[House Document 107-78]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-78
BENCHMARKS FOR A SUSTAINABLE PEACE
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A REPORT ON PROGRESS MADE TOWARD ACHIEVING BENCHMARKS FOR A SUSTAINABLE
PEACE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
June 5, 2001.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committees on International Relations, Appropriations, and Armed
Services and ordered to be printed June 5, 2001
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by the Levin Amendment to the 1998 Supplemental
Appropriations and Rescissions Act (section 7(b) of Public Law
105-174) and section 1203(a) of the Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-
261), I transmit herewith a report on progress made toward
achieving benchmarks for a sustainable peace process in Bosnia
and Herzegovina.
In July 2000, the fourth semiannual report was sent to the
Congress detailing progress towards achieving the ten
benchmarks that were adopted by the Peace Implementation
Council and the North Atlantic Council in order to evaluate
implementation of the Dayton Accords. This fifth report, which
also includes supplemental reporting as required by section
1203(a) of Public Law 105-261, provides an updated assessment
of progress on the benchmarks covering the period July 1, 2000,
to February 28, 2001.
George W. Bush.
The White House, May 25, 2001.
Report to Congress on Progress Toward Achieving Benchmarks in Bosnia
This document is divided into two parts, corresponding to
two separate Congressional reporting requirements concerning
SFOR operations and developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BiH). Part I responds to the requirements of section 7 of
Public Law 105-174 and outlines the latest developments in our
continuing efforts to achieve a sustainable peace in BiH. Part
II responds to the supplementary reporting requirements
contained in section 1203(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for fiscal 1999. I submit these two reports
in a single document to afford Congress a broad and
comprehensive assessment of developments in BiH from July 1,
2000 to February 28, 2001.
PART I
Introduction. In July 2000, then President Clinton sent the
fourth semiannual report to Congress under Public Law (PL) 105-
174, detailing progress towards achieving the ten benchmarks
adopted by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) and the North
Atlantic Council (NAC) for evaluating implementation of the
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(GFAP, or the Dayton Peace Agreement) over the period from
January 1 through June 30, 2000. This section is an updated
assessment of progress on the benchmarks for the period from
July 1, 2000 through February 28, 2001.
Working with our Allies and Partners, we are making
gradual, steady progress in helping BiH to achieve political
viability and economic recovery. The recent coming to power of
the first-ever non-nationalist government in independent Bosnia
is a significant step forward in the country's transition to a
modern, post-war society. In December 2000, the PIC Steering
Board identified priorities for the next six months for Bosnian
authorities and the international community (IC). The broad
goals remain self-sustaining peace, democracy, and economic
growth in BiH. The PIC's specific focus was on economic reform,
building state-level institutions, and pressing the fight
against corruption and organized crime. Continued active
engagement by the international community is needed to realize
these objectives. The goal remains to foster circumstances that
allow the people of BiH to assume stewardship of a lasting
peace leading to full integration of BiH into the family of
European democracies.
The following evaluation provides a detailed account of
progress achieved over the reporting period under each of the
ten benchmarks. Basic structures of government now in place are
slowly extending their reach, and Dayton-mandated central
institutions function with increased, though still limited,
effectiveness. A multi-ethnic State Border Service, trained by
the United Nations, has performed well in limited areas and is
scheduled to expand operations soon. A small, specially
trained, multi-ethnic Bosnian police unit remains deployed in
support of UN operations in East Timor and replacements are in
training. In the second half of 2000, the international
community (IC) began intensified action against deep-rooted
corruption in BiH with mixed results. The IC maintained strong
support for increased independence of the still-fragile BiH
police force and judicial system. There remains much room to
improve these institutions and prepare them to contribute to
establishing a truly unified, multi-ethnic state. The PIC
Steering Board stressed in December that newly elected BiH
authorities would be ``required to meet all standards of a
modern European state, as enumerated in the Constitution of
BiH.''
The November 11 elections produced, after protracted
negotiations, moderate pro-Dayton governments at the BiH and
entity levels. However, in Republika Srpska (RS) and the Croat
majority areas of the Federation, voting patterns indicated
that some political figures who remain committed to
ethnocentric, anti-Dayton visions of the future, though
weakening, continue to command support and resist measures that
would ensure a European future for a multi-ethnic BiH. Key
indicted war criminals remain at large, undermining advancement
toward stability, rule of law, and refugee return. The rate of
minority refugee returns, while registering continued increases
in the last half of 2000, remains less than satisfactory.
