[House Document 107-38]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-38
PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY CAUSED BY THE LAPSE OF THE
EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979 FOR AUGUST 19, 2000 TO NOVEMBER 13,
2000
__________
COMMUNICATION
FROM
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
THE FINAL REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER
12924 OF AUGUST 19, 1994, TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT TO THE NATIONAL
SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES CAUSED BY
THE LAPSE OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979, PURSUANT TO 50
U.S.C. 1641(c)
February 6, 2001.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations
and ordered to be printed
The White House,
Washington, February 1, 2001.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Speaker: As required by section 204(c) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c))
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C.
1641(c)), I transmit herewith the final report on the national
emergency declared by Executive Order 12924 of August 19, 1994,
to deal with the threat to the national security, foreign
policy, and economy of the United States caused by the lapse of
the Export Administration Act of 1979.
Sincerely,
George Bush.
President's Periodic Report on the National Emergency Caused by the
Lapse of the Export Administration Act of 1979--for August 19, 2000 to
November 13, 2000
On August 19, 1994 former President Clinton issued
Executive Order No. 12924, declaring a national emergency under
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) (50
U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to address the threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States
caused by the lapse of the Export Administration Act of 1979,
as amended (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.) (EAA) and the system
of controls maintained under that Act. In Executive Order No.
12924, he continued in effect, to the extent permitted by law,
the provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as
amended, the Export Administration Regulations (15 CFR 730 et
seq.), and the delegations of authority set forth in Executive
Order No. 12002 of July 7, 1977 (as amended by Executive Order
No. 12755 of March 12, 1991), Executive Order No. 12214 of May
2, 1980, Executive Order No. 12735 of November 16, 1990
(subsequently revoked by Executive Order No. 12938 of November
14, 1994), and Executive Order No. 12851 of June 11, 1993. As
required by the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)),
former President Clinton issued notices on August 15, 1995,
August 14, 1996, August 13, 1997, August 13, 1998, August 10,
1999, and August 3, 2000, continuing the emergency declared in
Executive Order No. 12924.
In 1996, then President Clinton issued two Executive Orders
concerning the transfer of items from the United States
Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. On October 12,
1996, he issued Executive Order No. 13020 (regarding hot-
section technologies for commercial aircraft engines) and on
November 15, 1996, then President Clinton issued Executive
Order No. 13026 (regarding encryption products). On December 5,
1995, he issued Executive Order No. 12981 setting forth the
application review process. On March 31, 1999, he issued
Executive Order No. 13117 deleting the reference to Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).
Then President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12924
pursuant to the authority vested in him as President by the
Constitution and laws of the United States, including, but not
limited to, IEEPA. At that time, he also submitted a report to
the Congress pursuant to section 204(b) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C.
1703(b)). Section 204 of IEEPA requires follow-up reports, with
respect to actions or changes, to be submitted every six
months. Additionally, section 401(c) of the National
Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) requires that the
President, within 90 days after the end of each six-month
period following a declaration of a national emergency, report
to the Congress on the total expenditures directly attributable
to that declaration. To comply with these requirements, then
President Clinton submitted combined activities and expenditure
reports for the six-month periods ending February 19, 1995,
August 19, 1995, February 19, 1996, August 19, 1996, February
19, 1997, August 19, 1997, February 19, 1998, August 19, 1998,
February 19, 1999, August 19, 1999, and February 19, 2000 and
August 19, 2000.
On November 13, 2000, then President Clinton signed into
law H.R. 5239 providing for the extension of the EAA until
August 20, 2001 (P.L. 106-508).
The following report, submitted pursuant to section 204 of
IEEPA and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act,
provides information on the activities and expenditures during
the final three-month period, from August 19, 2000 to November
13, 2000 of the national emergency former President Clinton
declared in Executive Order No. 12924. Detailed information on
export control activities is contained in the most recent
Export Administration Annual Report for Fiscal year 2000 and
the January 2001 Report on Foreign Policy Export Controls,
required by section 14 and section 6(f) of the Export
Administration Act, respectively.
Following the issuance of Executive Order No. 12924, the
Department of Commerce continued to administer and enforce the
system of export controls, including anti-boycott provisions,
contained in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). In
administering these controls, the Department acted under a
policy of conforming actions under Executive Orders No. 12924,
13020, 13026, 12981, and 13117 to the provisions of the Export
Administration Act, insofar as appropriate.
