[House Document 108-158]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




108th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-
158
 
REPORT RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG 
                              TRAFFICKING

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

   REPORT INCLUDING MATTERS RELATING TO THE INTERDICTION OF AIRCRAFT 
  ENGAGED IN ILLICIT DRUG TRAFFICKING, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 107-108 22 
                             U.S.C. 2291-4




    February 24, 2004.--Referred to the Committee on International 
                  Relations and ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, February 19, 2004.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the authorities relating 
to official immunity in the interdiction of aircraft engaged in 
illicit drug trafficking, (Public Law 107-108, 22 U.S.C. 2291-
4), and in order to keep the Congress fully informed, I am 
providing a report prepared by my Administration. This report 
includes matters relating to the interdiction of aircraft 
engaged in illicit drug trafficking.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
 United States Assistance for the Interdiction of Aircraft Engaged in 
                        Illicit Drug Trafficking

    (A) Colombia is the only country for which the President 
made a certification under 22 U.S.C. 2291-4 in calendar year 
2003. The President signed Presidential Determination 2003-32 
on August 18, 2003, certifying with respect to Colombia that: 
(1) interdiction of aircraft reasonably suspected to be 
primarily engaged in illicit drug trafficking in Colombia's 
airspace is necessary because of the extraordinary threat posed 
by illicit drug trafficking to the national security of 
Colombia; and (2) Colombia has appropriate procedures in place 
to protect against innocent loss of life in the air and on the 
ground in connection with such interdiction, which shall at a 
minimum include effective means to identify and warn an 
aircraft before the use of force is directed against the 
aircraft.
    On August 21, 2003, the Airbridge Denial (ABD) Program in 
Colombia began operations. In making a certification for 
Colombia, the President determined that narcotrafficking posed 
an extraordinary threat to Colombia's national security on the 
basis of several factors. These factors include the fact that 
Colombia is the world's largest producer of cocaine and a 
supplier of high quality heroin; that Colombia faces a growing 
cocaine abuse problem; that Colombian drug trafficking 
officials suborn Colombian officials and pay illegal armed 
groups to protect their organizations; that illegal revenue 
from the Colombian drug trade disrupts the licit Colombian 
economy; and that narcotrafficking presents a corrosive threat 
to the democratic institutions of government and law 
enforcement. Significantly, drug trafficking also serves as the 
primary source of funding for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) and an important source of funding for the 
Colombian United Self-Defense Forces (AUC) and the Colombian 
National Liberation Army (ELN).
    As is indicated in section (D) below, the Government of 
Colombia (GOC) observed over 200 unidentified flights in its 
airspace in the 4 months of 2003 in which the program operated. 
(About 40 of these flights were later determined to be legal.) 
This aerial activity further supports the concerns raised in 
the President's determination for Colombia.
    (B) The ABD Program in Colombia is based upon an approved 
set of procedures and United States safety oversight. The 
United States Government safety oversight of the ABD program 
includes approved ABD procedures, as outlined in a Bilateral 
Letter of Agreement signed April 28, 2003; a safety checklist; 
and three primary United States Government safety monitors: a 
ground safety monitor (GSM), an air safety monitor (ASM), and a 
Joint Interagency Task Force--South (JIATF-S) and ABD watch 
officer. These three safety monitors are known as the ABD 
safety triad. All three entities in the safety triad must be 
involved in all events in which Phase I, II, and III actions 
(as described below) are taken against an unidentified assumed 
suspect (UAS) flight in the air. The basic procedures for 
intercepting as UAS flight are as follows:
 Detection, Sorting, and Identification
    When the GOC detects or is informed of an aircraft 
operating in a defined zone of control that is a candidate for 
possible ABD action (a track of interest), information on that 
aircraft shall be gathered by the GOC from all reasonably 
available sources, including radar systems, radio and visual 
contract with the aircraft, electronic systems (which help 
determine whether the plane is traveling on a filed flight plan 
and what type of plane it is), and relevant air traffic control 
centers to begin to determine whether the aircraft is 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking. That determination shall be made by the Battle 
Commander Officer (BCO) in the Colombian Air Force's Command 
and Control Center, based upon certain factors set out 
elsewhere in the Agreement, in conjunction with other 
information provided to GOC and United States Government 
participants in the ongoing action.
 Monitoring
    If the GOC determines or has preliminary reasons to believe 
that an aircraft is primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking, that aircraft shall be traced and monitored. If 
tracking is intermittent, positive re-identification shall be 
made with reasonable certainty before the ABD event may 
continue. If the GOC has been unable to identify the track of 
interest as a legitimate track, the aircraft shall be 
considered suspect by the Colombian Air Force (CAF) under CAF 
procedures and may be intercepted.
           Phase I--Interception. The interception 
        phase (Phase I) includes attempts to contact the 
        intercepted aircraft by radio and, if necessary, by 
        visual signals in order to determine the identify of 
        the pilot or intercepted aircraft. If, during this 
        Phase, the GOC determines thatthe aircraft is 
reasonably suspected to be primarily engaged in illicit drug 
trafficking (on the basis of several considered factors), the CAF may 
order the intercepted aircraft to land at a designated place suitable 
for a safe landing. If, after being intercepted, the aircraft does not 
comply with the procedures and instructions given by the CAF, the pilot 
