[House Document 107-229]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
107th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-229
EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE
PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C.
1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c)
June 19, 2002.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the
Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-011 WASHINGTON : 2002
To the Congress of the United States:
As required by section 204(c) of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), I
transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared by my
Administration on the national emergency with respect to the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was declared
in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994.
George W. Bush.
The White House, June 18, 2002.
Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction
Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--nuclear chemical, and
biological weapons--and their missile delivery systems are
among the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War
world. In the hands of countries like those on the U.S. list of
terrorist-supporting states, these weapons would pose direct
threats to the United States and its forces, friends, and
allies. Some of these rogue states are already working on
intercontinental-range missiles that would be able to deliver
WMD against our territory directly.
This Administration has given high priority to dealing the
threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September 11
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and subsequent
anthrax crimes reinforce the importance of efforts to prevent
the proliferation of these weapons, especially to terrorists
and countries that harbor terrorists. This report describes WMD
and missile nonproliferation measures undertaken by the United
States between November 2001 and May 2002.
To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD
and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, former
President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12938, declaring a
national emergency under the International Emergency Economic
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 202(d) of
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration
unless, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary
date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register
and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national
emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996;
November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999;
November 12, 2000; and November 9, 2001.
The following report is made pursuant to Section 204(c) of
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C.
1703(c)) and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50
U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures
incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the
period November 12, 2001 through May 15, 2002.
Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical
and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts may be
found in the following reports: (a) the most recent annual
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons,
provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993
(Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation
Report;'' (b) the most recent semi-annual Report to Congress on
the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, provided to
Congress pursuant to Section 721 of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; (c) the most recent
annual report entitled ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control Agreements'', provided pursuant to section 403 of the
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most
recent report on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,
provided pursuant to Section 585 of the Foreign Operations,
Export, Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of
1997 (Public Law 104-208); (e) the most recent Report on
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia, provided
pursuant to Public Law 102-391, Section 585; (f) the most
recent Report on Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia,
submitted pursuant to Section 620F(c) of Foreign Assistance
Act; (g) the most recent Nuclear Nonproliferation Report, known
as the ``Section 601 Report,'' submitted pursuant to Section
601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-
242), as amended by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of
1994; (h) the most recent semiannual report on Proliferation-
Related Transfers to Iran, submitted pursuant to Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000; (i) the most recent report on
Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Sanctions, submitted pursuant
to the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, sections 1604-
1608; and (j) the most recent report on Libya sanctions,
provided pursuant to Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996
(ILSA), section 5(b).
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of
the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation. The first
meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT
Review Conference (RevCon) took place April 8-19, 2002, at UN
headquarters in New York. This meeting was preceded by
extensive consultations among key NPT parties and the
designated Chairman of the PrepCom, Ambassador Henrik Salander
of Sweden.
The PrepCom completed its work successfully by issuing the
Chairman's report--a factual summary for transmission to
PrepCom II, which will take place in Geneva from April 28-May
9, 2003, under the Chairmanship of Hungarian Ambassador Laszlo
Molnar. The PrepCom also decided that PrepCom III and the 2005
NPT RevCon will be held in New York, and that representatives
from the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) will chair PrepCom III and
preside over the 2005 RevCon.
On substantive issues, the participants agreed that
preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and
security. They expressed strong support for International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Many nations cited
September 11 as reinforcing the need to strengthen measures
against terrorist acquisition of nuclear material. India and
Pakistan were urged to exercise restraint and to join the NPT
as non-nuclear-weapon states. Many states expressed concern
about NPT compliance by Iraq and North Korea. Israel's nuclear
program was highlighted by other Middle East states. Some U.S.
nuclear policies were criticized, but many states welcomed
U.S.-Russian efforts to reduce nuclear weapons.
International Atomic Energy Agency: The International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the
compliance of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) with their NPT
safeguards obligations. The IAEA safeguards system helps deter
diversion of nuclear materials and provides the means to detect
such diversions in a timely manner should any occur. During
this reporting period, the United States continued to provide
significant technical and financial resources to the IAEA to
support its safeguards activities.
The discovery of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities
led to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to
detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United
States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in
the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures,
including the use of environmental sampling techniques,
expansion of the information on nuclear activities which states
are required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights.
