[Senate Document 106-4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress                                                  S. Doc.
                                 SENATE                                
 1st Session                                                     106-4
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     




                          PROCEEDINGS OF THE


                         UNITED STATES SENATE



                                IN THE



                         IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF


                  PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON


 
 VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF 
                  PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON




                            VOLUME IV OF IV

               February 12, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-104                     WASHINGTON : 1999

                 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE

                         Gary Sisco, Secretary

                 Sharon A. Zelaska, Assistant Secretary

   Ronald Kavulick and Jerald D. Linnell, Chief Reporters of Debates

                     Bruce E. Kasold, Chief Counsel

                         Keith Simmons, Counsel

                                ------                                


                      UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

                   In the Senate of the United States

                           February 12, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be 
authorized to include these statements [of Senators explaining 
their votes], along with the full record of the Senate's 
proceedings, the filings by the parties, and the supplemental 
materials admitted into evidence by the Senate, in a Senate 
document printed under the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Senate, that will complete the documentation of the Senate's 
handling of these impeachment proceedings.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                 To the memory of Raymond Scott Bates,

                    Legislative Clerk of the Senate,

who, until his untimely and tragic accidental death on February 
5, 1999, in the midst of these proceedings, brought to the 
conduct of this trial the constant dedication, skill, and 
professionalism that characterized his Senate career. Scott 
represented the best of the Senate staff who work tirelessly to 
support the institution and its members.
                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    This document contains the full record of the United States 
Senate proceedings in the impeachment trial of President 
William Jefferson Clinton. Its purpose is to preserve for the 
future use of the Senate, the American people, and historians 
the formal record of the only Presidential impeachment trial of 
the 20th century. Together with the 24-volume Senate Document 
106-3, which contains all publicly available materials 
submitted to or produced by the Judiciary Committee of the 
House of Representatives, these four volumes represent the 
entire official record of the impeachment actions against 
President Clinton.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Senate, by a unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 
1999, authorized the Secretary of the Senate to oversee the printing of 
the Senate proceedings in order to complete the documentation of the 
impeachment trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The present four volumes include the Senate proceedings in 
open session; filings by the parties; supplemental materials 
received in evidence that were not part of the House record, 
such as affidavits and depositions; floor statements of 
Senators in open session expressing their views regarding the 
proceedings; and statements delivered in closed deliberations 
that individual Senators elected to make public.
    The document is divided into four sections--
          Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings
          Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings
          Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits
          Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the 
        Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson 
        Clinton

                   Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings

    This volume contains the portion of the Senate proceedings 
that occurred before the actual trial commenced. On December 
19, 1998, the House of Representatives adopted two articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton (House Resolution 611, 
105th Congress) and a subsequent resolution appointing managers 
on the part of the House (House Resolution 614, 105th 
Congress).
    Because the Senate of the 105th Congress had already 
completed its business and adjourned sine die, the House 
managers, in the late afternoon of December 19, 1998, delivered 
the articles of impeachment to the Secretary of the Senate. The 
Senate of the 106th Congress convened and organized on January 
6, 1999, and the House notified the Senate that it had 
reappointed the managers (House Resolution 10, 106th Congress). 
On January 7, 1999, the House managers exhibited the articles 
of impeachment to the Senate and the Chief Justice of the 
United States, as presiding officer during the impeachment 
trial, took the prescribed oath, as did all Senators.
    On January 8, 1999, the Senate unanimously directed that 
the summons be issued to President Clinton and that his answer 
to the articles be filed, together with the response of the 
House of Representatives (Senate Resolution 16, 106th 
Congress). This resolution admitted into evidence the materials 
submitted by the House Judiciary Committee and authorized their 
publication. It also allowed the parties to file preliminary 
motions (none was filed), established a schedule for the filing 
of trial briefs by the parties, and established further 
procedures for the conduct of the trial. Although all these 
documents were previously printed in Senate Document 106-2--as 
well as the text of the provisions of the United States 
Constitution applicable to impeachment and the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice of the Senate When Sitting in 
Impeachment Trials--they are reprinted here for ease of 
reference.

                   Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings

    This volume reproduces the full record of the Senate floor 
proceedings in the impeachment trial as provided under Senate 
Resolution 16. The resolution first permitted the parties an 
extended period to make their presentations. The managers 
presented their case on behalf of the House of Representatives 
on January 14, 15, and 16, 1999. Counsel for the President 
presented their case on January 19 and 20, 1999. The Senate 
then devoted January 22 and 23, 1999, to posing questions to 
the House managers and counsel.
    Senate Resolution 16 also provided that, at the end of the 
question-and-answer period, the Senate would consider 
separately a motion to dismiss and a motion to subpoena 
witnesses and to present additional evidence not in the record. 
On January 25, 1999, the Senate heard argument on the motion to 
dismiss and, on January 26, 1999, considered the motion by the 
House managers to call witnesses and admit additional evidence. 
The Senate voted to deny the motion to dismiss and to grant the 
motion to subpoena witnesses.
    On January 28, 1999, the Senate established procedures for 
the taking of depositions (Senate Resolution 30), and three 
witnesses were deposed on February 1, 2, and 3, 1999. On 
February 4, 1999, the Senate heard argument and voted on 
motions to admit the deposition testimony into evidence, to 
call witnesses to testify on the Senate floor, and to proceed 
directly to closing arguments. The portions of the deposition 
transcripts admitted into evidence are reproduced in this 
volume, while the full transcripts of the three depositions 
appear in Volume III. Both parties presented evidence to the 
Senate on February 6, 1999.
    On February 8, 1999, the parties presented final arguments 
to the Senate. The Senate then considered proposals by various 
Senators to suspend the Senate impeachment rules to permit 
deliberation in open session, but all deliberations on motions 
and on the articles of impeachment occurred in closed session. 
(The proceedings in closed session are not published here, but 
statements that Senators elected to make public are printed in 
Volume IV.) Volume II concludes with the record of the February 
12, 1999, vote and judgment of the Senate to acquit President 
Clinton on both articles of impeachment.

                 Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits

    This volume reproduces the complete transcripts of the 
depositions taken by the Senate of witnesses Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal. It also 
contains the affidavits of Christopher Hitchens, Carol Blue, 
and R. Scott Armstrong, which were admitted into evidence by a 
unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 1999.

 Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the Impeachment Trial of 
                  President William Jefferson Clinton

    By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to provide each 
Senator an opportunity to place in the Congressional Record a 
statement describing his or her own views on the impeachment. 
The statement could, if a Senator so chose, be a statement he 
or she had delivered during closed deliberations. Since not all 
Senators chose to publish their remarks, the fact that a 
statement of a particular Senator does not appear in Volume IV 
does not mean that the Senator did not address the Senate 
during its closed deliberations.


    The publication of these four volumes, supplemented with 
Senate Document 106-3, contributes to a fuller understanding of 
the way in which the Senate conducted these important and 
historic proceedings.


                               Gary Sisco,                 
                          Secretary of the Senate.                 


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................     V

                   VOLUME I: PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment.........................     1
Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
  Impeachment Trials.............................................     3

                            January 6, 1999

Statements of Senators Lott and Reid regarding access to Senate 
  floor, galleries, and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]........................    15
Unanimous-consent agreement on access to Senate floor, galleries 
  and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S7-8 
  (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]......................................    16
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives by 
  Secretary of the Senate during sine die adjournment announcing 
  impeachment of President and appointment of Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S14-15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\1\.......................    17
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives 
  announcing reappointment of Managers, H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. 
  (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\2\........    19
Unanimous-consent agreement on receiving Managers and requesting 
  attendance of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................    20
Message from House of Representatives announcing reappointment of 
  Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].........    22
H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    23
H. Res. 614, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    29
H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    31
Sample of Senate Impeachment Trial gallery tickets...............    33

                            January 7, 1999

Exhibition of Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson 
  Clinton, President of the United States [145 Cong. Rec. S39-41 
  (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]......................................    35
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize taking 
  photograph in Senate Chamber of swearing-in, S. Res. 11, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].....    38
Appointment of escort committee to receive Chief Justice [145 
  Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].......................    38
Administration of oath to Chief Justice and Members of Senate 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S41-42 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]...............    40
S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    41
Photographs taken pursuant to S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999).....    42

                            January 8, 1999

Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle providing for issuance of 
  summons to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
  States, and establishing trial procedures, S. Res. 16, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1999)].....    45
    Rollcall Vote No. 1 [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 
      1999)].....................................................    47
S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    48
Writ of Summons (January 8, 1999)................................    53

                            January 11, 1999

Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999).................................    58
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999)....................................    71

                            January 13, 1999

Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999)......................................................   365
Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
  Clinton (January 20, 1999)\3\..................................   500

                            January 14, 1999

Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment (January 
  14, 1999)......................................................   735
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999)..........................................................   740

                   VOLUME II: FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
                            January 14, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott to authorize installation of 
  appropriate equipment and furniture in Senate Chamber, S. Res. 
  17, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   773
Unanimous-consent agreement on floor privileges during closed 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S59-60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]......   774
Unanimous-consent agreement on authority to print documents filed 
  by the parties and other impeachment documents \4\ [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................   775
Writ of Summons and Return of Service by Sergeant at Arms 
  (January 8, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S60-61 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   776
Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S61-63 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................................   778
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S63-190 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 14, 1999)]................................................   783
Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S191-214 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]..   938
Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S214-15 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]........................   992
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S215-21 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].......   994
Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S221-51 
  (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].....................................  1007
S. Res. 17, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1087
Floor plan and seating arrangements in Senate Chamber for 
  impeachment trial proceedings..................................  1089

                            January 15, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S260-79 
  (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999)].....................................  1091

                            January 16, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S281-300 
  (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999)].....................................  1144

                            January 19, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S483-95 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]............................................  1195
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S720-21 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]........................  1225

                            January 20, 1999

Statement of Senator Harkin in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S729-32 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1227
Statement of Senator Wellstone in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S732-33 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1234
Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S810-30 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]............................................  1237

                            January 21, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S832-48 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]............................................  1292
Statement of Senator Lott regarding procedure for question-and-
  answer period [145 Cong. Rec. S848 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]..  1335
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Harkin and Wellstone [145 Cong. Rec. S848-49 (daily ed. Jan. 
  21, 1999)].....................................................  1336

                            January 22, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S869-92 (daily ed. Jan. 
  22, 1999)].....................................................  1338
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Hutchison, Specter, Lieberman, Hagel, Collins, and Snowe [145 
  Cong. Rec. S892 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1999)].....................  1396
Sample question card used by Senators............................  1398

                            January 23, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S933-56 (daily ed. Jan. 
  23, 1999)].....................................................  1400
Letter from Senator Harkin to Chief Justice (January 23, 1999)...  1461

                            January 25, 1999

Letter from Chief Justice to Senator Harkin (January 25, 1999)...  1462
Unanimous-consent agreement on argument on motion to dismiss and 
  on motion to open debate [145 Cong. Rec. S962-63 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 25, 1999)]................................................  1466
Motion of Senator Byrd to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S963 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................  1469
Argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S963-65 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1469
Argument of counsel for President in support of motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S965-70 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1476
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to 
  dismiss [145 Cong. Rec. S970-73 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....  1489
Motion to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin, 
  Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye, 
  Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb, 
  Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer, 
  Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 
  (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................................  1495
    Rollcall Vote No. 2 [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 (daily ed. Jan. 
      25, 1999)].................................................  1496
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S974 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 
  1999)].........................................................  1497
Statement of Senator Mikulski in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S987 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)]...........................  1498

                            January 26, 1999

Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion of United States House 
  of Representatives for Appearance of Witnesses at Deposition 
  and to Admit Evidence Not in Record (January 26, 1999).........  1500
Motion of House of Representatives for appearance of witnesses 
  and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S991-92 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 26, 1999)]................................................  1531
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S992-99 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1532
Unanimous-consent agreement on order of consideration of and 
  deliberation on motions to suspend rules and for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S999-1000 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1552
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence, cont. [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1000-02 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]............................  1552
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1002-07 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1558
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  appearance of witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1007-09 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].......................  1571
Motion of Senator Harkin to Suspend the Rules of the Senate [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]....................  1578
    Rollcall Vote No. 3 [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
      1999)].....................................................  1579
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
  1999)].........................................................  1580

                            January 27, 1999

Vote on motion to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]............................  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 4 [145 Cong. Rec. S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 
      27, 1999)].................................................  1582
Vote on motion for appearance of witnesses and admission of 
  evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]......  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 5 [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 
      1999)].....................................................  1583
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Affidavit of Barry W. Ward, Law Clerk to Honorable Susan 
      Webber Wright, U.S. District Judge for Eastern District of 
      Arkansas...................................................  1585
    Declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, with attachments............  1586
    Telephone records documenting conversations between President 
      Clinton and Monica S. Lewinsky.............................  1594
Statement of Senator Hollings in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1028-29 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1595
Statements of Senator Abraham in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1029-30, 1031 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)] 

Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
orize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
eachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
sed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
 deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411ï¿½0912 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601982
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601984
I74February 11, 1999
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
tograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
nators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437ï¿½0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454ï¿½0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457ï¿½0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458ï¿½0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (

Statement of Senator Lieberman in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1030-31 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1599

                            January 28, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott and amendments thereto by Senator 
  Daschle relating to procedures for taking depositions, S. Res. 
  30, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1069-73 (daily ed. Jan. 
  28, 1999)].....................................................  1605
    Rollcall Vote No. 6 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1608
    Rollcall Vote No. 7 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071-72 (daily ed. Jan. 
      28, 1999)].................................................  1609
    Rollcall Vote No. 8 [145 Cong. Rec. S1072 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1610
Unanimous-consent agreement on taking of depositions [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1073-74 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1614
S. Res. 30, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1616
Leadership protocol on depositions pursuant to S. Res. 16 and S. 
  Res. 30 (January 28, 1999).....................................  1623
Statement of Senator Cleland in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1105-06 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1624
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1106-07 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1628
Statements of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1107-10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1631

                            January 29, 1999

Subpoenas issued for witnesses to appear at depositions:
    Monica S. Lewinsky (January 29, 1999)........................  1639
    Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (January 29, 1999).....................  1642
    Sidney Blumenthal (January 29, 1999).........................  1645

                            February 3, 1999

Statement of Senator Dorgan in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1117-19 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999)]........................  1648

                            February 4, 1999

Motion of House of Representatives for admission of evidence, 
  appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1199-1200 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]................  1653
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for admission of 
  evidence, appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S1200-05 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............  1654
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1205-07 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1667
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1207-08 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1673
Votes on motions for admission of evidence, appearance of 
  witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-
  10 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]...................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 9 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 10 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1678
    Rollcall Vote No. 11 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-10 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1680
    Rollcall Vote No. 12 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1681
Motion of Senator Daschle to proceed to closing arguments [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].....................  1681
    Rollcall Vote No. 13 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1682
Motion of counsel for President for provision of written notice 
  by House Managers of designated video excerpts [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............................  1683
    Rollcall Vote No. 14 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1685
Unanimous-consent agreement on printing partial transcripts of 
  depositions in Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1212 
  (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]......................................  1687
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1212-29 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1687
    Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1229-46 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1736
    Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1246-54 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1776

                            February 6, 1999

Presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1290-
  1303 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].................................  1800
Presentation of evidence by counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1303-15 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1836
Rebuttal presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1315-17 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]........................  1866
Unanimous-consent request of Senator Boxer to show additional 
  deposition testimony [145 Cong. Rec. S1317-18 (daily ed. Feb. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................  1873
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Lott, Daschle, Hutchison, Harkin, Collins, Specter, Wellstone, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1318 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]......  1873
Statements of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1330-32 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1874

                            February 8, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Lott for admission of 
  affidavits into evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1337 (daily ed. Feb. 
  8, 1999)]......................................................  1882
Final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1337-44 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 8, 1999)].............................................  1882
Final arguments of counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S1344-54 
  (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......................................  1900
Rebuttal final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1354-
  65 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]...................................  1925
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle, Lott, Hutchison, Harkin, Wellstone, Collins, Specter, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1365 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......  1955
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle and Feinstein [145 Cong. Rec. S1380 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 
  1999)].........................................................  1955
Letter from House Managers to Senators Lott and Daschle (Feb. 8, 
  1999)..........................................................  1956

                            February 9, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Specter to allow parties to 
  take additional discovery [145 Cong. Rec. S1385 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1964
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to Suspend the Rules of the 
  Senate [145 Cong. Rec. S1385-86 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]......  1964
    Rollcall Vote No. 15 [145 Cong. Rec. S1386 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1965
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize Senators to 
  insert statements delivered in closed deliberations into 
  Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1386-87 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1966
Motion of Senator Lott to close doors of Senate for final 
  deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...  1970
    Rollcall Vote No. 16 [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1970
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1388 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
  1999)].........................................................  1971
Statement of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1406-09 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1971
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...........................  1978
Statement of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1409-10 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1980

                           February 10, 1999

Colloquy on record of closed deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411-
  12 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)]..................................  1982
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 
  1999)].........................................................  1984

                           February 11, 1999

Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 
  1999)].........................................................  1986
Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to 
  authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment 
  vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437-38 
  (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)].....................................  1987
Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate 
  Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1454-55 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]............................  1987
Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]....  1988
S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1989

                           February 12, 1999

Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators 
  in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document 
  containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1457-58 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  1992
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1993
Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................................  1994
    Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1995
Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458-59 
  (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....................................  1997
    Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1997
Order to Secretary of the Senate to communicate judgment of 
  Senate to Secretary of State and House of Representatives [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  1998
Statement of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 
  12, 1999)].....................................................  1998
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle expressing gratitude of 
  Senate to Chief Justice of the United States, S. Res. 37, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1459-60 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1999
Unanimous-consent agreement on admitting affidavits into evidence 
  and making full deposition transcripts part of the record [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  2000
Adjournment sine die [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  2000
Statements of Senators Lott, Daschle and Chafee in legislative 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......  2001
Motion of Senator Feinstein in legislative session to suspend the 
  rules in order to permit the consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....  2002
Motion of Senator Gramm in legislative session to indefinitely 
  postpone consideration of motion to suspend rules [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2002
    Rollcall Vote No. 19 [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 
      12, 1999)].................................................  2003
Statement of Senator Feinstein in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1664-66 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2004
Statement of Senator Snowe in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1546-47 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................  2010
Statement of Senator Ashcroft in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1461 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2011
Statement of Senator Chafee in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1639 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2013
Statement of Senator Kohl in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1656 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]...............................  2014
Resolution by Senator Hollings in legislative session to censure 
  President [145 Cong. Rec. S1657 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....  2015
Statement of Senator Daschle in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1637-38 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2015
Statement of Senator Warner in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1667 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2017
S. Res. 37, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  2019
Photograph taken pursuant to S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)......  2021
Legislative Clerk's tally sheets for Senate votes on articles of 
  impeachment....................................................  2022
Judgment of United States Senate (Feb. 12, 1999).................  2024

                         TABLE OF ROLLCALL VOTES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Measure/
 Vote No.        Date           Description           Result        Page
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........  1/8/99.........  S. Res. 16........  Resolution Agreed     47
                                                 to 100-0.
2........  1/25/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1496
                             suspend the rules.  43-57.
3........  1/26/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1579
                             suspend the rules.  41-58.
4........  1/27/99........  Byrd motion to      Motion Rejected     1582
                             dismiss the         44-56.
                             impeachment
                             proceedings.
5........  1/27/99........  House Managers'     Motion Agreed to    1583
                             motion to           56-44.
                             subpoena
                             witnesses and
                             admit evidence
                             not in record.
6........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1608
                             1 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 44-54.
7........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1609
                             2 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 43-55.
8........  1/28/99........  S. Res. 30 as       Resolution Agreed   1610
                             amended.            to 54-44.
9........  2/4/99.........  Division I of       Motion Agreed to    1677
                             House Managers'     100-0.
                             motion re:
                             admission of
                             evidence.
10.......  2/4/99.........  Division II of      Motion Rejected     1678
                             House Managers'     30-70.
                             motion re:
                             appearance of
                             witnesses.
11.......  2/4/99.........  Murray motion to    Motion Rejected     1680
                             substitute          27-73.
                             Division III of
                             House Managers'
                             motion.
12.......  2/4/99.........  Division III of     Motion Agreed to    1681
                             House Managers'     62-38.
                             motion re:
                             presentation of
                             evidence.
13.......  2/4/99.........  Daschle motion to   Motion Rejected     1682
                             proceed to          44-56.
                             closing arguments.
14.......  2/4/99.........  White House         Motion Rejected     1685
                             Counsel's motion    46-54.
                             on video
                             deposition
                             excerpts.
15.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Rejected     1965
                             suspend the rules.  59-41.
16.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Agreed to    1970
                             close the doors.    53-47.
17.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 45-55.   1995
                             Article I.
18.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 50-50.   1997
                             Article II.
19.......  2/12/99........  Gramm motion to     Motion Rejected     2003
                             postpone            43-56.
                             consideration of
                             rules suspension
                             motion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 VOLUME III: DEPOSITIONS AND AFFIDAVITS

Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (full transcript)  2027
Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (full 
  transcript)....................................................  2224
Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (full transcript).  2399
Affidavit of Christopher Hitchens (Feb. 5, 1999).................  2534
Affidavit of Carol Blue (Feb. 7, 1999)...........................  2535
Affidavit of R. Scott Armstrong (Feb. 8, 1999)...................  2536

 VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF 
                PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON \5\
                           February 12, 1999

Sen. Specter \6\.................................................  2537
Sen. Gorton......................................................  2537
Sen. Feingold \7\................................................  2545
Sen. Hutchison...................................................  2548
Sen. Conrad......................................................  2558
Sen. Hutchinson..................................................  2561
Sen. Murray......................................................  2563
Sen. McCain......................................................  2565
Sen. Johnson.....................................................  2567
Sen. Lugar.......................................................  2570
Sen. Biden.......................................................  2573
Sen. Abraham.....................................................  2616
Sen. Mikulski....................................................  2622
Sen. Grams.......................................................  2625
Sen. Breaux......................................................  2627
Sen. Domenici....................................................  2630
Sen. Sarbanes....................................................  2633
Sen. Campbell....................................................  2637
Sen. Kerrey......................................................  2639
Sen. Voinovich...................................................  2641
Sen. Lautenberg..................................................  2643
Sen. Bond \8\....................................................  2646
Sen. Robb........................................................  2652
Sen. Boxer.......................................................  2656
Sen. Mack........................................................  2659
Sen. Fitzgerald..................................................  2672
Sen. Roth........................................................  2681
Sen. Burns.......................................................  2684
Sen. Inhofe \9\..................................................  2685
Sen. Cleland.....................................................  2689
Sen. Frist.......................................................  2694
Sen. Bunning.....................................................  2703
Sen. Durbin......................................................  2706
Sen. Kyl.........................................................  2710
Sen. Specter.....................................................  2715
Sen. Levin.......................................................  2738
Sen. Kohl........................................................  2758
Sen. Thompson....................................................  2761
Sen. Moynihan....................................................  2789
Sen. Graham......................................................  2792
Sen. Allard......................................................  2794
Sen. McConnell...................................................  2799
Sen. Kennedy.....................................................  2807
Sen. Collins.....................................................  2812
Sen. Harkin......................................................  2814
Sen. Reid........................................................  2826
Sen. Edwards.....................................................  2830
Sen. Akaka.......................................................  2833
Sen. Leahy \10\..................................................  2837
Sen. Grassley....................................................  2867
Sen. Craig.......................................................  2870
Sen. Dodd \11\...................................................  2873
Sen. Jeffords....................................................  2877
Sen. Wellstone...................................................  2884
Sen. Stevens.....................................................  2888
Sen. Lieberman...................................................  2892
Sen. Brownback...................................................  2905
Sen. Bryan.......................................................  2913
Sen. Ashcroft....................................................  2917
Sen. Thurmond....................................................  2934
Sen. Crapo.......................................................  2937
Sen. Dorgan......................................................  2939
Sen. Kerry.......................................................  2943
Sen. DeWine......................................................  2948
Sen. Lincoln.....................................................  2956
Sen. Helms.......................................................  2959
Sen. Hollings....................................................  2962
Sen. Wyden.......................................................  2965
Sen. Smith (Ore.)................................................  2967
Sen. Hagel.......................................................  2971
Sen. Rockefeller.................................................  2972
Sen. Murkowski...................................................  2977
Sen. Byrd........................................................  2981
Sen. Inhofe......................................................  2987
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  2996
Sen. Snowe.......................................................  3000

                           February 22, 1999

Sen. Nickles.....................................................  3005
Sen. Landrieu....................................................  3013
Sen. Smith (N.H.)................................................  3016
Sen. Bingaman....................................................  3022
Sen. Bennett.....................................................  3024
Sen. Reed \12\...................................................  3026
Sen. Enzi........................................................  3033
Sen. Feingold....................................................  3042

                           February 23, 1999

Sen. Daschle.....................................................  3053
Sen. Bond........................................................  3058
Sen. Sessions \13\...............................................  3059
Sen. Coverdell...................................................  3063
Sen. Hatch.......................................................  3066
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3090
Sen. Sessions....................................................  3094
Sen. Dodd........................................................  3099
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3102

                           February 24, 1999

Sen. Reed........................................................  3103

    \1\ On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives agreed to H. 
Res. 611, 105th Cong., the Articles of Impeachment, [144 Cong. Rec. 
H12040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998)] and H. Res. 614, 105th Cong., 
which provided for the appointment of managers and procedures relating 
to impeachment proceedings [id. at H12042-43].
    \2\ The House of Representatives agreed to H. Res. 10, 106th Cong., 
on January 6, 1999 [145 Cong. Rec. H216-17 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].
    \3\ The Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, consisting of exhibits, was filed separately on January 20, 
1999, but is inserted here for ease of reference.
    \4\ For ease of reference, the documents contained in S. Doc. 106-
2, i.e., the pertinent constitutional provisions, the Senate 
Impeachment Rules, the Articles of Impeachment, the Answer of President 
Clinton, and the Replication of the House of Representatives, are 
reprinted in this publication. Separately, the Senate admitted into 
evidence and authorized the printing, pursuant to S. Res. 16, 106th 
Cong., of the publicly available materials submitted to or produced by 
the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of public hearings 
or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of Representatives 
or the House Judiciary Committee pursuant to H. Res. 525 and H. Res. 
581, 105th Cong. (1998). That evidentiary record, S. Doc. 106-3 (1999) 
[24 vols.], is not reproduced here.
    \5\ The unanimous-consent agreement of February 9, 1999, allowed 
each Senator to place in the Congressional Record his or her statement 
delivered during closed deliberations. Not all Senators chose to 
publish their remarks; the fact that a statement of a particular 
Senator does not appear here does not mean that Senator did not address 
the Senate during the closed sessions. Additionally, the unanimous-
consent agreement of February 12, 1999, allowed Senators to have 
statements and opinions explaining their votes printed in the 
Congressional Record.
    \6\ Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2715 below.
    \7\ Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22, 
see p. 3042 below.
    \8\ Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see 
p. 3058 below.
    \9\ Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2987 below.
    \10\ Sen. Leahy submitted additional statements on February 12 and 
February 23, see pp. 2996, 3090, 3102 below.
    \11\ Sen. Dodd submitted additional statements on February 23, see 
pp. 3099 and 3100 below.
    \12\ Sen. Reed submitted an additional statement on February 24, 
see p. 3103 below.
    \13\ Sen. Sessions submitted an additional statement on February 
23, see p. 3094 below.
       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Arlen Specter*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
*Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12, see p. 
2715, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, between the time I made my 
statement in the closed Senate deliberations on February 11 and 
the time I cast my vote on February 12, I consulted with the 
Parliamentarian and examined the Senate precedents and found 
that if I voted simply ``not proven,'' I would be marked on the 
voting roles as ``present.'' I also found that a response of 
``present,'' and inferentially the equivalent of ``present,'' 
could be challenged and that I could be forced to cast a vote 
of ``yea'' or ``nay.''
    I noted the precedent on June 28, 1951, recorded on pages 
S7403 and S7404 of the Congressional Record, when Senator 
Benton of Connecticut and Senator Lehman of New York voted 
``present'' during a rollcall vote. Senator Hickenlooper of 
Iowa challenged these votes and argued that a Senator must vote 
either ``yea'' or ``nay'' unless the Senate votes to excuse the 
Senator from voting. Senator Hickenlooper's challenge was 
upheld, and the Senate voted against excusing these Senators 
from voting by a vote of 39 to 35 in the case of Senator Lehman 
and a vote of 41 to 34 in the case of Senator Benton.
    I also noted the precedent on August 3, 1954, on page 
S13086 of the Congressional Record, when Senator Mansfield of 
Montana voted ``present'' during a rollcall vote. Senator 
Cordon of Oregon objected and asked that the Senate vote on 
whether Senator Mansfield should be excused from voting. By 
voice vote, the Senate voted against excusing Senator Mansfield 
from voting.
    In order to avoid the possibility that some Senator might 
challenge my vote, I decided to state on the Senate floor, 
``not proven, therefore not guilty,'' when my name was called 
on the rollcall votes on article I and article II of the 
articles of impeachment. That avoided the possibility of a 
challenge and also more accurately recorded my vote as ``not 
guilty'' since I did not wish to be recorded as merely 
``present.''
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Slade Gorton

    Mr. GORTON. Mr. Chief Justice, the statement that I am 
placing in the Record is the statement I would have given had I 
been permitted to speak longer and in open session. During our 
closed deliberations, I gave a similar but abridged statement.
    For almost 2 years, the President of the United States was 
engaged in what he has come to describe as an ``inappropriate 
intimate'' relationship with a young woman who came to his 
attention as a White House intern. He then lied about their 
relationship, publicly, privately, formally, informally, to the 
press, to the country, and under oath, for a period of about a 
year.
    This course of conduct requires us to face four distinct 
questions.
    First, we must determine if the material facts alleged in 
the articles of impeachment have been established to our 
satisfaction.
    Second, do the established facts constitute either 
obstruction of justice or perjury, or both?
    Third, are obstruction of justice and perjury high crimes 
and misdemeanors under the Constitution?
    Fourth, even if the acts of the President are high crimes 
and misdemeanors, are they of sufficient gravity to warrant his 
conviction if it allows for no alternative other than his 
removal from office?
    The first article of impeachment alleges that the President 
committed perjury while testifying before the Starr grand jury. 
Although the House managers assert that his testimony is 
replete with false statements, it is clear, at the least, that 
his representations about the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky are literally beyond belief.
    From November 1995 until March 1997, the President engaged 
in repeated sexual activities with Monica Lewinsky, who was 
first a volunteer at, and then an employee of the White House 
and eventually the Pentagon. Though he denies directly few of 
her descriptions of those activities, he testified under oath 
that he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her. His 
accommodation of this paradox is based on the incredible claim 
that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky with any intent to arouse or 
gratify anyone sexually, even though she performed oral sex on 
him.
    It seems to me strange that any rational person would 
conclude that the President's description of his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky did not constitute perjury.
    In addition, while we are not required to reach our 
decision on these charges beyond a reasonable doubt, I have no 
reasonable doubt that the President committed perjury on a 
second such charge when he told the grand jury that the purpose 
of the five statements he made to Ms. Currie after his Jones 
deposition was to refresh his own memory.
    The President knew that each statement was a lie. His goal 
was to get Ms. Currie to concur in those lies.
    The other allegations of perjury are either unproven--
particularly those requiring a strict incorporation of the 
President's Jones deposition testimony into his grand jury 
testimony--or are more properly considered solely--with those 
already discussed--as elements of the obstruction of justice 
charges in article II.
    To determine that the President perjured himself at least 
twice, however, is not to decide the ultimate question of guilt 
on article I. That I will discuss later.
    All the material allegations of article II seem to me to be 
well founded. Four of them, however, those regarding the 
President's encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit 
and then to give false testimony, those regarding the 
President's failure to correct his attorney's false statements 
to the Jones court, and those bearing upon the disposal of his 
gifts to her are not, in my mind, proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Again, I do not believe this standard to be required in 
impeachment trials, but because I believe that the other three 
factual allegations of article II do meet that standard, I 
adopt it for the purposes of this discussion.
    From the time she was transferred to the Pentagon in April 
1996, Ms. Lewinsky had pestered the President about returning 
to work at the White House, and, other than some vague 
referrals, until October 1, 1997, the President had done 
nothing to make this happen and little to help her find another 
job.
    On the first of October 1997, the President was served with 
interrogatories in the Jones case asking about his sexual 
relationships with women other than his wife, and during the 
rest of October the President and his agents stepped up their 
efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky a job. Three weeks later, on 
October 21, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill 
Richardson, called Ms. Lewinsky personally to schedule an 
interview in her apartment complex, though apparently he 
interviewed no one else. Shortly after this unusual interview, 
the Ambassador created a new position in New York and offered 
it to Ms. Lewinsky.
    What is perhaps most striking about the U.N. job is not 
even how promptly it materialized, nor that the U.S. Ambassador 
was so personally involved in hiring a young woman with 
precious little job experience, but that Ambassador Richardson 
held the specially crafted sinecure open for 2 months while the 
former intern kept him waiting on her decision.
    When Ms. Lewinsky decided that she preferred the private 
sector, the President enlisted the help of one of his closest 
personal friends, one of the most influential men in the United 
States, Vernon Jordan. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan in 
early November. Mr. Jordan, who was acting at the President's 
behest, apparently did not fully appreciate how important it 
was for him to cater to Ms. Lewinsky and took no action for a 
month.
    The President and Mr. Jordan realized, however, on December 
5, 1997, the importance of satisfying Ms. Lewinsky's fancy when 
her name appeared on the Jones witness list. Before that date, 
the President needed Ms. Lewinsky only to commit a lie of 
omission--simply to refrain from making their relationship 
public. Her appearance on the witness list now meant that she 
would have to lie under oath.
    Fully appreciative of the higher stakes, the President 
redoubled his efforts and those of his agents to find Ms. 
Lewinsky a job and keep her in his camp. In the weeks after Ms. 
Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list, Mr. Jordan kept 
the President apprised of his efforts to find work for her in 
the private sector. He called his contacts at American Express, 
Young and Rubicam, and MacAndrews & Forbes, Revlon's parent 
corporation. When Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed on December 19, 
1997, to be deposed in the Jones case, Mr. Jordan oversaw the 
preparation of the affidavit that the President had suggested 
she file in lieu of testifying. On January 7, 1997, Ms. 
Lewinsky signed the affidavit, which she later admitted was 
false, denying that she had a ``sexual relationship'' with the 
President. On January 8, she interviewed with MacAndrews & 
Forbes. When she told Mr. Jordan that she had done poorly, he 
called the Chairman of the Board, Ronald Perelman, to recommend 
Ms. Lewinsky, whom he commended as ``this bright young girl, 
who I think is terrific.'' As a result of this conversation, 
Ms. Lewinsky was called back for another interview with 
MacAndrews the following day and given an informal offer. On 
January 9, she reported this to Mr. Jordan, who called Ms. 
Currie with the message, ``mission accomplished'' and then 
called the President himself to share his success.
    The President's lawyers arranged for Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit to be filed on January 14, 1998. After this date, 
although Ms. Lewinsky did not end up with a job in the private 
sector, neither the President nor Mr. Jordan, who so resolutely 
pursued their earlier mission, lifted a finger to help the 
``bright . . . terrific'' young woman. Why? Because shortly 
thereafter the fiction of the President's platonic relationship 
with Lewinsky had exploded. Monica Lewinsky was the same Monica 
Lewinsky, but she now could no longer protect the President.
    It is impossible to reconcile the President's course of 
conduct with any purpose other than to preclude Ms. Lewinsky's 
truthful testimony in the Jones case, or, indeed, to prevent 
her testifying at all. The case for obstruction of justice is 
clear. Obstruction was the President's only motive.
    Next we have the Currie conversation--a set of statements 
by the President in the nominal form of questions, addressed by 
the President to Ms. Currie on the Sunday evening following his 
Jones deposition when she was called to the White House at an 
extraordinary time and for apparently a single purpose. We are 
all familiar now with the questions he posed:
    ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
    ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
    ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
    ``You could see and hear everything, right?''
    ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.''
    Those five statements have a single common thread: the 
President knew each and every one of them to have been totally 
false.
    Had Ms. Currie been willing to confirm the President's 
suggestions, she would have been a devastatingly effective 
witness for him.
    There is no reasonable explanation of this incident other 
than it is the President's clear attempt to obstruct justice, 
both in the Jones case and in the subsequent grand jury 
investigation.
    The false self-serving statements by the President to 
senior members of his staff, to his Cabinet, and to the 
American people just after his affair became public present a 
somewhat different face. It is reasonably clear that, at the 
time at which they were made, the President's goal, at least in 
part, was to save face with his staff and put a less 
humiliating spin on the Lewinsky matter. At the same time, 
coupled with his public statements, the President's assertions 
to his staff were designed to influence their testimony at some 
future time and place and to enlist them in disguising his 
conduct. In fact, they did obstruct the grand jury 
investigation. The President's manipulation of friendly 
witnesses to testify falsely, if unknowingly, extended for 
months until the DNA evidence shattered both his public and 
private positions.
    The President's attempt to derail the independent counsel's 
inquiry--an inquiry the very purpose of which was to discover 
whether the President gave false testimony and tampered with 
witnesses--by lying to his colleagues, his Cabinet, his 
confidantes, the media, the American people, and ultimately, 
the grand jury, is--beyond a reasonable doubt--a wide-ranging 
and highly public obstruction of justice, deeply damaging to 
the judicial fabric of the United States.
    One final note: to the extent that there are unresolved 
questions of fact, almost every one of them could be resolved 
by truthful and complete testimony by the President himself. 
That is a course of action he spectacularly avoided both in his 
Jones deposition and before the Starr grand jury. Now, he 
refuses to answer interrogatories from Senator Lott and refuses 
to appear at this trial to testify on his own behalf.
    Under the circumstances, is it not appropriate to infer 
that to tell the truth would be to confirm all of the 
questionable charges against him? I have not done so for the 
purposes of this argument, and have considered only those 
charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but the President's 
silence allows the inference that every one of the factual 
charges by the House managers is true.
    With sufficient material facts alleged in the two articles 
of impeachment either essentially uncontested or established by 
overwhelming evidence, and with those facts clearly 
constituting both perjury and obstruction, we arrive at the 
third question before the Senate. Are perjury and obstruction 
of justice high crimes and misdemeanors under the impeachment 
clause of the Constitution?
    This is the easiest of the four questions to answer. 
Perjury and crimes less serious than obstruction of justice 
have always and properly been considered high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    In 1986 Judge Claiborne was convicted by the Senate and 
removed from office for filing a false income tax return under 
penalties of perjury. By a vote of 90 to 7, the Senate rejected 
his argument that he should not be convicted because filing a 
false return was irrelevant to his performance as a judge. In 
1989, Judge Nixon was convicted by the Senate and removed from 
office for perjury: in fact, for lying under oath to a grand 
jury. And in that same year, Judge Hastings was convicted of 
lying under oath and removed by the Senate even though he had 
already been acquitted in a criminal trial--it is generally 
recognized that an act need not be criminal in order to be 
impeachable. As these examples illustrate, perjury is and 
historically has been a sufficient cause for conviction and 
removal. Although no person has been convicted and removed for 
obstruction of justice, the nature and gravity of this crime, 
punished more harshly under our laws than bribery, clearly is 
also a sufficient cause for conviction and removal.
    Most of the Senate's precedents, of course, are based on 
the impeachment trials of judges. President Clinton argues that 
those precedents should not apply; that Presidents, who hold 
the highest office in the land, should benefit from a lower 
standard for removal than the judges they appoint and the 
military officers they command. This President would have 
Presidents remain in office for acts that have resulted in the 
dismissal of military officers under his command, in the 
removal of judges, and for acts that would have resulted in the 
removal of Senators like Bob Packwood, who, like the President, 
are popularly elected for a fixed term. As House Manager Canady 
has pointed out, the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon 
impeachment inquiry concluded that the constitutional provision 
stating that judges would hold office during ``good 
Behaviour,'' does not limit the relevance of judges' 
impeachments with respect to standards for Presidential 
impeachments. The President's argument that he should be held 
to a lower standard than judges, military officers and Senators 
has no basis in the Constitution, in precedent, in equity, or 
in common sense.
    The fourth and ultimate question, nevertheless, is 
considerably more difficult to answer. For me, the proof of 
material facts supporting some of the allegations is 
overwhelming, the proposition that the established facts of the 
President's conduct constitute perjury and obstruction of 
justice almost impossible to deny, and the conclusion that 
perjury and obstruction of justice are high crimes and 
misdemeanors a given.
    The inevitable result of a guilty verdict in this trial is 
the President's removal from office, and I believe that 
reasonable minds can differ on whether or not that consequence 
is appropriate. So does at least one of the House managers. In 
answering the question of whether removal is too drastic a 
remedy for these alleged acts of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, Lindsey Graham, one of the most thoughtful managers, 
stated that great minds may not necessarily agree on the 
question of whether, for the good of the nation, one should or 
should not remove this President for these high crimes. 
Removal, he said, is the equivalent of the political death 
penalty, and the death penalty is not imposed for every felony. 
Considerations such as repentance and the impact of removal on 
society should also be considered. Mr. Graham's view was not , 
incidentally, that reasonable minds could differ on any of the 
first three questions that I have outlined, but only on the 
ultimate question of removal.
    While removal upon conviction has not always been 
considered inevitable, I agree that article II, section 4 of 
the Constitution requires a mandatory sentence of removal upon 
conviction of high crimes and misdemeanors. Nevertheless, a 
number of thoughtful commentators, and at least a few Members 
of this Senate, have already decided that removal is too 
drastic a sanction. These commentators and Members--who are 
convinced, perhaps, that the President committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice, which, as classes of crime, are high 
crimes and misdemeanors--may nevertheless vote not to convict 
because they believe that removal from office is unwarranted 
for this perjury and this obstruction of justice.
    I share that conclusion with respect to article I, but not 
article II.
    On article I, I have decided, with some regret, that the 
instances of perjury I believe were established beyond a 
reasonable doubt are offenses insufficient for removing the 
President from office--based on the gravity of the offenses as 
against the drastic nature of removal. Equally important is the 
fact that these instances of perjury are also elements of the 
obstruction of justice charges in article II. One conviction 
for the same acts of perjury is enough.
    Nevertheless, I am convinced that one other reflection must 
precede a decision based on the belief that removal is 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses established 
here, and that is: what are the consequences of a not guilty 
finding by the Senate? The consequences are, of course, no 
sanction whatsoever.
    It is precisely because the absence of any sanction is so 
objectionable to those who choke over removal that there has 
been such a spirited search for a third way. But, fellow 
Senators, there is no third way. There is no third way.
    Article I, section 3 of the Constitution states: ``Judgment 
in Cases of Impeachment shall extend no further than to removal 
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office 
of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States. . . .''
    The drafters did not intend to allow Congress to choose 
among a range of punishments analogous to those available to 
the judiciary, and for this reason they specified that the 
impeached party was to remain subject to judicial process and 
specifically limited to two--removal and disqualification--the 
sanctions that Congress could apply.
    We must, I believe, by reason of this harsh choice 
consciously forced on us at the Constitutional Convention in 
1787, weigh seriously the effect on the Republic of either of 
our two possible courses of action. Will the Republic be 
strengthened, or will it be weakened, by determining that a 
President shall remain in its most exalted office after 
perjuring himself and obstructing the pursuit of justice both 
of a private citizen and of a federal grand jury, in a case 
occasioned by the President's sexual activities? Will the 
Republic be strengthened or weakened by removing the President 
from office by an impeachment conviction for this perjury and 
this obstruction?
    Early in our history an incident involving one of the 
authors of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, shows clearly 
the bright line between, on the one hand, a private sexual 
scandal, and on the other, a public obligation--a line the 
President has intentionally crossed.
    In No. 65 of ``The Federalist Papers,'' Mr. Hamilton 
described impeachable offenses as ``those offences which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately 
to the society itself.'' The President's defenders place great 
reliance on this explanation.
    Within 4 years of the composition of this essay, Mr. 
Hamilton had an opportunity to reflect on his own words. In the 
summer of 1791, Hamilton, then the Secretary of the Treasury, 
had an adulterous affair with a Maria Reynolds. Her husband 
discovered the affair and demanded a job in the Treasury 
Department. Though Secretary Hamilton turned him down, he did 
pay blackmail from his personal funds.
    A year later, three Congressmen, all politically opposed to 
Hamilton, learned of the payments, suspected that they might 
involve Treasury funds, and confronted Hamilton. Despite the 
tremendous political advantage the story, which eventually 
leaked, offered them, he immediately and without hesitation 
told them the truth and nothing but the truth.
    The author of Federalist No. 65 knew very well the 
distinction between a private scandal and the profound 
embarrassment arising out of its publication--and the violation 
of a public duty in an attempt to avoid that embarrassment. He 
chose not to use his Treasury position in a way that would 
justify an impeachment. The personal cost was immense and he 
assumed it without blinking.
    President Clinton could hardly have chosen a more different 
course of action. He chose to violate both his oath of office 
and his oath as a witness, using his office, his staff, and his 
position to try to avoid personal embarrassment. In any event 
even the personal consequences for him have been far worse than 
those visited upon Alexander Hamilton. But it is our duty to 
determine whether he merits a drastic public sanction--or none 
at all.
    Some will say that the President can be charged with crimes 
related to this affair after his term of office is over.
    First, such charges lie outside our jurisdiction or duty.
    Second, such charges seem to me to be unlikely if we acquit 
the President, or in any event.
    But third, and most important, let us assume that President 
Clinton is charged, convicted, and sentenced in 2001. What a 
devastating judgment on the Senate of the United States that 
would be! We ourselves would be convicted, by history and 
forever, of having permitted a felon who abused his office in 
committing his felonies to remain in office as President of the 
United States for 2 long years.
    I simply cannot imagine any Senator willing to carry that 
burden of conscience.
    No, we must choose between the sanction of removal and no 
sanction at all. We know how Alexander Hamilton would vote 
today on our question. We know how James Madison, one of 
Hamilton's interrogators and the careful author of the 
impeachment provision, would have voted. And merely to call up 
the name of George Washington is to answer the question of how 
he would vote.
    The Republic will not be weakened if we convict. The 
policies of the Presidency will not change. The administration 
will not change. If we acquit, if we say that some perjuries, 
some obstructions of justice, some clear and conscious 
violations of a formal oath are free from our sanction, the 
Republic and its institutions will be weakened. One exception 
or excuse will lead to another, the right of the most powerful 
of our leaders to act outside the law--or in violation of the 
law--will be established. Our republican institutions will be 
seriously undermined. They have been undermined already, and 
the damage accrues to all equally--Republicans, Democrats, 
liberals, and conservatives.
    If there is one thing this President can be relied on to 
do, it is to put his interests before those of his office and 
of the Republic. President Clinton has debased the Presidency 
now and, if he is allowed to remain in office, the low level to 
which he has brought the presidency will continue, and that is 
not tolerable.
    I cannot will to my children and grandchildren the 
proposition that a President stands above the law and can 
systematically obstruct justice simply because both his polls 
and the Dow Jones index are high.
    Our duty in this case is as unpleasant as it was unsought. 
But our duty is clear. It was imposed on us, by history, 
without equivocation, 212 years ago. It requires us to convict 
the President of article II of these articles of impeachment. 
And that is how I vote, with clear conscience and a saddened 
heart.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22, see 
p. 3042, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, like many 
others, the day the President wagged his finger at the American 
people and indicated he had not been involved with Ms. 
Lewinsky, I had the sense that he wasn't telling the truth and 
I felt some genuine regret. The President and I began here in 
Washington in the same month, in 1993. I had high hopes and 
actually felt very close to what he was trying to accomplish. 
So all along in this process, I have had to fight an urge to 
personalize that regret in a way that would affect my ability 
to do my job in this impeachment trial. And I will tell you 
that taking that separate oath helped me get into the mindset 
necessary to do that task.
    I do regret that the President's public conduct--not his 
private conduct--has brought us to this day.
    But we are here, and I want to take a minute to praise my 
colleagues on the process. I think it would have been 
unfortunate had we not had any witness testimony--at least in 
the form of deposition testimony. I think it would have been an 
unfortunate historical precedent. I found the video testimony 
helpful. I didn't enjoy it, but I found it helpful in 
clarifying some of the things that I was thinking about. So I 
am glad, on balance, that we did not dismiss the case at the 
time it was first suggested.
    As we get to the final stage and get immersed in the law 
and facts of this case, it is too easy to forget the most 
salient fact about this entire matter, and that is one simple 
fact that many others have mentioned: In November 1996, 47 
million Americans voted to reelect President Clinton. The 
people hired him. They are the hiring authority. An impeachment 
is a radical undoing of that authority. The people hire and 
somehow, under this process, the Congress can fire. So, I 
caution against, with all due respect to the excellent 
arguments made, the attempt to analogize this to an employee-
employer relationship, or a military situation, or even the 
situation of judges--those situations are all clearly 
different. Along with the choice of the Vice President, in no 
other case do the American people choose one person, and in no 
other case can a completely different authority undo that 
choice.
    Having said that, the Presidential conduct in this case, in 
my view, does come perilously close to justifying that extreme 
remedy. There really have been three Presidential impeachments 
in our Nation's history. I see this one as being in the middle. 
The Andrew Johnson case is usually considered by historians to 
have been a relatively weak case. President Johnson had a 
different interpretation of the constitutionality of the 
statute that he believed allowed him to remove the Secretary of 
War, Mr. Stanton. He was not convicted, and subsequently the 
U.S. Supreme Court, I believe, ruled that in fact that was 
constitutional. I see that as having been a relatively weak 
case.
    The case of Richard Nixon, in my view, was a pretty strong 
case, involving a 1972 Presidential election and attempts to 
get involved with the aspects of that election--frankly--an 
attempt to cover up what happened during that 1972 election. I 
think that had more to do with core meaning of ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors.''
    This is a closer case; this is a close case. In that sense, 
it may be the most important of the three Presidential 
impeachments, in terms of the law of impeachment, as we go into 
the future. I agree neither with the House managers who say 
their evidence is ``overwhelming,'' nor with the President's 
counsel who says the evidence against the President is 
``nonexistent.'' The fact is, this is a hard case, and 
sometimes they say that hard cases make bad law. But we cannot 
afford to have this be bad law for the Nation's sake.
    So how do we decide? There have been a lot of helpful 
suggestions, but one thing that has been important to me is the 
way the House presented their case. That doesn't bind us, but 
they did suggest that two Federal statutes had been violated. 
Mr. Manager McCollum said that ``you must first determine if a 
Federal crime has occurred.'' Many others have said that. I 
will reiterate a point. If that is the approach you want to 
take, then it is clear, in my view as one Senator, that you 
must prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, you are 
using the power and the opprobrium of the Federal criminal law 
as a sword but refusing to let the President and the defense 
counsel have the shield of the burden of proof that is required 
in the criminal law.
    I do not have time to discuss the perjury count this 
afternoon, but will do so in a longer presentation for the 
Record. Suffice it to say, I do not believe the managers have 
met their burden of proving perjury beyond a reasonable doubt.
    As to obstruction of justice, the President did come 
perilously close. Three quick observations make me conclude 
that, in fact, he did not commit obstruction of justice beyond 
a reasonable doubt. First, I am very concerned about the 
conversations between the President and Betty Currie concerning 
the specifics of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. But the 
critical question there is intent. Was his intent about 
avoiding discovery by his family and the political problems 
involved? Or was the core issue trying to avoid the Jones 
proceeding and the consequences of that?
    I don't think it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Jones proceeding was the President's concern. Perhaps 
Ms. Currie could have shed some light on this. That is why I 
was extremely puzzled when the House managers didn't call Betty 
Currie. Let me be the first to say that I don't think in this 
instance the House managers ``wanted to win too badly.'' I 
don't think they wanted to win badly enough to take the chance 
of calling Betty Currie, a crucial witness.
    I was very concerned about the false affidavit until I saw 
Ms. Lewinsky's Senate deposition testimony. I am persuaded that 
you cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that she was urged by 
the President to make a false statement in that affidavit.
    Finally, I was very concerned about the hiding of the 
gifts. And maybe everyone will disagree with me on this. But 
when I watched her testimony, I thought Ms. Lewinsky was the 
most indefinite about whether or not she had gotten that call 
from Ms. Currie than any other part of her testimony. I happen 
to believe that Ms. Lewinsky was the one who was the most 
concerned about the gifts. And I believe a showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt has not been made that the President 
masterminded the hiding of the gifts.
    So I cannot deny what Representative Graham said: If you 
call somebody up at 2:30 in the morning, you are probably up to 
no good. But if you call somebody up at 2:30 in the morning, 
you have not necessarily accomplished the crime of obstruction 
of justice.
    I realize there is a separate question of whether these 
same acts by the President, apart from the Federal criminal 
law, constitute high crimes and misdemeanors. I do not. I will 
discuss that in more detail in a future statement in the 
Record.
    But I would like to conclude by just talking a little bit 
about this impeachment issue in the modern context. When I say 
that the vote in 1996 is the primary issue, I don't just mean 
that in terms of the rights of people. I mean it in terms of 
the goal of the Founding Fathers, and our goal today; that is, 
political stability in this country. We don't want a 
parliamentary system. And we don't want an overly partisan 
system.
    I see the 4-year term as a unifying force of our Nation. 
Yet this is the second time in my adult lifetime that we have 
had serious impeachment proceedings, and I am only 45 years 
old. This only occurred once in the entire 200 years prior to 
this time. Is this a fluke? Is it that we just happened to have 
had two ``bad men'' as Presidents? I doubt it. How will we feel 
if sometime in the next 10 years a third impeachment proceeding 
occurs in this country so we will have had three within 40 
years?
    I see a danger in this in an increasingly diverse country. 
I see a danger in this in an increasingly divided country. And 
I see a danger in this when the final argument of the House 
manager is that this is a chapter in an ongoing ``culture war'' 
in this Nation. That troubles me. I hope that is not where we 
are and hope that is not where we are heading.
    It is best not to err at all in this case. But if we must 
err, let us err on the side of avoiding these divisions, and 
let us err on the side of respecting the will of the people.
    Let me conclude by quoting James W. Grimes, one of the 
seven Republican Senators who voted not to convict Andrew 
Johnson. I discovered this speech, and found out that the Chief 
Justice had already discovered and quoted him, and said he was 
one of the three of the ablest of the seven. Grimes said this 
in his opinion about why he wouldn't convict President Johnson:

    I cannot agree to destroy the harmonious working of the 
Constitution for the sake of getting rid of an unacceptable President. 
Whatever may be my opinion of the incumbent, I cannot consent to trifle 
with the high office he holds. I can do nothing which, by implication, 
may be construed as an approval of impeachment as a part of future 
political machinery.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison

    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. Chief Justice, if a university 
president, a minister or priest, general or admiral, or a 
corporate chief executive had engaged in a sexual relationship 
with an intern under his charge, he would lose his position, 
with scant attention paid to whether or not such a relationship 
were ``consensual.'' We place in certain individuals so great a 
measure of trust that they are seen as acting essentially in 
loco parentis.
    The question before us today is: Should the President of 
the United States be held to a lower standard?
    The answer is: No. To the contrary; we can bestow no higher 
honor than to select one individual to represent us all as 
President. In one person we endow the character of our Nation, 
as the head of state and the head of government.
    It is with great disappointment, but firm resolve, that I 
have concluded the President has not lived up to this high 
standard and that he should be removed from office. The House 
managers have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that, in 
addition to indefensible behavior with an intern, which was not 
illegal, the President engaged in the obstruction of justice 
and, as an element of that obstruction, committed perjury 
before a Federal grand jury, which is.
    This case began as an alleged civil rights violation of a 
young woman who came to the bar seeking justice. The Supreme 
Court unanimously decided to permit her case against the 
President to go forward. It was that case which led to the 
revelations regarding the President's relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky, the White House intern.
    Incredibly, an element of the President's defense is that 
we should take the long view. We are told by the President's 
defenders that we should not judge his actions toward one 
individual, in which he schemed to impede her ability to seek 
redress, because his overall actions on civil rights are so 
positive. We are asked not to judge his treatment of one woman, 
or two women, but to evaluate his policies that affect all 
women.
    Would the President's defenders forgive a schoolteacher who 
molests a student, simply because the teacher's classes are 
popular and his students all go on to college? Should we ignore 
the police officer who personally enriches himself by accepting 
graft, so long as his arrest record is high? Would we look away 
from the corporate executive who illegally profits from insider 
information, as long as his shareholders are happy with the 
return on their investment? We would not sustain civil society 
for long with such moral relativism as our guide.
    The President had it solely within his power to keep the 
country from the course on which it has been for the past year. 
First, of course, he could have chosen not to engage in the 
behavior in question. Having behaved as he did, though, and 
having been discovered, the President could have acknowledged 
his own actions and accepted the consequences. This could have 
been an honorable resignation, or an admission, contrition, and 
a firm resolve to take responsibility; with a request for 
resolution in a manner short of impeachment and trial.
    Instead, the President chose to deny the allegations, and 
fight them with a coordinated scheme of manipulation and 
obstruction. He lied outright to the American people, to his 
close associates, and to his Cabinet. An enduring image of this 
whole tale will be his finger-pointing lie to the American 
people, even after admonishing us to listen closely, because he 
didn't want to have to say it again.
    Even in view of these actions, the President missed 
numerous opportunities to right this matter and get it behind 
him and the country. At virtually every opportunity, though, he 
chose an action that further prolonged the matter and led 
directly to his impeachment.
    The President chose to impede the pursuit of justice by the 
independent counsel, who was given the authority to investigate 
this matter by the President's own Attorney General.
    The President chose to construct a cover story with Ms. 
Lewinsky, should their relationship become public.
    The President chose to direct his personal staff to 
retrieve items from Ms. Lewinsky that he knew were under 
subpoena in a Federal investigation.
    The President chose to seek the assistance of friends to 
find a job for Ms. Lewinsky, and to intensify that job search 
when it became clear that Ms. Lewinsky had become a target of 
the civil suit against him.
    The President chose to lie to his staff about the nature of 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky herself, with the 
expectation that these lies would become part of the public 
perception.
    The President chose to lie before a Federal grand jury 
about his actions with regard to some of the elements of 
obstruction of justice, including the concealment of the gifts 
that were likely to become evidence in the civil case against 
him.
    As a result of these choices by the President of the United 
States, the Senate was left with no choice other than to 
confront the charges and hear the case pursuant to the 
President's impeachment in the House of Representatives.
    In so doing, the Senate conducted a fair and expeditious 
trial. We rejected the idea of an early test vote that would 
have truncated the process. We rejected the motion for an early 
dismissal. The Senate is fulfilling its constitutional 
responsibility to hold a trial with a complete evidentiary 
record and a final vote on each article of impeachment sent to 
the Senate by the House of Representatives.
    Through skillful use of the written record compiled by the 
independent counsel, videotaped depositions, and hard evidence, 
the House managers presented a compelling case. The case for 
perjury was difficult. The President's testimony before the 
grand jury was guarded. He was fully aware of the evidence the 
prosecutors had with respect to this case. He chose his words 
carefully. He admitted his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
before the grand jury, but did so only after confronted with 
clinical evidence of its existence.
    He lied to the grand jury to deny other key facts. He 
perjured himself as an element of a broader attempt to obstruct 
justice. There are two false statements that are the most 
persuasive. First, when asked if he directed Betty Currie to 
retrieve gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, he stated unequivocally, ``No 
sir, I did not do that.''
    The facts are contrary to that allegation. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that Betty Currie called her to suggest that Ms. 
Lewinsky give her the gifts. We have cellular telephone records 
that indicate a call from Ms. Currie to Ms. Lewinsky at about 
the time the gifts were picked up. It was clear that Ms. Currie 
initiated a retrieval of the gifts at the direction of the 
President, for this was the only source of information she had 
that there were gifts. The evidence is overwhelming that the 
President directed Betty Currie to retrieve these gifts. Thus, 
his statement is false. Not only is this perjury, it is 
obstruction of justice.
    The President also lied before the grand jury about his 
conversations with White House aides regarding Ms. Lewinsky. He 
testified that ``I said to them things that were true about 
this relationship.'' We know this to be completely false from 
the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal, who stated directly and 
unequivocally that the President had lied to him about the 
nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The legal standard for perjury is high. Under 18 U.S.C. 
1623(a), a person is guilty of perjury if he or she knowingly 
makes a false, material statement under oath in a Federal court 
or grand jury. I believe these statements were false, 
intentional and material in that they attempt to put a false 
impression on key events in a series of attempts to obstruct 
justice. In effect, the President knew his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky was shameful, but not necessarily illegal. But he 
knew his obstruction of justice was illegal--so he lied about 
it to a grand jury.
    In many ways, obstruction of justice is even more corrosive 
than perjury to the machinery of our legal system. As the 
target of a grand jury and an independent prosecutor, the 
President has defended himself against charges of perjury by 
claiming he was caught off guard, was misinterpreted, was 
attempting to mislead but not lie.
    Obstruction of justice, though, is a quite different 
matter. It is an affirmative act that occurs at the person's 
own initiative; in this case, the President. It involves 
actions taken that were not instigated by anyone else.
    It has been said in his defense that the President did not 
initiate his perjury in that he was led to it by the 
prosecutor. But there is no similar argument regarding article 
II, the obstruction of justice. Without the affirmative actions 
of the President, there would have been no article II.
    The President sought out Mr. Blumenthal to tell his 
misleading story about the nature of his relationship and the 
character of Ms. Lewinsky.
    Separately, the President enlisted his personal secretary 
to further his obstruction of justice. He asked Ms. Currie to 
retrieve the gifts. He summoned her to coach her testimony 
under the guise of ``trying to figure out what the facts 
were.'' He did so within hours after coming back to the White 
House on January 17 from his deposition in the civil sexual 
harassment lawsuit. He required a face-to-face meeting with her 
the next day, a Sunday. It couldn't be done over the phone, and 
it couldn't wait until Monday. It was clear he needed her to 
reaffirm his false testimony. This is obstruction of justice.
    The edifice of American jurisprudence rests on the 
foundation of the due process of law. The mortar in that 
foundation is the oath. Those who seek to obstruct justice 
weaken that foundation, and those who violate the oath would 
tear the whole structure down.
    Every day, thousands of citizens in thousands of courtrooms 
across America are sworn in as jurors, as grand jurors, as 
witnesses, as defendants. On those oaths rest the due process 
of law upon which all of our other rights are based.
    The oath is how we defend ourselves against those who would 
subvert our system by breaking our laws. There are Americans in 
jail today because they violated that oath. Others have 
prevailed at the bar of justice because of that oath.
    What would we be telling Americans--and those worldwide who 
see in America what they can only hope for in their own 
countries--if the Senate of the United States were to conclude: 
The President lied under oath as an element of a scheme to 
obstruct the due process of law, but we chose to look the other 
way?
    I cannot make that choice. I cannot look away. I vote 
``guilty'' on article I, perjury. I vote ``guilty'' on article 
II, obstruction of justice.
    I ask unanimous consent that an analysis of the articles of 
impeachment be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                Analysis of the Articles of Impeachment