The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the
three-month period from August 19, 2000 to November 13, 2000
that are directly attributable to the exercise of authorities
conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with
respect to export controls were largely centered in the
Department of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration (BXA).
Expenditures by the Department of Commerce for the reporting
period are anticipated to be $9,286,000, most of which
represents program operating costs, wage and salary costs for
Federal personnel, and overhead expenses.
Since the last report to the Congress, there have been
several significant developments in the area of export
controls:
A. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENTS
Wassenaar Arrangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export
Controls is a multilateral regime consisting of 33 member
countries. Its purpose is to contribute to regional and
international security and stability by promoting transparency
and greater responsibility in international transfers of
conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies.
The United States Government has participated in
submissions of export data made by member countries in the
regime since the November 1996 implementation of the Wassenaar
dual-use export control list. The Wassenaar members make dual-
use data submissions on a semi-annual basis in April and
October.
The Wassenaar Arrangement continues annual reviews
of its control lists. In April and September 2000, BXA
representatives attended Experts Group meetings to review the
Wassenaar Arrangement's controls on conventional arms and dual-
use goods and technologies. Nearly 70 proposals were discussed
to modify and streamline Wassenaar's Dual-Use and Munitions
Lists, approximately 30 of which were submitted by the United
States. The majority of the proposals were in the areas of
electronics, computers, sensors, and machine tools. Nearly all
proposals discussed during the April meeting required
additional study by member countries. During the September
Experts Group meeting, agreement was reached on a number of
proposals for liberalizations in the area of electronics.
However, no agreement was reached on proposals regarding
controls on microprocessors and computers. In an attempt to try
to resolve the differences in control levels for computers and
microprocessors, an extraordinary meeting was held in December.
In May and October 2000, BXA representatives
participated in the Arrangement's General Working Group
meetings designed to increase the general information exchange
regarding regions and projects of concern to the United States
(e.g., Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea). The groupdiscussed the
specific information exchange on dual-use goods and technologies and
the scope of dual-use notifications and procedures associated with
cases requiring ``extreme vigilance.'' The group agreed to adopt a
``best practices'' procedure for exercising extreme vigilance for Very
Sensitive List items and to establish criteria for effective
enforcement. Member countries are still studying U.S. proposals for
expanding reporting of conventional arms exports, strengthening dual-
use export notification procedures by establishing a denial
consultation procedure, and implementing controls on man-portable
defense systems (MANPADS). The United States is continuing to work with
interested countries to bridge the gap between dual-use items and arms
in order to increase transparency and reduce differences in licensing
practices.
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The MTCR is a
group of 32 countries that have agreed to coordinate their
national export controls for the prevention of missile
proliferation. Each member, under its own laws and practices,
has committed to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines for export
licensing policy for items found on the MTCR Equipment and
Technology Annex.
The MTCR held its annual Reinforced Point-of-
Contact Meeting September 9-13 in Paris, France. The agenda was
dominated by the proposed Global Action Plan (GAP) against
missile proliferation, a proposal that would encourage MTCR
members and non-members alike to agree to an international
missile nonproliferation code of conduct.
The MTCR Plenary and associated Technical Experts
Meeting (TEM) was held October 9-13 in Helsinki, Finland. The
outline of the Global Action Plan to limit missile
proliferation was established at the Plenary. Discussions on
the specifics of the GAP will continue in future MTCR sessions.
At the TEM, while some progress was made, final agreement could
not be reached on measures to modify control parameters on
certain missile-related items, and differing views also
remained on how to define missile range and payload parameters.
Participants agreed to continue to meet on these issues early
this year.
Nuclear Suppliers Group. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),
composed of 38 member countries with the European Commission as
a permanent observer, is a group of nations concerned with the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. The NSG has established
guidelines to assist member nations in administering national
nuclear export control programs. Controls are focused on
certain categories of goods: nuclear material, equipment and
technology unique to the nuclear industry, and so-called
nuclear dual-use items that have both nuclear and non-nuclear
applications.
The NSG Implementation Working Group, the
Transparency Working Group, and the Dual Use Regime met in
Vienna, Austria the week of October 16.
The Implementation Working Group worked on a proposal to
administratively combine the two branches of the NSG--the
``trigger list'' items under the jurisdiction of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission and the ``dual-use'' items under the
jurisdiction of the Commerce Department. While combining the
administrative activities of the NSG related to these two
branches will provide less duplication of effort on the part of
those countries seeking membership, it will have no effect on
how the United States controls NSG items.
