iraq Action Team 
cannot fulfill their disarmament mission unless Iraq cooperates 
fully and immediately by bringing forward verifiable evidence 
of disarmament.
    While we hope that Iraq will comply with UNSC resolutions 
requiring WMD disarmament, we are prepared, if necessary to 
lead a coalition to use force to ride Iraq of its WMD 
capabilities. In order to allow the President to retain as much 
flexibility as possible in dealing with this situation, we are 
continuing to build up our forces in the region.
    We continue to support the Iraqi opposition as part of our 
program to back transition to a more representative government 
in Iraq. As part of that effort, the Iraqi National Congress 
(INC) and other groups continue to be funded for a variety of 
activities by the State Department, and continue to receive 
training under the drawdown authority of the Iraq Liberation 
Act (ILA).
    We continue to help maintain No-Fly Zones over northern and 
southern Iraq to uphold vital UNSC resolutions and to ensure 
the safety of Iraq's persecuted ethnic and religious groups and 
Iraq's neighbors.
    Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, the Secretary General's high-
level coordinator for Kuwait issues, presented his periodic 
report on Kuwaiti and third-country national prisoners and 
stolen Kuwaiti property in December. This report demonstrates 
Iraq's continuing failure to comply fully with its obligations 
under relevant UNSC resolutions. The Iraqi Government, in a 
departure from its standard practice of denying Ambassador 
Vorontsov entry to the country, has invited him to Baghdad in 
January for consultations.
    The Iraqi regime continues to undermine the Oil for Food 
(OFF) program, which the Security Council designed to provide 
for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people and to keep 
Iraq's oil revenues out of Saddam Hussein's control. Baghdad 
smuggles large amounts of oil outside theprogram in order to 
obtain unregulated funds to support WMD programs, rebuild its military, 
reward regime supporters, and maintain Iraq's extensive security 
apparatus. The Iraqi regime has also on occasion ceased oil sales under 
the program and has repeatedly demanded illegal surcharges from oil 
lifters. The United States, with the United Kingdom, has been 
responsible for the institution of a retroactive pricing policy that 
has effectively curtailed Baghdad's ability to demand a surcharge, and 
maintains a naval presence in the Gulf to interdict oil smugglers (see 
below).

UNMOVIC/IAEA: Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Iraq's continued defiance of the international community's 
will, as demonstrated by its failure to comply with relevant 
UNSC resolutions, caused a four-year absence of weapons 
inspectors and no progress in addressing Iraq's outstanding 
disarmament obligations. Iraq remains in violation of its 
obligations to end its programs to develop WMD and ballistic 
missiles with ranges exceeding 150 kilometers. Since 1998, Iraq 
has maintained its chemical weapons effort, energized its 
missile program, and invested more heavily in biological 
weapons; most analysts assess that Iraq is reconstituting its 
nuclear weapons program.
    Following President Bush's address to the U.N. General 
Assembly and the unanimous passage of UNSC Resolution 1441, 
Iraq accepted the return of U.N. weapons inspectors, who 
resumed their work in Iraq on November 27. We continue to 
consult regularly with UNMOVIC's Dr. Hans Blix and IAEA's Dr. 
Mohamed Al Baradei, and Mr. Jacques Baute and their staffs to 
provide the best support possible. The President and other high 
officials have met with UNMOVIC and IAEA leadership and we 
maintain working-level and higher-level contacts. Both UNMOVIC 
and the IAEA reaffirmed their requests for United States 
Government assistance, particularly technical, logistical, and 
information support.
    At the President's direction, we are actively providing 
intelligence, technical, and personnel and training support. 
Intelligence support has included briefings on Iraq's WMD 
programs, inspection concepts and strategies, 
counterintelligence information, and meeting specific requests 
from inspectors, such as the provision of maps. Technical 
support has included offers of aerial surveillance, lab 
equipment and services, sampling equipment, and communications 
equipment. We have offered training to the inspectors as well 
as suggested candidates for hire and provided others for 
temporary duty.
    So far, however, there are no signs that the regime has 
taken the decision to make a strategic shift in its approach 
and to give up its WMD. Indeed, there are many troubling and 
serious signs that it has no intention to disarm at all.
    The first day inspections resumed, air raid sirens sounded 
in Baghdad, apparently to warn that the inspectors had begun 
their work. Indeed, the first inspection was delayed by the 
actions of an Iraqi ``minder.''
    Even more serious is Iraq's response to UNSCR 1441's 
requirement that Iraq make a ``currently accurate, full, and 
complete'' declaration of its weapons of mass destruction 
activities. Iraq's declaration was incomplete and inaccurate. 
The December 7, 2002 declaration was padded with reams of 
extraneous material, but failed to address scores of questions 
pending since 1998. It seeks to deceive when it says that Iraq 
has no ongoing WMD programs. Illustrative examples--but not a 
complete list--of Iraq's omissions identified as issues by 
UNSCOM include: 550 artillery munitions filled with mustard 
agent; 400 R-400 aerial bombs capable of delivering biological 
agent; tons of unaccounted for chemical weapons precursors; 
30,000 empty chemical munitions; tens of thousands of liters of 
unaccounted biological agents.
    The report also failed to deal with issues which have 
arisen since 1998, including: mobile biological weapons 
laboratories; missiles and associated facilities which violate 
the U.N.-mandated 150km range limit; unmanned aerial vehicle 
programs associated with WMD; and attempts to acquire uranium 
and the means to enrich it.
    In short, we have not seen anything that indicates that the 
Iraqi regime has made a strategic decision to disarm. On the 
contrary, we believe that Iraq is actively working to disrupt, 
deny, and defeat inspection efforts.
    Given the false Iraqi declaration, the inspectors should 
focus their efforts on auditing the gaps and inaccuracies of 
the Iraqi declaration using all the tools at theirdisposal 
including: the right to ``immediate, unimpeded, unrestricted, and 
private access to all officials or other persons * * * inside or 
outside Iraq;'' the right to ``free and unrestricted use'' of aerial 
reconnaissance vehicles; and the right to ``immediate, unimpeded, 
unconditional, and unrestricted access'' to any and all buildings, 
equipment, and records.
    The United States stands ready to support the inspectors in 
this effort.