                   (By Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison)
    ``Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the 
trial of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to 
the Constitution and laws: So help you God?''
    When the Chief Justice of the United States administered this oath 
and I signed my name to it on January 7, 1999, as one of one hundred 
triers of fact and law in the Court of Impeachment of the President of 
the United States, I did so with a heavy heart, but with a clear mind.
    That solemn occasion in the well of this Senate, and the weight of 
the burden imposed on us as ``jurors'' in only the second such 
proceeding in the history of our Nation, reminded me with vivid clarity 
that our Constitution belongs to all of us.
    I was reminded as well, however, that the laws of our Country are 
applicable to us all, including the President, and they must be obeyed. 
The concept of equal justice under law and the importance of absolute 
truth in legal proceedings is the foundation of our justice system in 
the courts.
    In this proceeding, I have drawn conclusions about the facts as I 
see them, and I have applied the law to those facts as I understand 
that law to be.
              underlying facts leading to this proceeding
    The details of an intimate personal relationship that occurred 
during the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 between the President of the 
United States and a 22-year-old female White House Intern who was 
directly under his command and control have been chronicled throughout 
the world and are described in thousands of pages of evidence and 
materials filed with both the House and the Senate in this case and in 
bookstores across America. They involved intimate sexual relations 
within the White House, personal gifts, jobs within and outside of 
government, and ``missions accomplished.'' The underlying details will 
not be repeated by me here.
    While some facts about that relationship and the timing of some 
events were disputed at the trial in the Senate, their essence has been 
publicly admitted by the President, by his Counsel, and by the Intern 
in written or verbal form, including sworn testimony in various forms.
    However inappropriate the behavior of the President was, the legal 
issues in the impeachment trial do not deal with this relationship. All 
accusations against the President here relate instead to alleged 
attempts to prevent the disclosure of this relationship in a pending 
civil rights lawsuit against the President in an Arkansas Federal court 
and to the public. That is the critical factor that has brought us to 
this extraordinary moment in our Nation's history when we are 
considering whether or not to remove from office the President of the 
United States.
           core facts leading to the articles of impeachment
    In May, 1994, a female citizen and employee of the State of 
Arkansas filed a lawsuit in an Arkansas Federal District Court, 
alleging, in summary, that, in 1991 while President Clinton was 
Governor of Arkansas, the Governor committed the civil offense of 
sexual harassment against her by insisting that she perform sexual acts 
identical or similar to those later performed by the Intern.
    In the course of preparing for the trial of the Arkansas case, the 
plaintiff, with the consent of the presiding Federal Judge, attempted 
to develop evidence that defendant Clinton had, before and afterward, 
engaged in patterns of conduct that were similar to the allegations of 
the plaintiff in the case.
    In December, 1997, the Arkansas Judge ordered defendant Clinton to 
answer a written interrogatory naming every state and federal employee 
with whom he had had sexual relations since 1986. President Clinton 
answered: ``none.''
    In an alleged attempt to avoid giving a personal deposition in the 
case pursuant to a December, 1997, subpoena, the White House Intern, 
who had since become employed at the Pentagon, on January 7, 1998, 
signed an affidavit denying any sexual relationship with President 
Clinton. Six days later, on January 13, the Intern accepted a job offer 
at a major corporation in New York City. A friend called the President 
shortly thereafter with the message: ``Mission accomplished.''
    While the President was giving his own deposition in the Arkansas 
case, his counsel tendered this affidavit to the Arkansas Federal 
Court, referred to it, and vouched for its accuracy in the presence of 
the President. The President, knowing the affidavit to be false, sat by 
and said nothing. The President's counsel subsequently advised the 
Court that this affidavit was not reliable and should be ignored.
    Defendant Clinton was subpoenaed to give the above-mentioned 
deposition in the case and did so on January 17, 1998. In a rare event, 
the Arkansas Judge attended for the purpose of supervising the 
deposition of the President in a Washington lawyer's offices. While 
there, the Judge and participating counsel for the parties, either 
knowingly or unknowingly, formulated a definition of the meaning of the 
words ``sexual relations'' to exclude certain forms of human contact 
that in their commonly accepted meaning would be included. But, 
allegedly upon the basis of this definition, President Clinton denied, 
under oath, among other things, that he had sexual relations with the 
Intern.
    On January 21, 1998, the existence of an alleged inappropriate 
relationship between the President and the White House Intern blazed 
across the Nation from a story first published in the Washington Post 
carrying the headline: ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aid to Lie; Starr 
Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to 
(plaintiff's) Lawyers.''
    Evidence introduced and debated by the House Managers and the 
President's Counsel in the Senate painted a picture of frantic 
activities within and without the White House throughout the month 
before and during the week following this public disclosure, by the 
President, by his friends, by White House staff and employees, and 
others. It was alleged, among other things, that the President coached, 
manipulated, and influenced false testimony of witnesses, including the 
Intern, engineered the hiding of gifts and evidence that was subject to 
subpoena, lied to his staff and friends about the facts in order to 
assure that they would give false testimony in public and legal 
proceedings, manipulated the Intern into signing the false affidavit in 
the Arkansas Federal Court, and, after failures to obtain employment 
for her elsewhere, rewarded the Intern by obtaining for her an out-of-
town job in return for her cooperative falsehoods or silence. The 
sequence and importance of such activities, much of which is not 
disputed in the evidence, were debated aggressively by the House 
Managers and the President's Counsel in the Senate, but the essence of 
those activities was not seriously denied.
    After numerous public denials immediately after the public 
disclosure, and after several days of alleged ``damage control'' 
designed to synchronize false stories to be provided by various parties 
in response to all inquiries, and event of major, historic, and future 
national importance occurred.
    On January 26, 1998, the President addressed the Nation about this 
issue at a press conference in Washington, since replayed in television 
broadcasts thousands of times. On that occasion, the President looked 
sternly into the camera and pointed his finger directly at the American 
people and stated:
    ``I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to 
listen to me. I'm going to say this again: I did not have sexual 
relations with that woman (naming the Intern). I never told anybody to 
lie, not a single time. Never. These allegations are false.''
    During the following months, the gist of this representation filled 
the news media around the World and in every conceivable form, provided 
by every conceivable spokesman for the President, including government 
employees, Cabinet officials, lawyers, public relations specialists, 
political advisors, friends, Members of Congress, and others.
    After an immunity agreement was reached between the Independent 
Counsel (discussed below) and the Intern on July 28, 1998, the Intern 
delivered a dress to the Independent Counsel that, according to her 
testimony, had been worn by her on February 28, 1997, during a sexual 
encounter with the President in the White House. The dress was tested 
for the President's DNA. The test was positive.
    The President of the United States had lied directly to the 
American people.
            the president's appearance before the grand jury
    After months of negotiation for an appearance by the President, on 
July 17, 1998, the President was subpoenaed to appear before a Federal 
grand jury in Washington by the Independent Counsel assigned to 
investigate multiple issues concerning the President, including issues 
involving potential perjury by both the President and the Intern in the 
Arkansas sexual harassment case, issues relating to the President's 
relationship with the Intern, and issues relating to alleged actions 
taken to influence the testimony of witnesses in the Arkansas case and 
before the grand jury, attempts to discredit the Intern by describing 
her as a ``stalker,'' as ``ignorant,'' and as ``stupid,'' all done in 
an alleged effort to cover up and conceal the underlying relationship 
between the President and the Intern, to obstruct the right of the 
Arkansas plaintiff to pursue her sexual harassment claims in the 
Arkansas Federal Court, and to obstruct the proceedings of the grand 
jury itself.
    After various losing motions and court proceedings asserting 
various executive privileges against a Presidential appearance before 
the grand jury, the President, on August 17, 1998, gave testimony 
voluntarily to the grand jury by deposition given in the White House 
and piped live to the grand jury. The prior subpoena was withdrawn by 
the Independent Counsel.
    During and since this appearance, the President has repeatedly 
acknowledged publicly that he had an inappropriate relationship with 
the White House Intern but has insisted that he was misleading but 
truthful in his depositions in the Arkansas case and before the Federal 
grand jury and did not commit any act that would constitute an 
obstruction of any legal proceeding or the rights of any party 
associated with any portion of this historic tale.
                      impeachment of the president
    The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c), directs any 
Independent Counsel appointed under that law to advise the House of 
Representatives of any substantial and credible information received 
during the course of an investigation that may constitute grounds for 
the impeachment of the President of the United States.
    On September 9, 1998, the Office of Independent Counsel submitted 
its referral to the House of Representatives consisting of thousands of 
pages of sworn testimony from many parties, recorded telephone 
conversations, video tapes, interviews, reports, legal briefs, and 
arguments, including the following partial introduction:
    ``This Referral presents substantial and credible information that 
President Clinton criminally obstructed the judicial process, first in 
a sexual harassment lawsuit in which he was a defendant and then in a 
grand jury investigation.''
    The Judiciary Committee of the House, in its report to the full 
House of Representatives, recommended four Articles of Impeachment of 
the President. On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives 
declined to approve two of the proposed Articles, but did approve the 
following two Articles, and delivered H. Res. 611 to the Senate for 
trial in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of Article I of 
the Constitution of the United States:
    Impeachment Article I, the ``perjury'' article, accuses the 
President of violating his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed, of willfully corrupting and manipulating 
the judicial process, and of impeding the administration of justice for 
personal gain and exoneration, in that:
    While under oath before the Federal grand jury, the President gave 
perjurious testimony before the grand jury concerning one or more of 
the following: (i) the nature and details of his relationship with the 
Intern; (ii) prior perjurious, false, and misleading testimony he gave 
in the Arkansas case; (iii) prior false and misleading statements he 
allowed his attorney to make about the Intern's affidavit in the 
Arkansas case; and (iv) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony 
of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Arkansas 
case.
    Impeachment Article II, the ``obstruction of justice'' and 
``witness tampering'' article, accuses the President of violating his 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, 
of preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of justice, 
and, to that end, of engaging personally and through his subordinates 
and agents in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to the Arkansas Federal sexual harassment case.
    In support of the accusation, Article II accuses the President of 
seven specific acts of obstruction: (i) corruptly encouraging the 
Intern to execute false affidavit in the Arkansas case, (ii) corruptly 
encouraging the Intern to give false testimony in the Arkansas case if 
and when she was called to testify personally in that case, (iii) 
corruptly engaging in, encouraging, or supporting a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in the Arkansas case, (iv) obtaining 
a job for the Intern in order to corruptly prevent her truthful 
testimony in the Arkansas case, (v) corruptly allowing his attorney in 
the Arkansas case to make false statements to the Federal Judge 
characterizing the Intern's affidavit in order to prevent questioning 
deemed relevant by the Judge, (vi) corruptly influencing his personal 
secretary to give false testimony in the Arkansas case, and (vii) 
making false and misleading statements to witnesses in the Federal 
grand jury proceeding, confirmed by the witnesses, in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses.
                        the trial in the senate
    H. Res. 611 was received in the Senate on December 19, 1998. The 
trial commenced on January 7, 1999. During the trial, we have listened 
to hours of arguments from the House Managers and Counsel for the 
President, and have engaged in hours of internal Senate debate, both 
public and private. We have been provided with access to thousands of 
pages and other forms of evidence relating to the accusations contained 
in the two Articles of Impeachment.
    Under the Constitution, the power to impeach (or ``accuse'') a 
President of an impeachable offense is vested solely in the House of 
Representatives. As Senators and triers of both the facts and the law, 
we cannot ``accuse,'' ``venture outside the record,'' or ``create and 
assert new allegations.'' We are bound to cast our votes of ``guilty'' 
or ``not guilty'' solely on the two Article of Impeachment as presented 
by the House.
    I do not hold to the view of our Constitution that there must be an 
actual, indictable crime in order for an act of a public officer to be 
impeachable. It is clear to this Senator that there are, indeed, 
circumstances, short of a felony criminal offense that would justify 
the removal of a public officer from office, including the President of 
the United States. Manifest injury to the Office of the President, to 
our Nation, and to the American people, and gross abuses of trust and 
of public office clearly can reach the level of intensity that would 
justify the impeachment and removal of a leader. One of the Articles of 
Impeachment presented by the House Judiciary Committee to the full 
House of Representatives in this case charged the President with 
precisely such an offense. The House of Representatives did not approve 
that Article, and such a charge is, therefore, not before us in this 
proceeding.
    The two Articles of Impeachment before the Senate in this 
proceeding do in fact accuse the President of committing three actual 
crimes, ``perjury before the grand jury,'' `'obstruction of justice,'' 
and ``witness tampering,'' that meet the requirements for conviction of 
an indicted defendant in a criminal case brought under Federal law. The 
House Managers and Counsel for the President reviewed those laws 
extensively. Thus, in order to find the President ``guilty'' under 
either Article, this Senator must conclude that all of the statutory 
prerequisites to conviction are present that would be required to 
convict the President of one or more of those crimes, if this 
proceeding were, instead, the prosecution of felony criminal 
indictments in a United States District Court under Federal law.
    The President's Counsel did not significantly challenge the 
underlying facts in the case, but insisted throughout (i) that no 
crimes have been committed, and (ii) that, even if crimes have been 
committed, they ``do not rise to the level of the high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' contemplated by the Constitution that would permit a 
conviction in this proceeding, since a finding of ``guilty'' by 67 
Senators under either Article would, under the Constitution, 
automatically result in the removal of the President from office and 
prohibit him forever from holding another office of profit or trust 
under the United States.
 perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering as impeachable 
                                offenses
    Section 4 of Article II of our Constitution provides:
    ``The President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    Because of the uniqueness of this Constitutional process in which 
``guilt'' and ``punishment'' are combined, each Senator, as a trier of 
both fact and law, before voting as to the guilt or innocence of the 
President under either of the Articles must answer the basic question: 
Do the crimes of perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice 
as alleged in this proceeding rise to the level of the ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors'' included in our Constitution that would justify the 
automatic removal from office of the President of the United States?
    The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that there is 
an occasional misunderstanding to the effect that the crime of 
``perjury'' is somehow distinct from ``obstruction of justice.'' United 
States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937). They are not. While 
different elements make up each crime, each is calculated to prevent a 
court and the public from discovering the truth and achieving justice 
in our judicial system. Moreover, it is obvious that ``witness 
tampering'' is simply another means employed to obstruct justice.
    This Senate on numerous occasions has convicted impeached Federal 
Judges on allegations of perjury. Moreover, the historical fact is that 
``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as used and applied in English law on 
which portions of our Constitution were founded, included the crimes of 
``obstructing the execution of the lawful process'' and of ``willful 
and corrupt perjury.'' Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
a treatise described by James Madison as ``a book which is in every 
man's hand.'' See article entitled ``The True History of High crimes 
and misdemeanors,'' by Gary L. McDowell, Director of the Institute of 
United States Studies at the University of London, appearing in the 
Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1999.
    Some argue that the precedents of the Senate in cases involving 
Federal Judges are not applicable because Federal Judges are not 
elected by the people and the President is. This is a shocking analysis 
to this Senator. That the President is elected should call for a 
``higher'' standard of conduct, not a lower one. The fact is that the 
standards are set by the Constitution for all officers of the Federal 
government. They are precisely the same, and we are obligated to apply 
them evenly.
    It is argued by others that this test leaves Presidents at risk of 
being impeached and convicted for trivial offenses. The two-thirds vote 
requirement for conviction imposed by the Constitution, itself, is 
designed to protect public officers from precisely such a result.
    The President's Counsel and a number of Senators advance a 
``felony-plus'' interpretation of the Constitutional terms ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors.'' They seem to agree that the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice are ``high crimes'' under the 
Constitution, but they argue that, even if guilt is admitted, 
nevertheless, a Senator should vote ``not guilty,'' on any article of 
impeachment of a President, if the ``economy is good,'' if the 
underlying facts in the case are ``just about sex,'' or if the Senator 
simply feels for whatever personal reason that the President ought to 
stay in office despite having committed felonies while holding it.
    To this Senator, this astounding application of the plain language 
of our Constitution strikes at the very heart of the rule of law in 
America. It replaces the stability guaranteed by the Constitution with 
the chaos of uncertainty. Not only does it obliterate the noble ideal 
that our highest public officer should set high moral standards for our 
Nation, it says that the officer is free to commit felonies while doing 
it if the economy is good, if the crime is just about sex, or if, 
except for the crime, ``things are going pretty well right now,'' or 
simply that ``they can indict and try the President for the crime after 
leaving office in a couple of years.''
    I will not demean our Constitution or the office of the Presidency 
of the United States by endorsing the felony-plus standard.
              elements required for conviction of perjury
    Lying is a moral wrong. Perjury is a lie told under oath that is 
legally wrong. To be illegal, the lie must be willfully told, must be 
believed to be untrue, and must relate to a material matter. Title 18, 
Section 1621 and 1623, U.S. Code.
    If President Washington, as a child, had cut down a cherry tree and 
lied about it, he would be guilty of ``lying,'' but would not be guilty 
of ``perjury.''
    If, on the other hand, President Washington, as an adult, had been 
warned not to cut down a cherry tree, but he cut it down anyway, with 
the tree falling on a man and severely injuring or killing him, with 
President Washington stating later under oath that it was not he who 
cut down the tree, that would be ``perjury.'' Because it was a material 
fact in determining the circumstances of the man's injury or death.
    Some would argue that the President in the second example should 
not be impeached because the whole thing is about a cherry tree, and 
lies about cherry trees, even under oath, though despicable, do not 
rise to the level of impeachable offenses under the Constitution. I 
disagree.
    The perjury committed in the second example was an attempt to 
impede, frustrate, and obstruct the judicial system in determining how 
the man was injured or killed, when, and by whose hand, in order to 
escape personal responsibility under the law, either civil or criminal. 
Such would be an impeachable offense. To say otherwise would be to 
severely lower the moral and legal standards of accountability that are 
imposed on ordinary citizens every day. The same standard should be 
imposed on our leaders.
    Nearly every child in America believes that President Washington, 
as a child himself, did in fact cut down the cherry tree and admitted 
to his father that he did it, saying simply: ``I cannot tell a lie.''
    I will not compromise this simple but high moral principle in order 
to avoid serious consequences to a successor President who may choose 
to ignore it.
 elements required for conviction of witness tampering and obstruction 
                               of justice
    Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, 
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engage 
in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to--
          (i) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person 
        in an official proceeding;
          (ii) cause or induce any person to (A) withhold testimony or 
        evidence from an official proceeding, (B) alter or destroy 
        evidence in an official proceeding; (C) evade legal process 
        summoning that person as a witness or produce evidence in an 
        official proceeding to which the person has been summoned;
          (iii) harass another person and thereby hinder, delay, 
        prevent, or dissuade any person from attending or testifying in 
        an official proceeding; or
          (iv) corruptly influence, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to 
        influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of 
        justice;
is guilty of witness tampering and/or obstruction of justice. Title 18, 
Sections 1512 and 1503, U.S. Code.
    The elements of these crimes are evident from the laws themselves 
and do not need amplification here.
                my votes on the articles of impeachment
    Based upon my analysis of the facts of this case and my own 
conclusions of law, I have concluded:
    (i) The President of the United States willfully, and with intent 
to deceive, gave false and misleading testimony under oath with respect 
to material matters that were pending before the Federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998, as alleged in Article I presented to the Senate. I, 
therefore, vote ``Guilty'' on Article I of the Articles of Impeachment 
of the President in this Proceeding.
    (ii) The President of the United States engaged in a pattern of 
conduct, performed acts of willful deception, and told and disseminated 
massive falsehoods, including lies told directly to the American 
people, that were designed and corruptly calculated to impede, 
obstruct, and prevent the plaintiff in the Arkansas Federal sexual 
harassment case from seeking and obtaining justice in the Federal court 
system of the United States, and to further prevent the Federal grand 
jury from performing its functions and responsibilities under law, I, 
therefore, vote ``Guilty'' on Article II of the Articles of Impeachment 
of the President in this proceeding.
                article i, perjury--explanation of vote
    This Article accuses the President, while giving sworn testimony on 
August 17, 1998, before the Federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., of 
willfully corrupting and impeding the judicial process and the 
administration of justice by giving false and perjurious testimony 
about his relationship with the White House Intern, about his January 
17, 1998, deposition testimony in the Arkansas sexual harassment case, 
about his role in developing and tendering to the Federal Judge in the 
Arkansas case an affidavit that was knowingly false while giving his 
deposition in the Arkansas case, and about his attempts to influence 
the testimony of White House employees and other witnesses in the 
Arkansas case who were at the time also subject to the jurisdiction of 
the grand jury.
    In reaching my decision with respect to this Article, I have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the President gave false and 
misleading testimony in the Arkansas sexual harassment case and in his 
appearance before the Federal grand jury.
    At the trial in the Senate, the President's Counsel argued that, 
even if it were to be admitted that the testimony in both instances 
were false and misleading, the testimony would, nevertheless, not 
amount to perjury because it does not reach the level of 
``materiality'' that is required for a lie to rise to the level of a 
crime under Federal law.
    They attempt to trivialize the issues raised by Article I by 
reference to such questions as ``Who touched whom, and where,'' and to 
answers to questions by the President such as ``It depends on what the 
meaning of `is' is.''
    The false testimony complained of in Article I of the Articles of 
Impeachment relates to testimony before the grand jury, and only 
indirectly to the testimony in the Arkansas case. The Federal grand 
jury was investigating broad issues and many persons at the time the 
President gave false and misleading testimony before it.
    Willful, corrupt, and false sworn testimony before a Federal grand 
jury is a separate and distinct crime under applicable law and is 
material and perjurious if it is ``capable'' of influencing the grand 
jury in any matter before it, including any collateral matters that it 
may consider. See, Title 18, Section 1623, U.S. Code, and Federal court 
cases interpreting that Section.
    The President's testimony before the Federal grand jury was fully 
capable of influencing the grand jury's investigation and was clearly 
perjurious.
        article ii, obstruction of justice--explanation of vote
    When, on January 26, 1998, the President of the United States 
pointed his finger at the American people and represented to them that 
he was the victim of lies and not their perpetrator, he lied to 
America. The evidence is overwhelming that he did so because all of his 
``ducks were in a row.''
    The White House Intern had executed a false affidavit; subpoenaed 
gifts had been hidden; his own false deposition had been given; other 
witnesses had testified falsely based upon his own false 
representations to them; retribution against the White House Intern had 
been programmed should she abandon loyalty; and loyalty had been 
confirmed by the Intern's acceptance of a special new job in New York, 
that represented, according to a friend of the President, ``Mission 
accomplished.''
    Then came the dress, the tapes, and the Federal grand jury. The 
attempt to obstruct and cover-up grew, expanded, and developed a life 
of its own. It overpowered the underlying offense itself. A new 
strategy was required, fast: The President was advised: ``Admit the 
sex, but never the lies.'' Shift the blame; change the subject. Blame 
it on the plaintiff in the Arkansas case. Blame it on her lawyers. 
Blame it on the Independent Counsel. Blame it on partisanship. Blame it 
on the majority members of the House Judiciary Committee. Blame it on 
the process.
    The blame belongs to the President of the United States. This juror 
has concluded that the President is guilty of obstructing justice 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as alleged in Article II of the Articles of 
Impeachment in this proceeding.
                          concluding statement
    This has been a case about civil rights. It has been about the 
right of the weakest and the strongest among us to have equal access to 
our system of justice in order to pursue legal and Constitutional 
rights and to fix responsibility for alleged legal wrongs.
    During the last half of this passing century, we have managed to 
maintain the proposition established over 200 years ago that every 
American is entitled to equal justice under the law.
    In the middle of the century, our Country and our courts began to 
recognize the inherent evil of discrimination based on race and 
national origin. In the last two decades, we have begun to address 
issues of gender. We have enacted sexual harassment laws that have 
become the symbols of the high moral standards of our Country. They 
permit half of our citizens to work freely among us without fear of 
harm and sexual abuse.
    It has been said by many, in attempts to demean this proceeding, 
that this case is, simply, ``all about sex.'' In some ways, it is. It 
is about the right of an employed female American living in the State 
of Arkansas to hold a job without being forced to engage in it by the 
Governor of that State. That is not the question before us, and I 
express no opinion on that subject. But I do know that the President of 
the United States willfully and unlawfully obstructed her efforts in 
the Federal courts of our Land to pursue her cause. We are forced to 
leave it to history to determine whether her cause was factually just, 
and to define the message that the conduct of our Country's highest 
public officer sends into the next century.
    If only the President had followed the simple, high moral principle 
handed to us by our Nation's first leader as a child and had said early 
in this episode ``I cannot tell a lie,'' we would not be here today. We 
would not be sitting in judgment of a President. We would not be 
invoking those provisions of the Constitution that have only been 
applied once before in our Nation's history.
    But we should all be thankful that our Constitution is there, and 
we should take pride in our right and duty to enforce it. A hundred 
years from now, when history looks back to this moment, we can hope for 
a conclusion that our Constitution has been applied fairly and 
survives, that we have come to principled judgments about matters of 
national importance, and that the rule of law in American has been 
sustained.
                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Kent Conrad

    Mr. CONRAD. Mr. Chief Justice, I have served 12 years in 
the U.S. Senate.
    I respect this institution and all of you as colleagues. I 
especially respect the job our leaders have done in this trial. 
They have performed in the highest tradition of the U.S. 
Senate. Most of all, I respect our oath of office: to 
``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.'' I know all of us take that oath seriously.
    At the end of this proceeding, however, we may reach 
different conclusions about what the Constitution compels us to 
do. The simple truth is that this case is not black and white. 
As Mr. Manager Graham said, reasonable people may come to 
different conclusions.
    There is one thing on which we all agree: The President's 
conduct was wrong. In fact, it was very wrong. But the question 
before us is not whether the President's conduct was wrong. The 
question is whether that conduct meets the constitutional 
standard for removing a President from office.
    That requires us to make a profound judgment on whether we 
should overturn the results of a national election. Sixty-seven 
Members in this Chamber can nullify the votes of the 47 million 
Americans who voted for President Clinton. That is an awesome 
power. It must be used with great restraint.
    There are three questions we must answer in the affirmative 
to remove a President: First, did the President commit the 
crimes he is charged with? Second, are these crimes properly 
addressed by impeachment, or would they be better left to the 
criminal justice system? Third, do the charges rise to the 
level of high crimes and misdemeanors and justify the removal 
of the President of the United States?
    Let me start with the first question. The charges against 
the President are perjury and obstruction of justice.
    Five experienced Federal prosecutors representing both 
Republican and Democratic administrations concluded that no 
responsible Federal prosecutor would bring perjury charges 
based on the facts in this case.
    The President in his grand jury testimony acknowledged an 
intimate and inappropriate relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
The details of that relationship are in conflict. But I do not 
believe relatively minor differences in the details of that 
relationship would result in a perjury conviction.
    On the obstruction charges, again the Federal prosecutors 
told us they would not bring charges based on the facts in this 
case.
    Ms. Lewinsky has testified that no one ever asked her to 
lie or promised her a job for her silence. Ms. Lewinsky further 
testified she never discussed the contents of her testimony 
with the President, ever. Finally, she also testified that she 
believed she could file a truthful affidavit.
    There are two elements of the obstruction of justice 
charges that do trouble me. One is the transfer of gifts from 
Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie. That could constitute concealment 
of evidence. But Betty Currie has testified five times that Ms. 
Lewinsky called her to arrange for the transfer of gifts. And 
both the President and Betty Currie have denied that the 
President initiated the transfer.
    The second troubling charge is the questioning of Betty 
Currie by the President after his deposition in the Jones case. 
I find it hard to believe the President was just refreshing his 
memory when on two occasions he put the same set of questions 
to Ms. Currie. That could constitute witness tampering, but at 
the time of these conversations, Betty Currie was not a witness 
in any judicial proceeding. And she has testified that she did 
not feel pressured to agree with the President.
    Although I am not certain that there was no wrongdoing, I 
do conclude that the charges have not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
    That leads me to the second question: even if these charges 
were proven, is this a matter for impeachment, or should it be 
left to the ordinary course of judicial proceeding?
    For me, it is a question best answered by the rule of law 
that governs us all: the Constitution of the United States.
    James Madison kept a journal of the Constitutional 
Convention. In it, he said many of the Founders opposed 
impeachment altogether. Others believed impeachment was needed 
to protect against treason, bribery, or other ``attempts to 
subvert the Constitution.'' So a carefully crafted, very narrow 
compromise was adopted.
    Article II, section 4 originally read: ``The President . . 
. shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and 
conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors against the United States.''
    James Wilson, a 19th century constitutional scholar has 
written that impeachment was designed for ``great and publick 
[sic] offences by which the Commonwealth was brought into 
danger.''
    These charges against the President just do not measure up 
to that standard. Hiding presents under a bed, asking a 
secretary leading questions, these can hardly be the great and 
public offenses that our Founding Fathers had in mind. These 
charges, and the facts behind them, simply do not bring our 
Commonwealth into danger.
    So is the President above the law? Most emphatically, no.
    William Rawle, a contemporary of the Founders and a 
distinguished commentator on the Constitution wrote: ``In 
general, those offenses which may be committed equally by a 
private person as a public officer, are not the subject of 
impeachment . . . [A]ll offenses not immediately connected with 
office, except the two expressly mentioned, are left to the 
ordinary course of judicial proceeding.''
    I do not argue that no private wrongs can rise to the level 
of impeachable offense, but they must be heinous crimes.
    Article I, section 3, of the Constitution says: ``Judgment 
in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office . . . but the party convicted shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, trial, 
judgment and punishment according to law.''
    The President is not above the law. He can be prosecuted, 
indicted, convicted, and sentenced for alleged wrongful acts, 
just like any other American.
    We have our Founding Fathers' own words, distinguishing 
between public crimes and those that involve the President's 
conduct as a private individual. We have their deeds to guide 
us as well. When Vice President Aaron Burr killed Alexander 
Hamilton in a duel and was indicted for murder, impeachment was 
not even considered.
    Almost 200 years later, the House Judiciary Committee 
dismissed a tax evasion charge against President Nixon when an 
overwhelming majority of the committee concluded, in the words 
of Congressman Ray Thornton, ``These charges may be reached in 
due course in the regular process of law.''
    In the case before us today, the underlying offense is that 
the President had an extramarital affair. He is alleged to have 
lied about that under oath, and to have obstructed justice. 
These are serious allegations, and we have considered them 
seriously.
    Offensive as they were, the President's actions have 
nothing to do with his official duties, nor do they constitute 
the most serious of private crimes. In my judgment, these are 
matters best left to the criminal justice system.
    That brings me to the third and final question: do the 
charges so fundamentally threaten our democratic system of 
government that they constitute high crimes and misdemeanors 
and justify removal of the President from office?
    Our Founding Fathers told us two things about impeachment. 
First, the matter at hand had better be a very significant 
crime--a ``high crime'' that threatens our fundamental 
freedoms. These alleged crimes do not meet that standard. 
Second, they told us that it better not be partisan. That is 
why they required a two-thirds vote in the Senate to remove a 
President.
    They feared the passions of what they called a ``faction.'' 
This is a classic case of just that. This proceeding was 
partisan in the House. It has become partisan here. I am not 
casting aspersions here. I am stating a fact.
    Impeachment will fail. And it should. It lacks the 
fundamental legitimacy only a bipartisan consensus can provide.
    My colleagues, the Republic still stands. Our safety as a 
Nation is not in jeopardy. Our Constitution has not been 
shaken.
    Voting to impeach the President under these circumstances 
would undermine the core principle that lies at the heart of 
our system of government: the separation of powers. Our 
Founding Fathers made it difficult to remove a sitting 
President by design. They were convinced of the wisdom of 
having three coequal branches of government. They did not want 
the President serving at the pleasure--or being removed at the 
displeasure--of the legislative branch.
    Our Founding Fathers were right. Removing a popularly 
elected President from office would have implications not only 
for this President, but for every President to follow, and 
ultimately for the very system of government we hold so dear. 
Thomas Jefferson once said, ``I know of no safe depository of 
the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves.''
    My colleagues, we are a democracy. In a government ``of the 
people, by the people, and for the people,'' we cannot ignore 
the will of the people. Removing the President under these 
circumstances would be the most fundamental violation of the 
rule of law. It would overturn the rule of the people as 
expressed in a free election. It would adopt minority rule, 
overturning the clear wishes of a majority of the American 
people.
    Our freedom and liberty are not threatened by the wrongful 
acts of this President. But our freedom and liberty might be 
threatened if a minority can overturn the will of the majority.
    There may yet come a time when we have no choice but to 
substitute our judgment for the will of the people. I pray I 
never see that time. I know it has not come in this case.
    My colleagues, I will vote against the articles of 
impeachment in the case of William Jefferson Clinton.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Tim Hutchinson

    Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, we are nearing one of 
the most important votes most of us will ever cast.
    As an Arkansan, the impeachment process has been long and 
difficult. President Clinton is a dominating political 
influence in Arkansas and still immensely popular in my home 
State, so I am acutely aware of the political implications of 
this vote for me.
    As an Arkansan, I share pride in one of our own having 
achieved so much and having attained the highest elective 
office in the land. Arkansas has produced more than its share 
of political leaders--the Joe T. Robinsons, the Hattie 
Caraways, the John McClellans, and the J.W. Fulbrights. But 
never before has an Arkansan reached the Presidency. I, with 
all of Arkansas, was proud. We knew William Jefferson Clinton's 
intellect, his grasp of policy issues. We knew his personality, 
his charisma. We had seen for years his remarkable political 
skills, his uncanny ability to connect with people. I believe I 
am like most Arkansans--deeply conflicted--pride mixed with 
embarrassment, and most of all pain.
    This trial is not about private conduct. It is not about 
the President's personal behavior. We are all sinners. We are 
all flawed human beings. The President's personal life is his 
personal life. It is his business, not mine. The facts that are 
relevant are those relating to law.
    This trial is not about process. It seems to me that 
throughout this long drama, many have sought to put Ken Starr 
on trial or the House managers on trial. Was Ken Starr on a 
vendetta or was he just doing an unpleasant job? Whichever, we 
have to deal with the facts and the evidence. Did the House 
managers, as we have heard from the President's counsel so 
often, ``want to win too much?'' Frankly, both sides wanted to 
win, both sides were fervent in their presentations, and I am 
glad we didn't hear half-hearted arguments. A vigorous 
prosecution and defense is the basis of a successful 
adversarial system. What we are doing is important. I am glad 
they believe in what they are doing, but in the end it is the 
facts, the evidence, with which we must grapple. The process 
with all its flaws is secondary. The reality is, we are faced 
with a body of evidence.
    This trial is not about punishment. It is not about getting 
our pound of flesh from the Democrats. It is not about getting 
our retribution on the President. It is not political 
vengeance. It is not about polls. If polls had prevailed, 
Andrew Johnson would have been removed, and that would have 
been wrong. To argue that a popular President should not be 
removed regardless of his actions, merely because he is 
popular, is to lower our constitutional Republic to a 
meaningless level.
    To say popularity should be a factor in our decision is to 
say that bad poll numbers and unpopularity is an argument for 
removal of a President. How contrary to our constitutional 
system. The popularity of this President should never have been 
mentioned, in my opinion. Nor should political consequences of 
our votes be the basis for our decision of whether to remove 
this President.
    What I had to weigh was the evidence. Voting to remove a 
President--the very thought sobers and humbles me. But the 
facts are so inescapable, the evidence so powerful.
    I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that when the 
President testified before the Federal grand jury and said that 
he had been truthful to his aides in what he had said about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--that he committed perjury and 
obstructed justice. When he told Sidney Blumenthal that Ms. 
Lewinsky was a stalker and he was a victim, he was not being 
truthful. He was trying to destroy her reputation and he would 
have, had it not been for the dress. He lied, and he lied about 
his lie to the grand jury.
    I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that when the 
President led Betty Currie through a false rendition of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that he was tampering with a 
witness and obstructing justice. He did this not once, but 
twice. His explanation that he was refreshing his memory 
offends all common sense. When he denied this coaching before 
the grand jury, he obstructed justice and committed perjury. Of 
course, there is much more to this case, but how much do we 
need?
    If this trial was only about one man's actions, it might be 
easier. But this trial is about so much more--the office of the 
Presidency, the precedent of lowering the bar on the importance 
of our Nation's rule of law. It is about the oath Bill Clinton 
took when he was sworn in as our President, to uphold our 
Nation's laws. And it is about the oath the President took when 
he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth before the grand jury. The sanctity of the oath is the 
basis of our judicial system. To lessen the significance of 
violating the oath is in fact an attack on our legal system and 
the rule of law.
    There are men and women across America who languish behind 
bars today because they committed the crime of perjury, lying 
under oath. How can we tell America that our President, the 
highest government official in the land, is treated 
differently?
    While I was growing up in Gravette, AR, life seemed much 
more simple than it is today. It was a simpler time. But then 
and now, the bedrock of our society is still truth and justice. 
This hasn't changed. On August 25, 1825, Daniel Webster said, 
``Whatever government is not a government of laws, is a 
despotism, let it be called what it may.''
    Today is a somber day for our country. This trial has been 
a sad chapter of American history, and I have a heavy heart. As 
difficult as these votes will be, I know that I could not serve 
the people of Arkansas with a clear conscience unless I do what 
I believe is right and uphold the law. I will vote guilty on 
both articles of impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Patty Murray

    Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. Chief Justice, this past year certainly 
has been a difficult time for America. I have to say, as a 
citizen, as a woman, and as a parent, I cannot begin to 
describe how deeply disappointed and angry I am with the 
President.
    I came to Washington, DC, in 1992. Over the last 6 years I 
have worked with Bill Clinton. I trusted him. I thought I knew 
him. I refused to believe he would demean the Presidency in the 
way that he has. His behavior was appalling and has hurt us 
all.
    As a Senator, I have an obligation under the Constitution 
that transcends any sense of personal betrayal I might have. I 
am sworn to render my judgment based on the evidence presented 
and the larger question of what the framers of the Constitution 
meant when they wrote the impeachment clause.
    I have listened carefully throughout this debate. I have 
read and listened to every available article and argument. Like 
all of you, I have spent more hours on this case than I ever 
wanted to and have felt the tremendous weight of this decision.
    I believe that perjury and obstruction of justice can be 
considered high crimes. The question is whether the facts in 
this case support the allegations that the President committed 
these crimes.
    The Republican House managers presented a theory. But after 
listening carefully to both sides and, most importantly, 
reviewing the words of the witnesses themselves, they did not 
prove their theory of perjury and obstruction of justice beyond 
a reasonable doubt to me. If we are to remove a President for 
the first time in our Nation's history, none of us should have 
any doubts.
    We must also ask ourselves how it would affect the country 
to remove this President after such a partisan process. A 
conversation I had with a constituent not long ago really 
struck a chord with me. He said to me:

    I am old enough to remember President Nixon's resignation. I know 
how deeply it affected the psyche of an entire generation. I know it 
made many of us cynical of politics for a long, long time. Please don't 
put us all through that turmoil again. This country would be punished 
and hurt by a Presidential removal. This country doesn't deserve to be 
punished for this President's behavior.

    So despite my personal disgust with the President's 
actions, I intend to vote ``not guilty'' on both articles of 
impeachment.
    Our founders were wise. They knew the President would be 
imperfect. They knew he would stumble and fall. While it would 
be wrong to suggest they approved of such behavior, they were 
not interested in the individual and his flaws. They sought to 
protect the Nation.
    They set a very high standard for the legislative body to 
meet before overturning the results of an election--the very 
basis of our democracy. They declared it would only be for the 
crimes most threatening to our Nation. They did not establish 
the impeachment process to punish a wrongdoer; they established 
it to protect America.
    This President's behavior was reprehensible, but it does 
not threaten our Nation. In the past year, despite the scandal 
that ran on the front page nearly every day, our country has 
prospered. Our economy is growing. Our waters and air are 
cleaner. Our communities are safer. Our education system is 
stronger. America is not poised on the brink of disaster. Our 
democracy is safe.
    But what of our legacy in this process? What will I tell my 
daughter, or tell a classroom of young students? Well, it 
doesn't take a lawyer or a constitutional scholar to tell them 
that no matter how difficult it is, tell the truth. The lie 
will hurt you much, much more. It can consume you, your 
friends, your family, your nation. It can destroy those you 
love and diminish you forever in their eyes.
    This President now knows that. His legacy will be tainted 
with the anguish he inflicted on the people and country he 
loves because of his selfish and disgraceful behavior. It is a 
weight that he alone will bear for the rest of his life.
    We have heard a lot of emotions and strong feelings on this 
floor from both sides. I respect the deep convictions of 
everyone in this room. I am saddened it has appeared partisan. 
But it is my hope that we can now turn the page on this sad 
part of America's history and put an end to the recriminations.
    Mr. Chief Justice, a point of personal privilege.
    It is hard to stand before you without Scott Bates behind 
me. I knew him as all of you did as a loyal, excellent Senate 
employee. But I also knew him as a dad. We stood together as 
parents on a soccer field cheering on our daughters in victory 
and hugging them in defeat. He will be missed, but his absence 
should serve as a reminder that although we have been totally 
engrossed in this issue for far too long, there is life outside 
of these doors. There are friends to be hugged, kids to be 
educated, parents to take care of.
    I hope when this day is over, we will set aside our 
differences and remember there are a lot more important things 
each of us needs to be concentrating on, both professionally 
and personally. It is time to move on.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator John McCain

    Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I intend to vote to convict 
the President of the United States on both articles of 
impeachment. To say I do so with regret will sound trite to 
some, but I mean it sincerely. I deeply regret that this day 
has come to pass.
    I bear no animosity for the President. I take no partisan 
satisfaction from this matter. I don't lightly dismiss the 
public's clear opposition to conviction. And I am genuinely 
concerned that the institution of the Presidency not be harmed, 
either by the President's conduct, or by Congress' reaction to 
his conduct.
    Indeed, I take no satisfaction at all from this vote, with 
one exception--and an important exception it is--that by voting 
to convict I have been spared reproach by my conscience for 
shirking my duty.
    The Senate faces an awful choice, to be sure. But, to my 
mind, it is a clear choice. I am persuaded that the President 
has violated his oath of office by committing perjury and by 
obstructing justice, and that by so doing he has forfeited his 
office.
    As my colleagues across the aisle have so often reminded 
me, the country does not want the President removed. And, they 
ask, are we not, first and foremost, servants of the public 
will? Even if we believe the President to be guilty of the 
offenses charged, and even if we believe those offenses rise to 
the level of impeachment, should we risk the national trauma of 
forcing his removal against the clearly expressed desire of the 
vast majority of Americans that he should not be removed even 
if he is guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice?
    I considered that question very carefully, and I arrived at 
an answer by reversing the proposition. If a clear majority of 
the American people were to demand the conviction of the 
President, should I vote for his conviction even if I believed 
the President to be innocent of the offenses he is charged 
with? Of course not. Neither, then, should I let public opinion 
restrain me from voting to convict if I determine the President 
is guilty.
    But are these articles of impeachment of sufficient gravity 
to warrant removal, or can we seek their redress by some other 
means short of removing the President from office? Some of 
those who argue for a lesser sanction, including the 
President's able counsel, contend that irrespective of the 
President's guilt or innocence, neither of the articles charge 
him with high crimes and misdemeanors. Nothing less than an 
assault on the integrity of our constitutional government rises 
to that level. The President's offenses were committed to cover 
up private not public misconduct. Therefore, if he thwarted 
justice he did so for the perfectly understandable and 
forgivable purpose of keeping hidden an embarrassing personal 
shortcoming that, were it discovered, would harm only his 
family and his reputation, but would not impair our system of 
government.
    This, too, is an appealing rationalization for acquittal. 
But it is just that, a rationalization. Nowhere in the 
Constitution or in the expressed views of our founders are 
crimes intended to conceal the President's character flaws 
distinguished from crimes intended to subvert democracy. The 
President thwarted justice. No matter how unfair he or we may 
view a process that forces a President to disclose his own 
failings, we should not excuse or fail to punish in the 
constitutionally prescribed manner evidence that the President 
has deliberately thwarted the course of justice.
    I do not desire to sit in judgment of the President's 
private misconduct. It is truly a matter for him and his family 
to resolve. I sincerely wish circumstances had allowed the 
President to keep his personal life private. I have done things 
in my private life that I am not proud of. I suspect many of us 
have. But we are not asked to judge the President's character 
flaws. We are asked to judge whether the President, who swore 
an oath to faithfully execute his office, deliberately 
subverted--for whatever purpose--the rule of law.
    All of my life, I have been instructed never to swear an 
oath to my country in vain. In my former profession, those who 
violated their sworn oath were punished severely and considered 
outcasts from our society. I do not hold the President to the 
same standard that I hold military officers. I hold him to a 
higher standard. Although I may admit to failures in my private 
life, I have at all times, and to the best of my ability, kept 
faith with every oath I have ever sworn to this country. I have 
known some men who kept that faith at the cost of their lives.
    I cannot--not in deference to public opinion, or for 
political considerations, or for the sake of comity and 
friendship--I cannot agree to expect less from the President.
    Most officers of my acquaintance would have resigned their 
commission had they been discovered violating their oath. The 
President did not choose that course of action. He has left it 
to the Senate to determine his fate. And the Senate, as we all 
know, is going to acquit the President. As much as I would like 
to, I cannot join in his acquittal.
    The House managers have made, and I believe some of my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle would agree, a 
persuasive case that the President is guilty of perjury and 
obstruction. The circumstances that led to these offenses may 
be tawdry, trivial to some, and usually of a very private 
nature. But the President broke the law. Not a tawdry law, not 
a trivial law, not a private law.
    The tortured explanations with which the President's 
attorneys have tried to defend him against both articles fail 
to raise reasonable doubts about his guilt. It seems clear to 
me, and to most Americans, that the President deliberately lied 
under oath, and that he tried to encourage others to lie under 
oath on his behalf. Presidents may not be excused from such an 
abuse no matter how intrusive, how unfair, how distasteful are 
the judicial proceedings they attempt to subvert.
    The President's defenders want to know how can I be certain 
that the offenses, even if true, warrant removal from office. 
They are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution as 
impeachable offenses. Nor did the founders identify perjury or 
obstruction as high crimes or high misdemeanors. Were an 
ordinary citizen accused of perjury in a civil proceeding, he 
or she would in all likelihood not be prosecuted or forced out 
of political necessity into a perjury trap.
    No, an ordinary citizen would not be treated as the 
President has been treated. But ordinary citizens don't enforce 
the laws for the rest of us. Ordinary citizens don't have the 
world's mightiest armed forces at their command. Ordinary 
citizens do not usually have the opportunity to be figures of 
historical importance.
    Presidents are not ordinary citizens. They are 
extraordinary, in that they are vested with so much more 
authority and power than the rest of us. We have a right; 
indeed, we have an obligation, to hold them strictly 
accountable to the rule of law.
    Are perjury and obstruction of justice expressly listed as 
high crimes and misdemeanors? No. Why? Because they are self-
evidently so just as the President is self-evidently the 
Nation's chief law enforcement officer, despite his attorneys' 
quibbling to the contrary. It is self-evident to us all, I 
hope, that we cannot overlook, dismiss or diminish the 
obstruction of justice by the very person we charge with taking 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. It is self-evident 
to me. And accordingly, regretfully, I must vote to convict the 
President, and urge my colleagues to do the same.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Tim Johnson

    Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chief Justice, the great question now 
before the Senate is not whether the rule of law will prevail--
it surely will--both by the actions of this body and by 
possible proceedings within the judicial system.
    The question before the Senate is whether we should take 
action against the President beyond that allowed for in our 
Nation's courts. We are, I believe, confronted by two threshold 
questions which must first be resolved before consideration can 
or need be given to weighing the evidence presented by the 
House managers. First, is whether the articles of impeachment 
have been adequately drawn to allow the accused to know with 
precision the wrongdoing to which he is accused, and to require 
that a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate be secured upon a 
single act of wrongdoing in order to convict. As a second 
threshold matter, if the articles are at least adequately 
drawn, do they, if true, allege wrongdoing of sufficient import 
to justify for the very first time in our Nation's long 
history, the overturning of the people's will as expressed in a 
free, fair, and democratic national election? I am troubled by 
the adequacy of the articles, but even accepting them, the 
second threshold question of impeachability is simply not met.
    Only if these threshold questions are adequately met in the 
mind of an individual Senator, can that Senator proceed to 
determine whether the weight of the evidence is sufficient to 
convict. And even if both threshold questions are ignored, it 
is impossible for me to say that the circumstantial evidence 
presented reaches a ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard on 
either article. Reasonable doubt means that if there are 
multiple reasonable theories as to what occurred--if one of the 
reasonable theories is consistent with innocence, then an 
acquittal must follow. Especially relative to article two--I 
can understand the belief of some that a plausible scenario of 
obstruction was established. Some may even believe that the 
President was more likely than not obstructing justice. But the 
evidence is clearly not so powerful as to lead anyone to 
believe that no reasonable and innocent scenario remains.
    I am both profoundly honored and humbled to have this 
historic responsibility to participate with my Senate 
colleagues, Republican and Democrat, in perhaps the most grave 
proceeding envisioned by the authors of our national 
Constitution. I have listened carefully to both sides of this 
dispute, and I have also carefully reviewed the thoughts of 
many of our Nation's leading scholars of history and 
constitutional law. It is clear to me that the results of this 
trial have ramifications which go far beyond the fortunes of 
William Jefferson Clinton.
    The decision made by the Senate this week will have an 
utterly profound impact on the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches of our government for the 
rest of time. Accordingly, it is essential that the decisions 
made in this proceeding not be driven by transitory passions of 
partisan politics but rather with an eye toward the long-term 
stability and integrity of our democracy.
    My humble reading of history leads me to believe that the 
never-failing bipartisan honoring of national Presidential 
elections over these past two centuries has been one of the 
greatest sources of our national success. While holding a 
President accountable to all the same civil and criminal laws 
that apply to the general citizenry is absolutely essential, 
the writers of our Constitution properly intended for the 
reversal of fair elections at the hands of Congress to be 
exceedingly rare and difficult.
    The learned opinions of our Nation's leading scholars 
overwhelmingly support the understanding that Presidents should 
not be removed from office by Congress short of some horrific 
personal misconduct or misconduct which arises from executive 
authority and threatens the Nation--such as treason or bribery. 
By requiring a two-thirds vote for the overturning of 
Presidential elections, the founders of our Nation also made it 
crystal clear that such an extraordinary step should not and 
cannot be taken unless there is an overwhelming bipartisan 
outcry against the President's actions.
    The American public and most Members of Congress, including 
myself, have criticized President Clinton's personal conduct in 
harsh terms. But the American public also seems to understand 
that at stake is not simply Bill Clinton's future, but the 
integrity of our election system and the long-term freedom of 
the executive branch from partisan congressional attack--this 
understanding about the need for stability, for 
proportionality, for continuity, is a natural and a deeply 
conservative inclination on the part of our citizenry.
    The writers of our Constitution wanted some degree of 
proportionality between a President's conduct and the penalties 
applied--otherwise they would have made impeachment applicable 
to all crimes and misdemeanors. It is certainly conceivable 
that the will of the people expressed in an election may 
someday be rightly overturned by Congress. But it is also 
certain to me that while this President's personal conduct, 
involving immaterial testimony to a lawsuit dismissed by a 
Federal court as having no merit, is deserving of public 
condemnation, and even possible prosecution within the judicial 
system, it simply does not rise to the level of extraordinary 
danger to the Nation that justifies removal from office.
    Some will no doubt say that I have set a high standard for 
overturning Presidential elections. I would very much agree. 
Particularly as a recently former member of the House of 
Representatives, I have witnessed firsthand the depth and the 
intensity of partisan anger that can occur from time to time in 
Congress and among portions of the national public. It is a 
reaction to that open partisanship demonstrated by the House 
and the independent counsel that surely is at the foundation of 
the American public's overwhelming contempt for this proceeding 
and the view that this process is politics as usual, an 
exercise in raw political power and beneath what should be the 
dignity of Congress.
    I have no certain solutions for that sad and angry state of 
affairs, other than to attempt to conduct my own political life 
in as thoughtful and moderate a manner as I am capable, but I 
believe the Constitution provided our Nation with a strong 
bulwark against negative and hateful partisanship by creating 
an executive branch which is largely shielded from 
congressional partisanship and which is instead disciplined by 
law and by the electoral will of the people.
    I greatly fear that any lesser standard would result, even 
without an independent counsel law, in a situation whereby 
civil actions against standing Presidents will be routinely 
brought as yet another destructive partisan political tactic. 
These multiple and nefarious actions will then be followed by 
never-ending legal discovery proceedings, and they in turn 
followed by impeachment articles or the threat of impeachment 
each time the House is controlled by a different political 
party than the Presidency. I fear the wrong decision here will 
lead our Nation into an ever downward spiral where impeachment 
proceedings will be routine.
    It is critically important, in my view, for this U.S. 
Senate to say, ``Stop! Enough!'' We must send an unmistakable 
message to the House, the Nation and the world, that we will 
not permit the stability and independence of the executive 
branch of our government to be jeopardized by anything less 
than heinous crimes or gross threats to the Nation.
    This leaves, of course, other avenues for Congress and the 
public to express great displeasure with the President's 
dishonorable conduct. If illegal activity did in fact take 
place, that activity would be subject to discipline in the 
courts. While there are divided opinions on its wisdom, it is 
possible that some sort of collective censure may be agreed 
upon by the Senate, and certainly individual Senators are free 
to place their condemnations of the President's personal 
behavior in the Congressional Record. The House impeachment of 
the President, the public humiliation of Bill Clinton and his 
family, as well as the great private fortune this dispute will 
have consumed will also serve as punishment enough. But I think 
it is also important for this Senate to understand that the 
writers of our Constitution did not create an impeachment 
process as one more form of punishment, but exclusively to 
protect the viability of our Nation.
    Given my sacred oaths as a U.S. Senator and as a 
participant in this impeachment trial, and given my abiding 
commitment to the Constitution and the well-being of our 
Nation, I have no choice but to vote against both articles of 
impeachment. I do not know nor do I care what the political 
consequences might be of the decision I make here--I am a 
Democrat elected six consecutive times State-wide from my 
largely Republican State, and I have long been proud of the 
bipartisan support extended to me by the good people of South 
Dakota. In turn, I have long recognized that neither political 
party has a monopoly on good ideas or bad, good people or bad. 
But I know this--the issue before me is too grave for politics. 
At the end of the day, when my service in this body is done, I 
want my children, my family and myself to view my decisions 
here as honorable, as an exercise in responsible judgment, and 
in a small way, as efforts that strengthened the bulwark of 
democracy that our Constitution represents.
    The President dishonorably lied to the American people, 
however, the two articles before the Senate fail, first because 
they do not allege offenses that give rise to removal from 
office, and secondly, because it cannot be said that the 
evidence proves guilt of perjury or obstruction of justice 
beyond all reasonable doubt, to such a degree that no innocent 
and reasonable explanation exists.
    I will vote not guilty on both article I and article II.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar

    Mr. LUGAR. Mr. Chief Justice, for the first time in 120 
years, and only for the second time in U.S. history, the Senate 
is about to conclude a Presidential impeachment trial. Our 
Founding Fathers viewed the power to remove a President as a 
necessary constitutional safeguard, but they wanted to make 
certain that the process was sufficiently difficult that the 
will of the voters would be overturned only for the gravest of 
reasons. They wrote the words ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
as a threshold, but left it to us to determine what 
transgressions met this standard. All of us have endeavored to 
fulfill this enormous responsibility.
    From the beginning of the consideration of impeachment last 
year, many Members of Congress in both parties have made public 
statements expressing their opinions that the President lied to 
a Federal grand jury and that he obstructed justice on numerous 
occasions. These judgments are apparently shared by large 
majorities of the American people as illustrated in frequent 
public opinion polls. The same polls have consistently found 
that a large majority of Americans do not want the President to 
suffer the constitutional consequence of these breaches of law, 
namely, removal from office.
    Since the House voted for impeachment, almost all 45 
Democrats and some Republicans in the Senate have voiced their 
skepticism about voting to remove President Clinton from 
office. Early in the trial, 44 Democrats voted to dismiss the 
impeachment proceedings outright. Thus, a two-thirds majority 
vote needed for a guilty verdict has never been a likely 
outcome of the trial.
    In the background, most Senate Democrats and several 
Republicans have worked on a motion to censure President 
Clinton. Our distinguished colleague, Senator Feinstein, 
drafted a censure resolution that attracted substantial 
bipartisan support and was published in the New York Times of 
February 6, 1999. It stated:

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee in 
the White House, which was shameless, reckless and indefensible;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
deliberately misled and deceived the American people and officials in 
all branches of the United States Government;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
gave false or misleading testimony and impeded discovery of evidence in 
judicial proceedings;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter is 
unacceptable for a President of the United States, does demean the 
Office of the President as well as the President himself, and creates 
disrespect for the laws of the land;
    Whereas President Clinton fully deserves censure for engaging in 
such behavior;
    Whereas future generations of Americans must know that such 
behavior is not only unacceptable but also bears grave consequences, 
including loss of integrity, trust and respect;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and 
civil actions;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter has 
brought shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the 
President; and
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, through his conduct in this 
matter, has violated the trust of the American people: Now, therefore, 
be it
    Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and condemns his 
conduct in the strongest terms.

    Citizens might ask how a Senator could vote for a 
resolution stating that President Clinton ``deliberately misled 
and deceived the American people and officials in all branches 
of the United States Government'' and ``gave false or 
misleading testimony and impeded discovery of evidence in 
judicial proceedings'' and yet fail to vote ``guilty'' on 
articles of impeachment that specifically mention perjury and 
obstruction of justice. The answer to that question is at the 
heart of understanding the Senate trial.
    With few exceptions, Senators recognize that the 
Constitution gives only one outcome to a verdict of ``guilty,'' 
namely, removal from office. At the same time, many Senators 
are shocked by conduct which they call ``shameless, reckless, 
and indefensible,'' and they want their constituents to know 
that they have not been fooled or overwhelmed by Presidential 
charm. They have taken the initiative to explicitly denounce 
the bizarre conduct and the extraordinary corruption of this 
President. Members of both parties have deplored the fact that 
the President conducted an illicit sustained physical sexual 
relationship in spaces close to the Oval Office and publicly 
denied this to his family, his staff, and in televised 
statements to the world only to see all of the elaborate cover-
up collapse after DNA tests on the dress of a young woman, but 
the impeachment trial of President Clinton is not about 
adultery. The impeachment trial involves the President's 
illegal efforts to deny a fair result in the suit brought by 
Ms. Paula Jones. I have no doubt that the President worked 
deliberately to deny justice in this suit. In doing so, he lied 
to a Federal grand jury and worked to induce others to give 
false testimony, thus obstructing justice.
    Ms. Jones has often been described as a small person in our 
judicial system. In contrast, the President, who at the time of 
his inaugural takes a solemn oath to preserve and protect equal 
justice under the law for even the most humble of Americans, is 
a giant figure. As Senators who also take a solemn oath, we 
must ask ourselves the fundamental question: ``Is any man or 
woman above the law?''
    The legal defense team for the President does not admit 
that there is adequate proof of either perjury or obstruction 
of justice. They contend that Senators must embrace a theory of 
``immaculate obstruction'' in which jobs are found, gifts are 
concealed, false affidavits are filed, and the character of a 
witness is publicly impugned, all without the knowledge or 
direction of the President, who is the sole beneficiary of 
these actions. The President's lawyers further contend that 
such crimes are, in any event, insufficient to remove the 
President. The drafters of the Constitution would have rejected 
these rationalizations for the indefensible Presidential 
misconduct at issue. They were political men with a profound 
reverence for the sanctity of the oath and our entire system of 
justice. They did not suggest that Senators park their common 
sense and their stewardship for the security of our country at 
the Senate door as they entered into an impeachment trial.
    In fact, we have discovered in this trial that the Founding 
Fathers wanted the Senate to act as ``triers'' of fact and in 
the roles of both trial court and jury. Most importantly, they 
wanted us to act as guardians of the Constitution and thus the 
liberty and the rights under law of each individual American. 
Liberty itself is directly threatened when a President subverts 
the very judicial system that secures those rights.
    During this trial, I have concluded that the prosecutors 
made their case. I will vote to remove President Clinton from 
office not only because he is guilty of both articles of 
impeachment, but also because I believe the crimes committed 
here demonstrate that he is capable of lying routinely whenever 
it is convenient. He is not trustworthy. Simply to be near him 
in the White House has meant not only tragic heartache for his 
wife and his daughter but enormous legal bills for staff 
members and friends who admired him and yearned for his success 
but who have been caught up in his incessant ``war room'' 
strategies to maintain him in office. Senator Feinstein begins 
her censure resolution with the appropriate word ``shameless.'' 
The President should have simply resigned and spared his 
country the ordeal of this impeachment trial and its aftermath.
    We have been fortunate that this damaged Presidency has 
occurred during a time of relative peace and prosperity. In 
times of war or national emergency, it is often necessary for 
the President to call upon the Nation to make great economic 
and personal sacrifices. In these occasions, our President had 
best be trustworthy--a truth teller whose life of principled 
leadership and integrity we can count upon. Some commentators 
have suggested that with the President having less than 2 years 
left in his term of office, the easiest approach is to let the 
clock expire while hoping that he is sufficiently careful, if 
not contrite, to avoid reckless and indefensible conduct. But 
as Senators, we know that the dangers of the world constantly 
threaten us. Rarely do 2 years pass without the need for strong 
Presidential leadership and the exercise of substantial moral 
authority from the White House.
    Of particular concern are the implications of the 
President's behavior for our national security. As Commander in 
Chief, President Clinton fully understood the risks that he was 
imposing on the country's security with his secret affair in 
the White House. Even in this post-cold war era, foreign 
intelligence agents constantly look for opportunities for 
deception, propaganda, and blackmail. No higher targets exist 
than the President and the White House. The President even 
acknowledged in a phone call with Ms. Lewinsky that foreign 
agents could be monitoring their conversations. Yet this 
knowledge did not dissuade the President from continuing his 
affair. With premeditation, he chose his own gratification 
above the security of his country and the success of his 
Presidency. Then he chose to compound the damage by 
systematically lying about it over the span of many months.
    I believe that our country will be stronger and better 
prepared to meet our challenges with a cleansing of the 
Presidency. The President of the United States is the most 
powerful person in the world because we are the strongest 
country economically and militarily, and in the appeal of our 
idealism for liberty and freedom of conscience. Our President 
must be strong because a President personifies the rule of law 
that he is sworn to uphold and protect. We must believe him and 
trust him if we are to follow him. His influence on domestic 
and foreign policies comes from that trust, which a lifetime of 
words, deeds, and achievements has built.
    President Clinton has betrayed that trust. His leadership 
has been diminished because most Americans have come to the 
cynical conclusion that they must read between the lines of his 
statements and try to catch a glimmer of truth amidst the spin. 
His subordinates have demeaned public life by contending that 
``everybody does it'' as a defense of why the President has 
erred so grievously. But every President does not lie to a 
Federal grand jury. Every President does not obstruct justice. 
The last President to do so was President Nixon, and he had 
sufficient reverence for the office to resign before the House 
even voted articles of impeachment.
    The impeachment trial must come to an end. The Presidency 
will be strengthened and our ability as Americans to meet 
important challenges will be strengthened if we begin to 
restore our faith in the truth and justice that our government 
must exemplify and preserve. It will not be enough simply to 
condemn the tragic misdeeds of President Clinton. He must be 
removed from office as the Constitution prescribes, and we must 
celebrate the strength of that same Constitution which also 
provides a path for a new beginning.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

    Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Chief Justice, let me begin by stating what 
I believe the American people view as the obvious. There are no 
good guys in this sordid affair. Rightly or wrongly, the public 
has concluded that the President is an adulterer and liar; that 
Ken Starr has abused his authority by unfair tactics born out 
of vindictiveness; that the House managers have acted in a 
narrowly partisan way and are now desperately attempting to 
justify their actions for their own political reputation. 
Finally, they have concluded that Monica Lewinsky was both used 
and a user, while Linda Tripp, Lucianne Goldberg, Paula Jones 
and her official and unofficial legal team are part of a larger 
political plot to ``get the President.''
    All of that is beyond our ability to effect. Our job is not 
to dissect the motives or even the tactics of Ken Starr, the 
trial lawyers, Linda Tripp, and others. Our only job is to 
determine whether the President of the United States by his 
conduct committed the specific acts alleged in the two articles 
of impeachment. Not generally, but specifically: Did he do what 
is alleged? And if he did, do these actions rise to the level 
of high crimes and misdemeanors necessary to justify the most 
obviously antidemocratic act the Senate can engage in--
overturning an election by convicting the President?
    It is very important--both for history's sake and for 
fairness' sake--that we keep our eye on the ball. When I tried 
cases, I learned from a man named Sid Balick--he used to say at 
the outset to the jury:

    Keep your eye on the ball. The issue is not whether my client is a 
man you would want your daughter to date--a man you would invite home 
to dinner. The issue is did my client kill Cock Robbin--period.

    If we listen to the oft-times confusing presentation of the 
House managers, they would have us think that it is sufficient 
for us to conclude that we would not trust him with our 
daughters and not invite him home for dinner in order to 
convict.
    Much more is required. The House set the standard we must 
repair to in the articles--did he commit a criminal offense? 
That is what they allege; that is what they must prove.
    The managers keep saying that this case is about what 
standards we want our President to meet. We hear Flanders 
Fields intoned--the honor of our most decorated heroes. How 
incredibly self-serving and autocratic such a plea is.
    The American people are fully capable--without our guidance 
or advice--to determine what standards they want our President 
to meet. That is an appropriate question to ask ourselves when 
we enter the voting booth to vote--it is not when we rise on 
this floor to vote.
    Spare me from those who would tell the American people what 
standard they must apply when voting for President. Ours is an 
impeachment standard and our oath to do justice under that 
standard.
    Impeachment is about what standard to use in deciding 
whether or not to remove a President duly elected by the 
people.
    These are two very different questions and we must not, we 
cannot, get them confused. You and I and the American people 
can apply any standard we want our President to meet when we go 
to the polls on election day.
    Only the Constitution can supply the standards to use in 
deciding whether or not to remove the President--and--in my 
view, this case does not meet that standard, for two reasons.
    First, the facts do not sustain the House managers' case. 
According to the House's own theory, we must find that the 
President has violated Federal criminal statutes--not just that 
he did bad things. In all good conscience, I just cannot 
believe that any jury would convict the President of any of the 
criminal charges on these facts. I also believe that it is our 
constitutional duty to give the President the benefit of the 
doubt on the facts. To me, the allegations that the President 
violated title 18 were left in a shambles on this floor.
    I do not have time to dwell on the facts. So let me turn to 
the second reason: the President's actions do not rise to the 
level required by the Constitution for the removal of a sitting 
President.
    We have heard it argued repeatedly that the Constitution 
does not create different standards for judges and the 
President. But that argument fails to comprehend the organizing 
principle of our constitutional system--the separation of 
powers. The framers divided the power of the Federal Government 
into three branches in order to safeguard liberty. This 
innovation--the envy of every Nation on earth--can only serve 
its fundamental purpose if each branch remains strong and 
independent of the others.
    We needed a President who was independent enough to 
spearhead and sign the Civil Rights Act. We needed a President 
who was independent enough to lead the Nation and the world in 
the Persian gulf war. We still need an independent President.
    The constitutional scholarship overwhelmingly recognizes 
that the fundamental structural commitment to separation of 
powers requires us to view the President as different than a 
Federal judge. Consider our power to discipline and even expel 
an individual Senator. In such a case, we do not remove the 
head of a separate branch and so do not threaten the 
constitutional balance of powers. To remove a President is to 
decapitate another branch and to undermine the independence 
necessary for it to fulfill its constitutional role.
    Only a President is chosen by the people in a national 
election. No Senator, no Representative can make this claim. To 
remove a duly elected President clashes with democratic 
principles in a way that simply has no constitutional parallel. 
By contrast, there is nothing antidemocratic in the Senate 
removing a judge who was appointed and not elected by the 
people.
    Another contention we continue to hear is that the framers 
clearly thought that obstruction of justice of any kind by a 
President was a high crime and misdemeanor. For this they cite 
the colloquy between Colonel George Mason and James Madison, 
who argued that a President who abused his pardon power could 
be impeached. That colloquy illustrates that it is not any 
obstruction that would satisfy the Constitution--rather, that 
the framers were immediately concerned about abuses of official 
power, such as the pardon power.
    The House managers have relied repeatedly on Alexander 
Hamilton's explanation of impeachment found in Federalist No. 
65. But careful reading demonstrates that these articles of 
impeachment are a constitutionally insufficient ground for 
removing the President from office. Federalist No. 65 states:

    The subjects of [the impeachment court's] jurisdiction are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as 
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.

    Hamilton had the word ``political'' typed in all capital 
letters to emphasize that this is the central, defining element 
of any impeachable offense. Having emphasized its meaning, he 
did not leave its definition to chance. While all crimes by 
definition harm society, impeachable offenses involve a 
specific category of offenses. Using Hamilton's terms, these 
are offenses committed when ``public men'' who ``violat[e] some 
public trust'' cause ``injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' The public trust that resides in, to use Hamilton's 
hoary phrase, ``public men'' is what we would call today 
official power.
    What other construction can be given these words? Hamilton 
did not define an impeachable offense to be any offense 
committed by public men. He did not define an impeachable 
offense to be any reprehensible act committed by a bad man. 
Only those acts that abuse public office and so harm the public 
directly and politically are impeachable.
    While I would like to take credit for this insight into 
Hamilton's meaning, I actually stand in a line of 
interpretation that stretches back to the founding era. William 
Rawle wrote the first distinguished commentary on the 
Constitution, ``A View of the Constitution of the United States 
of America.'' In this treatise, he came to precisely the same 
interpretation I have described. He said, ``The causes of 
impeachment can only have reference to public character and 
official duty. . . . In general those which may be committed 
equally by a private person as a public officer are not the 
subject of impeachment.''
    Joseph Story was not only a long-serving and important 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he was a 
preeminent constitutional scholar and author of a treatise that 
remains an important source for understanding the 
Constitution's meaning. He, too, emphasized that ``it is not 
every offense that by the constitution is . . . impeachable.'' 
Which offenses did he regard to be impeachable? ``Such kinds of 
misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the 
abuse of high offices of trust.'' Justice Story tied the 
definition of impeachable offenses to the purpose that 
underlies the separation of powers--safeguarding the liberty of 
the people against abusive exercise of governmental power. He 
observed that impeachment ``is not so much designed to punish 
an offender as to secure the state against gross official 
misdemeanors.''
    There is no question that the Constitution sets the bar for 
impeachment very high--especially where the President is 
involved. Federalist 65 bears this out, as do numerous other 
commentaries.
    But Federalist 65 also sounds a warning--again, it is a 
warning that has been invoked over and over again--that 
impeachments inevitably risk being hijacked by partisan 
political forces.
    Federalist 65 worried that the ``animosities, partialities, 
influence, and interest on one side or the other'' would enable 
partisans to find a way to interpret words such as high crimes 
and misdemeanors to match the outcome they otherwise wished to 
reach--not necessarily out of any malevolence, but simply 
because of the great capacity that we all have to rationalize.
    Here the rationalization is pretty easy--the President is a 
disgrace to the office, I honor and revere the office of the 
Presidency, so there must be some way to get this man out of 
that office. Therefore, his actions must rise to the level of 
high crimes and misdemeanors.
    It is tempting to go down that road--but this is precisely 
the temptation that the framers urged us to avoid.
    In Federalist 65, Hamilton defended the U.S. Senate as the 
only body that could possibly hear a Presidential impeachment. 
``Where else than in the Senate could have been found a 
tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? 
What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in 
its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced the 
necessary impartiality between an individual accused and . . . 
his accusers?''
    Hamilton was placing the responsibility to be impartial 
squarely upon us--a responsibility that has become embodied in 
the oath we took when the trial began.
    Charles Black, the renowned constitutional law professor 
from Yale, boiled down the attitude that we as Senators must 
adopt in order to achieve an impartiality and independence 
sufficient to the responsibilities of impeachment. He said we 
must act with a ``principled political neutrality.''
    That is a tough standard to meet. In the Johnson 
impeachment, for example, James Blaine originally voted for the 
impeachment of the President in the House. Years later he 
admitted his mistake, saying that `the sober reflection of 
after years has persuaded many who favored Impeachment that it 
was not justifiable on the charges made, and that its success 
would have resulted in greater injury to free institutions than 
Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict.''
    And in our contemporary situation, former President Ford 
and our distinguished colleague and former majority leader, 
Robert Dole, have both urged us not to go down the road to 
impeachment, but to seek other means to express our 
displeasure.
    Charles Black knew that principled political neutrality was 
hard to achieve, so he suggested one approach. He suggested 
that prior to voting, a Senator should ask:

    Would I have answered the same question the same way if it came up 
with respect to a President towards whom I felt oppositely from the way 
I feel toward the President threatened with removal?

    In reaching a final decision, the question I wish to pose 
to my colleagues is this: Can you legitimately conclude that 
you would vote to remove a sitting President if he were a 
person towards whom you felt oppositely than you do toward Bill 
Clinton?
    Given the essentially antidemocratic nature of impeachment 
and the great dangers inherent in the too ready exercise of 
that power, impeachment has no place in our system of 
constitutional democracy except as an extreme measure--reserved 
for breaches of the public trust by a President who so violates 
his official duties, misuses his official powers or places our 
system of government at such risk that our constitutional 
government is put in immediate danger by his continuing to 
serve out the term to which the people of the United States 
elected him.
    In my judgment, trying to assume a perspective of 
principled political neutrality, the case before us falls far, 
far short on the facts and on the law.
    I ask unanimous consent that the text of a more 
comprehensive statement be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

   Senator Joseph R. Biden's Comprehensive Statement On Impeachment 
                             Deliberations

    There are no good guys in this sordid affair. Rightly or 
wrongly, the public has concluded that the President is an 
adulterer and liar. Ken Starr has abused his authority by 
unfair tactics born out of vindictiveness. The House Managers 
have acted in a narrowly partisan way and are now desperately 
attempting to justify their actions for their own political 
reputation and that Monica Lewinsky was both used and a user, 
while Linda Tripp, Lucianne Goldberg, Paula Jones and her 
official and unofficial legal team are part of a larger 
political plot to ``get the President''.
    At this point, all that occurred before this is beyond my 
ability to affect. My job as a United States Senator hearing an 
impeachment trial is not to dissect the motives or even the 
tactics of Ken Starr, the trial lawyers, Linda Tripp and 
others. My only job is to determine whether the President of 
the United States, by his conduct committed the acts alleged in 
the two Articles of Impeachment before us. Not generally, but 
specifically, did he do what is alleged--and if he did, do 
these actions rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors 
necessary to justify the most obviously antidemocratic act the 
Senate can engage in--overturning an election.

                      the articles of impeachment

    When the framers designed our elected branches of 
Government, they established a system of separate but equal 
branches. The independence of the President from the Congress, 
and vice versa, is constitutionally anchored in the fact that 
each answers directly to the people through the ballot box. The 
people determine who will serve in either branch.
    As I said in a speech last September at Syracuse Law School 
and in another on the floor of the United State Senate, the 
independence of the President from the Congress was no minor 
detail in the constitutional design. The single major goal and 
idea that best explains how the framers constructed the office 
of the Presidency was to make the Presidency as politically 
independent of the Congress as they could. They believed his 
independence vital to the protection of our liberties.
    It takes a strong and independent President to sign the 
Emancipation Proclamation in the face of congressional 
opposition, as Abraham Lincoln did. It takes a strong and 
independent President to sign the executive order integrating 
the Armed Services in the face of congressional resistance, as 
Harry Truman did. It takes a strong and independent President 
to veto legislation in the face of strong majorities, as Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush and all of our Presidents have done.
    We can, and we do, disagree about the wisdom of any 
particular Presidential decision, but none of us can doubt that 
the institution of a strong and independent Presidency has 
enhanced our freedoms and made us a stronger Nation.
    For us to remove a duly elected President will unavoidably 
harm our constitutional structure.
    Accordingly, for this Senator, the starting point in my 
thinking about the articles of impeachment must begin with 
giving the President the benefit of the doubt, and to err on 
the side of sustaining the independence of that office so vital 
to the framers and to the constitutional system they designed. 
Impeachment must be used against a President only as an extreme 
measure, when the President has so breached the public trust 
that our system of government is put in danger by his 
continuing to serve out the term to which the people of the 
United States elected him.
    Have the House managers presented a case of sufficient 
severity, and have they proved it with sufficient clarity, to 
justify the drastic and awesome, step of convicting a duly 
elected President?
    On January 12, when the House managers walked across the 
rotunda to the Senate and presented their case against the 
President, the country moved from the realm of sound bites and 
political attacks to a serious and sober consideration of the 
precise nature of the House's allegations against the 
President, and of the full extent of the record evidence 
against him.
    The House managers have told us that in their judgment two 
dangers to our system of government justify taking this 
unprecedented and awesome step.
    First, they said that failing to remove the President will 
undermine the rule of law and the administration of justice. 
Permitting a serial perjurer and obstructor of justice to 
escape punishment will bring disgrace on the oath ``to tell the 
truth.'' It will mean that we can no longer with good 
conscience punish other people who have committed perjury or 
obstructed justice. The ultimate effects would be felt 
throughout the judicial system. Like a pebble dropped into a 
pond, they said, it will send out ripples to all corners of our 
judicial system.
    Second, they said that failing to remove the President will 
also condone his plot or scheme to deny a specific civil rights 
plaintiff--Paula Jones--of a full opportunity to litigate her 
civil rights claims against the President. Regardless of the 
ripple effects of his actions, the acts themselves were 
violations of law that amounted to a failure of the President 
to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed,'' in 
violation of his oath of office.

           multiple violations of the criminal law necessary

    As I have said in earlier speeches on the impeachment 
power, not all crimes are impeachable, and an impeachable 
offense does not have to be a crime.
    In this case, however, the House managers have made it 
quite clear that their case against the President depends 
entirely on proving that he has committed crimes, and not just 
a few crimes, but an elaborate scheme that included ``lots and 
lots of perjury'' and ``many obstructions of justice,'' to 
quote Mr. McCollum. The dangers the President supposedly poses 
flow not from the President's reprehensible conduct, or from 
the fact that he misled his family, his aides, his cabinet and 
the Nation about that conduct. This impeachment is not about 
sex, they have insisted.
    I asked Mr. Barr about this during the trial, and he said 
``What brings us here . . . is the belief by the House of 
Representatives in lawful public vote that this President 
violated, in numerous respects, his oath of office and the 
Criminal Code of the United States of America--in particular, 
that he committed perjury and obstruction of justice.'' Mr. 
McCollum made the same point in his opening presentation, when 
he said, ``The first thing you have to determine is whether or 
not the President committed crimes. It's only if you determine 
he committed the crimes of perjury, obstruction of justice and 
witness tampering, that you ever move on to the question of 
whether he is removed from office. . . . None of us would argue 
to you that the President should be removed from office unless 
you conclude he committed the crimes that he is alleged to have 
committed.''

           the burden of proof in assessing the house's case

    So the question before the Senate is whether the President 
is a serial perjurer and a massive obstructor of justice.
    What standard of proof should a Senator apply in deciding 
whether the record supports the accusations contained in the 
articles of impeachment--the accusations that the President 
violated the Federal criminal law? The House managers quite 
correctly pointed out that the Senate has never sought to 
determine for the entire body what the burden of proof should 
be in an impeachment. In effect, we have left it to the good 
judgment of each Senator to decide whether or not they are 
convinced by the evidence presented to us.
    For this Senator, fundamental fairness as well as the 
nature of the House's case dictate that I ought to be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President violated the laws 
that the House alleges. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
same standard applied in criminal cases--it is the standard 
that would apply if the President were tried in a criminal 
court for perjury or obstruction of justice.
    It seems to me that fundamental fairness counsels that I 
apply the same standard as a criminal court precisely because 
the House asserts that what makes his actions impeachable is 
that he has violated Federal criminal statutes regarding 
perjury and obstruction of justice. It strikes me as absurd 
that the Senate would have the arrogance to throw out a duly 
elected President on these grounds unless it was convinced that 
he would be convicted of those charges. Otherwise, we would be 
saying in effect that even though the President would not be 
convicted on these crimes, we are nevertheless throwing him out 
of office because he committed those crimes. That would clearly 
be giving the President less protection than we provide any 
other citizen when charged with a crime.
    Someone else can try to explain the logic of that decision, 
but not me.
    In addition, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt seems to me compelled by the fact that in the House's 
explanation of the harm to our system of government if the 
President is not thrown out, their entire explanation rises and 
falls depending upon whether or not the President would be 
convicted in a court of law for the crimes alleged. If he could 
not be convicted in a court of law, then the Senate is not 
``condoning'' perjury or obstruction of justice any more than a 
criminal court is condoning those crimes when someone is 
acquitted on such charges. But if the Senate is not condoning 
those crimes, there is no conceivable basis for concluding that 
the public will be harmed by the President's remaining in 
office.
    Furthermore, in applying the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the Senate simply must pay attention to the 
precise legal definitions of the crimes. What the pundits have 
condemned as legal hair splitting, and what the public rightly 
condemns in the President's penchant for evasive answers when 
responding to questions in a public setting, must now 
necessarily occupy our attention with regard to the President's 
answers under oath, such as a deposition or a grand jury 
proceeding because the claim made by the House is that the 
President violated specific criminal laws. If your aim is to 
respect the rule of law, you must also respect the rules of 
law--the precise legal definitions of the crimes, as found in 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the federal perjury statute, and in 18 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 and 1512, the applicable Federal 
obstruction of justice statutes.
    I have now studied the record sent to us by the House, 
listened to the presentations and arguments of the House 
Managers and the President's counsel, reviewed the videotape 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney 
Blumenthal, and listened to the views of my colleagues.
    On that basis, I have reached the conclusion that the House 
has not presented evidence that could persuade a criminal jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President has violated the 
applicable federal criminal statutes. There are too many holes, 
too many conclusions reached only by drawing negative 
inferences against the President, and too much evidence that 
apparently contradicts or is inconsistent with the House's 
case.
    Now, let me be frank with you. I do not know for sure what 
actually occurred. Notwithstanding that, I am forced to make a 
judgment. In order to preserve the constitutional separation of 
powers, the independence of the presidency and the sovereignty 
of democratic elections, the President deserves the benefit of 
the doubt. This record falls well short of the certainty 
required to remove a President from office.

           the constitutional balance the senate must strike

    While I believe that I must apply a standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the nature of the charges 
that the House has brought to us, it is also quite true--and I 
have said as much on prior occasions--that the Senate does not 
sit as a court of law when it tries an impeachment. As 
Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 65, impeachment is a 
political process.
    ``Political'' in Hamilton's usage had two meanings as it 
relates to impeachments. The first I have mentioned already, 
and I have spoken about in this chamber before: impeachable 
offenses are offenses against the body politic. In the words of 
James Wilson, ``in the United States . . . impeachments are 
confined to political characters, to political crimes and 
misdemeanors, and to political punishments.''
    The Senate's judgment in an impeachment trial is ultimately 
political in a second sense, too. It is political in the sense 
that the Senate has the responsibility to weigh all the 
consequences to the body politic in making its decision--the 
consequences that might flow from removing the President as 
well as the consequences that might flow from failing to remove 
him.
    That is what I mean, and what Hamilton meant, by the 
ultimate judgment being a political one. As Senator Bumpers 
reminded us, the consequences of the decision we make will live 
on long after Bill Clinton has left office and long after each 
of us has left office. We must hand our constitutional 
structure on to our children and to future generations with its 
foundation as solid as it was when it was handed to us. It is 
our responsibility as Senators to make a judgment as to how 
best to accomplish that objective.
    The obligation to evaluate the competing costs of retention 
and removal, incidentally, is what clearly distinguishes 
judicial impeachments and Presidential impeachments--very 
different institutional and long term consequences weigh in the 
balance in these two cases.
    Removing the President from office without compelling 
evidence would be historically antidemocratic. Never in our 
history has the Senate overturned the results of an election 
and removed a President from office. History could not more 
plainly demonstrate what a dramatic step removing an elected 
President would be. The founding of our republic was the most 
dramatic assertion of the sovereignty of the people that the 
world had ever known. Abraham Lincoln dedicated the battlefield 
at Gettysburg to this proposition recalling that our union 
stands for ``government of the people, for the people, and by 
the people.''
    The sovereignty of the people is exercised through national 
elections. All citizens, but particularly those of us who have 
had the honor to stand for election, have an instinctive 
respect for the will of the people as expressed through 
national elections. Thomas Jefferson, in his first inaugural 
address, aptly called this democratic instinct a ``sacred 
principle.'' Reversing the people's sovereign decision would be 
in radical conflict with the principle on which our Nation is 
founded as understood and applied throughout our history.
    For one branch to remove the head of a co-equal branch 
unavoidably harms our constitutional structure. The framers 
intentionally chose not to create a parliamentary system of 
government. They meant for the President and Congress to be 
independent of and co-equal with one another. Maintaining each 
of those branches as strong and independent is fundamental to 
the Constitution's very structure--a structure they designed to 
safeguard the liberty of the governed against abuses of power 
by those who govern.
    It is true that impeachment is part of this structure. 
Removing a President from office for sufficient reasons and 
upon sufficient proof is therefore consistent with that 
structure. At the same time, the great dangers inherent in the 
too ready exercise of that power mean that impeachment should 
be seen as an extreme measure.
    The framers were accomplished, practical statesmen. They 
recognized that impeachment could be misapplied to undermine 
the primary structural guarantee of liberty--the separation of 
powers. They worried that Congress would be tempted to use the 
impeachment power to make the President ``less equal.'' As 
Charles Pinckney warned his colleagues at the Philadelphia 
Convention, Congress could hold impeachment ``as a rod over the 
Executive and by that means effectively destroy his 
independence.''
    How are we to keep the impeachment power within its 
constitutional boundaries, so that it stands ready to be used 
appropriately but does not become a ``rod'' in the hands of a 
partisan Congress, threatening the independence of the 
Presidency, as Charles Pinckney worried during the 
Constitutional convention?
    The solution to this problem must lie in approaching the 
Senate's ultimate decision from as much of a position of 
bipartisanship as we can possibly achieve. This is the only way 
in which we can possibly focus primarily on the institutional 
consequences of our actions to see them in terms of their long 
term consequences instead of their short term partisan ones.
    Nonpartisan faithfulness to the Constitution's structure, 
which protects the liberty of the governed must determine our 
action today.
    This was my view of our role in 1974, when I rose on the 
floor of the United States Senate and made a ``plea . . . for 
restraint on the part of all parties involved in the affair.'' 
That was in the case of the possible impeachment of Richard 
Nixon. And it was my view last year, when I urged restraint and 
bipartisanship as the attitude I hoped my colleagues would 
adopt. And it remains my view.
    Viewed from that perspective, it is hard for me to see how 
the harms flowing from keeping Bill Clinton in office outweigh 
the harms to our constitutional democracy that would result 
from removing him.

                   harmful consequences reconsidered

    I have listened attentively to the House managers' case. In 
all honesty, I can sympathize with their sense of outrage at 
the President's actions and his unwillingness to be fully 
accountable for those actions for so many months. 
Notwithstanding that, from the vantage point of a restrained 
view, and as nonpartisan a view as I can muster, the dangers 
they see from keeping President Clinton in office seem less 
dire than they claim. At the same time the harms to our system 
of government from removing him seem to me to be quite serious.
    The House managers warn that failure to remove the 
President would destroy or undermine the sound administration 
of justice and threaten the rule of law. If true, that would be 
a big deal.
    But we need to step back a moment and cool down the 
rhetoric. Manager Graham suggested as much when he reminded us 
all of the resiliency of the American system of government. 
``So when we talk about the consequences of this case,'' he 
said, ``no matter what you decide, in my opinion, this country 
will survive. If you acquit the President, we will survive. If 
you convict him, it will be traumatic, and if you remove him, 
it will be traumatic, but we will survive.''
    That same calmer judgment ought to apply to the 
administration of justice and the rule of law. The House 
managers presented no evidence whatsoever of the dire 
consequences they predict. And there is no evidence of such 
dire consequences that they could present--because their 
evaluation of the consequences is nothing but speculation.
    I would submit to you that the consequences of failing to 
remove the President will most likely be very different from 
those described by the House. This is one pebble whose ripples 
will in all likelihood simply wash up harmlessly on the shores 
and be forgotten forever. I, frankly, do not see how failing to 
remove the President will alter the conduct of the next 
prosecutor having to decide whether to bring a perjury 
indictment, nor do I think that juries will be persuaded by a 
lawyer's argument that because the President ``got away with 
it'' the jury should acquit his client. The fact of the matter 
is, lots of perjury trials result in acquittals without 
impacting the ability of the criminal justice system to bring 
such charges where appropriate.
    The House managers' cry of alarm ignores the fact that we 
are in an impeachment trial. This is not a criminal proceeding 
and thus the manner in which the Senate deals with the question 
has no implications at all for how a court of law would deal 
with it.
    The Constitution is very clear about this. In article I, 
Sec. 3, cl. 7, the Constitution provides that whether or not a 
person is removed from office through impeachment that party 
``shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, 
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.'' If the 
evidence is as overwhelming as the managers say, the President 
can be prosecuted for perjury and obstruction after he leaves 
office.
    The American people have a very robust understanding that 
impeachment is a political process--and a particularly clear 
understanding that this impeachment has been thoroughly 
politicized until it got to the Senate--I don't think anyone is 
confusing it with a legal process. No one, therefore, will take 
any solace from the President's acquittal in terms of their 
ability to commit perjury or obstruct justice and thereby avoid 
criminal charges.
    Now don't misunderstand me--I am not suggesting that 
letting a guilty person off from a crime he or she has 
committed is OK. I am saying, first, that the President has not 
been charged with a crime in a criminal court, so that failing 
to acquit him is not at all letting him off from a crime, and 
second, that our decision will not have the kind of ``sky is 
falling'' consequences described by the House in any event. In 
my judgment, the rule of law and the sound administration of 
justice in this country will be unaffected by the action we 
take in the Senate, one way or the other.
    The House managers have also warned that failing to remove 
the President will also condone his plot or scheme to deny a 
specific civil rights plaintiff--Paula Jones--her day in court, 
by withholding from her, through acts of perjury and 
obstruction, full information about the ``nature and details'' 
of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Just how accurate and 
complete a description is this one? In order to answer that 
question, we need a fuller picture of the ``nature and 
details'' of the Jones litigation itself.
    If you listened just to the House managers, you would think 
that the Jones lawsuit was just a run-of-the-mill typical 
sexual harassment civil rights case.
    It was not. From the very beginning, that lawsuit had been 
politically motivated. All the facts we know about this case, 
even taking Paula Jones at her word that the incident in the 
Excelsior Hotel actually occurred, demonstrate that the lawsuit 
was also without merit. She had never been harmed in any way in 
her job, and the President had never repeated anything remotely 
resembling an unwanted sexual advance on her again. She had 
received merit pay raises in her State employment and she had 
received good job performance reviews. She was unable to prove 
that she had been damaged in any way by the President's 
actions.
    Actually, what damages she did assert--what caused her to 
file the lawsuit, according to her testimony--was the result of 
the publication of a hatchet-job article against President 
Clinton run in the American Spectator. The article was one 
salvo in an on going right wing probe into Clinton's life in 
Arkansas, aimed simply at digging up anything that could be 
politically damaging to the President. When the American 
Spectator ran a story making an unflattering reference to a 
``Paula,'' Jones found a lawyer to file suit in order to 
``reclaim her good name.''
    The lawyers Paula Jones eventually found were also 
underwritten by right wing conservative Republican money. In 
fact, investigative reporters as recently as this past Sunday 
continue to reveal more and more details of the tightly knit 
web of conservative lawyers and conservative financial backers 
who have hounded this President relentlessly since the day he 
took the office.
    Now the President knew that the lawsuit was without merit--
he might have behaved obnoxiously with Paula Jones, but he did 
not commit sexual harassment. He also knew that the real 
motivation of the lawsuit, the motivation that funded it and 
kept it going, was a political assault on him, not a legal 
assault. The law suit and its powers of discovery were being 
used to engage in a fishing expedition throughout Arkansas in 
search of political dirt. Leaks from that discovery appeared 
regularly in the Washington press.
    The President knew something else, as well. He knew that 
his illicit relationship with Monica Lewinsky had nothing to do 
with the merits of the Jones litigation. On this matter, you do 
not have to rely on the President's assessment or mine, because 
the court independently concluded the same thing. In the order 
denying the plaintiff's discovery into the Lewinsky facts, 
Judge Wright said that the Lewinsky facts, even if the 
allegations concerning them were true, had nothing to do with 
the essential or core elements of Paula Jones lawsuit.
    So keeping Lewinsky out of the politically motivated Jones 
case did not jeopardize Paula Jones' chances of prevailing, 
which were nonexistent in any event. What it did do was to 
prevent the President's political enemies from using the Jones 
discovery procedures to pry open that secret relationship and 
expose it, all to the political damage of the President.
    In this context, it is understandable that the President 
wanted to frustrate the Jones litigation. What is more, the 
President can hardly be said to have prevented Paula Jones from 
presenting a case, because there was no meritorious case to 
present.
    That doesn't justify perjury or obstruction, of course, but 
it does provide an accurate context for appraising the House 
managers' second claim. If they are permitted to convert a 
meritless and politically motivated lawsuit into a Presidential 
conviction for impeachable offenses, the Senate will be 
rewarding behavior that we ought to condemn. We need to think 
more than once about rewarding this kind of political witch 
hunt.
    All of what I have just said informs this Senator's 
judgment concerning the harms to the country that would be 
caused by failing to convict a President who had committed the 
acts alleged by the House.
    In fact, if the rule of law and the fair administration of 
justice will not be destroyed--contrary to the House managers' 
assertions--and if the American people understand that the 
President's actions were in the context of a politically-
motivated lawsuit and involved concealing an embarrassing 
improper relationship that was irrelevant to that lawsuit--then 
it is very hard for this Senator to see how the President's 
continuing in office poses the sort of grave danger to our 
system of government that the framers had in mind when they 
gave the Congress the awesome power to impeach and remove an 
elected President.
    In weighing the competing consequences of removal and 
retention in office, we must honor the constitutional 
obligation we undertook when we swore to do ``impartial 
justice.''
    To that end, I think we all could benefit from the wisdom 
on several participants in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, 
131 years ago.
    Two of them--Chief Justice Salmon Chase and Congressman 
James G. Blaine--both of whom historians record as being highly 
critical of Johnson and initially favoring his removal--were 
nevertheless able to step back from the partisanship of that 
moment and weigh the competing harms in the way I have 
suggested is proper.
    Chief Justice Salmon Chase, who himself had political 
Presidential ambitions, wrote to a friend on the day the trial 
ended, saying, ``What possible harm can result in the country 
from continuance of Andrew Johnson months longer in the 
Presidential chair, compared with that which must arise if 
impeachment becomes a mere mode of getting rid of an obnoxious 
President?''
    And years later, James G. Blaine, who had voted for 
impeachment in the House, said, ``The sober reflection of after 
years has persuaded many who favored Impeachment that it was 
not justifiable on the charges made, and that its success would 
have resulted in greater injury to free institutions that 
Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict.''
    And in our contemporary situation, former President Ford 
and our distinguished colleague and former majority leader, 
Robert Dole, have both urged us not to go down the road to 
impeachment, but to seek other means to express our 
displeasure.
    We ought to follow these lessons, and to be attentive to 
the damage that removing a duly elected President on these 
charges will inflict on our system of government.
    A decision to remove Bill Clinton will not destroy our 
system of government. But it will stand as a precedent--the 
very first time the U.S. Senate has removed any President from 
office. If we vote to convict and remove the President after a 
highly partisan impeachment for conduct that appears to be 
private and non-official, we will create an opportunity for 
impeachments to become a tool of partisan politics by other 
means.