Those measures requiring additional legal authority are
embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved in 1997. With
these tools, the IAEA's capability to address a state's
undeclared nuclear activities has been substantially enhanced.
This Protocol has now been signed by 61 states and has entered
into force for 24 countries.
On May 9, 2002, the President submitted the U.S.-IAEA
Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to
ratification. In doing so, he emphasized that entry into force
of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts
to strengthen nuclear safeguards and promote the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of
U.S. foreign and national security policy.
During the March 18-21, 2002 IAEA Board of Governors
Meeting, the Director General presented his statement proposing
Agency activities relevant to preventing acts of terrorism
involving nuclear materials and other radioactive materials,
with a view to strengthening the Agency's work in this area.
The Board of Governors approved funding for such activities
through voluntary contributions, as well as approved, in
principle, the proposals advanced by the Director General for
further enhancing nuclear security. A number of member states
pledged specific sums of money in support of Agency activities,
while others expressed hope to be able to provide financial
and/or other support in the near future. Additionally, the
Board also recognized that the IAEA's program for technical
cooperation assistance could be important for implementing some
of these activities. The Agency will report to the Board
periodically on the progress made in implementing this
proposal.
Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT
Exporters (Zangger) Committee (ZC) is to harmonize
implementation of the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA
safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty
requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to
exports to non-nuclear weapon states of (a) source or special
fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially
designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of
special fissionable material. The ZC maintains and updates a
list of equipment and materials that may only be exported if
safeguards are applied to the recipient facility (called the
``Trigger List'' because such exports trigger the requirement
for safeguards).
All five of the nuclear weapon states are members of the
ZC. However, China is the only ZC member that is not also a
member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which requires
full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of nuclear supply to
NNWS. China has not been willing to require FSS as a condition
of nuclear supply in accordance with the NSG Guidelines--an
important distinction from the ZC.
The ZC held three meetings on November 26, 2001, in Vienna.
The first meeting was the Technology Holders Working Group,
under the chairmanship of Sweden, which focused on adding
plutonium isotope separation equipment to the Trigger List. At
the ZC Plenary meeting that afternoon, the Working Group Chair
reported that Technology Holders were closer to consensus on
new language, but that some members needed more time for
consideration of the proposal.
The second November 26 meeting was the Friends of the Chair
to discuss; (1) outcomes of the 2000 NPT RevCon; (2) possible
outreach activities with NPT Party non-members, including
review of a UK non-paper on the subject; (3) review of ZC
``understandings'' (guidelines) to determine if updating is
needed; and (4) actions that might be taken in preparation for
2002 or 2003 NPT PrepComs and recommendations that could be
made to the 2005 NPT RevCon.
The ZC's Austrian Chair outlined an ambitious program of
possible future ZC activities, including serving as an NPT-wide
technical resource, encouraging early ratification by states of
the Additional Protocol to strengthen IAEA safeguards, and
promoting outreach dialogue with non-member NPT Party states,
particularly members of the NAM who have been critical of the
nonproliferation regimes. The Chair also noted that in light of
the events of September 11, the ZC should consider exploring
new areas such as the combating of illicit trafficking.
The third November 26 meeting was the ZC Plenary that
reviewed the Friends of the Chair discussion on outreach. There
was strong support for the UK outreach paper, which outlined
various options for promoting dialogue with NPT Party non-
members. Most members, including the United States, supported
pursuing several outreach approaches including ZC-NAM forums
and roundtable discussions as well as ZC seminars and workshops
for selected NAM countries. However, some members had
reservations, suggesting that the ZC, as a technical body,
needed to avoid political activities such as outreach programs.
There was a general consensus that ZC outreach activities
should be conducted on an informal basis and not duplicate NSG
outreach activities nor involve non-NPT states such as India,
Israel and Pakistan. Some members were concerned about limiting
outreach dialogue to NPT Party critics of the nonproliferation
regimes and suggested that it would be more useful to engage
non-ZC NPT Party states supportive of nonproliferation regimes.
The United States reported that it was not prepared to join
in a consensus in ZC membership for Belarus owing to concerns
about certain of the GOB's nonproliferation policies. The
Russians questioned the U.S. position, given that Belarus was
an NPT Party, a member of the NSG, and had enacted the
necessary export control legislation to accord with NSG and ZC
Guidelines. The United States suggested that Belarus be
encouraged to cease questionable supply activities.