Necessary economic and judicial reforms are still pending.
Determined IC action is still needed to eliminate the influence
of opponents of the Dayton process.
A benchmark-by-benchmark analysis of the current situation
follows:
1. Military Stability. Aim: Maintain Dayton cease-fire.
Since the January 1-June 30, 2000, assessment, the military
security situation in BiH continues to be relatively calm.
SFOR's strength as of February 28, 2001, is approximately
20,000 (approximately 19,000 in Bosnia), reduction of more than
one third compared with December of 1999. The U.S. component
stands at around 4,4000, approximately 20 percent of SFOR's
totalstrength. As part of a process, initiated during the last
Six Month Review of SFOR's Operations Plan (OPLAN) and troop levels and
conducted in close consultation with the Allies, approximately 750 U.S.
troops, associated with equipment no longer needed for the mission in
Bosnia, will be drawn down in the first half of 2001. NATO has
determined that SFOR is able to carry out all of its key military and
supporting tasks at current troop levels. Local commanders have learned
to cover their assigned areas with fewer forces through enhanced
operational flexibility, which has permitted the restructured force to
accomplish its mission with undiminished effectiveness. The next
scheduled review of SFOR's OPLAN and troop levels will take place in
the spring of 2001.
Progress continued towards increasing mutual confidence
between the entity armed forces (EAFs). The IC has made
progress in planning the restructuring of the EAFs and
providing BiH with appropriate defense and security
institutions at the state level. Efforts to further accelerate
this process will continue. The state-level Standing Committee
on Military Matters (SCMM), representing the three-member BiH
presidency, made progress in formulating a common Bosnian
defense policy as a first step towards creating a state-level
dimension of defense. The SCMM's permanent secretariat
continued to develop its role in coordinating actions of the
EAFs at the policy level. In addition to working on the common
defense policy, the SCMM secretariat assisted in planning a
second 15 percent reduction of the EAFs' budgets and military
personnel at the end of calendar year 2000. The SCMM requires
more staff, more resources, and greater authority to deal with
security issues directly, in order to carry out its envisioned
role as the core of a future BiH defense ministry.
2. Public Security and Law Enforcement. Aim: A restructured
and democratic police force in the Federation and Republika
Srpska. There has been sustained progress in the areas of
police reform and professionalization. The multi-ethnic State
Border Service (SBS), which has been operational at the
Sarajevo airport and three land crossing points, has begun
expanding to an additional eight land crossing points by May
2001. The International Police Task Force (IPTF) regards the
SBS as a key priority and will reassign monitors to cover this
operation as it grows. Defying political pressures, the SBS has
upheld Bosnia's commitments relating to border security. In the
RS, customs and interior ministry officials in two separate
incidents intercepted large drug shipments (cocaine, heroin,
and marijuana). In accordance with an existing
cooperationagreement, both entities continue to allow voluntary
redeployments of officers across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL)
to enable them to undertake policing functions in their pre-war
communities. An Inter-Entity Joint Task Force has been established to
facilitate law enforcement information sharing across the IEBL and an
interagency task force to combat trafficking in persons has been
formed. In Mostar, the former FRY police facilities shared by Croat and
Bosniak police remain ethnically integrated. The first multi-ethnic
Bosnian Civilian Police (CIVPOL) contingent remains deployed in East
Timor, and training for rotational replacements has been completed.
The arrest of a key figure in the BH Banka fraud case led
to unprecedented cooperation within the Bosnian criminal
justice system, and groundwork has been laid for continued
support and development of investigative units to combat
organized crime and corruption. Internal affairs units are
increasingly active in upholding professional standards of
police conduct. At the same time, local police capacity in both
entities remains limited, and assistance from the international
community is still needed to fight organized crime, narcotics
trafficking, ethnic violence, and civil disorder more
effectively. A series of disturbances in Brcko, related to
school integration, illustrated the ongoing importance of IPTF
and SFOR assistance. The IPTF expects to complete all police
training functions by mid-2001 and will shift more of its focus
to the co-location program and staffing special units to help
local police deal with complex problems such as organized crime
and corruption. Through the co-location program and other
means, the IPTF continues to conduct intensive audits of local
police operations, and will vigorously enforce non-compliance
and decertification policies. The acting Livno canton Interior
Minister recently was fired for non-compliance with IPTF rules.