U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region

    Saddam Hussein's record of aggressive behavior necessitates 
the continued deployment of an increasingly capable force in 
the region in order to deter Baghdad and respond to its 
reconstitution of its WMD programs, respond to any movement 
against the Kurds in northern Iraq or the Shia in southern 
Iraq, and respond to any threat it might pose to its neighbors. 
We are continuing to build up our forces in the region to 
support our diplomatic effort to convince the Iraqi regime to 
disarm voluntarily and to ensure that the President has as much 
flexibility as possible in the event that Iraq must be disarmed 
by force.
    While we hope that Iraq will comply voluntarily with UNSC 
resolutions concerning WMD disarmament, we are prepared, if 
necessary, to lead a ``coalition of the willing'' to use force 
to rid Iraq of its WMD capabilities. In this regard, we have 
received offers of support from many other nations, to include 
military assistance both during and after a possible conflict, 
as well as humanitarian and economic aid in helping to rebuild 
Iraq.

The Iraqi Opposition

    We continue to support the Iraqi opposition, helping Iraqis 
inside and outside Iraq to become a more effective voice for 
the Iraqi people, and working to build support for the forces 
of change inside the country. They are working toward the day 
when Iraq has a government worthy of its people--a government 
prepared to live in peace with its people and its neighbors.
    The Iraqi opposition held a broad-based conference in 
London from December 14 to 17, 2002. The Administration was in 
close touch with a wide range of opposition groups as planning 
for this event moved forward, and during the conference itself. 
Over 340 Iraqi delegates attended and included representatives 
of almost all major Iraqi opposition groups. The conference 
produced a political statement and a statement on the post-
Saddam transition period, and formed a 65-member Advisory 
Committee that plans to hold its initial meeting in early 2003.
    In November, the INC signed a new grant agreement with the 
Department of State that will fund INC headquarters operations 
and satellite offices in Tehran, Prague and Damascus, increase 
funding for the INC's satellite television broadcasting into 
Iraq, increase funding for the production and distribution of 
the INC's newspaper, plan for the delivery of humanitarian 
relief to Iraqis in need, cover June and July expenses for the 
INC's Information Collection Program, and manage assistance 
provided to the INC under the ILA. The grant will cover INC 
expenses from June 2002 to January 2003.
    The President has directed the drawdown of the remaining 
$92 million available in assistance under the ILA. In addition, 
the United States has designated six new opposition groups as 
authorized recipients of drawdown assistance under the ILA, and 
removed one opposition party from the list.