Nuclear Suppliers Group: With 39 member states, the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely accepted and effective export
control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation
of nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for
control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue
the aims of the NSG through adherence to the Guidelines, which
are adopted by consensus, and through exchanges of information
on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.
The first set of NSG Guidelines (Part 1) governs exports of
nuclear materials and equipment that require the application of
IAEA safeguards at the recipient facility, FSS in the recipient
state, commitments for no nuclear explosive use, and retransfer
controls. The second set of NSG Guidelines (Part 2) governs
exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment and materials.
The NSG Guidelines also control technology related to both
nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports.
At the U.S.-hosted 2001 NSG Plenary meeting May 10-11, 2001
in Aspen, Colorado, the United States achieved its main
objectives on restructuring the regime's mechanisms and
procedures and revising its Guidelines. Moreover, the Plenary
strongly reaffirmed its support of full-scope IAEA safeguards
as a condition of nuclear supply and rejected Russian proposals
to broaden the safety exemption to the FSS policy and to confer
``associate member'' status on India, Israel and Pakistan to
permit nuclear cooperation with those countries. However, the
Plenary did agree to consider possibilities for an
``intensified dialogue'' with the three countries.
The Plenary also agreed to the establishment of a new
Consultative Group (CG) which, under Plenary direction, will
meet twice a year to deal with both Part 1 and 2 issues,
including review of the Guidelines and control lists,
procedures, information sharing, transparency and outreach
activities. The CG also replaced the NSG Dual Use Regime (DUR),
which previously had responsibility for coordination of dual-
use control issues. The 2001 NSG Plenary also accepted the
offer of the Czech Republic to chair the 2002 NSG Plenary,
welcomed Slovenia to its first Plenary meeting, and authorized
the United States as NSG Chair to continue contacts with
Kazakhstan regarding possible future NSG membership. The
Plenary took note of the concluding reports of Chairman of the
DUR, the Information Sharing Working Group, and the
Transparency Working Group. All of these groups will be
replaced by the CG.
The Plenary also took note of the report on outreach
activities with non-members by the outgoing French Chair, who
reported contacts with China, Egypt, India and Iran. The
Plenary authorized the U.S. Chair to continue coordination of
outreach contacts with non-members.
The first meeting of the CG, held November 27-28, 2001, in
Vienna under the chairmanship of France, was very productive.
The CG discussed options for an intensified dialogue with
India, Israel and Pakistan. The CG Chairman circulated in March
2002 a summary of Member Government areas of agreement and
disagreement on intensified dialogue. The May 2002 CG will seek
to reach consensus on a recommendation to the 2003 Plenary to
approve topics such as physical protection, export control, and
enforcement for the intensified dialogue that the new Czech NSG
Chair could pursue. Most Member Governments favor a dialogue
with India, Israel and Pakistan but are concerned that it not
be misinterpreted as undercutting fundamental NSG
nonproliferation principles. In other business, the CG welcomed
the offer of South Korea to host the 2003 NSG Plenary in Seoul,
and endorsed a UK proposal to have the NSG sponsor a meeting of
licensing and enforcement officials during the 2002 Plenary as
part of the Information Exchange Meeting. The CG also welcomed
a U.S. offer to draft a paper on possible changes to the
Guidelines to incorporate anti-terrorism measures.
South Asia Nuclear: Since their May 1998 nuclear tests,
India and Pakistan have openly pursued their respective nuclear
weapon programs and have continued to increase their stockpiles
of fissile material. Both maintain active ballistic missile
programs and have flight-tested short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles. Each could deploy nuclear weapons in a
short period of time. The United States has raised its WMD and
missile proliferation-related concerns with Indian and
Pakistani officials on many occasions, calling on them to:
maintain their nuclear testing moratoria; not assemble nuclear
weapons; bring an early end to the production of fissile
material; return any missiles deployed during the current
crisis to pre-crisis status as soon as possible; limit flight-
tests of ballistic missiles; resume their bilateral dialogue;
bring their export controls in line with international
standards; prevent and refrain from transfers of nuclear-,
missile-, and CBW-related items to other countries; and help
prevent proliferation globally.