In addition, BiH participates in the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative (SECI) regional effort to combat
transborder crime. BiH signed and ratified the SECI Agreement
to Cooperate in Combating Trans-Border Crime, along with eleven
other states in the region (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, FRY,
Macedonia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovenia, and
Turkey). The signatories have established a Center to Combat
Trans-border Crime in Bucharest, Romania, to exchange
information and coordinate law enforcement activities of police
and customs to interdict and bring to justice criminals who
operate across national boundaries. The Center, which receives
technical assistance from the U.S. Support for Eastern European
Democracies (SEED) program, opened in October 2000. BiH
alsoparticipates in the task forces on trafficking in humans and
narcotics under the Center's auspices. These task forces bring together
police and customs officials from eleven countries of the region to
coordinate national strategies to identify priority targets, share
information, and build confidence among law enforcement agencies.
3. Judicial Reform. Aim: An effective judicial reform
program. Significant judicial reform legislation was adopted by
the RS parliament in April 2000 and imposed by the Office of
the High Representative (OHR) in the Federation in May 2000.
The aim of these entity laws is to de-politicize the
prosecutorial service by establishing commissions composed of
serving judges and prosecutors to advise legislators on
appointments and dismissals. The laws also provide that the
commissions will review all sitting judges and prosecutors over
a period of 18 months. The United Nations' Judicial System
Assessment Program has completed its work. The Independent
Judicial Commission (IJC), the follow-on program focussed on
reform implementation, is being established within OHR. The IJC
will monitor and, if necessary, intervene in the work of the
entity commissions. The IJC will focus international assistance
on judicial reform initiatives, assist in the identification
and design of specific non-governmental organization
development programs, and support domestic judicial training
organizations.
In July the Constitutional Court ruled on the ``Constituent
Peoples'' case, striking down provisions in entity-level
constitutions that were deemed to be inconsistent with the BiH
constitution. Newly elected parliaments will be expected to
amend their constitutions in 2001. In November, the High
Representative imposed a law establishing a State Court with
jurisdiction over State-level administrative matters and
certain criminal law matters. This law strengthens the judicial
system at the state level and is vital for foreign investors,
who are reluctant to put money into a country with no
institution to settle legal disputes related to foreign trade.
The State Court, once it begins to function, will be such an
institution.
Additional effort is needed to ensure implementation of
these new structures and real independence (political and
financial) of the judiciary. Successful execution of judicial
reforms is critical to establishing the rule of law and the
confidence of all Bosnia's citizens, regardless of ethnicity,
in the domestic court system.
4. Illegal Institutions, Organized Crime, and Corruption.
Aim: The dissolution of illegal pre-Dayton institutions.
Several important steps were taken by Bosnian and international
officials, but much more remains to be done. Temporary Duty
U.S. FBI agents have assisted IPTF and local authorities in the
investigation of major organized crime/corruption cases. In
coordination with OHR's Anti-Fraud Unit (AFU), the U.S.
Treasury's Office of Technical Assistance began working in
January 2001 to improve the investigative skills of the
Financial Police in dealing with large-scale financial crime.
A major source of corruption and financial crime has been
the communist-era payments bureaus. The payment bureaus closed
in January 2001 and an increasingly visible commercial banking
system will be established in their place. The Central Bank
will clear all transactions of 20,000 KM ($10,000) and higher,
a standard threshold amount for money laundering.
A joint ask force composed of various Federation law
enforcement agencies, with the support of the IC, including the
FBI, has pursued the BH Banka case aggressively. (See Benchmark
2). The investigation phase has been completed, and prosecution
is underway. This is the first high-profile fraud case to go to
trail in Bosnia, and the IC wants to ensure that it has impact.
One primary suspect is in Bosnia awaiting trial.
U.S. support to the AFU includes $1.0 million for
additional auditors, prosecutors, and investigators, and for
conducting investigations. The United States also increased
assistance to police, prosecutors, judges and other legal
professionals in fighting corruption, particularly in the
banking sector in 2000.
BiH also participates in the regional SECI/World Bank Trade
and Transportation Facilitation Program. Under this program,
the World Bank will provide a loan to develop the
infrastructure and physical plant at border crossings, and the
United States will provide technical assistance to improve the
management and professionalism of the Customs Service and
reduce corruption. Discussions with the World Bank were
initiated in 2000, and the loan package is expected to be
completed and approved by the World Bank's Board in the first
half of 2001. BiH participates in the Regional Steering
Committee which meets on a regular basis to standardize
cooperation among Southeast European customs services, to share
best practices, and to bring them into line with European Union
standards.
