[Senate Treaty Document 106-45]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress Treaty Doc.
SENATE
2d Session 106-45
_______________________________________________________________________
CONVENTION FOR INTERNATIONAL CARRIAGE BY AIR
__________
MESSAGE
from
THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
transmitting
THE CONVENTION FOR THE UNIFICATION OF CERTAIN RULES FOR INTERNATIONAL
CARRIAGE BY AIR, DONE AT MONTREAL, MAY 28, 1999
September 6, 2000.--The Convention was read the first time, and
together with the accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate
-------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-118 WASHINGTON : 2000
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
The White House, September 6, 2000.
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to
ratification, the Convention for the Unification of Certain
Rules for International Carriage by Air, done at Montreal May
28, 1999 (the ``Convention''). The report of the Department of
State, including an article-by-article analysis, is enclosed
for the information of the Senate in connection with its
consideration of the Convention.
I invite favorable consideration of the recommendation of
the Secretary of State, as contained in the report provided
herewith, that the Senate's advice and consent to the
Convention be subject to a declaration on behalf of the United
States, pursuant to Article 57(a) of the Convention, that the
Convention shall not apply to international carriage by air
performed and operated directly by the United States for
noncommercial purposes in respect to its functions and duties
as a sovereign State. Such a declaration is consistent with the
declaration made by the United States under the Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, done at Warsaw October 12, 1929, as amended
(the ``Warsaw Convention'') and is specifically permitted by
the terms of the new Convention.
Upon entry into force for the United States, the
Convention, where applicable, would supersede the Warsaw
Convention, as amended by the Protocol to Amend the Warsaw
Convention, done at Montreal September 25, 1975 (``Montreal
Protocol No. 4''), which entered into force for the United
States on March 4, 1999. The Convention represents a vast
improvement over the liability regime established under the
Warsaw Convention and its related instruments, relative to
passenger rights in the event of an accident. Among other
benefits, the Convention eliminates the cap on carrier
liability to accident victims; holds carriers strictly liable
for proven damages up to 100,000 Special Drawing Rights
(approximately $135,000) (Special Drawing Rights represent an
artificial ``basket'' currency developed by the International
Monetary Fund for internal accounting purposes to replace gold
as a world standard); provides for U.S. jurisdiction for most
claims brought on behalf of U.S. passengers; clarifies the
duties and obligations of carriers engaged in code-share
operations; and, with respect to cargo, preserves all of the
significant advances achieved by Montreal Protocol No. 4.
I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable
consideration to this Convention and that the Senate give its
advice and consent to ratification, subject to a declaration
that the Convention shall not apply to international carriage
by U.S. State aircraft, as provided for in the Convention.
William J. Clinton.
LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, June 23, 2000.
The President,
The White House.
The President: I have the honor to submit to you the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for
International Carriage by Air, done at Montreal May 28, 1999
(``the Convention''). I recommend that this Convention be
transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification, subject to a declaration to be made on behalf of
the Untied States that the Convention shall not apply to
international carriage by air performed and operated directly
by the United States for non-commercial purposes in respect to
its functions and duties as a sovereign State. Such a
declaration is consistent with the declaration made by the
United States under the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air,
done at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (the ``Warsaw Convention'') and
is specifically permitted by the terms of the new Convention. A
detailed article-by-article analysis of the new Convention is
enclosed for the information of the Senate.
background
1. The Warsaw Convention (1929) and The Hague Protocol (1955)
The Convention represents the culmination of more than four
decades of efforts by the United States, initially to increase,
and later to eliminate, the meager and arbitrary limits of
liability (approximately $8,300 per passenger) applicable when
passengers are killed or injured in international air carrier
accidents and the harm was not due to the carrier's willful
misconduct. The liability limits were set first in 1929 by the
Warsaw Convention, which provides limitations on liability and
uniform liability rules applicable to international air
transport of passengers, cargo and mail. The United States has
been a party to the Warsaw Convention since 1934.