Some progress has been achieved in bringing Indian and
Pakistani export controls into closer conformity with
international standards. In April 2000, India instituted new,
more specific regulations on many categories of sensitive non-
nuclear equipment and technology and has said that nuclear-
related regulations will be forthcoming. In July 2001, Pakistan
publicly announced regulations restricting nuclear exports and
has indicated that further measures are being prepared.
However, both countries' steps still fall short of
international standards. We have proposed to both India and
Pakistan technical cooperation activities designed to improve
the effectiveness of their export controls, and encourage
further steps to bring controls in line with international
standards.
On September 22, 2001, President Bush waived Glenn
Amendment sanctions that were imposed on India and Pakistan
following their May 1998 nuclear tests. The President also
waived sanctions imposed on Pakistan under the Ex-Im Bank Act
and the Pressler and Symington Amendments. These steps do not
signal a diminution of U.S. nonproliferation commitments, but
rather a desire to engage India and Pakistan on our
nonproliferation concerns in a less coercive atmosphere.
U.S.-DPRK Agreed Framework: In October 1994, the United
States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or
North Korea) signed the Agreed Framework in an effort to
resolve concerns about North Korea's nuclear program and bring
the DPRK into compliance with its NPT commitments. As part of
the Agreed Framework, North Korea undertook to freeze and
dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and related
facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. It also undertook to remain
party to the NPT and come into full compliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement including taking all steps deemed
necessary by the IAEA when a significant portion of the light-
water reactor is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear
components. North Korea has yet to begin significant
cooperation with the IAEA toward this end. The United States
has called on North Korea to begin full cooperation so it can
live up to its commitments in the Agreed Framework. Meanwhile,
the United States assesses that the freeze at Yongbyon and
Taechon, monitored by the IAEA, remains in place. The IAEA has
maintained a continuous, presence in the DPRK since 1994.
Canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments
from the DPRK's 5-megawatt graphite-moderated nuclear reactor
was completed in April 2000. The IAEA continues to monitor the
canned fuel pending its ultimate removal from the DPRK once key
nuclear components begin to be delivered. A U.S. spent fuel
team periodically returns to the DPRK to continue maintenance
operations and recondition leaking canisters.
Although the Agreed Framework creates a process for
resolving the North Korean nuclear issue vis-a-vis the declared
graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities, concern
about the DPRK's nuclear intentions remains. The United States
remains committed to the Agreed Framework, as long as the DPRK
meets its obligations. However, we are concerned with North
Korea's failure to take steps needed to achieve full
cooperation with the IAEA, and to rectify its ongoing
noncompliance with the NPT. Concern over this issue and others
(lack of demonstrable steps to implement the North-South Joint
Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and no
reduction in the North Korean ballistic missile threat) led
President Bush to waive the Congressional certification
requirements for U.S. funding of heavy fuel oil for the Korean
Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Under the
Agreed Framework, North Korea receives 500,000 tons of heavy
fuel oil, purchased through KEDO.
In June 2001, President Bush announced that the
Administration was prepared to undertake serious talks with the
DPRK on a broad range of topics including improved
implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to North
Korea's nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on North
Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports; and
a less threatening conventional force military posture. At the
end of April, the DPRK informed the State Department that it
was prepared to begin bilateral talks.
Iran Nuclear: Despite its status as an NPT party, Iran
maintains an active nuclear weapons development program. Among
the persistent indicators that Iran is pursuing a nuclear
weapons development program is the fact that Iran is attempting
to obtain capabilities to produce both highly enriched uranium
and plutonium--the critical materials for a nuclear weapon.
Neither of these capabilities is necessary to meet Iran's
declared desire to have a civil nuclear power program to
generate electricity, which is itself suspicious in light of
Iran's abundant oil resources.
For the time being, Iran's nuclear program remains
dependent on external sources of supply. The United States has
played the leading role in developing and maintaining a broad
international consensus against assisting Iran's foreign
procurement efforts. We deny Iran access to U.S. nuclear
technology and material, and all major Western suppliers have
agreed not to provide nuclear technology to Iran. A number of
supplier states have abandoned potentially lucrative sales to
Iran's nuclear program. Russia remains the most significant
exception to this virtual embargo on nuclear cooperation with
Iran. The Administration is actively engaged with Russia in an
attempt to resolve differences over the nature and scope of
Russian cooperation with Iran's nuclear programs.