5. Media Reform. Aim: Politically independent media and an
apolitical telecommunications regulatory authority. Progress in
the course of the reporting period has been notable. The
Independent Media Commission (IMC), in line with newly adopted
guidelines for equitable access to media, closely monitored a
large number of broadcasters during the general election
campaign. The IMC assessed that broadcasters generally abided
by rules governing broadcasting during the general election
period and noted that the number of complaints was
significantly reduced from previous elections. The IMC
suspended one broadcaster's license for 30 days, fined three
others, and warned another broadcaster over violations of IMC
rules. The IMC noted that broadcasters increasingly turn to IMC
and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) for support in resisting political pressure related to
the content of news broadcasts and political programming. In
October, the IMC published a white paper on ``Media and
Democratization'' in BiH, which analyzed the development of the
media framework in BiH and assessed the largely successful
efforts to reduce dramatically nationalist party control over
media and improve media pluralism.
Despite these positive steps, pressures persist, including
political pressure on media outlets. In early summer,
Federation authorities used tax police in an effort to
intimidate the largest circulation daily newspaper in BiH. An
international outcry forced the removal of the head of the
Federation Tax Police and the strengthening of media freedom
prior to the November general elections. The international
community will continue to defend vigorously media freedoms,
while at the same time continuing to insist on adherence to
licensing regulations and professional standards of conduct in
journalism. U.S. assistance programs help journalists meet
those expectation and understand why they are important, but
much remains to be done.
6. Elections and Democratic Governance. Aim: National
democratic institutions and practices. Development of stronger
central institutions continues to be of paramount importance.
At the State level, all Dayton-mandated central institutions
meet regularly, but their effectiveness must be enhanced.
Following the November 1999 New York Declaration by the Joint
Presidents, a joint secretariat for the Presidency was created,
and efforts are underway to increase funding for the under-
funded State ministries. Under a law adopted by the State
Parliament, the number of ministries was increased from three
to six. BiH authorities have committed to issuing a
commonpassport and establishment of a central passport registry, though
implementation still suffers delays. With its deployment June 6, the
State Border Service (Benchmark 2) became the first multi-ethnic armed
force under central government control. There is still resistance from
the entities, particularly from the Serb side, to vesting state-level
institutions with real power, as they view increased state power as an
infringement on entity prerogatives. Nonetheless, progress is being
made on creating meaningful central institutions. Within the
Federation, the threat of veto by one group under the Vital Interest
Clause renders the legislative process slow and often ineffective.
Resistance by the nationalist Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) has made
government formation more difficult.
General elections took place November 11, 2000, under OSCE
supervision. The OSCE ran the elections because the BiH
Parliament has thus far rejected an OSCE-drafted election law,
despite international pressure. Once an election law is in
place, Bosnian authorities would take over responsibility for
conducting elections. In November, voters selected members of
the State parliament, parliamentary bodies in both entities,
cantonal assemblies in the Federation, and the RS presidency.
These elections were free and fair, resulting in overall
increases for more moderate parties in the Federation and RS.
However, nationalist parties retain significant strength, and
the nationalist Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) candidate Mirko
Sarovic won the presidency in the RS. He appointed as his prime
minister a relative moderate, Mladen Ivanic, who has sought to
limit hard-line influence in his cabinet of ministers.
7. Economic Development. Aim: Free-market reform. The
greatest progress in the economic reform area was in the
financial sector, and included bank privatization, the closing
of the payment bureaus, and the introduction of deposit
insurance in the Federation. There has also been considerable
progress in privatization, with the first tenders for a
strategic list of 138 companies already concluded, and all but
a few scheduled for the summer and fall of 2001. Voucher
privatizations for the remaining large and mid-sized companies
are underway. There are problems with both the tender and
voucher processes, but, importantly, these companies are being
pried from government control.
Key pension and labor law reforms were made at the end of
2000, although primarily through OHR imposition. Also,
government auditors and treasuries are finally being
established to control government spending and reduce
corruption moreeffectively. Securities exchanges are being
established in 2001 and will start trading in companies when the
voucher process is complete. An international group is coordinating tax
reform policies, and, if new entity governments are cooperative, there
should be substantial progress in both rationalization and collection
this year.