                               conclusion

    Engaging in the balance that the Constitution requires, I 
cannot vote to convict the President. The evidence of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President violated federal 
criminal statutes has not been presented. Even were the 
evidence stronger, the Constitution demands that we weigh the 
competing considerations in a nonpartisan manner.
    The President deserves our condemnation. He has brought 
shame to himself.
    But we have not reached this point due to his failings 
alone. It has taken the volatile combination of his 
blameworthiness and the unalloyed animosity of others toward 
him that have brought us to the brink of a profound 
constitutional moment.
    Given the essentially antidemocratic nature of impeachment 
and the great dangers inherent in the too ready exercise of 
that power, impeachment has no place in our system of 
constitutional democracy except as an extreme measure--reserved 
for breaches of the public trust by a President who so violates 
his official duties, misuses his official powers or places our 
system of government at such risk that our constitutional 
government is put in immediate danger by his continuing to 
serve out the term to which the people of the United States 
elected him.
    I urge my colleagues to remain faithful to the 
constitutional design and to our obligation to do impartial 
justice.
    (Below are significant issues of constitutional law, 
positive law, or Senate procedure that have arisen during the 
impeachment trial of President Clinton. As the impeachment 
process moved forward in the House to the point where its 
arriving in the Senate appeared likely, I began an intensive 
study of the Constitution, the framers' understanding, and our 
historical constitutional practices in the Senate to prepare 
for a possible impeachment trial, which I continued once the 
Senate assumed jurisdiction over the matter. Over the past 
several months, I have shared some of my conclusions with my 
colleagues and the public in speeches and memoranda, portions 
of which are below. Bracketed comments are additions to the 
original text, inserted to assist in comprehension.)
                             bipartisanship
    Mr. President, during the past twenty-six years as a United States 
Senator, I have been confronted with some of the most significant 
issues facing our Nation. Issues ranging from who sits on the highest 
court in the land to whether we should go to war. These are weighty 
issues. But none of these decisions has been more awesome, more 
daunting, more compelling, than the issue confronting us at the present 
time.
    The issue of whether to impeach a sitting President is a monumental 
responsibility. A responsibility that no Senator will take lightly.
    And as imposing as this undertaking is, I am sad to say that I have 
had to contemplate this issue twice during my service in the Senate; 
once during President Nixon's term and now.
    And while the circumstances surrounding these two events are 
starkly different, the consequences are starkly the same. The gravity 
of removing a sitting President from office is the same today as it was 
twenty-five years ago. Listen to what I said on the floor of the United 
States Senate on April 10, 1974 during the Watergate crisis:
    ``In the case of an impeachment trial, the emotions of the American 
people would be strummed, as a guitar, with every newscast and each 
edition of the daily paper in communities throughout the country. The 
incessant demand for news or rumors of news--whatever its basis of 
legitimacy--would be overwhelming. The consequential impact on the 
federal institutions of government would be intense--and not 
necessarily beneficial. This is why my plea today is for restraint on 
the part of all parties involved in the affair.''
    I could have said these same words today. It is uncanny how much 
things stay the same.
    Furthermore, in 1974 I urged my colleagues in the United States 
Senate to learn from the story of Alice in Wonderland. Then I cautioned 
that we remember Alice's plight when the Queen declared ``sentence 
first, verdict afterwards.''
    But the need for restraint is even greater today than it was in 
1974. In 1974, the impeachment question was not as politically charged 
as it is today. In 1974 we were willing to hear all the evidence before 
making a decision. Today, I hope, for our Nation's sake, that we do not 
follow the Queen's directive in Alice in Wonderland and that we will 
make a wise judgment after deliberate consideration.
    My legal training combined with more than a quarter century of 
experience in the United States Senate has taught me several important 
lessons. Two of these lessons are appropriate now.
    First, an ordered society must first care about justice.
    Second, all that is constitutionally permissible may not be just or 
wise.
    And it is with these two very important lessons guiding me, that I 
embark upon a very important decision regarding our country, our 
Constitution, and our President.
    The power to overturn and undo a popular election of the people, 
for the first time in our Nation's history, must be exercised with 
great care and sober deliberation.
    We should not forget that 47.4 million Americans voted for our 
President in 1996, 8.2 million more than voted for the President's 
opponent.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    Let me now stand back from the issues of substance and procedure, 
and look at the impeachment mechanism as it has actually functioned in 
our country's history. The proof of the Framers' design, after all, 
will be in how the mechanism has worked in practice.
    As we have seen, the Framers worried that impeaching a sitting 
President would most likely be highly charged with partisan politics 
and pre-existing factions, enlisting all the ``animosities, 
partialities, and influence and interest'' that inevitably swirl around 
a sitting President. History shows that they had a right to be worried.
    Prior to the case of President Nixon, Presidential impeachment had 
only been used for partisan reasons.
    History tells us that John Tyler was an enormously unpopular 
President, facing a hostile Congress dominated by his arch political 
enemy, Henry Clay. After several years of continual clashes, numerous 
Presidential vetoes and divisive conflicts with the senate over 
appointments, a select committee of the House issued a report 
recommending a formal impeachment inquiry.
    President Tyler reached out to his political enemies: he signed an 
important bill raising tariffs which he had formerly opposed--and he 
found other means of cooperating with the Congress. In the end, even 
Henry Clay, speaking from the Senate, urged a slowdown in the 
impeachment proceedings, suggesting instead the lesser action of a 
``want of confidence'' vote rather than formal impeachment proceedings. 
In early 1843, the resolution to proceed with an impeachment inquiry 
was defeated on the House floor, 127 to 83.
    In 1868, Andrew Johnson came much closer to conviction on charges 
of serious misconduct. Although Johnson's impeachment proceedings 
ostensibly focused on his disregarding the tenure in office act, 
historians uniformly agree that the true sources of opposition to 
President Johnson were policy disagreements and personal animosity. 
[Text note: The conflict this time was between Johnson's moderate post 
Civil War policies toward the Southern states and the overwhelming 
Radical Republican majorities in both chambers. One especially volatile 
division was over whether Southern Senators and Representatives ought 
to be admitted to Congress prior to the enactment of Constitutional 
amendments expressly denying the right of state succession. The 
Republicans feared dilution of their voting strength if the southerners 
were seated, especially since an effect of President Lincoln's 
Emancipation Proclamation would be to increase House representation for 
the Southern states, by virtue of the fact that each freed slave would 
count as a whole person, instead of the abandoned constitutional 
formula of three-fifths.
    The Tenure in Office Act had been enacted over his veto to restrict 
his ability to remove the Secretary of War--who was allied with the 
Radical Republicans--from that office without the Senate's consent. 
Johnson fired Edwin M. Stanton anyway, claiming that the restriction on 
his removal authority was unconstitutional.]
    The conflict this time was between Johnson's moderate post-Civil 
War policies toward the southern states and the overwhelming Republican 
majorities in both chambers. The Republicans feared dilution of their 
voting strength if the southerners were seated.
    Johnson's defenders in the Senate were eventually able to hold on 
to barely enough votes to prevent his conviction. In professor Raoul 
Berger's view, ``Johnson's trial serves as a frightening reminder that 
in the hands of a passion-driven congress, the process may bring down 
the very pillars of our constitutional system.''
    Yet, if the cases of Tyler and Johnson substantiate the Framers' 
fears, the Nixon situation vindicates the utility of the impeachment 
procedures. Notice how different the Nixon proceedings were from 
Tyler's and Johnson's. As the Nixon impeachment process unfolded, there 
was broad bipartisan consensus each step of the way.
    While it would be foolish to believe that Members of Congress did 
not worry about the partisan political repercussions of their actions, 
such factional considerations did not dominate decision making.
    Political friends and foes of the President agreed that the charges 
against the President were serious, that they warranted further inquiry 
and, once there was definitive evidence of serious complicity and 
wrongdoing, a consensus emerged that impeachment should be invoked. The 
President resigned after the House Judiciary Committee voted out 
articles of impeachment by a 28-10 vote.
    For me, several lessons stand out from our constitutional 
understanding of the impeachment process and our historical experience 
with it. Furthermore, I believe that a consensus has developed on 
several important points.
    While the founders included impeachment powers in the Constitution, 
they were concerned by the potential partisan abuse. We should be no 
less aware of the dangers of partisanship. As we have seen, the process 
functions best when there is a broad bipartisan consensus behind moving 
ahead. The country is not well served when either policy disagreements 
or personal animosities drive the process.
    Many scholars who have studied the Constitution have concluded that 
it should be reserved for offenses that are abuses of the public trust 
or abuses that relate to the public nature of the President's duties. 
Remember, what is impeachable is not necessarily criminal and what is 
criminal is not necessarily impeachable.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    I am here today to call for bipartisanship in the impeachment 
process. It is a concept many will say they agree with. But actions 
speak louder than words.
    The Framers of the Constitution knew that the greatest danger 
associated with impeachment was the presence of partisan factions that 
could dictate the outcome.
    It is clear from the debates and from the commentaries on the 
Constitutional Convention that the Framers were concerned that anything 
less than bipartisanship could, and would, do great damage to our form 
of government. They knew that to contemplate an action as profound as 
undoing a popular election requires at a minimum that members of both 
parties find that the alleged wrong is grave enough to overturn the 
will of the majority of the American people.
    The Framers also understood the sentiment expressed nearly 200 
years later by Congresswoman Barbara Jordan during the impeachment 
proceedings of Richard Nixon.
    She said, ``it is reason, and not passion, which must guide our 
deliberations, guide our debate, and guide our decision.''
    But the current debate is guided by faction, not reason. One 
example: The House Judiciary Committee this month heard a battery of 
witnesses address the question of what is an impeachable offense. 
Democrats called legal experts who testified that the President's acts 
are not impeachable offenses, and Republicans called witnesses who were 
just as certain they were. By the end of the hearing, anyone listening 
would have the overwhelming impression that there was no consensus in 
the legal community on the issue, that it was an open question.
    Yet the vast majority of historians and legal scholars have 
concluded--and stated publicly--that nothing that President Clinton has 
been accused of rises to the level of an impeachable offense. The 
hearing was a political charade. We are told that ultimately, this is a 
political process. Ultimately, it is. The question is whether it is 
going to be a fair process. I argue that it can, and must be fair.
    In his marvelous book on the impeachment process, published while 
the country was in the throes of President Nixon's Watergate troubles, 
Professor Charles Black alerted us to the danger of partisanship.
    Because the constitution and its history provide us with more 
questions about impeachment than answers, he said, ``it is always 
tempting to resolve such questions in favor of the immediate political 
result that is palatable to us, for one can never definitely be proved 
wrong, and so one is free to allow one's prejudices to assume the guise 
of reason.''
    Black was echoing Alexander Hamilton, who warned in Federalist 65 
that impeachments:
    ``will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, 
and to divide it into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to 
the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on the one side, or on the other; and in such 
cases there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will 
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by the 
real demonstrations of guilt or innocence.''
    I don't think I am being partisan myself in warning about the risks 
of partisan excess. As a 32 year-old Senator, I expressed this same 
concern about the fate of a Republican President. On April 10, 1974, I 
rose on the floor of the United States Senate and said:
    ``In the case of an impeachment trial, the emotions of the American 
people would be strummed, as a guitar, with every newscast and each 
edition of the daily paper in communities throughout the country.
    The incessant demand for news or rumors of news--whatever its basis 
of legitimacy--would be overwhelming. The consequential impact on the 
federal institutions of government would be intense--and not 
necessarily beneficial. This is why my plea today is for restraint on 
the part of all parties involved in the affair.''
    I make the same plea for restraint today. And while the 
circumstances surrounding these two events are starkly different, the 
consequences for our Nation are the same. The gravity of removing a 
sitting President from office is the same today as it was twenty-four 
years ago.
    The American people understand that the consequences of impeaching 
a sitting President are grave and, thus far, they have shown a 
remarkable restraint--more than some of the pundits and experts. But I 
believe they have reached two clear conclusions: Congress should 
resolve the matter expeditiously and resolve the matter in a fair and 
non-partisan manner.
    These conclusions have great significance to the impeachment 
process. I believe the American people will ultimately make their 
judgment about the proceedings and the outcome based in part, on 
whether the House Judiciary Committee votes along strict party lines 
and whether the House of Representatives acts in a similar manner.
    That may not be fair, but I believe that is how they will judge it. 
Therefore, it seems clear to me that for history's sake, and with the 
Committee's legacy in mind, Chairman Hyde and the Republican majority 
in the House must bend over backwards to demonstrate that they have 
conducted this proceeding based on principle, not politics.
    There is yet another issue where public opinion comes into play. 
That is the question of whether the President's transgressions warrant 
impeachment. We know from survey after survey that the American people 
believe the President's actions do not justify impeaching him.
    Should that have any bearing on the outcome? Many of my colleagues 
say they will ignore public opinion. In most cases, this is a sound 
position for a member of Congress to take. When we are elected to the 
House and the Senate, we are sent here to exercise judgment, not simply 
to be weathervanes that shift with the political winds. The fact that 
this is an impeachment proceeding doesn't change that--it makes it even 
more important that we exercise our best judgment.
    But I believe it is a serious mistake to take the position that 
public opinion should have no bearing on how we act and what we do. Let 
me explain. Many people--and many legal scholars--have said that 
impeachment should be reserved for grave breaches of the public trust. 
Surely, if we are trying to decide whether an offense is a breach of 
the public trust, it is important to know what the public thinks. If 
the American people think the President's actions do not warrant 
impeachment, we should listen to their views, and take them seriously.
    It would be a serious mistake to ignore public opinion for another, 
more fundamental reason. This is their President we are talking about. 
The President of the United States doesn't serve at the pleasure of the 
legislature, as a prime minister does in a parliamentary system. He is 
elected directly by the people of the United States.
    The election of a President is the only nationwide vote that the 
American people ever cast. That is a big deal. If the American people 
don't think they have made a mistake in electing Bill Clinton, we in 
the Congress had better be very careful before we upset their decision.
    This was brought home to me several weeks before the elections at a 
filling station in Wilmington. The woman working the cash register 
looked up at me with something of a scowl on her face. I assumed--
incorrectly, it turned out--that she had voted against me the last time 
I ran. She said, ``You're Joe Biden, aren't you?'' I nodded. She said, 
``What are you going to do to President Clinton on this Lewinsky 
thing?'' I started to give her a noncommittal answer about the process 
needing to go forward, but she brought me up short. ``Don't you or 
anyone else take my vote away, Joe. He's my President! If you remove 
him, I will never vote again.''
    This woman--and the American people--understand the genius of the 
American system in their bones. They know that the Congress and the 
President are separate branches of government. They understand that 
each branch is responsible to them, not to the other branch of 
government. Just as they know that the Senators from their state are 
theirs, and the Representative from their district is theirs, they know 
that the President is theirs, too.
    Anyone who wants to impeach Bill Clinton needs to keep in mind what 
the American people think about it, because he is their President.
    Let me be absolutely clear. This does not mean just doing what the 
opinion polls say. It means proceeding in a manner that the American 
people understand to be fair. In the case of an impeachment, fair means 
bipartisan. It means putting aside the disagreements that stem from 
partisan factions. The time for partisan factions to play a role is in 
the process of elections, where candidates advance competing policies 
and platforms and the people vote. Once the election is held, our 
leaders hold office until the next election. It is simply antithetical 
to our constitutional democracy to use impeachment to overturn an 
election on partisan grounds. It violates the independence of the 
Presidency and it usurps the people's voice.
    The Framers saw this danger when they wrote the impeachment power 
into the Constitution. Hamilton warned that an impeachment would 
``connect itself with pre-existing factions,'' just as Black much later 
saw that impeachment was an occasion for ``prejudices to assume the 
guise of reason.''
    So those who wish to proceed with impeachment in the face of the 
public's contrary opinion bear a special obligation and confront a 
special risk. The obligation they face is that they must proceed in a 
bipartisan manner, so that we can defend the Congress' actions as fair 
and consistent with the constitutional framework--so that if 
impeachment goes forward, those who support it can look my constituent, 
or their constituent, straight in the eyes and defend the process as 
fair and just.
    Should they fail to do this, the risk they face is the chance that 
they will inflict more damage on our system of government and induce 
more cynicism and disgust with politics than anything the President has 
done so far.
    So we must be prudent. Otherwise we will succumb to the danger the 
Framers warned against. We will subject the President to what amounts 
to a vote of no confidence. If you disapprove of his presidency and its 
policies, or if you do not like the man, vote to impeach. If, on the 
other hand, you support his presidency and his policies, or if you do 
like the man, vote to acquit. But that is not our system of government.
    When Benjamin Netanyahu returned home after signing the Wye 
accords, he faced a vote of no confidence. If he had lost, he would 
have been out of office and another government would have to be formed.
    That is simply not our system of government. Ours is not a 
parliamentary system. That is not how impeachment is supposed to 
operate.
    Reflect for just a moment on how different our government is. Here, 
the President and the Congress are separate branches of government. 
Each is elected directly by the people. The President and Vice 
President are the only officials elected by ALL the people. Through the 
electoral process, they answer to all the people. In such a system, a 
vote of no confidence, as a means of removing the head of government 
when the Congress disapproves of his leadership, contradicts the theory 
of separated powers. It would trample on the choice made by the people 
through the electoral process.
    This is no small matter. It goes to the heart of the constitutional 
design. As Jack Rakove, the Stanford historian, noted during the 
recently held House hearings on the standard for impeachment, the 
prevailing principle that guided the Framers in shaping the institution 
of the Presidency during the Philadelphia Convention, the one major 
goal and idea that best explains how that office took shape over the 
summer of 1787, was their intention on ``making the presidency as 
politically independent of the Congress as they could.''
    The Framers saw the system of separated powers and checks and 
balances as a bulwark in support of individual liberty and against 
government tyranny. The separation of powers prevents government power 
from being concentrated in any single branch of government. Permit one 
branch of government to subjugate another to its partisan wishes, and 
you permit the kind of concentration of power that can lead to tyranny.
    So the system the Framers established is utterly incompatible with 
the idea that sharp partisan divisions could be sufficient to impeach. 
Preserving our system, with its checks and balances and separation of 
powers, ought to be part of our consideration as we attempt to resolve 
the current controversy.
    How do we ensure that impeachments do not become the partisan 
showdowns that the Framers warned about? The answer is both simple and 
elusive. The only thing that prevents the impeachment power from being 
abused is the good faith of Members of Congress.
    Professor Black proposed a simple test. He said that for the 
purposes of impeachment, members take off their party's hat--shed their 
partisan identity--and then try to take on the identity of a member of 
the other party. In other words, Republicans who favor Clinton's 
impeachment should try to pretend they are Democrats, and see if they 
still hold that same conclusion. Democrats who scoff at impeachment in 
the present instance should try to see it from the Republicans' point 
of view.
    It is very difficult to perform this test, especially in the highly 
charged partisan atmosphere in which we live, but you get the point. 
Before we undertake such a solemn act as impeachment, we should examine 
our reasoning very carefully to be sure we are not simply following 
partisan instincts.
    Impeachment can be legitimate if and only if it emanates from a 
bipartisan conviction that the President has committed high crimes and 
misdemeanors--when people of opposing viewpoints can come together in 
agreement over the seriousness of the offense and the appropriateness 
of the sanction.
    Partisanship need not disappear entirely--that would be impossible. 
It simply must be held in check for a time--a few weeks, perhaps a 
month--and by a relatively small number of people, so that a bipartisan 
consensus can take shape.
    Look back at the Nixon impeachment. It took on legitimacy when a 
core of Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee were moved by the 
nature of President Nixon's offenses to break party ranks and vote for 
articles of impeachment. In the Senate, it was the stark reality of 
eroding Republican support that prompted President Nixon to resign. 
There was bipartisan consensus that what Nixon did was impeachable.
    Partisanship did not evaporate entirely during the impeachment 
trial of Andrew Johnson. In fact, the entire episode was riddled with 
partisanship, and overall it stands as an excellent example of how not 
to conduct an impeachment.
    Still, seven Republican Senators did vote with the Democrats for 
acquittal, shedding their partisan preferences, to prevent that 
impeachment from succeeding. It took only that amount of bipartisanship 
to save the country from an impeachment that most people--in 
retrospect--have concluded would have been a terrible mistake. The fact 
that a conviction in the Senate requires a two-thirds majority 
guarantees a measure of necessary bipartisanship except in all but the 
most lopsided Senates.
    But bipartisanship should not wait until the matter reaches the 
Senate chamber. In previous impeachments the votes in both the House 
and the Senate have been by overwhelming majorities. In the past, 
except for the Johnson impeachment, the only times articles of 
impeachment reached the floor were in cases of tremendous bipartisan 
consensus that the offenses satisfy the constitutional standard and 
that the officer ought to be removed.
    As for the Johnson impeachment itself, according to James Blaine, 
one of the Republican House members who voted for impeachment, he and 
others came in time to regret the effort. In private correspondence, 
Blaine wrote that, ``the sober reflection of after years has persuaded 
many who favored impeachment that it was not justifiable on the charges 
made, and that its success would have resulted in greater injury to 
free institutions than Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able 
to inflict.''
    The conclusion I reach is this. The burden is, as it always has 
been, on those who seek to impeach and convict a President. To overturn 
a popular election, they must convince the American people and at least 
some in the President's party that the President's actions meet the 
high standard for impeachment settled upon by our founders in the 
Constitution.
    This is what I mean by bipartisanship.
    The standard is ``principled political neutrality.''
    And one measure of whether a member has met that principle is to 
ask in Professor Black's words: ``Would they have answered the same 
question the same way if it came up with respect to a President towards 
whom [they] felt oppositely from the way [they] feel toward the 
President threatened with removal.''
    The American people will know whether each member met that test. 
They will not demand unanimity, but they will demand consensus.
    Thus far, the House Judiciary Committee has proceeded without 
dignity, causing the American people to lose respect for the Committee.
    As a result, the burden of demonstrating that they are proceeding 
with a standard of ``principled political neutrality'' will be 
politically difficult to meet.
    Ken Starr will make his case, the President should be allowed to 
make his. Then let them decide if the President's conduct meets the 
test of what the Framers had in mind by ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    The choice is not whether the President's self-evidently shameful 
and possibly criminal conduct must be punished by impeachment or be 
condoned. The choice is whether the process for dealing with his 
conduct is removal from office or some other means--censure, or perhaps 
even a criminal trial after he has left office.
    To those who say that failure to bring articles of impeachment 
against the President would amount to condoning his immoral behavior or 
overlooking a criminal act, notwithstanding the fact it does not meet 
the test of an impeachable offense, I say they do not understand our 
system of government. For the Constitution contemplates and the law 
provides for such a circumstance--it is called a criminal trial after 
his term is served. It is a way to punish the President without doing 
damage to the system of separated powers or overruling the judgment of 
the American people.
    Failure to impeach, even failure to proceed with a criminal action, 
does not mean that the President has not paid for his immoral 
behavior--he has already been sentenced to a hundred years of shame in 
the history books, which is not an insignificant penalty.
    So I say to my colleagues in the House, do your duty. Proceed with 
principled political neutrality. For if you do, history will judge you 
kindly. And if you do not, it will judge you harshly.
    And for those of us who hold high public office and the public 
trust, history is a judge.--[Speech, 11/18/98]
                            burden of proof
    What is the standard of proof? The Constitution does not set forth 
an express standard of proof that the evidence must meet in order to 
allow the Senate to convict the President. Practice has left to each 
Senator to determine for him or herself what standard to apply.
    From the judicial setting there are three major standards from 
which to choose. Most civil trials require a plaintiff to prove his or 
her case by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that the 
plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that the 
plaintiff's assertions are true. Criminal trials require the most 
exacting degree of proof. The prosecution must prove the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A third, middle course is applied in 
some cases. This standard, clear and convincing evidence, requires 
proof that substantially exceeds a mere preponderance but that does not 
eliminate all reasonable doubt. There must be a very high degree of 
probability that the evidence proves what the plaintiff asserts, but 
the proof may fall short of certainty.
    Many Senators, analogizing to a criminal trial, have expressed that 
they would require the House Managers to prove their case ``beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'' In anticipation of an impeachment trial of 
President Richard Nixon, Senators Sam Ervin, Strom Thurmond, and John 
Stennis all declared that they would apply the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. But it is clear that individual Senators may opt for a 
civil standard.
    This issue may not have more than rhetorical significance for the 
impeachment trial of President Clinton. These standards are meant to 
guide juries in their fact-finding capacity. Insofar as the trial 
focuses on the question whether the President's conduct justifies 
conviction and removal from office, the proceedings will call on the 
Senate in its judicial character. Resolving that question requires the 
Senate to exercise its legal and political judgment in order to 
determine whether the constitutional punishment fits the misconduct. It 
does not call upon the Senate to make a factual determination about 
what conduct actually occurred.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
           the burden of proof in assessing the house's case
    But can the President rightly be charged with having committed the 
massive number of crimes that the House Managers allege? As Mr. 
McCollum said, if we cannot conclude that the President has violated 
the law, even the House Managers would agree that he should not be 
removed from office. Even if you accept their recitation of the dire 
consequences of President Clinton remaining in office, if the President 
cannot be shown to have been a serial perjurer and a massive obstructor 
of justice, the Senate should acquit.
    What standard of proof should a Senator apply in deciding whether 
the record supports these charges? Both the House Managers and the 
President's counsel addressed this significant issue. The House 
Managers quite correctly pointed out that the Senate has never sought 
to determine for the entire body what that burden of proof should be in 
an impeachment. In effect, we have left it to the good judgment of each 
Senator to decide whether or not they are convinced by the evidence 
presented to us.
    For this Senator, fundamental fairness as well as the nature of the 
House's case indicate that I ought to be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President violated the laws that the House alleges. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same standard applied in 
criminal cases--it is the standard that would apply if the President 
were tried in a criminal court for perjury or obstruction of justice.
    It seems to me that fundamental fairness counsels that I apply the 
same standard a criminal court would apply precisely because the House 
asserts that what makes his actions impeachable is that he has violated 
the criminal statutes regarding perjury and obstruction of justice. It 
strikes me as absurd that the Senate would have the arrogance to throw 
out a duly elected President on these grounds unless it was convinced 
that he would be convicted of those charges. Otherwise, we would be 
saying in effect that even though the President would not be convicted 
on these crimes, we are nevertheless throwing him out of office because 
he committed those crimes. Someone else can try to explain the logic of 
that decision to the voters, but not me.
    In addition, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt seems 
to me compelled by the fact that in the House's explanation of the harm 
to our system of government if the President is not thrown out, their 
entire argument rises and falls depending upon whether or not the 
President would be convicted in a court of law for the crimes alleged. 
If he could not be convicted in a court of law, then the Senate is not 
``condoning'' perjury or obstruction of justice any more than a 
criminal court is condoning those crimes when someone is acquitted on 
such charges. The Senate, like a court, is simply saying, ``not 
proven.'' But if the Senate is not condoning those crimes, there is no 
conceivable basis for concluding that the public will be harmed by the 
President's remaining in office.
    (There is another way to look at this: In any impeachment, a 
Senator must simply be convinced to his or her satisfaction that the 
defendant committed the acts alleged. That standard never changes. 
However, when the articles of impeachment allege that offenses rise to 
an impeachable level because these actions violate the law and have 
harmful consequences to the country because the defendant has violated 
the law and would not be punished, in that case a Senator must be 
convinced that a defendant would in fact be punished by a criminal 
court. In other words, the Senator must simply be convinced that a 
court would find that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
    (In contrast, if the charges were that the President had lied to 
the American people, the Congress or foreign leaders, and that the 
harmful consequences flowed from being unable to rely upon his word, 
then a Senator must simply be convinced that the President lied, 
relying upon whatever level of proof is sufficient to convince him or 
her of that fact.)--[Memorandum, 1/21/98]
                                censure
    In recent days, some have suggested that because the Starr report 
provides prima facie evidence of what are arguably impeachable 
offenses, the House and the Senate have a constitutional responsibility 
to see the impeachment process through to its conclusion. In my view, 
the constitutional history that I have sketched here this evening shows 
this position to be entirely mistaken. Indeed, if anything, history 
shows a thoroughly understandable reluctance to have the procedure 
invoked.
    Stopping short of impeachment would not be reaching a solution 
``outside the Constitution,'' as some suggest--it would be entirely 
compatible and consistent with the Constitution.
    The 28th Congress [which contemplated but then terminated 
impeachment proceedings against President Tyler] hardly violated its 
constitutional duty when the House decided that, all things considered, 
terminating impeachment proceedings after cooperation between the 
Congress and the President improved was a better course of action than 
proceeding with impeachment based on his past actions, even though it 
apparently did so for reasons no more laudable than those that 
initiated the process.
    Impeachment was and remains an inherently political process, with 
all the pitfalls and promises that are thus put into play. Nothing in 
the document precludes the Congress from seeking means to resolve this 
or any other putative breach of duty short of removing him from office. 
In fact, the risky and potentially divisive nature of the impeachment 
process may counsel in favor of utilizing it only as a last resort.
    Of course, impeachment ought to be used if the breach of duty is 
serious enough--what the Congress was prepared to do in the case of 
Richard Nixon was the correct course of action. However, nothing in the 
Constitution precludes the congress from resolving this conflict in a 
manner short of impeachment.
    The crucial question--the question with which the country is 
currently struggling--is whether the President's breaches of conduct--
which are now well-known and which have been universally condemned--
warrant the ultimate political sanction. Are they serious enough to 
warrant removal?
    In answering that, we need to ask ourselves, what is in the best 
interest for the country?
    And while I have not decided what ultimately should happen, I do 
want to suggest that it is certainly constitutionally permissible to 
consider a middle ground as a resolution of this matter. Such an 
approach might bring together those of the President's detractors who 
believe there needs to be some sanction, but are willing to stop short 
of impeachment, as well as those of the President's supporters who 
reject impeachment, but are willing to concede that some sanction ought 
to be implemented.
    As a country, we have not often faced decisions as stark and 
potentially momentous as the impeachment of a President. On the other 
hand, we would be wise not to overstate such claims--surely we have 
faced some moments just as stark and serious as this one. We have 
survived those moments, and we will survive this one.
    Whatever the outcome of the present situation, I am confident that 
our form of government and the strength of our country present us not 
with any constitutional crisis, but rather with the constitutional 
framework and flexibility to deal responsibly with the decisions we 
face in the coming months.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
                     crimes and misdemeanors, high
    Let me say at the outset, that what President Clinton did was 
reprehensible. It was a horrible lapse in judgment and it has brought 
shame to him personally and to the office of the President. His actions 
have hurt his family, his friends, his supporters and the country as a 
whole. President Clinton has said this himself.
    Let me also say that I have not made any decision as to what I 
think should happen. I have not come to any conclusion as to what 
consequences the President should face for his shameful behavior. I 
believe the oath I have taken precludes me and other Senators from 
prejudging, as I may be required to serve as a judge and juror in the 
trial of the century.
    I can only make an assessment after hearing all of the evidence: 
evidence against the President, and evidence in support of the 
President.
    No one knows how this will turn out. However, I have given the 
topic some thought and would like to explore some of the issues that 
surely will confront responsible Members of Congress and all Americans 
as we enter this difficult period in our history.
    The Framers of the Constitution who met in Philadelphia in the 
summer 1787 considered offering the country a constitution that did not 
include the power to impeach the President. After all, any wrongs 
against the public could be dealt with by turning the President out in 
the next election.
    One delegate to the constitutional convention, Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina, worried that the threat of impeachment would place the 
President under the thumb of a hostile congress, thereby weakening the 
independence of the office and threatening the separation of powers. 
According to James Madison's notes, Pinckney called impeachment a 
``rod'' that congress would hold over the President.
    In being reluctant to include an impeachment power, the Framers 
were not trying to create an imperial presidency. In fact, what they 
were worried about was protecting all American citizens against the 
tyranny of a select group.
    In their view, the separation of powers constituted one of the most 
powerful means for protecting individual liberty, because it prevented 
government power from being concentrated in any single branch of 
government. To make the separation of powers work properly, each branch 
must be sufficiently strong and independent from the others.
    The Framers were concerned that any process whereby the legislative 
branch could sit in judgment of the President would be vulnerable to 
abuse by partisan factions. Federalist No. 65 begins its defense of the 
impeachment process by warning of the dangers of abuse. It argues that 
impeachments:
    ``Will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, 
and to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to 
the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by the 
real demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    So the Framers were fully aware that impeachment proceedings could 
become partisan attacks on the President--charged with animosities 
generated by all manner of prior struggles and disagreements, over 
executive branch decisions, over policy disputes, over resentment at 
losing the prior election. Federalist No. 65 expresses the view that 
the use of impeachment to vindicate these animosities would actually be 
an abuse of that power.
    This sentiment is as true today as it was when the constitution was 
being written. It was also true when Richard Nixon faced impeachment in 
1974. In fact, it would have been wrong for Richard Nixon to have been 
removed from office based upon a purely partisan vote. No President 
should be removed from office merely because one party enjoys a 
commanding lead in either house of the congress.
    Yet while the Framers knew that impeachment proceedings could 
become partisan, they needed to deal with strong anti-federalist 
factions.
    The anti-federalists strenuously argued that the federal government 
would quickly get out of step with the sentiments of the people and 
become vulnerable to corruption and intrigue, arrogance and tyranny. 
This charge proved close to fatal as the ratifying conventions in the 
states took up the proposed constitution.
    The Framers of the Constitution knew that the Constitution would 
have been even more vulnerable to charges of establishing a government 
remote from the people if the President were not subject to removal 
except at the time of re-election.
    James Madison's notes of the Philadelphia constitutional convention 
record his observations of the debate. He:
    ``Thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for 
defending the community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy 
of the chief magistrate [that is, the President]. The limitation of the 
period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might lose his 
capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration 
into a scheme of speculation or oppression. He might betray his trust 
to foreign powers.''
    So in the end, the Framers of the Constitution risked the abuse of 
power by the congress to gain the advantages of impeachment.
    Once the decision to include the power of impeachment had been 
made, the remainder of debate on the impeachment clauses focused on two 
issues:
          1. What was to constitute an impeachable offense or what were 
        the standards to be?
          2. How was impeachment to work or what were the procedures to 
        be?
    As we shall see, the Framers proved unable to separate these two 
issues entirely. Understanding how they are intertwined, however, helps 
us to understand the full implications of the power.
    The Constitution provides that ``the House of Representatives shall 
. . . have the power of impeachment.'' (Article I, Section 2, Clause 
5).
    The Framers decision that the House of Representatives would 
initiate the charges of impeachment follows the pattern of the English 
Parliament--where the House of Commons initiates charges of 
impeachment. Beyond this, the choice must have seemed fairly compelled 
by two related considerations.
    The first, already mentioned, was the need to provide the people as 
a whole with assurances that the government they were being asked to 
create would be responsive to the interests and concerns of the people 
themselves.
    The second was the Framers' substantive understanding of the 
impeachment power. It was a power to hold accountable government 
officers who had, in Hamilton's terms, committed ``an abuse or 
violation of some public trust'' thereby committing an injury ``done 
immediately to the society itself.''
    If the gravamen of an impeachment is the breach of the public's 
trust, no branch of the federal government could have seemed more 
appropriate to initiate such a proceeding than the House, which was 
conceived and defended as the chamber most in tune with the people's 
sympathies and hence most appropriate to reflect the people's views.
    The Constitution further provides that the President shall be 
``removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' (Article II, Section 
4).
    This language went through several changes during that summer of 
1787. In initial drafts, the grounds for impeachment were restricted to 
treason and bribery alone. When the matter was brought up on September 
8, 1787, George Mason of Virginia inquired as to why the grounds should 
be restricted to these two provisions.
    He argued that ``attempts to subvert the constitution may not be 
treason as above defined.'' Accordingly, he moved to add 
``maladministration'' as a third ground.
    James Madison objected to Mason's motion, contending that to add 
``so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of 
the senate.'' Here again, we see the worry that impeachment would be 
misused by the congress to reduce the independence of the President, 
allowing partisan factions to interfere at the expense of the larger 
public good.
    The objection apparently proved effective because mason 
subsequently withdrew the motion and substituted the phrase ``or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    What does the phrase mean? It is clear the Framers thought it to be 
limited in scope. But beyond this, constitutional scholars have been 
debating the meaning of this phrase from the very early days of the 
republic.
    Yet despite this on-going dialogue, I believe there are two 
important points of agreement as to the original understanding of the 
phrase, and a third issue where the weight of history suggests a 
settled practice.
    First, as we have already seen, the Framers did not intend that the 
President could be impeached for ``maladministration'' alone.
    Second, a great deal of evidence from outside the convention shows 
that both the Framers and ratifiers saw ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' as pointing to offenses that are serious, not petty, and 
offenses that are public or political, not private or personal.
    In 1829, William Rawle authored one of the early commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States. In it, Rawle states that ``the 
legitimate causes of impeachment . . . can only have reference to 
public character and official duty.''
    He went on to say, ``in general, those offences which may be 
committed equally by a private person as a public officer are not the 
subjects of impeachment.''
    In addition, more than one hundred fifty years ago, Joseph Story, 
in his influential Commentaries on the Constitution, stated that 
impeachment is:
    ``Ordinarily'' a remedy for offenses ``of a political character,'' 
``growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, 
or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the discharge of the 
duties of political office.''
    The public character of the impeachment offense is further 
reinforced by the limited nature of the remedy for the offense. In the 
English tradition, impeachments were punishable by fines, imprisonment 
and even death. In contrast, the American constitution completely 
separates the issue of criminal sanctions from the issue of removal 
from office.
    The Constitution states that ``judgment in cases of impeachment 
shall not extend further than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit 
under the United States.'' (Article I, Section 3, Clause 7).
    The remedy for violations of the public's trust in the performance 
of one's official duties, in other words, is limited to removal from 
that office and disqualification from holding future offices. Remedies 
that I might add, correspond nicely to the public nature of the 
offenses in the first instance.
    Additional support comes from yet another commentator, James 
Wilson, a delegate to the convention from Pennsylvania. In his lectures 
on the Constitution, Wilson wrote that ``in the United States and 
Pennsylvania, impeachments are confined to political characters, to 
political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.''
    All in all, the evidence is quite strong that impeachment was 
understood as a remedy for abuse of official power, breaches of public 
trust, or other derelictions of the duties of office.
    The third point to make about the scope of the impeachment power is 
this: to be impeachable, an offense does not have to be a breach of the 
criminal law.
    The renowned constitutional scholar and personal friend and 
advisor, the late Phillip Kurland, wrote that ``at both the convention 
that framed the constitution and at the conventions that ratified it, 
the essence of an impeachable offense was thought to be breach of trust 
and not violation of the criminal law. And this was in keeping with the 
primary function of impeachment, removal from office.''
    If you put the notion that an impeachable offense must be a serious 
breach of an official trust or duty, together with the point that it 
does not have to be a criminal violation, you reach the conclusion that 
not all crimes are impeachable, and not every impeachable offense is a 
crime.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    Reference has been made to an exchange between George Mason and 
James Madison at the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Mason is reported 
to have worried that a President might ``stop [an] inquiry'' into 
wrongdoing involving the President. Madison is reported to have replied 
that this concern was not substantial because the House of 
Representatives could impeach the President if he did so. The exchange, 
it has been argued, proves that the Framers viewed obstruction of 
justice as clearly an impeachable offense.
    A more extended look at the colloquy shows that Mason's precise 
concern was that the President would use his pardon power to pardon 
people whose investigations might reveal Presidential involvement in 
criminal activities. Mason used this concern as the basis for arguing 
that the pardon power should be placed in the House, and not with the 
President. To this concern, Madison replied that if the President so 
abused the pardon power, he could be impeached. So it was an action 
that abused an official power of the President that Madison thought was 
impeachable.
    Here is a condensed version of the exchange as reported in Eliot's 
Debates.
    Mr. GEORGE MASON, animadverting on the magnitude of the powers of 
the President, was alarmed . . . Now, I conceive that the President 
ought not to have the power of pardoning, because he may frequently 
pardon crimes which were advised by himself. It may happen, at some 
future day, that he will establish a monarchy, and destroy the 
republic. If he has the power of granting pardons before indictment, or 
conviction, may he not stop inquiry and prevent detection?
    Mr. MADISON, adverting to Mr. Mason's objection to the President's 
power of pardoning, said it would be extremely improper to vest it in 
the House of Representatives, and not much less so to place it in the 
Senate. . . . There is one security in this case to which gentlemen may 
not have adverted: if the President be connected, in any suspicious 
manner, with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will 
shelter him, the House of Representatives can impeach him. . . . This 
is a great security.''--[Memorandum, 2/9/99]
          * * * * * * *
     ii. the meaning of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' under the 
                              constitution
    The Constitution establishes that the President ``shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of Treason, Bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' That instrument, by design, does 
not contain an express definition of the phrase ``other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' The Framers intended the Constitution to endure for 
centuries and recognized that they could not provide a more specific 
definition that would justly serve the Nation's interest into an 
unknowable future. Instead, they wisely entrusted the construction and 
adaptation of that phrase to the judgment and conscience of the 
people's chosen representatives in Congress. Thus, the Senate is left 
to exercise what Alexander Hamilton termed our ``awful discretion'' to 
judge whether the President's conduct warrants removing him from 
office.
    While the Constitution calls upon each Senator to bring his or her 
good faith political judgment to bear on the meaning of the 
constitutional standard of ``other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' it 
does not abandon us to an ad hoc or partisan exercise of our 
discretion. Indeed, the Framers strongly urged in both the Philadelphia 
convention and the state ratifying conventions that the constitutional 
standard is not properly understood to allow impeachment to be used as 
a tool of partisan punishment. The Constitution itself, the history of 
its framing and ratification, and the construction given through 
faithful interpretation and practice since its ratification converge to 
provide powerful guidance for determining what offenses justify 
impeachment and conviction. These touchstones of constitutional 
interpretation reveal that high crimes and misdemeanors are great 
offenses characterized by two elements: (1) grave harm to the 
constitutional system of government that (2) results from official 
misconduct.
                     a. the history of impeachment
    The Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 because the government 
under the Articles of Confederation was so ineffectual as to have 
brought the fledgling union to ``the last stage of national 
humiliation.'' They intended to establish a government through which 
the people could effectively define and pursue the general welfare. To 
do so, the Framers understood that the government whose charter they 
were about to write would have to be entrusted with broad coercive 
powers to act directly upon American citizens. At the same time, the 
Framers were practical statesmen who understood that the powers 
necessary to make a government effective could be misused to make it 
potentially an instrument of oppression. Madison explained the dilemma:
    ``If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the 
next place oblige it to control itself.''
    To meet this potential threat to liberty, the Framers divided the 
federal government into three co-equal branches and further divided the 
legislative branch into two houses in order to require the concurrence 
of the branches before the government's coercive power could be brought 
to bear on the people. Thus, while Article 1, Section 1 of the 
Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress, this power is 
subject to Presidential veto and judicial review for constitutionality. 
Executive action generally requires a legislative basis or 
appropriation or other legislative support and is subject to judicial 
review.
    Finally, the establishment and jurisdiction of the federal courts 
generally depend upon legislative authorization, subject again to 
Presidential veto. Within this structure each branch is to be 
independent and is ``armed'' to defend itself against encroachments by 
the others. As Justice Robert Jackson observed, ``the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty. . . . It enjoins upon its 
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.''
    Maintaining the independence of the three branches of government 
dominated the debates regarding impeachment at the Constitutional 
Convention. Initially, the Framers considered offering the country a 
constitution that did not include the power to impeach the President. 
After all, any wrongs against the public could be dealt with by turning 
the President out in the next election. One delegate to the 
constitutional convention, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, worried 
that the threat of impeachment would place the President under the 
thumb of a hostile congress, thereby weakening the independence of the 
office and threatening the separation of powers. According to James 
Madison's notes, Pinckney called impeachment a ``rod'' that congress 
would hold over the President.
    In being reluctant to include an impeachment power, the Framers 
were not trying to create an imperial presidency; they were concerned 
about protecting all American citizens and the Nation as a whole. In 
their view, the separation of powers constituted one of the most 
powerful means for protecting individual liberty, because it prevented 
government power from being concentrated in any single branch of 
government. To make the separation of powers work properly, each branch 
must be sufficiently strong and independent from the others.
    The Framers' worry was largely animated by the concern that any 
process whereby the legislative branch could sit in judgment over the 
President would be vulnerable to abuse by partisan factions. Federalist 
No. 65 begins its defense of the impeachment process by warning of its 
potential for abuse. It argues that impeachments:
    ``Will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, 
and to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to 
the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by the 
real demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    The Framers were fully aware that impeachment proceedings could 
become partisan attacks on the President charged with animosities 
generated by all manner of prior struggles and disagreements over 
executive branch decisions, over policy disputes, over resentment at 
losing the prior election. Federalist No. 65 expresses the view that 
the use of impeachment to vindicate these animosities would actually be 
an abuse of that power.
    Although the Framers were concerned about impeachment proceedings 
becoming partisan, they needed to deal with strong anti-federalist 
factions. They were very aware that the anti-federalists strenuously 
urged that the federal government would quickly get out of step with 
the sentiments of the people and would become vulnerable to corruption 
and intrigue, arrogance and tyranny. This charge proved close to fatal 
as the ratifying conventions in the states took up the proposed 
constitution. The Framers of the constitution knew that the 
constitution would have been even more vulnerable to charges of 
establishing a government remote from the people if the President were 
not subject to removal at all except at the time of re-election.
    James Madison's notes of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention 
record his observations of the debate where he:
    ``Thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for 
defending the community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy 
of the chief magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service 
was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his 
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of 
speculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign 
powers.''
    So in the end, the Framers of the constitution risked the abuse of 
power by the Congress to gain the advantages of impeachment.
                b. the constitution's text and structure
    The Constitution does not define impeachable offenses, yet its text 
and structure provide clear manifestation that these words refer to 
official misconduct causing grave harm to our constitutional system of 
government. The starting point for any analysis of the Constitution's 
meaning must be its text, which in relevant part reads, ``the President 
. . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of 
Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    Here, the text sets forth a list that begins with terms that have 
definite meaning (treason, which is defined in the Constitution itself, 
and bribery, whose definition was fixed at common law) and proceeds to 
relatively indefinite terms, high crimes and misdemeanors. In this 
setting, two rules of construction, ejusdem generis and noscitur a 
sociis, instruct that the meaning of the indefinite terms are to be 
understood as similar in kind to the definite terms. Application of 
these canons of construction is bolstered here by the text itself. The 
indefinite element, ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' is introduced by 
the term ``other.'' This specifically refers the reader back to the 
preceding definite terms, treason and bribery, as supplying the context 
and parameters for the meaning of the indefinite phrase, ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors.''
    Every criminal offense, including such trivial infractions as 
parking offenses, involves public or societal harm. It is for this 
reason that criminal cases are titled, ``The State versus . . .'' or 
``The Government versus. . . .'' Each of the definite impeachable 
offenses, treason and bribery, are distinct in that they cause grave 
harm to the public not in some undifferentiated sense but in a way that 
strikes directly at our system of constitutional government. The 
Constitution defines treason as ``levying War against [the United 
States] or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort,'' 
which plainly involves the most serious offense against our system of 
government. Similarly, bribery inescapably involves a serious 
subversion of the processes of government. In describing the common 
characteristics of treason and bribery, Professor Charles Black of Yale 
Law School explained that each offense ``so seriously threaten[s] the 
order of political society as to make pestilent and dangerous the 
continuance in power of their perpetrator.''
    Furthermore, Professor Edwin Corwin quoted with approval the 
statement of Justice Benjamin Curtis who said in defense of President 
Andrew Johnson that ``treason and bribery . . . these are offenses 
which strike at the existence of [the] government. `Other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.' Noscitur a sociis. High crimes and misdemeanors; so 
high that they belong in this company with treason and bribery.''
    In this constitutional setting, the terms treason and bribery take 
on a second distinctive aspect. As used in Article II, Section 4, each 
term involves official misconduct. Bribery, by definition, occurs only 
where a public official undertakes an official act in return for 
payment or some other corrupt consideration. Likewise, treason 
necessarily involves official misconduct in the impeachment context. To 
be sure, it is possible for a private citizen to commit treason by 
giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States. It must be 
remembered that impeachment proceedings may be pursued only against 
civil officers of the United States. By limiting impeachable treason to 
civil officers, the Constitution expressly contemplates that treason 
will provide a grounds for impeachment and conviction only where a 
civil office is used to adhere to or aid the enemies of the United 
States.
    The textual construction expressed above--that high crimes and 
misdemeanors refer to grave harms to our constitutional system of 
government that result from official misconduct--comports with and 
draws significant support from the Constitution's structure. First, the 
structure reflects the Framers' conscious decision not to adopt a 
parliamentary system of government, in which the executive power is 
subordinate to and controlled by the legislature. The structure also 
reflects the Framers' judgment that the executive branch not be 
accorded primacy; their experience with the tyranny of the British 
monarchy was too recent to have permitted them to accept executive 
supremacy. Instead, the Constitution establishes three branches that 
are independent, strong, and co-equal. Construing the category of high 
crimes and misdemeanors too broadly would threaten the independence of 
the executive and judicial branches. This specific concern animated 
James Madison in the Philadelphia Convention and moved him to object to 
vague and potentially expansive formulations of the grounds upon which 
the President could be impeached and removed from office.
    The formulation of high crimes and misdemeanors must be understood 
as consistent with the Constitution's overall structure. In as much as 
the Constitution's structure specifically rejects the parliamentary 
form, the power of impeachment and removal must be construed and 
exercised in a way that respects this fundamental constitutional 
judgment. Understanding the grounds for impeachment to be limited to 
cases of official misconduct that cause serious harm to our system of 
government allows the Congress to protect the public against oppressive 
official action without undermining the necessary independence of the 
President or the judiciary.
    The Constitution's structure also supports limiting the category of 
impeachable offenses to those involving official misconduct. The 
constitutional separation of powers is designed to safeguard liberty 
against tyrannical or oppressive exercise of the government's power. In 
advocating the specific governmental structure erected in the 
Constitution, Madison repeatedly described the motivating concern to be 
establishing internal mechanisms, specifically the system of checks and 
balances, to control the federal government's power and minimize threat 
to the liberty of the people. This supports limiting the scope of 
impeachable offenses to official misconduct; that is, to conduct in 
which the civil officer misuses his or her official power. Other sorts 
of misbehavior by civil officers are simply beyond the concern of the 
separation of powers, of which the impeachment powers are a significant 
component. Indeed, the Constitution specifically provides that civil 
officers, including the President, remain subject to criminal 
prosecution and punishment for wrongdoing that does not involve 
official conduct.
     c. history of the debates and ratification of the constitution
    Moving beyond the text and structure of the Constitution itself, 
the debates at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, where the 
Constitution was drafted, and those in the subsequent state ratifying 
conventions provide important insight into the meaning of ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors.'' Close examination of these proceedings demonstrates 
that the Framers gave careful consideration to Congress' impeachment 
powers. This consideration led them to understand the Constitution as 
setting forth a very narrow category of impeachable offenses.
    Through most of the convention, the drafts of the Constitution 
denominated treason and bribery as the exclusive grounds for 
impeachment and removal of civil officers. In September 1787, as the 
convention was drawing to a close, Colonel George Mason and James 
Madison undertook colloquy that gave this provision its ultimate 
formulation. Because treason was expressly and narrowly defined in the 
Constitution itself, Mason was concerned that the impeachment power 
would not reach ``great and dangerous offenses'' and that ``attempts to 
subvert the Constitution may not be treason'' as defined in Article III 
of the Constitution. Mason moved to add ``maladministration'' as a 
catchall category. Significantly, this offense, which had been an 
accepted ground for impeachment in British practice, comprises 
exclusively official misconduct.
    Madison objected to this addition, not because it was too 
restrictive, but because it was too vague and so potentially too 
expansive. He feared that ``so vague a term will be equivalent to a 
tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.'' Here again it is clear that 
the Framers were concerned that impeachment would be misused by the 
Congress to reduce the independence of the President. In response Mason 
withdrew his own original motion and moved to add ``or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.'' His motion was quickly approved.
    The purpose of Mason's motions was to include all offenses that 
pose a threat to our system of constitutional government similarly to 
that posed by treason. Madison expressed the important concern that the 
expansion not be left so far open as to erode the essential 
independence of the other branches, and particularly of the President. 
In responding to Madison's concern, Mason must be understood to have 
intended to narrow a definition that already applied solely to official 
misconduct. The colloquy between Mason and Madison, then, strongly 
supports construing the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors to cover 
only official misconduct that threatens grievous harm to our 
governmental system.
    Madison was not alone in his concern that Congress might use 
impeachment as a tool for encroachments upon the executive branch. This 
concern was raised in various state ratifying conventions as well. For 
example, in supporting the Constitution at the Pennsylvania Convention, 
James Wilson repeatedly assured the delegates that only ``great 
injuries'' could serve as a basis for invoking impeachment. In his 
lectures on the Constitution, Wilson went on to say that ``in the 
United States and Pennsylvania, impeachments are confined to political 
characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political 
punishments.'' In the North Carolina Convention, several defenders of 
the Constitution, including James Iredell who was a delegate to the 
Philadelphia Convention and later became a Justice of the Supreme 
Court, argued that impeachment would ``arise from acts of great injury 
to the community.'' The debates surrounding ratification in New York 
produced the Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton explained that,
    ``[t]he subjects of [the Senate's impeachment] jurisdiction are 
those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in 
other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are 
of a nature which with peculiar propriety may be denominated POLITICAL, 
as they relate chiefly to injuries done to the society itself.''
    Like Hamilton, the founding generation understood impeachment to be 
a political remedy for political offenses. It is important to bear in 
mind what they meant by ``political.'' They meant that which relates to 
government and the pursuit of the general welfare; that which involves 
the system of government or ``society in its political character.'' 
They specifically did not mean political in the sense of partisan which 
the Framers affirmatively feared. Charles Pinckney, James Wilson, and 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, each decried construing the 
impeachment powers in ways that would allow these powers to be put to 
partisan ends. They lodged the power to try impeachments in the Senate 
precisely because they thought the Senate would have the necessary 
independence, stature, and impartiality to prevent the impeachment 
powers from becoming a tool of factionalism and partisanship. The 
Framers expected that the Senate was, among government institutions, 
uniquely capable of fidelity to the constitutional limits partisanship 
that the Framers understood to be implicit in the phrase high crimes 
and misdemeanors.
    Leading constitutional scholarship of the founding era reflects the 
same view of the intended narrow scope of high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Justice Joseph Story, in his pathbreaking Commentaries on the 
Constitution, looked to British practice to understand the scope of 
impeachment in the United States Constitution. Recognizing that the 
U.S. Constitution intended to confine impeachment to a narrower set of 
offenses than those permitted under British law, he observed that even 
in Great Britain, ``such kinds of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure 
the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust are the most 
proper and have been the most usual ground for this kind of prosecution 
in parliament.'' Story went on to say that impeachment is a remedy for 
offenses ``of a political character,'' ``growing out of personal 
misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of 
the public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political 
office.''
    The public character of the impeachment offense is further 
reinforced by the limited nature of the remedy for the offense. In the 
English tradition, impeachments were punishable by fines, imprisonment 
and even death. In contrast, the American Constitution completely 
separates the issue of criminal sanctions from the issue of removal 
from office. The Constitution states that ``judgment in cases of 
impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit 
under the United States.'' The remedy for violations of the public's 
trust in the performance of one's official duties, in other words, is 
limited to removal from that office and disqualification from holding 
future offices.
    Therefore, the Constitution contemplates both an impeachment and a 
criminal action as consequences for Presidents who commit impeachable 
offenses. This differs from the English model which only provides for 
criminal punishments after an impeachment conviction. If, however, a 
President engages in egregious but non-impeachable activity, the 
Constitution subjects the President to criminal liability. Impeachment 
therefore, is viewed not as a mechanism to punish a President, but 
rather a device to protect the populace. As Story said, impeachment 
proceedings are ``not so much designed to punish an offender as to 
secure the state against gross official misdemeanors.''
    Impeachment, therefore, is intended to preserve the constitutional 
form of government by removing from office an official who subverts the 
Constitution and is not intended to be a remedy for someone who breaks 
the law in connection with a private matter.
    At least one important early treatise writer, William Rawle, 
concluded that only official misconduct could provide a basis for 
impeachment. He contended that ``the causes of impeachment can only 
have reference to public character and official duty. . . . In general 
those which may be committed equally by a private person as a public 
officer are not the subject of impeachment.'' Additional support for 
this proposition comes from the renowned constitutional scholar, 
Phillip Kurland who wrote that ``at both the convention that framed the 
Constitution and at the conventions that ratified it, the essence of an 
impeachable offense was thought to be breach of trust and not violation 
of the criminal law. And this was in keeping with the primary function 
of impeachment, removal from office.'' Finally, additional support for 
this proposition comes from the United States Department of Justice. As 
a legal memorandum produced by the Justice Department's Office of Legal 
Counsel during impeachment proceedings against President Nixon 
observed, ``[t]he underlying purpose of impeachment is not to punish 
the individual, but is to protect the public against gross abuse of 
power.''
                d. constitutional practice and precedent
    Another important guide to the meaning of the Constitution is the 
construction applied throughout our history by those who have been 
charged with applying its provisions. The significance of 
constitutional practice is heightened in the absence of applicable 
judicial interpretation. As Justice Frankfurter stated:
    ``The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the way 
the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has 
operated according to its true nature. Deeply embedded traditional ways 
of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or 
legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply 
them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American 
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and 
to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.''
    In the history of the United States, the Senate has never convicted 
any President of an impeachable offense. This fact stands out as the 
sum total of the Senate's practical construction of the Constitution's 
impeachment provisions as they relate to the President of the United 
States. It must serve as a chilling call to self-restraint in 
construing those provisions.
    The Senate has convicted other civil officers of impeachable 
offenses, including high crimes and misdemeanors. There is reason to 
doubt whether these cases, mostly involving federal judges, provide 
directly analogous precedent for cases involving the President. First, 
the Madison-Mason colloquy and the debates in the state ratifying 
conventions demonstrate the Framers' primary concern was with the use 
of impeachment as a vehicle for encroachments on the President's 
structurally necessary independence from the legislature. Second, 
federal judges serve life terms and are not elected. The automatic 
removal of the President upon conviction of high crimes and 
misdemeanors has the widely remarked upon consequence of artificially 
altering the expected result of an election and thus is regarded as in 
tension with democratic principles. Moreover, because the President 
serves a limited term of four years, the need for an artificial removal 
mechanism is less urgent than it is in the case of judges who would 
otherwise serve an illimitable term.
    These caveats aside, an examination of congressional practice in 
the case of the fifteen officers who have been impeached by the House 
strongly supports construing high crimes and misdemeanors as aimed 
primarily at official misconduct that results in grave harm to our 
constitutional system of government. In every case, the misconduct 
cited as impeachable involved the misuse of office or the power of 
office. No case involved impeachment for conduct that did not involve 
the exercise of the impeached person's office or official power. The 
closest the Congress has come to impeaching and convicting an officer 
for conduct not involving abuse of office was the case of Judge Harry 
Claiborne. Judge Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from 
office for committing tax evasion. Superficially, this conduct did not 
itself involve his judicial office in any direct way. The income he was 
convicted of withholding, however, allegedly came from improper 
payments to him, which were made because of his judicial office. In 
their essence, then, the charges against him were charges of serious 
abuse of office involving what amounted to bribery, though the articles 
of impeachment did not formally recount the source of the income at the 
heart of the tax evasion case against Judge Claiborne. [Memorandum, 12/
22/98]
                           evidence, rules of
    Are the Federal Rules of Evidence Applicable? Neither the Senate 
nor its presiding officer, the Chief Justice, is required to follow the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in ruling on evidentiary objections during an 
impeachment trial. As a matter of practice these decisionmakers have 
relied upon the Federal Rules in considering evidentiary objections, 
but have not always excluded evidence that the Federal Rules would 
exclude or admitted evidence that the Federal Rules would allow. The 
Senate's approach has been to receive all evidence except where doing 
so would be unfair to one of the parties. In determining what is fair, 
the Senate has placed great weight on the Federal Rules.
    The refusal to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence is apparently 
based on the judgment that the Senate is highly sophisticated as a jury 
examining political crimes and weighing political remedies. 
Consequently, the Senate does not need the sort of protections that 
juries commonly require. The concern raised by not adopting the Federal 
Rules is that, where the only limit on the discretion of individual 
Senators is their sense of fairness, party-line voting may emerge and 
the impeachment process could come to be viewed as lacking the 
necessary impartiality.
    While the Senate has never accepted that it is bound by the Federal 
Rules, it may vote to require their application in a given case. In 
fact, the Senate did just that on at least one occasion. During the 
Rule XI committee deliberations in the impeachment trial of Judge Harry 
Claiborne, Senator Orrin Hatch argued that the committee should accept 
the Federal Rules as binding. Then-Senator Albert Gore argued against 
accepting the Federal Rules.
    Is the Starr Report Admissible? Either or both parties may seek to 
introduce the referral and supporting documentation that independent 
counsel Kenneth Starr submitted to the House Judiciary Committee. Much 
of this material would not be admissible in a judicial proceeding. The 
referral itself is not evidence, but a summation of evidence contained 
in the attachments. The attachments include grand jury testimony where 
witnesses were not subject to cross-examination and other material 
could represent hearsay.
    There is some precedent for admitting the record and proceedings 
from a judicial proceeding as substantive evidence in an impeachment 
trial. In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, one of the 
House Managers, then-Representative Michael DeWine, argued that the 
Rule XI committee should accept the record of the criminal trial in 
which Judge Claiborne was convicted of tax evasion charges. 
Specifically, Manager DeWine argued that accepting the evidence would 
establish an important precedent in favor of economy and efficiency in 
impeachment proceedings. The committee accepted DeWine's argument and 
received the trial record as substantive evidence.
    In Judge Claiborne's case, the committee agreed to receive evidence 
that had been subject to cross-examination by Judge Claiborne's 
attorneys. If the President's counsel objects to the Senate receiving 
the Starr report and supporting materials, he could distinguish the 
Claiborne precedent on the ground that the President's lawyers had no 
opportunity to cross examine grand jury witnesses.
    Is Evidence of Prosecutorial Misconduct Admissible? The President's 
counsel may seek to introduce evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The 
House Managers or Senators may object on the grounds that such evidence 
is irrelevant. Either the President committed high crimes or 
misdemeanors, or he did not; evidence relating to what the independent 
counsel may have done to investigate the President is beside the point.
    The President, however, would have a powerful contrary argument, 
particularly if the Starr report and supporting documents are admitted 
as substantive evidence. The report itself represents the conclusions 
drawn by the independent counsel. The supporting documents represent 
evidence and testimony collected by the independent counsel without 
opportunity for supplementation, challenge or cross-examination by the 
President. Understanding the independent counsel's bias or impartiality 
is crucial to assessing the weight and credibility of this type of 
evidence. For example, the independent counsel's office will have 
chosen to pursue certain lines of questioning with witnesses before the 
grand jury. If the independent counsel acted from bias, there is a 
reasonable inference that the roads the prosecutor chose not to follow 
would have revealed evidence favorable to the President. If, on the 
other hand, the independent counsel is impartial, one may reasonably 
infer that he sought to uncover all relevant information whether 
favorable or unfavorable to the President.
    In addition, if officials in the Office of the Independent Counsel 
threatened witnesses, that fact is relevant to assessing the 
credibility of the testimony and evidence given by those witnesses.
    In one previous case, the Rule XI committee voted to allow the 
defense to present evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, although it 
did not allow the defense to pursue elements of its theory that were 
purely speculative and highly dubious.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                            findings of fact
    Various proposals to have the Senate vote on ``findings of fact'' 
prior to a final vote on the articles of impeachment are circulating. 
The most onerous of these would ask the Senate to ``find'' that the 
President had violated federal laws against perjury and obstruction of 
justice.
    Under one presumed scenario, the findings of fact would pass, while 
the subsequent vote on the articles would fail. Thus, while the 
President would remain in office, his legacy would be besmirched by an 
impeachment trial's finding that he was guilty of crimes.
    There are several constitutional arguments against this procedure, 
each based on the fact that it is either equivalent to, or tantamount 
to, separating a vote on guilt or innocence from a vote on removal.
    Very early in the Senate's history, the Senate did in fact separate 
these two votes, notably in the case of Judge John Pickering. Pickering 
was charged with drunkenness, among other things, but not with any 
crimes. The Senate voted separately on whether he was guilty under the 
articles and then on whether or not he should be removed from office. 
(They voted to convict and to remove.)
    This procedure might signal that the Senate believed that in an 
impeachment trial a person could be found guilty by the Senate of 
offenses that did not rise to the level of ``treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Under that interpretation, the second 
vote would be necessary to establish whether or not the offenses 
justified removal from office.
    However, this possible interpretation of the trial procedure was 
repudiated in the 1936 impeachment trial of Judge Halstead Ritter, when 
the chair ruled that removal followed automatically from a finding of 
guilty, so that a separate vote on removal was not in order. The ruling 
was based on the text of Article II, Section 4, of the Constitution 
which provides that ``The President [and other civil officers] shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    The dominant view of constitutional scholars is that the chair's 
ruling in the Ritter case was correct. Notice that there are two 
significant components of the Ritter interpretation: (1) the President, 
vice President or other civil officers can only be impeached for 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' and (2) 
removal then follows by operation of Constitutional law upon 
conviction.
    Against this background, the proposed findings of fact could 
produce substantial constitutional mischief. Suppose they received a 
two-thirds vote. If the offenses outlined in the findings of fact are 
high crimes and misdemeanors, the President would have been removed 
from office by operation of Constitutional law.
    Suppose, further, that the Senate then took the final vote on the 
articles and on that vote the yeas were less than two-thirds. Looking 
strictly at this vote, the President has been acquitted, and remains in 
office.
    Who, then, is the President of the United States after these two 
votes have been cast--Bill Clinton or Al Gore? In other words, who 
decides whether the first vote convicted the President of high crimes 
and misdemeanors?
    Senators might well argue that the very fact that the Senate took 
the second vote proves that the first vote was not on offenses that 
justified removal. That would be an ironic position for many Republican 
Senators to be in, however, as many of them are on record defending the 
proposition that perjury and obstruction of justice are clearly 
impeachable offenses.
    One argument against the proposed findings of fact, then, is that 
it could create enormous uncertainty about who occupies the office of 
President. The impact of that uncertainty on foreign and domestic 
policy would potentially be quite great, infecting every official 
action the President might undertake. (Perhaps Bill Clinton and Al Gore 
could do everything in tandem--co-sign all official documents, co-
attend all foreign negotiations, etc.--thereby eliminating the legal 
ambiguities by creating a true co-presidency.)
    The uncertainty would, in all likelihood, result in litigation. 
Suit could be brought by someone adversely affected by a law ``signed'' 
by Bill Clinton that would otherwise have been pocket vetoed due to the 
adjournment of Congress, claiming that the bill never became law. Or it 
could be brought by someone seeking the benefits of a law that Bill 
Clinton had ``vetoed,'' claiming that the veto had no effect because 
Bill Clinton was not President.
    Even if such litigation would eventually lead to a resolution of 
the uncertainty, the country would suffer during the interim.
    There is a real possibility, however, that the Supreme Court would 
find the question of what constitutes a ``high crime and misdemeanor'' 
to be nonjusticiable. In United States v. Nixon, the Court held that 
nearly all questions regarding the Senate's power to try impeachments 
are nonjusticiable, and it might well so find in this instance, as 
well.
    Even if the findings of fact did not garner two-thirds support, a 
second argument against the findings of fact can be based on the two-
part Ritter interpretation of the impeachment power (i.e., impeachment 
available only for high crimes and misdemeanors; removal follows 
automatically from conviction). The contemplated bifurcated vote 
provides a mechanism for doing exactly what the Ritter interpretation 
and the prevailing view among scholars say the constitution does not 
permit: impeaching and convicting a person of lesser offenses than high 
crimes and misdemeanors.
    The consequences of sanctioning impeachment for ``low'' crimes and 
misdemeanors in this way are spelled out nicely in a draft op-ed by Jed 
Rubenfeld. He argues that if the Senate proceeds with the proposed 
findings of fact,
    ``[t]he Senate would then have taken another big step toward 
transforming impeachment into a tool of partisan politics.
    ``The Clinton Impeachment would then establish the proposition that 
it is a legitimate senatorial function in an impeachment proceeding to 
``find'' that the President committed crimes or serious misconduct (but 
not high crimes). In that case, why shouldn't a majority of the House 
impeach every President who has engaged in conduct worthy of censure? 
It would no longer matter whether this conduct rose to the level of 
high crimes and misdemeanors, for after all, one of the Senate's 
legitimate and proper functions would be to find that the President had 
committed ``low'' or ``medium'' crimes or other serious misconduct not 
requiring removal from office.
    ``If the Senate wants to censure the President, let it. But 
impeachment is not about finding criminal guilt or innocence, and it is 
not about censure. It is about removal from office. The Senate must 
vote, up or down, on conviction and removal. Anything less or in-
between is more partisan mud.''
    The idea that the House could routinely start up the Senate 
impeachment trial apparatus on the basis of offenses insufficient to 
constitute high crimes and misdemeanors because the bifurcated vote 
procedure supplied the Senate with a way to cope with such charges 
would probably have been anathema to the Framers, who thought that 
impeachment ought to be rarely used and reserved for the most serious 
breaches of public trust.
    Judge Bork agrees that the bifurcated approach poses serious 
separation of powers problems. He wrote in the February 1, edition of 
the Wall Street Journal:
    ``That course would also create an unconstitutional political 
weapon in the permanent struggle between the legislative and executive 
branches. Had the Isenbergh-Kmiec proposition been accepted during 
Iran-Contra, is there any doubt that the Democratic House and Senate 
would have impeached Ronald Reagan and, unable to convict him by a two-
thirds vote, adopted findings of fact by a majority vote that 
effectively condemned him as the perpetrator of high crimes and 
misdemeanors? This is precisely what the separation of powers does not 
allow and what anyone who thinks ahead should disavow.''
    (The Isenbergh-Kmiec proposition mentioned by Judge Bork refers to 
a law review article by Professor Isenbergh of Chicago Law School 
arguing that the Ritter interpretation is wrong--that in fact people 
can be impeached under the Constitution for offenses less than high 
crimes and misdemeanors, in which case lesser sanctions than removal 
are also available to the Senate.)
    These are powerful arguments. There are responses to them, however, 
which I believe make the ultimate judgment as to whether or not the 
bifurcated procedure passes constitutional muster open to reasonable 
disagreement.
    As to the complaint that the procedure unconstitutionally 
bifurcates a unitary vote, the complaint just misconceives what the 
findings of fact motion is. It is not a vote on guilt or innocence of 
impeachable offenses at all because it doesn't by its terms convict the 
President of anything. It is antecedent to any question of conviction 
for impeachable offenses or of remedy. It leaves Senators free to vote 
any way they wish on guilt or innocence and thus does not split up the 
conviction/remedy questions. If necessary, this could be made crystal 
clear through careful drafting, such as by phrasing the motion as, 
``Without prejudice to the final question of guilt or innocence on any 
of the articles of impeachment, the Senate finds . . .''
    This interpretation also responds to the complaint urged by 
Rubenfeld and echoed by Bork. Because the findings of fact are 
toothless as regards guilt or innocence, passing such a motion is not 
equivalent to convicting the President of low crimes and misdemeanors. 
The Rubenfeld-Bork objection would lie if and only if the Senate 
purported to convict the President of such offenses, and then sought to 
avoid removing him by rejecting the articles. But it is not doing that 
when it makes findings of fact. Because such findings lack any 
conceivable juridical effect, they are no more offensive to the 
Constitution than a censure resolution.
    One could even imagine a findings of fact motion serving a purpose 
that would be beneficial to the impeachment process. Findings of fact 
could help provide a clear historical record as to what this United 
States Senate believed did not rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses (or did rise to that level, depending upon the outcome of the 
vote on conviction). Historically, the Senate has left to each 
individual Senator the responsibility to make an overall unitary 
determination as to the facts that have been proven, the requisite 
burden of proof as to those facts, and the ultimate consequences that 
flow from those facts, taking into account both the costs of retaining 
the civil officer in office as well as the costs of removing him or 
her. It could be argued that our constitutional practices would be just 
as well served if the basis for the final judgment was expressed in 
more discrete and articulated collective judgments, first as to the 
facts proven, and then as to their consequences.
    This last point runs counter to the Senate's current rules and 
practices, of course. Rule XXIII of the rules of impeachment provides 
that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose 
of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' This provision was 
adopted in 1986. Some of its legislative history is pertinent:
    ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the division 
of an individual article into separate specifications is proposed to 
permit the most judicious and efficacious handling of the final 
question both as a general matter and, in particular, with respect to 
the form of the articles that proposed the impeachment of President 
Richard Nixon. The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of 
embodying an impeachable offense in an individual article but, in 
respect to the first and second of those articles, set out broadly 
based charges alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a 
recital of transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The 
wording of Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could 
be had thereunder if supported by `one or more of the' enumerated 
specifications. The general view of the Committee at that time was 
expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom felt that division 
of the articles in question into potentially 14 separately voted 
specifications might `be time consuming and confusing, and a matter 
which could create great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will . 
. .' ''
    The rule and its history suggest that the Senate currently operates 
under a norm of maximum individual Senatorial autonomy in reaching an 
overall unitary judgment as to guilt or innocence, without the 
interposition of potentially divisive antecedent motions seeking to 
clarify exactly what acts the Senate as a body has found the accused to 
have committed.
    It is possible to object to the proposed findings of fact as being 
inconsistent with Rule XXIII. The rejoinder to that objection, of 
course, is a version of what has already been stated: the findings need 
not be construed as ``dividing'' any article of impeachment, but rather 
as a motion antecedent to an eventual vote on the articles. Still, the 
findings do seem inconsistent with the spirit of Rule XXIII and with 
its evident intention to avoid divisive preliminary votes of this kind.
    Putting aside constitutional or rule-based objections to the 
proposed findings of fact, Rubenfeld-Bork make a very powerful 
practical argument that this bifurcation will have pernicious 
consequences. We are currently living through proof of how all-
consuming an impeachment and trial of a President can be. The country 
loses time and attention that could be devoted to constructive matters 
of public interest, trust in the ability of elected officials to work 
together by placing the Nation's business first is eroded, and the 
Presidency is placed under a cloud of uncertainty during the pendency 
of the proceedings. Lowering the impeachment bar through the use of 
this bifurcated procedure would be unwise and, as suggested earlier, 
would most likely be viewed with alarm by the Framers who drafted the 
impeachment power into the Constitution.
    There is, finally, an argument that such findings would amount to 
an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. The risk that such findings 
would be found to be an unconstitutional ``trial by legislature'' is 
enhanced (a) by the fact that under some of the proposals, the finding 
would be that the President had violated the law; (b) by the fact that 
the findings would occur in the context of a Senate trial.
    Such Senate action could well have an adverse effect on President 
Clinton's bar membership. Bar rules disqualify individuals who have 
been convicted of perjury or obstructed justice. If those consequences 
followed from the Senate action, they could be construed as punishment, 
thus bringing the findings of fact within the constitutional 
prohibition on bills of attainder.--[Memorandum, 2/2/99]
                     impeachment rules, changes to
    The existing Senate Rules establish the basic contours of how an 
impeachment trial will proceed. Many questions remain open, however--
just as in civil cases, the federal rules of civil procedure provide 
the basic contours, but the actual route traveled by any trial depends 
upon the particular facts and law of each case, the motions that 
parties choose to bring, and, in general, the manner in which the 
parties choose to litigate the matter.
    This section highlights the major questions that deserve 
examination before the trial begins. It also discusses the available 
mechanisms for resolving outstanding procedural issues.
    Should any of the existing rules be modified? The existing Rules 
were last amended in 1986. Should the Senate wish to revise any of 
them, motions to do so would be in order on the first day and would be 
fully debatable. Once the actual trial begins motions are not 
debatable, and a motion to suspend, modify, or amend the rules would 
require unanimous consent. Before the trial begins (the period between 
the exhibition of the articles of impeachment and the presentation of 
opening statements by the parties), Senate precedent supports allowing 
debate on preliminary motions that relate to how the Senate will 
organize itself to conduct the trial. It appears that such motions are 
subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate, and not the limitations on 
debate contained in the impeachment Rules. Thus, they could be 
filibustered during the pre-trial stage. As a motion to suspend, 
modify, or amend the rules, any such motion would be subject to a 
heightened cloture requirement. Standing Rule XXII requires a two-
thirds vote to invoke cloture and end debate on a motion to suspend, 
modify, or amend the rules.
    The impeachment rules provide for the proceedings to be ``double-
tracked'' (with legislative business conducted in the morning session 
and the impeachment trial conducted in the afternoon). Even after the 
trial has commenced, then, a motion to suspend, modify, or amend could 
be made in a morning legislative session, but would be subject to 
filibuster with a two-thirds cloture requirement.--[Memorandum, 12/28/
98]
                         obstruction of justice
    The House relies on two different federal obstruction of justice 
statutes. The first, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, is the general obstruction of 
justice statute. The second, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b), addresses witness 
tampering.
    A. Elements of the General Obstruction of Justice Statute
    To establish a violation of the general obstruction of justice 
statute (Sec.  1503), the government must prove each of the following:
          (1) that there was a pending judicial proceeding;
          (2) that the defendant knew this proceeding was pending; and
          (3) that the defendant corruptly influenced, obstructed, or 
        impeded the due administration of justice or endeavored to 
        corruptly influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration 
        of justice.
    The first two elements are straightforward. The third element is 
more complex. In general:
    ``Corruptly'' means to engage in an act voluntarily and 
deliberately for the purpose of improperly influencing, obstructing, or 
interfering with the administration of justice.
    ``Endeavor'' means that the defendant also knowingly and 
deliberately acted or made an effort which had a reasonable tendency to 
bring about the desired result of interfering with the administration 
of justice.
    The defendant must engage in misconduct that has the ``natural and 
probable effect'' of interfering with the due administration of 
justice. He need only ``endeavor'' to obstruct justice; he need not 
succeed.
    B. Elements of the Witness Tampering Statute
    To establish a violation of the witness tampering statute (Sec.  
1512(b)), the government must establish that the defendant:
          (1) knowingly
          (2) corruptly persuaded another person or attempted to do so, 
        or engaged in misleading conduct toward another person
          (3) with the intent--
                  to influence, delay, or prevent a witness's testimony 
                from being presented at official federal proceedings,
                  to cause or induce any person to withhold testimony 
                or physical evidence from an official federal 
                proceeding; or
                  to prevent a witness from reporting evidence of a 
                crime to federal authorities.
    Unlike the general obstruction of justice statute, the witness 
tampering statute does not require that the defendant's misconduct be 
committed during the pendency of federal proceedings. Thus, the 
defendant need not be aware of any pending or contemplated federal 
proceedings or investigations at the time he engages in his obstructive 
conduct. Nonetheless, it must be proved that the defendant intended by 
his prohibited conduct to obstruct a federal proceeding or the 
reporting of a federal crime.
    There is no judicial consensus as to the meaning of ``corrupt 
persuasion,'' but several courts have defined the term to mean that the 
defendant's attempts to persuade ``were motivated by an improper 
purpose.''
    The term ``misleading conduct'' is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec.  1515 
to include (A) knowingly making a false statement; (B) intentionally 
omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of 
such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material 
fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement; (C) 
with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting reliance on a 
writing or recording that is false, forged, altered, or otherwise 
lacking in authenticity.
    At least one court has held that a defendant violates the witness 
tampering statute when he tells a potential witness a false story as if 
the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and 
testify to it before the grand jury.--[Memorandum, 1/15/99]
                                perjury
    Under federal law, a witness commits grand jury perjury if shown, 
when under oath before a federal grand jury, to have made a: knowingly 
false declaration that is of a material matter that the grand jury has 
the power to investigate. Proof only of an intent to mislead is not 
sufficient for a perjury conviction.
    ``Knowingly false declarations'' can be proved by evidence that the 
individual did not believe a declaration to be true at the time it was 
made.
    Only unambiguous questions can form the basis of perjury 
convictions. If a question can reasonably be interpreted in multiple 
ways, perjury cannot be based only on the questioner's intended meaning 
and there must be evidence of what the person answering understood when 
responding.
    Grand jury perjury can not be based on an answer that was literally 
true even if misleading and nonresponsive to the question asked. The 
burden is on the questioner to identify evasive answers and press for 
clarity at the time rather than let it pass and charge perjury later.
    Grand jury perjury convictions can be based on the testimony of a 
single uncorroborated witness. And, even if no single statement can be 
shown to be knowingly false, perjury can be shown if the individual 
knowingly made multiple material declarations under oath that are 
``inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false.''
    A ``material matter'' for perjury convictions under federal law 
must have had some bearing on the substantive elements of the issues 
that the grand jury was convened to investigate and would have some 
bearing on influencing or impeding that investigation, regardless of 
whether the statement actually was misleading on a particular point.
    The Minority Views in the House Report argue that because the judge 
in the Jones sexual harassment case ruled in January 1998 that evidence 
relating to Monica Lewinsky was not ``essential to the core issues in 
that case,'' Jones' lawyers could not have introduced evidence about 
her relationship with the President in order to attack his credibility 
in that suit, so that his statements on the subject are not material 
under perjury law.--[Memorandum, 12/30/98]
                        president, indictment of
    The New York Times recently reported that Ken Starr and his staff 
have recently concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit them 
from indicting and prosecuting President Clinton while he is still in 
office. The independent counsel has a legitimate reason for seeking an 
indictment before the end of President Clinton's term. The grand jury 
that is currently impaneled and that has heard all the evidence will 
expire by August. If the Independent Counsel waits until the President 
leaves office, he will have to impanel a new grand jury and present 
evidence all over again.
    This memorandum reviews the constitutional issues that would be 
raised if a prosecutor were to attempt to indict and prosecute a 
sitting President. It concludes that the Constitution permits a 
prosecutor to indict a sitting President, but does not allow the 
prosecutor to proceed to prosecute the indictment until the President's 
term has expired. Although the Constitution does not forbid indictment 
of a sitting President, there are significant prudential arguments 
counseling against such a move. Moreover, there may be a statutory 
impediment to indicting the President.
                                i. text
    Until recently, numerous commentators interpreted the 
Constitution's text to prohibit criminal prosecution of any officer 
before the officer was impeached and removed. The only provision on 
point states, ``Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; 
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.'' Article 
I, section 3. This interpretation reads the phrase ``the party 
convicted shall nevertheless . . .'' to mean that only parties who have 
been convicted are subject to judicial process. In other words, 
impeachment and conviction are a prerequisite to judicial process.
    The better reading has always been that the Constitution's text is 
ambiguous. It can just as easily be understood to mean that impeachment 
and conviction, if that should occur first, are not a bar to judicial 
process. This interpretation has been vindicated by recent practice. 
The three judges impeached and convicted in the late 1980s were all 
indicted and prosecuted criminally first. In addition, Vice President 
Spiro Agnew was indicted while in office, as was sitting Vice President 
Aaron Burr in 1804. The provision cited does not distinguish between 
the President and other officers subject to impeachment. Thus, if the 
President is to be treated differently than other impeachable officers, 
it must be on some basis other than the Constitution's text.
                             ii. structure
    Even the most originalist minded constitutional scholars do not 
limit their arguments to those based on language alone. They also argue 
based on the structure of the document taken as a whole. Shifting the 
focus from text to structure, there is strong reason to conclude that 
the Constitution does not forbid indictment of a sitting President but 
that it does prohibit taking the further step of prosecuting him 
criminally.
    The Constitution structures the federal government by dividing it 
into three branches. In order to safeguard liberty, each of these 
branches must be fully functioning at all times. Anything that 
significantly impairs the President's ability to act as a check on the 
other branches may violate the Constitution's structural safeguards. By 
contrast, there are hundreds of district court judges. A criminal 
proceeding against one of them has only remote ramifications for the 
constitutional role of the judiciary as a collective institution.
    The constitutional status of the President is unique, and 
materially distinguishable from that of other impeachable officers, 
such as district court judges or even the Vice President. First, the 
President, of course, is the head of one of the three constitutional 
branches of government. The other branches have collective heads. The 
legislative branch is headed by the entire Congress, while the 
judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court. To indict and prosecute the 
President is in this sense the constitutional equivalent of indicting 
and prosecuting the entire Congress or the entire Supreme Court.
    Second, the presidency is a uniquely consuming office. Its occupant 
is perpetually on duty. Nearly every President from George Washington 
through George Bush has expressed just how consuming the office is. For 
example, Lyndon Johnson related that ``Of the 1,885 nights I was 
President there were not many when I got to sleep before 1 or 2 a.m. 
and there were few mornings when I didn't wake up by 6 or 6:30.'' The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides for 
Presidential succession in the case of disability, recognizes not only 
how consuming the office is, but how critical it is that the office be 
filled at all times.
    Third, the President acts as the embodiment of the Nation on the 
international stage and even in domestic matters. As Justice Robert 
Jackson reminded us, the Presidential office locates the executive 
power ``in a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, 
making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, 
magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that 
almost alone he fills the public eye and ear.''
    Against this structural argument stand rule of law considerations. 
The continuing vitality of the rule of law as a fundamental principle 
requires that the President be subject to law as are all citizens. This 
commitment is voiced in the President's constitutional duty to ``take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' The primary purpose of 
this provision is to make it clear that the President, unlike the King 
of England, has no ``dispensing power,'' that is, no power to declare a 
law inapplicable to himself or anyone else. Similarly, the courts have 
placed great weight on the integrity of the criminal justice system. In 
a variety of executive privilege cases, the courts have placed a great 
premium on according prosecutors access to evidence and on preserving 
evidence.
    Determining whether the Constitution permits either indictment or 
prosecution of a sitting President requires balancing these 
considerations.
      punishments upon conviction of high crimes and misdemeanors
    If the Senate convicts the President of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, the Constitution requires that he be removed from office. 
``The President--shall be removed from office upon impeachment for and 
conviction of--high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The Constitution allows 
the Senate to impose an additional punishment upon convicting the 
President; it may disqualify the President from holding any office of 
honor, trust or profit. Odd as it sounds, this disqualification 
probably does not apply to membership in the House of Representatives 
or the Senate. This is because the text of the Constitution, in several 
clauses, makes it clear that members of Congress are not ``officers.'' 
The very first impeachment trial proceeded against Senator Blount. 
Senator Blount was acquitted and many Senators refused to convict on 
the basis of their constitutional interpretation that a Senator is not 
an officer and so is not subject to impeachment.--[Memorandum, 12/28/
98]
          * * * * * * *
    Very early in the Senate's history, the Senate did in fact separate 
these two votes, notably in the case of Judge John Pickering. Pickering 
was charged with drunkenness, among other things, but not with any 
crimes. The Senate voted separately on whether he was guilty under the 
articles and then on whether or not he should be removed from office. 
(They voted to convict and to remove.)
    This procedure might signal that the Senate believed that in an 
impeachment trial a person could be found guilty by the Senate of 
offenses that did not rise to the level of ``treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Under that interpretation, the second 
vote would be necessary to establish whether or not the offenses 
justified removal from office. However, this possible interpretation of 
the trial procedure was repudiated in the 1936 impeachment trial of 
Judge Halstead Ritter, when the chair ruled that removal followed 
automatically from a finding of guilty, so that a separate vote on 
removal was not in order. The ruling was based on the text of Article 
II, Section 4, of the Constitution which provides that ``The President 
[and other civil officers] shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    The dominant view of constitutional scholars is that the chair's 
ruling in the Ritter case was correct. Notice that there are two 
significant components of the Ritter interpretation: (1) the President, 
vice President or other civil officers can only be impeached for 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' and (2) 
removal then follows by operation of Constitutional law upon 
conviction.--[Memorandum, 2/2/99]
                         role of chief justice
    The Chief Justice of the United States is the Presiding Officer 
over the Senate's deliberations when the President has been impeached. 
His role is loosely analogous to that of a trial judge, but with less 
ultimate authority. He directs preparations for the trial, as well as 
the trial proceedings themselves. Under the precedent of the Johnson 
trial, the Chief Justice can make rulings on all evidentiary and 
procedural motions and objections, although he can also refer them 
directly to the Senate for its determination (this was in fact Chief 
Justice Chase's practice on evidentiary motions made during the Johnson 
trial). His rulings can be overruled by majority vote of the Senators 
present and voting.
    The Constitution dictates that the Chief Justice acts as the 
presiding officer during an impeachment trial of the President. The 
extent and content of his role is subject to determination by the 
Senate. There could be sentiment to expand his powers, such as by 
making him the chair of a Rule XI committee, on the theory that the 
Chief Justice will be non-partisan and impartial. Other powers that 
might be granted to the Chief Justice could include authority to 
conduct pre-trial proceedings or to oversee settlement negotiations. If 
the Chief Justice is perceived as impartial, his rulings on evidence 
and other motions will carry great weight and place a heavy burden on 
anyone seeking to overrule them. On the other hand, a determined 
majority can substantially minimize the effect of the Chief Justice on 
the proceedings by reversing his rulings and refusing to grant him 
powers beyond the inherent powers of the presiding officer.--
[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                         role of house managers
    The House of Representatives appoints a delegation of its own 
members to serve as prosecutors of the impeachment. These managers 
exhibit the articles of impeachment and perform all functions normally 
performed by a prosecutor. They make an opening and closing statement 
on the case, decide what evidence to present and what witnesses to 
call, subject to the Senate's decision to issue a subpoena to compel 
attendance of involuntary witnesses. The managers lead examination of 
witnesses they offer and cross-examine witnesses called by the 
President's counsel. They may also make procedural, evidentiary, and 
other motions.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                      role of president's counsel
    The President may choose an attorney or agent to present his 
defense. These attorneys perform the same functions in defense of the 
President as the House Managers perform in behalf of the impeachment. 
Neither the President's Counsel nor the House Managers may appeal a 
ruling of the Chief Justice. Only a member of the Senate may do that.--
[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                           role of the senate
    [The constitutional text, the Framers' understanding, and our 
constitutional practices] Provide important anchors for any impeachment 
inquiry, but they do not resolve all questions of scope that may arise. 
Much remains to be worked out--and only to be worked out--in the 
context of particular circumstances and allegations.
    As Hamilton explained in the Federalist No. 65, impeachment ``can 
never be tied down by . . . strict rules, either in the delineation of 
the offence by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the 
judges. . . .''
    After all of the legal research, we are still left with the 
realization that the power to convict for impeachment constitutes an 
``awful discretion.''
    This brings us directly to the Senate's role. To state it bluntly: 
I believe the role of the Senate is to resolve all the remaining 
questions. Let me elaborate.
    The Senate's role as final interpreter of impeachments was 
recognized from the beginning of the republic. For example, to refer 
again to Joseph Story, after he devoted almost fifty sections of his 
commentaries to various disputed questions about the impeachment power, 
he concluded that the final decision on the unresolved issues ``may be 
reasonably left to the high tribunal, constituting the court of 
impeachment.''
    The court of impeachment he refers to is the United States Senate. 
Similarly, the Federalist Papers refer to Senators as the judges of 
impeachment.
    Speaking of the Senate as the jury in impeachment trials is perhaps 
a more common analogy these days, but the judge analogy is more 
accurate.
    In impeachment trials, the Senate certainly does sit as a finder of 
fact, as would a jury. But it also sits as a definer of the applicable 
standards, as would a judge.
    The Senate, in other words, determines not only whether the accused 
has performed the acts that form the basis for the House's Articles of 
Impeachment, but also whether those actions justify removal from 
office.
    Once again we find support for this view from the country's 
history. In 2 of the first 3 impeachments brought forward from the 
House to the Senate, the Senate acquitted the accused.
    In each of the two acquittals, however, the Senate did not disagree 
with the House on the facts. One case involved a Senator, William 
Blount, the other an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Samuel 
Chase. In neither one was there any question that the individuals had 
done the deeds that formed the basis of the House's Articles of 
Impeachment.
    In each case, however, the Senate concluded that the deeds were not 
sufficient to constitute valid grounds for impeachment and so they 
acquitted.
    Eventually, then, if the current impeachment proceeds, it will fall 
to the Senate to decide not only the facts, but the law, and to 
evaluate whether or not the specific actions of the President are 
sufficiently serious to warrant impeachment.
    The Framers intended that the Senate have as its objective doing 
that what was best for the country, taking context and circumstance 
fully into account.
    I should try to be as clear as I can be about this point, because 
the media discussion has come close to missing it. It seems to be 
widely assumed that if the President committed perjury, then he must be 
impeached and convicted.
    Conversely, you may think that unless it can be proven that the 
President committed perjury or violated other laws, impeachment cannot 
occur.
    Both statements are wrong. Not all crimes are impeachable, and not 
every impeachable offense is a crime.
    The Senate could decline to convict even if the President has 
committed perjury, if it concluded that under the circumstances, this 
perjury did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach of duty to 
warrant removal of this President. On the other hand, the Senate could 
convict the President of an impeachable offense even if it were not a 
violation of the criminal law. For instance, if the Senate concluded 
that the President had committed abuses of power sufficiently grave, it 
need not find any action to amount to a violation of some criminal 
statute.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    The Senators have a multifaceted role that defies a simple label. 
They act in part as a jury, which considers evidence and makes the 
ultimate determination of whether to convict or acquit the President. 
This role explains the limitations that the rules impose on the ability 
of Senators to debate or discuss motions and evidence in open session.
    Senators also act as judges, with authority to decide whether a 
ruling by the Chief Justice should stand. This law interpreting role is 
also a component of the ultimate decision on conviction or acquittal. 
Senators must determine not only whether the factual allegations 
against the President are true, they must also determine whether the 
facts alleged, if true, represent a high crime and misdemeanor.
    Senators may also take actions that resemble those typically 
undertaken by counsel for the parties. They may propound questions 
(though only in writing) of witnesses or of counsel; they may make 
objections to questions by counsel or to evidence sought to be 
introduced; and they may make any motion that a party may make.
    The Senate has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses by 
instructing the Chief Justice to issue subpoenas and to enforce 
obedience to its orders. The Senate also has authority to punish 
summarily contempts of and disobedience to its orders, although the 
rules of impeachment do not specify the penalties it may impose. Under 
the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Senate can also refer a contempt 
citation to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for 
prosecution pursuant to 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  191-194 for criminal 
prosecution.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                            trial, nature of
    The Constitution assigns the Senate the sole power to try all 
impeachments. This power imposes upon the Senate a duty to adjudicate 
every case in which the House of Representatives impeaches a civil 
officer of the United States. The Framers were deeply concerned that 
impeachment could become a partisan tool used to gain control and 
influence over civil officers, and the President in particular. They 
entrusted to the Senate the role of adjudicating impeachments because 
the Senate's structurally conferred capacity for deliberation, 
independence, and impartiality would allow it to act as a check against 
partisanship. The Constitution fortifies the Senate in this role by 
providing that conviction requires a vote of two-thirds of the members 
present.
    The Constitution, however, does not define the Senate's power to 
``try'' impeachments and appears to leave broad discretion for the 
Senate to interpret it as allowing whatever method of inquiry and 
examination is best suited to a given case. Justice White declared 
emphatically that ``the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying 
impeachment trial procedures. . . .'' The constitutional power, and 
corresponding duty, to try impeachments does not absolutely require the 
full Senate or a committee to take live witness testimony subject to 
cross-examination. The Senate has routinely entertained and voted on 
motions for summary adjudication. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
that the Senate would be constitutionally required to hold live 
evidentiary proceedings in every conceivable impeachment case. If, for 
example, the House were to impeach an official who is not a civil 
officer, it would be absurd to construe the Constitution to require the 
Senate to go forward with an evidentiary proceeding. Similarly, if the 
House were to impeach a civil officer on the grounds of misconduct that 
is not properly considered a high crime or misdemeanor, no 
constitutional purpose is served by an evidentiary hearing.
    Even if an impeachment meets all of the constitutional criteria to 
invoke a Senate trial, evidentiary proceedings may be unnecessary. It 
is well-established that the House Managers charged with prosecuting 
the impeachment may introduce the record of other proceedings as 
substantive evidence in the Senate trial. The House Managers have 
independent discretion over their prosecution of the case, and may 
decide to rest their case on the documentary record. In addition, the 
impeached defendant may choose to present no affirmative evidence in 
his defense. Where the parties have decided that the documentary record 
is sufficiently encompassing to allow adjudication, the Constitution 
does not require the Senate to ferret out additional evidence.
    Strong support for summary adjudication as a faithful discharge of 
the Senate's constitutional duty to try impeachments can also be found 
in the operation of the federal judiciary. The constitution guarantees 
``the right of trial by jury'' in ``suits at common law.'' There is a 
tension between the right to trial by jury and summary adjudication by 
the court. Where a federal court grants summary judgment or dismisses a 
lawsuit, for example because it fails to state a claim, there is no 
trial at all, let alone a trial by jury. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the authority of the federal courts to grant motions 
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. There would seem to be 
even less concern regarding summary adjudication in the context of a 
Senate impeachment trial. This is because the Senate acts as both judge 
(finder of law) and juror (finder of fact) so there is no concern about 
the proper allocation of the adjudicative function between judge and 
jury.
    The Constitution imposes upon the Senate a duty to try impeachments 
so that the Senate can act as a check against partisan abuse of the 
impeachment process. Fidelity to the Constitution requires the Senate 
carefully to interpret the law of impeachment as set forth in the 
Constitution and to apply that law to the facts and circumstances of 
every impeachment approved by the House of Representatives. As with the 
federal judiciary, this adjudicative duty, however, does not require 
the Senate to discover new evidence or to hold evidentiary proceedings 
where the record does not warrant.--[Memorandum, 12/22/98]
          * * * * * * *
           i. the history of presidential impeachment trials
    We have had exactly one impeachment trial of a President, Andrew 
Johnson, in 1868. This resulted in his acquittal by a single vote. In 
1974, the House Judiciary Committee voted to send articles of 
impeachment with respect to President Richard Nixon to the House floor, 
but President Nixon resigned shortly thereafter, and the articles were 
never voted on by the full House.
    However, fourteen other impeachment trials have been held in the 
Senate over the country's history. In preparation for these trials, 
almost all of which involved federal judges, the Senate has developed a 
set of standing Rules of Procedure and Practice for such trials, as 
well as a body of precedent concerning questions of procedure that have 
arisen and been answered in previous trials. These rules and precedent 
provide a good basic outline to how the trial of President Clinton will 
proceed in the Senate, unless they are altered or amended prior to the 
beginning of President Clinton's trial.
           ii. current senate rules of procedure and practice
    Senate procedures while hearing an impeachment are strikingly 
different from those that operate during normal legislative and 
executive business. Senators are combinations of judges and jurors. 
Senators take an oath to do ``impartial justice.'' They cannot debate 
or discuss matters in open session. They are expected to commit 
questions to writing and send them to the Presiding Officer. The Senate 
when sitting to consider impeachment is a very different body than the 
Senate we are used to seeing on C-SPAN.
    Major points to bear in mind:
    The trial and its rules take precedence over normal business. Once 
the trial begins, the rules set forth a schedule for continuing the 
trial until conclusion. The fundamental provisions are Rule III, 
stating that the Senate shall continue in session from day to day 
(Sundays excepted) until the trial is concluded, and Rule XIII, stating 
that the trial proceedings shall begin at 12 noon each day, unless 
otherwise provided by the Senate.
    Majority rules. Motions and objections during the proceedings are 
governed by majority vote.
    There are few opportunities to filibuster. Unlike the normal 
Senate, almost all trial motions, decisions, and orders are resolved 
under strict time limits--although these time limits would not prevent 
a determined effort to prolong the trial through repeated motions, 
whether by counsel or by a group of Senators. In fact, during the trial 
itself, motions, objections or challenges to rulings by the chair 
raised by Senators (which must be submitted in writing to the Presiding 
Officer) are voted on without debate at all, unless the Senate elects 
to go into closed session. In that case, each Senator is entitled to 
speak once for no more than 10 minutes.
    Where the impeachment Rules are silent, the Standing Rules of the 
Senate apply.  Precedents extending back at least to the Johnson 
impeachment support this.
      iii. how might the matter be resolved without a formal trial?
    A. The Senate's duty to try the impeachment. The Constitution 
provides that ``the Senate shall have sole power to try all 
impeachments.'' Some consider this provision to impose a duty upon the 
Senate to try or adjudicate all impeachments. Even if the Constitution 
imposes such a duty, the Senate has not understood this duty to 
adjudicate as necessarily requiring a formal trial. There is precedent 
for the Senate considering dispositive motions that would allow the 
Senate to render a judgment without holding a trial. (In the 
impeachment proceedings against Judges Ritter, Claiborne, and Nixon, 
the Senate entertained motions to strike articles of impeachment or to 
summarily adjudicate the matter.) Although such a motion is not 
specifically discussed in the impeachment rules, the Senate has not 
viewed dispositive motions as seeking to suspend, modify, or amend the 
rules. As a result, dispositive motions are ordinary trial motions 
subject to the limits on debate set forth in the impeachment rules and 
governed by simple majority vote.
    An additional method available to resolve the matter is adjournment 
sine die. In the case of Andrew Johnson, the Senate voted on three 
articles of impeachment, acquitting on each. Rather than vote on the 
remaining eight articles, the Senate simply adjourned the impeachment 
proceedings sine die. The impeachment rules allow for a vote to adjourn 
sine die. Adjournment sine die does not specifically pass judgment on 
the articles of impeachment and so may not be satisfactory to those who 
consider the Senate duty-bound to try the impeachment.
    B. Different motions to adjudicate the matter without an 
evidentiary trial. Several different motions would seem possible, some 
drawing on analogies to judicial proceedings.
    1. A motion to dismiss would assert that the articles of 
impeachment fail as a matter of law to state actions upon which a 
conviction may constitutionally be based. Such an assertion could be 
based upon the claim that the articles do not state ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' Because the articles accuse President Clinton of 
committing perjury before a grand jury and of obstructing justice 
(among other things), a ``motion to dismiss'' would assert that such 
actions can never support conviction for high crimes or misdemeanors. 
Additionally, a ``motion to dismiss'' could be a vehicle for the 
President to raise the contention that the articles of impeachment 
lapsed when the 105th Congress adjourned sine die.
    While there are no Senate rules governing the timing of motions, 
analogy to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would require a motion 
to dismiss to be made before the President submits his answer to the 
summons, or along with his answer to the summons.
    2. In contrast to the motion to dismiss, a motion for summary 
judgment asserts (1) that the parties agree on all material facts and 
(2) that those facts compel judgment for the moving party. A party 
submitting a motion for summary judgment is agreeing to have the 
dispute finally adjudicated on the basis of the facts asserted in his 
moving papers. The opposing party has the option of filing a cross 
motion for summary judgment or of objecting that the parties are not in 
agreement as to all material facts and that a trial is required on the 
disputed facts. If the opposing party chooses the first course of 
action (and this could be done by prior agreement between the parties), 
then the Senate could enter judgment in the case without holding any 
evidentiary trial.
    On a motion for summary judgment, the Senate by majority vote could 
issue a judgment for the President if it concluded that the undisputed 
facts fail to establish the existence of a high crime or misdemeanor 
warranting the President's removal from office. Because this motion 
rests on a view of the undisputed facts in the specific case, granting 
the President's motion for summary judgment would mean only that the 
specific perjury and obstructions charged in these articles of 
impeachment do not warrant conviction and removal from office (or that 
the facts failed to establish that these offenses had actually been 
committed). It would not imply that perjury or obstruction of justice 
could never serve as grounds adequate to impeach, convict, and remove a 
President from office.
    3. The trial might also be ended by a motion for a directed 
verdict. Such a motion in civil litigation is brought after the 
plaintiff has concluded his case, and before the defendant mounts a 
defense. The motion asserts that the plaintiff's evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the claim, and that no reasonable fact finder 
would disagree. Were the House Managers to decide to submit the 
impeachment to the Senate based solely on evidence already gathered by 
Starr, the President could bring a ``motion for a directed verdict'' 
prior to an evidentiary trial involving any live witness testimony.
    4. Finally, the Senate's own precedents supply the possibility of a 
fourth option, a motion for summary disposition. Such a motion might be 
entertained as an alternative to any of the motions just discussed, in 
order to avoid contending with the technicalities of such motions.
    In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, for example, the 
House Managers introduced a motion for summary disposition. Both sides 
argued this motion without invoking the federal rules of civil 
procedure or judicial opinions relating to summary dispositions. The 
parties disputed only whether the facts warranted further evidentiary 
proceedings in the Senate or if the matter could be decided solely on 
the basis of Judge Claiborne's conviction for tax evasion. The Senate 
considered the motion without reference to judicial standards.
    This approach is consistent with the Senate's position that it is 
not bound by the federal rules of civil procedure. Removing the motion 
from the technical categories and requirements under those rules allows 
each Senator the discretion to consider whether additional evidentiary 
proceedings, including live testimony, will serve the public interest.
    C. Should the Senate appoint a committee? If the matter is not 
resolved on a summary basis, Rule XI provides that the Senate can 
appoint a committee to ``receive evidence and take testimony'' rather 
than having the Senate as a whole do so. This procedure has been 
employed in the case of trials of federal judges, and has been 
sustained by the Supreme Court. Such a committee would not and could 
not decide the case, but it could assemble the evidence submitted, 
prepare a transcript of all testimony and submit it to the Senate. The 
committee meetings could be televised so that noncommittee Senators 
would be able to watch them as they occurred, and videotapes could also 
be prepared for subsequent review. A number of the early proponents of 
what is now Senate Rule XI option are on record stating their view that 
such a committee should not be used for a presidential trial.
    Composition of a Rule XI committee would be very important. 
Traditionally, these committees have been composed of twelve members, 
six from each party with the committee chair chosen from the committee 
members in the majority party. The Chair exercises the same role within 
the committee that the Chief Justice fulfills in the full Senate. This 
is significant because the decisions of the chair may be reversed only 
by a majority vote. If the votes in committee are on straight party 
lines, the ruling of the chair will be upheld in every instance. A 
complicating factor in a presidential impeachment is the requirement 
that the Chief Justice preside. This may require that the Chief Justice 
serve as the chair of a rule XI committee if one is appointed. In this 
event, the rulings of the Chief Justice would be upheld on any party-
line vote.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
          * * * * * * *
    House Managers have asserted repeatedly that live witness testimony 
will resolve discrepancies between the testimony of witnesses, and 
therefore they ought to be called. There are several points to be made 
against this point of view.
    Demeanor evidence is notoriously unreliable. Recall, for example, 
Alger Hiss/Whittaker Chambers. Some people were convinced by one side, 
some people by the other.
    Demeanor evidence is not necessarily dispositive, in any event. 
Both witnesses can come across as reliable, honest and trustworthy. 
Witnesses often give credible performances while dissembling.
    The House Managers are poorly situated to claim the necessity of 
hearing from live witnesses in order to resolve credibility issues. The 
House Judiciary Committee heard from no live witnesses, except Ken 
Starr, and yet the managers have had no difficulty in deciding all 
credibility disputes against the President or anyone giving testimony 
favorable to his story.
    Any gains from live witnesses need to be assessed against the 
costs. The costs will come when the Senate chamber descends into the 
facts of the case with the specificity that will come from live 
testimony.
    For example, one prominent disagreement that the House Managers 
have cited is that between President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky regarding 
whether the President ever touched Ms. Lewinsky's breasts or genitalia. 
If both witnesses are called and reiterate their prior testimony, the 
Senate will certainly get the opportunity to observe their demeanor. 
This might shed some additional light on the question, but it probably 
won't. The possibility of securing the additional credibility data must 
be weighed against the serious negative ramifications such proceedings 
would likely have.
                             a. indictment
    The Supreme Court engaged in a similar balancing exercise in 
deciding Clinton v. Jones. In that case, the court held that requiring 
the President to submit to judicial process in a civil case and go 
through an entire civil trial would not so damage the presidency as to 
justify interfering with the ordinary judicial process that vindicates 
the rule of law. Considering only indictment, as distinct from 
prosecution of a criminal trial, seems to impose less of a burden on 
the President. Indictment alone imposes no demands on the President's 
time.
    An attempt to distinguish indictment could proceed on two bases. 
First, the President is apt to be more concerned about being criminally 
convicted than found civilly liable. Thus, an indictment could be a 
greater distraction from the President's duties than is a civil suit. 
Second, criminal indictment, unlike filing a civil complaint, 
stigmatizes the President.
    Each of these distinctions is subject to dispute. As the Paula 
Jones suit itself demonstrates, a civil case can be extremely 
distracting. If a criminal indictment is more distracting, it seems 
doubtful that it is so much more distracting as to be constitutionally 
significant. A distinction based on stigma seems particularly weak in 
this case.
    President Clinton has been impeached. Correctly or not, the House 
of Representatives has construed this impeachment as analogous to a 
grand jury indictment. It is thus not obvious that an actual criminal 
indictment would add materially to the stigma the President has already 
suffered.
    Even accepting these grounds of distinction, the independent 
counsel may seek a sealed indictment. A sealed indictment would not be 
made known either publicly or to the President. If an indictment 
remains sealed until the President leaves office, it is difficult to 
see how it could either distract the President or stigmatize him.
                             b. prosecution
    Prosecution presents a different matter. Unlike an indictment with 
nothing more, proceeding to an actual prosecution would place 
significant physical and temporal burdens on the President. Preparing 
for trial and then actually presenting a defense would consume the 
President's time and attention over a lengthy period. During the 
pendency of criminal proceedings, the President would repeatedly face a 
choice between spending the time necessary to mount a meaningful 
defense and devoting time to fulfilling his constitutional and 
statutory duties. Even if the President were to choose to spend no time 
on his defense, it is difficult to imagine that his mind could be fully 
focused on his official duties.
    To so stigmatize and distract the President would seriously 
undermine his ability to act as a check on the legislative branch. It 
would also impose significant costs in terms of the nation's standing 
internationally.
    The Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones could be taken to 
support subjecting the President to criminal prosecution while in 
office. In that case, the President had argued that the civil lawsuit 
should be stayed until the President's term in office expired. He based 
this position on concerns that the demands of defending a civil lawsuit 
would impermissibly interfere with his ability to discharge his 
official duties. Admittedly, it is unlikely that defending against a 
criminal prosecution is any more time consuming than defending a civil 
lawsuit.
    There are, however, several crucial distinctions between a civil 
and a criminal lawsuit. In the Jones case, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that the burden imposed on the President could be minimized through 
proper case management by the trial judge. A court does not have the 
same broad array of options available in a criminal proceedings. 
Perhaps most significantly, the options for settling the suit without a 
trial are quite different. President Clinton settled the Paula Jones 
case by making a cash payment with no admission of wrongdoing. The 
rough equivalent of settlement in a criminal proceeding is a plea 
bargain. Such a ``settlement,'' however, requires the defendant to 
admit to some criminality. As such, there is far greater pressure on 
the president to proceed to trial in a criminal prosecution as opposed 
to a civil prosecution. Moreover, the President's attendance at a civil 
trial is not nearly so crucial as is his attendance at a criminal 
prosecution. The Sixth Amendment expresses the constitutional 
commitment to allowing a criminal defendant's presence at trial. 
Finally, consider what follows a judgment in a criminal trial as 
opposed to a civil trial.
    The Paula Jones suit threatened the President with nothing more 
than an assessment of monetary compensation. An adverse verdict at a 
criminal trial threatens imprisonment. It is clear that the 
Constitution does not allow the judiciary to order the imprisonment of 
the President. Thus, at the very least, sentencing would have to be 
stayed until the President leaves office.
    Extending the holding in Clinton v. Jones to cover criminal 
prosecutions is subject to an additional objection. The course of 
events since the Court rendered that decision casts significant doubt 
upon the conclusions the Court drew in that case. In Clinton v. Jones, 
the Supreme Court doubted that the civil lawsuit would consume much 
time or attention of the President. It could not be plainer that this 
prediction was wrong. While there is no reason to believe that the 
Court is considering overruling Clinton v. Jones, there is very 
powerful reason to apply the practical lessons we have learned since 
that decision to any claim for extending the Clinton v. Jones holding 
to criminal prosecutions. In light of all that has occurred since that 
ruling, it is wildly implausible to contend that a criminal proceeding 
against the President would not significantly disrupt his ability to 
fulfill his constitutional and statutory duties.
    Against this significant disruption is concern for the rule of law. 
As a practical matter, it is critical to recall that sentencing would 
be stayed until the President leaves office. Given this, it is doubtful 
that staying the trial as well would add significant concern from the 
standpoint of the rule of law. It is important to bear in mind what the 
rule of law requires. It demands that similarly situated citizens be 
treated similarly. In light of the President's unique constitutional 
role, it is error to contend that the President must be treated 
identically to a private citizen. The rule of law must encompass the 
fundamental law of the Constitution, and account for the peculiar role 
of the President within the constitutional structure. Accommodating 
that role by staying criminal proceedings until the President is out of 
office respects the rule of law as long as the President is subject to 
criminal prosecution once out of office. Under these circumstances, the 
President is subject to liability in the same way as any citizen.
    The New York Times reports that these conclusions accord with the 
view of most scholars. According to the Times, most scholars accept 
that the President may be indicted while in office, but that he may not 
be prosecuted. This assessment of the state of scholarship is probably 
accurate, but there is significant dissent as to each conclusion. In 
other words, the scholarship does not betray a consensus.
                             iii. practice
    There is very little practical experience dealing with the question 
of indicting or prosecuting a sitting President. The only precedent is 
the investigation of President Richard Nixon. The biographer to special 
counsel Archibald Cox reports that Cox had concluded that the 
separation of powers forbids indicting a sitting President. Cox' 
successor, Leon Jaworski, decided against seeking to indict President 
Nixon, although his decision was based on prudential considerations and 
he did not reach a certain constitutional interpretation.
    In 1972, Vice President Spiro Agnew argued to the Supreme Court 
that a sitting Vice President could not be indicted. Then-Solicitor 
General Robert Bork submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the United 
States in which he argued that a sitting Vice President could be 
impeached, but a sitting President could not be. Judge Bork repeated 
this position yesterday in an op-ed published in the New York Times.
                              iv. history
    A number of framers made statements that appear to assume that the 
President may not be indicted while in office. In The Federalist 
Alexander Hamilton claimed that the President would be ``liable to be 
impeached, tried, and removed from office; and would afterwards be 
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.'' 
In two other numbers of The Federalist Hamilton repeated this sequence 
and that criminal process comes ``after'' impeachment and conviction. 
In none of these passages, however, is Hamilton addressing the specific 
question of whether the President could be subject to criminal process 
while in office. It may represent no more than Hamilton's assumption as 
to what the ordinary sequence would in fact be.
    Another framer, Gouverneur Morris, explained that the Constitution 
vests the power to try impeachments in the Senate rather than the 
judiciary because the judiciary would ``try the President after the 
trial of impeachment.'' In the First Congress, Vice President John 
Adams and Senator (later Justice) Oliver Ellsworth expressed the view 
that ``the President personally is not . . . subject to any [judicial] 
process whatever.'' But their view was disputed, for example by Senator 
William Maclay.
    The Supreme Court reviewed this historical record in Clinton v. 
Jones. They concluded that history provides no answer to this question. 
These comments reflect the view of only a few, albeit influential, 
individuals and either were not made in the context of whether a 
sitting President could be indicted or were disputed.
                      v. prudential considerations
    Even if the Constitution does not prohibit indictment, that does 
not mean there are not powerful prudential arguments against 
indictment. Brett Kavanaugh, who was Associate Independent Counsel in 
Ken Starr's office for three years, put this argument most succinctly 
in a recent article he published in the Georgetown Law Journal:
    The President is not simply another individual. He is unique. He is 
the embodiment of the federal government and the head of a political 
party. If he is to be removed, the entire government likely would 
suffer, [and] the military or economic consequences to the nation could 
be severe. . . . Those repercussions, if they are to occur, should not 
result from the judgment of a single prosecutor--whether it be the 
Attorney General or special counsel--and a single jury. Prosecution or 
nonprosecution of a President is, in short, inevitably and unavoidably 
a political act.
    Thus, as the Constitution suggests, the decision about the 
President while he is in office should be made where all great national 
political judgments in our country should be made--in the Congress of 
the United States.
    There is an additional, closely related, consideration--protecting 
Congress' constitutional impeachment power. If an independent counsel 
can indict a sitting President, this act alone tends to force Congress' 
hand with respect to impeachment. The mere fact of an indictment is an 
additional factor that generates some pressure to impeach and convict a 
sitting President. That pressure is even more coercive in the context 
of a prosecution and verdict than of indictment alone.
                    vi. department of justice policy
    Professor David Strauss recently argued that there is no need to 
address the constitutional issues because the independent counsel is 
statutorily barred from indicting a sitting President. The United 
States Code instructs that the independent counsel ``shall except where 
not possible comply with the written or other established policies of 
the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal 
laws.'' 28 U.S.C. 594(f). Professor Strauss argues Judge Bork's Supreme 
Court brief in the Spiro Agnew case established the Department's policy 
on indicting a sitting President and that this policy is confirmed in 
the practice of special counsels Cox and Jaworski.
    This is a strong argument, but there is a response: the brief in 
the Agnew case represents not a policy but an interpretation of the 
Constitution. That interpretation, the response would continue, has 
been demonstrated to be in error by the subsequent decision in Clinton 
v. Jones. An article published by Ken Starr's advisor on constitutional 
law, Professor Ronald Rotunda, argues that Clinton v. Jones makes clear 
what had previously been obscure--namely that a sitting President may 
be indicted and prosecuted.--[Memorandum, 2/4/99]
                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Spencer Abraham

    Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, in light of our time 
constraints, I would like to focus my remarks today primarily 
on the one issue--more than any other--that has arisen during 
our deliberations: namely, whether the President should be 
convicted if we find he committed the acts alleged in the 
articles.
    I believe this issue is not only central to the case at 
hand, it is also central to all future evaluations and 
applications of what we do here.
    In arguing for the President, White House lawyers have 
asserted that the threshold for Presidential removal must be 
very high--and I agree. At the same time, however, we must 
remember that there is an inverse relationship between the 
level at which we set the removal bar and the degree of 
Presidential misconduct we will accept.
    So, then, where do we set the bar?
    As we know, the Constitution says: ``The President, Vice 
President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
    Now it has been suggested by some that a ``high Crime'' 
must be a truly heinous crime. But that interpretation is 
obviously wrong. Treason is certainly among the most heinous 
crimes. But bribery is not.
    Taking a bribe, like treason, is however, a uniquely 
serious act of misconduct by a public official. That suggests a 
different meaning for ``high Crime,'' one that is linked 
somehow to the fact that the person committing it holds public 
office.
    Alexander Hamilton's comment about the impeachment power, 
quoted by so many of us here, provides the clue. In Federalist 
65, Hamilton says: ``The subjects of its jurisdiction are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, 
in other words, from the violation of some public trust.''
    The President's lawyers invoked this line, but in my view 
they misread it. They argued that what it means is that a 
President's conduct must involve misuse of official power if he 
is to be removed from office, but that is not what the 
Constitution demands, or what Hamilton's comment, fairly read, 
suggests. Otherwise, as has been noted, we would have to leave 
in office a President or a Federal judge who committed murder, 
so long as they did not use any powers of their office in doing 
so.
    Rather, as Hamilton's language connotes, and our own 
precedents in the judicial impeachment cases confirm, the 
connection the Constitution requires between an official's 
actions and functions is a more practical one: the official's 
conduct must demonstrate that he or she cannot be trusted with 
the powers of the office in question.
    This rule certainly encompasses official acts demonstrating 
unfitness for the office in question--but it also reaches 
beyond such acts.
    In my view, we need not determine the outer limits of this 
principle to decide the question before us today: whether the 
President's actions, as alleged in these articles, constitute a 
violation of a ``public trust'' as Hamilton uses the term.
    The answer to that question is plain when we consider the 
President's conduct in relation to his responsibilities.
    The President's role and status in our system of government 
are unique. The Constitution vests the executive power in the 
President, and in the President alone. That means he is the 
officer chiefly charged with carrying out our laws. Therefore, 
far more than any Federal judge, he holds the scales of justice 
in his own hands.
    In the wrong hands, that power can easily be transformed 
from the power to carry out the laws, into the power to bend 
them to one's own ends.
    The very nature of the Presidency guarantees that its 
occupant will face daily temptations to twist the laws for 
personal gain, for party benefit or for the advantage of 
friends.
    To combat these temptations, the Constitution spells out--
in no uncertain terms--that the President shall ``take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed,'' and the President's 
oath of office requires him to swear that he will do so.
    If he obstructed justice and tampered with witnesses in the 
Jones case, a Federal civil rights case in which he was the 
defendant, the President violated his oath and failed to 
perform the bedrock duty of his office. He did not faithfully 
execute the laws.
    A President who commits these acts thereby makes clear that 
he cannot be trusted to exercise the executive power lawfully 
in the future, to handle impartially such specific Presidential 
responsibilities as serving as the final arbiter on bringing 
Federal, civil, or criminal cases, or determining the content 
of Federal regulations--especially if, as will often be the 
case, he has a personal or a political interest in the outcome.
    Surely retaining a President in office under these 
circumstances constitutes exactly the type of threat to our 
government and its institutions so many have said must exist 
for conviction.
    That brings the President's alleged conduct squarely within 
the purview of our impeachment power, whose purpose, as 
described by Hamilton, is to deal with ``the violation of some 
public trust.''
    Furthermore, if the articles' allegations are true, how can 
we leave the executive power in the hands of a President who, 
through his false grand jury testimony, even attempted to 
obstruct and subvert the impeachment process itself?
    For this particular grand jury before which the President 
testified was not only conducting a criminal investigation; it 
was also charged, under congressional statute, with advising 
the House of Representatives as to whether it had received any 
substantial and credible information that might constitute 
grounds for impeachment.
    The framers placed the impeachment power in our 
Constitution as the ultimate safeguard to address misuse of the 
executive power.
    A President who commits perjury, intending to thwart an 
investigation that might otherwise lead to his impeachment, 
has, I believe, committed a quintessential ``high Crime.''
    Such conduct of necessity impedes, and could even preclude, 
Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty to prevent the 
President from usurping power and engaging in unlawful conduct.
    To permit such behavior would set an unacceptable 
precedent, because it could, in the future, allow nullification 
of the impeachment process itself, rendering it meaningless.
    Hence, a President who acts to subvert what the framers 
viewed as the ultimate constitutional check on abuse of 
executive power, most certainly violates the public trust as 
defined by Hamilton.
    Throughout this discussion I have analyzed this case as 
though one or more of the underlying counts in each impeachment 
article were established. I recognize that not everyone has 
reached this conclusion--and I confess that I have spent 
countless hours attempting to make this determination of guilt 
or innocence on each article.
    However, after listening to and studying the evidence, I 
have concluded beyond any reasonable doubt that the President 
committed one or more of the acts alleged under each article. 
Time does not permit me to fully explain the basis for my 
conclusions. But, in my view, that is where the evidence 
inescapably points.
    In my opinion, there is no way that the President could 
have testified as he did in his Jones deposition concerning his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, unless he believed Ms. 
Lewinsky would validate his false statements if called as a 
witness.
    The President may not have explicitly told her to lie, but 
when he called her on December 17, he did say, ``You can always 
say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
letters.''
    To whom did he intend her to say this? They had already 
agreed on the use of these cover stories in nonlegal contexts. 
The only new audience was, clearly, the Jones court, and the 
President's comments that night were surely aimed at 
influencing Ms. Lewinsky's potential testimony before that 
court, if she were to be subpoenaed.
    That this was the President's intent, is confirmed by his 
own testimony in the Jones case. What did he say when asked if 
Ms. Lewinsky had come to see him? He said that Ms. Lewinsky had 
come to visit Betty Currie and perhaps deliver him papers.
    In my opinion, there is also no way you can refresh your 
memory by making assertions you know to be false to another 
person--as the President twice did to Betty Currie after that 
deposition. No, the purpose of those statements was to cause 
her to validate the false testimony he had just given, if she 
were to be subpoenaed.
    Finally, if you believe that was the President's intention, 
then you must conclude he committed material perjury later in 
his grand jury testimony, when in response to the question: 
``You are saying that your only interest in speaking with Ms. 
Currie in the days after your deposition was to refresh your 
own recollection?'' he answered with one word: ``Yes.''
    There is more.
    Fellow Senators, none of us asked for this task, but we 
must live with the consequences of our actions, not just on 
this administration but on our Nation for generations to come.
    That responsibility cannot be shirked. It has led me to a 
difficult but inexorable decision.
    I deeply regret that it is necessary for me to conclude 
that President William Jefferson Clinton committed obstruction 
of justice and grand jury perjury as charged in the articles of 
impeachment brought by the House, that these are ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors'' under our Constitution, and that therefore I 
must vote to convict him on these charges.
    I ask unanimous consent that a fuller opinion be printed in 
the Record.
    There being no objection, the opinion was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                   Opinion by Senator Spencer Abraham

    The President has been impeached on the grounds that he obstructed 
justice and tampered with witnesses in connection with a Federal civil 
rights suit in which he was the defendant, and that he committed 
perjury before a grand jury charged with investigating whether his 
previous conduct warranted prosecution or possible impeachment. It is 
our duty to determine whether the President did what the articles of 
impeachment charge and, if so, whether his actions were ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors'' that under our Constitution should bar him from 
further service in his office.
    In considering these questions, I have done my best to imagine that 
I was deciding them, not about a President of the opposing political 
party, with whom I disagree on many issues, but about a President of my 
own party. I have tried to imagine what I would do if confronted with 
the same evidence concerning a popular Republican President whose 
policies I strongly supported. I have tried to decide the case before 
me just as I would the case of such a President.
    Let me start with the facts.
    After a great deal of listening, research, and contemplation, I am 
compelled by the evidence to conclude that the President did engage in 
the conduct charged in both articles. In reaching this conclusion, I 
rely exclusively on those elements of the case that I believe have been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because I believe these dictate my 
conclusion, I do not decide whether in an impeachment trial, the 
Constitution requires application of this highest of evidentiary 
standards, which governs in ordinary criminal cases, or whether it 
would also be proper for me to rely on any of the other conduct charged 
by the House, much of which I might well find proven under either of 
the lower civil law standards.
    Let me briefly outline the basis for my conclusions. I will start 
with the second article because the conduct giving rise to it actually 
occurred first.
    In my view, the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that, for 
over 11 months, from December 6, 1997, to November 13, 1998, when the 
President agreed to pay Paula Jones $850,000 to withdraw her sexual 
harassment lawsuit, the President engaged in a systematic course of 
obstructing justice and tampering with witnesses in Ms. Jones' case. 
There is no room for reasonable doubt that as part of this course of 
conduct the President made statements to Ms. Monica Lewinsky and Ms. 
Betty Currie that were intended to cause them to validate, through 
testimony he thought they could well be called upon to give, the false 
story he was planning to tell or had already told in his own 
deposition. These statements to Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie constitute 
the second and sixth Acts of obstruction and witness tampering charged 
by the House. There is also no room for reasonable doubt that the 
President supported efforts to conceal gifts he had given to Ms. 
Lewinsky after those gifts had been subpoenaed as evidence in that 
case. That constitutes the third act of obstruction charged by the 
House.
    As to the first article: I am convinced that the House has shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President perjured himself before 
the grand jury in two instances. First, he stated that his only purpose 
in talking to Ms. Currie in the days following his Jones deposition was 
to refresh his own recollection, thereby falsely claiming to the grand 
jury that he did not intend to tamper with her potential testimony if 
she were called as a witness in the Jones case. Second, he reaffirmed 
the veracity of his Jones deposition denial of ``sexual relations'' 
with Ms. Lewinsky, under the definition of that term approved by the 
court in that case. This was not merely a ``lie about sex'' to protect 
his family. By the time of his grand jury appearance, the President had 
already acknowledged to his family his improper relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Before the grand jury, the President falsely asserted the 
truth of his earlier sworn statements for the sole purpose of 
protecting himself from possible prosecution or impeachment.
    In light of these conclusions, the final overriding issue is 
whether the President's actions constitute ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' requiring his removal from office under article II, 
section 4 of the Constitution. As has been acknowledged on both sides, 
reasonable people can differ on this question. And indeed it is only on 
this issue, whether the President must be removed, that Americans are 
consequentially divided. A decided majority of Americans agree that the 
President committed the crimes alleged in at least one of the articles. 
And in their hearts I believe a significant majority of my colleagues 
do as well.
    The public, like us, is in disagreement over what the consequences 
should be. A clear majority oppose removal, but for a variety of 
reasons--ranging from a feeling that the President does not deserve to 
be removed, to a concern not to endanger current economic conditions, 
to a preference for the President over the Vice President, to the 
belief that, because the President has less than 2 years remaining in 
this term, removing him is not worth the disruption it would cause.
    These considerations would legitimately play a role in our decision 
if we were functioning as a legislative body in a parliamentary system 
deciding whether to retain the current government. But that is not our 
role here. The Constitution requires the Senate to sit not in an 
ordinary legislative capacity on this matter, but as a Court of 
Impeachment. That is why, at the beginning of a trial on articles of 
impeachment, article I, section 3 of the Constitution states that 
Senators must take a special oath to do impartial justice. Accordingly, 
it is my view that our decision cannot be based on other 
considerations, but instead must be based on what the Constitution 
dictates, and taken with a view toward the precedent we will establish 
regarding what is acceptable Presidential behavior.
    In arguing for the President, White House lawyers have asserted 
that the threshold for Presidential removal must be very high--and I 
agree. At the same time, however, we must remember that there is an 
inverse relationship between the level at which we set the removal bar 
and the degree of Presidential misconduct we will accept.
    So, then, where do we set the bar? What does the Constitution 
dictate? What precedent should we set for the ages?
    Let us start with the text of the Constitution, which states 
simply: ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
    The first interpretation that has been suggested is that a ``high 
Crime'' must be a truly heinous crime. But that is obviously wrong. 
Treason is certainly among the most heinous crimes. But bribery is not.
    Taking a bribe, like treason, is however uniquely serious 
misconduct by a public official. That suggests a different meaning for 
``high Crime,'' one that is linked somehow to the fact that the person 
committing it holds public office.
    A comment by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 65 provides the clue.
    In Federalist 65, speaking of impeachment, Hamilton says: ``The 
subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the 
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the violation of 
some public trust.''
    The President's lawyers invoke this line, but they misread it. They 
argue that what it means is that to require removal, a President's 
conduct must involve misuse of official power.
    That is not what the Constitution demands, or what Hamilton's 
comment fairly read suggests. Otherwise we would have to leave in 
office a President or a Federal judge who committed murder, so long as 
they did not use any powers of their office in doing so. Rather, as 
Hamilton's language connotes, and our own precedents confirm, the 
connection the Constitution requires between the official's actions and 
functions is a more practical one: the official's conduct must 
demonstrate that he or she cannot be trusted with the powers of the 
office in question. This rule encompasses official acts demonstrating 
unfitness for the office in question, but it also reaches beyond such 
acts.
    We need not determine the outer limits of its principle to decide 
the question before us today: whether the President's actions here 
constitute a violation of a ``public trust'' as Hamilton uses the term. 
The answer to that question is plain when we consider his conduct in 
relation to his responsibilities.
    The President's role and status in our system of government are 
unique. The Constitution vests the executive power in the President, 
and in the President alone. That means he is the officer chiefly 
charged with carrying out our laws. Therefore, far more than any 
Federal judge, he holds the scales of justice in his own hands.
    In the wrong hands, that power can easily be transformed from the 
power to carry out the laws into the power to bend them to one's own 
ends. The very nature of the Presidency guarantees that its occupant 
will face daily temptations to twist the laws for personal gain, for 
party benefit, or for the advantage of friends in or out of power. To 
combat these temptations, the Constitution spells out in no uncertain 
terms that the President shall ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,'' and his oath of office requires him to swear that he will 
do so.
    By obstructing justice and tampering with witnesses in the Jones 
case, a Federal civil rights case in which he was the defendant, the 
President violated his oath and failed to perform the bedrock duty of 
his office. He did not faithfully execute the laws. He thereby made 
clear that he cannot be trusted to exercise the executive power 
lawfully in the future, to handle impartially such specific 
Presidential responsibilities as serving as the final arbiter on 
bringing Federal civil or criminal cases, or determining the content of 
Federal regulations--especially if, as will often be the case, he has a 
personal or political interest in the outcome.
    Surely retaining a President in office under these circumstances 
constitutes the type of threat to our government and its institutions 
so many have said must exist for conviction. That brings his conduct 
squarely within the purview of our impeachment power, whose purpose, as 
described by Hamilton, is to deal with ``the violation of some public 
trust.''
    Obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and grand jury perjury 
are serious Federal crimes. How do we explain to others who commit 
them, many out of motives surely as understandable as the President's, 
that while the President stays in the White House, his Department of 
Justice is trying to send them to prison? How can we expect ordinary 
citizens to accept that the President can remain in office after lying 
repeatedly under oath in court proceedings, but that it is still their 
duty to tell the truth?
    Finally, how can we leave the executive power in the hands of a 
President who, through his false grand jury testimony, has even 
attempted to obstruct and subvert the impeachment process itself? For 
the particular grand jury before which the President testified falsely 
was not only conducting a criminal investigation; it was also charged, 
under congressional statute, with advising the House of Representatives 
whether it had received any substantial and credible information that 
might constitute grounds for impeachment.
    The framers placed the impeachment power in our Constitution as the 
ultimate safeguard to address misuse of the executive power. A 
President who commits perjury, intending to thwart an investigation 
that might otherwise lead to his impeachment, has committed a 
quintessential ``high Crime.'' This crime impeded, and could have even 
precluded, Congress from fulfilling its duty to prevent the President 
from usurping power and engaging in unlawful conduct. To permit such 
behavior could, in effect, allow nullification of the impeachment 
process itself, rendering it meaningless. Hence, a President who acts 
to subvert what the framers viewed as the ultimate constitutional check 
on abuse of executive power, most certainly violates the public trust 
as defined by Hamilton.
    To allow a President to continue in office after committing these 
acts would place the Presidency above the law and grant the President 
powers close to those of a monarch. This, in turn, presents a clear and 
present danger to the rule of law, the birthright of all Americans. 
Indeed, we Americans take the rule of law so thoroughly for granted 
that while it has been much invoked in these proceedings, there has 
been little discussion of what it means or why it matters. Simply put, 
the rule of law is the guarantee our system makes to all of us that our 
rights and those of our countrymen will be determined according to 
rules established in advance. It is the guarantee that there will be no 
special rules, treatment, and outcomes for some, but that the same 
rules will be applied, in the same way, to everyone.
    If America's most powerful citizen may bend the law in his own 
favor with impunity, we have come dangerously close to trading in the 
rule of law for the rule of men. That in turn jeopardizes the freedoms 
we hold dear, for our equality before the law is central to their 
protection.
    We are a great nation because, in America, no man--no man--is above 
the law. Americans broke from Great Britain because the mother country 
claimed it had a right to rule its colonies without restraint, as it 
saw fit. Our tradition of chartered rights--rights laid down in laws, 
which no King, Parliament or other official could breach--culminated in 
our Constitution. That Constitution, which is itself only a higher law, 
protects us from tyranny. Once the law becomes an object of convenience 
rather than awe, that Constitution becomes a dead letter, and with it 
our freedoms and our way of life.
    Mr. Chief Justice, my grandparents did not come to this country 
seeking merely a more convenient, profitable life. They came here 
seeking the freedoms that were given birth on Bunker Hill and in the 
Convention at Philadelphia.
    I know some people mock as self-righteous or feckless the piety 
many Americans have toward their heritage and toward the Constitution 
that guards their freedom. But I will never forget that it is not the 
powerful or those favored by the powerful who need the law's 
protection.
    If we set a precedent that allows the President--the Chief 
Magistrate and the most powerful man in the world--to render the 
judicial process subordinate to his own interests, we tell ordinary 
citizens, like my grandparents, that Americans are no longer really 
equal in the eyes of the law. We tell them that they may be denied 
justice. And we thereby forfeit our own heritage of constitutional 
freedoms.
    None of us asked for this task, but we must live with the 
consequences of our actions, not just on this administration, but on 
our Nation for generations to come. That responsibility cannot be 
shirked. It has led me to a difficult but inexorable decision. I deeply 
regret that it is necessary for me to conclude that President William 
Jefferson Clinton committed obstruction of justice and grand jury 
perjury as charged in the articles of impeachment brought by the House, 
that these are ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' under our Constitution, 
and that therefore I must vote to convict him on these charges.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski

    Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, I will vote against the 
articles of impeachment accusing the President of the United 
States of perjury before a grand jury and obstruction of 
justice.
    The Republican House managers have asked the Senate to 
remove the President from office, overturning a free and fair 
election in which 100 million Americans cast their vote. Short 
of voting on whether or not to send our sons and daughters to 
war, I can envision no more profound decision.
    I have taken this responsibility as seriously as anything I 
have done in my life. A little over a month ago, I escorted the 
Chief Justice into this Chamber and stood with my colleagues 
when we took a collective oath, as an institution, to render 
impartial justice in this trial. Then, we individually signed 
our names and pledged our honor to faithfully fulfill our oath. 
That was an indelible and profound moment.
    I have sought to fulfill both responsibilities--to be 
impartial and to render justice. I have sought to be impartial, 
which I view as a test of character and will. And I have sought 
to pursue justice, which to me includes the responsibility to 
perform the homework--do the reading, review the evidence and 
weigh the facts.
    I have listened carefully, and with an open mind, to the 
presentations of the Republican House managers and the 
President's counsel. I have reviewed the evidence. I have read 
all of the key witnesses' testimony before the grand jury. I 
have intensely studied the law pertaining to perjury and 
obstruction of justice, discussed the issue with respected 
lawyers, developed an appropriate standard of proof, and 
reviewed the House testimony of Republican and Democratic 
former prosecutors for their views on the charges. Finally, I 
have read what our Nation's founders wrote about impeachment 
during those months in 1787 when the Constitution was formed, 
and considered the writings of many of today's finest scholars.
    As I reviewed the historical underpinnings of impeachment, 
I have reflected on the intentions of the Founding Fathers who 
developed our famed system of ``checks and balances''--our 
Constitution. That system, designed with the precision of Swiss 
watchmakers and the concern of loving parents, has served our 
Nation very well over the last 200 years and served as a 
guidepost for nations around the world as they struggled to 
establish democracies.
    I wondered what the framers of the Constitution would think 
of this trial--how they would counsel us. In fact, we can use 
their rationale and their framework to guide us as we reach 
conclusions about the evidence and as we determine whether that 
evidence merits removing a President from office.
    Using all this as my guide, I have concluded that the 
evidence presented by the House managers does not meet a 
sufficient standard of proof that President Clinton engaged in 
the criminal actions charged by the House. I conclude that the 
President should not be removed from office.
    In coming to that conclusion, I have used the highest legal 
standard of proof--``beyond a reasonable doubt,'' which is 
required in Federal and State criminal trials. I believe that 
removing a President is so serious, and such an undeniably 
tumultuous precedent to set in our Nation's history, that we 
should act only when the evidence meets that highest standard. 
The U.S. Senate must not make the decision to remove a 
President based on a hunch that the charges may be true. The 
strength of our Constitution and the strength of our Nation 
dictate that we be sure--beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The House managers' case is thin and circumstantial. It 
doesn't meet the standard of ``beyond a reasonable doubt.''
    The first article of impeachment, charging the President 
perjured himself before the grand jury, has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
    For instance, the House managers claim that President 
Clinton committed perjury when he used the term ``on certain 
occasions'' to define the number of times he had inappropriate 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The managers believed the term ``on 
certain occasions'' meant fewer than the 11 times that were 
counted by Federal investigators and they labeled it ``a direct 
lie.''
    But there is no clear numeric or legal definition of 
``certain occasions.'' To disagree about the definition of 
``certain occasions'' is not perjury. And it is not material 
whether it was 11 times or ``on certain occasions.'' President 
Clinton admitted the relationship, which was the material 
point.
    The Republican House managers also claimed President 
Clinton committed perjury by not recalling the exact date, 
time, or place of events that occurred 2 years before. This was 
because other witnesses recalled things slightly differently. I 
do not believe this is or can be perjury because well-
established court standards state that ``the mere fact that 
recollections differ does not mean that one party is committing 
perjury.''
    Overall, the House managers' assertions rest on Mr. 
Clinton's vague and unhelpful responses to the independent 
counsel's questions. While those responses may be frustrating 
to the independent counsel, the Republican House managers, and, 
perhaps the American public, they are not perjurious as defined 
by law.
    Similarly, the case presented by the Republican House 
managers has not presented sufficient direct evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President obstructed 
justice. Instead, the House managers relied on extensive 
conjecture about what the President may have been thinking. In 
fact, there is direct and credible testimony by multiple 
witnesses that is directly contrary to the House managers' 
conjecture, leaving ample room for doubt.
    The Republican House managers also did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was a causal connection between Ms. 
Lewinsky's job search and the affidavit she gave in the Jones 
lawsuit. Ms. Lewinsky testified clearly and repeatedly that she 
was never promised a job for her silence. That testimony is not 
challenged by any other witness. In fact, other witnesses 
support that testimony and her most recent deposition by the 
House managers confirms it.
    From the outset of this trial, I established that I would 
use a two-tier analysis for my deliberations. First, I would 
determine whether the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the President was guilty of the charges. Second, I would 
then determine whether or not those charges rose to the level 
of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors''--the standard required by 
the Constitution for conviction and removal of a president.
    Since my analysis of the charges brought by the Republican 
House managers determined that they had not been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the question of determining high crimes and 
misdemeanors is, I believe, moot. I will say, however, that I 
am again taken by the wisdom and prescience of the Founding 
Fathers in addressing this point. I, like many, have read and 
re-read the work of Alexander Hamilton with particular 
interest. On March 7, 1788, he wrote Federalist 65, outlining 
the reasons for, and consequences of, an impeachment trial in 
the Senate. In that writing, Mr. Hamilton asserted that the 
proper subject of an impeachment trial would be ``the abuse or 
violation of some public trust . . . as they relate to injuries 
done immediately to the society itself.''
    I believe it is clear from those words, and the words of 
others who drafted the Constitution, that impeachment was not 
intended to be used for an act that did not meet that standard. 
It was not meant to be used for punishment of the President. I 
believe that the framers intended the last resort of 
impeachment to be used when a presidential action was a clear 
offense against the institutions of government. I do not 
believe that President Clinton's conduct, as wrong as it was, 
rises to that level.
    I wish to choose my words judiciously for I believe the 
behavior of the President was wrong, reckless and immoral. 
President Clinton has acknowledged that his behavior has harmed 
his family and the Nation, and that his behavior, in the end, 
is what brought us to this day. Mr. Clinton engaged in an 
illicit, inappropriate relationship and tried to hide it out of 
shame and the fear of disgrace. Those actions are clearly 
deplorable and should be condemned in the most unequivocal 
terms. But the evidence simply and profoundly does not prove 
criminal wrongdoing.
    Certainly, the impeachment process has been a difficult 
period in our Nation's history. It has challenged the strength 
of our institutions and the strength of our Nation. But, Mr. 
Chief Justice, I still find reason for tremendous hope.
    First, I find hope in the unflagging commitment of the U.S. 
Senate to do the right thing for the right reason. I am proud 
to be a part of this Senate that was ably led by Mr. Lott and 
Mr. Daschle and conducted this trial in a serious, bipartisan, 
reflective, and cooperative spirit.
    I am reassured that Alexander Hamilton and other 
constitutional framers saw fit to charge the Senate with the 
responsibility to try such a case. I hope and believe that we 
have fulfilled their expectations to be a sufficiently 
dignified and independent tribunal, one that could preserve 
``unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality'' between 
the parties in this trial. I would like to thank my colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle for meeting their responsibilities 
with such commitment, honor, professionalism, and concern for 
this body and the judgment of history. I will modestly presume 
that history will say we discharged our duty well.
    I will never forget one of our finest hours--when, early in 
the process, we convened in the old Senate Chamber to 
deliberate. I had the honor to preside, with my Republican 
colleague Mr. Mack, over that colloquy in which we established 
a process that would maintain the dignity of the Senate and 
provide a framework for conducting the trial. That precedent 
set an important tone for the proceedings that followed and I 
believe that the goodwill generated in that historic meeting 
held throughout our deliberations.
    Finally, I also find tremendous hope in the growing 
national consensus that we must move forward together to 
address pressing problems in our neighborhoods, communities, 
and cities. Over the last month, the Nation has cried out for a 
focus on education, preserving Social Security and Medicare, 
investing in our economy, and providing global leadership.
    We should now heed those calls. I will not say that now we 
must ``return to the Nation's business.'' In fact, as difficult 
and time consuming as this process has been, I believe 
fulfilling our duty to ``render impartial justice'' has been 
the Nation's business. I am hopeful that with the conclusion of 
this trial, we may all return to the work of making our Nation 
more prosperous, our families stronger, our children better 
educated, our communities more cohesive, and our world safer at 
home and abroad. I believe we will move on knowing that we have 
fulfilled our constitutional responsibilities with diligence 
and honor.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Rod Grams

    Mr. GRAMS. Mr. Chief Justice, despite the handicaps placed 
upon the House managers, I feel they did an excellent job in 
presenting their case in support of the articles of impeachment 
and laying out the facts. I listened to them carefully, as I 
listened to the White House counsel and the President's lawyers 
in their vigorous defense of William Jefferson Clinton.
    I have heard some of my colleagues say that it was one 
particular fact or incident that led them to their conclusion. 
That was not the case with me. I needed to listen to all the 
facts throughout the trial, before I truly could decide how I 
would vote.
    But after carefully weighing all the evidence, all of the 
facts, and all the arguments, I have come to the conclusion--
the same conclusion reached by 84 percent of the American 
public--that President Clinton committed perjury and wove a 
cloth of obstruction of justice.
    Lead Presidential counsel Charles Ruff said in testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee, and here during the 
Senate trial, that fair-minded people could draw different 
conclusions on the charges.
    I disagree in one aspect, but agree in another. I 
personally feel there is no room to disagree on whether the 
President is guilty of the charges in both article I and 
article II; he committed perjury and he clearly obstructed 
justice. But I agree we will differ on whether these charges 
rise to the level of high crimes which dictate conviction. 
Again, I believe they do and have voted yes, on both articles.
    The President was invited by letter to come and testify 
before the Senate. As the central figure in this trial, he 
alone knows what happened, and if truthful, he could have 
addressed the compelling evidence against him. He refused.
    It has been said that many have risked their political 
futures during this process. Perhaps--yet I will not hesitate 
telling constituents in my State how and why I voted the way I 
did. With a clear conscience, I will stand in their judgment 
and I will live with and respect whatever their decision on my 
political future may be.
    But remember, those who vote to acquit--that is, to not 
remove this President--will have the rest of their political 
lifetimes to explain their votes. They also will be judged.
    Collectively, too, we will have to await what history will 
say about this trial and how it was handled. Will this Senate 
be judged as having followed the rule of law; that is, deciding 
this case on the facts, or will we be remembered as the 
rulemaking body who deferred to public sentiment? The polls say 
this President is too popular to remove. If we base our 
decision on his popularity rather than the rule of law, we 
would be condoning a society where a majority could impose 
injustice on a minority group, only because it has a larger 
voice. A rule of law is followed so that justice is done and 
our Constitution is respected, regardless of popularity polls.
    The foundation of our legal system, I believe, is at risk 
if the Senate ignores these charges. The constitutional 
language of impeachment for judges is the same as for the 
President. Judges are removed from the bench for committing 
perjury, and also face criminal charges, as do ordinary 
citizens. We must not accept double standards.
    The prospect of such a double standard was raised countless 
times by the House managers. Consider the irony created by a 
two-tiered standard for perjury. A President commits perjury, 
yet remains in office. But would a Cabinet member who committed 
perjury be allowed to keep his or her job? Would a military 
officer who committed perjury be allowed to continue to serve? 
Would a judge who committed perjury remain on the bench? They 
would not, and yet our President, the Nation's chief law 
enforcement officer, is allowed to keep his office after having 
committed the same offense.
    Again, in my view, this is a double standard and is 
completely unacceptable for a nation that prides itself on a 
legal system which provides equal justice under the law.
    As to our final duty, the final vote, I believe the so-
called ``so what'' defense has controlled the outcome. ``He did 
it, but so what.'' We have heard it a thousand times from a 
hundred talking heads. We have heard it from our colleagues, 
too, in both Chambers. Well, for this Senator, ``so what'' 
stops at perjury and obstruction of justice. I will cast my 
vote with sorrow for the President, his family, and for the 
toll this trial has taken on the Nation, but with certainty 
that it is the only choice my conscience and the Constitution 
permit me to make.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator John B. Breaux

    Mr. BREAUX. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you very much, as so 
many people have said before, for serving with your patience 
and your fairness. If you care to extend your time with us, I 
would invite you to help preside over my Medicare Commission--
if you would like to help out in that regard.
    I also want to acknowledge and thank our two leaders for 
the fairness and the patience that they both have exhibited to 
all of us and the good job they have done keeping this body 
together, which I happen to think is extremely important as 
well.
    I think it is always very difficult for us to sit in 
judgment of another human being, and particularly is that very 
difficult when it involves moral behavior, or moral misbehavior 
as this case essentially is all about. I was always taught that 
there was a higher authority that made those types of 
decisions, but here we are, and that is part of our task.
    I think it is also especially difficult to make those kinds 
of decisions when they involve someone you know and someone you 
actually deal with in a relatively close relationship, almost 
on a day-to-day basis. It is difficult when it is someone that 
you can in private kid with or that you in private can joke 
with, as is the case for many of us with this accused whom we 
now sit in judgment of.
    I know this President and he is someone I have admired for 
his political accomplishments and I have admired for what he 
has been able to do for this country, but also quite well 
recognize the human frailties that he has, as all of us have. 
If this were a normal trial, many of us wouldn't even be here; 
we would have been excused a long time ago; we would never have 
been selected to sit in judgment of this President. We would 
have been excused because of friendship, we would have been 
excused because we know him, we would have been excused because 
we campaigned for him and with him, or we would have been 
excused for the opposite reasons--because he is a political 
adversary that we have campaigned against, that we have given 
speeches against, that we disagree with publicly on just about 
everything he stands for. None of us would find ourselves 
sitting in judgment of this individual if it were a normal 
trial. But, then again, it is not a normal trial, and these 
certainly are not normal times.
    For many of us, this is the first time we have ever had a 
President who has sort of been a contemporary--certainly for 
me, and many of my colleagues are in that same category. I was 
here, as were many of you in my generation, when President 
Johnson was here, and served throughout the time of President 
Johnson all the way through President Bush. I have met them all 
and knew them all to various degrees but never in the same way 
that I and many of us know this particular President, because 
he really is in the same generation as we are. I think we have 
that feeling, when we talk with him. I mean, many times I feel 
he knows what I am going to say before I say it and he 
understands what I am trying to convey to him before I even 
said anything about the subject matter.
    I think that many of us have had, with him, the same type 
of life experiences, and that our lives have been shaped by 
similar events because we really are of the same generation. So 
it is very difficult, coming from that position and now sitting 
in judgment of a person for his moral behavior. So I think we 
have to be extremely careful, those of us who come from this 
side with that personal friendship and relationship, as well as 
those who come from the opposite side, as a political 
adversary. It is very difficult to set those emotions aside and 
say I am going to be fair in judging someone I just cannot 
stand politically, that I don't agree with on anything, and I 
wish he wasn't my President; in fact, I supported someone else. 
So it is very difficult for all of us to try to set that aside 
and come to an honest and fair and decent conclusion.
    I think the American people have been able to do that. I 
think they have had a good understanding of what this case is 
about from the very beginning. They understood what it was 
about before the trial ever started. They understood what it 
was about during the trial, and I think they understand what it 
is all about after the trial. I think they understand what 
happened. I think they know when it happened, they know where 
it happened, and they know what was said about it. I think that 
they were correct from the very beginning.
    What we really have is a middle-aged man, who happens to be 
President of the United States, who has a sexual affair with 
someone in his office, and when people started finding out 
about it, he lied about it, tried to cover it up, tried to 
mislead people about what happened. I would daresay that this 
is not the first time in the history of the world that this has 
ever happened. I daresay it probably will not be the last time 
that it will happen. It is probably not the first time it has 
happened in this city.
    All of that does not make it right; it does not make it 
acceptable. It does not make it excusable. It cannot be 
condoned and it cannot be overlooked. Actions that are wrong 
have consequences, and now the consequences must be determined 
by the Senate.
    The question here is not really whether anything wrong was 
done. For heaven's sakes, everybody knows that what was done 
was clearly wrong. It was unacceptable. It was embarrassing. It 
was indefensible and any other adjective you can possibly think 
of to really describe it. But that is not really the question 
before us, and we can all agree on that. I think the question 
is not even whether this was perjury or whether it was 
obstruction of justice under the terms of the Constitution.
    I think the only question before us is whether what 
happened rises to the highest constitutional standards of high 
crimes and misdemeanors under the Constitution, justifying 
automatic removal of this President from the office of 
President.
    I have concluded that the Constitution was designed very 
carefully to remove the President of the United States for 
wrongful actions as President of the United States in his 
capacity as President of the United States and in carrying out 
his duties as President of the United States. For wrongful acts 
that are not connected with the official capacity and duties of 
the President of the United States, there are other ways to 
handle it. There is the judicial system. There is the court 
system. There are the U.S. attorneys out there waiting. There 
may even be the Office of Independent Counsel, which will still 
be there after all of this is finished.
    We here cannot expand the Constitution in this area. I 
think history supports my position. I will cite you just a 
quick two examples. Senator Slade Gorton earlier spoke about 
the situation with the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton. As Secretary, he was having an affair with a woman 
here in this city and they found out about it. He was paying 
off the husband of the wife that he was having an affair with. 
He was trying to get her to burn the evidence, which were 
letters that he had sent, to try to cover it up--criminal acts. 
But the Congress that was investigating him, came to the 
conclusion that the behavior was private. It was wrong, it was 
terrible, it was criminal, but it was private behavior and he 
was not impeached. Not because, I think, as Slade tried to say, 
that he wasn't impeached because he admitted it, he only 
admitted it when he got caught. But he was not impeached 
because they decided that it was essentially private behavior. 
That was in 1792, and Adams and the Founding Fathers were here 
at that time and they came to that conclusion.
    More recently, the situation with President Richard Nixon, 
I think, is a clear example of what we are struggling with 
here, to find this connection between official duties and what 
he did. One of the articles that they accused President Nixon 
with was that he had, not once, but four times filed fraudulent 
income tax returns under the criminal penalty of perjury--that 
he deducted things that he should not have deducted and that he 
didn't report income that should have been reported. By a 26-
to-12 vote, the House Judiciary Committee said, among other 
things, that ``the conduct must be seriously incompatible with 
either the constitutional form and principles of our Government 
or the proper performance of the constitutional duties of the 
President's office.'' They said that it did not demonstrate 
public misconduct, but rather private misconduct that had 
become public. I think the situation today is very similar.
    These are clear examples both in the beginning of our 
country's history and very recently about the need for this 
nexus or connection between the illegal acts and the duties of 
the office of the President.
    Let me conclude by saying I am voting not to convict and 
remove. But that is not a vote on the innocence of this 
President. He is not innocent. And by not voting to convict we 
can't somehow establish his innocence. If the standard of 
removal was bad behavior, he would be gone. I mean there would 
probably be no disagreement about that. But that is not the 
standard.
    I urge a ``no'' vote on conviction and removal and ask our 
colleagues to join in a bipartisan, strong, clear censure 
resolution and spell out what happened and where it happened 
and when it happened and what was said about what happened so 
that history will be able to, forever, look at that censure 
resolution and study it and learn from what we do today. That, 
my colleagues, I think is an appropriate and a proper remedy.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici

    Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. Chief Justice, I have listened carefully 
to the arguments of the House managers and the counterarguments 
by the White House counsel during this impeachment trial. I 
have taken seriously my oath to render impartial justice.
    While the legal nuances offered by both sides were 
interesting and essential, I kept thinking as I sat listening 
that the most obvious and important but unstated question was: 
What standard of conduct should we insist our President live up 
to?
    Only by taking into account this question do I believe that 
we in the Senate can properly interpret our Founding Fathers' 
impeachment criteria comprised of ``Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Clearly, the Constitution 
recognizes that a President may be impeached not only for 
bribery and treason, but also for other actions that destroy 
the underlying integrity of the Presidency or the ``equal 
justice for all'' guarantee of the judiciary.
    All reasonable observers admit that the President lied 
under oath and undertook a substantial and purposeful effort to 
hide his behavior from others in order to obstruct justice in a 
legal proceeding. My good friends and Democratic colleagues, 
Senators Joe Lieberman, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Bob Kerrey, 
Dianne Feinstein, and Robert Byrd, among others, have bluntly 
acknowledged publically that the President lied, misled, 
obstructed, and attempted in many ways to thwart justice's 
impartial course in a civil rights case. The sticking point has 
been: Does this misbehavior rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses?
    I have concluded that President Clinton's actions do, 
indeed, rise to the level of impeachable offenses that the 
Founding Fathers envisioned.
    I am not a constitutional scholar, as I have told you 
before. But more than 200 years ago, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court John Jay summed up my feelings about lying under 
oath and its subversion of the administration of justice and 
honest government:

    Independent of the abominable insult which Perjury offers to the 
divine Being, There is no Crime more pernicious to Society. It 
discolours and poisons the Streams of Justice, and by substituting 
Falsehood for Truth, saps the Foundations of personal and public 
rights. . . . Testimony is given under solemn obligations which an 
appeal to the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to be held 
sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would become insecure.

    Lying under oath is an ``insult to the divine Being . . . 
It discolours and poisons the Streams of Justice . . . and . . 
. saps the Foundations of personal and public Rights.''
    How can anyone, after conceding that the President lied 
under oath and obstructed justice, listen to this quotation and 
not conclude that this President has committed acts which are 
clearly serious, which corrupt or subvert the political and 
government process, and which are plainly wrong to any 
honorable person or to a good citizen?
    We must start by saying that this trial has never been 
about the President's private sex acts, as tawdry as they may 
have been.
    This trial has been about his failure to properly discharge 
his public responsibility. The President had a choice to make 
during this entire, lamentable episode. At a number of critical 
junctures, he had a choice either to tell the truth or to lie, 
first in the civil rights case, before the grand jury, and on 
national television. Each time he chose to lie. He made that 
fateful choice.
    Truthfulness is the first pillar of good character in the 
Character Counts program of which I have been part of 
establishing in New Mexico. Many of you in this Chamber have 
joined me in declaring the annual ``Character Counts Weeks.'' 
This program teaches grade school youngsters throughout America 
about six pillars of good character. Public and private schools 
in every corner of my State teach children that character 
counts; character makes a difference; indeed, character makes 
all the difference.
    Guess which one of these pillars comes first? 
Trustworthiness. Trustworthiness.
    So what do I say to the children in my State when they ask, 
``Didn't the President lie? Doesn't that mean he isn't 
trustworthy? Then, Senator, why didn't the Senate punish him?''
    Let me quote one of the most critical passages from Charles 
L. Black, Jr., and his handbook on impeachment, one of the 
seminal works on the impeachment process. He ponders this 
question: what kinds of noncriminal acts by a President are 
clearly impeachable? He concludes that ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' are those kinds of offenses which fall into 
three categories: ``(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which 
in some way corrupt or subvert the political and governmental 
process, and (3) which are plainly wrong in themselves to a 
person of honor, or to a good citizen, regardless of words on 
the statute books.''
    Well, there you have it in my judgment. The President lied 
under oath in a civil rights case, he lied before a grand jury 
and he lied on national television to the American people.
    Regarding article II, obstruction of justice the House 
managers proved to my satisfaction the following facts:
    (1) The President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to prepare and 
submit a false affidavit; (2) He encouraged her to tell false 
and misleading cover stories if she were called to testify in a 
civil rights lawsuit; (3) He engaged in, encouraged or 
supported a scheme to conceal his gifts to Monica Lewinsky that 
had been subpoenaed in the civil rights lawsuit; (4) He 
intensified and succeeded in an effort to find Monica Lewinsky 
a job so that she would not testify truthfully in the civil 
rights lawsuit; (5) He gave a false account of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky to Betty Currie in order to influence Ms. 
Currie's expected testimony in the civil rights lawsuit; (6) At 
his deposition in a Federal civil rights action against him, 
William Jefferson Clinton allowed his attorney to make false 
and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an 
affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by 
the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
subsequently called to the attention of the judge by his 
attorney; (7) He lied to John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, 
Erskine Bowles, and other White House aides regarding his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky to influence their expected 
testimony before the Federal grand jury.
    In this day and age of public yearning for heroes, we 
criticize basketball, football, and baseball players, and 
actors and singers who commit crimes or otherwise fail to be 
``good role models.'' One of those celebrities said a few years 
ago that he was only a basketball player, not a role model. He 
said in essence: ``Want a role model, look to the President.''
    Do not underestimate, my friends, the corrupting and 
cynical signal we will send if we fail to enforce the highest 
standards of conduct on the most powerful man in the Nation.
    Finally, I want to address a question that my good friend, 
Senator Byrd, raised over the weekend in a television show. 
After declaring that the President had lied and obstructed 
justice, and after concluding these acts were impeachable 
offenses, Senator Byrd, for whom I have great respect, noted 
that it was very hard, in his judgment, to impeach a President 
who enjoyed the public popularity that this President enjoys.
    Let me respond to that. Popularity is not a defense in an 
impeachment trial. Indeed, one of our Founding Fathers 
addressed this issue of popularity directly in the oft-quoted 
``Federalist Papers'': ``It takes more than talents of low 
intrigue and the little arts of popularity'' to be President. 
And, popularity isn't a pillar of Character Counts.
    What if a President committed the same acts as those 
alleged in this trial but he was presiding over a weak economy, 
a stock market at a 3-year low, 12-percent unemployment, 16-
percent inflation and a nation worried about their job security 
and families? I wonder if this would be a straight party line 
vote. I just wonder.
    Conversely, I wonder if you had a President who committed 
one of the impeachable crimes enumerated in the Constitution--
bribery or treason, and the facts were obvious and clear: he 
gave a job to someone in exchange for a $5,000 bribe and the 
entire episode was on videotape. In this hypothetical, what if 
this bribery-perpetrating President was very popular but the 
House, nonetheless, impeached him. It would be the Senate's 
responsibility to hold a trial. In this example, economy is 
strong, the country is at peace, everyone's stock market 
investments are soaring. Would we then interpret the 
Constitution to provide a popularity defense? Would we create a 
``booming economy exception'' to the conviction and removal 
clause of the Constitution? I doubt it. I doubt it very much. 
Let me repeat, temporary popularity of a President cannot be a 
legitimate defense against impeachment.
    The President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors, 
in violation of his oath of office. He lied under oath. He 
obstructed justice. His behavior was unworthy of the Presidency 
of the United States.
    Thus, I sadly conclude that the President is guilty of the 
charges made against him by the House of Representatives and I 
will vote to convict him on both counts before the Senate.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes

    Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Chief Justice and colleagues, in his 
award-winning book ``The Making of the President, 1960,'' 
Theodore H. White refers to an American Presidential election 
as ``the most awesome transfer of power in the world.''
    He notes that:

    No people has succeeded at it better or over a longer period of 
time than the Americans. Yet as the transfer of this power takes place, 
there is nothing to be seen except an occasional line outside a church 
or school or file of people fidgeting in the rain, waiting to enter the 
voting booths. No bands play on election day, no troops march, no guns 
are readied, no conspirators gather in secret headquarters.

    Later in that opening chapter White observes:

    Good or bad, whatever the decision, America will accept the 
decision and cut down any man who goes against it, even though for 
millions the decision runs contrary to their own votes. The general 
vote is an expression of national will, the only substitute for 
violence and blood.

    I begin with those quotes to underscore the critical 
significance of a Presidential election in the structure of our 
national politics. Many learned commentators have observed that 
one of the original contributions to the art of government made 
by the Constitutional Convention was to develop a Presidential, 
as opposed to a parliamentary, system of government, wherein 
the Executive is chosen by the electorate and is not dependent 
upon the confidence of the legislature for his office. As 
former Attorney General Katzenbach observed:

    It is a serious matter for the Congress to remove a President who 
has been elected in a democratic process for a term of four years, 
raising fundamental concerns about the separation of powers.

    He goes on to note that if the removal power is not 
limited, as it clearly is, impeachment could be converted into 
a parliamentary vote of no confidence which, whatever its 
merits, is not our constitutional system. The separation of 
powers embraced in our Constitution and the fixed term of the 
President have been credited by many observers with providing 
stability to our political system.
    It is important therefore to recognize that in considering 
the matter before us, we do so in the context of a Presidential 
election, wherein the people have chosen the single leader of 
the executive branch of our government--the President.
    Since the framers put the impeachment remedy in the 
Constitution, it is obvious they recognized that there may be 
circumstances which require the Congress to remove a duly 
elected President. However, in my judgment, as the framers 
indicated, we need to be very careful, very cautious, very 
prudent, in undertaking that remedy lest we introduce a 
dangerous instability in the workings of our political 
institutions.
    Viscount Bryce, whose bust is at the foot of the steps in 
the hallway below, was a distinguished commentator about the 
American political system. He wrote in ``The American 
Commonwealth'' in discussing the impeachment of a President:

    Impeachment is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional 
arsenal, but because it is so heavy, it is unfit for ordinary use. It 
is like a 100-ton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into 
position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large mark to 
aim at. Or to vary this simile, impeachment is what physicians call a 
heroic medicine, an extreme remedy proper to be applied against an 
official guilty of political crimes.

    Let me turn next to the argument which seeks to draw an 
analogy between the impeachment of a President and the 
impeachment of judges, an argument that cites three recent 
cases in which judges have been removed from office. In my 
view, this analogy misses the mark.
    Two of the judges the Senate convicted and thus removed 
from office had been accused in a criminal case, tried before a 
jury, found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and were in jail. 
Until we removed them, they were still drawing their salaries. 
In the third case, the defendant had been acquitted of bribery, 
but a judicial inquiry found that he had perjured himself to 
cover up the bribery misdeeds. Difference No. 1: Judges can be 
criminally prosecuted while in office; the President cannot. At 
least that has been the theory up to this point.
    Secondly, elected versus appointed. Judges are appointed to 
the bench for life. They can only be removed by impeachment. 
The President is elected by the people for a 4-year term and 
can only hold two such terms. As President Ford, when he was a 
Congressman, stated:

    I think it is fair to come to one conclusion, however, from our 
history of impeachments. A higher standard is expected of Federal 
judges than of any other civil officers of the United States. The 
President and the Vice President and all persons holding office at the 
pleasure can be thrown out of office by the voters at least every 4 
years.

    Thirdly, one needs to consider the injury to the branch of 
government which would result from the removal of the officer. 
The removal of one judge out of hundreds and hundreds of judges 
does not significantly affect the operation of the judicial 
branch of our government. The removal of the President, the 
single head of the executive branch, obviously is in an 
entirely different category. The President, under our system, 
holds the executive power. In the end, executive branch 
decisions are his decisions.
    In the minority report in the House Watergate proceedings, 
Republican Members stated:

    The removal of a President from office would obviously have a far 
greater impact upon the equilibrium of our system of Government than 
removal of a single Federal judge.

    The House Judiciary Committee majority report accompanying 
the article of impeachment against Judge Walter Nixon in 1989 
similarly stated as follows:

    Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than other 
officials. As noted by the House Judiciary Committee in 1970, Congress 
has recognized that Federal judges must be held to a different standard 
of conduct than other civil officers because of the nature of their 
position and the tenure of their office.

    In putting on their case, the House Republican managers 
sought to portray a simple logical progression--first that the 
material which they brought before the Senate showed violations 
of provisions of the Federal Criminal Code, i.e., perjury and 
obstruction of justice. Then they argued that if you find such 
crimes, you have high crimes and misdemeanors and, ergo, 
removal from office. But let us look at this supposed logical 
progression which I view as flawed at each step.
    First, I do not believe the House managers carried the 
burden of proof with respect to the commission of crimes. Since 
they relied on the Federal Criminal Code--charging crimes--in 
making their case, it is appropriate that they be held to the 
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt--the standard used 
in criminal cases.
    In the House Judiciary Committee a panel of distinguished 
former Federal prosecutors testified that a responsible Federal 
prosecutor would not have brought a criminal prosecution on the 
basis of the case set out in the Starr Report on which the 
House Judiciary Committee relied. One of them, Thomas P. 
Sullivan, a veteran of 40 years of practice in Federal criminal 
cases, and U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois 
from 1977 to 1981, stated the following:

    If the President were not involved, if an ordinary citizen were the 
subject of the inquiry, no serious consideration would be given to a 
criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in discovery in 
the Jones civil case having to do with an alleged coverup of a private 
sexual affair with another woman or the follow-on testimony before the 
grand jury. The case simply would not be given serious consideration 
for prosecution.

    Now, let me move beyond this question of proving the case 
and address the next step in the managers' ostensible logical 
progression, namely that the crimes that they were trying to 
prove are high crime and misdemeanors and, therefore, a vote 
for conviction and removal must follow.
    Actually, in considering this issue we must bear in mind 
the ultimate question: Does the conduct warrant removal from 
office? The House logic seems to be that any perjury, any 
obstruction of justice, warrants removal. As serious as those 
charges are, not all such conduct in all instances may rise to 
the level of an impeachable offense. In considering this 
matter, it is important to understand that the House articles 
included within them not only the charges but also the penalty. 
In the ordinary criminal case, there is a two-step judgment--
guilt and then sentence. In an impeachment case, the finding of 
guilty carries with it removal from office--the remedy provided 
by the Constitution.
    There is an important precedent for the view that in 
certain circumstances offenses of the sort alleged here may not 
rise to the level of a high crime and misdemeanor. That 
precedent is found in the tax article of impeachment of Richard 
Nixon which was before the House Judiciary Committee in 1974. 
That article charged President Nixon with knowingly filing tax 
returns which fraudulently claimed that he had donated pre-
Presidential papers before the date Congress had set for 
eliminating such a charitable tax deduction. It was worth 
$576,000 in deductions. This deduction was claimed in tax 
returns that contained the following assertion just above the 
taxpayer's signature:

    Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this 
return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct and complete.

    The House Judiciary Committee voted down that article of 
impeachment by a vote of 12 for, 26 against. As one of nine 
Democrats who joined the Republicans in voting against this 
article of impeachment in the Nixon case, I did not believe 
that in the circumstances of that case it rose to the level of 
a high crime and misdemeanor; I did not believe it was conduct 
against which the Founding Fathers intended the Congress to 
invoke the impeachment remedy.
    Let me turn briefly to the procedure followed in this 
impeachment matter, since good procedure enhances the chances 
of good results while bad procedure does the opposite. I am 
prompted to do so by various comments made by House managers 
criticizing the Senate for the procedure we have followed. I 
think the Senate has handled this matter well under very 
difficult circumstances. Given that the House managers 
questioned our procedure, let us look at the procedure on the 
House side.
    The House, which brought in no ``fact'' witnesses, came to 
the Senate and said to us, ``In order to evaluate testimony 
that is in the record, you must bring witnesses in and look 
them in the eye in order to assess their credibility.'' 
Obviously, one must ask, how did the House managers assess the 
credibility of witnesses when they brought none before them and 
yet voted to bring articles of impeachment recommending the 
President's removal to the Senate?
    Secondly, the other day, in response to a reasonable 
request by the President's lawyers on how the House planned to 
proceed in using deposition excerpts, a House manager said, ``I 
believe the appropriate legal response to your request is that 
it is none of your damn business what the other side is going 
to put on.'' This same attitude marked the treatment of 
President Clinton's lawyers before the House Judiciary 
Committee.
    Contrast this with the House Judiciary Committee's conduct 
in the matter of President Nixon's impeachment when the 
President's lawyers sat in with the committee in its closed 
sessions when committee staff presented findings of fact. The 
President's lawyers were able to challenge material, to ask 
questions, to supplement all presentations. Fact witnesses were 
called in and were subjected to questions by all. There was an 
understanding of the gravity of the matter for the Nation and 
the absolute imperative of having a fair process.
    In this matter, the House Judiciary Committee took only a 
few weeks to report impeachment articles. In the Nixon case the 
committee took 6 months. In the Judge Hastings case, the House 
Judiciary Committee received an 841-page report from the 
Judicial Conference as to why Hastings should be removed. 
Nevertheless, the committee undertook its own examination of 
the evidence. It heard 12 fact witnesses, deposed or 
interviewed 60 others, and held 7 days of hearings.
    In closing, it is very important to keep in mind the 
distinction between the person who is President and the office 
of President of the United States provided for in our 
Constitution.
    President Clinton has engaged in disgraceful and 
reprehensible conduct which has severely sullied and demeaned 
his tenure as President. Because of his shameful and reckless 
behavior he has brought dishonor upon himself, deeply hurt his 
family, and grievously diminished his reputation and standing 
now, and in history.
    But the diminishing of Bill Clinton must not lead us to 
diminish the Presidency for his successors as our Nation moves 
into the new millennium. There is a danger to the Nation in 
deposing a political leader chosen directly by the people and 
we must be wary of the instability it would bring to our 
political system.
    In the report of the staff of the impeachment inquiry in 
1974 on the constitutional grounds for Presidential 
impeachment, the conclusion states:

    Not all presidential misconduct is sufficient to constitute grounds 
for impeachment. There is a further requirement--substantiality. In 
deciding whether this further requirement has been met, the facts must 
be considered as a whole in the context of the office, not in terms of 
separate or isolated events. Because impeachment of a President is a 
grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct 
seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and 
principles of our government or the proper performance of 
constitutional duties of the presidential office.

    I do not believe the conduct examined here meets this test.
    I will vote against removing the President.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

              Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

    Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chief Justice and colleagues, my friends, 
I am not going to try to dazzle you with my knowledge of the 
law, which is minimal, or the 40 hand-written pages I have 
taken during these proceedings. But I signed the same oath you 
did, with a pen that should have had on it ``United States 
Senate,'' but did not. It said, ``Untied States Senate.''
    We were asked to turn the pens back in. I heard they are 
going to be valuable collectors' items, and I am not turning 
mine in. I want to see what it is worth.
    There you have it, an imperfect Senator being asked to 
judge an imperfect President. One of our colleagues noted 
yesterday that we all come from different backgrounds. It is 
true, and perhaps the living proof of that great aspect of this 
Nation is that I could be here at all.
    The same body where someone named Daniel Webster, John F. 
Kennedy, and Harry Truman once served also welcomed a mixed 
blood kid from the wrong side of the tracks. The offspring of 
an alcoholic father and a tubercular mother; in and out of 
orphanages; a lawbreaker and high school dropout who lied, 
cheated, stole, and did many other shameful things make me a 
poor judge, indeed, of someone else who used poor judgment.
    I would rather take a beating than to judge someone else 
for their indiscretions. But as one of our colleagues said 
yesterday, ``We didn't ask for this.''
    Still, with all my own human failings, I, like you, must 
try to separate them from the rule of law. I wish I had the 
historical knowledge of Senator Byrd or the legal knowledge of 
Orrin Hatch or the government experience of John Warner. But I 
don't--I must use common sense.
    I want to tell you an anecdote--about a conversation I had 
with the President right after he made his rather startling 
confession before this Nation and a group of reverends which I 
watched from my Denver office as millions of others were also 
watching at the same time.
    I was so moved by his statement that I wrote him a personal 
note telling him how sorry I was for what his family was going 
through. I told him I would not be one to pile on; that I would 
make no statements to the press; nor would I be a party to the 
impeachment process going on in the other body.
    As I look around this room, I see several others who 
subscribed to that same conduct as this proceeding moved to the 
Senate and took on soap opera proportions, and Members of both 
parties ran pell mell to the cameras at each recess.
    I sit right there in the back row 15 feet from the 
Cloakroom. But, at each recess by the time I walk to the 
Cloakroom and glance at the TV, some of my colleagues are 
already sprinting somewhere else to be in front of the cameras. 
As you know, I used to be on the U.S. Olympic Team, and I tell 
my speedy friends--you could have made the team.
    About 3 days after I wrote to the President, he called me 
to thank me for my note and we spoke for about 15 minutes. I 
asked him how his family was dealing with it and he told me 
they were having good days and bad, but it was hardest on his 
daughter, Chelsea, because she was away at college without the 
family unit to console her. He told me he would keep my note 
always. I felt badly then, and I do now.
    As I look around this room in which so many great people in 
our history have spoken and I read their names written in the 
desk drawers along with those who no one remembers, I tell you 
that I like this President.
    He came through a difficult childhood as I did, and I 
genuinely like him and feel sorry for both him and his family. 
But after agonizing as many of my Senate friends have, I 
remember the first question my then 9-year-old son, Colin, 
asked me 17 years ago when I told him I was going to run for 
public office. He asked, ``Dad, are you going to lie and 
stuff?''
    I told him, ``No.'' I don't have to learn how to lie--I 
still remembered how to lie from my delinquent days. I am still 
trying to forget it.
    I told him, human frailties not withstanding, elected 
officials should not ``lie and stuff.''
    Every one of us knows that when we step into the public 
arena, we are judged by a different standard. Being honest and 
truthful becomes more important because we must set the 
examples.
    As a Senator, if I ever forget it, this body will not have 
to throw me out because I will have brought it on myself, and I 
will save this body the time and expense and resign.
    I would not fear being thrown out. When I was young and not 
yet house-broken, I was thrown out of a lot of places. I swore 
a lot of oaths--not when I went in, but when I came out.
    There is a difference: one is about anger in private--the 
other is about honor in public. If we are not going to honor 
our oath, why don't we get rid of it and have an every-man-for-
himself kind of elected official?
    Better yet, let's change it. Mr. Chief Justice, you could 
say: ``Senators-elect. Raise your right hand and repeat after 
me: `On my honor, I'll do my best, to help myself and lie like 
the rest.''
    I took a solemn oath--perhaps it is the only thing in 
common I share with John F. Kennedy, Harry Truman and Daniel 
Webster as well as the founders of this Nation--and that is why 
honoring it is all the more important to me.
    Simply speaking, the President did, too. And, so even 
though I like him personally, I find I can only vote one way. 
And that is guilty on both articles.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator J. Robert Kerrey

    Mr. KERREY. Mr. Chief Justice, in the impeachment case of 
President Clinton I have read the depositions, reviewed the 
massive volume of evidence and carefully followed the detailed 
presentations of both the House managers and the President's 
counsel. The instructions for my decision come from two places: 
the oath I took to do impartial justice and the Constitution of 
the United States.
    Nebraskans, including me, are angry about the President's 
behavior. We find it deplorable on every level. It has 
permanently and deservedly marred his place in history. But 
impeachment is not about punishing an individual; it is about 
protecting the country. We punish a President who behaves 
immorally, lies and otherwise lacks the character we demand in 
public office with our votes. Presidents are also subject to 
criminal prosecution when they leave office.
    Impeachment must be reserved for extreme situations 
involving crimes against the state. Why? Because the founders 
of our country and the framers of our Constitution correctly 
placed stability of the Republic as their paramount concern. 
They did not want Congress to be able to easily remove a 
popularly elected President. They made clear they intended a 
decision to impeach to be used to protect the Nation against 
only the highest of crimes.
    On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives, on an 
almost straight party line vote, approved and delivered to the 
Senate two articles of impeachment. The Constitution permits me 
to judge and decide upon only these articles, not to wander 
through all of the President's conduct looking for any reason 
for removal.
    Some Nebraskans have told me the President should be 
removed from office by the Congress because he is no longer 
trusted, has lost the respect of many, and has displayed 
reprehensible behavior. As strong as those feelings are, the 
Constitution does not provide for overturning an election even 
if all of these things are true.
    Three recent letters to the editor in the Omaha World-
Herald help make the point. The first, from a man in Kearney, 
says that by voting to dismiss the trial, I ``voted to support 
sexual harassment,'' among other things. A second, from Honey 
Creek, IA, raises allegations regarding the President and 
China, says he is ``dangerous'' and urges Senator Hagel and I 
to ``oust him now.'' The third, from Omaha, reminds readers of 
an often quoted comment I once made about the President's 
credibility and asks how, in light of that, I could vote to 
leave him in office.
    However, the House did not charge the President with these 
offenses. Impeachment is not a judgment of a President's 
character, all his actions, or even his general fitness for 
office. We make those decisions every 4 years at the ballot 
box. Our job in contemplating the extraordinary step of 
overturning an election is to judge only those charges the 
House actually brought.
    Because the premium on constitutional stability is so high, 
I decided to judge the case against the strictest possible 
standard: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the 
President can be convicted only if there is no reasonable 
interpretation of the facts other than an intent to commit 
perjury and obstruction of justice. The following is a summary 
of my analysis of this case:
    Article I accuses the President of perjury in his August 
17, 1998, testimony to a Federal grand jury, during which he 
waived his rights against self-incrimination. Most important in 
determining guilt or innocence is the rule of law governing 
perjury, which makes it clear that a person has not committed 
perjury just because they misled or even lied. Perjury occurs 
when a false statement is made under oath with willful intent 
to mislead in a material matter. Lying is immoral; perjury is 
illegal. I should not accuse the President of ignoring the rule 
of law and then ignore it myself in making a judgment.
    After reading and watching the President's grand jury 
testimony, listening to the arguments of the House managers and 
the President's lawyers, discussing this case with prosecutors 
and reviewing the impeachment trial of U.S. District Judge 
Alcee Hastings, I have concluded the President did not commit 
the crime of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt. I frequently 
found the President's testimony maddening and misleading, but I 
did not find it material to a criminal act.
    Article II accuses the President of obstructing justice in 
seven instances. The House managers relied on circumstantial 
evidence, saying that common sense provides only one conclusion 
about why the President acted the way he did. However, the 
direct evidence, including the testimony of Monica Lewinsky 
herself, rebutted the circumstantial evidence. Second, while 
the House managers were correct in saying that common sense 
could lead to a conclusion that the President intended to 
obstruct justice, common sense could also lead to other 
reasonable conclusions about the reasons for his actions. 
Third, with respect to the allegations of obstructing justice 
in the civil case, Paula Jones' lawsuit was thrown out, then 
eventually settled. In the end, justice was done.
    As reprehensible as I find the President's behavior to be, 
I do not believe that high crimes and misdemeanors as defined 
by the framers have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, I will vote to acquit on both articles. My vote to 
acquit is not a vote to exonerate. While there is plenty of 
blame to go around in this case, the person most responsible 
for it going this far is the President of the United States. He 
behaved immorally, recklessly, and reprehensibly. These were 
his choices. In the final analysis, they do not merit removal, 
but they do merit condemnation.
    While I am confident this vote is the right one--not just 
for this case, but as a precedent for future Congresses and 
Presidents too--I understand that reasonable people could reach 
the opposite conclusion. The bitterness in America on both 
sides of this debate has saddened me. I hope and pray that with 
this vote behind us the people's Congress can return without 
rancor to the important work of our country.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator George V. Voinovich

    Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. Chief Justice, we are not here today 
because the President had a relationship that he himself has 
described as inappropriate and wrong. As House Manager James 
Rogan appropriately noted, ``Had the President's bad choice 
simply ended with this indiscretion, we would not be here 
today. Adultery may be a lot of things, but it is not an 
impeachable offense. Unfortunately, the President's bad choices 
only grew worse.'' It is not the President's inappropriate 
relationship, but his deliberate and willful attempts to 
conceal and mislead that bring us to this point.
    The very foundation of this Nation is the rule of law, not 
of men. The framers of our Constitution specifically provided 
article II, section 4 of the Constitution which states, ``The 
President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
    On January 7, 1999, as one of my first official duties as a 
U.S. Senator, I took an oath to consider the evidence and 
arguments in the impeachment case against the President. We 
answered in the affirmative when the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court administered the following oath:

    Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial 
of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to 
the Constitution and laws, so help you God?

    I understood that the private inappropriate conduct of the 
President alone did not then and does not now rise to a level 
necessitating his removal from office. My responsibility is to 
fulfill the oath I took to determine impartially based on the 
facts, evidence, and testimony whether the President committed 
high crimes and misdemeanors as outlined in the Constitution.
    During my 33 years in public office, I have had to make 
some very difficult decisions. As Governor, I had to make 
determinations on hundreds of requests for commutations and 
pardons. To my recollection, in no case have I labored more 
than I have over the articles of impeachment of our President.
    After an exhaustive study, which included reading volumes 
of transcripts, watching the taped testimony and listening to 
the able arguments made by the House managers, the White House 
counsel, and my colleagues in the Senate, I have reached the 
conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the President 
committed both perjury and obstruction of justice as outlined 
in articles I and II in the articles of impeachment.
    I also have concluded that the President's obstruction of 
justice was premeditated and undertaken over a long period of 
time beginning when he learned that Monica Lewinsky was placed 
on the witness list in the Jones case.
    It is particularly disturbing that he used his brilliant 
mind and superb interpersonal skills to sweep other people into 
his scheme, thereby impairing their credibility, all to 
extricate himself from taking responsibility for his conduct. 
But for a conclusive DNA analysis, he may have succeeded in 
that scheme.
    By committing perjury and obstructing justice, the 
President is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. As 
constitutional scholar Charles Cooper said, ``The crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, like the crimes of treason 
and bribery, are quintessentially offenses against our system 
of government, visiting injury immediately on society itself.''
    He violated his oath of office and failed to fulfill his 
responsibility under the Constitution, which provides that the 
President ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.'' Judge Griffin Bell has correctly noted, ``A 
president cannot faithfully execute the laws if he himself is 
breaking them.'' The President has undermined the fundamental 
principle that we are a nation ruled by laws and not by men. 
There is no way in good conscience that we as a nation can have 
a lawbreaker remain as President of the United States when his 
conduct in office has included the very same acts that have 
resulted in the impeachment of Federal judges and have sent 
hundreds of people to prison. Ours is a nation of equal justice 
under the law.
    I believe the framers of the Constitution had a President 
like Bill Clinton in mind when they drafted the impeachment 
provisions in article II, section 4--a very popular, brilliant 
communicator with extraordinary interpersonal skills who abuses 
his power, violates his oath of office, and evades 
responsibility for his actions because he believes he is above 
the law.
    One who has committed high crimes and misdemeanors 
disqualifies himself from serving as President, Commander in 
Chief, and chief law enforcement officer. The President also 
represents much more than these titles and responsibilities. He 
is a symbol of the greatness of the American people. 
Presidential scholar Clinton Rossiter observed that the 
President of the United States is ``the one-man distillation of 
the American people.'' And, President William Howard Taft 
described the President as ``the personal embodiment and 
representative of their dignity and majesty.''
    By virtue of his own conduct, William Jefferson Clinton has 
forfeited his elected right to hold the office of President. I 
sincerely believe that this country can survive the removal of 
a popular President who has forfeited public trust. But, our 
country cannot survive the abandonment of trust itself.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

    Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chief Justice, the Senate must now 
fulfill a weighty and solemn duty. For only the second time in 
the more than 200 years since our Founding Fathers established 
the Constitution, we must vote on articles of impeachment 
against a President.
    When considering this issue, which goes to our core 
constitutional responsibilities as Senators, each of us must 
come to a conclusion based on his or her conscience. Guided by 
the Constitution, we must bring all of our moral beliefs, our 
education, our careers, and our experiences as public servants 
to the question. And we must try to reach a decision that will 
serve the best interests of the Nation for generations to come.
    As I reflect on the impeachment proceedings, I think first 
of the range of emotions I have felt. From the moment I 
realized that the President had engaged in this shameful 
relationship, I have struggled with my thoughts.
    I was angry, of course. I was ashamed for the President, a 
talented man--someone I consider a friend. How could he risk so 
much with his disgraceful behavior?
    I was saddened. I do not know how the President will 
reconcile himself to his family. I could imagine the 
embarrassment and the humiliation of the First Lady and his 
daughter Chelsea. I pitied them as they felt the searing glow 
of the public spotlight.
    I am sure that colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, have 
empathized with similar emotions.
    But now we must put those feelings aside. We have a very 
specific charge under the Constitution. That hallowed document 
delineates our duty. Under article II, section 4, we must 
determine whether the President has committed ``high Crimes or 
Misdemeanors'' requiring his removal from office.
    In my view, our Founding Fathers meant to set a very high 
standard for impeachment. Clearly, the phrase ``high Crimes or 
Misdemeanors'' does not include all crimes. But what are the 
crimes that meet that standard? I find the words of George 
Mason to be compelling. He understood the phrase to mean 
``great and dangerous offenses'' or ``attempts to subvert the 
Constitution.''
    When applying this standard, we must also consider the 
national interest. The Founding Fathers vested the impeachment 
power in the Senate, and not the judiciary, precisely because 
this body would be accountable to the people.
    In the words of Alexander Hamilton, only the Senate would 
``possess the degree of credit and authority'' required to act 
on the weighty issue of whether to remove a Federal official. 
In my view, this means that we must look not just at the facts 
and the law, but we must also try to determine what is in the 
best interests of the Nation.
    But we should not read the polls, or some other temporary 
gauge of the public temperament. Instead, we must look back 
through history, and toward the future, to reach a decision 
that will reflect well on the Senate and the Nation for 
generations to come.
    In my view, this case does not involve efforts to subvert 
the Constitution, and the national interest will not be served 
by removing the President from office.
    Before turning to the evidence, I want to express my 
concern with the way in which the articles of impeachment are 
written.
    They do not specify which statements and actions by the 
President are unlawful. Instead, they make general allegations. 
With this approach, we cannot fulfill our duty to the American 
people. The American people must know specifically what 
Presidential conduct justifies overturning an election.
    While the articles could have been more clearly written, 
there is a more fundamental problem. There is simply 
insufficient evidence for a vote to convict. Whether you apply 
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, or even the lower 
standard of clear and convincing evidence, the House managers 
have not proved their case.
    With regard to article I, the evidence does not support a 
charge of perjury. The President may have been uncooperative 
and evasive. He certainly was misleading. But he never 
committed perjury as that term is defined in the law. 
Consequently, the President should be acquitted on article I.
    There is also insufficient evidence to convict the 
President on article II, which charges him with obstruction of 
justice. The main problem with this article is that testimony 
from the principal witnesses do not support the allegations. 
Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, and Vernon Jordan testified that 
the President did not tamper with witnesses, conceal evidence, 
or take any other actions that would constitute obstruction of 
justice. All of the witnesses support the President's version 
of events.
    I realize that some of you may view the evidence 
differently. But I think we must still consider whether this is 
an appropriate case for the Senate to use the awesome power of 
impeachment to overturn a national election.
    I further ask you to consider the precedent we would set 
with a conviction of this President. We risk making the 
impeachment power another political weapon to be wielded in 
partisan battles.
    Our Founding Fathers warned against this. In ``The 
Federalist Papers'' No. 65, Alexander Hamilton noted that the 
prosecution of impeachable offenses would ``connect itself with 
the pre-existing factions.'' And that this would create ``the 
greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by 
the comparative strength of parties than by the real 
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.''
    Prior to the present case, the House of Representatives had 
seriously considered articles of impeachment against only two 
Presidents--Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon. In the more than 
200 years since the Constitution was established, the House set 
the impeachment machinery in motion in only two occasions.
    Today, no one doubts that the serious abuses of our 
constitutional system by the Nixon administration warranted 
impeachment proceedings. And the bipartisan approach of 
Congress solidified President Nixon's decision to resign.
    But history has not been kind to those who pushed the 
impeachment of President Johnson upon the Nation. Scholars 
agree that the charges were baseless--a purely partisan 
campaign. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has presided so 
effectively in this case, wrote in his book on impeachment that 
if the Senate had convicted President Johnson ``a long shadow 
would have been cast over the independence'' of the Presidency.
    So for most of our history, the fears of our Founding 
Fathers have not been realized. Congress has not resorted to 
impeachment even when previous administrations faced far-
ranging scandals--the Whiskey Ring scandal during the tenure of 
President Grant; the Teapot Dome scandal in the Harding 
administration, and more recently allegations that Presidents 
Reagan and Bush were not truthful regarding the Iran-Contra 
scandal.
    Historically, Congress has held its hand when circumstances 
might have warranted a pull of the impeachment lever. But 
contrast that history with the circumstances surrounding this 
case.
    President Clinton was a defendant in a civil lawsuit. In 
determining whether that lawsuit should be allowed to go 
forward while the President was in office, the Supreme Court of 
the United States noted that the case involved ``unofficial 
conduct.'' That case was eventually dismissed, and the 
plaintiff reached a settlement with the President.
    But with that lawsuit in place, the plaintiff's attorneys 
had license to probe into the President's personal life. The 
private lives of many people were paraded through the press.
    Then the independent counsel joined the hunt. Although he 
was originally appointed to investigate a real estate 
transaction in Arkansas, and even though he eventually cleared 
the President of any wrongdoing in that matter and other 
reckless accusations, the independent counsel turned his 
attention to a private affair.
    I think this background cautions against the use of the 
awesome and irrevocable power of impeachment. Think for a 
minute about how future partisans might proceed. We have a 
readily accessible legal system. Anyone with the filing fee can 
bring a lawsuit. And our laws provide great leeway in the 
discovery process.
    If we take the wrong path now, we can expect to see future 
Presidents hauled into court. They will be questioned 
repeatedly, and it will not be hard for skilled attorneys to 
hurl charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. We cannot 
allow the Presidency to be weakened in this way.
    Once again, we find the wisdom of our Founding Fathers 
providing guidance.
    James Wilson, who participated in the Philadelphia 
Convention at which the Constitution was drafted, observed that 
the President is ``amenable to [the law] in his private 
character as a citizen, and in his public character by 
impeachment.''
    In other words, the legal system, our civil and criminal 
laws provide the proper venue for a President who has failed in 
his private character, and in this case, the legal system can 
and will continue to address the President's personal 
transgressions.
    The Paula Jones lawsuit has been settled. When he leaves 
office, the President could be subject to further prosecution. 
But there is simply no injury to our constitutional system, no 
aspect of what James Wilson called the President's public 
character, which must be remedied through a Senate conviction 
under the impeachment power. Of course, I understand the great 
pain inflicted by the President's private character. As I said 
earlier, his behavior was reprehensible. He has shamed himself, 
his family, and the Nation.
    I understand the desire to punish the President for his 
conduct. But we must remember the many ways in which the 
President has already been punished. He has suffered enormous 
embarrassment and humiliation. Beyond that personal pain, he 
has also been subject to public condemnation. Every Member of 
Congress is on the record rebuking his behavior.
    Of course, this may not satisfy some. They may want more 
punishment. But please remember--the purpose of the impeachment 
power is not to punish. Instead, impeachment serves to protect 
the Nation from corrupt officials.
    So, to render a proper verdict, we must put aside the 
powerful desire to punish. And I submit that to impeach the 
President in this case would be a terrible use of the 
impeachment power, lacking proportionality and perspective.
    We must step back from the partisan precipice. We must not 
weaken the Presidency for future generations. We must reject 
these articles of impeachment and help restore the balance of 
power between the branches of the government.
    Let us put this matter behind, heal the wounds inflicted by 
partisanship, and rededicate ourselves to the challenges facing 
our Nation.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Christopher S. Bond*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see p. 
3058 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, on Friday, February 12, 1999, 
I voted to convict President William Jefferson Clinton on both 
counts of the impeachment articles brought by the U.S. House of 
Representatives charging that he committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice. My reasons follow.
    On January 16, 1998, at the request of the U.S. Attorney 
General Janet Reno, the three judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit expanded the 
previously entered order authorizing the Office of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to look into certain matters relating 
to a lawsuit brought against President William Jefferson 
Clinton by former Arkansas State employee Paula Jones alleging 
sexual harassment. Pursuant to that order, Ms. Jones' attorneys 
issued subpoenas for evidence and deposed Mr. Clinton and 
others seeking information on a pattern of conduct that might 
be relevant to the issues in the Jones case.
    The President denied in a deposition in the Jones case and 
in a forceful statement to the American public that he had 
sexual relations with ``that woman,'' referring to Monica 
Lewinsky. Subsequently, however, Ms. Lewinsky turned over a 
stained blue dress that she had worn in an encounter with the 
President; a scientific examination revealed that the DNA on 
the dress was President Clinton's DNA.
    The Office of Independent Counsel convened a Federal grand 
jury to look into the matter and deposed Mr. Clinton in the 
White House on August 17, 1998, about his participation in the 
Jones lawsuit.
    The Office of Independent Counsel then referred the matters 
developed in the investigation to the U.S. House of 
Representatives, which on December 19, 1998, voted two articles 
of impeachment against Mr. Clinton alleging that he committed 
perjury before the Federal grand jury in four instances and 
that on seven occasions he had obstructed justice by tampering 
with witnesses and evidence in the Jones case proceedings.
    For the sake of brevity, I shall only cover several of the 
allegations and evaluate the evidence supporting them.
    Counsel for the President has admitted that there was an 
inappropriate relationship between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky and that they had concocted a cover story to conceal 
their relationship and activities. On December 17, 1997, at 
approximately 2 a.m., Mr. Clinton telephoned Ms. Lewinsky after 
he learned that she had been summoned for a deposition in the 
Jones case. According to this testimony he called to tell her 
of the death of the brother of Mr. Clinton's secretary. Ms. 
Lewinsky states that he told her about the death of the 
brother, but that he also reminded her of their cover story and 
notified her that she was included on the witness list in the 
Jones case.
    According to Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, Mr. Clinton further 
stated that they might be able to avoid her testimony if she 
executed an affidavit. Although Mr. Clinton had also reminded 
Ms. Lewinsky of her cover story, the White House counsel made 
much of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky said that the President did 
not tell her to file a false affidavit and did not link the 
cover story to the need to file an affidavit.
    I do not believe it is at all inconsistent with a scheme or 
out of the ordinary to note that the President would not make 
such a connection. As an experienced attorney, the President 
would know he would be in grave danger if he ever explicitly 
asked anyone to file a false affidavit or to lie under oath. To 
paraphrase a statement made during the trial by Vernon Jordan, 
``He is no fool.'' He would have known that such a statement 
could be revealed by subsequent judicial inquiry.
    Mr. Clinton did not have to tell Ms. Lewinsky expressly to 
execute a false affidavit. She knew that in the absence of 
contrary instructions she was to continue to follow their 
story. She was referred by the President's best friend, Vernon 
Jordan, to an attorney who drafted the affidavit for her. The 
President, through Mr. Jordan, was kept advised of the progress 
of the affidavit.
    During the time that Mr. Jordan was serving as liaison 
between the attorney and the President in the procuring of the 
affidavit, he was also pursuing a job search for Ms. Lewinsky, 
which he admitted was under his control.
    The President's lawyer was presented the affidavit and 
offered it into the evidence when the President was summoned 
before federal judge Susan Webber Wright to participate in the 
deposition on January 17, 1998, by the Jones attorneys. The 
President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, referred to the deposition 
in evidence and stated that it showed that there ``is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form'' 
with Mr. Clinton. Mr. Bennett further stated, ``In preparation 
of the witness for this deposition, the witness (Mr. Clinton) 
is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, for I have not told 
him a single thing he doesn't know. . . .'' (Evidentiary 
Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. XIV, p. 23.) Although the videotape 
of the deposition showed the President looking in the direction 
of the attorney when the affidavit was presented, Mr. Clinton 
subsequently stated that he was not paying attention and had no 
knowledge of the representations made by his attorney about the 
affidavit.
    I believe that to be totally incredible.
    The President had known that Ms. Lewinsky would be a prime 
subject of the deposition and he had asked Ms. Lewinsky to file 
an affidavit and took steps to be kept advised of the progress 
of that affidavit. Subsequent events showed that his attorney, 
Mr. Bennett, did not at the time know the falsity of the 
affidavit and that Mr. Clinton was apparently the only one at 
the deposition who was fully aware of the fraud that was being 
perpetrated on the court.
    When Mr. Bennett later learned the falsity of the 
affidavit, he did what any attorney hates to do and that is to 
advise the court that he provided false information. He asked 
that the affidavit and his characterization of it be 
disregarded.
    I believe Mr. Clinton encouraged the execution of a false 
affidavit, secured job assistance to help prevent truthful 
testimony, and allowed his attorney to make false statements as 
alleged in article II, paragraphs 1, 4, and 5.
    When Mr. Clinton testified before the Federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998, he was asked:

    A. If he misled Judge Wright in some way then you would have 
corrected the record and said, excuse me Mr. Bennett, I think the judge 
is getting a mis-impression by what you are saying?
    A. . . . I wasn't even paying much attention to this conversation.
    Q. Do you believe, Mr. President, that you have an obligation to 
make sure that the presiding federal judge was on board and had the 
correct facts?
    A. I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in 
the exact words he did until I started reading this transcript 
carefully for this deposition.--(Deposition of President Clinton, page 
30, lines 2-5.)

    I therefore believe he provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to the Federal grand jury concerning 
statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge 
as alleged in article I, paragraph 3.
    On December 28, 1997, the President met in his White House 
office with Ms. Lewinsky and exchanged gifts. During the course 
of the conversation Ms. Lewinsky raised the question of what to 
do with other gifts he had provided her and which had been 
subpoenaed by the attorneys for Paula Jones. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky, he made no definitive statement about the gifts.
    Very shortly thereafter, according to Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony, Mr. Clinton's personal secretary, Bettie Currie, 
initiated a series of telephone conversations, in which in 
effect Ms. Currie communicated to Ms. Lewinsky that she 
understood from the President that Ms. Lewinsky had something 
for her. Pursuant to those telephone calls Ms. Currie picked up 
gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and took them back to Ms. Currie's 
apartment where she stored them under her bed.
    During the course of proceedings in the Senate, Ms. 
Lewinsky was asked in a deposition about these telephone calls 
and expanded upon her testimony about them. A prior statement 
by Ms. Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had actually initiated the call 
was recanted by Ms. Currie, and I believe the testimony of Ms. 
Lewinsky is credible. By hiding the gifts rather than 
presenting them to the Jones attorneys pursuant to the 
subpoena, Ms. Lewinsky committed a felonious act and, if Ms. 
Currie had knowledge of the subpoena, she also committed a 
felonious act of concealing materials covered by a valid 
subpoena. Mr. Clinton, by orchestrating, facilitating, and 
encouraging the suppression of evidence under subpoena, also 
committed a felonious act. I, therefore, believe that the 
charge in article II, paragraph 3, of the impeachment articles 
is proven.
    During the course of his deposition by the Jones attorneys, 
President Clinton continued to rely on his cover story and on 
the perjurious affidavit submitted by Ms. Lewinsky. During that 
deposition he referred repeatedly to Ms. Currie as one who 
would corroborate the cover story which he and Ms. Lewinsky had 
devised. Immediately after his testimony on Saturday, January 
17, 1998, he called Ms. Currie and summoned her to come into 
his office on a Sunday, January 18, 1998. There he stated five 
rhetorical questions to Ms. Currie: (1) ``I was never really 
alone with her . . . right?''; (2) ``You were always there when 
Monica was there . . . right?''; (3) Monica came to see me and 
I never touched her right . . . right?''; (4) ``She wanted to 
have sex with me and I can't do that . . . ?''; (5) ``You could 
see and hear everything . . . right?''
    Each of these statements supported the position taken by 
the President in the Jones deposition, but each one of these 
statements was false. The President was transmitting to Ms. 
Currie what he wanted her to say should she be called as a 
witness in this case. For good measure, he even went back to 
her a couple of days later and walked her through the 
statements again. It is uncontroverted that he made those 
statements, but he attempted to justify them on the basis that 
he was trying to refresh his memory.
    His statements to Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998, and 
several days later constituted relating a false and misleading 
account of relevant events to influence corruptly the testimony 
of a witness in a Federal civil rights action as alleged in 
article II, paragraph 6, of the impeachment proceedings.
    Subsequently, he also made statements to his subordinates 
including Sidney Blumenthal, John Podesta, and Erskine Bowles. 
The statements he made to them were also known by him to be 
false and were designed to provide misleading information 
through them which could be and subsequently was transmitted 
under oath in the judicial proceedings by the subordinates.
    His statements to his subordinates on January 21, 23, and 
26, 1998, were false and misleading statements to potential 
witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding to influence 
corruptly the testimony of those witnesses as alleged in 
article II, section 7, of the articles of impeachment.
    At his Federal grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998, Mr. 
Clinton falsely and corruptly denied he had attempted to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and impede the discovery 
of evidence in civil rights actions as set out in the analysis 
above. Thus, he committed the acts as charged in article I, 
paragraph 4, the count charging perjury. (Evidentiary Record, 
S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, pp. 559-60.)
    I believe that the evidence presented on the above charges 
was clear and convincing that the President engaged in a 
continuing scheme to fabricate and establish in Federal court 
proceedings a false story about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky and that through circumstantial evidence, the direct 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie, Mr. Blumenthal, and 
others, plus the corroborating evidence, he was shown to have 
committed the acts charged.
    The totality of his actions can be judged in the success 
with which he maintained his cover story. Had it not been for 
the DNA on the stained dress, there is little likelihood that 
the false cover story would have been exposed for the lie that 
it was. In perpetrating that false and misleading story Mr. 
Clinton tampered with witnesses, obstructing justice in the 
civil rights lawsuit brought against him by Paula Jones. He 
also falsely misrepresented these acts in testimony before the 
grand jury August 17, 1998.
    Having resolved in my mind the question that clear and 
convincing evidence shows that William Jefferson Clinton 
obstructed justice and committed perjury before a grand jury, 
the next issue is whether these activities rise to the level of 
offenses for which removal from office is the appropriate 
remedy. Defenders of the President have said that no one would 
press charges in a case like this, that it was not grave enough 
to merit a criminal proceeding, and that it certainly was not 
sufficient to warrant removing the President from office.
    With respect to the seriousness of the offense, it is 
worthy of note that during the year 1997, 182 people were 
sentenced by Federal judges for perjury and another 144 were 
sentenced for obstruction and witness tampering. These 
prosecutions were brought by Clinton administration appointees 
and in many instances in front of Clinton-appointed judges.
    The case of Dr. Barbara Battaglia is particularly 
compelling. In a lawsuit brought by a patient of a Veterans' 
Administration hospital alleging sexual harassment, Dr. 
Battaglia was asked in a deposition if she had had consensual 
sex with the plaintiff. Her answer to that question was a 
simple, ``No.'' When that denial was shown to be a lie, she was 
convicted of a felony and sentenced to house arrest with an 
electronic monitoring device. She has lost her ability to 
practice medicine and also her ability to utilize her law 
degree to practice law.
    The serious nature of these offenses is particularly clear 
when considered in the context of the proceedings. The U.S. 
Supreme Court had ruled unanimously that Mr. Clinton, as 
President, had to answer the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones. A 
Federal judge was assigned to the suit and presided over the 
deposition in which Mr. Clinton testified and at which time he 
and his lawyer presented the false affidavit.
    It is totally inconsistent within the context of this case 
and the sound functioning of the judicial system to say that 
the Supreme Court meant that Mr. Clinton should respond to 
these charges but he was not bound to respond truthfully. His 
actions in procuring and using false affidavits, causing the 
hiding of subpoenaed evidence, and tampering with a potential 
witness by giving false information to use in any testimony 
effectively denied the plaintiff the civil rights the Supreme 
Court ruled she had. To say that the acts are not grave, not 
high crimes, and not a threat to the judicial system, is 
untenable. No lawyer could make such a statement in open court 
and not be subjected to the loss of a license to practice law.
    Likewise, his lies to a grand jury from his White House 
office were a serious challenge to the administration of 
justice.
    Moreover, the debates of the authors of the Constitution 
showed that they considered obstructing justice would warrant 
the President's impeachment and conviction. George Mason asked 
if the President could advise someone to commit a crime and 
then before an indictment or conviction use the power of a 
pardon to stop inquiry and prevent detection. James Madison 
responded that, ``If the President be connected, in any 
suspicious manner, with any person, and there be grounds to 
believe he will shelter him, the House of Representatives can 
impeach him.'' (Elliott, ``Debates on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution,'' Vol. III, p. 498 (1836 ed.).)
    Another argument has also been made by the White House 
counsel and supporters of the President that to remove the 
President from office on impeachment would be to nullify the 
election. This argument suggests that impeachment is never an 
appropriate remedy, provided the President is popular and the 
country is enjoying good times. The office of the Presidency is 
not so brittle that it would be gravely damaged by removing the 
current President or any other President. The Founding Fathers 
certainly did not envision that impeachment could only apply to 
an unpopular President or one who was leading the country in 
hard times.
    At the height of a cold war with United States forces 
engaged in Vietnam, impeachment proceedings against President 
Richard M. Nixon forced him to leave office. The country was 
not wounded, it did not lose its way; Vice President Gerald 
Ford assumed the Presidency and continued the course of 
government. In this case, Vice President Al Gore would assume 
office and would be expected to continue the policies of the 
Clinton administration.
    The U.S. Senate in recent years did not shirk from driving 
from office a colleague accused of obstructing justice in a 
sexual harassment case. No one objected that we had 
``nullified'' the votes of the citizens of his State.
    Some of my colleagues have argued that the President has 
been so strong and forceful in foreign policy and conducted 
such wise relations with other nations that we could not afford 
to lose him. That argument, too, smacks of a referendum on the 
President's conduct of office, not a judgment on his wrongful 
acts. If we were to judge impeachment on the basis of the 
policies of the President, then impeachment could always be 
expected to be purely a partisan matter turning on the approval 
or disapproval of formulation or implementation of policy by 
the President. The framers rightfully dismissed any option that 
the proper or improper administration of the regular powers of 
the President would be involved in a decision on impeachment, 
either positively or negatively.
    In addition, we have the precedents set by the removal by 
the Senate of judges who have been found to have committed 
perjury. During my tenure in the Senate we have twice removed 
judges for committing perjury because of the serious adverse 
impact perjury has on our judicial system. If a judge is 
removable for committing the significant act of perjury, can 
the one who appoints the judge be held to a lower standard?
    The President not only appoints the judges, he appoints the 
Attorney General, the U.S. attorneys, and the Supreme Court 
Justices. Certainly we should impose no lower standard on the 
person with the ultimate responsibility for the proper 
administration of justice than on those he appoints.
    It is precisely in good times, with the President high in 
the polls, that it is incumbent upon the Senate to exercise 
very thoroughly and carefully the responsibility under the 
Constitution to make the difficult decision on whether the 
President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors warranting 
his removal from office. If we are to have a government of laws 
and not of men and not of public opinion polls, then we must 
judge the President on the evidence presented to us. I believe 
that the acts that he committed constitute high crimes and 
misdemeanors warranting his conviction.
    I should note that the Senate made a serious mistake in 
beginning the proceedings by limiting the ability of the House 
managers to call witnesses. The absence of witnesses to testify 
to the acts alleged as the basis of impeachment charges 
significantly impeded the progress toward resolving the 
allegations against the President. I trust that the Senate will 
not make the same mistake in future impeachment proceedings.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Charles S. Robb

    Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, sitting in 
judgment of the President of the United States is not easy for 
any of us. It is particularly difficult for me because of the 
personal and political relationship I have had with this 
President over the last 20 years. We served together as 
Governors in the early eighties, as several of you did. We 
traveled together on foreign trade missions. We shared similar 
priorities for our States. At my urging, he joined the 
fledgling Democratic Leadership Council, which would later 
become an intellectual and organizational resource for his 
Presidential campaign.
    From our earliest meetings, I recognized in him, as many of 
you have recognized, gifts of head and heart and a truly 
extraordinary range of political and communication skills that 
marked him with a potential for greatness. It was not as a 
friend, however, but as a U.S. Senator that I took an oath to 
render impartial justice under the Constitution in this 
impeachment trial. I was fully prepared to convict and remove 
the President from office if I concluded that the articles 
charged met the test of high crimes and misdemeanors as 
envisioned by the framers of our Constitution, and if the 
evidence convinced me of his guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. 
That is the standard I would require to remove this President 
or any President from office.
    As we wrestle with the decisions before us today, I believe 
that it is incumbent upon us to reflect on the consequence of 
these decisions tomorrow; for while this trial is about this 
President, it is also about the future of this Republic. We 
simply cannot escape the fact that what we do today will affect 
the strength and stability of our Nation because the actions we 
take, the precedent we set, directly affects the separation of 
powers and the independence of the Presidency as an 
institution.
    The writings of the framers and the overwhelming consensus 
of the scholarship that has followed demonstrate that the 
mechanism for removing a President was central to maintaining 
the delicate balance of power among the three branches of 
government. The Founding Fathers struggled to resolve the 
tension between making it too difficult to remove a President, 
thereby creating a king, and making it too easy, thereby 
creating a weak Chief Executive who would serve at the pleasure 
of the legislature. As more than 400 scholars concluded last 
November, the lower the threshold for impeachment, the weaker 
the President.
    The resolution of this dilemma--where to set the standard 
for removal--occupied the brilliant minds of several Virginians 
who took part in our constitutional debates two centuries ago. 
When George Mason offered specific language to define an 
impeachment standard, James Madison worried about making the 
standard too low. In worrying, he replied that so vague a term 
would be equivalent to a tenure at the pleasure of the Senate. 
After much deliberation, our founders finally agreed that the 
President should be removed only for committing treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors against the 
United States. Thereafter, as we all know, a Committee on 
Style, which had no authority to make substantive changes, 
dropped the last four words, considering them redundant.
    Alexander Hamilton defined impeachable activities as those 
that relate chiefly to the injuries done immediately to society 
itself. During the debate, Edmund Randolph, a Virginia 
Governor, reflected concerns. He stated that the Executive will 
have great opportunities of abusing his power, particularly in 
time of war when the military force and, in some respects, the 
public's money will be in his hands. Clearly, our founders 
created impeachment not to punish the President, but to protect 
the Republic. They had lived under a king and they didn't want 
another.
    History and common sense tell us, therefore, that the 
threshold for impeachment should be high--very high. It should 
be difficult, not easy, to impeach a President of the United 
States because impeachment is the ultimate sanction for 
protecting the Republic. It is a weapon to be respected and 
feared, but wielded only under the most compelling 
circumstances. Similarly, history and common sense tell us that 
removing a President is not the same as removing a Federal 
judge. In James Madison's records of the debate at the Federal 
Constitutional Convention, he wrote, ``The judiciary hold their 
places not for a limited time, but during good behavior.'' The 
Executive was to hold his place for a limited term, like the 
members of the legislature.
    Like them--particularly the Senate, whose Members would 
continue in appointment in the same term of 6 years--he would 
periodically be tried for his behavior by his electors, who 
would continue or discontinue him in trust, according to the 
manner in which he had discharged it. Likewise, removing a 
President is not the same as removing a member of the Armed 
Forces for violating the military code of conduct. The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice is required to maintain the good order 
and discipline for waging war and securing peace. And all of us 
who have served in the Armed Forces understood that we swore an 
oath to obey a code not required of any civilian, even those 
with the power to send us into harm's way--a civilian Commander 
in Chief, our Secretary of Defense, and Members of Congress.
    Finally, removing a President is not the same as punishing 
a citizen in a court of law. Like any citizen, a President can 
be fully punished in court after he leaves office, and the 
failure to convict him in an impeachment trial in no way 
precludes a subsequent criminal prosecution.
    If a President is subject to the law, then he is clearly 
not above it, as some have claimed.
    Some also argued that since the President's oath requires 
him to faithfully execute the laws, any violation of those laws 
should thereby warrant his removal from office. While that 
argument may be appealing, it simply was not the standard 
adopted by the framers. Their standard was narrowly confined to 
treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors. And it 
is against this standard that we are called upon to judge the 
conduct of this President.
    I believe the President lied. When he came before the 
television cameras and addressed the American people, wagging 
his finger and denying that he had sexual relations with a 
subordinate employee, he lied. This offensive public conduct, 
which has caused me the greatest personal anguish, is an act 
that will be forever seared into our Nation's memory. His 
deception was calculated, politically motivated, and directed 
at each and every one of us.
    Though clearly reprehensible, this lie did not violate any 
law and was not the subject of any article of impeachment. So, 
while I am convinced that the President lied to us, I am not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he lied to the grand 
jury, which is the sole basis for the first of the two 
impeachment articles.
    Despite the apparent strength of the evidence, the House of 
Representatives defeated an article alleging perjury in the 
President's civil deposition. They voted to impeach the 
President for perjury based solely on his testimony before the 
grand jury. Article I alleges that the President willfully 
provided perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury.
    I listened intently to the arguments presented by both 
sides, and I have read the President's grand jury testimony 
carefully. In my judgment, the President's grand jury testimony 
ultimately boiled down to a few irreconcilable discrepancies, 
and while often slippery, hairsplitting, legalistic, and, in 
the words of the President's counsel, ``maddening,'' was not 
perjurious beyond a reasonable doubt.
    On article I, therefore, I will vote not guilty.
    Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a crime 
difficult to prove because it requires a determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt about what a person intended by his words or 
deeds.
    In this case, it is extremely difficult to determine 
whether the President's intentions were to obstruct justice in 
a civil or a criminal proceeding, or whether his intention was 
to mislead his family and the Nation about an embarrassing 
personal relationship. While his intent is difficult to prove, 
the unconstitutional bundling of charges contained in article 
II is clear to me.
    Article I, section 3, of the Constitution clearly requires 
that in an impeachment trial no person shall be convicted 
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. 
The rule of law requires concurrence by two-thirds.
    While article I, in my judgment, violates this 
constitutional requirement, at least it focuses on a single 
event. Article II is flagrantly worse. Drafted in the 
disjunctive and containing 7 subparts each alleging a separate 
act of obstruction of justice, the bundling of these 
allegations would allow removal of the President if only 10 
Senators agreed on each of the 7 separate subparts. If, for 
example, 10 Senators voted to convict based solely on subpart 1 
and a different group of 10 Senators voted to convict based on 
subpart 2, and so on, it would be possible to reach a total of 
70 votes for conviction. But that total would not have been 
reached with a two-thirds concurrence on any individual 
subpart.
    Such a pleading is not allowed under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and would be thrown out by every Federal 
court in the land. Surely the founders did not envision 
removing a President from office if no more than 10 Senators 
could agree on a given allegation.
    Trying to justify this unconstitutional bundling by citing 
a similar approach in the Richard Nixon case is weak because 
the Nixon charges were not presented to the Senate. Trying to 
justify this unconstitutional bundling by citing the Senate 
impeachment rules is no more compelling since our rules cannot 
conflict with the Constitution. We simply cannot remove a 
President from office with an article of impeachment that so 
clearly violates constitutional standards that we are required 
by law to follow.
    On article II, therefore, I will vote not guilty.
    Thus, I will vote not to convict on both articles because 
the factual, legal, and constitutional standard for removal was 
not met.
    I am not prepared to say, however, that perjury and 
obstruction of justice are not impeachable offenses, because I 
believe it would be a mistake to attempt to do that which the 
founders chose not to do--to define what is impeachable with 
specificity.
    For impeachment to remain what our forefathers intended it 
to be--a deterrent to misconduct and a means to protect the 
Republic--future generations should be free in each case to 
examine the facts, apply the law, and follow the Constitution 
and to render impartial justice. That is the impeachment 
process we have inherited from those who came before us, and 
that is the precedent we bequeath to the ongoing chronicles of 
American history.
    The legacy of this trial, I believe, is not what becomes of 
one man. This trial is larger than one man. The legacy of this 
trial is that the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, 
proved worthy of the faith of our founders to render justice.
    No matter what judgment is rendered, however, this trial 
cannot exonerate the President. A vote against conviction is 
not a vote to condone his lying to the American people, nor 
does it suggest that any Member of the U.S. Senate believes 
that perjury or obstruction of justice charges are anything but 
serious. They are very serious charges.
    Sadly, the vote we are poised to take on these charges has 
divided our Nation. In the eyes of too many of our citizens, 
this vote will represent either a nonmilitary coup attempt 
against a duly elected President or a victory for those bent on 
accelerating the moral decline of the Nation. In truth, this 
vote represents neither. A vote for acquittal indicates nothing 
more and nothing less than what it says. The case to remove the 
President from office was not proven.
    We sit in judgment today not because we are free from human 
failings--I certainly have my share--but because our 
forefathers bestowed upon the Senate the responsibility of 
protecting the Republic by judging the President when articles 
of impeachment are exhibited by the House of Representatives. 
In doing so, they carefully and deliberately limited the scope 
of our judgment.
    We are judging the President in his capacity as President, 
and we are called upon to decide only one issue--whether he 
should be removed from office. The Senate does not have the 
duty nor the capacity to rule on the broader character of the 
President. In our limited role, we are not called upon to judge 
him as husband and father, for that is the province of his 
family. We are not called upon to judge him as accused citizen, 
for that is the province of the courts. We are not called upon 
to judge him as sinner, for that is the province of God. And we 
are not called upon to judge his legacy, for that is the 
province of history.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer

    Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you for your dignity. 
And to both our leaders, thank you for your patience.
    Colleagues, I will vote to acquit the President, and it is 
not because his poll numbers are high or because the economy is 
good. And it is not because Bill Clinton is a Democrat.
    When I was in the House of Representatives, an impeachment 
resolution was filed against Republican President Ronald 
Reagan--an impeachment resolution because of Iran-contra, which 
involved selling arms to a terrorist nation with the proceeds 
going to the Nicaraguan contras. This was against the law of 
the United States of America--against the law--against the rule 
of law.
    I voted for that law, but I never went on that impeachment 
resolution against Ronald Reagan because I felt it would have 
hurt the country and because there was no bipartisan support 
for it.
    I think the same should be said of this impeachment. There 
is no bipartisan support for it and the President's removal 
would hurt the country.
    One more preface: It has been said that what the President 
did in this case was worse than what Senator Packwood did.
    In this case, we have a consensual affair, wanted by both 
parties. It was irresponsible and indefensible: a young woman, 
a relationship wrong in every way, a President trying 
desperately to hide the affair.
    The young woman was secretly tape-recorded and forced to 
testify. Her mother was forced to testify.
    The more than 20 women who complained about Senator 
Packwood alleged forced sexual misconduct against them. One 
victim was 17 years old. They wanted to tell their stories.
    So each of us can decide for himself or herself the 
relationship of one case to the other. But surely that is not 
the issue before us.
    Neither is the Paula Jones case, which was thrown out of 
court by a Republican female judge who ruled that there was no 
sexual harassment by the President. Testimony about a 
consensual sexual affair was immaterial.
    Yes, the case was later settled, but that doesn't change 
its history: no sexual harassment, determined by a Republican 
female judge.
    So Senator Packwood is not before us, nor is Paula Jones. 
What is before us is the sanctity of the Constitution.
    Let me now offer an apology to my constituents for voting 
in favor of the independent counsel law in its current form--a 
law that has given one person an unlimited budget, unlimited 
scope, unlimited time and an unlimited ability to hurt people, 
and to hurt them badly.
    The Senate is now sitting as a Court of Impeachment, 
primarily because, for over 4 years, we had an independent 
counsel spending more than $42 million searching for an 
impeachable offense.
    And while I condemn the President's behavior, it was no 
excuse for the Ken Starr witchhunt, which went from a real 
estate deal, to several other fruitless investigations, to a 
sex deal built around illegally recorded phone conversations 
with someone named Linda Tripp. Linda Tripp, who says she's 
like all of us. Heaven help us if all of us act like Linda 
Tripp, secretly recording our dear friends. What a country this 
would be!
    I also want to comment on one other matter which is 
personal to me, and that is my daughter's family connection to 
the First Lady.
    While none of my Senate colleagues questioned the propriety 
of my participation in the impeachment matter--for which I 
thank you all--I was the target of a barrage of questions by 
the media and others outside this body.
    I just want to say that yes, my daughter is married to the 
First Lady's brother, a brother who loves and admires his 
sister and doesn't want to see her hurt. So I am far from being 
a defender of the President's behavior.
    I am a fierce defender of our Constitution. That is why I 
have joined a small number of Senators, led by the 
distinguished senator from West Virginia, in fighting 
amendments to that precious document.
    Believe me, being against the line-item veto and the 
balanced budget amendment were not popular positions in my 
State; my positions made my reelection tougher. But I have 
never doubted that defending the Constitution is worth risking 
my Senate seat, which I cherish so much, and it is because of 
my deep reverence for the Constitution that I believe we must 
reject the articles of impeachment before us today.
    Why? Because the high crimes and misdemeanors 
constitutional requirement for removal has not been met--not 
even close.
    The Constitution does not say remove the President if he 
fails to be a role model for our children. It does not say 
remove the President if he violates the military code of 
conduct, or the Senate Ethics Code. It does not say remove the 
President if he brings pain to his family.
    It says very clearly that the President shall be impeached 
and removed from office only for committing treason, bribery or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.
    In his ``Commentaries on the Constitution,'' Justice Joseph 
Story endorsed the view that ``those offenses which may be 
committed equally by a private person as a public officer are 
not the subject of impeachment.'' This means that Presidential 
impeachable offenses are, generally, acts which could not be 
done by anyone other than the President.
    Impeachment and removal from office was not meant to be a 
punishment of the President, but rather a protection of the 
country from a tyrant who would use his or her power against 
the people and the Constitution.
    This President is not a tyrant who is threatening our 
democracy and freedom or the delicate balance of powers set up 
by our Constitution. So the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
standard established by the Constitution has not been met in my 
view.
    We must also reject these articles because there is every 
reason to doubt the House managers' case on perjury and 
obstruction of justice. They have presented not one shred of 
direct evidence for their claims, and the details of their 
circumstantial case have been decimated in many respects. As 
one manager said on national television, he couldn't win the 
case in a court of law as it was presented in the House.
    I don't see how the case was strengthened in the Senate. In 
fact, I believe that it was weakened in the Senate.
    When you have clear statements by Monica Lewinsky that the 
President never, ever told her to hide gifts and never 
discussed the contents of her affidavit--when you have Betty 
Currie saying she never felt intimidated by the President and 
Vernon Jordan saying the job search was never connected to 
anything else--it seems to me there is substantial doubt on 
both counts.
    That leads to another point. Rejecting these articles of 
impeachment does not place this President above the law. As the 
Constitution clearly says, he remains subject to the laws of 
the land just like any other citizen of the United States.
    As article I, section 3 of the Constitution says, the 
President ``shall . . . be liable and subject to Indictment, 
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.'' So it 
should be a comfort to those who believe the President 
committed crimes surrounding his affair that the President, 
indeed, is subject to the rule of law--our founders made that 
certain.
    At this point, I want to thank Senator Tom Harkin for his 
challenge to the House managers that the Senate is not a jury. 
In so ruling, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in my view, gave us the 
charge to look at the big picture, and that is very important.
    Part of that picture is how the House of Representatives 
acted in this matter. I served in the House for 10 years, and I 
never saw the minority party denied a vote on an alternative of 
their choosing in an important matter. Yet Democrats and 
moderate Republicans were denied a vote on censure, and I 
believe this was a disaster for democracy in that body.
    Listen to what a Republican House Member who voted against 
impeachment wrote to a constituent:

    I regret that congressional Republicans were so blinded by their 
opposition to President Clinton that they voted to impeach him rather 
than stand by the traditional principles of their party. I also regret 
that threats were made against me by the Republican leadership in an 
attempt to keep me from voting my conscience.

    Those are the words of one of the five brave Republicans 
who voted against impeachment in the House. To me that speaks 
volumes about the kind of illegitimate process that got us 
here, and I believe in my heart that history will judge the 
House proceedings very harshly.
    I believe the Senate, if it rejects the articles in a 
bipartisan way, will be viewed in a better light, and history 
will say that in 1999 the Senate decided that impeachment 
should not be used by one party to overturn the results of a 
Presidential election that it did not like.
    As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote of the Senate acquittal of 
President Andrew Johnson in 1868:

    The importance of the acquittal can hardly be overstated. With 
respect to the Chief Executive, it has meant that as to the policies he 
sought to pursue, he would be answerable only to the country as a whole 
in the quadrennial Presidential elections, and not to Congress through 
the process of impeachment.

    If I may, Mr. Chief Justice, I understand from your wise 
words that the President does not and should not serve at the 
pleasure of the House and Senate.
    The Senate did the right thing in 1868--and by its decision 
not to remove the President, it brought stability to our 
Nation. We should do no less now.
    Voting against the articles of impeachment is the right 
thing to do to keep faith with our Constitution and to keep 
faith with our democracy for generations to come.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Connie Mack

    Mr. MACK. Mr. Chief Justice, today the Senate finds itself 
at an unlikely crossroads in American history. We have 
assembled as a Court of Impeachment to sit in judgment of our 
President, William Jefferson Clinton, on the charges of perjury 
and obstruction of justice. We have worked our will in this 
matter according to a process rooted in English common law, 
written by our founders into the Constitution, and exercised 
against the Chief Executive only once before in American 
history.
    This is not a task to be taken lightly, and we have not 
arrived easily at our decision. The Senate today is engaged in 
weighty struggles that go to the very heart of our private and 
public lives. We are at an unlikely juncture between principle 
and public opinion, repentance and the rule of law, perception 
and punishment, forgiveness and findings of fact. These are 
difficult issues, Mr. Chief Justice. We approach our task fully 
aware that our decisions today will reverberate across this 
great land and throughout the length and breadth of history.
    There has been much discussion about how we got here. And 
while the answer to that question may be varied in all its 
permutations, then amplified in the echo chamber that is our 
modern public debate, it can be said with assurance that this 
whole unseemly business began when the President, caught in an 
improper private act, took deliberate steps to conceal it. And 
for all the other parties blamed for our presence here today--
the media, the independent counsel, the political factions 
opposed to the President, the House of Representatives--it must 
be clearly understood that this process began with the 
deliberate and willful acts of the President of the United 
States to lie in a Supreme Court sanctioned civil rights 
inquiry and obstruct the due course of justice. It all started 
with the high-handed disregard for the law exhibited by the 
Nation's Chief Executive. It ends today.
    Mr. Chief Justice, when the sound and fury of the moment 
has passed, and this episode can be observed with the 
objectivity that comes with the passage of time, I believe it 
will be self-evident that we have followed the Constitution to 
the best of our abilities. In a free, democratic society such 
as ours, the foundation of freedom is an independent judiciary, 
the rule of law, and most importantly the Constitution. Our 
Constitution is the framework for American society, and I have 
been constantly reminded throughout these proceedings of the 
importance of our duty to honor the dignity of this document.
    The magnitude of this undertaking deserves no less than a 
sincerity of purpose and an absolute confidence in the wisdom 
of our founders. The American people should not be swayed by 
those who argue the prominence of this case--in all its tawdry 
and unseemly detail--has made unnecessary a thorough process of 
determining the truth. We stand in judgment of the President. 
Our decisions will be remembered throughout history. Our 
precedent may be followed by future Senates. Yet still we have 
heard throughout this exercise the unfortunate call to end 
these proceedings, save a few weeks, and inject the politics of 
expediency into a monumental Constitutional undertaking. I find 
these arguments display a remarkable lack of confidence in the 
sound and just system outlined by our founders to address very 
serious charges levied against the President of the United 
States.
    I am grateful the Senate rejected those calls and put in 
place a responsible mechanism for the thorough airing of fact 
and argument. I am confident our process during this trial, 
though far from perfect, was appropriate. We allowed time for 
detailed presentations on the part of the House of 
Representatives and the President. We held an extensive 
question-and-answer session to review and clarify matters 
presented by both sides. And we have allowed for the 
appropriate and necessary deposition of key witnesses. 
Unfortunately, the simple fact is that the outcome of this 
matter was, in many minds, predetermined. In spite of this, the 
integrity of the process was, time and again, fought for and 
protected. Now--today--it only remains for us to cast our 
votes.
    I wish to address my remarks not so much to the people 
listening in this room today, but rather to those future 
generations who will look back at the record and transcripts 
for guidance, direction, and a more thorough understanding of 
the process that played out in this Chamber during the first 2 
months of 1999. I mentioned earlier the significance of the 
Constitution. I cannot stress enough the essential role that 
this historical document has played in the trial of William 
Jefferson Clinton. This document laid the framework for what 
has taken place. Be it understood, the Senate tried the 
President because the Constitution requires that we do so. 
There is no exception for popular Presidents, such as William 
Jefferson Clinton. The Constitution provides for this process 
to be applied to everyone evenhandedly.
    Although the trial of this President was not a trial in the 
traditional sense, it is important to note that if the 
impeachment of a President presents itself again, there is 
nothing restricting a more traditional trial from occurring. In 
fact, I would encourage future Senates to utilize a judicial 
proceeding more closely aligned to a typical courtroom trial. 
Every impeachment trial will have its own dynamic environment, 
determined by the political and social context in which it 
occurs. The trial of William Jefferson Clinton occurred in a 
prosperous time. The citizens of this Nation are largely 
satisfied, the President enjoys consistently high approval 
ratings, and the economy is outstanding. Impeaching and then 
trying the President has not engendered popular public support. 
I make these observations for future generations who reflect on 
this process simply to explain the mood of our Nation and the 
political environment in which this proceeding occurred. As a 
result, we should not deceive ourselves into believing that 
public opinion did not impact this process. I would like to 
believe, however, that the competing demands of expediting the 
process versus honoring our constitutional duties created a 
struggle that produced the most fair trial possible under the 
circumstances. Accordingly, the process we followed and the 
rules complied with may not be appropriate for the next trial. 
The decisions made in this environment should not be considered 
to set a precedent that is inflexible. In fact, the precedent 
we set deserves thoughtful consideration and reasoned critique 
when reflected upon in the years and decades to come.
    In that light, our official duties in this matter began on 
December 19, 1998, when the U.S. House of Representatives 
impeached the President, William Jefferson Clinton. After 
listening to the evidence, reading the trial memorandums and 
the record, and carefully considering the arguments presented 
by both the House managers and White House counsel, I believe 
the President is guilty of both articles.
    Before I address the merits of the case against the 
President, I think it is necessary to discuss whether the 
crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice constitute high 
crimes and misdemeanors as contemplated by the framers of our 
Constitution. This topic has been the subject of much 
controversy in the past months.
    It is true that private acts are the genesis of the matter 
before us. Had the acts stayed private, we would not be here 
today. The President, however, brought these private acts under 
our public purview and created a matter of public concern when 
he used his position and his power to deny and obstruct the 
civil rights of Paula Jones.
    Contrary to what has been asserted, this is not just a case 
about a sexual encounter between the President and a young 
White House intern. This instead is a case about depriving 
Paula Jones, an individual who sought and was granted the right 
to file a civil rights action against the President, of her 
constitutional right to a day in court, a right which nine 
Justices of the Supreme Court unanimously decided that she 
deserved. And--almost unbelievably--on the heels of this 
Supreme Court mandate, the President seemed to strengthen his 
efforts to deny Paula Jones' civil rights. Once these acts 
moved into the public arena, forming the basis for charges as 
serious as perjury and obstruction of justice, it is my opinion 
these acts became high crimes and misdemeanors as envisioned by 
our founders. While our only precedent involves the 
impeachments of Federal judges, I am satisfied the standards 
used in these cases also apply to the charges levied against 
the President.
    The President of the United States is the head of the 
executive branch and the chief law enforcement officer of this 
Nation. When the Founding Fathers established our tripartite 
system of government, it was decided that the three branches of 
government would operate as checks and balances on one another. 
As a result, no branch would be more powerful than the other. 
This structure is at the very core of our success as a 
Republic.
    By obstructing justice and lying under oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton violated his duty as chief law enforcement 
officer, disrespected the judicial branch of the government, 
and undermined the foundations of our judicial system's truth-
seeking process. If I were to determine that the President's 
actions did not constitute high crimes and misdemeanors, I 
would be asserting that the executive branch and the Office of 
the Presidency are more important than the judicial branch, and 
that the President of the United States is not obligated to 
abide by the rule of law. As a citizen and as a Senator, I 
cannot, in good faith, ignore the separation of powers 
argument. In my view, the President's conduct was in violation 
of the rule of law and his actions have betrayed the trust of 
the people of the United States. It is my firm belief that the 
serious offenses committed by William Jefferson Clinton are 
high crimes and misdemeanors and warrant impeachment, 
conviction, and removal from office.
    Amazingly, we continue to hear the argument that although 
the President's actions rise to the level of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, he should not be removed from office. The 
Constitution provides if a President is found guilty of high 
crimes, then he is automatically removed from office. Our 
Constitution does not allow for finding the President guilty of 
high crimes and misdemeanors, and then permitting him to stay 
in office. Only an amendment to the Constitution would make 
such a step permissible.
    There were several points during the trial of the President 
when I had a visceral reaction to certain charges raised by the 
House managers. This reaction occurred, each time, at precisely 
the point when the managers discussed the President's strategy 
to attack the character of Monica Lewinsky, Kathleen Willey and 
others. The callous disregard for the soul of another human 
being and the unsympathetic wounding of the character of 
another carried out by the President using the apparatus of the 
Presidency is chilling and deserves condemnation by those who 
cherish freedom.
    Before I proceed to my view of the specific articles, it 
may help to explain that I approach this process unencumbered 
by a law degree. While that in no way gives me license to 
disregard the legal aspects of the matter before me, it does 
permit me to translate legal concepts into layman's terms. As I 
worked my way through the voluminous record and sat through 
days of the trial, I found it easiest to understand this case 
if I approached it in chronological order. Given that, I will 
discuss the obstruction of justice count first, because in the 
course of this tragic series of events, I believe the President 
started down this slippery slope by the actions he took, as 
opposed to the words he spoke. Sadly, the words, uttered under 
an oath to tell the truth, came later.
    I view obstruction of justice, in its most simple terms, as 
actions that somehow interfere with the fact-finding or truth-
seeking mission of a lawsuit. The record before us is replete 
with examples which, in my opinion, prove that the President of 
the United States intended to, and did in fact, obstruct 
justice. Specifically, I believe the President obstructed 
justice by corruptly engaging in, encouraging, and supporting a 
scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in the 
Jones case; by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to file a false 
affidavit in the Jones case; by allowing his attorney to make 
false and misleading statements to a Federal court judge; by 
relating false and misleading statements to Ms. Currie and 
Presidential aides in order to influence their testimony; and 
by intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job 
assistance for Ms. Lewinsky in order to encourage her to 
testify favorably toward the President in the Jones case.
    I believe the first example of obstruction occurred when 
the President was issued a subpoena in the Paula Jones case. 
This case was a Federal civil rights action in which the 
President was sued for sexual harassment, hostile work 
environment harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. As part of the discovery process in the Jones case, 
subpoenas were issued to several former State and Federal 
employees suspected of having sexual relations with the 
President. Included in these was a subpoena which requested the 
President to produce the gifts he had received from Monica 
Lewinsky. This request was denied by the President on five 
different occasions, as ultimately five separate subpoenas were 
issued. As a last resort, Judge Wright granted Paula Jones' 
motion to compel the President to produce gifts. The President, 
however, still did not turn over the gifts and instead replied 
that he had none. The President's unwillingness to comply is 
ironic given that later--in his grand jury testimony--he stated 
that he receives and gives hundreds of gifts a year, and that 
the whole gift-giving concept is inconsequential to him. The 
President's behavior belies his testimony.
    The gift concealment continued beyond the President 
refusing to turn over the presents Ms. Lewinsky gave him. Ms. 
Lewinsky was also subpoenaed in the Jones case and was asked to 
turn over gifts the President had given to her. According to 
Ms. Lewinsky, when she suggested to the President that the 
gifts be hidden, he responded that he would have to ``think 
about it.'' I am aware that the record does not reflect a 
specific directive by the President to Ms. Lewinsky to hide the 
gifts. My reading of the record and my interpretation of the 
evidence, however, leads me to the inescapable conclusion that 
the chief law enforcement officer of the country, and a well-
educated lawyer to boot, did not fulfill his duty to turn gifts 
over himself and did not abide by his duty again when Ms. 
Lewinsky asked him what she should do with her gifts.
    There is some confusion over exactly how the President's 
secretary, Ms. Currie, came to be in possession of the gifts 
that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky. I find it compelling, 
however, that when the President and Ms. Lewinsky met on the 
morning of December 28, Ms. Lewinsky suggested that the gifts 
the President had given to her should be hidden. A few hours 
later phone calls were made from Ms. Currie to Ms. Lewinsky. On 
that same afternoon, Ms. Currie arrived at Ms. Lewinsky's 
residence to pick up the gifts, and ultimately, the gifts were 
found under Ms. Currie's bed. In my view, this is sufficient 
evidence to connect the President's involvement with the gift 
concealment. I find it hard to believe that Ms. Currie would on 
her own, without influence from the President, decide to hide 
Ms. Lewinsky's gifts.
    As an aside, I feel compelled to point out a pattern that 
seems to have evolved during this administration. The hiding of 
evidence in a personal residence harks back to the mysterious 
reappearance of the Whitewater billing records in the White 
House residence several years ago. There seems, in my mind, a 
proclivity on the part of the President to cause the 
disappearance of key evidence whenever wrongdoing is alleged. 
Hence, gifts under the bed equate to billing records in the 
White House residence.
    In view of the President's actions up to this point, I am 
convinced the President was involved in Ms. Currie's receipt of 
the gifts. The simple truth is that, in spite of repeated 
requests, the gifts the President received were never produced 
and only some of the gifts given to Ms. Lewinsky were produced. 
In my view, it was no accident that gifts which were not handed 
over were instead hidden beneath the President's secretary's 
bed.
    As the Jones case progressed, so did the President's 
determination to obstruct justice. As fate would have it, 
Monica Lewinsky was named as a witness in the civil rights 
action. Upset and scared, the President suggested to Ms. 
Lewinsky that if she were subpoenaed she could file an 
affidavit in an effort to avoid testifying in a deposition. Ms. 
Lewinsky did in fact file an affidavit. The affidavit was 
claimed by the President to be truthful because of what Ms. 
Lewinsky understood ``sexual relations'' to mean at that time.
    While the President maintains the truth of the affidavit 
even until this day, Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand 
jury that, in fact, it was not a truthful affidavit. 
Specifically, she testified before the grand jury that she was 
willing to submit a false affidavit under the penalty of 
perjury because she did not think that her affair with the 
President was anyone's business. I assume that we would still 
not have Ms. Lewinsky's admission that the affidavit was false, 
but for the fact that she was in fear of being prosecuted for 
perjury herself.
    I think the President's behavior in regard to the affidavit 
of Ms. Lewinsky fits squarely in the definition of obstruction 
of justice. I am not impressed with the President's argument 
that this conduct became ``irrelevant'' when Judge Wright later 
determined that the Lewinsky matter was not essential to the 
Jones lawsuit.
    On the contrary, I am compelled by the fact that when the 
President was weaving this contorted web, it was his clear 
intent to conceal his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. At the 
time the Lewinsky affidavit was prepared, the President could 
not have known Judge Wright would later determine that the 
Lewinsky matter was unrelated to the Jones lawsuit due to the 
consensual nature of the President and Ms. Lewinsky's 
relationship. Rather, the President was making every effort to 
see that nothing about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was 
disclosed.
    The next crucial event arrived on the day of the 
President's deposition in the Jones case. At the deposition, 
the President's attorney, Bob Bennett, stated that Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit was true. Specifically, Mr. Bennett stated 
that ``there is no sex of any kind, shape, or form.'' The 
President claims, not surprisingly, that he was not paying 
attention when his attorney made these statements, and in 
addition, that the Lewinsky affidavit was technically true 
because the word ``is'' means ``at this time.''
    My review of the President's videotaped testimony leads me 
to believe the President was paying attention to Mr. Bennett. 
When watching the videotape, it is apparent to me the 
President's attention is riveted on every person who speaks. He 
is attentive and his eyes track the speakers as they engage in 
dialog. I believe the President purposely allowed Mr. Bennett 
to mislead the court. Part of the record before us includes a 
letter from Mr. Bennett asking the trial court not to rely on 
the affidavit or his comments regarding the document. Thus, it 
appears Mr. Bennett also believed that the President allowed 
him to mislead the court.
    Moreover, I am not persuaded by the President's argument 
that the affidavit was technically true because ``is'' means 
``at this time.'' I am offended by the President's lack of 
respect for the truth-seeking process our justice system is 
designed to foster and protect. Indeed, I am disturbed that the 
President would attempt to manipulate each and every word. To 
take the President's interpretation of ``is'' to its logical 
conclusion that nothing was occurring at that very minute is 
ridiculous.
    Clearly, things did not go well at the Jones deposition. In 
fact, the President admitted later in his grand jury testimony 
that he was surprised by the depth of the inquiry regarding 
Monica Lewinsky. This probing questioning made the President 
increasingly desperate. On Saturday, after the President's 
deposition, he called his secretary, Ms. Currie, and asked her 
to come to the White House the following day. Both the 
President and Ms. Currie testified that such a Sunday meeting 
was out of the ordinary. When Ms. Currie arrived, the President 
called her into the Oval Office and made several statements, 
which he later described as questions, regarding Monica 
Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified before the grand jury, that the 
President said the following to her:

    I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    You could see and hear everything, right?
    She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

    This conversation was repeated between the President and 
Ms. Currie again 2 days later. Though Ms. Currie testified that 
on both occasions she felt ``no real pressure'' to agree with 
the President, she did nonetheless think he wanted her to agree 
with him. And, agree she did.
    Lawyers for the President have defended his actions by 
stating that the President was refreshing his memory with Betty 
Currie because he was aware that the media frenzy regarding 
Monica Lewinsky was about to break loose. I find this 
explanation unconvincing for numerous reasons. The first, and 
perhaps most obvious reason is that a person does not typically 
refresh his recollection with statements he knows to be false. 
It is beyond belief that the President could assert such a 
defense. He knew he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, and even he 
testified he would have been an ``exhibitionist'' if he had 
conducted these acts in public view. In fact, when asked during 
the grand jury proceedings if Ms. Currie was nearby when he and 
Ms. Lewinsky had intimate contact, the President responded: ``I 
never--I didn't try to involve Betty in that in any way.'' 
Further, the President's statements to Ms. Currie implying that 
she was always present, and that she could see and hear 
everything, defy logic by indicating that Ms. Currie was always 
with the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The President clearly knew 
that was not the case.
    The sum of this evidence convinces me the President was not 
only obstructing justice by tampering with a potential future 
witness, but also violating the gag order that had been put 
into effect by Judge Wright in the Jones case. The irony here 
is that one reason Ms. Currie became a potential witness was 
due to the President's own urging. Throughout the Jones 
deposition the President repeatedly offered ``you should ask 
Betty.'' Then, on the very next day following these remarks, he 
summoned Ms. Currie to the White House and asked and answered 
his own leading questions. Importantly, the following week, Ms. 
Currie was subpoenaed to testify in the Jones matter.
    I have also concluded the President's conversations with 
his aides concerning his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
constitute witness tampering. The President told his aides, 
John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, and Erskine Bowles, misleading 
and untrue statements about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. In fact, Mr. Podesta testified in the grand jury 
proceedings that the President was extremely explicit in his 
comments about denying any physical relationship and any sexual 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Although the President's approach to this group of 
potential witnesses differed from his approach to Ms. Currie in 
that he did not ask this group to agree with his statements, I 
find these conversations equally disturbing. To mislead his key 
aides, who he admitted might be called to testify before the 
grand jury, demonstrates that there are no bounds on the 
President's attempts to protect himself. He was willing to 
mislead any person who might have blocked his intricate 
obstruction plan.
    In addition, I believe that the President obstructed 
justice by intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure 
job assistance for Ms. Lewinsky in order corruptly to prevent 
her from truthfully testifying in the Jones case. Although the 
President promised Ms. Lewinsky assistance with her New York 
job search prior to her name appearing on a witness list in the 
Jones case, it seems odd and much too coincidental that the 
President's assistance intensified after he learned that Ms. 
Lewinsky was on the witness list.
    In October, Ms. Lewinsky expressed her interest to the 
President in moving to New York and finding a job. In early 
November, Ms. Lewinsky had a meeting with Vernon Jordan to 
discuss potential jobs in New York City. Ms. Lewinsky testified 
before the grand jury that this meeting resulted in no activity 
taking place. However, unbeknownst to Ms. Lewinsky, her job 
search would take a 360 degree turn in December. Possibly the 
most important day was December 6, 1997, when the President 
learned that Ms. Lewinsky's name had appeared on a list of 
potential witnesses in the Jones case. A little over a month 
later, Ms. Lewinsky was offered and accepted a job with Revlon 
in New York City.
    Because I believe the sequence of events that took place in 
December is extremely telling, I will lay out these events. On 
December 6, the President learned Ms. Lewinsky was a potential 
witness in the Jones case. On December 7, the President and Mr. 
Jordan met at the White House. According to both parties, 
however, Ms. Lewinsky was never discussed. On December 8, Mr. 
Jordan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume by courier. On December 
11, Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky and made phone calls to 
various New York companies on her behalf. On December 17, after 
a job in New York seemed like a much more likely prospect for 
Ms. Lewinsky, the President telephoned Ms. Lewinsky at 2 a.m. 
to inform her that her name was on a witness list in the Jones 
case. On December 19, Ms. Lewinsky was served a subpoena in the 
Jones case. On December 31, Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan ate 
breakfast together at the Park Hyatt Hotel. On January 7, Ms. 
Lewinsky signed an affidavit to be filed in the Jones case in 
which she denied having sexual relations with the President. On 
January 8, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed in New York with MacAndrews 
& Forbes, a company recommended by Mr. Jordan. On that same 
day, Ms. Lewinsky informed Mr. Jordan that the interview did 
not go well. Mr. Jordan made a call to the chairman of the 
board and chief executive officer at MacAndrews & Forbes. On 
the morning of January 9, Ms. Lewinsky was given a second 
interview. On that same morning, Ms. Lewinsky was given an 
informal job offer, which she accepted. On January 13, 1998, 
Ms. Lewinsky received a formalized job offer.
    It is apparent from the above time line that the 
President's efforts in finding Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York 
intensified at an excessive rate once it was discovered that 
Ms. Lewinsky was going to be a witness in the Jones case. The 
President was well aware of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony could be harmful to him, and thus, it was in his best 
interest to get Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York as soon as 
possible. It seems to be no coincidence that the President did 
not tell Ms. Lewinsky that she was a potential witness until 11 
days after he learned of this news. Rather, it appears the 
President was using these 11 days to ensure that Ms. Lewinsky 
understood the President was her friend and was trying to 
assist her in her New York job hunt. Interestingly, Ms. 
Lewinsky was not informed of her witness status until after 
interviews in New York had been scheduled for her by Vernon 
Jordan.
    The President is also charged with making perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury 
concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones 
civil rights action. My review of this charge, and the evidence 
offered, leads me to conclude that the President engaged in 
several separate acts of perjury. Specifically, the President 
lied under oath regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; lied regarding his conversation 
with Ms. Currie on the day following his Jones deposition; lied 
regarding his knowledge of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in the 
Jones case; lied regarding statements made to aides about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; lied regarding prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney Bob Bennett to 
make to a Federal judge in the Jones case; and lied when he 
denied engaging in a plan to hide gifts that had been 
subpoenaed in the Jones case.
    After the Jones deposition, on January 26, 1998, the 
President went on national television and declared: ``I did not 
have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky.'' In 
addition, he denied that he urged her to lie about the affair. 
Over the next 7 months, the President continued to deny the 
relationship. In the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, 
the Office of the Independent Counsel sought and received 
permission from the Attorney General to expand its 
investigation to include whether the President lied under oath 
in his Jones deposition.
    Seven months later, on August 17, 1998, the President 
appeared before a grand jury to answer questions regarding his 
Jones deposition and his alleged affair with Ms. Lewinsky. 
Prior to his testimony, the President took a solemn oath to 
tell the truth. Specifically, when asked during the grand jury 
proceedings what this oath meant to him, the President stated: 
``I have sworn on an oath to tell the grand jury the truth, and 
that's what I intend to do.'' Moreover, the President stated: 
``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky; questions about my understanding of the term `sexual 
relations,' as I understood it to be defined at my January 17, 
1998 deposition; and questions concerning alleged subornation 
of perjury, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of 
witnesses.''
    In my opinion, however, the President violated his stated 
intention to answer questions honestly and to the best of his 
ability. Perjury is defined by the United States Code as 
``whoever under oath in any proceeding before or ancillary to 
any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes 
any false material declaration or makes or uses any other 
information, including any book, paper, document, record, 
recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any 
false declaration.'' (18 U.S.C. 1623.) I believe that the 
President's statements fall within the above definition because 
his statements were both false and material to the proper 
inquiry of the grand jury.
    First, the President gave false and misleading testimony 
during the grand jury proceedings concerning the nature and 
details of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. On August 17, 
1998, the President read a prepared statement to the grand jury 
as a response to the question of whether he was physically 
intimate with Monica Lewinsky. The prepared statement said:

    When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These 
encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at 
my January 17, 1998, deposition. But they did involve inappropriate 
intimate contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 
1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky 
that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this 
conduct, and I will take full responsibility for my actions.

    During Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony, she stated that 
the President had contact with various parts of her body. Even 
under the limited interpretation that the President has given 
the Jones definition of ``sexual relations,'' the contact 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky, as testified to by Ms. 
Lewinsky, constituted sexual relations on the part of both 
parties.
    Before the grand jury, the President referred to his 
prepared response 19 times in order to avoid providing honest 
and complete answers to the questions posed. By referring to 
his prepared statement, the President asserted that his 
encounters with Ms. Lewinsky did not constitute ``sexual 
relations.'' The fact is that the evidence overwhelmingly 
affirms that the President had sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky 
and his attempts at legal hairsplitting to maneuver around the 
truth failed.
    To address part of the perjury charge creates the need to 
resolve the credibility conflict between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky. By finding that the President committed perjury in 
regard to testimony concerning the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, it is clear that I find the 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky to be more honest and forthright. 
Some may question why I believe the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky 
over the testimony of the President. First and foremost, I 
believe Ms. Lewinsky had no motive to lie, whereas the 
President had every motive to conceal the details of this 
intimate relationship. Not only was his Presidency on the line, 
but his credibility with his staff would be destroyed if the 
truth were exposed. Even more importantly, the President's 
credibility is questionable because he had to fear that 
discovery of the truth would cause his family immense 
devastation.
    Furthermore, I believe Ms. Lewinsky is more credible 
because her statement is corroborated. Ms. Lewinsky told the 
intimate details of her relationship to her therapists, her 
friends, Linda Tripp, her mother, and her aunt. Thus, it is not 
difficult to find that Ms. Lewinsky is a more credible witness 
than the President.
    I further believe the President made perjurious and 
misleading statements before the grand jury when he disclosed 
his version of his conversations with Betty Currie. As stated 
earlier, I believe that the rhetorical questions the President 
asked Ms. Currie on two separate occasions were an effort to 
coach a potential witness in the Jones case. During his grand 
jury testimony, the President testified that he questioned Ms. 
Currie because he thought the story would break in the press, 
he needed to get the facts down, and he was trying to refresh 
his memory. The reality is the President was never trying to 
refresh his memory. Ms. Currie even acknowledged in the grand 
jury proceedings that based on the way the President stated the 
questions and his demeanor, she believed he wished for her to 
agree with his statements.
    In addition, according to the President's own grand jury 
testimony, he told no one of his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. Specifically, during grand jury questioning, the 
President was asked with regard to his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky: ``Had you told anyone?'' The President answered: 
``Absolutely not.'' Question: ``Had you tried, in fact, not to 
let anyone else know about this relationship?'' Answer: ``Well, 
of course.'' Question: ``What did you do?'' Answer: ``Well I 
never said anything about it, for one thing. And I did what 
people do when they do the wrong thing. I tried to do it where 
nobody else was looking at it.''
    Thus, if the President was hiding his intimate encounters 
with Ms. Lewinsky, how would Ms. Currie have been capable of 
refreshing his memory on details of his secret relationship? 
The truth is that the President was fully aware of the fact he 
touched Ms. Lewinsky. Likewise, the President was fully aware 
that there had been instances when he was alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky. The only reason the President asked Ms. Currie those 
five infamous rhetorical questions was to provide a false and 
misleading account of the events to Ms. Currie in the hope Ms. 
Currie would substantiate the false testimony he gave in his 
deposition. The President's grand jury testimony that he was 
trying to refresh his memory was simply a story concocted to 
cover up the fact that he obstructed justice. Thus, his grand 
jury testimony was perjurious.
    In addition to making false statements with regard to the 
potential testimony of Betty Currie, the President also made 
false statements with regard to tampering with the potential 
testimony of his aides. The President testified to the grand 
jury that he said to his aides things that were true about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. ``I said, I have not had sex 
with her as I defined it.'' This statement is, however, 
patently untrue, as White House deputy chief of staff John 
Podesta's testimony indicates. Mr. Podesta testified that the 
President was explicit in stating that no sexual contact of any 
kind occurred between the two parties.
    Furthermore, during the grand jury proceedings, the 
President testified that when he was asking Ms. Currie about 
the times he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, he was referring to 
1997. The President stated: ``Keep in mind, sir, I just want to 
make it--I was talking about 1997. I was never, ever trying to 
get Betty Currie to claim that on the occasions when Monica 
Lewinsky was there when she wasn't anywhere around, that she 
was. I would never have done that to her, and I don't think she 
thought about that. I don't think she thought I was referring 
to that.'' The President was then asked: ``Did you put a date 
restriction? Did you make it clear to Ms. Currie that you were 
only asking her whether you were never alone with her after 
1997?'' The President responded: ``Well, I don't recall whether 
I did or not, but I assumed--if I didn't, I assumed she knew 
what I was talking about, because it was the point at which Ms. 
Lewinsky was out of the White House and had to have someone 
wave her in, in order to get in the White House.'' In my view, 
this is just one more example of the President creating a false 
story to cover up the fact that his conversation with Betty 
Currie constituted witness tampering.
    The President also provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury regarding his 
knowledge that the contents of an affidavit executed by Ms. 
Lewinsky were untrue. Attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking 
evidence of sexual relationships the President may have had 
with other State or Federal employees. In this process, Ms. 
Lewinsky was subpoenaed as a witness. The President suggested 
that Ms. Lewinsky should file an affidavit to avoid having to 
testify. If the truth had been told in this affidavit, and if 
Ms. Lewinsky had been honest about the nature of her 
relationship with the President, Ms. Lewinsky indisputably 
would have been an important witness.
    The President stated before the grand jury, when asked 
about the Lewinsky affidavit: ``Did I hope [Monica Lewinsky 
would] be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit? 
Absolutely. . . . Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? 
No, I did not.'' The President's testimony is not credible and 
is misleading in light of the fact that it was virtually 
impossible for Ms. Lewinsky to file a truthful affidavit that 
would have permitted the President to achieve his objective of 
not having Ms. Lewinsky testify. This is just one more instance 
were the President lied, misled, and violated his solemn oath 
to tell the truth.
    In addition, the President gave perjurious testimony in 
regard to false and misleading statements he allowed his 
attorney Bob Bennett to make to a Federal judge in the Jones 
case. When asked during his grand jury testimony how he could 
have lawfully sat silent while his attorney made a false 
statement, the President explained that he was not paying ``a 
great deal of attention.'' As I stated earlier, from reviewing 
the President's videotaped deposition numerous times, I believe 
that it is apparent that the President was indeed paying 
attention when his attorney made these false statements.
    Finally, in his grand jury testimony, the President stated 
he told Ms. Lewinsky that if the attorneys for Paula Jones 
asked for the gifts, she had to provide them. In light of the 
fact that all of the gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky were 
never produced and some of the gifts were found under Ms. 
Currie's bed, I do not believe that the President's grand jury 
testimony regarding his conversation with Ms. Lewinsky was 
truthful.
    Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I 
believe that the President is guilty on both article I and 
article II.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the President of the United States has 
put the Senate in a difficult position. His actions have caused 
all of us to examine the uncomfortable details surrounding his 
reckless affair with a young White House intern. But it was not 
his unfortunate actions with the White House intern that 
brought us to this moment. Rather, it was his willful and 
deliberate attempt to cover it up in a judicial proceeding and 
then lie under oath to a Federal grand jury. We are not here 
because we disagree with the President's politics. In fact, I 
happen to consider the President a very capable man, who has, 
by his own actions, destroyed his place in history. For me to 
watch someone strategically dismantle all they have worked for 
is disturbing, to say the least. However, in spite of the human 
side of this tragedy, there is no escaping that we are here 
simply because of the President's intentionally deceptive 
behavior and his unwillingness to abide by the law.
    We were handed very serious charges against the President 
by the House of Representatives. In disposing of this matter, 
we have followed the only template we have: the Constitution 
and the precedent of previous Senates. We have followed the 
founders to the best of our abilities. Despite cries all around 
to end the trial and ignore our constitutional mandate, the 
Senate allowed for a process rooted in the search for truth. 
All sides had an opportunity to make their case, question 
witnesses, and answer inquiries posed by individual Senators.
    Although this journey was less than perfect, we did not 
fail in this endeavor. We did not fail our founders, we did not 
fail the House of Representatives or the President, and we did 
not fail the American people. I attended the meetings of the 
Senate, reviewed the material in the record, asked questions of 
the House managers and White House counsel, and reviewed the 
depositions of witnesses. I am satisfied that our proceedings 
over the past month allowed me sufficient information to arrive 
at my decision.
    I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that William 
Jefferson Clinton is guilty of the charges levied by the House 
of Representatives and should be removed from office. By 
employing that standard I do not wish to influence others who 
find a different standard to be more appropriate.
    I am proud of the U.S. Senate and how it conducted itself 
during this process. Despite extraordinary difficulty, we did 
our job according to the Constitution and to the best of our 
ability. I am hopeful that through this process we have 
provided future generations with enough information to make an 
informed judgment of this President's actions. In the end, 
however, history will be the final arbiter.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald

    Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chief Justice, as a freshman Senator, I 
am saddened that the first issue I confront in my service to 
the people of Illinois is the impeachment of a President of the 
United States. It is difficult to imagine a task less welcome 
and more awesome to me. As a newly elected Senator, I have 
barely begun to know the Senate, my colleagues, our rules and 
procedures, our precedents, or, finally, even our duty. I have 
watched you all so carefully--looking for examples, and 
guidance--and wondering at the gravity of these days.
    On a personal note, before I begin, I want to thank those 
on both sides of the aisle--Senators who, in difficult days, 
have been so gracious to a newcomer. Thank you for taking the 
time, and making the effort, to welcome the newest among you. 
Through these hours, I have developed a deep respect for my new 
colleagues, for the Senate as an institution, and for the 
Constitution that has anchored our Republic for over 200 years. 
I thank God for the wisdom of the framers and their ability to 
construct enduring institutions that allow us to confront, 
peacefully, the question of whether our President should be 
removed from office. We now come to the conclusion of this 
constitutional process, itself an extraordinary example of the 
rule of law that makes our Nation the envy of the world.
    The people of Illinois have entrusted me with the duty to 
uphold the Constitution, a duty I share with all of you. In 
addition, we share the responsibility of abiding by the 
separate oath which we took in this proceeding to ``do 
impartial justice according to the Constitution and the laws.''
    As a trier of fact and law, I find that the President has 
committed perjury and obstruction of justice as charged in the 
two articles of impeachment, and that those offenses constitute 
``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I will vote for conviction on 
both counts.
    I reach this decision after detailed examination of the 
evidence presented, the arguments of counsel, Senate 
precedents, and the impeachment clause of the Constitution.
    The initial decision I made was to determine the 
appropriate burden of proof. Failure to impose a burden of 
proof on the House managers would severely weaken the 
Presidency, a result the founders feared and sought to avoid. 
The precedents of the Senate make it clear that there is no 
single standard that each of us must apply.
    The President has argued that we should apply the criminal 
standard of ``proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'' In recent 
impeachment trials of Federal judges, a number of Senators also 
argued that conviction was only appropriate if the proof met 
this standard. Some commentators have suggested that Senators 
could use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard typically 
applied in civil cases, or some standard in between.
    I have concluded that, to support a conviction, allegations 
must be proven by ``clear and convincing'' evidence. The 
criminal standard is not warranted, because the relief in this 
instance, i.e., the removal of the President, is not punitive, 
but remedial. In contrast, the civil standard would place the 
Presidency at too great a risk. The ``clear and convincing'' 
evidence standard strikes a prudent balance, providing 
sufficient protection for the authority of the Presidency and 
the expression of popular will represented by the President's 
election, while avoiding the risk of a President remaining in 
office despite clear and convincing evidence of impeachable 
offenses.
    On Article I, the House has presented clear and convincing 
evidence that the President committed perjury when he testified 
before a Federal grand jury on August 17, 1998.
    On January 17, 1998, President Clinton testified in a civil 
deposition in the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit, after the Supreme 
Court had ruled unanimously that a civil suit against a sitting 
President could proceed. After the deposition, the independent 
counsel secured the approval of the Attorney General, and the 
three-judge Federal court which superintends the independent 
counsel law, to expand his jurisdiction to inquire into whether 
the President testified truthfully in his deposition. On August 
17, 1998, the President, as the target of the investigation 
testified by video to a Federal grand jury in Washington, DC.
    The President's deposition testimony in the Jones case was 
false in numerous respects, and his grand jury statements that 
he had sought to be completely truthful in his deposition 
testimony cannot be accurate. (Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 458-59.) The 
falsehoods are of such a quantity and kind that a reasonable 
reading of the evidence suggests the President had to know at 
the time he gave his deposition in the Jones case that he was 
not being truthful. His testimony to the grand jury that he 
intended to be truthful at his deposition is false.
    Example: the President had testified in his deposition that 
he believed that, in the preceding 2 weeks, no one had reported 
to him any conversations with Ms. Lewinsky about the Jones 
suit. (Jones Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, 
Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. XXII, p. 22.) In 
testifying to the grand jury that he was truthful in his 
deposition, the President reaffirmed this portion of his 
deposition testimony. (Grand Jury Testimony of President 
Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 458.) We know, however, 
that Vernon Jordan had, within the 2 weeks prior to the 
President's deposition, told the President that Ms. Lewinsky 
had signed her affidavit. (Deposition Testimony of Vernon 
Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 Cong. Rec. S1241 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).) 
The President's grand jury testimony was material to the issue 
of whether the President had sought to influence the content of 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and thereby obstruct justice.
    The President again committed perjury before the Federal 
grand jury when he tried to explain why he made a series of 
false statements to his secretary, Betty Currie, on two 
separate occasions. At his deposition, the President was 
questioned about Ms. Lewinsky. The President attempted to 
employ Ms. Currie as an alibi witness. In the wake of the 
deposition, the President asked Ms. Currie to come to the 
office on a Sunday. Once there, the President asked Ms. Currie 
a series of leading questions concerning her recollection of 
events regarding Ms. Lewinsky. (Grand Jury Testimony of Betty 
Currie, 1/7/98, H. Doc. 105-316, pp. 559-60.) A few days later, 
the President again queried Ms. Currie with leading questions. 
(Id. at p. 561.)
    When questioned during his grand jury testimony about the 
series of leading questions he had directed to Ms. Currie, the 
President responded: ``I was trying to figure out what the 
facts were. I was trying to remember.'' (Grand Jury Testimony 
of President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 591.) He 
also claimed that he was only trying to ``ascertain what the 
facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was.'' 
(Id. at p. 593.)
    While Ms. Currie would not say she felt pressured by the 
President, she did testify that she believed that the President 
was seeking her agreement with those statements. (Grand Jury 
Testimony of Betty Currie, 1/7/98, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 559.) It 
is unreasonable to conclude that the President was trying to 
refresh his recollection by making patently false statements to 
Ms. Currie, in the days immediately following his deposition 
for the Jones case. Ms. Curry could not possibly have known the 
answers to some of the President's ``questions,'' and the 
President clearly already knew the answers to others.
    We took an oath to do impartial justice. We did not take an 
oath to check our common sense at the door of this Chamber. The 
President's proffered explanation of the questions he directed 
to Ms. Currie defies common sense. I believe he sought, 
instead, to influence Ms. Currie's anticipated testimony by 
imparting to Ms. Currie his preferred version of the events. 
His false explanation was material to the grand jury's inquiry 
and constitutes perjury.
    The President also committed perjury when he testified and 
then reiterated before the Federal grand jury, in answer to a 
question about false accounts he gave to his aides regarding 
Ms. Lewinsky, that ``I said to them things that were true.'' 
(Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 106, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 557-58.)
    In fact, the President said to his aides things that were 
false. Presidential aide Sidney Blumenthal testified in his 
Senate deposition that the President had told him that Ms. 
Lewinsky had threatened him, and that she was called ``the 
stalker.'' (Deposition Testimony of Sidney Blumenthal, 2/3/99, 
145 Cong. Rec. S1301 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999).) Mr. Blumenthal 
testified he now knows that the President lied to him. (Id. at 
S1302.) The President knew what he said to Mr. Blumenthal was 
false because the President knew the facts. The one fact the 
President did not know was that Ms. Lewinsky would produce DNA 
evidence that would provide incontrovertible physical evidence 
to contradict him.
    The President's statements before a Federal grand jury 
regarding accounts he gave to his aides of Ms. Lewinsky were 
false, and the falsehoods were material to the grand jury's 
investigation into whether the President had testified falsely 
in the Jones deposition.
    On Article II, the House has presented clear and convincing 
evidence that President Clinton obstructed justice by engaging 
in a course of conduct designed to impede, cover up, and 
conceal evidence and testimony related to the Federal civil 
rights action brought against him.
    The evidence shows that the President improperly influenced 
Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit in the Jones suit. I 
believe that the only version of the evidence that makes sense 
is that offered by the House. Thus, I conclude that the 
President influenced the entire process that led to the filing 
of the false affidavit, from its inception to its conclusion. 
He did so through direct conversations with Ms. Lewinsky, and 
through his close friend, Mr. Jordan, who was able to monitor 
the process through an attorney that he, Mr. Jordan, procured 
for Ms. Lewinsky.
    Ms. Lewinsky admitted that on December 17, 1997, the 
President informed her by telephone at 2 a.m. that she was on 
the witness list in the Jones case, and suggested that she 
might avoid testifying by filing an affidavit. (Deposition 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 2/1/99, 145 Cong. Rec. S1218 
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).) And the President told Ms. Lewinsky 
to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. (Id.)
    The President's assertion that he thought Ms. Lewinsky 
could have avoided testifying by filing a truthful affidavit is 
unbelievable. I believe that the President knew that a truthful 
affidavit by Ms. Lewinsky would have ensured that she would 
have been called as a deposition witness, and that her 
subsequent truthful testimony would have been legally damaging 
to the President. In fact, in the very conversation in which 
the President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file an affidavit, 
they discussed the cover stories they could use to avoid public 
knowledge of the truth. (Id. at S1219.)
    Vernon Jordan testified in his Senate deposition that he 
``was acting on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a 
job.'' (Deposition Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 
Cong. Rec. S1293 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999).) Mr. Jordan 
confirmed in the deposition that ``[t]he President was 
obviously interested in her job search.'' (Id. at S1314.) It 
was Mr. Jordan--one of the President's closest friends--whom 
Ms. Lewinsky called when she was subpoenaed. Mr. Jordan met 
with Ms. Lewinsky and arranged a lawyer for her. (Deposition 
Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 Cong. Rec. S1234-36 
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).) Mr. Jordan delivered Ms. Lewinsky to 
her lawyer's office. (Id. at S1238.) Mr. Jordan monitored the 
drafting and content of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. (Grand Jury 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 920.) 
Ms. Lewinsky herself delivered a copy of her first signed 
affidavit to Mr. Jordan's office. Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
she and Mr. Jordan conferred about the contents of the 
affidavit and agreed to delete one portion inserted by her 
lawyer and make other changes. (Id. at pp. 921-22, 1229-30 
(Exhibit 3).)
    Mr. Jordan kept the President informed throughout the 
affidavit-drafting process. He personally notified the 
President that Ms. Lewinsky had signed the false affidavit. 
(Deposition Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 Cong. Rec. 
S1241 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).)
    The evidence also clearly and convincingly demonstrates 
that after Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list in 
the Jones case, the President, through Mr. Jordan, provided 
intensified assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in finding a job in 
order to encourage her to file the false affidavit. Mr. Jordan 
accepted responsibility for the job search and has admitted 
that he and Ms. Lewinsky discussed both the job search and her 
affidavit in most conversations. (Id.) Mr. Jordan attempted to 
separate each aspect of his work with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
testified that ``[t]he affidavit was over here. The job was 
over here.'' (Id.) Whatever Mr. Jordan's belief, it cannot have 
been lost on Ms. Lewinsky that she had a very prominent and 
powerful lawyer soliciting job offers for her at the same time 
she was being asked to help that lawyer's friend, the 
President, who had first suggested that she file an affidavit.
    On the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed the false affidavit, 
Mr. Jordan personally called the CEO of a Fortune 500 company 
to secure a job for her, a job she was offered on the 
subsequent day. (Id. at S1241-42.) On the day that Ms. Lewinsky 
received the job offer, Mr. Jordan called the President, 
through Ms. Currie, and left the message ``mission 
accomplished.'' (Grand Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/28/
98, Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. IV, p. 1898.) The 
President's own testimony in his deposition for the Jones case 
followed exactly the false claims of Ms. Lewinsky's false 
affidavit. While the President's lawyers encouraged the 
perception that this convergence was a coincidence, I do not 
buy it.
    The evidence is clear and convincing that the President 
continued to involve Ms. Currie in his lies and obfuscation. 
Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she met with 
President Clinton and informed him that she had been 
subpoenaed, and that the subpoena required her to produce all 
gifts she had received from the President. She testified that 
the subpoena specifically requested a hat pin, which alarmed 
her. (Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 
105-311, p. 852.) The President responded that the subpoena 
``concerned'' him. (Id. at p. 872.) When Ms. Lewinsky asked him 
what she should do in response to the subpoena for the gifts, 
the President answered, ``I don't know,'' or ``Let me think 
about that.'' (Id.) He never gave the only appropriate answer, 
which was to comply.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that later that same day, Ms. Currie 
telephoned her, saying, ``I understand that you have something 
for me,'' or ``the President said that you have something to 
give me.'' (Id. at pp. 874-75.) Ms. Currie had an unclear 
memory about this incident, but said that ``the best [she] 
remembered,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. (Grand Jury Testimony of 
Betty Currie, 5/6/98, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 581.)
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that Ms. Currie instigated the 
retrieval of the gifts is credible and convincing. In contrast, 
Ms. Currie's testimony that Ms. Lewinsky instigated the 
retrieval is not persuasive. I do not believe that the 
President's personal secretary would have acted upon a request 
from Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve the gifts without asking the 
reason for such an exchange or informing the President of the 
request. It is too bizarre that she would simply pick up a box 
of gifts and deposit them under her bed. It defies a 
commonsense reading of the evidence and the evidentiary 
narrative.
    The evidence is also clear and convincing that the 
President obstructed justice by coaching Ms. Currie, a 
potential witness in the Jones case, to provide false testimony 
in the Jones case, and by arranging for the concealment of 
gifts subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers.
    On Saturday, January 17, 1998, a few hours after completing 
his own deposition in the Jones case, the President called Ms. 
Currie and asked her to come to the White House on Sunday, 
January 18, 1998. (Id. at p. 558.) The President's assertions 
and leading questions to Ms. Currie on January 18 and January 
20 or 21, 1998, were indisputably false. The President knew 
that Ms. Currie was a potential witness when he made these 
false statements to her. In his deposition in the Jones case, 
the President brought Ms. Currie's name up, without prompting, 
in at least 16 different answers to questions, clearly 
anticipating and inviting the Jones attorneys to subpoena her 
to back up his account.
    I am unable to conclude that the President was attempting 
to ``refresh his recollections'' by calling Ms. Currie and 
requesting her to come to the White House on a weekend and 
making false statements to her. Simple common sense tells us 
that he was letting her know what he had said in his deposition 
and that he was hoping that she would later corroborate his 
false account.
    Although I have determined that the House has proven the 
acts alleged in both articles of impeachment by clear and 
convincing evidence, the inquiry does not end here. I must also 
consider whether the acts constitute ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' as required by the Constitution. This has been 
a singularly difficult question for this body, but I conclude 
that the President's offenses rise to the level of ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' within the meaning of the 
Constitution.
    The framers of our Constitution provide that the Senate can 
only convict a President for ``treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.'' The framers relied, in part, on 
William Blackstone for their understanding of the common law 
they inherited from England. In the fourth book of his 
``Commentaries on the Laws of England,'' Blackstone addressed 
the criminal law. He distinguished between crimes that ``more 
directly infringe the rights of the public or commonwealth, 
taken in its collective capacity,'' and ``those which in a more 
peculiar manner injure individuals or private subjects.'' 
(William Blackstone, ``Commentaries on the Laws of England,'' 
Book IV, pp. 74, 176 (special ed., 1983).)
    Within the latter category, Blackstone included crimes such 
as murder, burglary, and arson. The former category of 
``public'' crimes included offenses that were counted as 
``offenses against the public justice.'' Blackstone included 
within this category the crimes of perjury and bribery side by 
side. (Id. at pp. 127, 136-39.) Blackstone's formulation 
equating perjury and bribery as ``public'' offenses suggests 
that, within the definition of the Constitution, perjury may 
also be a high crime and misdemeanor.
    Because perjury, at its core, involves an effort to 
obstruct justice, other acts that obstruct justice may very 
well be considered ``public'' offenses as the framers would 
have understood them. Indeed, Blackstone writes that 
``impediments of justice'' are ``high misprisions'' and 
``contempts'' of the King's courts. (Id. at pp. 126-28.)
    The intent of the framers and subsequent interpretation of 
this clause show that impeachment and conviction of the 
President is a constitutional remedy for serious offenses 
against our system of government. Alexander Hamilton, in 
Federalist No. 65, explained that impeachable offenses ``relate 
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself'' 
and arise ``from the abuse or violation of some public trust.''
    Certainly, perjury before a grand jury and obstruction of 
justice are offenses against the American system of government, 
as they strike at the rule of law itself. These acts subvert 
the truth-seeking process that is the very essence and 
foundation of the judicial branch. These acts, when committed 
by a President, are a repudiation of our judicial system by the 
Chief Executive of the country, undermining the checks and 
balances and disturbing the delicate balance between the 
branches of the Federal Government that is at the heart of our 
constitutional form of government.
    The President's counsel attempted to diminish the severity 
of the crimes of perjury before a Federal grand jury and 
obstruction of justice. But the Founding Fathers understood 
that these crimes are offenses against the public trust. 
Perjury was among the few offenses outlawed by statute by the 
First Congress, in 1790. And today, perjury is punishable by up 
to 5 years imprisonment in a Federal penitentiary. (18 U.S.C. 
1621-23.) The Supreme Court, in a 1976 plurality opinion, 
wrote, ``[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant 
affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings.'' 
(United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576.)
    We do not need to decide whether the President's perjury 
before the grand jury would have risen to the level of a ``high 
crime and misdemeanor'' had the target of the grand jury been 
someone other than the President, nor do we need to decide 
whether a President's perjury in a civil trial in and of itself 
rises to the level of an impeachable offense. I have 
reservations about considering such acts ``high crimes'' or 
``high misdemeanors.'' But where, as here, the President 
committed perjury in a Federal grand jury investigation of 
which he was the target, I am convinced that his acts fall into 
the category that warrants removal from office.
    Further support for this conclusion comes from Senate 
precedent in the impeachment, conviction, and removal from 
office of two Federal judges in the 1980s--Walter Nixon and 
Alcee Hastings. Judge Nixon was impeached and convicted for 
lying to a grand jury that was investigating him, and Judge 
Hastings was impeached and convicted for making numerous false 
statements under oath in testimony in his own criminal trial.
    Obstruction of justice is particularly serious. Two Federal 
criminal statutes, sections 1503 and 1512 of title 18 of the 
United States Code, specifically prohibit corruptly influencing 
or obstructing the due administration of justice or the 
testimony of a person in an official proceeding.
    Federal appellate courts have applied these statutes to 
individuals who provide misleading stories to a potential 
witness without explicitly asking the witness to lie. For 
example, in 1988, a Federal appellate court upheld the 
conviction of an individual for attempting to influence a 
witness even though that witness was not scheduled to testify 
before the grand jury nor ever appeared before a grand jury. 
The court held that a conviction under section 1503 is 
appropriate so long as there is a possibility that the target 
of the defendant's activities will be called upon to testify in 
an official proceeding. (United States v. Shannon, 836 F. 2d 
1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1988).)
    The Supreme Court has called the President's responsibility 
to enforce the laws ``the Chief Executive's most important 
Constitutional duty.'' (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 577 (1992).) A President who obstructs the very laws 
he is called upon to enforce has committed high crimes and 
misdemeanors as set out in the impeachment clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.
    Some argue that the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, should allow public opinion polls to influence its 
judgment, claiming that these proceedings are not judicial, but 
political in nature. I believe the Constitution, the intent of 
the framers, and the Senate's own impeachment procedures show 
that when the Senate convenes to fulfill its obligation to 
``try all impeachments,'' as article I of the Constitution 
prescribes, it takes on a judicial role quite distinct from its 
normal legislative proceedings. The Constitution also states, 
in article III, that ``the trial of all Crimes, except in Cases 
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . .,'' implying that an 
impeachment trial is a trial similar to all others. When a 
President stands accused, the Constitution requires the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court to preside, explicitly introducing 
the judicial branch into the trial by the Senate. And Alexander 
Hamilton, in Federalist No. 65, discusses ``the judicial 
character of the Senate'' when it meets as ``a court for the 
trial of impeachments.''
    We are required to take a special oath for impeachments, 
above and beyond our oath of office, to ``do impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and the laws.'' What can this 
oath mean if it does not place on us a special, judicial 
burden, unique among our senatorial duties, to apply rules of 
impartiality and independence in pursuit of a verdict that is 
just? If an innocent President can be convicted, or a guilty 
President can be acquitted, even in part because of the polls 
that purport to reflect the will of the moment, then we violate 
our constitutional duty and assault the very foundations of our 
system of justice.
    Carved into the West Pediment of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Building in Washington are four simple words: ``Equal Justice 
Under Law.'' Standing watch in front of that building is a 
statue of Justice, blindfolded because justice must be blind. 
Even the President must respect the laws of the land. To the 
extent that we allow the popularity or unpopularity of a 
particular President to inform our votes for either conviction 
or acquittal, we undermine the principle of ``Equal Justice 
Under Law,'' and we chip away at the blindfold that covers the 
eyes of Justice.
    As a trier of fact and law, I find that the President has 
committed perjury and obstructed justice as charged in the two 
articles of impeachment, and that those offenses constitute 
``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I will vote to convict on 
both counts.
    For me, this is not an easy verdict to reach, and comes 
after great deliberation. I am 38 years old. Today is my 38th 
day as a Senator. Those 38 days feel like they have lasted my 
entire life. As a freshman, I have had to confront, very 
suddenly, difficult truths that at the very least have 
challenged the idealism that propelled me here in the first 
place. But through the din of argument and counterargument, it 
has occurred to me that the President's acts, however serious, 
are not nearly as consequential as our response. I have 
listened to those who assert that perjury before a grand jury 
and obstruction of justice are not removable offenses--or that 
if they are, removal of a President, in this time, is too 
disruptive to contemplate.
    And truly, the call to do nothing is seductive. I hear it, 
too. We are so comfortable--so prosperous--that it is difficult 
to be bothered with unpleasantness. But as the youngest Member 
of this body, I believe we must hold firm to the oldest truths. 
The material blessings of peace and prosperity are but the 
fruit of liberty that does not come without a price--a liberty 
sustained, only and finally, by the rule of law, and those 
willing to defend it. Our commitment to impartial justice, now 
and forever, is an abstraction more profound and precious than 
a soaring Dow and a plummeting deficit. I vote as I do because 
I will not stand for the proposition that a President can, with 
premeditation and deliberation, obstruct justice and commit 
perjury before a grand jury. It cannot be.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.

    Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chief Justice, the House of Representatives 
presented to the Senate two articles of impeachment alleging 
that the President of the United States committed ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors'' in the form of perjury and obstruction of 
justice. These are serious offenses, not unlike those which in 
the past have been sufficient to remove other Federal officials 
from office.
    In deciding how to vote on the articles of impeachment, 
each Senator had to undertake a two-step analysis: first, to 
determine the facts--the conduct in which the accused engaged; 
and second, to determine whether that conduct constituted 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' 
which, under the Constitution, require removal from office. 
This second step calls for the Senate to determine the facts 
and evaluate the effect of the conduct on the office and on the 
operations of government.
    Having listened to the presentations made to the Senate by 
the House managers and by counsel for the President, it is my 
opinion that the President committed perjury and obstructed 
justice, and that this misconduct--based on constitutional 
definitions and historical precedents--meets the standard for 
convicting an official of an impeachable offense.
    As the impeachment process is not a criminal proceeding, it 
is not necessary that the evidence shows that the accused is 
guilty of a criminal offense under the United States Code. The 
framers wrote the Constitution before Congress wrote, and then 
amended, the criminal code. Nor is it required that relevant 
facts be established to the same standard as in a criminal 
trial, as Congress cannot punish the President, other than to 
remove him from office. Simply put, the framers' objective was 
to provide a remedy to protect the American people and their 
institutions of government from an unfit officeholder. In view 
of this, I believe that such remedy is to be available if there 
is clear and convincing evidence to establish the underlying 
facts which demonstrate that an officeholder is unfit to serve.
    In determining whether alleged conduct is a ``high crime 
and misdemeanor,'' Senators must examine each case 
individually. They must consider the officeholder's position in 
government and look at the effect of the officeholder's conduct 
in light of the particular position he or she holds. The fact 
that the Senate has convicted and removed Federal judges for 
committing perjury does not necessarily mean that it should 
automatically remove a President who commits perjury. The 
precedents regarding Federal judges are instructive, but they 
are not conclusive.
    The 1974 House Judiciary Committee Staff Report during the 
Nixon Impeachment Inquiry, drawing on two centuries of 
precedents, explains this concept in connection with a 
Presidential impeachment. The report states that the 
impeachment of the President should be ``predicated only upon 
conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional 
form and principles of our government or the proper performance 
of constitutional duties of the presidential office.'' In other 
words, Congress must determine whether the particular 
misconduct in which President Clinton engaged is serious enough 
to warrant removal from that particular office. This is what I 
call the ``incompatibility'' test.
    The ``incompatibility'' test requires Senators to exercise 
their expertise in, and knowledge of, government and to use 
their best judgment, focusing on the offenses committed and the 
effect of those offenses on the office and on the operation of 
government. It is this kind of threat to the Republic which we 
must evaluate in applying the ``incompatibility'' test. 
Accordingly, under this test we should focus on the unique 
nature of the Presidency and the offenses the President 
committed.
    The Constitution created three separate branches of 
government in order to limit the powers of government and to 
enhance the liberty of the American people. Each branch is 
supreme in its own area but must respect and defer to the 
others, when they are operating in their assigned areas. 
Reduced to the simplest characterization, the legislature makes 
the laws, the executive executes the laws, and the judiciary 
interprets the laws and dispenses justice. As the head of the 
executive branch, the President stands alone as the official 
responsible for executing the laws of our country.
    The duty of a branch to respect the other branches is a 
duty that can only be carried out by Federal officeholders. It 
cannot be borne by private citizens. And it is fundamental to 
the operations of the Federal Government. Our government could 
not function if the branches did not respect one another. I 
believe President Clinton violated this fundamental duty to 
respect the judicial branch by subverting its function.
    When a private citizen sued President Clinton under our 
civil rights statutes, the President took the position that he 
was unique in our system of law and could not be sued while 
President. When the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that the President 
could be sued, the President decided to frustrate the judicial 
process while appearing outwardly to comply with the 
requirement of our constitutional plan. As a practical matter, 
he sought to veto this Supreme Court decision.
    The evidence shows that he undertook a deliberate and 
multifaceted plan to thwart the Supreme Court ruling. That plan 
included the commission of perjury and obstruction of justice, 
which are very serious and fundamental wrongs. Even worse is 
that his conduct was conscious and calculated. It was not a 
mistake of the moment. Rather he deliberated and chose to 
commit perjury. He deliberated and chose to obstruct justice. 
In making these conscious and calculated choices, he placed his 
personal and political interests above his Presidential duty to 
respect the judicial branch.
    This is what concerns me greatly. If the President is 
willing to place his personal and political interests above his 
duties as President, he is not fit for the office he holds.
    The President has, as one branch of the Federal Government, 
a duty to respect the requirements of the judicial branch and 
its proceedings. The President has, as the Chief Executive, an 
express duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
In committing perjury and in obstructing justice, he exhibited 
an attitude dangerous to the operation of government--an 
attitude where he viewed himself as more important than the 
rule of law, where his personal and political interests took 
precedence over the public interest in administering equal 
justice under law.
    Ours is a nation ruled by law, not by men, and not by 
personalities. The judgment that we render here will set a 
precedent for the ages. If Congress concludes that the Office 
of the Presidency should remain occupied by one who has sullied 
it with premeditated criminal conduct in violation of 
constitutional and legal duty, then it will have diminished 
America's right of self-defense against unfit officeholders, 
something that the framers specifically provided for in the 
Constitution.
    A President who commits perjury before a Federal grand jury 
and obstructs justice poisons the well from which justice is 
administered. As far as I know, this President has the dubious 
distinction of being the first and only President in the 
history of the United States to lie directly to a Federal grand 
jury. After taking an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, he deliberately violated that oath. 
The first Chief Justice of the United States, John Jay, 
accurately stated that there is no crime more extensively 
pernicious to society than perjury. If the President commits 
perjury and we conclude that nevertheless he may remain in 
office, by what authority does any judge ask any litigant to 
swear under oath?
    As far as I am concerned, this is not just an empty 
question that has no relevance in today's society. Every day, 
in courtrooms and grand jury rooms across the country, 
witnesses are asked to hold up their right hand and take an 
oath to tell the truth. The judicial process in the United 
States depends on the sanctity of that oath. The prosecutorial 
function of the United States depends on the sanctity of that 
oath. It is the cornerstone of our system of justice. We simply 
cannot allow people across the country to look at the conduct 
of our President and raise legitimate questions about whether 
they need to comply with their solemn oaths.
    Moreover, how can judges refer violations of perjury or 
obstruction of justice to the executive branch for prosecution, 
when the Chief Executive himself has committed these offenses? 
On prior occasions, the Senate has removed judges for perjury 
because it was ``incompatible'' to ask litigants not to commit 
perjury in a courtroom presided over by someone who had himself 
committed perjury. A similar ``incompatibility'' exists where 
the sanction for perjury or obstruction of justice must be 
applied by the executive branch presided over by someone who 
has likewise committed these violations.
    The President must be removed before the corrosive effect 
of his conduct eats away at the rule of law and undermines the 
legal system. To imagine this President remaining in office 
brings to mind Alexander Pope's troubling question: ``If gold 
should rust, what will iron do?'' If our President commits 
perjury and obstruction of justice, what can we expect of our 
citizens?
    The Senate should seek to protect the legal system from 
that threat. And that is why I voted to convict and remove 
William Jefferson Clinton from office.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Conrad Burns

    Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chief Justice and my Senate colleagues, we 
now close one of the most serious chapters in the history of 
this Senate. While some may not agree with the outcome, and 
others may not like the way I voted, I'm satisfied the 
Constitution has been followed. We must now accept this verdict 
and try to work together without talk of revenge or gloating.
    In reaching my conclusions, I asked myself two questions: 
Were the articles of impeachment proven, and if so, should the 
President be removed from office?
    I believe the President perjured himself before a grand 
jury. He put the protection of his Presidency ahead of the 
protection of the institution of the Presidency. He gave false 
testimony about his efforts to keep other witnesses from 
telling the truth. We have already learned in our history that 
lies lead to more lies, and the pattern in this case led to 
perjury.
    I also feel strongly that a case for obstruction of justice 
was proven conclusively. The Senate heard the many actions and 
motives of the President, and it was easy to connect the dots. 
Those dots reveal a clear and convincing case against the 
President.
    I believe the President tampered with the testimony of 
witnesses against him; that he allowed his lawyers to present 
false evidence on his behalf; that he directed a job search for 
a witness in exchange for false testimony; and that he directed 
the recovery and hiding of evidence under subpoena.
    Does this warrant the President's removal from office? I 
agree with my respected colleague, Senator Byrd, that this 
reaches the level of high crimes and misdemeanors, for a number 
of reasons: The President's actions crossed the line between 
private and public behavior when those actions legally became 
the subject of a civil rights lawsuit against him, and when he 
tried to undermine that lawsuit. His actions were an attack on 
the separation of powers between the executive and judicial 
branches when he abused his power in an effort to obstruct 
justice. Remember, he impeded a lawsuit the highest court in 
our land allowed to proceed on a 9-0 vote.
    It's clear even to some of the President's supporters that 
he committed many of the offenses he has been charged with. But 
given this outcome, I hope for our system of justice and for 
our character as a nation that these votes are never seen as 
treating actions such as perjury and obstruction of justice 
lightly, whether by a President or by any citizen.
    Our new world of communications has made more information 
available to us than ever before. But it also contributed to 
the media overkill that jaded the American people to this 
process long ago. When the Lewinsky story became public, the 
President conducted a poll in which he learned that Americans 
would tolerate a private affair, but not perjury or obstruction 
of justice. His goal from that point on to was to poison the 
well of public opinion. Once the focus shifted away from the 
facts and toward opinion, once the clatter and clutter echoed 
on 24-hour talk television, the President's goal was reached. 
But the facts remain, and they are not in dispute.
    Montanans didn't send me to the Senate to be a weathervane, 
shifting in the wind, but to be a compass. It may be common to 
say the President's offenses don't ``rise to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors,'' but I believe that would ignore our 
history and what we stand for as a nation.
    That's why I also oppose censuring the President. The 
Constitution gives us one way to deal with impeachable 
offenses: a yes or no vote on guilt. Anything else would be 
like amending the Constitution on the fly and infringing on the 
separation of powers between the branches of government.
    As we accept this outcome and move forward, we have plenty 
of time left ahead to help out Montana's farm and ranch 
communities, which is my top priority. We have time to save 
Social Security in a way that fixes the program without raising 
taxes. We have time to give control of education back to 
parents and teachers, and to give Federal funds to classrooms, 
not bureaucrats. We have time to cut the record burden of 
taxation on Montanans, many of whom are forced to take more 
than one job to make ends meet.
    We should all roll up our sleeves and get to work.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe*

    Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chief Justice, in the absence of hearing 
something that I haven't heard or seeing something that is 
unforeseen up to now, it is my plan to vote for conviction on 
the two articles of impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12, see p. 
2987 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I think this is probably the most important vote I will 
cast during the course of my lifetime. I say it very sincerely. 
I believe we are going to rise to the occasion.
    I had an experience back in 1975, 24 years ago. I was a 
member of the State senate in Oklahoma. I can remember being 
called for jury duty, and I was very happy to find myself 
assigned to a murder case about which I had already expressed a 
definite opinion. I said I believed this defendant was surely 
guilty, and besides, I was the author of the capital punishment 
bill in the State legislature. So I thought for sure I wasn't 
going to be qualified as a juror.
    Well, I went through the qualification procedure and 
somehow they qualified me. Five days later, I was the foreman 
of the jury that acquitted that accused murderer. This can 
happen. It is an experience that taught me a lot about our 
judicial system.
    I sometimes say one of the few qualifications I have for 
the U.S. Senate is I am not a lawyer. So that when I read the 
Constitution, I know what it says; when I read the oath of 
office, I know what it says; when I read the law, I know what 
it says. I don't have to clutter up my mind with what the 
definition of ``is'' is. So it makes it a little easier for me.
    From a nonlawyer perspective, let me share a couple of 
observations.
    First, insofar as perjury is concerned--lying under oath--I 
might be wrong, but I don't think there is a Senator in this 
Chamber who doesn't believe the President lied under oath.
    I quote from the White House counsel, Charles Ruff, himself 
who said: ``Reasonable people can believe the President lied 
under oath.''
    I quote from Senator Chuck Schumer who said: ``He lied 
under oath both in the Paula Jones deposition and what he said 
in the grand jury.''
    I quote from Representative Robert Wexler, a strong 
supporter of the President, who serves on the House Judiciary 
Committee, who said: ``The President did not tell the truth. He 
lied under oath.''
    I quote from former U.S. Senator Paul Simon, one of my 
favorite Democrat colleagues, who appeared with me on a 
television program before the trial, who said: ``You have to be 
an extreme Clinton zealot to believe perjury was not 
committed.''
    Second, as a nonattorney, I have a hard time reconciling 
the idea that there might be certain permissible exceptions to 
telling the truth under oath. Maybe you who are attorneys, and 
have a different background than mine, see it differently. But 
how can you reconcile this idea that under some conditions--if 
the subject matter is sex or something else--you can lie under 
oath? I really have a hard time with this.
    I know that morality is not supposed to be the issue here. 
We are supposed to concentrate on the two specific articles of 
impeachment. However, I don't think anyone can completely 
compartmentalize himself and totally disregard other things 
going on.
    All of us get many, many letters from young children, 
parents, teachers, and others who are deeply distressed about 
the President's behavior and its impact on the moral health of 
the Nation. I think I am very fortunate because my kids are all 
in their upper thirties and my eight grandchildren, make that 
nine--I count them when they are conceived--are all under six, 
so I don't get those embarrassing questions. But I know many 
parents are struggling with this.
    The other thing that concerns me is the reprehensible, 
consistent attitude this President has displayed over the years 
against women. Take Paula Jones as just one example. She may 
not win a popularity poll, but her civil rights have just as 
much standing as anyone else's, do they not? Is not our country 
based on the principle that even the least among us is entitled 
to equal treatment under the law?
    It amazes me how these feminist organizations continue to 
hold this President in such high regard--groups such as the 
National Organization for Women. I went back and read their 
bylaws. They claim to want to protect women with regard to 
``equal rights and responsibilities in all aspects of 
citizenship, public service, employment . . . including freedom 
from discrimination.''
    And here we have a President who not only misused his power 
to seduce a college-age intern, but who has also engaged in 
extensive similar misconduct outside of his marriage. It is not 
just Monica Lewinsky. There is Gennifer Flowers, Elizabeth Ward 
Gracen, Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey, Dolly Kyle Browning, Beth 
Coulson, Susan McDougal, Cristy Zercher--the list goes on and 
on.
    This President has a consistent pattern of using and 
abusing women. You know that. I imagine most of you watched the 
Monica Lewinsky tapes as I did. I don't know why the House 
managers didn't pick this up--somehow they let it slip 
through--about when she told this story concerning the two 
security badges. She came here to Washington, this wide-eyed 
kid, and there is a blue badge that lets you get into the White 
House proper and a pink badge that lets you only into the Old 
Executive Office Building. And she wanted to be in there--in 
the West Wing--where she could see what was going on.
    She had the pink badge so she had to be escorted to the 
West Wing by someone else. So the very first day she meets and 
talks to the President in person, he begins the relationship 
we're talking about. He didn't even know her name. And then he 
reached across and grabbed her pink badge, yanked it down, and 
said, ``This is going to be a problem.'' I don't think there is 
anyone in the room who doesn't know what he was referring to. 
He was preparing to use this girl and abuse her and discard her 
like an old shirt. But I know that these are not things the 
lawyers expect us to consider.
    I do want to give another observation, though. I thought 
the playing field would be very uneven when this trial started. 
The members of the Judiciary Committee who are the House 
managers are all lawyers. But mostly, they are Congressmen 
first. Many of these Congressmen-lawyers had not been in a 
courtroom for literally years. And here they were taking on the 
most prestigious, the most prominent, the most skilled, the 
most experienced, the highest priced lawyers anywhere in 
America. And yet when they finished with their opening 
statements, there was no doubt the House managers had risen 
superbly to the occasion, and I believe they have done a great 
job throughout.
    The White House lawyers are very skilled, very persuasive 
people. I would make this observation--again, a nonlawyer 
observation: I felt that three or four of them should have quit 
their opening remarks about 5 minutes sooner than they did. 
They had a tendency to close their presentations with arguments 
that undermined their credibility.
    Cheryl Mills, for example, was really doing well, and she 
was very persuasive until she started at the very last talking 
about the President's record on civil rights, as if the civil 
rights of a person his associates had dubbed as ``trailer park 
trash'' were not significant, or the dignity of the intern he 
had branded ``a stalker'' was not significant. I really think 
she destroyed her otherwise very persuasive presentation.
    I think the same thing was true with Gregory Craig. He 
ended by talking about how conviction in this case would 
somehow ``destroy a fundamental underpinning of democracy'' by 
overturning the results of an election, as if Bob Dole would 
come in if that were to happen.
    Even our good friend, Dale Bumpers--I knew Dale Bumpers 
long before I came here to the U.S. Senate--did a great job. 
But I think he should have quit early, too, because at the very 
last it sounded like he was predicating the innocence of this 
President on his foreign policy. And as I just look at Iraq and 
what is going on over there, I think if that had been the test 
for this, I could have made up my mind a lot earlier.
    Another perspective I bring to this is as chairman of the 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. Having been in the 
service myself, and knowing how important discipline is, I am 
very disturbed that we have so many cases where severe 
punishment is dealt to individuals who have engaged in conduct 
far less serious than that of the President. Consider:
    Capt. Derrick Robinson, an Army officer, was caught up in 
the Aberdeen sex misconduct case and is serving time in 
Leavenworth for admitting to consensual sex with an enlisted 
person who was not his wife.
    Delmar Simpson is serving 25 years in a military prison 
because a court-martial found that, even though his 
relationship with a female recruit was consensual, the power 
granted him by his rank made such consensual sex with a 
subordinate unacceptable. Think of the power granted this 
President by his rank.
    Remember Kelly Flinn. She is not flying B-52s anymore. She 
was forced out the Air Force for lying about an adulterous 
affair.
    Sgt. Maj. Gene McKinney, the Army's top enlisted man, was 
tried for perjury, adultery, and obstruction of justice--all 
concerning sexual misconduct. He was convicted of obstruction, 
but not before his attorney asserted at the trial how people in 
uniform rightly ask: ``How can you hold an enlisted man to a 
higher standard than the President of the United States, the 
Commander in Chief?''
    So I have looked at this and studied it. I think anyone who 
votes to acquit has to say that we are going to hold this 
President to a lower standard of conduct and behavior than we 
hold other people. I do not understand how they can come to any 
other conclusion.
    My wife and I have been married 40 years. I have a thing 
called the wife test. You go home and when you want to get an 
opinion that is totally apolitical, you ask your wife. So I 
went home and I presented the case--as explained so eloquently 
by the White House lawyers and others--on why we could have a 
lower standard of conduct for a President than we have for a 
judge. And I know the argument. And I expressed the argument to 
my wife in the kitchen. I said, there are a thousand judges, 
only one President. I went through the whole thing. Then she 
looked up and said, ``I thought the President appointed the 
judges.'' You know, my wife is so dumb, she is always asking me 
questions I can't answer.
    I really believe that in this case we are getting at the 
truth. I really believe that the President of the United States 
should be held to the very highest of standards.
    Winston Churchill said: ``Truth is incontrovertible. 
Ignorance may deride it, panic may resent it, malice may 
destroy it, but there it is.''
    I think we have seen the truth. And I think the final truth 
is that this President should be held to the very highest of 
standards.
    Sometimes when I am not really sure I am right, I consult 
my best friend. His name is Jesus. And I asked that question. 
Now I will quote to you the response that is found in Luke: 
``From one who has been entrusted with more, much more will be 
asked.''
    Mr. Chief Justice, I think Jesus is right.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Max Cleland

    Mr. CLELAND. Mr. Chief Justice, inasmuch as the impeachment 
trial of the President has focused on the importance of oaths, 
I have begun to reflect on the oaths I have taken in my life. 
In terms of affirming my allegiance to this nation and the U.S. 
Constitution, I have taken an oath four times. I have followed 
up each oath with my signature.
    The first such oath I took was when I was 21 years old. I 
was sworn in to the U.S. Army as a young Second Lieutenant. 
Later I followed my flag and my Commander in Chief in being a 
part of the armed military forces in the Vietnam war.
    After the war, I took another oath. This time I was sworn 
in as head of the Veterans' Administration under President 
Carter. I still remember that turbulent time after the Vietnam 
war when so many of my fellow veterans were returning from that 
conflict. The words from Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural 
address seemed to constantly echo in my mind: ``. . . to care 
for him who has borne the battle and for his widow and his 
orphan.'' Having been wounded in Vietnam myself, I felt a grave 
responsibility to carry out my oath on behalf of my fellow 
veterans.
    The next time I took an oath it was January 1997. It was on 
the occasion of being sworn into the U.S. Senate. As Vice 
President Al Gore swore the new Senators in, I placed my right 
elbow on my Bible and raised my left hand in an oath to defend 
the Constitution against ``all enemies, foreign and domestic.'' 
Once in the Senate, I was fortunate to have been selected to 
follow distinguished former Georgia Senators Richard B. Russell 
and Sam Nunn in service on the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
I fully expected that any threat to our Constitution, our 
electoral process, or our delicately-honed system of checks and 
balances would come from outside our country, not from within.
    I was wrong.
    This leads me to my most recent oath to do ``impartial 
justice'' in the Senate in the impeachment trial of the 
President of the United States. In my personal view, this final 
oath, sealed with my signature in a book which will become part 
of the archives of American history, is a culmination of the 
other three oaths I have taken.
    I have sworn to defend this country.
    I have sworn to take care of its defenders.
    I have sworn to uphold the Constitution for which my fellow 
defenders have suffered and died.
    How can I now turn my back and ignore the challenge to that 
Constitution posed by this precedent-setting, first-time ever 
impeachment of an elected President of the United States?
    I cannot.
    When my name is called in regular order for my vote on the 
articles of impeachment, I will vote not guilty.
    I have reached my decision after much effort. I have tried 
to keep an open mind and an open heart. I have attempted to 
search the depths of American history and the lore of our 
English forebearers for insight and guidance. I have counseled 
privately with experts on American history and constitutional 
law. I have met with knowledgeable sources inside and outside 
the government. I have personally listened to constituents in 
my State and throughout the Nation. I have talked to them on 
the phone, read their letters and scanned their e-mail. I have 
tried to weave an appropriate course through the barrage of 
media talk and the system of political reporters doing their 
duty.
    I have given it my best shot.
    I understand now what Alexander Hamilton meant when he 
predicted 212 years ago that individual Senators faced with an 
impeachment trial had the ``awful discretion'' of removing a 
President. Yet I believe Hamilton was correct when long ago he 
advocated placing his faith in the Senators, where he hoped to 
find ``dignity and independence.'' I believe that under the 
circumstances the Senate has conducted itself appropriately, 
and has complied with Hamilton's standards of conducting an 
impeachment trial with ``dignity and independence.'' I also 
believe the Senate should continue to follow the standards set 
by our Founding Fathers regarding the use of impeachment power. 
According to the founders as articulated in the Constitution, 
the impeachment clearly should be reserved for ``bribery, 
treason or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This language 
did not just turn up in the Constitution overnight. The 
language grew and evolved over a period of months in 
Philadelphia in 1787.
    One of the Founding Fathers who especially impressed me is 
George Mason. Mason had an interesting background. Like many of 
our country's early statesmen, he was from Virginia. For me, 
Mason is a bridge of insight into what the impeachment clause 
in the Constitution is all about.
    Mason was a soldier. Indeed, he was an officer, a colonel. 
He, too, understood the grave responsibility of military 
leadership, of leading men in combat and in caring for them 
afterwards. He certainly knew about the gravity of his own 
personal oath. It was Mason, then, who articulated during the 
Constitutional Convention that the phrase in the Constitution 
regarding impeachment must be more fully fleshed out and should 
more appropriately read ``. . . and other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors against the state.''
    Here was a soldier of the American Revolution. Here was an 
officer in that Revolution working with his fellow statesmen 
charting out a course for the Nation's future. Here was a 
brother of the bond from Northern Virginia who wanted to make 
sure the actual constitutional language was clear that any 
impeachment must rise to a high level. According to the thrust 
of Mason's argument, for an impeachment of the President to be 
legitimate, the impeachable offenses must pose a threat to the 
Nation itself. The committee which reviewed the language 
believed that the phrase ``against the state'' was redundant, 
and, in effect, assumed.
    President Clinton has committed serious offenses. His 
personal conduct in this matter was, as I have said before, 
wrongful, reprehensible and indefensible. He has admitted to 
personal offenses, and will be appropriately judged for his 
misconduct elsewhere. In my judgement, under all the others I 
have taken under the U.S. Constitution, his offenses do not 
rise to the required level for impeachable offenses under the 
U.S. Constitution.
    I will be voting against conviction and removal from office 
of the President on both articles because I do not believe that 
these particular charges reach the high standard for 
impeachment which I believe George Mason and the other founders 
intended: that such an offense must be conduct which threatens 
grievous harm to our entire system.
    As the Senate concludes this trial, I am reminded of other 
words from Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address: ``with 
malice toward none, with clarity for all, let us bind up the 
Nation's wounds . . .'' If Lincoln can say that as the Nation 
was concluding the most divisive time in our history, which 
ultimately resulted in the first impeachment trial of an 
American President, surely we can say that to each other and to 
our nation as we conclude this historical second impeachment 
trial.
    It is time to end this trial.
    It is time to let the President conclude the term he was 
elected to by the American people.
    It is time to put an end to partisan bickering about the 
motives and conduct of all of those who have become involved in 
this sad episode.
    It is time for us all to bind up the Nation's wounds.
    It is time to get on with the business of the American 
people we were elected to conduct.
    I ask that a supplement of my statement be printed in the 
Record.
    Thank you.
    There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

 The Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton By Senator Max 
                                Cleland
    Mr. Chief Justice, let me begin by saying that the reason we are 
here today, the reason the U.S. Senate is being asked to exercise what 
Alexander Hamilton termed the ``awful discretion'' of impeachment, is 
because of the wrongful, reprehensible, indefensible conduct of one 
person, the President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton. 
Indeed, I believe it is conduct deserving of the censure of the Senate, 
and I will support such a resolution when it comes before us.
    The question before the Senate, however, is not whether the 
President's conduct was wrong, or immoral, or even censurable. We must 
decide solely as to whether or not he should be convicted of the 
allegations contained in the articles of impeachment and thus removed 
from office. In my opinion, the case for removal, presented in great 
detail in the massive 60,000-page report submitted by the House, in 
many hours of very capable but often repetitive presentations to the 
Senate by the House managers and the President's defense team, and in 
many additional hours of Senators' questioning of the two sides, fails 
to meet the very high standards which we must demand with respect to 
Presidential impeachments. Therefore, I will vote to dismiss the 
impeachment case against William Jefferson Clinton, and to vote for the 
Senate resuming other necessary work for the American people.
    To this very point, I have reserved my judgment on this question 
because of my constitutional responsibility and oath to ``render 
impartial justice'' in this case. Most of the same record presented in 
great detail to Senators in the course of the last several weeks has 
long been before the public, and indeed most of that public, including 
editorial boards, talk show hosts, and so forth, long ago reached their 
own conclusions as to the impeachment of President Clinton. But I have 
now heard enough to make my decision. With respect to the witnesses the 
House managers apparently now wish to depose and call before the 
Senate, the existing record represents multiple interrogations by the 
Office of the Independent Counsel and its grand jury, with not only no 
cross-examinations by the President's counsel but, with the exception 
of the President's testimony, without even the presence of the 
witnesses' own counsel. It is difficult for me to see how that record 
would possibly be improved from the prosecution's standpoint. Thus, I 
will not support motions to depose or call witnesses.
    In reaching my decision on impeachment, there are a number of 
factors which have been discussed or speculated about in the news media 
which were not a part of my calculations.
    First of all, while as political creatures neither the Senate nor 
the House can or should be immune from public opinion, we have a very 
precise constitutionally prescribed responsibility in this matter, and 
popular opinion must not be controlling consideration. I believe 
Republican Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine said it best during 
the only previous Presidential impeachment trial in 1868:
    ``To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the conviction of 
the President on these charges, I reply that he is not now on trial 
before the people, but before the Senate. . . . The people have not 
heard the evidence as we have heard it. The responsibility is not on 
them, but upon us. They have not taken an oath to `do impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and the laws.' I have taken that oath. I 
cannot render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer to 
themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And I should consider 
myself undeserving of the confidence of that just and intelligent 
people who imposed upon me this great responsibility, and unworthy of a 
place among honorable men, if for any fear of public reprobation, and 
for the sake of securing popular favor, I should disregard the 
convictions of my judgment and my conscience.''
    Nor was my decision premised on the notion, suggested by some, that 
the stability of our Government would be severely jeopardized by the 
impeachment of President Clinton. I have full faith in the strength of 
our Government and its leaders and, more importantly, faith in the 
American people to cope successfully with whatever the Senate decides. 
There can be no doubt that the impeachment of a President would not be 
easy for the country but just in this century, about to end, we have 
endured great depressions and world wars. Today, the U.S. economy is 
strong, the will of the people to move beyond this national nightmare 
is great, and we have an experienced and able Vice President who is 
more than capable of stepping up and assuming the role of the 
President.
    Third, although we have heard much argument that the precedents of 
judicial impeachments should be controlling in this case, I have not 
been convinced and did not rely on such testimony in making my 
decision. After review of the record, historical precedents, and 
consideration of the different roles of Presidents and Federal judges, 
I have concluded that there is indeed a different legal standard for 
impeachment of Presidents and Federal judges. Article II, section 4 of 
the Constitution provides that ``the President, Vice President, and all 
civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article III, section I of the Constitution 
indicates that judges ``shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior.'' Presidents are elected by the people and serve for a fixed 
term of years, while Federal judges are appointed without public 
approval to serve a life tenure without any accountability to the 
public. Therefore, under our system, impeachment is the only way to 
remove a Federal judge from office while Presidents serve for a 
specified term and face accountability to the pubic through elections. 
With respect to the differing impeachment standards themselves, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist once wrote, ``the terms `treason, bribery and other 
high crimes and misdemeanors' are narrower than the malfeasance in 
office and failure to perform the duties of the office, which may be 
grounds for forfeiture of office held during good behavior.''
    And my conclusions with respect to impeachment were not based upon 
consideration of the proper punishment of President Clinton for his 
misdeeds. During the impeachment of President Nixon, the report by the 
staff of the impeachment inquiry concluded that ``impeachment is the 
first step in a remedial process--removal from office and possible 
disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment 
is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
constitutional government.'' Regardless of the outcome of the Senate 
impeachment trial, President Clinton remains subject to censure by the 
House and Senate, and criminal prosecution for any crimes he may have 
committed. Whatever punishment President Clinton deserves for his 
misdeeds will be provided elsewhere.
    Finally, I do not believe that perjury or obstruction of justice 
could never rise to the level of threatening grievous harm to the 
Republic, and thus represent adequate grounds for removal of a 
President. However, we must approach such a determination with the 
greatest of care. Impeachment of a President is, perhaps with the power 
to declare war, the gravest of constitutional responsibilities bestowed 
upon the Congress. During the history of the United States, the Senate 
has only held impeachment trials for two Presidents, the 1868 trial of 
President Johnson, who had not been elected to that office, and now 
President Clinton. Although the Senate can look to impeachment trials 
of other public officials, primarily judicial, as I have already said, 
I do not believe that those precedents are or should be controlling in 
impeachment trials of Presidents, or indeed of other elected officials.
    My decision was based on one overriding concern: the impact of this 
precedent-setting case on the future of the Presidency, and indeed of 
the Congress itself. It is not Bill Clinton who should occupy our only 
attention. He already stands rebuked by the House impeachment votes, 
and by the words of virtually every Member of Congress of both 
political parties. And even if we do not remove him from office, he 
still stands liable to future criminal prosecution for his actions, as 
well as to the verdict of history. No, it is Mr. Clinton's successors, 
Republican, Democrat or any other party, who should be our concern.
    The Republican Senator, Edmund G. Ross of Kansas, who ``looked down 
into my open grave'' of political oblivion when he cast one of the 
decisive votes in acquitting Andrew Johnson in spite of his personal 
dislike of the President, explained his motivation this way:
    ``In a large sense, the independence of the executive office as a 
coordinate branch of the government was on trial. . . . If . . . the 
President must step down . . . upon insufficient proofs and from 
partisan considerations, the office of President would be degraded, 
cease to be a coordinate branch of government, and ever after 
subordinated to the legislative will. It would practically have 
revolutionized our splendid political fabric into a partisan 
Congressional autocracy.''
    While our government is certainly on a stronger foundation now than 
in the aftermath of the Civil War, the basic point remains valid. If 
anything, in today's world of rapidly emerging events and threats, we 
need an effective, independent Presidency even more than did mid-19th 
century Americans.
    While in the history of the United States the U.S. Senate has never 
before considered impeachment articles against a sitting elected 
official, we do have numerous cases of each House exercising its 
constitutional right to ``punish its Members for disorderly behavior, 
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a Member.'' However, 
since the Civil War, while a variety of cases involving personal and 
private misconduct have been considered, the Senate has never voted to 
expel a Member, choosing to censure instead on seven occasions, and the 
House has rarely chosen the ultimate sanction. Should the removal of a 
President be subject to greater punishment with lesser standards of 
evidence than the Congress has applied to itself when the Constitution 
appears to call for the reverse in limiting impeachment to cases of 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes or misdemeanors?'' In my view, 
the answer must be no.
    Thus, for me, as one U.S. Senator, the bar for impeachment and 
removal from office of a President must be a high one, and I want the 
record to reflect that my vote to dismiss is based upon a standard of 
evidence equivalent to that used in criminal proceedings--that is, that 
guilt must be proven ``beyond a reasonable doubt''--and a standard of 
impeachable offense which, in my view, conforms to the founders' 
intentions that such an offense must be one which represents official 
misconduct threatening grievous harm to our whole system of government. 
To quote Federalist No. 65, Hamilton defined as impeachable ``those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as 
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' As I have said before, I can conceive of instances in which 
both perjury and obstruction of justice would meet this test, and I 
certainly believe that most, if not all, capital crimes, including 
murder, would qualify for impeachment and removal from office. However, 
in my judgment, the current case does not reach the necessary high 
standard.
    In the words of John F. Kennedy, ``with a good conscience our only 
sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds,'' I believe 
that dismissal of the impeachment case against William Jefferson 
Clinton is the appropriate action for the U.S. Senate. It is the action 
which will best preserve the system of government which has served us 
so well for over 200 years, a system of checks and balances, with a 
strong and independent Chief Executive.
    In closing, I wish to address those in the Senate and House, and 
among the American public, who have reached a different conclusion than 
have I in this case. I do not question the sincerity or legitimacy of 
your viewpoint. The process itself pushes us to make absolute 
judgments--yes or no to conviction and removal from office--and the 
nature of debate yields portraits of complex issues in stark black-and-
white terms, but I believe it is possible for reasonable people to 
reach different conclusions on this matter. Indeed, I recognize that, 
while my decision seeks to avoid the dangers of setting the impeachment 
bar too low, setting that bar too high is not without risks. I believe 
the House managers spoke eloquently about the need to preserve respect 
for the rule of law, including the critical principle that no one, not 
even the President of the United States, is above that rule. However, I 
have concluded that the threat to our system of a weakened Presidency, 
made in some ways subordinate to the will of the legislative branch, 
outweighs the potential harm to the rule of law, because that latter 
risk is mitigated by: an intact, independent criminal justice system, 
which indeed will retain the ability to render final, legal judgment on 
the President's conduct; a vigorous, independent press corps which 
remains perfectly capable of exposing such conduct, and of extracting a 
personal, professional and political price; and an independent Congress 
which will presumably continue to have the will and means to oppose 
Presidents who threaten our system of government.
    By the very nature of this situation, where I sit in judgment of a 
Democratic President as a Democratic Senator, I realize that my 
decision cannot convey the nonpartisanship which is essential to 
achieve closure on this matter, one way or the other. Indeed, in words 
which could have been written today, the chief proponent among the 
Founding Fathers of a vigorous Chief Executive, Alexander Hamilton, 
wrote in 1788, in No. 65 of The Federalist Papers, that impeachments 
``will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and 
to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to the 
accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing 
factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by real 
demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    I have, however, in making my decision laid out for you the 
standards which I believe to be appropriate whenever the Congress 
considers the removal from office of an elected official, whether 
executive branch or legislative branch. I will do my best to stand by 
those standards in all such cases to come before me while I have the 
privilege of representing the people of Georgia in the U.S. Senate, 
regardless of the party affiliation of the accused. I only hope and 
pray that no future President, of either party, will ever again engage 
in conduct which provides any basis, including the basis of the current 
case, for the Congress to consider the grave question of impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Bill Frist

    Mr. FRIST. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to explain my decision 
to convict President William Jefferson Clinton on two articles 
of impeachment charging him with high crimes and misdemeanors. 
I have heard from thousands of fellow Tennesseans during this 
trial, and their opinions were deeply split. While I looked to 
the people of Tennessee for guidance, responsibility for my 
final vote ultimately turned on my own conscience. I am sure 
that this will be one of the most important votes I cast as a 
U.S. Senator, and I am honored to explain fully my vote.
    I sought throughout President Clinton's trial to be true to 
my oath to do ``impartial justice according to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States.'' When I raised my right hand 
and swore that oath on January 7, I accepted a solemn 
responsibility. I did not approach this trial with some 
preordained outcome in mind; I carefully listened during the 5 
weeks of this trial to the evidence and the arguments, and 
sought to do justice.
    In considering the allegations against President Clinton, I 
believed that I should apply a ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' 
burden of proof--even though the Constitution does not specify 
a particular burden of proof in impeachment trials. The 
Constitution entrusts the decision to convict an impeached 
officer to the individual judgment of each Senator; however, I 
wanted to give the President the benefit of the same high 
standard of proof applied in criminal trials. I would remove a 
President from office only if the House managers met this 
rigorous burden of proof.
    The jury instructions used in Federal courts explain what 
must be established to meet this burden of proof:

    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all 
possible doubt. Possible doubts or doubts based purely on speculation 
are not reasonable doubts. A reasonable doubt is based on reason and 
common sense. It may arise from evidence, the lack of evidence, or the 
nature of the evidence.
    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof which is so convincing 
that you would not hesitate to rely and act on it in making the most 
important decisions in your own lives.

    In the end, I concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
President Clinton repeatedly lied under oath before a Federal 
grand jury. I also concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
engaged in a calculated, premeditated campaign to obstruct 
justice. I now wish to address each of those articles of 
impeachment in turn.
    The circumstantial and direct evidence demonstrates beyond 
a reasonable doubt that President Clinton committed perjury 
during his grand jury appearance. The criminal law of the 
United States forbids perjury before a grand jury. To prove a 
case of grand jury perjury, a prosecutor must demonstrate: (1) 
that the defendant testified under oath before a grand jury; 
(2) that the testimony so given was false in one or more 
respects; (3) the false testimony concerned material matters; 
and (4) the false testimony was knowingly given. There are 
three instances during the President's August 17, 1998, grand 
jury testimony in which these four elements were established.
    First, he lied when he denied that he had ``sexual 
relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky, even under his own 
interpretation of the definition of that term. Quite simply, 
Ms. Lewinsky offered a detailed account of numerous times when 
they did engage in such relations, even under President 
Clinton's interpretation of that term. Her testimony is 
corroborated by contemporaneous accounts she offered to a 
number of friends and professional counselors. President 
Clinton conjured up a tortured definition of the term ``sexual 
relations'' to explain the blue dress, and its physical 
evidence corroborating sexual relations, to the grand jury--
while still asserting the truthfulness of his earlier denial of 
``sexual relations'' in his deposition in the Paula Jones 
sexual harassment suit. This attempt to have it both ways, in 
turn, forced him to lie before the grand jury about the details 
and nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. There is no 
doubt in my mind that President Clinton lied about this matter. 
Moreover, this lie was material; that is, it had the tendency 
to affect the grand jury's investigation. That investigation 
focused on President Clinton's possible perjury and obstruction 
of justice in the Jones case. Lying to the grand jury to 
attempt to deny the earlier perjury in the Jones deposition was 
clearly material to that investigation.
    Second, President Clinton lied to the grand jury about his 
attempt to coach Ms. Currie immediately following the 
deposition. This coaching, which I will discuss in more detail 
later, was explicitly denied by the President before the grand 
jury. His testimony that he made a series of false statements 
to Ms. Currie and sought her agreement with them merely in an 
attempt ``to refresh [his] memory about what the facts were'' 
and that he was ``trying to get as much information as quickly 
as [he] could'' is false. He did not ask her what she recalled; 
he made false declarations and sought her agreement with them. 
One cannot refresh one's recollection by making knowingly false 
statements to another. This is a classic example of why courts 
instruct juries to use their common sense in resolving factual 
disputes. Moreover, President Clinton coached her twice in the 
exact same manner: Once on January 18, 1998, and again on 
January 20 or January 21. He had just finished lying in his 
civil deposition on January 17, and he wanted to enlist her 
support for his lies if she was called by Paula Jones' 
lawyers--as she was on January 22. Again, this issue was 
plainly material to an investigation into President Clinton's 
possible obstruction of justice.
    Third, President Clinton lied to the grand jury about 
attempting to influence the testimony of his aides whom he knew 
would be called before the grand jury. These allegations are 
discussed later. For now, it is only important to note that he 
testified that he ``said to them things that were true about 
this relationship. . . . So, I said things that were true. They 
may have been misleading. . . .'' In fact, he lied to his 
aides, as even Sidney Blumenthal stated in his videotaped 
deposition testimony. It is understandable that President 
Clinton would not admit to the grand jury that he lied to these 
aides, because to do so would admit that he obstructed justice. 
He could have asserted his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination; however, he chose to lie. He denied that he had 
lied to these aides. The Supreme Court has addressed just this 
sort of a lie, stating: ``A citizen may decline to answer the 
question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity 
knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.''
    The evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that 
President Clinton obstructed justice. He suggested that Ms. 
Lewinsky submit a false affidavit in a civil case. He coached a 
potential witness, Ms. Currie, in the civil case and the grand 
jury investigation by repeating a series of assertions to her 
that he knew to be false in the hope that she would adopt those 
assertions as her own. Last, he made false statements to his 
top advisors, knowing that they would then repeat those 
statements to a Federal grand jury.
    The United States Criminal Code makes it illegal for one to 
obstruct justice. The precise wording of the general 
obstruction of justice statute--title 18, section 1503 of the 
United States Code--provides: ``Whoever . . . corruptly . . . 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall 
be punished. . . .'' Courts have interpreted the word 
``corruptly'' to mean that the defendant had an intent to 
obstruct, impair, or impede the due administration of justice. 
In other words, one need not use threats of force or 
intimidation to obstruct justice. Thus, one who merely proposes 
to a potential witness that the witness lie in a judicial 
proceeding is guilty of obstructing justice.
    Also, an additional Federal statute, section 1512 of title 
18, deals specifically with witness tampering. It provides: 
``Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or attempts 
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person with intent to . . . influence, delay, or prevent the 
testimony of any person in an official proceeding . . . shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned. . . .'' Unlike section 
1503, section 1512 has been interpreted as applying to more 
than just ``pending'' judicial proceedings; courts have found 
it adequate that a defendant ``feared'' that such a proceeding 
might begin and sought to influence the testimony of those who 
may be witnesses in such a proceeding.
    With this statutory backdrop in mind, I turn first to the 
allegation that President Clinton urged Ms. Lewinsky to submit 
a false affidavit and deny their sexual relationship. The 
evidence establishes that he telephoned her between 2 and 2:30 
a.m. on December 17, 1997. According to Ms. Lewinsky, President 
Clinton informed her that she was on the witness list in the 
Paula Jones sexual harassment lawsuit. He then suggested that, 
if she were subpoenaed to give a deposition, ``she could sign 
an affidavit to try to satisfy [Ms. Jones's] inquiry and not be 
deposed.'' As has been pointed out, a truthful affidavit about 
their relationship would not have prevented her deposition; in 
fact, a truthful affidavit would have encouraged the 
deposition. Notwithstanding this obvious fact, President 
Clinton's lawyers vigorously asserted at trial that a ``limited 
but truthful'' affidavit could have misled the Jones lawyers 
sufficiently to avoid her being deposed.
    The problem with this defense is that President Clinton on 
December 17, in the very same telephone conversation in which 
he suggested the affidavit, also encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to 
continue with the ``cover stories'' they had used to hide their 
relationship. According to Ms. Lewinsky, he told her that she 
``should say she visited [the White House] to see Ms. Currie 
and, on occasion when working at [the White House] she brought 
him letters when no one else was around.'' Of course, Ms. 
Lewinsky was going to the White House to see President Clinton, 
and the only time she ``brought him letters'' was to cover 
their illicit rendezvous. These cover stories, hatched as 
explanations to prevent coworkers from discovering their sexual 
relationship, amounted to obstruction of justice when the 
President suggested their use in judicial proceedings. These 
cover stories ultimately found their way into drafts of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit. The evidence establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton was urging Ms. Lewinsky 
to file a false and misleading affidavit in the Jones case.
    As one court has observed, conduct amounting to less than 
an explicit command to lie can nonetheless form the basis for 
an obstruction conviction: ``The statute prohibits elliptical 
suggestions as much as it does direct commands.'' There is no 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton was suggesting that Ms. 
Lewinsky file an affidavit consistent with their previously-
agreed upon cover stories. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she 
understood after that conversation that she would deny their 
relationship to Paula Jones' lawyers.
    The evidence also establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that President Clinton sought to tamper with the testimony of 
his secretary, Ms. Currie. Within a few hours of completing his 
deposition in the Jones case on Saturday, January 17, 1998, 
President Clinton called Betty Currie and made an unusual 
request: She should come to work to meet with him the following 
day, Sunday. Sunday afternoon, she met with him at her desk 
outside the Oval Office. Ms. Currie testified that he seemed 
``concerned.'' He told her that he had been asked questions the 
previous day about Ms. Lewinsky. According to Ms. Currie, he 
then said, `` `There are several things you may want to know.' 
'' After that, he made a series of statements: You were always 
there when she was there, right? We were never really alone. 
Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? You can 
see and hear everything, right? Monica wanted to have sex with 
me, but I told her I couldn't do that.
    Ms. Currie further testified that, although President 
Clinton did not ``pressure'' her, she observed from his 
demeanor and the way he said these statements that he wanted 
her to agree with those statements. She did agree with each 
statement, though she knew them to be false or beyond her 
knowledge.
    There is no reasonable doubt that this meeting was an 
attempt by President Clinton to coach Ms. Currie's probable 
testimony. In fact, during the previous day's deposition, 
President Clinton invoked Ms. Currie's name in relation to Ms. 
Lewinsky on at least six different occasions, even going so far 
as to tell Ms. Jones' lawyers that they would have to ``ask 
Betty'' whether he was ever alone with Ms. Lewinsky between 
midnight and 6 a.m. Simply put, he made her a potential witness 
in the Jones case. One who attempts to corruptly influence the 
testimony of a prospective witness has obstructed justice. In 
fact, the Jones lawyers issued a subpoena for Ms. Currie a few 
days after President Clinton's deposition.
    President Clinton's assertion that he posed these 
statements to Ms. Currie merely to refresh his recollection and 
test her own memory of the events is undercut by his repetition 
of the coaching exercise a few days later. According to Ms. 
Currie, either 2 or 3 days later he called her in again, 
presented the same statements, with which she again agreed, and 
had the same ``tone and demeanor'' as he had during the Sunday 
coaching session. This amounted to egregious witness tampering.
    Last, the unrefuted evidence establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton obstructed justice by 
giving a false account of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky to 
aides that, by his own admission, he knew might be called by 
the grand jury. John Podesta, then-deputy chief of staff to 
President Clinton, testified before the grand jury about a 
conversation with President Clinton on January 23, 1998:

    [H]e said to me he had never had sex with her [Ms. Lewinsky], and 
that--and that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he 
was extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her. . . .
    Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate of, you 
know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had sex 
with her in any way whatsoever--that they had not had oral sex.

    This, as we now know, was false. Yet, according to Mr. 
Podesta, President Clinton ``was very forceful. I believed what 
he was saying.''
    More important, on January 21, 1998, President Clinton told 
aide Sidney Blumenthal the following utterly false story:

    He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on 
me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've 
caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.''
    She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had 
an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that 
she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then 
she wouldn't be a stalker anymore.

    This story is eerily reminiscent of President Clinton's 
coaching of Betty Currie. ``Monica wanted to have sex with me, 
but I told her I couldn't do that.'' President Clinton sought 
to portray himself as a victim of Ms. Lewinsky. At the time, 
Mr. Blumenthal ``certainly believed his story. It was a very 
heartfelt story, he was pouring out his heart, and I believed 
him.'' Mr. Blumenthal admitted to the Senate that he now knows 
the President's story was a lie.
    President Clinton does not deny the testimony of either Mr. 
Podesta or Mr. Blumenthal. Their testimony establishes a clear-
cut case of obstruction. The President admitted knowing that 
both were likely to be called to testify before the grand jury. 
According to their testimony, he provided them with a false 
account of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and President 
Clinton does not deny their version of events. The unrefuted 
evidence establishes obstruction of justice. As the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: ``The most obvious example 
of a section 1512 [witness tampering] violation may be the 
situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a false 
story as if the story were true, intending that the witness 
believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury.''
    I did not vote to convict President Clinton on every ground 
presented by the House managers. For example, though I was 
concerned that the intensification of efforts to secure Ms. 
Lewinsky a private sector job were undertaken to influence her 
testimony, and secure a false affidavit from her, I had 
reasonable doubt that there was a sufficiently direct nexus 
between the two to justify finding against President Clinton on 
that basis. The videotaped testimony of Vernon Jordan nearly 
made the case, but fell just short. Accordingly, I did not 
consider that element of the obstruction of justice case to be 
grounds for removing President Clinton.
    Another serious allegation of obstruction of justice 
concerned the mysterious fact that subpoenaed gifts from 
President Clinton to Ms. Lewinsky were found underneath Ms. 
Currie's bed. The evidence tends to establish that President 
Clinton directed Ms. Currie to get gifts from Ms. Lewinsky; 
however, I cannot say that the proof establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this occurred. In the absence of hearing 
directly from Ms. Currie as a witness on this issue and having 
the chance to look her in the eye and gauge her credibility, I 
cannot resolve beyond a reasonable doubt the testimonial 
conflict between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie on who initiated 
the return of the gifts. The weight of the evidence suggests 
that Ms. Currie initiated the return on instructions from 
President Clinton; however, without Ms. Currie's testimony, I 
cannot say that case has been proven ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt.''
    For this reason, I am disappointed that the Senate chose to 
cut itself off from hearing from whatever fact witnesses either 
side wished to call. I voted to allow live testimony, but the 
motion was unsuccessful. Although there was ample evidence upon 
which to convict for many allegations, some allegations remain 
in doubt. Rather than have a traditional trial, we listened to 
lawyers argue, then argue some more, and then a bit more. The 
only time we actually had a chance to see witnesses was when we 
were allowed to see the videotapes of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, 
and Mr. Blumenthal. I learned from those tapes. The presence of 
live witnesses in accord with Senate precedent would have been 
helpful. I regret that the Senate chose not to allow live 
witnesses and that we did not see their cross-examination. We 
did not use the most powerful weapons in our truth-seeking 
arsenal. This truncated ``trial'' may have been politically 
expedient, but I doubt history will judge it kindly.
    Having found that President Clinton committed the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, my duty to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States made it clear that these 
offenses were high crimes and misdemeanors requiring his 
removal from office. There is no serious question that perjury 
and obstruction of justice are high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Blackstone's famous Commentaries--widely read by the framers of 
the Constitution--put perjury on equal footing with bribery as 
a crime against the state. Perjury was understood to be as 
serious as bribery, which is specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution as a ground for impeachment. Today, we punish 
perjury and obstruction of justice at least as severely as we 
punish bribery. Apparently, the seriousness of perjury and 
obstruction of justice has not diminished over time.
    Indeed, our own Senate precedent establishes that perjury 
is a high crime and misdemeanor. The Senate has removed seven 
Federal judges from office. During the 1980s, three judges were 
convicted for the high crime and misdemeanor of perjury. 
Federal judges are removed under the exact same constitutional 
provision--article II, section 4--upon which we remove 
Presidents. To not remove President Clinton for grand jury 
perjury lowers uniquely the Constitution's removal standard, 
and thus requires less of the man who appoints all federal 
judges than we require of those judges themselves.
    I will have no part in the creation of a constitutional 
double-standard to benefit the President. He is not above the 
law. If an ordinary citizen committed these crimes, he would go 
to jail. Many Senators have voted to remove Federal judges 
guilty of perjury, and I have no doubt that the Senate would do 
so again. Those who by their votes today confer immunity on the 
President for the same crimes do violence to the core principle 
that we are all entitled to equal justice under law.
    Moreover, I agree with the view of Judge Griffin Bell, 
President Jimmy Carter's Attorney General and a former judge of 
the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Judge Bell 
has stated: ``A President cannot faithfully execute the laws if 
he himself is breaking them.'' These offenses--perjury and 
obstruction of justice--are not trivial; they represent an 
assault on the judicial process. Again, Judge Bell's words are 
instructive:

    Truth and fairness are the two essential elements in a judicial 
system, and all of these statutes I mentioned, perjury, tampering with 
a witness, obstruction of justice, all [are] in the interest of truth. 
If we don't have truth in the judicial process and in the court system 
in our country, we don't have anything. So, this is serious business.

    I agree. The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice 
are public crimes threatening the administration of justice. 
They therefore fit Alexander Hamilton's famous description of 
impeachable offenses in Federalist No. 65: ``[O]ffences which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust.'' The 
electorate entrusted President Clinton to enforce the laws, yet 
he chose to engage in a pattern of public crime against our 
system of justice. We must not countenance the commission of 
such serious crimes by the Chief Executive of our Nation.
    The President broke his oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help him God. He likewise 
broke his oaths to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.
    Just how important are oaths? We take oaths to substantiate 
the sanctity of some of our highest callings. Years ago, I took 
the Hippocratic Oath to become a physician. In January 1995, I 
took an oath of office as a U.S. Senator to preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States. Then, just 
last month, I had to take a special oath of impartial justice 
for this impeachment trial. Raising your right hand and 
swearing before God is meant to be serious business. Swearing 
falsely is equally serious. I recall the conclusion of the 
Hippocratic Oath:

    If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to 
me to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all 
time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of 
all this be my lot.

    President Clinton broke his oaths; the opposite of honor 
and fame should be his lot.
    Many of my colleagues have publicly expressed their belief 
that President Clinton broke his oaths and committed the crimes 
of perjury and obstruction of justice. Some have gone further 
and said that these are high crimes and misdemeanors. Yet they 
flinched from removing President Clinton from office, hoping 
that we could just move on, put this behind us, and ``heal'' 
the Nation.
    Although our acquittal of President Clinton may bring 
initial relief at the end of this ordeal, it will also leave 
unfortunate, lasting lessons for the American people: Integrity 
is a second-class value; the hard job of being truthful is to 
be left to others; and virtue is for the credulous. Though we 
do not know how these lessons will manifest themselves over 
time in our society, they will not be lost. Thus, I do not 
believe the acquittal of President Clinton will heal the wounds 
of this ordeal; rather, acquittal regrettably will inject a 
slow-acting moral poison into the American consciousness.
    There is one aspect of the case that made me uncomfortable: 
The perjury and obstruction of justice arose out of an illicit 
sexual relationship between President Clinton and a young White 
House intern. President Clinton no doubt sought to shield the 
knowledge of that relationship from his family and staff, and 
that impulse is understandable. However reprehensible his 
affair might be, both it and his efforts to hide it were 
originally of no concern to the public or the Senate. None of 
us can claim to be free from sin.
    What began as an attempt to keep an affair secret from 
family and coworkers, however, escalated into illegal activity 
when keeping that affair secret trumped the civil rights of 
Paula Jones to seek redress in court, and, in turn, thwarted 
the investigation of a Federal grand jury. President Clinton 
chose to cheat. Cheating the judicial process, whether to keep 
an ordinary citizen from having her day in court or to avoid 
criminal indictment, is wrong.
    Dr. William Osler was a late 19th century physician and is 
regarded as the father of modern surgery. In a lecture to his 
medical students about the pursuit of truth, he said:

    Start with the conviction that absolute truth is hard to reach in 
matters relating to our fellow creatures, healthy or diseased, that 
slips in observation are inevitable even with the best trained 
faculties, that errors in judgment must occur in the practice of an art 
which consists largely in balancing probabilities.
    Start, I say, with this attitude of mind, and mistakes will be 
acknowledged and regretted; but instead of a slow process of self-
deception, with ever-increasing inability to recognize truth, you will 
draw from your errors the very lessons which may enable you to avoid 
their repetition.

    President Clinton's repetition of wrong, often illegal 
choices most disturbs me. He faced a series of choices about 
his affair once our system of justice became concerned with it. 
He could have come clean in the civil deposition and urged Ms. 
Lewinsky to do the same. He did not. When the story became 
public, he could have then come clean to the American public 
and revised his deposition testimony. Instead, he took a poll. 
Having learned that the American people would forgive him for 
adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice, he 
declared that he would just have to ``win.'' He then wagged his 
finger at us on national TV and chided us for believing what 
has since proven true. He embarked on a quiet smear campaign 
against Ms. Lewinsky, calling her a ``stalker'' and sending 
aides into the grand jury to repeat that mean-spirited 
falsehood. Above all else, he could have come clean when he 
went before the grand jury. Indeed, the discovery of the 
infamous blue dress served as a powerful reminder to tell the 
truth. But he continued to lie.
    The pattern of behavior is disturbing. That pattern is 
driven by President Clinton's choice, on every occasion in this 
saga, to put his self-interest above the the public interest. 
Indeed, President Clinton is well down the dangerous road Dr. 
Osler described to his students: ``A slow process of self-
deception.''
    To me, his perjury before the grand jury was defining. Some 
of my fellow Senators urged him not to lie in that grand jury, 
lest he be impeached. He had a chance to try to set matters 
right by the American people and by our system of justice. 
Instead, he lied. It has been said, ``Character is what we know 
about ourselves. Reputation is what others know about us.'' 
What we now know about President Clinton's conduct before the 
bar of justice illuminates his integrity: We learned that he 
always cheated and put himself above the law. We can pray that 
God will forgive President Clinton for his sins, but we cannot 
ignore the consequences of his behavior to our society.
    We in the Senate faced the difficult choice of deciding 
whether to remove President Clinton. To find him not guilty of 
perjury and obstruction of justice and leave him in office 
would corrode the respect we all have for the office of 
President. More troubling, the example to our youth would be 
destructive. I have three sons, 15, 13, and 11 years old. As 
anyone with children knows, President Clinton's conduct has 
undermined all our efforts to instill in our children two 
essential virtues: truthfulness and responsibility. If we allow 
a known perjurer and obstructor of justice to continue in the 
office of President and lead us into the 21st century, we set a 
sad example for future generations.
    In a recent sermon on the topic, ``What Do I Tell My 
Children about the Crisis in Washington?'' a minister quoted 
from Michael Novak's book ``The Experience of Nothingness'':

    The young have a right to learn a way of discriminating right from 
wrong, the posed from the authentic, the excellent from the mediocre, 
the brilliant from the philistine, the shoddy from the workmanlike. 
When no one with experience bothers to insist--to insist--on such 
discrimination, they rightly get the idea that discernment is not 
important, that no one cares either about such things--or about them.

    President Clinton committed perjury and obstructed justice. 
In so doing, he broke his oath of office and his oath to tell 
the truth. He broke the public trust. I took an oath to do 
impartial justice by the Constitution and laws of our country. 
I had a duty to the Constitution and laws of this Nation to 
convict President Clinton, so I voted to remove him from office 
and restore the trust of the American people in the high office 
of President. Prosperity is never an excuse to keep a President 
who has committed high crimes and misdemeanors.
    Though many of my colleagues agreed with these conclusions, 
two-thirds of the Senate did not. I am concerned about the 
message this acquittal will send to our youth. So I am 
convinced that you and I now have a shared duty: Rather than 
give in to easy cynicism, we should work toward integrity and 
responsibility in all that we do. We must remind our children 
that telling the truth and accepting responsibility for 
wrongdoing are virtues with currency. Our Nation's future 
depends on how earnestly we fulfill that shared duty.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Jim Bunning

    Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Chief Justice, this is my first speech on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate. I had hoped my opening speech 
would be about Social Security. This year, in my opinion, we 
have a golden window of opportunity to reform and strengthen 
this vital program and I had hoped to use my first comments on 
the Senate floor to help open the debate on real Social 
Security reform.
    Unfortunately, it didn't turn out that way. Of necessity, 
my opening speech in this body is about the articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton. It was not my choice!
    In fact, none of us have much choice in this matter. Here 
in the U.S. Senate, we have been charged with the 
responsibility of looking at the facts as presented by the 
managers from the House of Representatives. Each of us took an 
oath to do impartial justice.
    And the Constitution doesn't give us much wiggle room when 
it comes to choices. The framers were pretty explicit about our 
options. If we determine that the President is guilty of the 
charges as outlined in the two articles of impeachment, the 
penalty is removal from office. We have no other choice.
    Because we are all political animals, I think it is natural 
that the legitimacy of this process and the outcome of this 
debate will be clouded to some degree by the perception that it 
is a partisan exercise.
    Many of the President's defenders and many of our friends 
in the media, in fact, have insisted all along that the whole 
process has been driven by partisan Republicans who are intent 
to removing a Democratic President they do not like from 
office.
    The difficulty you run into when you start throwing around 
the term ``partisan'' politics is that it is seldom a one-way 
street.
    Is it any more ``partisan'' to blindly support the 
impeachment of a President of the other party than it is to 
blindly support a President of your own regardless of the 
facts? Of course not. Just as each of us, in keeping with our 
oath to do impartial justice, must strive to avoid a partisan, 
knee-jerk solution to the process, we must also not let 
ourselves be deterred from doing what we feel is right simply 
to avoid charges of partisanship.
    So, hiding behind the charge that the process has been 
tainted by political partisanship gives us no relief from our 
responsibility to look at the facts nor does it expand our 
choices.
    So, it is the facts that matter. And each of us must weigh 
them individually. We are not talking about public opinion 
polls. They should have no bearing on the case at this point. 
It is a question of facts pure and simple.
    Each of us must weigh those facts individually. We might 
reach different conclusions. But if I determine that the 
President is guilty, and if you determine that the President is 
guilty, based on those facts we don't have any options. We must 
vote to convict and to remove the President from office.
    I am personally convinced that the President is guilty 
under both of the articles of impeachment presented to us by 
the House managers.
    The managers from the House have presented a strong case 
that President Clinton committed perjury. The circumstantial 
and supporting evidence is overwhelming that Bill Clinton did 
lie under oath to the grand jury when he testified about his 
attorney's use of a false affidavit at his deposition. He lied 
under oath to the grand jury when he testified about the nature 
of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He lied under oath about 
what he told his aides about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He lied under oath to the grand jury about his 
conversations with Betty Currie.
    That is perjury. That is a felony. We cannot uphold our 
reverence for the rule of law and ignore it.
    The circumstantial and supporting evidence is also 
overwhelming that the President did willfully obstruct justice 
when he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file an affidavit in the 
Jones case; when he coached Betty Currie on how to respond to 
questions about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    When he lied to aides whom he knew would be called as grand 
jury witnesses, when he promoted a job search for Ms. Lewinsky, 
and when he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to return the gifts he had 
given her, he was attempting to obstruct justice.
    After listening to the facts and the evidence, and after 
listening to the President's defense team try to refute the 
charges, I have determined that he is guilty as charged.
    I have tried to the best of my ability to reach this 
determination impartially without being biased by my political 
affiliation. Have I been successful? I believe so.
    I am encouraged in the belief that I have reached the 
proper conclusion for the proper reasons by the harsh wording 
of the resolution being circulated by some of the defenders of 
the President, Senators who oppose impeachment but support a 
censure resolution.
    The most recent version of a censure resolution that I have 
seen admits that the President engaged in shameless, reckless 
and indefensible conduct. It goes on to say that the President 
of the United States deliberately misled and deceived the 
American people and officials of the U.S. Government.
    It also says that the President gave false or misleading 
testimony, and impeded discovery of evidence in judicial 
proceedings and that, as a result, he deserves censure.
    These are the people who are opposed to the articles of 
impeachment.
    The Constitution doesn't really give us that kind of 
choice. If the President is guilty of these charges, he must be 
convicted and he must be removed from office. Censure is not an 
option.
    I would rather be speaking about Social Security but I 
wasn't given a choice in the matter.
    I would prefer not to vote to convict any President of 
articles of impeachment. But I don't have a choice in that 
matter either.
    If he is guilty, he must be convicted. And I believe he is 
guilty as charged.
    There is one central, elemental ingredient that is 
necessary to the success of our ability, as a nation, to govern 
ourselves. That is trust.
    Before a President takes office, he swears a solemn oath to 
``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.''
    We accept his word on that.
    When the Vice President, U.S. Senators and Members of the 
House of Representatives take office, they are required to take 
an oath ``to support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.''
    We trust that they will live up to that oath.
    We administer these oaths and we accept them as binding 
because government, at least in this Nation, is, above all 
else, a matter of trust. Trust is the glue that holds it all 
together. If that trust is destroyed or tarnished, it seriously 
undermines the basic foundations of our government.
    The President's defenders try to excuse him by saying that 
if he did lie under oath and obstructed justice, he did it to 
protect himself and his family from personal embarrassment 
about sexual indiscretions, and somehow this makes the lies all 
right.
    It doesn't. When he lied and when he tried to hide his lies 
from the grand jury, he broke trust with the Nation's justice 
system. He broke faith with the American people.
    Not only did he break the law, he also violated the sacred 
trust of the office of the President, and in so doing, he 
violated his oath of office. And that raises the two articles 
of impeachment to a level that definitely justifies his removal 
from office.
    It is a matter of trust. It leaves us no choice but to vote 
for conviction.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin

    Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chief Justice, from the opening statement 
to the closing argument, Chairman Henry Hyde and the House 
managers stated repeatedly that what is at stake in this trial 
is the rule of law.
    In a compelling reference to the life of Sir Thomas More, 
Mr. Hyde quoted from ``A Man for All Seasons'' by Robert Bolt 
to remind us that More was prepared to die rather than swear a 
false oath of loyalty to the King and his church. But Mr. Hyde 
did not read my favorite passage from that work. Let me share 
it with you and tell you why I think it is important to us in 
this deliberation.

    MORE. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's 
right. And I'll stick to what's legal.
    ROPER. Then you set Man's law above God's!
    MORE. No far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact--I'm 
not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find 
such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the 
thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a man 
alive who could follow me there, thank God.
    ALICE. While you talk, he's gone!
    MORE. And go he should if he was the devil himself until he broke 
the law!
    ROPER. So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
    MORE. Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to 
get after the Devil?
    ROPER. I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
    MORE. Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 
round on you--where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? 
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast--Man's laws, 
not God's--and if you cut them down--and you're just the man to do it--
d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow 
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.

    Sir Thomas More's words remind us the law must be followed 
not only by the accused but also by the accusers.
    Every day in America many who are accused of crimes are 
released because this government has violated their 
constitutional rights--denied them due process--forsaken the 
rule of law.
    How American of us. We are prepared to release an accused 
because the accuser has not played by the rules, the rules of 
law.
    The House managers built their case on one key question: 
Did the President respect the rule of law?
    But the same managers who exalted the rule of law from 
their opening words would have us ignore the process which 
brought us to this moment:
    An independent counsel in name only whose conduct before 
the House Judiciary Committee led Sam Dash, former Watergate 
counsel and Mr. Starr's ethics advisor, to resign in protest.
    Listen to Dash's words to Kenneth Starr in his letter of 
resignation concerning Starr's appearance and testimony:

    In doing this you have violated your obligation under the 
Independent Counsel Statute and have unlawfully intruded on the power 
of impeachment, which the Constitution gives solely to the House. . . . 
By your willingness to serve in this improper role (advocating for 
impeachment) you have seriously harmed the public confidence in the 
independence and objectivity of your office.

    Much has been made about the so-called pep rally which some 
House Democrats held for President Clinton at the White House 
after the impeachment vote. If you wonder how those Members 
could act in such an apparently partisan manner after the 
historic vote on December 19, 1998, I hope you will recall that 
the Republican Members of the House Judiciary Committee gave 
Mr. Starr nothing less than a standing ovation when he 
completed testimony which Mr. Dash characterized as 
``unlawful'' and ``improper.''
    Is it any wonder why the American people think this whole 
impeachment process reeks of partisanship and the excesses of 
the independent counsel have created a bipartisan sentiment to 
amend if not abolish that statute?
    Did Mr. Starr respect the rule of law?
    And the House Judiciary Committee--so anxious to complete 
its work in a lame-duck session that it would vote for 
impeachment without calling a single material witness. Then 
those same managers came to the Senate and argued justice 
cannot be served without live witnesses on the Senate floor.
    When I listen to Paul Sarbanes recount the painstaking 
efforts to avoid partisanship during the impeachment hearing on 
President Nixon, it is a stark contrast to the committee 
process which voted these articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton.
    Did the House Judiciary Committee respect the rule of law?
    And the House of Representatives, an institution which I 
was proud to serve in for 14 years, was so hellbent on 
impeachment that it bent the rules, denied the regular order of 
business and refused the House a vote to censure this President 
so the majority would have a better chance to visit the 
disgrace of impeachment on his record.
    Did the House of Representatives respect the rule of law?
    But it would be too facile to dismiss this case simply 
because the process which brought us to this point is so 
suspect--too easy to discard the fruit of this poisoned tree.
    Justice and history will not give us this easy exit. We 
must ignore the birthing of this impeachment and judge it on 
its merits.
    First, let me stipulate the obvious. The personal conduct 
of this President has been disgraceful and dishonorable. He has 
brought shame on himself and his Presidency. No one--not any 
Senator in this Chamber nor any person in this country--will 
look at this President in the same way again.
    I have known Bill Clinton for 35 years. I remember him as a 
popular student when we both attended Georgetown. And I know 
despite all of the talk about ``compartmentalization'' that 
this man has suffered the greatest humiliation of any President 
in our history. I hope his marriage and his family can survive 
it.
    But our job is not to judge Bill Clinton as a person, a 
husband, a father. Our responsibility under the Constitution is 
to judge Bill Clinton as a President, not whether he should be 
an object of scorn but whether he should be removed from 
office.
    Did William Jefferson Clinton commit perjury or obstruct 
justice, and for these acts should he be removed from office?
    When this trial began I believed that President Clinton's 
only refuge was in a strict reading of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors''--that James Madison, George Mason and Alexander 
Hamilton would have to serve as his defense team and save this 
President from removal.
    The managers' case was compelling, but as the defense team 
rebutted their evidence I saw the charges of perjury crack, 
obstruction of justice crumble and impeachment collapse.
    The managers failed in article I on perjury to meet the 
most basic requirement of the law: specificity. In the Andrew 
Johnson impeachment trial, Senator William Fessenden of Maine 
pointed out the unfairness of failing to name specific charges:

    It would be contrary to every principle of justice to the clearest 
dictates of right, to try and condemn any man, however guilty he may be 
thought, for an offense not charged, of which no notice has been given 
to him, and against which he has had no opportunity to defend himself.

    Senator Fessenden understood the rule of law.
    And by what standard should the President be judged?
    When the House managers discussed the gravity of the case 
for impeachment, they said repeatedly: ``These are crimes.'' 
But when asked why they failed to meet the most basic criminal 
procedural requirements of pleading and proof, Mr. Canady said: 
``This proceeding is not a criminal trial.''
    What is the difference between charging a crime and proving 
something less than a crime? The difference is known as the 
rule of law--a rule which requires fair notice and due process 
whether the accused is President or penniless.
    How many times have we seen the House managers run into the 
brick wall of sworn testimony contradicting their charges? On 
gifts--Monica Lewinsky said hiding them was Betty Currie's 
idea--Betty Currie claimed it was Lewinsky's idea--neither of 
them claimed it was the President's idea. On the affidavit 
issue--the House managers could not produce one witness--not 
Lewinsky, not Jordan and not the President to support their 
charge of obstruction.
    Time and again the House managers failed to prove their 
case--failed to produce testimony or evidence and at best 
played to a draw. I don't need to remind my colleagues in the 
Senate that playing to a draw on this field comes down in favor 
of the President.
    The House managers failed to meet their burden of proof.
    Let me say a word about witnesses. We have spent a lot of 
time on this issue. I do not know who came up with the 
limitation of three witnesses for the managers. But is there 
anyone in this Chamber who believes that Sidney Blumenthal was 
a more valuable witness to this case than Betty Currie?
    Surely my colleagues in the Senate remember that the House 
managers spent 3 solid days building their obstruction of 
justice case on concealing gifts and tampering with witnesses. 
And Betty Currie was critical to the most credible charges 
against the President.
    Then when the House managers were given a chance to call 
this key witness, they refused.
    What can we conclude from this tactical decision? Let me 
read rule 14.15 from Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases.

    If it is peculiarly within the power of either the government or 
the defense to produce a witness who could give relevant testimony on 
an issue in the case, failure to call that witness may give rise to an 
inference that this testimony would have been unfavorable to that 
party. No such conclusion should be drawn by you, however, with regard 
to a witness who is equally available to both parties or where the 
testimony of that witness would be merely cumulative.
    The jury must always bear in mind that the law never imposes on a 
defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any 
witnesses or producing any evidence.