Iraq Nuclear: We believe that some nuclear activity has
continued in Iraq since UN inspections stopped in December
1998. The acquisition of highly-enriched uranium or weapons-
grade plutonium remains Iraq's biggest obstacle to a nuclear-
weapons capability. We remain concerned that Iraq still seeks
to acquire a nuclear weapons capability.
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
EPCI Regulations: The export control regulations issued
under the Expanded Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI)
remain fully in force and continue to be administered by the
Department of Commerce, in a consultation with other agencies,
in order to control the export of items with potential use in
WMD or missile programs. In particular, EPCI is being applied
to items with potential use in chemical or biological weapons
or unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction.
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC): Chemical weapons (CW)
continue to pose a very serious threat to our security and that
of our allies. On April 29, 1997, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (known as the
Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC) entered into force with 87
of the CWC's 165 States Signatories as original States Parties,
including the United States, which ratified on April 25, 1997.
As of the end of this reporting period, 145 countries have
become States Parties.
The implementing body for the CWC--the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)--carries out the
verification provisions of the CWC, and presently has a staff
of approximately 500 international civil servants, including
about 200 inspectors trained and equipped to inspect military
and industrial facilities throughout the world. To date, the
OPCW has conducted over 1100 routine inspections at over 500
sites in some 50 countries. No challenge inspections have yet
taken place. The OPCW maintains an inspector presence at
operational CW destruction facilities. U.S. facilities have
hosted approximately one-third of OPCW inspections and two-
thirds of total inspection days (due to the significant level
of CW destruction activity in the United States).
The United States is determined to seek full implementation
and compliance with the concrete measures within the CWC. This
includes accurate and complete declarations from all States
Parties and compliance with the CWC's inspection provisions
that provide for access by international inspectors to declared
and potentially undeclared facilities and locations. The United
States is actively taking steps to strengthen the OPCW's
ability to effectively implement the CWC, including recently
securing a much-needed change in OPCW leadership.
We also are working to ensure that countries that refuse to
join the CWC are increasingly isolated politically and denied
access under the CWC's provisions to certain key chemicals from
States Parties. The relevant treaty provisions are specifically
designed to penalize countries that refuse to become party to
the CWC.
Biological Weapons Convention: The United States agreed in
1994 to participate in an AD Hoc Group to negotiate a Protocol
to the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) that would
``strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation
of the Convention.'' On July 25, 2001, after a thorough United
States Government policy review, the United States announced
that the draft Protocol text was unacceptable and unfixable. At
the Fifth BWC Review Conference last November, the
Administration offered a number of other ideas and alternative
approaches that would be effective in combating the threat of
BW proliferation and in strengthening the BWC. When the Review
Conference resumes in November 2002, the United States will
seek agreement to these proposals, a number of which are
already being implemented at national levels.
Australia Group: The United States continues to be a
leading participant in the 33-member Australia Group (AG)
chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation regime. At the
most recent annual AG Plenary Session from October 1-4, 2001,
the Group reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief
in the AG's viability, importance and compatability with the
CWC and BWC. Responding to the terrorist events of September
11, AG participants agreed that strengthening the regime to
better counter CBW proliferation and CBW terrorism should be a
priority.
Participants agreed to several proposals aimed at plugging
loopholes in current AG export controls; they also agreed that
export controls, regional nonproliferation and countering CBW
terrorism will be the main focus of the Group for the
foreseeable future. These proposals were further developed at
intersessional meetings in February and April 2002. Members
also continued to agree that full adherence to the CWC and BWC
by all governments will be a key to achieving a permanent
global ban on chemical and biological weapons, and that all
states adhering to these Conventions must take steps to ensure
that their national activities support these goals. The Group
welcomed Bulgaria as its newest member and reaffirmed its
commitment to continue its active outreach program of briefings
for non-AG countries, and to promote regional consultations on
export controls and nonproliferation to further awareness and
understanding of national policies in these areas.
Sanctions/Interdiction: During the last six months, we
continued to examine closely intelligence and other information
concerning trade in CBW-related material and technology. In May
2002, the United States imposed penalties on two Armenian and
five Chinese entities, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 2000, for transferring AG-controlled items to Iran.