The banking sector in the Federation has strengthened
significantly and the role of private sector banks has
increased. Several prime-rated foreign banks entered the market
in the second half of 2000. The state-owned banks in both
entities have prepared privatization plans, and the first
should be privatized soon. Under recent legislation, the
banking agencies in both entities are taking a more active role
in sanctioning banks that violate the law and regulations. OHR
had to impose immunity legislation for their staff, and this
will further de-politicize the banking sector. A single state-
level deposit insurance agency will likely be established in
2001.
Significant challenges remain, many of which have been
unreasonably delayed. The power and telecommunications
industries have to be privatized; those processes are just now
starting. There has been little reform of the commercial code
or of the commercial courts. Government procurement practices
are still not transparent. There has been little infrastructure
development beyond repairs of war damage, and some elements,
such as railroads, are still moribund due to ethnic divisions.
The IMF's stand-by agreement has dragged on for more than a
year beyond its scheduled closing date. As a result, foreign
investment is still almost non-existent, and regional
integration is lagging.
8. Displaced Person and Refugee (DPRE) Returns. Aim: A
functioning and orderly minority return process. This period
has seen a significant increase in DPRE returns to pre-war
homes. Minority returns to some of the previously most hostile
regions in the RS have taken place and appear to be gaining
momentum. Only occasionally have majority groups in the RS
publicly resisted returnees, and even these demonstrations were
largely orchestrated rather than spontaneous.
The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
reports that in 2000, 67,445 registered minority returns took
place, compared to 42,200 for 1999, an increase of 57 percent.
Only anecdotal information is available regarding spontaneous
(unregistered) returns, but they were likely in excess of
50,000. The great majority of these returns, however,
continueto be to outlying, destroyed, rural villages, where individuals
take advantage of improved security conditions provided by SFOR to
begin rebuilding while awaiting international assistance. Lack of
assistance funds for shelter repair is the greatest obstacle to
sustaining these returns.
Returns of minorities to urban areas, particularly the
larger towns, continue to lag behind those to villages. One
reason for the relatively slow pace of returns to cities has
been the inefficiency (and often obstructionism) of local
officials in resolving property claims, as well as the related
reluctance of local authorities to evict illegal occupants.
Officials in the RS and in hardline Croat majority areas, in
particular, commonly obstruct evictions and minority
reinstatements. To address this problem, OHR initiated a
Property Legislation Implementation Plan late in 1999 as a
follow-up to the package of amendments to property laws imposed
on both entities by the High Representatives.
Security is no longer the primary concern of most
returnees, with the possible exception of those in some
hardline regions in the RS. According to a USAID-sponsored
study, while security and shelter remain the greatest needs for
sustainable returns, other important factors were cited by
returnees, including employment, education, and infrastructure
issues (power, water, health facilities, and transportation).
9. Brcko. Aim: Implementation of the Brcko Final Award.
Retired U.S. diplomat Gary Matthews assumed office as Brcko
District Supervisor on May 26, 2000. (Matthews became Principal
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General of the
UN in Kosovo in early 2001.) The period since has been
completion in September of a Framework Agreement with the
Federation and the Republika Srpska on entity obligations to
Brcko. This agreement was followed in October by Implementation
Agreements on entity obligations, including on pensions, on
health care, and on refugees, displaced people, and
reconstruction. Refugee returns to Brcko have increased,
indicating growing confidence in the District's future. The
October reopening of the Sava River bridge linking Brcko with
Croatia should encourage trade and provide a badly needed
source of income for the District. Matthews, others in the IC,
and the District government have taken much-needed steps to
regularize the notorious Arizona Market, which, after
relocation, also will be a revenue source. Trouble erupted
between Serb and Bosniak students in mid-October following
implementation of the Supervisor's plan to share limited school
space. (Benchmark 2) Fast and thorough actionby the Supervisor
and multi-ethnic education authorities and police allowed the
integrated schools to reopen November 29 without incident, indeed wth
more students in attendance than in October. The Brcko Law Revision
Commission has made considerable progress. Brcko residents are
beginning to identify with their city as well as with their ethnic
groups.
10. Persons Indicted For War Crimes (PIFWCs). Aim:
Cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) leading to the transfer of PIFWCs to
The Hague for trial. As of the end of January 2001, 50 PIFWCs
have been transferred to The Hague for trial under open and
sealed indictments. Acting within its mandate, SFOR has
assisted in the transfer of indictees to The Hague and
continues to support ICTY field investigations in Bosnia. PIFWC
Janko Janjic died while resisting detention by SFOR units on
October 12. Cooperation from the parties, who are responsible
for apprehending and turning over PIFWCs to ICTY, continues to
vary widely. In particular, Bosnian Serb extremists continue to
oppose action against PIFWCs in the RS.