may request permission to proceed to Phase II.
           Phase II--Use of Warning Shots. Phase II 
        consists of the firing of warning shots, using 
        ammunition containing tracer rounds, in order to 
        demonstrate to the pilot of the intercepted aircraft 
        that he must comply with the interceptor's order. If 
        all of the procedures required under the Agreement have 
        been followed, if the information gathered continues to 
        indicate that an aircraft is suspect, and if the 
        aircraft fails to respond to the interceptor's order to 
        land, the GOC may, in accordance with the following, 
        move to Phase III.
           Phase III--Firing of Weapons at Intercepted 
        Aircraft in the Air. If, after warning shots are fired 
        under Phase II, the intercepted aircraft does not 
        acknowledge or follow the interceptor's directions, the 
        Colombian interceptor aircraft may only fire weapons at 
        the intercepted aircraft if he requests and receives 
        permission to do so (Phase III). The Commander of the 
        Colombian Air Force (COCAF) must review all such 
        requests. The COCAF may approve such requests after 
        verifying that all procedures required under the 
        Agreement have been followed. Upon receipt of the 
        authorization, the interceptor aircraft shall warn the 
        intercepted aircraft, using ICAO radio communications 
        procedures and using the appropriate frequencies, that 
        it will be fired upon if it refuses to comply.
    The interceptor shall use reasonable force to disable the 
intercepted aircraft, starting with a minimum level of fire in 
an attempt to persuade the intercepted aircraft to land as 
directed. The intercepted aircraft shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to obey the previously issued orders to land before 
the interceptor uses additional force. Levels of force may be 
increased if the intercepted aircraft continues to refuse to 
follow the interceptor's directions. It is acknowledged that 
even the minimum level of force could result in loss of life. 
If the intercepted aircraft has landed or been shot down, the 
interceptor aircraft or tracker aircraft shall give immediate 
notice to the Colombia Air Force Command and Control Center of 
the location of the intercepted aircraft.
    The Agreement requires similar identification and warning 
procedures when a suspected narcotrafficking aircraft has been 
located on the ground. Further, the Agreement contains 
additional strictures on the use of force, including a 
prohibition on the use of force against state or commercial 
aircraft, aircraft that have filed and are not significantly 
deviating from a flight plan, aircraft whose pilots appear to 
be incapacitated, and aircraft whose pilots genuinely appear to 
be under duress.
    The United States Government initially trained the GOC's 
pilots and sensor operators to operate the Citation aircraft 
involved in the program. Pilot and crew refresher training as 
well as training of new Colombian personnel are on-going as the 
program matures. Semi-annual reviews of the program will 
address any issues that have arisen in the program's 
implementation. Further, the United States Government receives 
weekly and monthly reports on program events.
    (C) United States Government assistance to the ABD Program 
in Colombia consists of the following:
    The United States Government provides a number of positions 
to Colombia's ABD program. These positions include a DOD
JIATF-S Tactical Commander and Command Duty Officer; a Ground 
Safety Monitor in the Colombian Air Force Command and Control 
Center (CAFCCC); Air Safety Monitors on board GOC tracking 
aircraft; and a Host Nation Rider Assistant on board United 
States tracking and detection/monitoring aircraft. Both 
Monitors and the Host Nation Rider Assistant are fluent in 
Spanish.
    JIATF-S, as United States Tactical Commander, exercises 
command and control of United States ABD assets through JIATF-
S's Joint Operations Center (JOC). The JIATF-S Command Duty 
Officer is the Tactical Commander's senior watch officer at the 
JOC. The Ground Safety Monitor is the U.S. representative at 
the CAFCCC during ABD operations. The Air Safety Monitor is the 
U.S. representative on GOC tracking aircraft and is available 
to observe decisions made by GOC personnel, communicate with 
the U.S. Ground Safety Monitor and the JIATF-S Command Duty 
Officer, and report to them whether the agreed-upon procedures 
are being followed. The Host Nation Rider Assistant is a U.S. 
representative who assists the Host Nation Rider. The Counter 
Drug Operation and Coordination Center, which is located in the 
CAFCCC, will assist in coordination, information exchange, and 
analysis between JIATF-S and CAFCCC. An employee of the 
Narcotics Affairs Section in the U.S. Embassy in Bogota is 
devoted exclusively to overseeing implementation of this 
program.
    The United States Government has provided three Citation 
aircraft to the GOC on a no-cost loan basis for use in the ABD 
program, and provides ongoing radar information and 
intelligence.
    Additional United States Government assets (both aircraft 
and personnel) from the Department of Defense and the Bureau of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement can provide support for 
this program under the conditions contained in the Agreement.
    In addition, the GOC has agreed that the six United States 
Government-supported ground-based radars and the Peace Panorama 
System (which is the airspace management system linking ground-
based radars in Colombia to a central radar picture) 
constitutes United States Government support for ABD.
    (D) From August 21, 2003 until December 21, 2003, the GOC, 
with the assistance of the United States Government as 
described in section (C), identified over 200 unidentified 
assumed suspect (UAS) flights within Colombian airspace. Over 
40 of these flights were determined to be legal flights. The 
GOC was in a position to act upon approximately 85 of these UAS 
flights. The GOC forced down six (6) suspect drug trafficking 
aircraft, destroyed four (4) of those aircraft on the ground, 
and seized 5.9 metric tons of cocaine. The United States 
Government is unaware of any deaths or injuries resulting from 
these actions.

                                
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