[Senate Treaty Document 107-7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress Treaty Doc.
SENATE
2d Session 107-7
_______________________________________________________________________
THE PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION
OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WITH ANNEXES, SIGNED AT
VIENNA JUNE 12, 1998
May 10, 2002.--Protocol was read the first time, and together with the
accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and
ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-118 WASHINGTON : 2002
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, May 9, 2002.
To the Senate of the United States:
I submit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to
ratification, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between
the United States of America and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United
States of America, with annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998
(the ``Additional Protocol''). Adhering to the Additional
Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear
safeguards and promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,
which is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security
policy.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned the
extent of Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program to
develop nuclear weapons. In order to increase the capability of
the International Atomic Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') to
detect such programs, the international community negotiated a
Model Additional Protocol (the ``Model Protocol'') to
strengthen the Agency's nuclear safeguards system. The Model
Protocol is to be used to amend the existing bilateral
safeguards agreements of states with the Agency.
The Model Protocol is a milestone in U.S. efforts to
strengthen the safeguards system of the Agency and thereby to
reduce the threat posed by clandestine efforts to develop a
nuclear weapon capability. By accepting the Model Protocol,
states assume new obligations that will provide far greater
transparency for their nuclear activities. Specifically, the
Model Protocol strengthens safeguards by requiring states to
provide broader declarations to the Agency about their nuclear
programs and nuclear-related activities and by expanding the
access rights of the Agency.
The United States signed the Additional Protocol at Vienna
on June 12, 1998. The Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty
that would supplement and amend the Agency verification
arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the United
States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency
for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of
America of November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which
entered into force on December 9, 1980. The Additional Protocol
will enter into force when the United States notifies the
Agency that the U.S. statutory and constitutional requirements
for entry into force have been met.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the
``NPT'') requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept
Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities. The United
States, as a nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, is not
obligated to accept Agency safeguards on its nuclear
activities. Nonetheless, it has been the announced policy of
the United States since 1967 to permit the application of
Agency safeguards to its nuclear facilities--excluding only
those of direct national security significance. The Additional
Protocol similarly allows the United States to exclude its
application in instances where the United States decides that
its application would result in access by the Agency to
activities with direct national security significance to the
United States or access to locations or information associated
with such activities. I am, therefore, confident that the
Additional Protocol, given our right to invoke the national
security exclusion and to manage access in accordance with
established principles for implementing these provisions, can
be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent with U.S.
national security.
By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its
civil nuclear activities that non-nuclear-weapon states parties
to the NPT are subject to, the United States intends to
demonstrate that adherence to the Model Protocol does not place
other countries at a commercial disadvantage. The U.S.
signature of the Additional Protocol was an important factor in
the decisions of many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the
Model Protocol and provided significant impetus toward their
early acceptance. I am satisfied that the provisions of the
Additional Protocol, given our right to manage access in
accordance with Article 7 and established implementation
principles, will allow the United States to prevent the
dissemination of proliferation-sensitive information and
protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information.
I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the
report of the Department of State concerning the Additional
Protocol, including an article-by-article analysis, a
subsidiary arrangement, and a letter the United States has sent
to the Agency concerning the Additional Protocol. Additionally,
the recommended legislation necessary to implement the
Additional Protocol will be submitted separately to the
Congress.
I believe that the Additional Protocol is in the best
interests of the United States. Our acceptance of this
agreement will sustain our longstanding record of voluntary
acceptance of nuclear safeguards and greatly strengthen our
ability to promote universal adoption of the Model Protocol, a
central goal of my nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread
acceptance of the Protocol will contribute significantly to our
nonproliferation objectives as well as strengthen U.S., allied,
and international security. I, therefore, urge the Senate to
give early and favorable consideration to the Additional
Protocol, and to give advice and consent to its ratification.
George W. Bush.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
The Secretary of State,
Washington, April 30, 2002.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you the
Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States
of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with
annexes (the ``Additional Protocol''). I recommend that the
Additional Protocol be transmitted to the Senate for advice and
consent to ratification. Also enclosed, for the information of
the Senate, are a letter the United States has sent to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') concerning
the Additional Protocol; a Subsidiary Arrangement to the
Additional Protocol, which specifies particular, but not all,
measures that the United States intends to use to protect
information of direct national security significance to the
United States and to manage access under the Additional
Protocol; and an article-by-article analysis of the Additional
Protocol, including its annexes. The recommended legislation
necessary to implement the Additional Protocol will be
submitted separately to the Congress.
The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of
Governors of the Agency on June 11, 1998, signed by the United
States and the Agency on June 12, 1998, and will enter into
force when the United States notifies the Agency that the U.S.
statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force
have been met. The Administration intends to put in place the
necessary regulatory and implementation framework before entry
into force.
This Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that
supplements and amends the Agency verification arrangements set
forth in the existing Agreement Between the United States of
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the
Application of Safeguards in the United States of America of
November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which entered into
force on December 9, 1980. Specifically, this Additional
Protocol expands the types of nuclear and nuclear-related
locations and activities the United States will declare and, by
permitting access to these locations and activities in certain
circumstances, expands the Agency's access rights. As is the
case with the Voluntary Offer, the Additional Protocol permits
the United States to exclude its application in instances where
its application would result in access by the Agency to
activities with direct national security significance to the
United States or to locations or information associated with
such activities (the ``National Security Exclusion'').