The United States continues to consider the apprehension
and detention of PIFWCs Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic to be
a high priority in serving the interest of justice and
facilitating Dayton implementation. Their success in avoiding
apprehension sustains Bosnian Serb extremism, inhibits the
establishment of trust among ethnic communities, undermines the
credibility of the IC, and erodes the rule of law.
Conslusion. This reporting period continued a positive
trend. The level of support by Serb and Croat voters for hard-
line ``nationalist'' parties in the November elections remains
a matter of concern. However, this did not halt progress in
other areas of civil implementation. Multi-ethnic police forces
continue to be trained and deployed. Aggressive auditing and
closure of the payments bureaus will weaken party links to key
sectors of the economy. The democratic change of government in
Belgrade, together with the continued successful consolidation
of democratic rule in Croatia, weakened substantially the
negative external influences on domestic BiH politics.
Progress on security and civil implementation has helped
SFOR consolidate its force requirements at a substantially
lower level than a year ago. The Administration will continue
to use NATO's process of Six Month Reviews to determine
opportunities for additional reductions and the early
transition of SFOR to a deterrent-based mission.
PART II
Section 1203(a) of the fiscal 1999 National Defense
Authorization Act requires submission of a semiannual report to
Congress as long as U.S. ground combat forces continue to
participate in the Stabilization Force (SFOR). This report is
reflective of events that occurred from July 1, 2000 through
February 28, 2001. Events subsequent to February 28, 2001 will
be addressed in the July semi-annual report. This report
supplements the ``Bosnia Benchmarks'' report required by Public
Law 105-174 and is therefore submitted here in conjunction with
that report. When possible, where requirements overlap, an
effort has been made to avoid duplication in the two reports.
The numbered responses that follow correspond to specific
numbered reporting requirements contained in section 1203(b).
1. Expected duration of U.S. forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina. NATO has not established an end date for SFOR, but
uses a process of Six Month Reviews to monitor the force size
and mission. As of February 28, 2001, SFOR totals about 20,000
troops, less than two-thirds the number in December 1999.
Utilizing enhanced operational flexibility, SFOR has continued
to fulfill its key military and supporting tasks. (Part I,
Benchmark 1)
Ongoing reevaluations of required force structure have led
to significant reduction of the U.S. footprint from a high of
approximately 20,000 in 1996 to the current level of
approximately 4,400. As noted in Part I, Benchmark 1,
approximately 750 additional troops will be drawn down
beginning in the first half of 2001 as a result of the last
SFOR Six Month Review of the SFOR OPLAN and troop levels
conducted in close consultation with Allies.
2. Percentage of benchmarks completed. No benchmark has
been totally fulfilled to date, although in some security areas
we are approaching completion. Substantial progress has been
recorded in other areas, particularly Brcko, but completing the
benchmarks will require time and continued commitment, as
described fully in Part I of this report.
3. Status of the NATO ``force of gendarmes.'' The
Multinational Specialized Unit (MSU) continues to be an
essential component of SFOR, which provides unique capabilities
in information gathering and crowd control. The MSU carries out
liaison with the International Police Task Force and
localpolice. It deters disruptive civil behavior by demonstrating that
SFOR can deal effectively with outbreaks and by maintaining a police-
like professional presence throughout BiH that is less confrontational
than a military response. These qualities, combined with the MSU's
continuous patrolling and cooperation with local police and community
leaders, help to foster an atmosphere of security and rule of law.
There are about 380 mostly Italian troops assigned to the MSU in
Bosnia. They operate under an Italian Carabinieri Commander, who
oversees certification of specialized units from other contributing
countries. As a part of SFOR's restructuring completed this past
spring, the MSU was to have gained a second battalion, but no nation to
date has been prepared to contribute sufficient numbers of personnel
properly trained for this task.
4. Military and non-military missions directed by the
President for U.S. forces in BiH.--The United States Government
supported the decision of the North Atlantic Council to task
the Commissioner of the Stabilization Force (COMSFOR), through
SACEUR, with the mission of providing a continuing military
presence in order to deter renewed hostilities, contribute to a
secure environment, and help stabilize the peace in BiH. The
tasks outlined below were identified for NATO forces deployed
to BiH.
Key military tasks:
Maintain a deterrent military presence.
Ensure continued compliance with the military aspects
of the GFAP.