The Transparency Working Group made some progress in
developing a proposal for the establishment of an Internet web
site; the German Government, with the technical assistance of
the European Community, will establish an official NSG web site
in 2001.
The Dual Use Regime meeting addressed member concerns
regarding the proposal by one member to supply nuclear fuel to
power plant reactors in India. Thus far, NSG members have
refrained from making such exports to India as a result of
India's detonation of a nuclear device in May 1998. Members
agreed to formally consider the proposal to supply nuclear fuel
to India.
Australia Group. The Australia Group (AG) is a multilateral
export control regime that seeks to impede the proliferation of
chemical and biological weapons through the harmonization of
export controls, an exchange of information on global
proliferation activities, and outreach to nonmembers. The 32
member countries meet annually and communicate between sessions
to review and refine the list of controlled chemicals,
biological agents, and related equipment and technology.
Turkey and Cyprus became the newest members of the
Australia Group (AG) at the Plenary held in Paris, France, on
October 2-5. The U.S. delegation took the opportunity offered
by the plenary to present U.S. positions in support of (1) the
strengthening of export controls on graphite composite chemical
manufacturing equipment, centrifugal separators, and
impermeable protective suits; and (2) the removal of controls
on medical diagnostic, analytical and food testing kits. At the
request of the AG, the United States also presented a paper on
export controls on intangible technology for future discussion.
B. ENCRYPTION/HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER POLICY
Encryption. During the period August 20 to November 13,
2000, BXA carried out a number of activities to implement
revisions to the Clinton Administration's encryption policy.
These activities included publishing new rules, meeting with
industry representative and technical advisory committees, and
working with interagency groups on emerging encryption policy
initiatives.
The Administration implemented significant updates
to encryption export controls in January and October 2000. The
policy continues a balanced approach by streamlining export
controls while protecting critical national security interests.
The most significant change in the October 19 rule is that a
license is no longer required for exports of encryption items
and technology to the European Union and several other major
trading partners. The update is consistent with recent
regulations adopted by the European Union; thus assuring
continued competitiveness of U.S. industry in international
markets. Other changes include streamlined export provisions
for most mass-market products, beta test software, products
that implement short-range wireless encryption technologies
(e.g., Bluetooth), products that enable non-U.S.-sourced
products to operate together and technology for standards
development. Additionally, certain U.S.-origin encryption
products incorporated into foreign products do not require a
U.S. export license. Post-export reporting is no longer
required for products exported by U.S.-owned subsidiaries
overseas, or for generally available software pre-loaded on
computers or handheld devices.
The October update to encryption policy reflects
the invaluable and ongoing dialogue between the Interagency
Working group on Cryptography (IWG) and various industry,
privacy advocates, and technical advisory groups. Through
consultation with groups such as the President's ExportCouncil
Subcommittee on Encryption (PECSENC), Regulations and Procedures
Technical Advisory Committee (RPTAC), Alliance for Network Security
(ANS), Americans for Computer Privacy (ACP), and Computer Systems
Policy Project (CSPP), the new rules take into account technology
trends and market realities which, if not addressed as a matter of
policy, would only serve to disadvantage U.S. industry and undermine
the national interest.
To support and explain U.S. encryption policy in
the international arena, BXA participated in several Wassenaar
Arrangement working group meetings to discuss U.S. policy and
our proposal to release encryption software considered ``in the
public domain.'' Wassenaar members also discussed proposals to
ease or lift key length restrictions for mass market products.
BXA also held encryption export control policy discussions with
other foreign delegations on a bilateral basis.
BXA continued, during the reporting period, to
educate exporters and the general public on the goals of the
Clinton Administration's updated encryption policy, and advise
the public on how to obtain export authorization through
licensing and classification requests. BXA presented
Information Technology workshops both domestically and
internationally in Chicago, Illinois, Stockholm, Sweden and The
Hague, Netherlands. Through regular meetings with U.S.
companies and web site updates, BXA provides exporters with
practical guidance concerning encryption export control policy
and procedures.
High Performance Computers. During the reporting period,
BXA engaged in various activities to implement the Clinton
Administration's High Performance Computer (HPC) export control
policy, including updating export controls on HPCs, studying
alternative methods for controlling HPCs, meeting with industry
counterparts to assess their needs, and working on developing
bilateral and multilateral relationships with certain countries
to ensure appropriate safeguards are attached to the export of
HPCs.