Future of Iraq

    Should it become necessary for the United States and 
coalition armed forces to take military action against Iraq, 
the United States, together with its coalition partners, will 
play a role in helping to meet the humanitarian, 
reconstruction, and administrative challenges facing the 
country in the immediate aftermath of a conflict. We will also 
be responsible for securing the elimination of WMD capabilities 
and stockpiles. We will work to transfer authority as soon as 
practical to the Iraqis themselves, initially in an advisory 
role, and to maximize the contributions of Non-Governmental 
Organizations, international organizations, and other members 
of the international community to these activities, as 
appropriate. The U.S. is fully committed to stay as long as 
necessary to fulfill these responsibilities, but is equally 
committed to leave as soon as the Iraqi people are in a 
position to carry out these responsibilities themselves.
    Should there be a conflict with Iraq, there is a potential 
for adverse humanitarian consequences. The nature and 
significance of such consequences depend in large measure on 
the conduct of the Iraqi regime, which has in the past attacked 
its own people with chemical weapons. The United States is now 
engaging in contingency planning for humanitarian operations 
involving USAID, the Department of State, and numerous other 
United States Government agencies to assist those driven from 
their homes and to minimize disruption and damage to existing 
humanitarian infrastructure.
    In an immediate post-conflict environment, the United 
States, with its coalition partners, would seek to help the 
Iraqi people to begin the reconstruction of their country. We 
are planning for this reconstruction to begin as quickly as 
possible, and to demonstrate to the Iraqi people an immediate 
improvement in their lives and the promise of a brighter post-
Saddam future.
    In addition, we have formed a ``Future of Iraq'' project, 
which helps expatriate Iraqis address post-regime change issues 
such as transitional justice, public health, democratic 
principles, public finance, education, environment and water, 
and the role of the military, free press, and civil society in 
a democratic Iraq. This program has made considerable progress, 
establishing several working groups to address these issues and 
many others. These working groups utilize the talents and 
experience of Iraqis living throughout the world and engaged in 
many fields of endeavor who wish to contribute to the 
restoration of the country in which they were born.
    The United States is committed to working with the 
international community and Iraqis dedicated to building a 
broad-based, democratically-oriented government that respects 
the rights of its people, regardless of gender, ethnicity or 
religion, and which is committed to ensuring Iraq becomes a 
country at peace within itself, seeking peace with its 
neighbors, and respectful of its international 
responsibilities.

Operation NORTHERN WATCH and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

    Aircraft of the United States and coalition partners 
patrolling the No-Fly Zones over Iraq under Operations NORTHERN 
WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH are routinely tracked by Iraqi radar, 
fired upon by anti-aircraft artillery, and attacked with 
surface-to-air missiles. Hostile Iraqi actions against United 
States and United Kingdom aircraft continued after November 8 
despite the passage of UNSC resolution 1441. Our aircrews will 
continue to respond in self-defense to threats against and 
attacks on our aircraft patrolling the No-Fly Zones. If Iraq 
were to cease its attacks on and threats to coalition aircraft, 
there would be no need for responses in self-defense by 
coalition forces.

Maritime Intercept Operations

    The U.S.-led maritime Multinational Interception Force 
(MIF) continues to enforce U.N. sanctions in the Gulf. The 
United States continues to approach potential participants in 
the MIF to augment current partners. Canadian, Australian, and 
British forces are currently operating with U.S. forces.
    In large part, member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) continue to support the MIF. The United Arab 
Emirates and Kuwait accept the vast majority of vessels 
diverted for violating U.N. sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait has 
also increased its ability to offload smuggled oil from 
smuggling vessels by contracting a bunkering tanker, further 
indicative of its continued support. Oman accepts the 
infrequent vessels diverted off its coasts. Other GCC nations 
are more hesitant to accept diverted vessels, but all provide 
support in some form to the enforcement of UNSC resolutions 
against Iraq.
    Monthly totals of smuggled petroleum products through the 
Gulf are declining. Indicative of this fact is the dramatic 
decrease in the amount of illegal oil loaded in Khawr az Zubayr 
onto smuggling vessels. Overall, loading in 2002 when compared 
to 2001 was down 55 percent. This significant downward trend 
indicates a declining willingness of smugglers to invest in 
this trade and represents a critical measure of MIF 
effectiveness.
    The MIF continues to serve as a critical deterrent to the 
smuggling of prohibited items and products into and out of 
Iraq. We will continue to reassess the adequacy of MIF force 
levels as conditions develop.