Operate Joint Military Commissions at appropriate
levels.
Contribute, within means and capabilities, to a secure
environment, in which the international civil
organizations and the parties to the GFAP can carry out
their responsibilities under the agreement.
Ensure force protection and freedom of movement for
SFOR.
Monitor Entity Armed Forces activities and inspect
Weapons Storage sites, within capabilities and in close
co-ordination with relevant international
organizations.
Be prepared to coordinate turnover of responsibility
for Airspace Management/Control to the BiH Department
of Civil Aviation when directed. (Section 4(D)
Key supporting tasks, within the means and capabilities of
SFOR:
Provide support on a case-by-case basis to the Office
of the High Representative in implementing the civil
aspects of the GFAP.
Support implementation of the Brcko Arbitration Award.
Support the conduct of elections and installation of
elected officials.
Support the return of displaced persons and refugees
by contributing to a safe and secure environment but
not forcibly returning them or undertaking to guard
individual locations.
Support the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia and efforts against persons indicted
for war crimes.
Selectively support the OHR and International Police
Task Force in assisting local police, providing back-
up, and contributing to a secure operating environment,
without undertaking civil police tasks.
Provide on a case-by-case basis selective support to
the OSCE, if requested, in implementing Annex 1B
(Agreement on Regional Stabilization) of the GFAP in
BiH.
Support the continued development of the Standing
Committee on Military Matters.
With regard to specific issues raised under reporting
requirement 4:
(A) Persons Indicted for War Crimes: Primary responsibility
for the apprehension and transportation of PIFWCs lies with the
parties. By the end of 2000, SFOR had detained 33 indictees
without support from the parties. Additionally, SFOR continues
to support, as necessary and within means and capabilities, the
ICTY in the exhumation of war crime sites. (Part I, Benchmark
10).
(B) Support to civilian police functions: As long as
organized opposition to Dayton continues, the OHR, UN, and
other international organizations involved in civil
implementation will rely on SFOR to contribute to a secure
environment an to provide back-up in the case of civil unrest
provoked by Dayton opponents. Our objective is to transition
responsibilities for public security to the MSU in SFOR,
international police, and ultimately local institutions. (also
Part I, Benchmarks 2, 3, 4).
(C) Resettlement and return of refugees: During this
reporting period, SFOR continued close cooperation with the OHR
and UNHCR to encourage returns. Returns of minorities
accelerated during the summer. UNHCR assesses that over three-
quarters of the 1.2 million wartime refugees and more than one-
fifth of the 1 million displaced persons have now returned to
their homes or resettled. However, this increase in returns is
also an area of increased tension, as evictions and the
resettlement process force internally displaced persons from
homes they have occupied illegally. SFOR focuses on advanced
planning, enhanced information exchange to identify hot spots,
and maintaining a secure environment to minimize any efforts to
intimidate returnees. (Part I, Benchmark 8)
(D) Support to local and international authorities:
Elections. SFOR continued to provide wide-area
security during recent parliamentary and RS
presidential elections, although this requirement is
significantly reduced from previous reports due to the
improved security environment. Reports of violence and
opposition to elections were few, and SFOR's presence
proved essential to a fair campaign and vote. (Part I,
Benchmark 6)
Crime and Corruption. Crime and corruption remain
perhaps the most significant threats to the secure
environment in BiH, impeding progress in civil
implementation of the GFAP. There is still significant
political influence on police, prosecutors, and judges,
and links between organized crime and the local
officials remain. Civilian authorities have achieved
only limited progress in developing an effective legal
framework and comprehensive strategy to address these
problems. SFOR continues to support United Nations
Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and OHR efforts to
develop a State Border Service, which began operations
earlier this year. (Part I, Benchmarks 2, 3, 4)
Brcko. Since the final Brcko Arbitration Award in
March 1999, the Brcko District has been completely
demilitarized with the full cooperation of the EAF.
(Part I, Benchmark 9)
Airspace Control. In January 2000, SFOR returned to
Bosnian authorities control of the BiH upper airspace,
which NATO had controlled, as provided for in the GFAP,
since initial implementation of the Intervention Force
(IFOR). SFOR is currently working with local
authorities to develop a state-level approach to other
civil aviation issues, including management of the
airport in Sarajevo.
5. Assessment of threats to the United States forces: The
security situation in BiH remains stable. The Entity Armed
Forces (EAFs) generally comply with the GFAP and cooperate with
SFOR, so maintenance of public order is normally not a problem.