On October 13, 2000, BXA published a rule in the
Federal Register implementing the Clinton Administration's
August 3 announcement updating the HPC export control policy.
The rule raised the upper level for License Exception CTP for
Computer Tier 2 countries from 33,000 to 45,000 Millions of
Theoretical Operations Per Second (MTOPS), and for Computer
Tier 3 countries, from 20,000 to 28,000 for both civil and
military end users. This rule removed the distinction between
civil and military end-users and end-uses in Computer Tier 3
countries. Additionally, Argentina was moved form Tier 2 to
Tier 1.
The October 13, 2000, rule also raised the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) notification and post
shipment reporting levels for HPC exports to Computer Tier 3
countries from 12,500 to 28,000 MTOPS, effective February 26,
2001. Additionally, the rule moved Estonia from Tier 3 to Tier
2 effective December 28, 2000.
The Information Security Technical Advisory
Committee (ISTAC) continued to study alternative control
parameters for HPCs. CTP-based control levels need to be
continually updated in order to keep up with the rapid
technological advances in the computer industry. The need for
these significant adjustments calls into question the viability
of the current approach for determining HPC control levels. For
this reason, alternative control parameters that would provide
the flexibility necessary to accommodate future advances in HPC
and microprocessor technology are being explored.
BXA participated in Wassenaar Arrangement working
group meetings in September. BXA presented a proposal to change
multilateral controls to match U.S. controls. BXA also engaged
in bilateral negotiations with other HPC producing countries to
ensure that appropriate safeguards and licensing mechanisms are
in place to avoid exports or transfers to countries of concern
and proliferation entities.
C. BILATERAL COOPERATION/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
As part of the Clinton Administration's effort to encourage
other countries to strengthen their export control systems, the
Department of Commerce and other agencies conducted a wide
range of discussions with a number of foreign countries.
Hong Kong. Under the Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, the
United States Government will continue its export licensing
treatment that was in effect before the People's Republic of
China regained control of Hong Kong, as long as Hong Kong
maintains an effective and autonomous export control program.
BXA aggressively monitors the status of Hong Kong's post-
reversion export control program to ensure that it continues to
be effective and autonomous from Beijing. By openly and
vigilantly observing Hong Kong's program, BXA supports Hong
Kong's efforts to maintain the separation of it's export
control system from that of the rest of China.
India. BXA officials concluded successful bilateral talks
with the Indian Government in New Delhi during August 7-11,
2000. During the talks, the Indian Government indicated its
interest in participating in several of the export control
workshops that the United States Government proposed. The first
of these programs, an export licensing workshop, was held on
October 16-18, 2000, in Washington. The Indian delegation
visited BXA licensing divisions and heard presentations by BXA
attorneys, export licensing officials, export enforcement
personnel, representatives of BXA industry advisory committees,
and representatives form other agencies involved in dual-use
licensing.
Asia. BXA officials attended the annual Asian Export
Control Seminar in Tokyo in November 2000. Sponsored by Japan,
the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, the
conference was attended by representatives of Asian
governments. The purpose of the annual seminar is to provide
information on export controls to Asian governments, some of
which have just begun to develop comprehensive systems. BXA
plans to participate in the next annual meeting in Tokyo in
March 2001.
China. BXA hosted the first Sino-American export control
seminar with China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC) on October 26-27 in Shanghai, PRC. The
seminar covered various legal and procedural aspects of the
U.S. dual-use export control system. Participants included 180
Chinese and foreign business representatives based in China as
well as approximately 20 Chinese Government officials. After
the seminar, BXA held bilateral talks with Chinese officials on
export control policies and procedures, including the schedule
of future cooperative events and end-use visits. The Chinese
Government agreed that bilateral exchanges have been fruitful
and should continue in 2001.
South Korea. October 31, 2000, BXA officials participated
in a seminar hosted by the U.S. Foreign Commercial Service and
the American Chamber of Commerce in South Korea on export
control policies and procedures. In addition to a general
overview of recent changes and initiatives within BXA and
theEAR, BXA officials spoke about the recent policy changes towards
North Korea.