Efforts by the United States in the early 1950s to raise
the limits of liability succeeded only in doubling the original
Warsaw Convention liability limit to $16,600, as codified in
the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, done
at the Hague September 28, 1955 (``The Hague Protocol''). In
response to the inadequacy of that limit, the United States
considered a form of accident insurance legislation in
conjunction with considering ratification of The Hague
Protocol. The proposed legislation fixed various levels of
compensation based upon the type of injury sustained by the
passenger. The cost of the insurance would have been built into
international carrier ticket prices. The Hague Protocol was
sent to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification,
but when the insurance legislation package failed, due largely
to the inadequacy of the proposed liability limits, The Hague
Protocol was withdrawn.
2. The Montreal Inter-carrier Agreement (1966)
Failure of the insurance legislation domestically, coupled
with increasing dissatisfaction with the Warsaw liability
limits, even as increased by The Hague Protocol, led the United
States, in 1965, to submit a notice of denunciation of the
Warsaw Convention. However, before it went into effect, the
United States withdrew this notice of denunciation in
consideration of a private voluntary agreement negotiated under
the auspices of the International Air Transport Association
(IATA) that was signed by all major foreign and U.S. carriers
serving the United States (the ``Montreal Inter-carrier
Agreement''). The Montreal Inter-carrier Agreement ensured that
accident victims on flights to or from the United States are
compensated for up to $75,000 of proven damages, whether or not
the negligence of the carrier was the cause of the accident. In
time, all foreign carriers operating services to or from the
United States accepted the terms of the Montreal Inter-carrier
Agreement.
3. The Guadalajara Convention (1961)
During the period when The Hague Protocol and supplemental
insurance legislation were under consideration, a further
diplomatic conference was heldin Guadalajara, Mexico for the
limited purpose of supplementing the Warsaw Convention to address
indirect carriage of cargo. In operations involving indirect carriage
of cargo, a consignor purchases transportation from one carrier, such
as an air freight forwarder or consolidator (``the contracting
officer''), but the transportation is provided by another carrier (the
``actual carrier''), in accordance with an agreement between the
carriers. The product of the diplomatic conference was the Convention,
Supplementary to the Warsaw Convention, for the Unification of Certain
Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air Performed by a Person
Other than the Contracting Carrier, done at Guadalajara September 18,
1961 (the ``Guadalajara Convention''). The United States did not ratify
the Guadalajara Convention, due in part to questions within the U.S.
Government as to whether, in light of the unreasonable limits on
airline liability for passengers, the United States should withdraw
from the Warsaw Convention. The essential terms of the Guadalajara
Convention have been incorporated into the Convention at Chapter V,
which addresses, among other things, modern code-share arrangements.
4. The Guatemala City Protocol (1971)
Further efforts to advance the cause of passenger rights
were reflected in the Protocol to Amend the Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage
by Air, as amended by The Hague Protocol, done at Guatemala
City March 8, 1971 (``Guatemala City Protocol''). This Protocol
held carriers strictly liable for up to 1,500,000 francs
($100,000) of proven damages in the event of passenger death or
injury, but that amount constituted an unbreakable limit on
liability per passenger, even if the carrier engaged in willful
misconduct. However, the Guatemala City Protocol expressly
recognized the right of States to supplement passenger
recoveries through State legislated insurance plans. This
Protocol had not been sent to the U.S. Senate for its advice
and consent to ratification, when there arose another
opportunity to negotiate a more favorable and more
comprehensive revision of the Warsaw Convention. This
opportunity was the 1975 Diplomatic Conference on Air Law in
Montreal.
5. The 1975 Montreal Protocols
At the 1975 diplomatic conference, called primarily to deal
with cargo issues, the key substantive provisions of the
Guatemala City Protocol were incorporated into Additional
Protocol No. 3 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, as
amended by The Hague Protocol and the Guatemala City Protocol,
done at Montreal September 25, 1975 (``Montreal Protocol No.
3''). In translating the Guatemala City Protocol provisions
into the Montreal Protocol No. 3, the only change in content
was the replacement of the gold standard with the currency
conversion formula based on ``Special Drawing Rights''
(hereinafter referred to as ``SDR,'' which is an artificial
`basket' currency developed by the International Monetary Fund
for internal accounting purposes).