Penalties imposed in January 2002 and June 2001, pursuant to
the Iran Nonproliferation Act, on a total of four Chinese
entities for their involvement in the transfer of AG-controlled
items to Iran also remain in effect. The United States
continues to cooperate with its AG partners and other countries
in stopping shipments of proliferation concern.
Country Issues: Iran continues to seek precursors and
production technology to augment its CW stockpile, and
continues to actively pursue biological warfare capabilities.
In the absence of UN inspections and monitoring, Iraq may be
reconstituting its WMD programs. Syria and Libya continue to
make some improvements to their CW infrastructure and both may
be pursuing limited biological agent development. North Korea
has a dedicated, national-level effort to achieve a BW
capability and has developed and produced, and may have
weaponized, BW agents. North Korea is also assessed to maintain
a stockpile of CW agents. Sudan has received foreign assistance
in the development of a CW program and may be actively pursuing
more advanced capability, perhaps in cooperation with other
state sponsors of terrorism.
MISSILES FOR DELIVERY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The United States rigorously controls exports that could
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass
destruction, and monitors closely activities of potential
missile proliferation concern. We also continue to implement
U.S. missile sanctions laws. During the reporting period, no
new missile sanctions were imposed. However, the United States
imposed penalties on a number of entities, pursuant to the Iran
Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (see below).
Missile Technology Control Regime: The Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) Partners continued to share information
about proliferation problems with each other and with other
potential supplier, consumer, and transshipment states.
Partners also emphasized the need for implementing effective
export control systems. This cooperation has resulted in the
interdiction of missile-related materials intended for use in
missile programs of concern.
As agreed to the September 2001 Ottawa Plenary, the MTCR
Partners held a Reinforced Point of Contact (RPOC) meeting in
Paris on April 25-26. The meeting focused on regional missile
proliferation issues and resulted in a detailed and productive
discussion of additional measures Partners could take to
address the missile proliferation threat. The Partners also
discussed ways to enhance outreach and transparency to non-
members, the ongoing need to impede proliferation procurement
efforts, and the importance of vigorous export control
enforcement. The Partners will give further attention to these
important topics at the September 2002 MTCR Plenary in Warsaw.
International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile
Proliferation: The United States was one of 78 countries that
participated in a meeting hosted by France on February 7-8 on
universalization of the draft International Code of Conduct
Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC). The meeting was
an opportunity for participants to provide views on this
important issue. However, no decisions were taken on next
steps. The European Union has offered to hold a follow-up
meeting, and we expect France to announce soon plans for taking
the ICOC process forward.
The ICOC is intended to create a widely-subscribed
international predisposition against ballistic missile
proliferation. It consists of a broad set of principles,
general commitments, and modest confidence building measures.
It is intended to be a voluntary political commitment, not a
treaty, and will be open to all countries. The ICOC will
supplement, not supplant, the important work of the MTCR.
Sanctions: In May, the United States imposed penalties on
two Moldovan entities, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation
Act of 2000, for the transfer of MTCR-controlled items to Iran.
(NOTE: The United States also imposed penalties on three
Chinese entities, pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of
2000 for engaging in conventional weapons-related cooperation
with Iran. END NOTE.) No new missile sanctions, however, were
imposed during the reporting period.
On November 2, 2001, in order to facilitate certain
necessary cooperation with the Pakistani Ministry of Defense
(MOD) in support of Operation Enduring Freedom, the United
States waived certain missile sanctions imposed against the
Pakistani MOD in November 2000 for transactions determined to
be needed (1) to support Operation Enduring Freedom or (2) to
permit sale or export to Pakistan of defense articles or
defense services comparable to those delivery of which was
blocked by the imposition of sanctions on May 30, 1998. On
November 21, 2000, Category I missile sanctions were imposed on
the Pakistani MOD and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research
Commission (SUPARCO) for their knowing engagement in missile
proliferation activities with Chinese entities. Missile
sanctions imposed against SUPARCO and another entity, NDC in
September 2001, remain unchanged.