Dual-Use Items

    On May 14, 2002, the UNSC voted unanimously to adopt a new 
export control system on Iraq. Resolution 1409, and the ``Goods 
Review List'' (GRL) it establishes, are the centerpiece of the 
U.N. effort to revise U.N. sanctions against Iraq. The 
resolution has two critical elements: (1) It makes clear that 
there is no change in the prohibition on providing to Iraq 
weapons or the means to produce them, and clearly restates that 
Iraq has not met its obligations and must not be allowed to 
rearm; and (2) It effectively lifts U.N. controls on purely 
civilian goods, and focuses U.N. controls on items Iraq could 
use to rearm. UNMOVIC and the IAEA, the two U.N. inspection 
bodies already assigned to monitor Iraq, use the GRL to examine 
proposed exports to Iraq. They examine all purchase contracts 
to see if they contain GRL items, and advise the U.N. Office of 
Iraq Programs (OIP) accordingly. UNMOVIC and the IAEA have the 
authority to approve all non-GRL items, and forward to the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee for further review and prompt approval or 
denial all items that they deem to be covered by the GRL.
    While the GRL improved the movement of humanitarian goods, 
it became clear that Baghdad has found and continues to exploit 
weaknesses in the list. Accordingly, in considering the renewal 
of the OFF program in the Security Council in November and 
early December, the United States sought changes and was 
working to address key deficiencies in the GRL as of the date 
of this report. We will continue to monitor and to prevent 
intensive Iraqi efforts to circumvent the list in order to 
obtain dual-use items to support prohibited weapons programs.

The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the OFF program. Under U.N. control, the 
proceeds of Iraqi oil sales are used to purchase humanitarian 
goods and maintain oil infrastructure, to fund U.N. 
Compensation Commission awards against Iraq arising out of its 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and to meet U.N. 
administrative costs. From the inception of the program in 1996 
through December 4, 2002, revenue from oil sales totaled 
roughly $60 billion. During the most recent accounting period, 
May 30 to December 4, Iraq exported $5.64 billion worth of oil, 
according to U.N. data.
    According to U.N. data from the inception of the OFF 
program through December 4, 2002, contracts for humanitarian 
goods worth over $40.3 billion have been approved.
    The OFF program maintains a separate program for northern 
Iraq, administered directly by the U.N. in consultation with 
the local authorities, and funded by 13 percent of OFF oil 
sales proceeds, which are set aside for the three governates of 
northern Iraq.
    Humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq have led to a marked 
contrast between the health of the population of the north, 
where indicators show a vast improvement, and of the population 
living in the areas where the U.N. does not administer the 
program.
    As noted by the U.N. in a September 25, 2002 report, the 
Government of Iraq is not committed to using all the funds 
available through OFF to improve the health and welfare of the 
Iraqi people. The U.N. report cites the Iraqi Government's 
failure to purchase humanitarian goods worth $1.76 billion from 
the available funds in the U.N.'s escrow account. Iraq's month-
long unilateral cut-off of oil exports in April 2002, which it 
attributed to its support for the Palestinians' political 
cause, is the latest in a series of political moves that affect 
principally the Iraqi people. Baghdad's periodic oil cut-offs, 
its smuggling outside OFF and its demand for illegal surcharges 
all negatively affect funding of the OFF program. In addition, 
Iraqi contracting delays, cuts in food, medicine, educational 
and other humanitarian sector allocations, government attempts 
to impede or shut down humanitarian Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGO) operations in northern Iraq, and Baghdad's 
delays in the issuance of visas for U.N. personnel reveal the 
Iraqi regime's attempts to undermine the effectiveness of the 
OFF program.
    Although the OFF program is designated for humanitarian 
purposes only, we remain concerned that Iraq is abusing this 
program in an attempt to acquire goods and materials for its 
prohibited weapons programs. On March 6, 2002, the United 
States briefed the U.N. Sanctions Committee on Iraq's diversion 
of trucks designated for humanitarian useto its military 
programs. We will continue to work with the U.N. Secretariat, other 
members of the Security Council, and others in the international 
community to ensure that the implementation of UNSC resolution 1284, 
and other relevant UNSC resolutions, better meets the humanitarian 
needs of the Iraqi people while denying political or military benefits 
to the Baghdad regime.