Also negotiated at the same diplomatic conference as
Montreal Protocol No. 3 was the Protocol to Amend the
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
International Carriage by Air, as amended by The Hague
Protocol, done at Montreal September 25, 1975 (``Montreal
Protocol No. 4''). Among other things, this Protocol eliminated
the outmoded cargo documentation provisions of the Warsaw
Convention, thereby facilitating the application of electronic
commerce to international air cargo. For example, Montreal
Protocol No. 4 eliminated the need for consignors of cargo to
complete detailed air waybills prior to consigning goods to a
carrier. In place of such detailed air waybills, consignors
could use simplified electronic records of facilitate
shipments.
Finally, there were two other Protocols negotiated at the
1975 diplomatic conference, referred to as Montreal Protocols
numbers 1 and 2. These protocols related solely to the
conversion from a gold standard to the SDR standard for
purposes of calculating allquantitative limitations on
liability under the Warsaw Convention and under the Warsaw Convention
as amended by The Hague Protocol. The United States signed Montreal
Protocols Nos. 3 and 4, but not Nos. 1 and 2, when they were opened for
signature on September 25, 1975.
Following the singing of Montreal Protocol No. 3, and
consistent with its provisions, the United States considered
domestic legislation that would have established a Supplemental
Compensation Plan providing for a $200,000 insurance based
supplement to the Montreal Protocol No. 3 carrier liability
limit for passengers (increasing total recovery to
approximately $300,000). An effort in 1981 to achieve Senate
advice and consent to U.S. ratification of that Protocol, along
with Montreal Protocol No. 4, was unsuccessful, due in large
part to concerns about accepting any limits on passenger
recoveries. Similarly, a subsequent effort to achieve Senate
advice and consent to ratification of Montreal Protocol No. 3
in conjunction with a new Supplemental Compensation Plan that
contained no liability limits also did not garner the necessary
support in the Senate.
6. The IATA and ATA Inter-carrier Agreements (1997)
In the face of the failure of governmental efforts to
modernize the liability regime for passengers, the Department
of Transportation facilitated communications among U.S. and
foreign carriers, under the auspices of the IATA and the Air
Transport Association (ATA) to develop private voluntary
agreements under which carriers would waive the passenger
liability limits of the Warsaw Convention and its related
instruments (the ``Warsaw liability limits''). In February
1997, the Department of Transportation approved a set of two
IATA and one ATA inter-carrier agreements, all of which, at a
minimum, waived the Warsaw liability limits in their entirety.
Because these agreements waived the Warsaw liability limits for
participating carriers, they effectively superseded the 1966
Montreal Inter-carrier Agreement, by which carriers had merely
waived the limits on liability up to $75,000 per passenger.
As of June 1, 2000, 122 international carriers,
representing more than ninety percent of the world's air
transport industry, have signed the IATA Inter-carrier
Agreement on Passenger Liability (IIA), which waives the Warsaw
liability limits. Most of the carriers signing the IIA also
signed the second IATA agreement, which requires carriers to
pay up to 100,000 SDR (approximately $135,000) to accident
victims, regardless of carrier negligence. Consequently, any
accident victim having a claim against a carrier that was party
to this second IATA agreement would have an absolute right to
recover up to 100,000 SDR of proven damages. The ATA agreement,
signed by a number of U.S. carriers, describes the manner in
which carriers agree to implement the two IATA agreements. In
addition to waiving the Warsaw liability limit for passenger
injuries and accepting 100,000 SDR of strict liability,
airlines signatory to the ATA agreement also agree, subject to
application law, that compensation for passenger injuries may
be determined by reference to the law of the domicile or
permanent residence of the passenger. Meanwhile, at
governmental levels, a number of States adopted domestic laws
or regulations to address their growing dissatisfaction with
the Warsaw liability limits.
7. Montreal Protocol No. 4 and Cargo Operations
Until 1988, nothing had been done in the United States to
modernize the rules relating to the air cargo industry.