South Asia Missile: India has an extensive, largely
indigenous ballistic missile development and production
program. Nevertheless, India's ballistic missile programs have
benefited from the acquisition of foreign equipment and
technology, which it continues to seek. India conducted flight
tests of a variety of missiles during the reporting period,
including the sea-based Dhanush, a short-range version of the
Agni, and the Brahmos cruise missile it jointly developed with
Russia.
Pakistan has an active ballistic missile program and,
during the last several years, has received considerable
Chinese and North Korean assistance in these efforts. Continued
development of nuclear-capable ballistic missiles by both
countries raises the prospect that more sophisticated and
possibly destabilizing capabilities will be fielded in the
coming years. Such a race constitutes a threat to regional and
international security.
DPRK Missile: Although the DPRK has maintained its
September 1999, self-imposed, long-range missile flight test
moratorium, it has, during the last several years, been
extremely active in the research, development, testing,
deployment and export of ballistic missiles and related
equipment and technology. The DPRK also is working to increase
the capability of its missile systems. During meetings with
other international leaders in 2001, including Russian
President Putin, PRC President Jiang Zemin, and Swedish Prime
Minister Persson, DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-Il reportedly stated
North Korea's commitment to maintain its moratorium until 2003.
As noted above, pursuant to the Administration's North
Korea policy review, on June 6, 2001, President Bush announced
that the United States was prepared to undertake serious
discussions with North Korea on a broad agenda, to include:
improved implementation of the Agreed Framework relating to
North Korea's nuclear activities; verifiable constraints on
North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile
exports; and a less threatening conventional military posture.
On April 27, the DPRK informed the State Department that it was
prepared to begin bilateral talks.
Iran Missile: Iran has substantial missile inventories and
an indigenous ballistic missile production capability. In
recent years, North Korean, Russian and Chinese entities have
continued to supply Iran with a wide variety of missile-related
goods, technology and expertise. In response to Iranian efforts
to acquire sensitive items from Russian entities for use in
Iran's missile and nuclear development programs, the United
States has pursued a high-level dialogue with Russia aimed at
funding ways to work together to cut off the flow of sensitive
goods to Iran's ballistic missile development and nuclear
weapon programs. Russia's government has created institutional
foundations to implement its nonproliferation commitments and
passed laws to punish wrongdoers. It also has passed new export
control legislation and adopted implementing regulations to
tighten government control over sensitive technologies and
continued a dialogue with the United States aimed at
strengthening export control practices at Russian aerospace
firms. However while some progress has been made, we are
concerned that Russian entities continue to supply missile
technology and equipment to Iran.
Other Countries: Other countries in addition to the above
are pursuing missile programs. Iraq retains a significant
missile production capability, continues work on short-range
ballistic missiles allowed by UNSCR 687, and may be expanding
to longer-range systems. Technical experience gained in this
pursuit will likely be applied to future longer-range missile
development efforts. Libya's limited success with its
indigenous missile production effort may renew its focus on
purchasing a complete ballistic missile system. Syria continues
to acquire missile-related equipment and materials, and has
received considerable foreign production assistance.
VALUE OF NONPROLIFERATION EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. national export controls--both those implemented
pursuant to multilateral nonproliferation regimes and those
implemented unilaterally--play an important part in impeding
the proliferation of WMD and missiles. (As used here, ``export
controls'' refer to requirements for case-by-case review of
certain exports, or limitations on exports of particular items
of proliferation concern to certain destinations, rather than
broad embargoes or economic sanctions that also affect trade.)
As noted in this report, however, export controls are only
one of a number of tools the United States uses to achieve its
nonproliferation objectives. Global nonproliferation treaties
and norms, multilateral nonproliferation regimes, interdictions
of shipments of proliferation concern, sanctions, export
control assistance, redirection and elimination efforts, and
robust U.S. military, intelligence, and diplomatic capabilities
all work in conjunction with export controls as part of our
overall nonproliferation strategy.
Export controls are a critical part of nonproliferation
because every emerging WMD and missile program seeks equipment
and technology from other countries. Proliferators look to
other sources because needed items are unavailable within their
country, because indigenously produced items are of substandard
quality or insufficient quantity, and/or because imported items
can be obtained more quickly and cheaply than domestically-
produced ones.