Despite an increase in refugee returns, actions against PIFWCs,
and BiH-wide elections, the situation remains generally
peaceful. As part of an initiative to reduce the EAFs to a size
and budget commensurate with Bosnia's population and financial
capabilities, a second 15 percent force reduction is scheduled
to be completed in early 2001. Additionally, SFOR is involved
in a multi-year plan to develop a single, state-level Bosnian
army with a unified command and control structure. Cooperation
between the RS Army and Federation Army on civil projects and
demining continues to improve. (Part I, Benchmark 1)
BiH authorities, civil and military, have yet to develop
fully the legitimate, responsible, accountable state
institutions necessary to achieve the ultimate goal of self-
sustaining peace. However, the latest Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe and SFOR estimates view the likelihood of
an internal military threat as remote. There has also been
significant improvement in the external security situation of
BiH, due to recent democratic political change in the FRY and
Croatia. The impact of these democratic changes is not yet
clear, and their effect on Bosnia remains to be seen.
6. Assessment of costs: Since fiscal 1996, the projected
cost to the Department of Defense of the military missions that
the President directed in BiH has been about $11.2 billion.
Costs are summarized below (in millions):
[In millions of dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2001
Operation Pres. FY 2000 FY 1999 FY 1998 FY 1997 FY 1996
Budget Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Joint Forge/Guard/SFOR/IFOR................... 1,255.6 1,381.8 1,431.2 1,792.8 2,087.5 2,241.0
Deliberate Forge/Deny Flight.................. 153.0 101.3 141.4 159.4 183.3 225.9
Task Force Saber/Able Sentry.................. ......... ......... 14.0 10.5 11.7 30.9
UNCRO/Provi de Promise........................ ......... ......... ......... ......... ......... 22.2
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Total................................... 1,408.6 1,483.1 1,586.6 1,962.7 2,282.5 2,520.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operation Deliberate Forge (follow-on to Deny Flight,
Decisive Edge, and Deliberate Guard) involves air operations
for maintaining the no-fly zone over Bosnia.
Operation Joint Forge (follow-on to IFOR, SFOR, Deliberate
Force, Joint Endeavor, and Joint Guard) is the NATO operation
to deter the resumption of hostilities and to contribute to a
secure environment that promotes the reestablishment of civil
authority in BiH. Operations finances include continued support
of a U.S. Division headquarters by a U.S. Brigade Combat Team
Task Force with a force capacity of approximately 6,200 in
Bosnia, reduced to below 4,600 in April 2000, support of
approximately 600 enabling soldiers in adjacent countries
(RIM), five base camps reduced to four in the fourth quarter of
fiscal 2000, and two troop rotations per year.
IFOR Preparation and IFOR included the costs of preparing
U.S. troops for deployment to IFOR, which was the peace
implementation force in the FRY.
Operation Provide Promise was the military operation that
airlifted and airdropped humanitarian supplies into Bosnia.
Operation Sharp Guard enforced the United Nations-
sanctioned embargo against the FRY (excluding the enforcement
of the arms embargo against Bosnia) conducted in conjunction
with Western European Union forces.
Task Force Able Sentry was U.S. participation in the United
Nations preventive deployment along the Serbian/Macedonian
border (UNPREDEP).
United Nations Mission to Croatia was support provided to
the Zagreb hospital in support of the United Nations in
Croatia.
7. Status of future operation plans: As these two reports
indicate, there has been a continued, gradual improvement in
all aspects of civil implementation and in the security
situation in Bosnia during the reporting period. The EAFs have
been cooperative, and implementation of the final Brcko
arbitration decision has been generally peaceful. The November
election campaign and vote were free, fair, and generally free
of violence. Increasing flows of returning refugees and
internally displaced persons continue. To the extent that
Bosnia slowly moves toward normalcy and as its leaders and
citizens take on greater responsibility for implementing all
aspects of the agreement, the requirement for NATO's presence
should diminish. The threat of a resumption of hostilities by
the EAFs remains low. In accordance with OPLAN 10407, NATO will
continue to evaluate its presence and the forces required based
on these elements.
In conclusion, the Administration seeks a stable and
peaceful Southeastern Europe that is part of a Europe whole,
free, and at peace. Implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in
Bosnia is part of our overall regional strategy. The United
States remains committed to working with our NATO allies and
the European Union to achieving this aim, while shifting an
increasing share of the responsibilities and the burden to
Europe and the region.