Accordingly, following Senate advice and consent to
ratification, given on September 28, 1998, the United States
accomplished its objective of modernizing rules for the
international air-cargo industry by ratifying Montreal Protocol
No. 4, which entered into force for the United States on March
4, 1999. Among other things, this Protocol eliminated
requirements for paper-based transactions, including the
requirement to completed detailed air waybills. In accordance
with the provisions of Montreal Protocol No. 4, the United
States also became bound by the provisions of The Hague
Protocol when it ratified Montreal Protocol No. 4. The
passengerliability limitations contained in The Hague Protocol,
although objectionable to the United States decades earlier, no longer
were an obstacle, because they were effectively superseded by the IATA
and ATA Inter-carrier Agreements, by which most major international
scheduled carriers had waived those limits.
8. The 1999 International Conference on Air Law
The IIA and Montreal Protocol No. 4 together represented a
reasonable interim fix, but not a long-term solution, to the
problem of creating a modernized uniform liability regime for
international air transportation. Work on that larger task
commenced at the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) in 1997 and was completed at the May 1999 International
Conference on Air Law in Montreal at which the convention was
negotiated and open for signature.
ICAO had long recognized the need for a new convention to
replace the patchwork of liability regimes around the world. At
present, carriers are subject to vastly different liability
regimes, depending upon the treaties to which their governments
are parties and the private inter-carrier agreements that they
have signed. In addition, differences in size and financial
strength of the world's carriers, as well as differences in the
objectives and legal systems of ICAO member States, have
complicated any effort to achieve international consensus on
modernization. Despite these differences, the Convention
adopted on May 28, 1999 in Montreal represents a success with
respect to all key U.S. policy objectives. It was immediately
signed by 52 countries, including the United States.
The Convention requires ratification, acceptance, approval
or accession by thirty States before it enters into force. Upon
entry into force, the Convention will take precedence over the
Warsaw Convention and any of its amendments and related
instruments, and as a practical matter will supersede the
private inter-carrier agreements, when the State or States
relevant in a particular accident are party to the new
Convention. For the United States, the new Convention,
following U.S. ratification and entry into force, would
supersede the Warsaw Convention, as amended, for flights
between the United States and Foreign States also party to the
Convention and for international flights having their origin
and destination in the United States (round-trips).
the convention
There are currently more than 135 parties to the Warsaw
Convention either in its original form or one of its amended
forms. Some States separately have adopted laws or regulations
relating to international carrier liability. In addition, as
noted earlier, there are private voluntary agreements among
carriers relating to liability. The result of these many
instruments is a patchwork of liability regimes. The new
Convention is designed to replace the Warsaw Convention and all
of its related instruments and to eliminate the need for the
patchwork of regulation and private voluntary agreements.
The most notable features of the new Convention include:
(1) it removes all arbitrary limits on recovery for passenger
death or injury; (2) it imposes strict liability on carriers
for the first 100,000 SDR of proven damages in the event of
passenger death or injury; (3) it expands the bases for
jurisdiction for claims relating to passenger death or injury
to permit suits in the passenger's homeland if certain
conditions are met; (4) it clarifies the obligations of
carriers engaged in code-sharing operations; and (5) it
preserves all key benefits achieved for the air cargo industry
by Montreal Protocol No. 4. A more detailed review of the
essential elements of the Convention follows.
The Convention generally is limited by Article 1 to
commercial international air carriage, including flights
between two States Parties to the Convention or a round trip
from a State Party to the Convention with an agreed stopping
point in another State, regardless of whether that State is
party to the Convention. Article 2 notesthat the Convention may
cover air carriage provided by a State for compensation.
Articles 3 through 11 of the Convention discuss
documentation requirements for international air carriage of
passengers, baggage, and cargo. Most significantly, they
preserve the benefits to the cargo industry achieved under
Montreal Protocol No. 4, including the elimination of the need
for consignors of cargo to complete detailed air waybills prior
to consigning goods to a carrier. Under the new provisions, as
under Montreal Protocol No. 4, consignors may use simplified
electronic records to facilitate shipments. Articles 12 through
16 address the relative rights and obligations of carriers,
consignors, and consignees of air cargo. As with Articles 3
through 11, these provisions preserve all of the significant
advances benefiting the air cargo industry established by
Montreal Protocol No. 4.