It is important to note that proliferators seek for their
WMD and missile programs both items on multilateral lists (like
gyroscopes controlled on the MTCR Annex and nerve gas
precursors on the AG list) and unlisted items (like lower-level
machine tools and very basic chemicals). In addition, many of
the items of interest to proliferators are inherently dual-use.
For example, key precursors and technologies used in the
production of fertilizers or pesticides also can be used to
make missile propellant and chemical weapons; bio-production
technology can be used to produce biological weapons.
The most obvious value of export controls is in impeding or
denying proliferators access to key pieces of equipment or
technology for use in their WMD and/or missile programs. In
large part, U.S. national export controls--and similar controls
of our partners in the AG, MTCR, and NSG--strive to deny
proliferators access to the largest sources of the best
equipment and technology. If denied, proliferators might then
turn to non-regime suppliers to seek less capable items.
Moreover, in many instances, U.S. and regime controls and
associated efforts have forced proliferators to engage in
complex clandestine procurements, taking time and money away
from their WMD and missile programs.
U.S. national export controls and those of our regime
partners also have played an important role in increasing over
time the critical mass of countries applying nonproliferation
export controls. For example: the seven-member MTCR of 1987 has
grown to 33 member countries; the NSG adopted full-scope
safeguards as a condition of supply and extended new controls
to nuclear-related dual-use items; several non-member countries
have committed unilaterally to apply export controls consistent
with one or more of the regimes; and most of the members of the
nonproliferation regimes have applied national ``catch-all''
controls similar to those under the U.S. Enhanced Proliferation
Control Initiative. (Export controls normally are tied to a
specific list of items, such as the MTCR Annex. ``Catch-all''
controls provide a legal basis to control exports of items not
on a list, when it is believed that those items could be
destined for WMD and/or missile programs.)
The United States maintains a global program to assist
other countries' efforts to strengthen their export control
systems. Assistance is focused on helping weapons-source
countries along potential smuggling routes to develop effective
export control regimes, including effective capabilities to
control illicit weapons trafficking across their borders; to
establish the necessary legal and regulatory basis for
effective export controls; to improve licensing procedures and
practices; to coordinate, train, and equip export enforcement
agencies, including customs agents and border security and
enforcement authorities; to develop and install automated
information systems for licensing and enforcement; and to
foster effective interaction between government and industry on
export controls.
This program has placed some 19 advisors in countries
around the world to coordinate export control/border security
activities. The program continues to register successes: new
cooperative relationships have been established with key
transshipment states; a number of countries have adopted, or
are adopting, export and transshipment control laws and
regulations largely based on U.S. advice; the program has
contributed to a significant strengthening of border security
capabilities in former Soviet states, notably in Central Asia;
and various countries' enforcement agencies have used U.S.
equipment and training to interdict the movement of arms,
related items and radioactive materials across borders.
Finally, export controls play an important role in enabling
and enhancing legitimate trade. They provide a means to permit
dual-use exports to proceed under circumstances where, without
export control scrutiny, the only prudent course would be to
prohibit them. They help build confidence between countries
applying similar controls that, in turn, results in increased
trade. Each of the nonproliferation regimes, for example, has a
``no undercut'' policy committing each member not to make an
export that another has denied for nonproliferation reasons and
notified to the rest--unless it first consults with the
original denying country. Not only does this policy make it
more difficult for proliferators to get items from regime
members, it establishes a ``level playing field'' for
exporters.
THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION ASSISTANCE TO THE FORMER SOVIET
STATES
The President has made clear repeatedly that his
Administration is committed to strong, effective cooperation
with Russia and the other former Soviet states to reduce
weapons of mass destruction and prevent their proliferation. To
ensure that the promise of these programs is fully realized,
the Administration undertook in 2001 a detailed review of U.S.
nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to the Russian
Federation. The review was completed in December 2001. It found
that most U.S. programs in this area work well, are focused on
priority tasks, and are well managed. The review further
identified some programs for expansion and others for
adjustment. In keeping with the President's commitment, and the
results of the review, the President's FY2003 budget included
historically high requests to the Congress for nonproliferation
and threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet States.
EXPENSES
Pursuant to Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act
(50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I report that there were no specific
expenses directly attributable to the exercise of authorities
conferred by the declaration of the national emergency in
Executive Order 12938, as amended, during the period from
November 12, 2001, through May 15, 2002.