Consistent with the President's authority, the decision by a
Federal Agency to use the National Security Exclusion will be
guided by principles developed for its application. The United
States intends to provide information and access to the Agency
in accordance with the terms of the Additional Protocol in
order to assist it in developing the procedures, tools, and
techniques that will strengthen the capability of the Agency to
detect undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon
states. The Additional Protocol contains no arms control or
disarmament undertakings.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the
``NPT'') requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept
Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in all of their
peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear-
weapon state party to the NPT, is under no legal obligation to
accept such safeguards. However, beginning with President
Johnson's 1967 pledge, it has been the announced policy of the
United States to permit the application of Agency safeguards to
all of its nuclear facilities, except only those excluded for
national security reasons. By submitting itself to the same
safeguards on all of its civil nuclear facilities that non-
nuclear-weapon states parties are subject to, the United States
intended to demonstrate that adherence to the NPT did not place
other countries at a commercial disadvantage, either because of
increased costs associated with safeguards or because of the
risk of the compromise of proprietary information. This offer
was critical to gaining the acceptance of the NPT by countries
such as Germany and Japan.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned about
the extent of Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program
to develop nuclear weapons. The international community
recognized that the Agency's international inspection system
needed to be strengthened in order to increase its capability
to detect secret nuclear programs. After 4 years of work by the
Secretariat of the Agency, an Agency committee agreed on a
Model Additional Protocol (the ``Model Protocol'') for
strengthening nuclear safeguards. The Model Protocol was
approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in 1997. The Model
Protocol was designed to be used to amend existing safeguards
agreements to strengthen such safeguards by requiring non-
nuclear-weapon states to provide, inter alia, broader
declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs and
nuclear-related activities, and by expanding the access rights
of the Agency. The new safeguards measures become effective in
each state when it brings its protocol into force.
During the negotiations of the Model Protocol, many non-
nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT urged the United
States, as the strongest proponent, to accept on a voluntary
basis theprovisions of the Model Protocol. Following the
example of the Voluntary Offer, the United States stated during the
negotiations that it would accept the provisions of the Model Protocol,
subject to a National Security Exclusion. The United States took a
leading role in the negotiation of the Model Protocol, and the success
in achieving a strong Model Protocol was critically dependent on
voluntary acceptance of Model Protocol measures by the United States.
The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol was a significant factor
in the early decision by many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the
Protocol. By the end of March of this year, 61 states had signed
additional protocols with the Agency based on the Model Protocol.
The Model Protocol requires states to report a range of
information to the Agency about their nuclear and nuclear-
related activities and about the planned developments in their
nuclear fuel cycles. This includes expanded information about
their holdings of uranium and thorium ores and ore concentrates
and of other plutonium and uranium materials not currently
subject to Agency safeguards, general information about their
manufacturing of equipment for enriching uranium or producing
plutonium, general information about their nuclear fuel cycle-
related research and development activities not involving
nuclear material, and their import and export of nuclear
material and equipment.
Such broad-based information makes it substantially more
difficult for a state planning a nuclear-weapon program to
conceal the early stages of that program and provides the
Agency with a critical reference base for comparison with
information otherwise available to it, including information
from other states. The Model Protocol also provides the Agency
with certain rights of access to declared locations as well as
to other locations to investigate the possibility of undeclared
activities. This increased risk of early detection is intended
to deter non-nuclear-weapon states that might, in the future,
be tempted to undertake a clandestine nuclear weapon program.
With increased transparency of non-nuclear-weapon states'
nuclear programs, the Agency should be able to provide greater
assurance of both the absence of diversion of declared nuclear
material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities in non-nuclear-weapon states.
Minimizing the burden of safeguards on inspected locations
is a long-standing concern of the Agency and its member states
and is reflected in a number of provisions of existing
safeguards agreements, including the Voluntary Offer, and in
the Model Protocol. Existing Agency safeguards agreements
specify that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner
designed to avoid hampering economic and technological
development and to avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear
activities, that the Agency shall take every precaution to
protect commercial and industrial secrets and other
confidential information coming to its knowledge, and that the
Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and
data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities. These
provisions of existing safeguards agreements remain in force
and are expanded by the Model Protocol.
The overall design of the Model Protocol was shaped by the
interest of states in establishing an appropriate balance
between improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system
and the need to avoid undue interference with legitimate
nuclear or nuclear-related activities. The declaration
requirements of the Model Protocol are of a general character.
The Agency is precluded from mechanistically or systematically
verifying the declarations. The Model Protocol defines the
activities the Agency may carry out at locations of different
types; provides for managed access to protect various classes
of sensitive information; and provides for the negotiation of
subsidiary arrangements as needed to further define how
Protocol measures shall be applied, including at particular
locations. The Model Protocol requires the Agency to maintain a
stringent regime to ensure effective protection against
disclosure of confidential information.
The Department of State, the former Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department
of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the
advice and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, were
primarily responsible for the negotiation of the Additional
Protocol. The responsibility for preparing for its entry into
force has been undertaken by an interagency group led by the
National Security Council staff and comprised of
representatives of the Department of State, the Department of
Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce,
the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
and the Central Intelligence Agency. Based on the deliberations
of this interagency group, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the advice and support of
the Central Intelligence Agency, support the transmittal of the
Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification.
Acceptance of the Additional Protocol will sustain the
longstanding U.S. record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear
safeguards and greatly strengthen the U.S. ability to promote
universal adoption of the Model Protocol, a central goal of
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread acceptance of
the Model Protocol will contribute significantly to U.S.
nonproliferation objectives, as well as strengthen U.S. and
international security. I therefore recommend that you submit
the Additional Protocol to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
Respectfully submitted,
Colin L. Powell.