Article 17 defines conditions required for carrier
liability for harm to passengers, including a death or bodily
injury and an accident occurring within a defined time frame.
At the International Conference on Air Law at which the
Convention was adopted, delegates considered making express
reference to recovery for mental injury, but instead resolved
to leave untouched legal precedents developed under the
language of the Warsaw Convention, acknowledging that such
precedents currently allow the recovery of mental injury in
certain situations and that the law in this area will continue
to develop in the future. Article 17 also contains rules for
carrier liability for lost, damaged or destroyed baggage, just
as Article 18 contains such rules for cargo. Liability for
damages associated with the delay of passengers, baggage or
cargo is addressed in Article 19.
Consistent with provisions of the Warsaw Convention and its
related instruments, Article 20 details the conditions under
which a carrier can exonerate itself, wholly or partly, from
liability by showing, for example, that the person claiming
compensation caused or contributed to the damage by negligence
or a wrongful act or omission.
The Convention, at Article 21, eliminates all arbitrary
limits on air carrier liability with respect to accident
victims. The carrier may avoid liability for the full amount of
damages only if it proves that it was not negligent or that a
third party was solely responsible for the damages. Thus,
victims or their heirs may recover all provable damages allowed
under applicable State law, in contrast to the arbitrary caps
under the Warsaw Convention and its related instruments. As a
further benefit for accident victims, Article 21 holds carriers
strictly liable for the first 100,000 SDR of proven damages for
each passenger, i.e., the carrier may not avoid liability for
this amount, even if the carrier can prove that the harm was
not caused by its negligence. The only exception to this strict
liability is that the carrier may be able to avoid paying any
damages under the exoneration (i.e., contributory negligence)
provisions of Article 20.
Article 22 generally preserves limits on liability in
relation to delay, baggage, and cargo. These limits--4,150 SDR
(approximately $5,600) for delay of passengers; 1,000 SDR
(approximately $1,350) per passenger for claims related to
baggage; 17 SDR (approximately $23) per kilogram for cargo--
follow precedents set by the Warsaw Convention, as amended by
The Hague Protocol and Montreal Protocol Nos. 3 and 4.
Article 24 of the Convention provides for inflation based
increases every five years of the various SDR amounts and
limits that remain in the Convention. Operation of the
provision would result in inflation-based increases whenever
the inflation factor exceeds ten percent at the time of a
review. However, if a majority of States Parties register
timely disapproval of an increase, then the matter is referred
to a meeting of States Parties. This provision applies to the
limit of ``strict'' liability set by Article 21 for passenger
claims and the Article 22 limits in relation to delay,
baggageand cargo. Article 25 acknowledges the rights of carriers to
stipulate to raising or eliminating the limits of liability established
by the Convention.
The Convention has a provision on advance payments, Article
28, which acknowledges the right of States to have national
laws that require their own carriers to make such payments in
the event of passenger death or injury and addresses certain
procedural issues related to such payments. In addition, a
resolution adopted by the Diplomatic Conference as part of the
Final Act encourages States to adopt such laws.
The Convention's provision on jurisdiction, Article 33,
reflects the U.S. success in achieving a key U.S. objective
with regard to the Convention--the creation of a ``fifth
jurisdiction'' to supplement the four bases of jurisdiction
provided under the Warsaw Convention. Article 33(1), like the
Warsaw Convention, allows a suit to be brought against a
carrier in the country: (1) of its incorporation, (2) of its
principal place of business; (3) where the ticket was
purchased, and (4) of destination of the passenger. Article
33(2) of the new Convention allows cases involving the death or
injury of a passenger to be brought in the country of the
passenger's principal and permanent residence, so long as the
carrier provides service to that country, either directly or
via a code share or other similar arrangement with another
carrier, and the carrier conducts business there from premises
leased or owned by it or by a carrier with which it has a
commercial arrangement, for example, a code-share arrangement.
Given the number of carriers whose operations in the United
States satisfy these criteria, this fifth jurisdiction
provision should ensure that nearly all U.S. citizens and other
permanent residents of the United States have access to U.S.
courts to pursue claims under the Convention.