Flight Control Regime

    UNSC resolutions are open to competing interpretations 
regarding international flights to Baghdad. The UNSC has so far 
unsuccessfully attempted to reach a consensus on new procedures 
for international flights. In the absence of an agreement, we 
continue to press for adherence to existing Sanctions Committee 
procedures that allow for Committee approval of flights with a 
demonstrable humanitarian purpose. The majority of 
international flights to Iraq in the past year have operated in 
compliance with UNSC procedures.

Northern Iraq: Kurdish Reconciliation

    The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan continue their efforts to implement the September 17, 
1998, reconciliation agreement (the ``Washington Agreement''). 
They work together effectively in a number of areas, including 
joint efforts to bring the needs of their region to the 
attention of the U.N. and the international community, and 
within the larger Iraqi national democratic opposition 
movement. On October 4, they convened the first joint session 
of their regional assembly since 1994.

The Human Rights Situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation in Iraq continues to fall 
severely short of international norms. UNSC resolution 688 
expressly notes that the consequences of the regime's 
repression of the civilian population in many parts of Iraq 
constitute a threat to international peace and security in the 
region. It also demands immediate access by international 
humanitarian aid organizations to all Iraqis in need in all 
parts of Iraq. Yet, the Iraqi regime has allowed only one brief 
visit by the U.N. Human Rights Commission's Special Rapporteur 
for Iraq. U.N. human rights monitors have never been allowed 
in. On April 18, 2001, the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights strongly condemned ``the systematic, widespread and 
extremely grave violations of human rights and of international 
humanitarian law by the Government of Iraq, resulting in an 
all-pervasive repression and oppression sustained by broad-
based discrimination and widespread terror.''
    Human rights NGOs and other interested voices continue to 
call for creation of an international tribunal to address the 
war crimes and crimes against humanity of the Iraqi leadership. 
There are a number of possible mechanisms that might be 
appropriate, and the international community, the military 
coalition in case of war, and the Iraqi people must address 
these issues as soon as hostilities come to an end.
    In the north, outside the Kurdish-controlled areas, we 
continue to receive reports that the Iraqi regime maintains its 
ethnic cleansing policy by forcibly expelling ethnic Kurds and 
Turkomans from Kirkuk and other cities, and transferring Arabs 
into their places. Additionally, Saddam's security apparatus 
continues to repress Shias throughout the country.

The United Nations Compensation Commission

    The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC) was 
established by and operates pursuant to UNSC Resolutions 687 
(1991) and 692 (1991). It continues to process claims and pay 
compensation for losses and damages suffered by individuals, 
corporations, governments and international organizations, as a 
direct result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait. As of 12 December, the UNCC has issued approximately 
2.6 million awards worth about $43.7 billion, and has already 
paid over $16 billion of those awards. Of the former amount, 
U.S. claimants have been awarded approximately $700 million, of 
which approximately $250 million has already been paid. Awards 
and the costs of the UNCC's operation are paid from the 
Compensation Fund, which is funded through the allocation to it 
of 25 percent (reduced from 30 percent originally) of the 
proceeds from authorized Iraqi oil sales under UNSC resolution 
986 (1995) and subsequent extension.

                               CONCLUSION

    Iraq remains a serious and growing threat to international 
peace and security. For more than a decade, the Iraqi regime 
has deceived and defied the will of the international community 
and numerous UNSC resolutions by, among other things, 
continuing to seek and develop WMD and prohibited long-range 
missiles, brutalizing the Iraqi people, supporting 
international terrorism, and committing gross human rights 
violations. The United States has participated in international 
efforts at containment, sanctions, inspections, and selected 
military action against Iraq, and, despite these measures, Iraq 
continues to violate its international obligations. As 
President Bush stated in his October 7th speech, ``the time for 
denying, deceiving and delaying has come to an end. Saddam 
Hussein must disarm himself, or, for the sake of peace, we will 
lead a coalition to disarm him.'' As the President stated to 
the United Nations General Assembly on September 12, ``The 
Security Council resolutions will be enforced--the just demands 
of peace and security will be met--or action will be 
unavoidable. And a regime that has lost its legitimacy will 
also lose its power.''

                                
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