Israel. On September 17-21, 2000, BXA participated in a
visit to Israel to review bilateral cooperation on export
control issues. Members of the U.S. delegation met with senior
officials from the Israeli Ministries of Defense and Industry
and Trade, and with representatives from Israeli and U.S.
defense and high-technology companies. BXA officials conducted
a seminar on U.S. export control issues for Israeli industry.
During the visit, the Israelis pledged to strengthen their own
export control practices and to continue to adhere with the
multilateral export control regimes.
Nonproliferation and Export Control International
Cooperation. During the period August 20 through November 13,
2000, BXA's Office of Nonproliferation and Export Control
International Cooperation (NEC) hosted, participated in, and/or
coordinated seven technical exchanges on export controls, as
well as a multilateral conference on export controls in Oxford,
England, for 32 countries. These programs sought not only to
familiarize the governments of Central and Eastern Europe, the
Baltic and the Balkans, the Caucasus, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan,
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkey with the major elements
comprising an export control system that meets international
standards for effectiveness, but also to assist the governments
in developing and strengthening their own national export
control systems. These elements involve five functional areas:
the legal and regulatory framework necessary for an effective
export control system, licensing procedures and control lists,
enforcement mechanisms, industry-government relations, and
system administration and automation support. Programs
conducted during this period also included special activities
and other multilateral conferences that related to NEC
objectives. These programs have contributed to a reduction of
the proliferation threat from and through the participating
countries by strengthening these countries' national export
control systems.
D. REGULATORY ACTIONS: PUBLISHED AND PENDING
Crime control items. On September 13, 2000, BXA published a
rule that expanded controls on exports of restraint devices,
such as handcuffs, and discharge type arms, such as stun guns.
BXA maintains export controls on these and other crime control
items in support of U.S. foreign policy to promote the
observance of human rights throughout the world. Prior to
September 13, 2000, these items did not require a license for
export or reexport to Australia, Japan, or New Zealand, or to
NATO countries. A license is now required for all destinations,
except Canada. This rule also modified BXA's license
application review policy for crime control items to include
consideration of whether there is civil disorder in the country
or region to which crime control items are proposed to be
exported.
Australia Group. On October 3, 2000, BXA published a rule
that implemented several export control changes agreed upon
during the October 1999 Australia Group consultations. The
Australia Group (AG) is a multilateral forum in which 30
participating countries have agreed to maintain export controls
on a list of chemicals, biological agents, and relevant
equipment and technology that could be used in the production
of chemical or biological weapons. The October 3, 2000, rule
clarified the scope of controls that apply to ricin, saxitoxin,
toxic gas monitoring systems, and cross-flow filtration
equipment. The rule also authorized exports to most
destinations, without a license, of certain medical products
containing botulinum toxins and certain diagnostic and food
testing kits that contain AG-controlled toxins. Finally, the
rule implemented an AG agreement on how to deal with mixtures
containing trace and unintended quantities of AG-controlled
chemicals that are also identified as Schedule 1 chemicals
under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Mixtures that
contain less than 0.5% aggregate quantities of Schedule 1
chemicals as unavoidable by-products or impurities do not
require a license, provided that the Schedule 1 chemicals have
not been intentionally produced or added.
Serbia. On October 12, 2000, in the wake of Vojislav
Kostunica's victory in the Serbian elections, the United States
lifted certain economic sanctions on Serbia. Initially, this
sanctions-easing initiative allowed U.S. commercial air
carriers to fly in and out of Belgrade, and removed the ban on
exports of petroleum and petroleum products to Serbia. In a
concerted effort to continue targeted measures against Slobodan
Milosevic and his close associates, however, the U.S. action
maintained sanctions against exports to two Serbian oil
companies (Jugpetrol and NIS-Nafta) and the Serbian national
airline (Jugoslovenski Aerotransport aka JAT).
In addition to the sanctions-easing actions (air travel and
oil export bans lifted) related to the October 12 announcement,
Commerce, Treasury and State worked to implement the removal of
sanctions and return Serbia to the export control treatment it
enjoyed prior to April 30, 1999. Pending publication of this
rule, BXA changed its licensing policy on exports to Serbia
from general denial to a case-by-case review.
High Performance Computers. On October 13, 2000, BXA
published a rule implementing the August 3 White House
announcement updating the HPC export control policy (see
detailed discussion under section B. above).
Encryption. BXA published the Clinton Administration's
second update of its encryption policy during 2000 on October
19, 2000 (see detailed discussion under section B. above).