Articles 39-48 of the Convention define the rights of
passengers and consignors in operations where all or part of
the carriage is provided by an airline that is not party to the
contract of carriage (e.g., code-share operations, freight
consolidators, etc.). The provisions follow the precedent set
by the Guadalajara Convention. Pursuant to Article 40, when a
claim arises under the Convention, a claimant may bring suit
against the carrier from which the carriage was purchased or
against the code-sharing carrier operating the aircraft at the
time of the accident.
In accordance with the provisions of Article 53, the
Convention requires that thirty States consent to be bound to
the Convention before it may enter into force. Article 53 also
permits Regional Economic Integration Organizations (REIO)
(such as the European Union) to be parties, but does not grant
them the right to vote or otherwise to be counted. Accordingly,
as noted in Article 53(2), a REIO would not be counted for
purposes of a determination, in accordance with Article 24, as
to whether liability limitations in the Convention should be
adjusted for inflation. Similarly, a REIO would not be counted
for purposes of bringing the Convention into force, as noted in
Article 53(6). The Convention has no termination date, but may
be denounced by any State Party, pursuant to Article 54.
To accomplish its fundamental purpose of establishing
uniformity in the context of international carriage by air, the
Convention limits reservations available to States party to it.
Article 57 describes the only two possible reservations that
States may make. These reservations allow States to exempt from
application of the Convention: (a) the operations of State
aircraft and (b) the operations of aircraft chartered by the
military. These limited reservations generally are consistent
with the reservations available under the Warsaw Convention and
its related instruments. The reservation relating to State
aircraft operations was revisited to clarify that the
reservation is available only for non-commercial operations
related to the functions and duties of a sovereign State.
Consistent with the past practice of the United States under
the WarsawConvention and its related instruments, I recommend
that the United States make the declaration, pursuant to Article 57(a)
of the Convention, to exempt only the operations of State aircraft from
application of the Convention.
conclusion
The provisions described above reflect the many benefits
that will accrue under the Convention to the air transportation
industry and its consumers. One key benefit not reflected in
the provisions themselves is the benefit of uniformity. Based
upon the response to the Convention at the diplomatic
conference and communications with other governments since that
time, I believe that U.S. ratification of this Convention will
encourage ratification by a number of other States and will
lead to a much-needed and long sought after modernized
unification of the liability regime applicable to international
air carriers.
Certain of the passenger benefits codified in the
Convention already are provided for under the IATA/ATA
Agreements. However, those agreements are voluntary on the part
of carriers; they are not embodied in law. Also, while airlines
that have signed those agreements uniformly waive the Warsaw
liability limits, they do not all accept strict liability up to
100,000 SDR. Furthermore, the inter-carrier agreements do not
contain provisions to protect against inflation. In addition,
those agreements do not contain the invaluable supplementary
``fifth'' jurisdictional provision codified at Article 33(2) of
the Convention. Finally, in the case of code-share operations,
the IATA/ATA Agreements do not assure passengers and cargo
consignors of recourse against both the contracting carrier and
the actual carrier operating the flight.
A more detailed article-by-article analysis of the
provisions of the Convention is enclosed for the information of
the Senate. The Department of Transportation and the Department
of State cooperated in the negotiation of the Convention.
Together with the Department of State, the Departments of
Defense, Justice, and Transportation all concur in the
submission of the Convention to the Senate for its advice and
consent to ratification. Support for the Convention within the
United States is broadly based and includes groups representing
families of aircraft accident victims, the carriers,
manufacturers, and lawyers specializing in representing
plaintiffs and defendants in aviation accidents. Responses from
all fronts have been positive.
The entry into force of the new Convention would represent
the culmination of a four decades-long effort by the United
States and other countries to persuade the international
aviation community to provide increased economic protection for
the international air traveler and shipper with a regime of
liability and modernized procedures that match the developments
in today's aviation industry. I therefore recommend that you
transmit the new Convention to the Senate at an early date with
the recommendation that the convention be approved at the
earliest possible time, subject to a declaration on behalf of
the United States that the Convention shall not apply to
international carriage by air performed and operated directly
by the United States for non-commercial purposes in respect to
its functions and duties as a sovereign State.
Respectfully submitted,
Strobe Talbott.