E. EXPORT LICENSE INFORMATION
During the reporting period, BXA continued to receive many
requests for export licensing information through the Freedom
of Information Act and through discovery requests during
enforcement proceedings. Under section 12(c) of the Export
Administration Act, BXA continued to withhold from public
disclosure information obtained for the purpose of
consideration of, or concerning, export license applications,
unless the release of such information was determined by the
Under Secretary to be in the national interest, pursuant to the
directive in Executive Order No. 12924 to carry out the
provisions of the Export Administration Act, to the extent
permitted by law, notwithstanding an adverse decision regarding
BXA's authority to withhold such information.
F. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT
Export Enforcement continued, through its three offices,
its programs of prevention of diversions, investigation and
enforcement of the export control provisions of the Export
Administration Regulations, and enforcement of the antiboycott
provisions of the Export Administration Regulations.
OFFICE OF ENFORCEMENT ANALYSIS
Preventive/Compliance Activities. The Office of Enforcement
Analysis (OEA) prevention activities included designing a
systematic plan to target and prioritize pre-license checks
(PLCs) and post-shipment verifications (PSVs) conducted by
representatives of U.S. diplomatic posts. The purpose of the
plan is to ensure that the PLC and PSV programs, which are
coordinated by BXA's Export Enforcement, reflect the full
rangeof U.S. export control concerns and use available resources as
effectively as possible.
PLCs validate information on export license applications
including the reliability of end-users. In contrast, PSVs
strengthen assurances that exporters, shippers, consignees, and
end-users comply with the terms of export licenses and
licensing conditions that are intended to deter diversions from
approved end-users and end-uses of dual-use exports. The
overall objective for conducting PLCs and PSVs is to detect and
prevent the illegal transfer of controlled U.S.-origin goods
and technology.
Another major preventive enforcement activity of OEA is the
compiling of information regarding parties of export control
concern and maintaining these names on Export Enforcement's
watch list. All of the parties included on this watch list are
screened against names listed on export license applications
received by BXA. OEA analysts review all applications in detail
that include a match against a party on the watch list to
assess diversion risks, identify potential violations, and
determine the reliability of proposed end-users of controlled
U.S.-origin commodities or technical data.
NDAA Activities. OEA has responsibility for implementing
the High Performance Computer post-shipment verification and
annual report requirements of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY1998. OEA tracks all post-shipment
reporting on exports of HPCs over a set operating level to
``Tier 3'' counties, as defined by the NDAA, and oversees the
post-shipment verifications performed on such exports. OEA has
the responsibility for reporting the total number of HPCs
exported and the number of NDAA HPC post-shipment verifications
performed to Congress in an Annual Report.
Visa Review Program. During the reporting period, OEA
continued restructuring its Visa Application Review Program to
prevent unauthorized access to controlled technology or
technical data by foreign nationals visiting the United States.
The Office has developed new criteria and thresholds for
evaluating visa applications for targeting purposes. OEA has
narrowed its focus and concentrated on specific products most
often used in weapons of mass destruction projects. OEA's
evaluation and analysis of visa application cable traffic
involves preventive enforcement efforts such as recommending
denial of certain visas and the referral of enforcement leads
to Office of Export Enforcement (OEE) field offices for
possible case development. In some instances, OEE Special
Agents uncovered possible visa fraud on the part of the foreign
applicant. These findings were forwarded to OEA and submitted
to the State Department's Visa Fraud Unit for further
investigation and action during the reporting period.
Shipper's Export Declaration Review Program. OEA
systematically reviews Shipper's Export Declarations (SEDs)
filed by exporters. Using a computerized index of data fields,
OEA produces a list of SEDs targeted for closer review. These
reviews focus particularly on licensed and license exception
shipments, shipments bound for destinations of concern, and
shipments of strategic commodities of proliferation concerns.
Through these reviews, OEA identifies SEDs that may indicate
violations and refers them to OEE special agents for further
enforcement actions.
OFFICE OF EXPORT ENFORCEMENT
The Office of Export Enforcement opened 187 and closed 372
investigations during the reporting period.
Office of Antiboycott Compliance Activities
The Office of Antiboycott Compliance continued to supply
the State Department with information on boycott requests
received by U.S. persons. The State Department uses this
information in its discussions with boycotting countries
concerning ending the Arab boycott of Israel. The Office of
Antiboycott Compliance opened four investigations during the
reporting period.