    Betty Currie was no help to the House managers in her 
deposition and they clearly concluded she was more likely to 
hurt than help their case if called as a witness. The key 
witness in the obstruction of justice charge never materialized 
and neither did the proof the House managers needed.
    How will history judge this chapter in our history?
    The House managers and many of my colleagues believe an 
acquittal will violate the basic American principle of equal 
justice under the law--they argue that acquitting the President 
will cheapen the Presidency--and imperil our Nation and its 
values.
    I have heard my colleagues stand in disbelief that the 
American people could still want a man they find so lacking in 
character to continue as their President. William Bennett and 
his pharisaical followers have profited from books and lectures 
decrying the lack of moral outrage in our Nation against Bill 
Clinton.
    I hope my colleagues will pause and reflect on this 
conclusion that the American people have somehow lost their 
moral compass--that the polls demonstrate our people have lost 
their soul--and that we, their elected leaders, have to impeach 
this President to remind the American people of the values--the 
integrity--the honor which is so important to our Nation.
    May I respectfully suggest that those who appoint 
themselves as the guardians of moral order in America risk the 
vices of pride and arrogance themselves. Before we don the 
armor and choose our side in what Manager Hyde calls a 
``cultural war,'' let us not give up on the wisdom and judgment 
of the people we represent.
    Like Abraham Lincoln, I am a firm believer in the American 
people. If given the truth they can be depended upon to meet 
any national crisis.
    And the American people have this right. The President's 
personal conduct was clearly wrong. He has endured 
embarrassment and will spend the rest of his natural life and 
forever in the annals of history branded by this experience. 
The American people clearly believe that the process which 
brings him before us in this trial was too partisan, too 
unfair, too suspect.
    What has occurred here is a personal and family tragedy--it 
is not a national tragedy which should result in the removal of 
this President from office.
    In 1798, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison: ``History 
shows that in England, impeachment has been an engine more of 
passion than justice.''
    Jefferson feared that even our process for impeachment 
could be a formidable partisan weapon. He feared that a 
determined faction in Congress would use it ``. . . for getting 
rid of any man whom they consider as dangerous to their views, 
and I do not know that we could count on one-third in an 
emergency.''
    In 1868, with the suffering and death of our Civil War 
still fresh in everyone's mind, this Senate came within one 
vote of impeaching a President who was viewed as too 
sympathetic to the vanquished South.
    In 1999, after 6 years and millions of tax dollars spent in 
investigation of this President, I believe the Senate will once 
again cool the political passions, preserve the Presidency, 
protect the Constitution, and prove to Thomas Jefferson that 
his trust in this body and that great document was not 
misplaced.
    I will vote to acquit William Jefferson Clinton on both 
articles of impeachment and support a strong resolution of 
censure to bring this sad chapter in American politics to a 
close.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                      Statement of Senator Jon Kyl

    Mr. KYL. Mr. Chief Justice, this case is about the rule of 
law--specifically, whether actions and statements of President 
Clinton in Federal court proceedings have done such harm to the 
rule of law that he should be removed from office. I conclude 
in the affirmative, and reluctantly vote to convict on both 
articles of impeachment.
    Chairman Henry Hyde observed that the House of 
Representatives had come to the Senate ``as advocates for the 
rule of law, for equal justice under law, and for the sanctity 
of the oath.'' (145 Cong. Rec. S221 (January 14, 1999).)
    These are not just grand words.
    The rule of law refers to our judicial process, which is 
governed by uniform standards and procedures that we say will 
always be guaranteed and applied fairly and equally. We are 
willing to submit ourselves to this process because we have 
worked hard for 210 years to ensure that it produces impartial 
justice for all.
    Equal justice means that each of us, including the least 
among us, has rights that the state is bound to protect; and it 
surely includes the requirement that those who make the laws, 
including the President, must live under them like anybody 
else.
    Oaths are essential to the rule of law because the judicial 
process is about seeking the truth; and that requires that we 
be able to trust what is said. The oath formalizes the 
commitment to tell the truth, and the whole truth--a commitment 
so important that its violation is itself a crime.
    I believe there are two questions to be answered.
    The first is whether the President impermissibly took the 
law into his own hands in a Federal civil rights case and 7 
months later before a Federal grand jury in order to suppress 
the truth. The second question is whether, if the President did 
engage in the impeachable conduct, it is a breach serious 
enough to warrant removal from office.
    The Constitution permits only one vote: to acquit or 
convict. This leaves some in the anomalous position of 
determining guilt on an impeachable offense, but having to vote 
to acquit because they deem the offense insufficiently serious 
to warrant removal. While the fact that the offense is 
impeachable should itself resolve the issue of 
``proportionality,'' I would not consider it impermissible to 
reach a contrary conclusion, as some will do in this case.
    For my part, I answer both questions in the affirmative. 
The President ``willfully provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony'' under oath to a grand jury and he 
``prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of 
justice.'' (H. Res. 611.)
    While the House of Representatives asserted that the 
President's actions were criminal, violations of specific 
criminal statutes are not essential for wrongful conduct to 
constitute the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' that 
demonstrate unfitness to continue as Chief Executive. Most 
authorities agree a President cannot be prosecuted while in 
office for crimes allegedly committed during his term. So, for 
example, whether a lie under oath would necessarily later 
result in a criminal perjury conviction cannot be known with 
certainty, and an impeachment trial is not an effective forum 
for establishing criminal guilt. It is conduct, not a proven 
crime, that is the basis for impeachment.
    This is one of the reasons why it is clear that each 
Senator may apply his or her standard of proof--it need not be 
the criminal standard ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' (Senate 
Proceedings in the Impeachment Trial of Judge Claiborne, S. 
Doc. 99-48, p. 150.) Moreover, because the Senate constrained 
the House of Representatives as it did--by limiting the number 
of witnesses that could be deposed, by effectively foreclosing 
other discovery, and by precluding ``live'' testimony--it would 
be unfair to impose a ``beyond reasonable doubt'' standard.
    The President's counsel argued that the Senate should not 
consider article I because the House of Representatives 
defeated a perjury count relating to the Jones civil action. 
But article I also included allegations of ``perjurious, false, 
and misleading'' statements in the Jones case; so the argument 
is meritless. Moreover, the President's falsehoods in the Jones 
civil suit also formed part of his strategy to obstruct 
justice.
    What is striking about this case is the President's 
persistent, sustained, carefully calculated, deliberate, and 
callous manipulation of the judicial process for over a year.
    Without attempting to summarize all of the evidence, I 
conclude that the President lied before the Federal grand jury 
about: (1) the nature of details of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky; (2) his assertion that he told the truth in the Jones 
deposition; (3) the false and misleading statements that he 
allowed his lawyer to make to a Federal judge in the Paula 
Jones civil case; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the 
testimony of his aides who were potential grand jury witnesses.
    It seems clear to me that the President obstructed 
justice--that he corruptly: (1) encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to 
execute a false affidavit; (2) encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie 
if called as a witness; (3) encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to conceal 
gifts; (4) encouraged cooperation of Ms. Lewinsky through job 
assistance; (5) allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements about the affidavit; (6) attempted to 
influence the testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie; and (7) 
attempted to influence the testimony of other aides.
    The final question is whether the President should be 
removed for his actions.
    As a preliminary matter, there can be no doubt that 
perjurious, false, and misleading statements made under oath in 
Federal court proceedings are indeed impeachable offenses. The 
fact that the House of Representatives reached this conclusion, 
of course, establishes the precedent as to the kind of conduct 
in this case. But, it is also confirmed by the impeachment and 
conviction of Federal judges--of Judge Harry Claiborne, removed 
in 1986 for filing a false income tax return under penalty of 
perjury, of Judge Walter Nixon, removed in 1989 for perjury 
before a grand jury, and of Judge Alcee Hastings, removed in 
1989 for perjury related to financial misconduct. I cannot 
agree with those colleagues who assert that there is a 
different standard for a President--that it would require a 
more egregious kind of perjury to remove a President than a 
judge. Nothing in the Constitution suggests such a double 
standard.
    John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States, 
said ``there is no crime more extensively pernicious to 
society'' than perjury, precisely because it ``discolors and 
poisons the streams of justice.'' (John Jay's charge to the 
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, 
Apr. 5, 1792, in Marcus, ed., ``The Documentary History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800,'' Vol. 2, pp. 
253, 255 (1988).)
    As to obstruction of justice, on which there is no other 
direct precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, our Presiding 
Officer, in his history of impeachment, ``Grand Inquests,'' 
wrote that ``the counts relating to the obstruction of justice 
and to the unlawful use of executive power [by President Nixon] 
were of the kind that would surely have justified removal from 
office.''
    The House managers pointed out, accurately, that even 
though perjury and obstruction of justice are not specifically 
listed as impeachable offenses in the Constitution, the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines treat these offenses more seriously than 
they do the crime of bribery--one of two specifically 
enumerated impeachable offenses. Significantly, where bribery 
is committed in connection with a judicial proceeding, such as 
bribing a witness in a case, its seriousness under the 
guidelines rises to that of perjury and obstruction. When 
misdeeds, in other words, take place in connection with a 
judicial process, to try to affect or control that process, 
they get extra attention in our legal system. They are not 
simply brushed aside. Far from it. Perjury and obstruction are 
like bribery; they are ``other high crimes'' by any reasonable 
construction.
    The President's counsel argued that the President's conduct 
could not be impeachable because he did not abuse the power of 
his office in conducting ``matters of state,'' and did not 
violate the public trust. But impeachable offenses are not 
limited to the President's conduct of ``matters of state.'' If 
this were so, Richard Nixon could never have been impeached. If 
this were so, a twenty dollar bribe for a Senator to vote for a 
bill would be impeachable, while a million dollar bribe to 
cover up political dirty tricks would not be.
    It simply cannot be, as some have argued, that the only 
impeachable offenses are those that can only be committed by 
the President. If a President commits murder, can he not be 
removed? Must we wait until his term is over to deal with his 
crime? It is clear that seriously wrongful official conduct is 
impeachable. But it is just as clear that impeachment cannot be 
limited to that.
    It is not only the exercise of Presidential power but also 
the violation of a public duty that can constitute impeachable 
conduct. As the head of the executive branch, the President has 
the duty under article II of the Constitution to ``take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' The 1974 House 
Judiciary report on the ``Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment'' summarized that impeachment of a 
President can ``be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles 
of our government or the proper performance of constitutional 
duties of the presidential office.'' (Staff of House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1974), 
Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, p. 27.) 
Surely the violation of constitutional obligations can 
constitute high crimes or misdemeanors for which the President 
may be impeached. And surely, such violation would constitute 
an abuse of trust by the Chief Executive.
    By his oath of office and article II responsibilities, 
President Clinton is supposed to see that the sexual 
discrimination laws are faithfully executed. But he thought the 
Jones case was illegitimate, so he took the law into his own 
hands. His conduct in this case clearly violated his public 
duties, his oath, and the public trust. And it interfered with 
the proper functioning of another branch of the government.
    The same is true for his deliberate efforts to impede 
legitimate discovery efforts in Federal court proceedings. Such 
action ``is incompatible with . . . the constitutional form and 
principles of our government,'' as the 1974 House Judiciary 
report said. It simply cannot be that a President who 
wrongfully interferes with the proper functioning of another 
branch of our government by attempting to subvert justice in 
Federal court proceedings cannot be impeached because he did 
not do it as President, but, rather, as a citizen.
    That the underlying conduct covered up is sexual, is, if 
anything, an aggravating not a mitigating factor. In sex-
discrimination litigation, where there is frequently no 
corroboration for the plaintiff, a defendant who lies can 
easily subvert justice. Had the blue dress not been found, with 
its incontrovertible tangible evidence, I doubt Paula Jones 
would have gotten a dime in settlement.
    Judgements about the severity of the impeachable conduct in 
this case will lead different Senators to reach different 
conclusions. That is why some of us are willing to say 
reasonable people can differ. For those who fear the long-term 
consequences to the rule of law, however, I believe there can 
be only one result. Anyone who so willfully, callously, and 
persistently connived to deny the Federal court and grand jury 
the truth, and who used and abused the highest office in the 
land to advance his personal coverup is not only no longer 
worthy of trust--which all agree is essential to the conduct of 
his office--but also must be removed to avoid the perpetuation 
of a legal double standard. If Federal judges, such as Judges 
Claiborne, Nixon, and Hastings, are removed for similar 
conduct; if average Americans are imprisoned for it, can the 
rule of law long survive ``special exceptions'' for powerful 
people we like, or who are doing a good job, or who hold 
elective office? None of these rationalizations are defenses to 
illegal or impeachable conduct.
    As I said, sexual harassment cases are precisely the kind 
of judicial proceedings that demand the maximum cooperation of 
and truth-telling by the defendant because of the lack of 
third-party witnesses or corroborating evidence. In these 
cases, justice is denied if obstruction, witness tampering, or 
perjury prevent the truth from coming out. Can anyone say this 
is not serious? To what standard of seriousness does it not 
rise? How many plaintiffs will have to lose their sexual 
harassment, domestic violence, or sexual assault cases because 
defendants lie and obstruct justice, and there is no blue dress 
to keep them honest, before it becomes serious?
    An acquittal in this case will make it harder to deal 
properly with similar conduct in the future. We will be hard 
pressed to perpetuate a double standard, so the lowest common 
denominator of conduct will be established as the permissible 
norm. And this cannot help but weaken the ability of courts to 
enforce truth-telling and prevent obstruction of justice.
    The precedent set by this case may not change the law 
overnight, but this unforgettable episode is now part of the 
institutional life of our country. The chief magistrate 
perverted justice and remained in power. The lesson is 
corrosive. Like water dripping on a rock, it eventually makes a 
deep hollow in the American justice system.
    It is true the President could be sent to jail later. How 
does that validate his right to appoint judges and be head of 
U.S. law enforcement now? How does that square with his 
leadership of the armed forces right now, as our Commander in 
Chief? Should the standard for the President not be at least as 
high as for those he appoints and leads?
    In the end, my colleagues who would censure rather than 
convict the President are right about one thing: the 
President's conduct is ``unacceptable.'' But, if conduct is 
unacceptable, we cannot accept it--meaning, we have to do 
something about it that does not leave it stand. And under our 
Constitution that means removal of the President through 
conviction on the articles of impeachment.
    Henry Hyde closed the House case by warning that public 
cynicism is the greatest threat we face. Our failure to remove 
the President will only fuel the cynicism of Americans such as 
Louie Valenzuela of Glendale, AZ. He was quoted recently in a 
man-on-the-street interview about this case. ``They talk about 
justice,'' he told the Arizona Republic. ``They talk about 
doing the right thing,'' said Mr. Valenzuela. ``But they always 
look the other way when someone rich, famous or powerful does 
something wrong. Look at O.J. Simpson. Clinton will be next. 
Asi es. (That's just the way it is.)''
    That is not the way it has to be. But how it is is up to 
us.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Arlen Specter

    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, a great deal 
has been spoken in the Chamber about separation of powers and 
tomes have been written on it. And in reading the Constitution, 
article I, creating the Congress; and article II, the executive 
branch; and article III, the judiciary, we have seen the wisdom 
of limiting power through the separation of powers among the 
three branches of the Federal Government.
    The one provision of the Constitution--the impeachment 
provision--reaches across that divide. It is my thinking that 
before the Congress can exercise the power of removal, 
especially of an American President, there has to be a very, 
very heavy burden of proof.
    I had occasion, fairly recently, to go very deeply into the 
issue of separation of powers when I argued the Base Closing 
Commission case regarding the Philadelphia Navy Yard, which was 
unfairly closed--a subject that I will not amplify on--and I 
had an opportunity to appear before the Supreme Court.
    In my two earlier speeches during the closed session on the 
motion to dismiss and the issue of depositions, I did end 
within the allotted time. But I will say that the Chief Justice 
is a good deal more tolerant here than in the Supreme Court. In 
the Supreme Court, when I argued the base closing case, I was 
cut off in mid-syllable. I didn't know that was possible. But 
with the forcefulness of the Presiding Officer, he was able to 
limit the speakers to the precise time allotted. I did not do 
well in the outcome of that case in the Supreme Court. I had 
done better on my previous appearances in the Supreme Court 
when I was representing the district attorney's office on law 
and order.
    That sojourn into that case brought me into 200 years of 
reflection and analysis on case law on separation of powers, 
something that is not often done by practicing lawyers, and 
certainly not Senators. It instilled in me a very, very deep 
appreciation of separation of power.
    So when I approached this case--and it has been the 
toughest case I have ever seen, and I think it has been a very, 
very intense drain on this body and all of us individually--the 
focus I had was: what is the burden that you ought to have to 
show if the Senate is going to remove a President? As I 
reviewed the evidence, I am not satisfied at all that that 
burden was met.
    Perjury is a very tough offense to prove under the 
standards established by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the famous Bronston case. Bronston was giving testimony in a 
bankruptcy proceeding in New York and was asked about bank 
accounts in Zurich, and said, ``My company had a bank account 
for about 6 months,'' leading to the implication that he did 
not have a personal bank account when in fact he did. His 
conviction in the district court was upheld by the Second 
Circuit, but reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court because the 
interrogator, the prosecutor, has to go further. You have to 
ask the last questions to prove perjury.
    The President was very artful, very careful and full of 
guile as he wound his way through the grand jury proceedings. 
We heard the testimony again and again. The President said he 
told his aides, things that were true. Well, he didn't comment 
about the things that he told them that were false. But nobody 
said, ``Did you tell them things that were false as well?'' to 
set the stage for a perjury prosecution.
    When asked about Monica Lewinsky--was he alone with her?--
on a series of rambling answers he said he wasn't alone with 
her in the hallway. But that is not the end of the question. He 
wasn't alone with her in the hallway. But nobody followed up, 
and said, ``Were you alone with her somewhere else?'' which he 
was not asked. Had he been asked whether he was alone with her 
somewhere else and denied that, there may have been a record to 
establish perjury. On this record, he did not commit perjury 
under the Bronston case.
    The testimony of Betty Currie we heard again and again and 
again. In late January 1998, Betty Currie testified that when 
the President gave her that series of questions, she thought 
the President was trying to lead her, to mold her testimony. 
Then when she came back to testify in July, she said, well, it 
was different on that occasion. She testified that the 
President gave her the option of either agreeing or 
disagreeing.
    Betty Currie was not a witness in this proceeding. Her 
deposition was not even taken because of very, very restrictive 
rules which the U.S. Senate established for what the House 
managers could do. The House managers were on very, very sharp 
notice that if they asked for too many depositions, they might 
get none at all. They made their selection of witnesses and 
they left off Betty Currie.
    Had House managers been able to present their case in the 
normal course of events, I daresay the proceeding would have 
been even faster. We heard some 12 days of speeches, 6 days of 
opening speeches; 3 and 3 on each side. We could have done that 
in 2 hours. We then spent 2 days propounding questions through 
the Chief Justice where we learned very, very little. We heard 
arguments on the motion to dismiss, and on depositions, and 
arguments on what to do about the witnesses on those 
videotapes. Again and again, we heard legal arguments, but we 
did not hear from witnesses.
    We are bound by this record. It is my view that, on this 
record, the burden of proof has not been met, the kind of a 
burden that would have to be sustained, in my judgment, for the 
Senate to remove an American President.
    One comment about mindset. The Senate really approached 
this matter as if it were a waste of time from the outset. 
There was an early effort to structure a vote to show that more 
than one-third of the Senators would not be for conviction and, 
therefore, to end it. Then when we had the vote on the motion 
to dismiss and 44 Senators voted to dismiss. It confirmed what 
we all knew; and that is that there would not be a two-thirds 
vote. I think that put a mindset in this body really not to 
conduct a trial.
    The Constitution calls for a trial. The proceeding we had 
does not measure up in any way, shape or form to a trial. It is 
true that there are some few cases submitted on a record where 
judges are going to decide it. But a trial customarily requires 
witnesses. Had witnesses appeared on the floor of the U.S. 
Senate with examination and cross-examination, you would have 
gotten a feel for what happened here. If Betty Currie had 
appeared on the floor of the U.S. Senate, or even if her 
deposition had been taken, there could have been a 
clarification of inconsistencies in her two lines of 
questioning.
    A word for the future: It would be my hope that if, as, and 
when the Senate has to revisit impeachment that it would be 
done differently. Senator Lieberman made a suggestion on a 
December 20 television show that there ought not to be party 
caucuses, that there only ought to be joint caucuses. I have 
passed that recommendation on. I realized that given the 
history of the Senate and our party caucuses, that would be a 
very, very abrupt change.
    But I came out of some of our party caucuses and walked 
over and talked to my friends on the other side of the aisle, 
the people who I had agreed with on many, many, many issues. We 
were just irreconcilably opposed, just totally opposed. My only 
conclusion was that it was the kind of argument and the kind of 
discussion on what happened in the caucuses--really choosing 
sides and having teams--as opposed to trying to make an 
analytical, judicial decision as to what was involved here.
    So it is my hope that if we ever have to undertake this 
again we will do it differently.
    My position in the matter is that the case has not been 
proved. I have gone back to Scottish law where there are three 
verdicts: guilty, not guilty, and not proved. I am not prepared 
to say on this record that President Clinton is not guilty. But 
I am certainly not prepared to say that he is guilty. There are 
precedents for a Senator voting present. I hope that I will be 
accorded the opportunity to vote ``not proved'' in this case.
    We really end up, colleagues, very much, in my judgment, 
where at least I started on the matter. I had thought at the 
outset that this was not an appropriate case for impeachment 
because the requisite two-thirds would not be present, and had 
hoped that impeachment would be bypassed, but instead we would 
allow the President to finish his term of office, which I 
thought an inevitability, just as it has worked out that way, 
and that the criminal process would do whatever was appropriate 
after his term was finished; if indicted, if convicted, 
whatever a judge would have to say as to sentencing. I am still 
hopeful that the rule of law will be vindicated in that 
process.
    We obviously have learned much from this proceeding. It is 
my hope that we will leave a mark to guide future Senates if we 
ever have to repeat this very, very trying sort of an 
experience.
    The removal of an American President through impeachment 
carries a high burden of proof and persuasion. For conviction 
in the criminal courts on charges of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. An extra 
measure of certainty is necessary to persuade the Senate that 
the national interest mandates invoking the extraordinary 
remedy of removing the President.
    The starting point is article II, section 4 of the 
Constitution:

    The President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.

    From that language, there is reason to interpret ``other 
High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as relating back to specific 
categories of offenses earlier enumerated, such as ``Treason 
and Bribery''; but I think that is too limited. Nor do I agree 
with the simplistic definition that perjury and obstruction of 
justice, being felonies and therefore more serious than 
misdemeanors in the criminal law, are automatically impeachable 
offenses.
    The framers did not foresee the circumstances before us. 
The omission of ``perjury'' and ``obstruction of justice'' from 
the enumerated offenses probably reflected the framers' thought 
that it would be unlikely that a President would be testifying 
under oath or be a participant in a judicial proceeding. Yet it 
is equally clear that perjury and obstruction of justice are 
serious crimes. For the President to commit either, he would be 
placing his own interest above his public duty and the people's 
interest in due process.
    In 1970, then-Congressman Gerald R. Ford offered this 
definition:

    . . . an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of 
Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history . . .

    While that may state the raw power of Congress, it is too 
subjective to provide any real guidance. Instead, I look to the 
framers at the Constitutional Convention, ``The Federalist 
Papers,'' and the English and U.S. impeachment cases.
    Commenting on impeachment at the Constitutional Convention, 
James Wilson said:

    . . . far from being above the laws, he (the President) is amenable 
to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his public 
character by impeachment.

    The President's attorneys have argued that the charges 
arise from private conduct unrelated to his official duties. 
The issue then arises whether his conduct is ``in his public 
character'' by virtue of his constitutional duty:

    . . . he (the President) shall take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . Article II, Section 3--

    Such a public duty may be insufficient for impeachment 
under Alexander Hamilton's definition of impeachment in 
Federalist No. 65:

    . . . those offences (sic) which proceed from the misconduct of 
public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some 
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.

    From Hamilton's statement, the conventional wisdom has 
evolved that impeachment is essentially a political question. 
The framers, cases and commentaries have not articulated a 
handy definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    Whether to impeach and convict transcends the facts and law 
to what is in the national interest at a specific time in the 
Nation's history on the totality of the circumstances.
    Consideration of the national interest may include whether 
there is a clear and present danger to the integrity or 
stability of the national government; or whether the conduct is 
so vile or reprehensible as to establish unfitness for office; 
or whether the electorate has lost confidence in the President 
to the extent that he cannot govern.
    The precedents and commentaries leave substantial latitude 
for Senators to establish their own standards. The ultimate 
definition may be analogous to Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart's struggle to define obscenity when he concluded: ``. . 
. perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I 
know it when I see it.''
    The extreme partisanship of the impeachment proceeding in 
the House prejudiced the matter before it came to the Senate. 
While it takes two to tango or be partisan, somehow the House 
Republicans bore the brunt of the public disdain on the 
partisan charge. It was more than the party-line votes. The 
whole process was filled with rancor, acrimony and bitterness 
which contributed significantly to the public view that it was 
all politics without real substances.
    It has been widely noted that there must be significant 
bipartisan support to remove a President. President Nixon's 
forced resignation occurred only when Republican elders like 
Senators Goldwater and Scott joined Democrats in urging his 
resignation.
    In an early Sunday TV talk show on December 20, 1998, the 
day after the House sent the articles to the Senate, Senator 
Joseph Lieberman and I appeared together on ``Face the Nation'' 
where he urged that there be no party caucuses but only joint 
caucuses. I recommended that to Senator Lott in my memorandum 
of December 29 and urged that policy to colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle. Perhaps, it was too much to expect or even 
hope that would be done given the Senate's history and practice 
of party caucuses.
    As noted in this floor statement, the Senate struggled to 
achieve bipartisanship, mostly without success, but we did 
avoid the rancor and bitterness which prevailed on the House 
side.
    From the outset, the conventional wisdom was there would 
not be two-thirds of the Senate in favor of conviction. That 
pervasive view has cast a long shadow over the impeachment 
proceedings. When the Senate convened on January 6, there was 
immediate informal consideration on taking a test vote to 
determine if there were 34 Senators opposed to conviction which 
would end the matter. There appeared to be even more than that 
number so opposed who based their judgments on news media 
accounts. That trial balloon was abandoned when many Senators 
objected on the ground that the Constitution called for a trial 
and the Senate owed the House the constitutional deference to 
give the House managers a chance to prove their case.
    In mid-November, I wrote in a New York Times op-ed article 
that impeachment should be bypassed and the President should be 
held accountable through the criminal process after his term 
ended. When the House of Representatives returned articles of 
impeachment in mid-December, I felt at that stage the Senate 
had a constitutional duty to proceed to a trial.
    The Constitution explicitly provides for a trial: ``The 
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,'' 
article I, section 3, clause 6.
    The same clause refers to being convicted and the next 
clause refers to judgment, so the constitutional mandate for a 
trial is plain. Senate impeachment rules VI and XVII deal with 
witnesses.
    The Senate was schizophrenic in wanting to avoid what many 
considered to be a pointless trial. Others considered it to be 
our constitutional duty to hold a trial and give appropriate 
deference to the House's action on the articles. In a series of 
halting half-steps, the Senate stumbled through a 
``pseudotrial,'' a ``sham trial''--really no trial at all. In 
the end, it would have taken less time to let the House 
managers put on their case with a full White House defense than 
the helter-skelter procedures adopted by the Senate.
    From the time the Senate reconvened on January 6, 1999, the 
public pressure to conclude the trial promptly was palpable. 
The improbability of a two-thirds vote for conviction was only 
one factor although the totality of the other factors 
contributed to that improbability.
    The adverse public reaction was reflected in consistent 
polling data and the feel on the streets in our various States. 
Notwithstanding the serious charges of perjury and obstruction 
of justice, Democratic Senators argued and many people agreed 
that a private sexual liaison should not have caused a 
multiyear, multimillion-dollar investigation. If the 
independent counsel, they argued, could establish no wrongdoing 
in Whitewater, Travelgate and Filegate, why elevate a charge 
based on sex to an impeachable offense?
    I think it is a significant distinction that President 
Clinton, unlike President Nixon, was not charged with covering 
up an underlying crime. President Clinton had the option of not 
answering deposition questions and/or simply not defending the 
Paula Jones lawsuit. At worst that would have resulted in a 
default judgment being entered against him with an assessment 
of damages. As it worked out, a nondefense might still have led 
to dismissal of the case as a matter of law and on the eventual 
settlement. In any event, the President would have avoided his 
present predicament by not responding.
    Once the President undertook his course of action, then he 
must answer to the serious charges of perjury and obstruction 
of justice even though he was not covering up criminal 
activity.
    Attorney General Reno made a major mistake in acting to 
expand Judge Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction to include the 
Lewinsky matter. In mid-January 1998, contemporaneously with 
the Attorney General's action, I commented that the public 
would suspect a vendetta on the part of Judge Starr because 
there had been so many apparently unproductive investigations 
going on for so long. This was not a criticism of Judge Starr, 
but an inevitable public reaction. The public's suspicion of 
Judge Starr carried over to impeachment.
    When I challenged Attorney General Reno in the Judiciary 
Committee oversight hearing on July 15, 1998, about why she 
acted to expand Judge Starr's authority, she refused to answer 
the question, saying only: ``The application speaks for itself, 
Senator.''
    The failure of the House to call witnesses during their 
hearings injected a Trojan horse into the articles. The House 
had good reason not to call witnesses because of its concern to 
finish its work before the 106th Congress convened to take up 
the Nation's important pending business. But, that set the 
stage for the witness issue to haunt the Senate from the 
outset.
    Early in January, there was a strenuous effort for 
bipartisanship on witnesses and procedures. At a joint caucus 
on January 8, by almost spontaneous combustion, agreement was 
reached 100-0 on preliminary procedures, leaving depositions 
and witnesses until later.
    Immediately thereafter, bipartisanship broke down. While 
this may seem self-serving from the Republican point of view, 
Republicans had more to gain from bipartisanship than Democrats 
to avoid the rancor of the House proceedings and give 
legitimacy to impeachment. Many Democrats openly said the 
President would be helped by party-line votes making the Senate 
look like the House.
    The Democrats then lined up solidly behind the President 
with a number of Republicans, sometimes more than six, 
teetering on joining the Democrats. There are obviously limits 
to what elected officials will do to vote a straight party line 
if it puts their seats in jeopardy. The Senate Democrats had 
the effective cover of a popular President and their party-line 
votes followed while a significant number of Republicans faced 
constituents opposed to impeachment in their election cycles.
    The sequence of partisan maneuvering on witnesses is 
important to understanding how the House managers were 
precluded from presenting their case in a fair way. Appendix A 
describes those events in some detail. The ultimate result was 
a sharply limited number of deposition witnesses, three, with 
videotaped depositions only and no live witnesses at trial.
    In my Senate tenure, I have not seen a more contentious 
issue than the calling of witnesses, either live or videotaped. 
It goes beyond the public pressure to terminate or at least 
abbreviate the Senate proceeding. The argument that the well of 
the Senate should not be the stage for lewd and lascivious 
testimony was answered by the commitment of the House managers 
to avoid such testimony. The argument that Monica Lewinsky 
should not appear on the Senate floor once occupied by Daniel 
Webster and John F. Kennedy has to give way to the Senate's 
duty to try this President. The Senate did not choose the 
President's consorts and potential witnesses, but the Senate is 
duty bound to ``try'' the case as mandated by the Constitution 
and do ``impartial justice'' as the Senators' oath specified.
    I was one of three Senator presiders/observers designated 
by Senator Lott, the majority leader, for the depositions of 
Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney Blumenthal. Observing 
these live witnesses confirmed my thinking that the full Senate 
should have seen and heard their testimony in the tradition of 
trial practice. While a videotape is very informative, there is 
no substitute for the more precise evaluation of demeanor and 
its many nuances which comes across fully only through live 
testimony.
    When the videotapes were played in the Senate Chamber, the 
contrast was stark with the same live testimony I saw and 
heard. On a number of occasions, the sound was inaudible and 
the tape could not be rewound. There was a far superior 
opportunity in person to observe the witnesses' facial 
responses, their reactions and their general demeanor. In 
addition, only a portion of their videos was played. Although 
Senators had a chance for full private viewings, it is 
inevitable that many Senator-jurors did not utilize that 
opportunity to observe all the videos.
    Ms. Monica Lewinsky was a very impressive witness: poised, 
articulate, well-prepared. Seeing her testify in person, I 
understand why the President's counsel had fought so 
strenuously to keep her away from the well of the Senate. Had 
she told her whole story in the well of the Senate, a rapt 
national TV audience would have been watching and the dynamics 
of the proceeding might have been dramatically changed.
    Instead of hearing testimony from live witnesses, the 
Senate listened to 12 days of lawyer's arguments. Six days were 
consumed with opening statements which should have taken a few 
hours. For 2 days, Senators submitted questions through the 
Chief Justice for responses from attorneys which added little 
illumination to what was already on the record. Two more days 
were spent arguing the motion to dismiss and the resolution on 
depositions where the lawyers essentially repeated earlier 
arguments with an additional day for votes on those issues.
    Finally, limited evidence was presented with three 
videotaped depositions--Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and 
Sidney Blumenthal. Another day was consumed on votes rejecting 
live witnesses and permitting use of the videotapes. On the day 
designated for presentation of those depositions, only snippets 
were shown with most of the time consumed by lawyers' 
arguments. A final day for closing arguments was held with 
lawyers again presenting arguments which had been repeated on 
11 prior days.
    So in place of a traditional trial with live witnesses such 
as Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, Vernon Jordan, Erskine 
Bowles, John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, possibly Kathleen 
Willey or whomever the House managers chose to call, the Senate 
heard days of repetitious lawyers' argument from a grand jury 
record.
    The President's version was limited to his deposition in 
the Paula Jones case on January 17, 1998 and his grand jury 
testimony on August 17, 1998. In their totality, those two 
cameo appearances raised more questions by far than they 
answered. As expected, the President was exceptionally well 
prepared on the law and exceptionally adroit and manipulative 
on the facts or, more accurately, on evading the facts.
    The law on perjury is set forth in the case of Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 342 (1973), where the Supreme Court of 
the United States established a rigorous standard for proving 
perjury. Bronston, under oath in a 1966 bankruptcy hearing, was 
asked whether he ever had bank accounts in Swiss banks and he 
replied: ``the company had an account there for about 6 months, 
in Zurich.''
    His answer that the company had an account there for about 
6 months was accurate. It was not accurate that it was the only 
account the company had. The Supreme Court exonerated Bronston 
on the charge of perjury because the questioner did not press 
further to get a specific answer on whether the company had an 
account in addition to the one responded to by Bronston.
    Utilizing the holding in Bronston to the utmost, the 
President couched his answers with great care relying on the 
questioner not to pursue the unanswered issues. For example, 
the President did not deny lying to his aides, but rather 
evaded the question and there was no followup. John Podesta, 
President Clinton's deputy chief of staff at the time, 
testified that on January 23, 1998:

    He [President Clinton] said to me he had never had sex with her 
[Monica Lewinsky], and that--and that he never asked--you know, he 
repeated that denial, but he was extremely explicit in saying he never 
had sex with her--[H]e [President Clinton] said that he never had sex 
with her [Monica Lewinsky] in any way whatsoever--that they had not had 
oral sex.

    In a Senate deposition, Sidney Blumenthal, an assistant to 
the President, testified that the President lied to him. In 
testimony before the grand jury, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
the President told him that he had ``rebuffed'' Ms. Lewinsky's 
advances. Mr. Blumenthal further testified that the President 
told him the following:

    She [Monica Lewinsky] threatened him. She said that she would tell 
people they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among 
her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she 
had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any more.
    He [President Clinton] told me that she [Monica Lewinsky] came on 
to him and that he had told her he couldn't have sexual relations with 
her and that she threatened him. That is what he told me.

    In his testimony before the grand jury, President Clinton 
stated,

    I told them [his aides] things that were true about this 
relationship. They [things the President said to his aides] may have 
been misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, 
and I'm sorry.

    Note that the President does not deny lying but only that:

    I told them things that were true about this relationship.

    The President did say some things which were true. The 
questioner did not then pursue the line of interrogation by 
asking if, in addition to saying some things which were true, 
the President told his aides other things which were lies. On 
that clever, ambiguous record, the President escapes the 
perjury net.
    Similarly, President Clinton dodged the perjury charges on 
his testimony on being alone with Monica Lewinsky. She 
testified they were alone when they had 11 sexual encounters 
either in the President's personal office or the adjacent 
hallway. In his January 17 deposition, the President was asked 
if he was ever alone with Monica Lewinsky in any room of the 
White House. The President responded,

    I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on 
duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs 
office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend.

    Further, when the President was asked if he was ever alone 
with Ms. Lewinsky in the hallway between the Oval Office and 
the kitchen area, the President responded,

    I don't believe so, unless we were walking back to the back dining 
room with the pizza. I just, I don't remember. I don't believe we were 
alone in the hallway, no.

    The President again gets away with vague, unresponsive 
replies. When the President says, ``I don't believe we were 
alone in the hallway, no'', there is then no pursuit as to 
whether they were alone in other places. He succeeds in 
avoiding and misleading, but does not make the unequivocal 
false statement required by Bronston to constitute perjury.
    The President was treated differently than other witnesses 
before a grand jury when he was permitted to read from a 
prepared statement:

    I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did not 
consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations 
as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate contact.

    The President then declined to respond to Monica Lewinsky's 
specific charges and was not pressed for answers. He made a 
blanket denial of having sex with Monica Lewinsky relying on a 
tortured interpretation of Judge Wright's definition of sexual 
relations:

    I thought the definition included any activity by the person being 
deposed, where the person was the actor and came in contact with those 
parts of the bodies with the purpose or intent of gratification, and 
excluded any other activity. For example, kissing is not covered by 
that, I don't think.

    He further stated that:

    My understanding was, what I was giving to you, was that what was 
covered in those first two lines was any direct contact by the person 
being deposed with those body parts of another person's body, if the 
contact was done with an intent to arouse or gratify. That's what I 
believe it means today.

    The question was not pursued whether there was a sexual 
relationship where Ms. Lewinsky was the actor who made contact 
with the President's body with an intent to arouse or gratify. 
When asked specifically about oral sex, the President 
responded,

    . . . [Y]ou asked me did I believe that oral sex performed on the 
person being deposed was covered by that definition, and I said no. I 
don't believe it's covered by the definition.

    And there is the curious contention by the President on 
what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. A videotape of his 
deposition shows the President sitting quietly and listening to 
his attorney Robert Bennett's arguments to Judge Wright based 
on Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit which the President knew to be 
perjurious.
    In his grand jury testimony, the President defended his 
silence during this statement:

    I was not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was 
focusing on my own testimony.

    The President also told the grand jury that Mr. Bennett's 
statement that there ``is'' no sex of any kind was not 
necessarily false, but rather:

    It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If the--if 
he--if ``is'' means is and never has been, that is not--that is one 
thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true statement.

    On this state of the record, the Senate should have pressed 
the President for responses to so many important unanswered 
questions. Since the President was, in effect, asking the 
Senate to leave him in office, why was the Senate not justified 
in, at least, insisting on answers to key questions. When 
Senators submitted interrogatories to the Chief Justice for 
responses from the attorneys, I submitted the following 
question:

    Would the President honor a request by the Senate to testify? If 
not, why not? If he declined to testify either on his own initiative or 
a Senate invitation, would the Senate be justified in drawing an 
adverse inference from his failure to testify?

    With so many other questions submitted, this one was not 
asked. During the trial, White House counsel said the President 
would respond to written questions, but that offer was 
rescinded. On January 25, the President refused to answer 10 
written questions submitted by Republican Senators.
    On February 3, 26 Republican Senators sent the President a 
letter requesting a deposition. As expected, he declined. In a 
context where the Senate voted against live witnesses and 
permitted only three deposition witnesses, it was not 
surprising that there was no political will to press the 
President for his testimony. I believe that was a serious 
mistake. In the context where the Senate could not even 
consider exercising the political will to ask, let alone 
compel, the President to leave the Oval Office for a day or a 
few days to testify at his impeachment trial or even to give a 
deposition, how could the Senate be expected to exercise the 
much greater political will to remove the President from 
office?
    In her civil lawsuit, Paula Jones had been able to compel 
the President to give a deposition. In the grand jury 
proceeding, the independent counsel, in effect, compelled the 
President to testify. Why, then, shouldn't the Senate exercise 
the commensurate power in an impeachment proceeding to obtain 
the President's testimony when there were so many open 
questions?
    In my legal judgment, the Senate has the power to subpoena 
the President. My memorandum to Senator Lott dated December 10, 
1998, attached as appendix B, discusses the Senate's legal 
authority to subpoena the President. My memorandum to Senator 
Lott dated December 29, 1998, attached as appendix C, discusses 
possible testimony by the President. Senate Impeachment Rule VI 
gives the Senate the subpoena power. The Supreme Court of the 
United States held President Nixon was subject to subpoena to 
turn over the famous tapes under the established principle 
``That the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.'' 
President Nixon's case, although not dealing with impeachment, 
is further instructive in the Supreme Court's sweeping language 
on the need for all the facts even where the President is 
subject to subpoena:

    The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would 
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative 
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system 
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all 
the facts, within the framework of the rule of evidence. To ensure that 
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that 
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed 
either by the prosecution or the defense.

    Following President Clinton's deposition in the Paula Jones 
case on January 17, 1998, the President called his personal 
secretary, Betty Currie, at home and asked her to come into the 
office on the following day. On Sunday, January 18, President 
Clinton met with Ms. Currie and, according to Ms. Currie, made 
the following statements to her, one right after the other:

    You were always there when she was, right?
    We were never really alone.
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    You can see and hear everything, right?

    Ms. Currie testified at first, on January 27, 1998, that, 
based on his demeanor and the way he made the statements, the 
President wanted her to agree with them.
    Six months later, on July 22, 1998, when she testified for 
the second time, Ms. Currie said that although the President 
stated ``right?'' at the end of the statements, she understood 
that she could agree or disagree with them.
    I find the testimony of Betty Currie on January 27, 1998, 
most troubling. Why would the President ask a series of 
questions when he knew the answers unless he sought to 
influence her testimony? But then, Ms. Currie undercut her 
January 27 testimony when she testified on July 22, 1998, that 
she understood from the President that she could disagree with 
him on those questions.
    In order to make a finding on an important issue like this 
which could lead to the removal of the President, the Senate 
should have heard Ms. Currie in person to clarify her 
testimony. In the absence of such clarification on this state 
of the record, there is at least a reasonable doubt on this 
issue.
    Monica Lewinsky testified that she met with the President 
in the Oval Office on December 28, 1997, and that the President 
gave her several Christmas presents at this meeting. Ms. 
Lewinsky further testified that at some point in the 
conversation she said to the President, ``Maybe I should put 
the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
someone, maybe Betty.'' Ms. Lewinsky recalled that the 
President responded either ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think 
about that.''
    The President testified that he has no distinct 
recollection of discussing the gifts with Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 28. He told the grand jury that:

    My memory is that on some day in December, and I'm sorry I don't 
remember when it was, she said, well, what if they ask me about the 
gifts you have given me. And I said, well, if you get a request to 
produce them, you have to give them whatever you have.

    In the afternoon of December 28, 1997, Betty Currie drove 
to Ms. Lewinsky's Watergate apartment and collected a box 
containing most of the President's gifts. Ms. Currie then drove 
home and placed this box under her bed. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky, the transfer originated in a phone call from Ms. 
Currie in which Ms. Currie stated, ``I understand you have 
something to give me,'' or, ``The President said you have 
something to give me.''
    Betty Currie testified that it was Ms. Lewinsky who first 
raised the idea of the gift transfer, either in person or over 
the telephone. Ms. Currie testified that she did not remember 
the President ever telling her to call Ms. Lewinsky or to pick 
something up from Ms. Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky testified that Ms. Currie came over to pick 
up the gifts at ``around 2 p.m. or so.'' Cellular phone records 
reveal that Ms. Currie phoned Monica Lewinsky's home at 3:32 on 
December 28, and had a conversation of 1 minute or less.
    The evidence against the President on the gifts issue is 
equivocal where the idea returning the gifts in the 
conversation between the President and Monica Lewinsky 
originates with Ms. Lewinsky; Ms. Currie says she does not 
remember the President telling her to call or pick up something 
from Ms. Lewinsky; the time of the call as shown on the cell 
phone records, 3:32 p.m., conflicts with Ms. Lewinsky's version 
of the sequence of events and the President gave Monica 
Lewinsky more gifts on December 28, 1997, the same day that 
efforts were made for the return of some of the gifts.
    In December 1997 and January 1998, the President's close 
friend, Washington attorney Vernon Jordan, helped find Monica 
Lewinsky a job in New York City. On Friday, December 5, 1997, 
the President's attorneys received a witness list for the Paula 
Jones case. Monica Lewinsky was included on this list.
    On December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright issued an 
order which stated that Paula Jones was entitled to 
``information regarding any individuals with whom the President 
had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual 
relations and who were during the relevant time frame State or 
Federal employees.'' This order made it clear that Ms. Jones 
would be able to subpoena Monica Lewinsky.
    On December 11, 1997, Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky met and 
Mr. Jordan took concrete actions to help Ms. Lewinsky find a 
job. Mr. Jordan placed calls on her behalf to three business 
contacts. Mr. Jordan also told her to send letters to three 
additional business contacts that he provided to her. This 
meeting and the phone calls took place prior to the issuance of 
Judge Wright's order of the same day.
    On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed an affidavit denying a 
sexual relationship with the President. On January 8, Ms. 
Lewinsky had an interview with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. 
Afterwards, she phoned Vernon Jordan to report that the 
interview had gone poorly. Vernon Jordan immediately phoned Mr. 
Ron Perelman, the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes, and asked for his 
help. The next day, Ms. Lewinsky was given another interview 
and was extended an offer to work for Revlon, a subsidiary of 
MacAndrews & Forbes.
    Vernon Jordan defended his efforts to help Monica Lewinsky 
get a job as a payback for help he secured as a young lawyer in 
getting a job when he was a victim of racial discrimination. 
Jordan testified that he told no one at Revlon that Monica 
Lewinsky was a witness in a case involving the President and 
that Revlon offered Monica Lewinsky a job because she was 
qualified.
    If the Revlon job offer was part of a plan or conspiracy to 
obstruct justice, then Vernon Jordan would have had to be part 
of that. The House managers raise no such contention.
    An important piece of evidence on this issue was the 
uncontradicted testimony of Monica Lewinsky that she intended 
to deny her relationship with the President from the outset 
before she was subpoenaed or the President coached her or 
Vernon Jordan helped her get a job.
    The signals to the House managers from the Senate were 
unmistakable that the Senate was unlikely to approve 
depositions if the list was too long. Responding to that 
advance notice, the House managers submitted only three names 
for depositions necessarily leaving off potentially important 
witnesses like Ms. Currie. Given the absence of live witnesses 
and limitations on depositions, the House managers have been 
compelled to rely on transcripts from questioning by the 
independent counsel in grand jury proceedings. Those 
transcripts have left many key issues unresolved.
    The Senate proceeding posed a curious dichotomy with 100 
sitting silent Senators in the Chamber and nonstop Senators' 
interviews in the corridors and media galleries. The case was 
really not being tried in the Senate Chamber, but in a sense 
was being tried in the Senate corridors, on the evening TV 
interview shows and on the Sunday talk shows.
    I declined TV interviews after the day the trial began on 
the ground that my oath to do ``impartial justice'' was in 
jeopardy by interviews on the day's proceedings which might 
conflict with my juror's functions. Again, oddly, on the 
occasions when Senators were permitted to speak on the Senate 
floor on the motion to dismiss and the resolution on 
depositions, the sessions were closed so the public could not 
hear our debate.
    Efforts to open the Senate proceeding during final 
deliberations also failed to get the two-thirds vote to 
overturn the Senate rule closing the Chamber. I thought the 
public and posterity should know the reasons for our votes as a 
guide for today and the future. The informal, seat-of-the 
pants, corridor comments may be found in the CNN or MSNBC 
files, but there will be no Senate videotape to record what 
could be important Senators' views.
    Each Senator individually and the Senate collectively took 
an oath to do ``impartial justice.''
    The Senate has done only ``partial justice,'' a double 
entendre, both: (1) in the sense of not doing ``impartial 
justice'' to the House managers by unduly restricting them in 
the presentation of their case; and, (2) ``partial justice'' in 
the sense of hearing only part of the evidence.
    When the Senate prohibited live witnesses and permitted 
only three videotaped depositions, the House managers had one 
hand tied behind their back. There has been no ``trial'' but 
only a ``pseudotrial'' or a ``sham trial.'' The best the House 
managers could do was to cut, paste and glue together 
transcripts from the independent counsel's grand jury 
proceedings. Ms. Lewinsky testified briefly on videotape and 
the President gave two vague, evasive depositions.
    The House managers could not meet the heavy burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the only appropriate 
statement where the underlying charges are the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice.
    Had the House managers sustained that burden under these 
articles, there was a further burden of persuasion, as I see 
it, to establish that the national interest warranted removal 
from office.
    Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious offenses 
which must not be tolerated by anyone in our society. However, 
I remain unconvinced that impeachment is the best course to 
vindicate the rule of law on this offensive conduct. President 
Clinton may still be prosecuted in the Federal criminal courts 
when his term ends. His lawyers have, in effect, invited that 
prosecution by citing it as the preferable remedy to 
impeachment.
    A criminal trial for the President after his term ends may 
yet be the best vindicator for the rule of law.
    If the full weight of the evidence with live witnesses had 
been presented to the Senate instead of bits and pieces of cold 
transcript, it is possible that the Senate and the American 
people would have demanded the President's appearance in the 
well of the Senate. Under firm examination, the President might 
have displayed the egregious character described harshly by his 
defenders in their proposed censure petitions. That sequence 
might have led to his removal.
    On this record, the proofs are not present. Juries in 
criminal cases under the laws of Scotland have three possible 
verdicts: guilty, not guilty, not proven. Given the option in 
this trial, I suspect that many Senators would choose ``not 
proven'' instead of ``not guilty.''
    That is my verdict: not proven. The President has dodged 
perjury by calculated evasion and poor interrogation. 
Obstruction of justice fails by gaps in the proofs.
    Many Senators have sought to express their gross 
displeasure by findings of fact or censure. I reject both. The 
Constitution says judgment in cases of impeachment shall not 
extend beyond removal and disqualification from future office. 
Under the crucial doctrine of separation of powers, the 
Congress is not and should not be in the business of censuring 
any President. We are properly in the business of examining our 
own conduct as Senators. On that score, on the record of this 
``pseudotrial,'' it is my view that the Senate failed to 
fulfill the constitutional mandate to ``try'' this case.
    I ask unanimous consent that Appendices A, B and C be 
printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the appendices were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                               Appendix A

    When the Republican and Democratic caucuses could not agree on the 
preliminary procedures and witness issue, including depositions, a vote 
was set for late afternoon on January 7th. That vote was canceled in an 
effort to achieve a bi-partisan compromise. A joint caucus was then 
held in the Old Senate chamber at 9:30 am on January 8th where the 
outline of a procedural agreement was reached for the first stage 
without resolving the witness or deposition issues, but deferring them 
until we knew more about the opposing parties' cases.
    While a resolution of agreement was being drafted in the early 
afternoon fleshing out the compromise, Senator Lott asked Senator Kyl, 
Senator Sessions and me to explore the case to determine what 
witnesses, if any, the Senate should hear to make its decision. In mid 
afternoon, Senators Kyl and Sessions and I met with Chairman Henry Hyde 
and some of the House Managers to inform them of the joint discussions, 
to get a preliminary idea of their thinking on witnesses and to set up 
a meeting for the afternoon of January 11 to get their specification on 
what witnesses they believed necessary for the Senate trial. Later on 
the afternoon of January 8th, Resolution 16 was agreed to 100 to 0.
    In an effort to carry out a bi-partisan approach, I called Senator 
Lieberman on the morning of January 11th to invite him and/or other 
Senate Democrats to an afternoon meeting with House Managers. He said 
he would check with Senator Daschle and then called back to decline. 
Senators Kyl, Sessions and I met with the House Managers that afternoon 
to review their witness list. We advised them that the Democrats were 
opposed to witnesses and there was opposition among Republican Senators 
to a lengthy trial with many witnesses. We said their best opportunity 
for witnesses would be to show conflicts in the record testimony which 
could establish the need for seeing and hearing the witnesses to 
evaluate their demeanor. They responded they needed witnesses beyond 
conflicts to show the tone and tenor of their case. We said they might 
consider using their 24 hours of opening statements to develop the 
need, as they saw it, for specific witnesses.
    I called White House Counsel Charles Ruff on January 12th advising 
him of the meeting with House Managers stating that Senators Kyl, 
Sessions and I were interested in meeting with the President's 
attorneys. Mr. Ruff called back on January 13th declining the 
invitation.
    On January 25th, in advance of consideration of Senator Byrd's 
motion to dismiss and Senator Lott's resolution on taking depositions, 
Senator Lott requested Senator Kyl and me to talk again to House 
Managers to determine how many witnesses they would need and for what 
purpose. Senator Lott had extended an invitation to join in those 
discussions to Senator Daschle who declined. Before that meeting was 
held on January 25th, I advised Senator Lieberman of the scheduled 
meeting and told him Senator Daschle declined Senator Lott's 
invitation.
    Between our January 11 and January 25th meetings with House 
Managers, there had been numerous public comment by Republican Senators 
opposing many witnesses even for depositions with some expressing 
possible opposition to any deposition witnesses. When Senator Kyl and I 
met with House Managers on January 25th, we said it was problematic 
whether there would be 51 or more votes for a lengthy witness list.
    In arguments before the full Senate, House Managers complained 
about the limitations on deposition witnesses and expressed their 
interest in calling live witnesses with latitude to develop their cases 
as they saw fit in accordance with regular trial practice.
    Late in the evening on January 26th after closed door Senate debate 
on calling witnesses for depositions, Senator Carl Levin and I 
discussed a bi-partisan compromise. We continued that discussion early 
the next morning and presented our views to our respective caucuses on 
January 27th. While Senator Levin and I did not agree on all points, we 
were closer together than our caucuses. At mid-day on January 27th on 
an almost straight party line vote, the Senate decided to take 
depositions of only three witnesses.
    For the balance of the afternoon of January 27th and all day on the 
28th, there were strenuous efforts to agree on deposition procedures. 
Democrats were adamant that the depositions should not be videotaped; 
or, if videotaped, on the commitment that they could be viewed only by 
Senators and limited staff. Republicans insisted that the depositions 
should be videotaped deferring the decision on whether they would be 
used as a substitute for live witnesses. Late in the afternoon Senator 
Lott's resolution was adopted to videotape the depositions without 
specifying their use after defeating Senator Daschle's amendment to 
limit the depositions to a typed transcript without videotapes.
    After those depositions were taken, on February 4, 1999, the Senate 
voted to exclude live witnesses and to see the videotapes of the three 
deposed witnesses after the defeat of Senator Daschle's amendment to 
limit the depositions to the typed transcript only without videotapes.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix B

                                                 December 10, 1998.
To: Senator Trent Lott, Majority Leader.
From: Senator Arlen Specter.
    As a follow up to our recent meeting, this memorandum sets forth my 
thinking on how to handle the impeachment proceeding if it reaches the 
Senate and my analysis on some of the legal issues as follows:
    1. May the Senate consider in the next Congress articles of 
impeachment passed by the House in this Congress?
    2. Must the Senate trial begin the day following the House 
presentment?
    3. Is censure authorized in an impeachment proceeding?
    4. Must/should the Senate hear testimony from live witnesses?
    5. How long will the Senate impeachment trial take?
    6. Possibility of conviction
    7. Concluding observations
 may the senate in the 106th congress consider articles of impeachment 
     passed by the house of representatives in the 105th congress?
    Yes. Precedents hold that the Senate may carry an impeachment over 
into a subsequent Congress. As noted in the addenda to the Rules on 
Senate Impeachment Proceedings:
    ``Articles of impeachment against Harold Louderback, a United 
States district judge for the northern district of California were 
exhibited on March 3, 1933, at the end of the second session of the 72d 
Congress, and the trial occurred during the first session of the 73d 
Congress, . . .
    ``At the end of the 100th Congress, the Senate adopted a resolution 
to continue into the 101st Congress the proceedings in the impeachment 
of Alcee L. Hastings, a United State judge for the southern district of 
Florida''.
    Notwithstanding a contrary opinion given at the House proceeding, 
it is my judgment that these practical precedents would virtually 
certainly be upheld if any judicial challenge was attempted because of 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case involving 
Judge Nixon where the Court held the Senate had the authority to 
establish procedures under the impeachment clause.
  must rule iii on senate impeachment procedure be read literally to 
require continuous consideration by the senate the day following house 
                presentation of articles of impeachment?
    No. While Rule III appears to impose such a rigid requirement on 
its face, the Rules taken on the whole and prior practice show the 
Senate may establish a more flexible schedule.
    The specific language of Rule III provides: ``Upon such articles of 
impeachment being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 
o'clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such 
presentation, or sooner if ordered by the Senate, proceed to the 
consideration of such articles, and shall continue in session from day 
to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence (unless 
otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be 
rendered.''
    Other Rules provide for intervening action between the time the 
articles are presented by the House to the Senate and subsequent 
proceedings before the Senate. For example, Rule 8 provides for a writ 
of summons to be issued to the person impeached with a date to appear 
before the Senate.
    The impeached party is given a date to answer the Articles and the 
House is then given a date to reply.
    For example, in the trial of President Andrew Johnson, the 
President was given 17 days to prepare his answer (his counsel had 
requested 47 days to prepare). The House managers took one day to file 
their brief reply to the President's answer. In the 1989 trial of Judge 
Walter Nixon, the Judge was given 29 days to prepare his answer, and 
the House was given 12 days to file its response.
    These rules and that prior practice demonstrate that there is a 
necessary time lapse between the presentation of the Articles to the 
Senate and the commencement of further Senate hearings or proceedings.
   is censure an authorized consequence or remedy in an impeachment 
                              proceeding?
    No. The specific language in the Constitution Article 1, Section 3, 
Clause 7 contains the clear implication that judgment in an impeachment 
proceeding shall not include censure or any consequence or remedy other 
than that specified in the Constitution: ``Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit 
under the United States.'' The language ``shall not extend further'' 
than the enumerated consequences or remedies precludes any judgment 
beyond ``removal from office'' and ``disqualification to hold and enjoy 
any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit under the United States''.
    Further support for the conclusion that impeachment does not 
contemplate penalties like censure is contained in the historical 
references. Of the fifteen individuals impeached by the House of 
Representatives, all seven convicted by trial in the Senate were 
removed from office.
    Contrasted to censure, impeachment and removal from office are not 
intended to be a punishment. In his ``Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States,'' Justice Joseph Story notes that impeachment 
``is not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure the state 
against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor 
property but simply divests him of his political capacity.''
    Consequently, the impeachment process does not contemplate Congress 
imposing any penalty, including censure, as part of an impeachment 
proceeding. Once the impeachment proceeding is concluded, it is a 
different issue as to whether Congress can pass a resolution of censure 
in the same manner Congress enacts resolutions generally.
    would the constitutional requirements of the senate impeachment 
proceeding be satisfied by the factual recitations in the starr report 
   or is the senate obligated to hear testimony from live witnesses?
    While the Constitution provides no explicit answer, inferences from 
the Constitution, the Senate Rules on Impeachment and the prior 
practice strongly suggest that live witnesses were contemplated by the 
framers instead of merely a hearsay report.
    The Constitution explicitly provides for a trial in the provision 
of Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6: ``The Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all impeachments'' (Emphasis added). The seriousness and 
magnitude of removal of a Federal official, especially the President, 
suggests that the jury (senators) should have the best evidence and 
that would require something more than a hearsay document no matter how 
extensive and explicit the Starr Report may be.
    That clause further provides: ``and no person shall be convicted 
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present'' 
(Emphasis added). The use of the word ``convicted'' again refers to a 
phase or the consequence of trial and the analogy to a criminal 
proceeding. While the Senate is not bound by traditional rules of 
evidence so that we might consider matters not admissible in a court of 
law, it would seem questionable or appear unseemly to base our judgment 
exclusively on hearsay in such an important proceeding.
    The provisions of Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 carry forward the 
analogy of trial referring to the ultimate ``judgment'': ``Judgment in 
cases of impeachment shall not extend further . . .'' (Emphasis added).
    The Senate Rules on Impeachment further contemplate, although do 
not necessarily mandate, a proceeding with live witnesses and 
opportunities for the examination and cross-examination of such 
witnesses. For instance, Rule 6 provides that: ``The Senate shall have 
power to compel the attendance of witnesses. . . .'' Rule 17 provides 
that: ``Witnesses shall be examined by one person on behalf of the 
party producing them, and then cross-examined by one person on the 
other side.''
    Although the Rules never explicitly give the parties the right to 
call witnesses, the language ``on behalf of the party producing them'' 
in Rule 17 implies that the parties do have such a right. The practice 
of the Senate confirms this implication that the parties have the right 
to call witnesses. For example, in the trial of Andrew Johnson, 
witnesses for the President were called and heard over a period of one 
week. In the trial of Alcee Hastings, both sides were allowed to call a 
total of 55 witnesses.
    The foregoing analysis does not conclusively rule out the propriety 
of proceeding on the Starr Report.
    The House of Representatives relied upon the Starr Report for the 
facts even though the practice of the House in prior impeachment 
hearings has been to take testimony from witnesses. ``Hinds' Precedents 
of the House of Representatives'' notes that witnesses were called 
during the House impeachment hearings on Senator Blount and Judge 
Perry. More recently, during the House deliberations on the 
impeachments of President Nixon, Judge Claiborne, Judge Hastings and 
Judge Nixon, numerous witnesses were called to lay a factual basis for 
the impeachment charges. In the case of Judge Nixon alone, witnesses 
provided testimony to the House committee for over a month.
    As a practical matter, it is obvious the House did not take the 
time to hear witnesses because the House proceedings were structured to 
finish in the abbreviated time frame between the election of November 
3rd and the end of the year. Starting in mid-November and seeking to 
finish shortly after mid-December, that time frame was even further 
constricted.
            how long will the senate impeachment trial take?
    It depends entirely on what the Senate seeks to do and what 
parameters are established.
    If the Senate peremptorily chooses to dismiss the House articles 
without consideration, there is authority that could be accomplished at 
the outset by a majority vote on a motion to adjourn. Since there is no 
specific Rule relating to the adjournment of an impeachment trial, the 
general rules of the Senate would apply. A motion to adjourn the Senate 
requires only a majority vote and is not subject to debate. The Senate 
impeachment proceeding could be concluded by adjournment with, in 
effect, a dismissal which would be the equivalent of a nol pros in a 
criminal case. That is the equivalent of a judgment of acquittal. The 
Senate would then resume its normal business.
    There is historical precedent to concluding the Senate impeachment 
proceeding by passing a motion to adjourn. In the impeachment trial of 
Andrew Johnson, the Senate voted on three of the eleven articles of 
impeachment. After failing to secure a conviction on these three 
articles, Senator Williams moved that the Senate sitting as a court of 
implement adjourn sine die. The motion carried and the trial of Andrew 
Johnson ended prior to a vote on the remaining eight articles.
    If the Senate chose to accept the facts of the Starr Report, the 
entire trial could be relatively brief if the President did not put on 
a factual defense.
    An adequate Senate trial need not necessarily be long. The key 
witnesses would be Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan and 
possibly Kathleen Willey. There may be a few other peripheral witnesses 
such as Judge Susan Webber Wright. It is hard to calculate but it will 
probably be a matter of weeks, not months. That estimate would be 
expanded if President Clinton testifies and/or if he puts on a factual 
defense.
                       possibility of conviction
    This matter has had unprecedented and unpredictable turns of 
events. The President's August 17th short speech was a bomb. The 
House's release of the President's grand jury deposition reversed the 
tide. The President's answers to the House questions reversed the 
reversal.
    It is entirely conceivable that a Senate trial could defy 
conventional wisdom and find the two-third votes for conviction if the 
evidence is properly presented focusing on abuse of power and 
obstruction of justice instead of lying about sex. While impossible to 
quantify with precision, it may be that there are now about fifty votes 
for conviction, perhaps a half dozen open minds and maybe another dozen 
senators might be persuadable if they think there is insufficient 
political cover to acquit.
    Monica Lewinsky has the potential to be a strong witness because 
her recollection is so extraordinary. She was able to pinpoint with 
precision the two dates when, as she put it, the President received 
telephone calls from a congressman with a nickname and a sugar grower 
in Florida with a name something like ``Fanuli''. It was later 
confirmed that the President had talked on those two dates to 
Congressman Sonny Montgomery and a Florida sugar grower named Alfonso 
Fanjul.
    Although Betty Currie's testimony was watered down as the 
investigation proceeded, questioning her from her first statement might 
provide highly incriminating testimony on the obstruction charge. 
Vernon Jordan's testimony has substantial potential on the abuse of 
power issue. Jordan testified he reported to the President ``mission 
accomplished'' after Monica Lewinsky's perjurious affidavit was 
obtained and Jordan secured a job for Ms. Lewinsky with Revlon. When 
her initial interview went badly, Jordan called Ronald Perelman, head 
of Revlon's holding company, and Ms. Lewinsky was recalled the next day 
for another interview and given a job on the spot.
    The case is also reportedly strong on the perjury charge against 
the President on the incident involving Kathleen Willey. Judge Susan 
Webber Wright's testimony, in observing the President's attentiveness 
at this deposition in the Jones' case, could undercut the President's 
contention that he wasn't paying attention when his lawyer strenuously 
argued for the President's innocence at his deposition based on the 
Lewinsky affidavit. At that time, the President conclusively knew it 
was perjurious.
                        concluding observations
    As you know, my own initial preference was for both Houses to 
abandon impeachment proceedings and to then hold the President 
accountable through the judicial criminal process once his term was 
over leaving the Congress free to attend to the nation's other 
business: social security, health, education, etc.
    My view on waiting to hold the President accountable after he 
leaves office was based on the blunt proposition that it was more 
trouble to get rid of him than to keep him. It may well be that the 
public opposition to impeachment had the same basis. Once we get to the 
Senate trial, my view may change if it is no more trouble to get rid of 
him than to keep him. Perhaps the public will have a similar change of 
heart.
    If the House returns Articles of Impeachment, the Senate should 
proceed with a dignified trial with the calling of witnesses because 
the seriousness of the issue and the historical impact call for an 
unhurried, deliberative trial. To the maximum extent possible, we 
should make the proceeding non-partisan. Concessions to the minority on 
some procedural matter would be worthwhile. As the majority party in 
charge, we should take the lead on non-partisanship. We should avoid 
the House bickering at all reasonable costs.
    The Senate prides itself on being the world's greatest deliberative 
body. This trial will be by far the highest visibility for the Senate 
in its history to date and for the foreseeable future. While the 
President will be on trial, the Senate will also be on trial.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix C

                                                 December 29, 1998.
To: Senator Trent Lott, Majority Leader.
From: Senator Arlen Specter.
    Supplementing my memorandum of December 10 and our telephone 
conversation of December 22, this memo suggests procedures to deal with 
the Senate trial in light of the public dissatisfaction with the House 
proceedings, public impatience with impeachment generally and ways to 
achieve a judicious, non-partisan Senate trial. Since this memorandum 
was written while I have been traveling, the rules and case citations 
could be checked only by long-distance telephone.
    can procedures be structured to shorten the length of the trial?
    Yes. While it is impossible to say with certainty the duration of 
any trial, procedures can be put into place to abbreviate the trial 
with a reasonable likelihood of reaching a verdict within a few weeks 
(perhaps even three weeks as earlier predicted by you--Senator Lott) as 
contrasted with some assessments that the trial would take months or 
the better part of a year.
    The Senate already is under pressure and will probably be under 
greater pressure to finish at an early date which accounts for the call 
for short-circuiting the trial through a plea-bargained censure. It is 
obviously in the national interest to end the trial as soon as possible 
without rushing to judgment and it would doubtless meet with public 
approval to announce at the outset a plan to accomplish that.
    Several steps could be taken to abbreviate the trial time:
    (1) Require submission of pre-trial memoranda by the parties 
followed by a pre-trial conference with the Chief Justice to establish 
the parameters of the trial;
    (2) Organize the House Managers' case, with input from the Senate, 
to focus on only the key witnesses and indispensable lines of 
questions; and
    (3) Establish long trial days and Saturday sessions.
    Without management and limitations, the lawyers could take a long, 
indeterminate time. By analogy to Federal court litigation, this trial 
could be managed by having the parties submit pre-trial memoranda which 
would identify any pre-trial motions, list prospective witnesses and 
lines of questions, etc., and approximate the time involved at each 
stage.
    The Chief Justice would then meet with the parties and issue a pre-
trial order establishing the trial parameters just as the presiding 
judge does in Federal court trials.
                     an activist, bipartisan senate
    In an impeachment trial, Senators function in a very unusual way in 
that we are both jurors and judges. A majority of Senators may overrule 
the Chief Justice's rulings. We decide individually for ourselves what 
is the burden of proof and what evidence on what conduct is sufficient 
for a guilty verdict.
    The Senate will be proceeding without precedent on most issues. The 
Senate has broad latitude as noted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Judge Nixon where the Court held the Senate had 
authority to establish its procedures under the Impeachment Clause.
    This case and these times call for a more activist approach by the 
Senate than prior impeachment trials. While it was not inconvenient or 
problemsome to allow the House managers to set the pace for the 
Hastings, Nixon or Claiborne trials, this is obviously a very different 
matter. The impeachment trials of President Johnson and those which 
occurred earlier offer little guidance on how the Senate should proceed 
today.
    The existing Senate rules on impeachment are a starting point. They 
can be changed by a majority vote unless there is disagreement in which 
case proposed changes are debatable and subject to a two-thirds vote.
    It is only through bipartisanship that the Senate can succeed in 
having a judicious, non-partisan trial which can gain public 
acceptance. So, all significant procedures must have the concurrence of 
most Senators from both parties.
    In my judgment, it would be appropriate and practical to structure 
the presentation of the evidence by having a small bipartisan Senate 
committee work with the House managers and President's lawyers on what 
the Senate wants presented in a tightly focused case, taking into 
consideration any differences with the House managers which could then 
be worked out.
    Arguments in appellate courts customarily take the form of the 
appeals judges focusing on the questions they want addressed by counsel 
as opposed to having the lawyers decide how to use their allotted time. 
It would be analogous to such appellate proceedings to have the Senate 
direct, or work out collaboratively with the House the evidence the 
Senate wants to hear.
    I suggest that a small committee, perhaps five Senators with three 
Republicans and two Democrats, work up a trial format and trial brief. 
It will be helpful for the Senators to have prosecution or criminal 
defense experience. This Senate committee, or perhaps one Republican 
and one Democrat, should participate in preparation of the pre-trial 
memorandum and pre-trial conference.
                          long trial sessions
    Substantial evidence could be presented with trial days from 9:30 
am to 5 pm or even 9 am to 6 pm with Saturday sessions. The 
Philadelphia criminal courts had the minimum trial day established from 
9:30 am to 5 pm. Senate Impeachment Rule 3 provides for Saturday 
sessions in impeachment trials.
    I recommend against the so-called double track with the Senate 
sitting half days on the trial and half on other Senate business. There 
is too much legitimate public concern to have the trial proceed 
expeditiously and end as soon as possible. Even with the trial ending 
at 5 pm or 6 pm, some Senate business could be conducted in the 
evenings on confirmations or other business which can be handled by 
unanimous consent.
    We might consider canceling our February and March recesses for the 
trial, which would likely produce significant public approval.
                    the importance of live witnesses
    I strongly recommend live witnesses on the key issues although 
there is no prohibition against use of hearsay such as the Starr 
Report. Prior impeachment cases establish the precedent for live 
witnesses and the Senate rules provide procedures for live witnesses. 
Live witnesses have customarily testified in House impeachment 
proceedings. In the Senate, for example, live witnesses testified in 
cases involving President Johnson and in the most recent impeachment 
case on Judge Alcee Hastings. Senate Rules 6 and 17 establish 
procedures for dealing with witnesses.
    The dignity, tenor and stature of the Senate Trial call for live 
witnesses on an impeachment of this magnitude. Everything the Senate 
does will be subjected to a microscope both contemporaneously and 
historically. While it is a sweeping generalization, I think it is fair 
and accurate to say that no trial in history to date has been or will 
be so closely watched.
    We have some gauge as to how closely this trial will be scrutinized 
from the work of the Warren Commission which has been the most closely 
dissected investigation in history. Notwithstanding constant pressure 
from Chief Justice Warren, who wanted the inquiry concluded at an early 
date, the staff lawyers insisted on extended tests and extensive 
interrogation knowing the record would be closely examined. At that 
time, we couldn't conceive of the extent of the scrutiny, but we had 
some inkling of what was coming. At this time, the Senate should be on 
notice to cross every ``t'' and dot every ``i'' twice.
    It may be sufficient to use the Starr Report to establish some of 
the lesser proofs for the record.
    Without attempting to be dispositive on who are all the key 
witnesses and what are all the indispensable lines of questioning, a 
suggested focused strategy would be to call:
    (1) Monica Lewinsky to testify on the perjury issue by covering the 
numerous times she and the President were alone (he claimed they were 
never alone) and the specifics of their conduct on the issue as to 
whether they had sex.
    It may be wise to have her testify in a closed session on the 
details of their sexual relationship. In retrospect, the Judiciary 
Committee might have been wise to hear some of the testimony by 
Professor Hill and Justice Thomas in a closed session. In the 
confirmation hearing of Justice Breyer, testimony was taken in a closed 
session on his finances.
    Even though most, if not all, of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony has 
already been made public, it would be less offensive to public taste 
and arguably less prejudicial or more considerate of the President to 
avoid the spectacle of television on the specifics of their sex. Any 
objection to the closed or secret hearing could be largely answered by 
releasing a transcript to the public at the end of each daily session.
    If the President testifies, consideration should also be given to a 
closed session on the specifics of their sexual activities. It is 
arguably, and perhaps realistically, different to have a closed session 
with the President, but these questions will have to be thrashed out at 
the time depending on the feel of the case if, as and when they arise.
    In order to have a closed session, there would have to be a 
modification of Rule 20 which requires the Senate doors to be open 
except during deliberation.
    (2) Vernon Jordan to testify about contacts with the President 
including his telephone call where he reported ``mission accomplished'' 
after arranging with another lawyer to get Ms. Lewinsky's perjurious 
affidavit and getting her a job with Revlon.
    (3) Betty Currie to testify on the President's efforts to alter and 
mold her version of what happened. Even though Ms. Currie gave several 
statements, the essential elements of her testimony could be put on the 
record at trial by going through her first statement to the FBI.
    The President's possible testimony is considered later in this 
memorandum.
 should the senate trial be terminated by an arranged disposition for 
                                censure?
    No, for several reasons:
    (1) The Constitution specifies the two remedies or consequences in 
cases of impeachment which necessarily excludes censure: ``Judgment in 
Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, 
Trust or Profit under the United States''--Article 1, Section 3, Clause 
7. The language ``shall not extend further'' specifically precludes 
censure or any other remedy not enumerated in the Constitution.
    The argument is now being strenuously advanced by many, including 
some Senators, that the impeachment trial should be ended at an early 
stage by a motion to adjourn the Senate and then, by pre-arrangement, 
taking up a Resolution of Censure to be approved by the Senate and 
House. In my judgment, that would be a perversion of and at variance 
with the Constitution or, simply stated, unconstitutional.
    (2) Censure would be meaningless for this President--not worth a 
``tinker's dam.''
    (3) Censure would be a bad precedent which could be used whenever 
the Congress of one party wanted to express displeasure or embarrass 
the President of the other party. Simply stated, the Congress is not in 
the business of censuring the President under our Constitutional 
separation of powers.
    (4) Censure would prejudice a possible later criminal prosecution 
of the President after he leaves office. There will be an inevitable 
sense that censure will constitute a form of punishment or final 
judgment, although not technically double jeopardy, which would 
preclude a later prosecution, as a practical matter.
    The prospects for censure have been dampened by Vice President 
Gore's statement that the President would not accept censure 
conditioned on the President's admitting to lying under oath even if 
that admission could not to be used against him in any criminal 
proceeding. Even if the President would admit to lying under oath, he 
would most certainly object to the procedures necessary to rule out use 
of that admission in a criminal prosecution.
    Only a court, not the Senate or Congress, can grant immunity from 
future criminal prosecution. The Senate can take steps to have immunity 
granted by the Court. But that action can be taken only after the 
President or any witness asserts the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. The Court then grants immunity 
and the testimony cannot be later used against that person in a 
criminal prosecution.
    Since the President has announced his unwillingness to admit to 
lying under oath, it is fruitless to suggest the Fifth Amendment 
course.
                 president clinton's possible testimony
    For the Senate to have all the facts--or all versions of the facts 
from which Senator-jurors must determine what the facts are, the Senate 
should hear from the President. It may be that the President will 
choose to testify; and as a matter of comity, the Senate should await 
the President's decision.
    If the President elects not to testify, the Senate will be faced 
with a difficult legal question and perhaps an even more difficult 
political question. On its face, Impeachment Rule 6 gives the Senate 
the authority to compel the President to testify:
    ``The Senate shall have the power to compel the attendance of 
witnesses'' and ``to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, 
precepts and judgments.''
    Notwithstanding that express language, some doubt has arisen as to 
whether the President is subject to compulsory process (subpoena) 
because of Rule 8 which provides:
    ``A writ of summons shall issue to the person impeached reciting 
said articles and notifying him to appear before the Senate upon a day 
and at a place to be fixed by the Senate . . . and file his answer to 
said articles of impeachment . . .
    ``If the person impeached, after service, shall fail to appear, 
either in person or by attorney, on the day so fixed therefore as 
aforesaid, or appearing, shall fail to file his answer to such articles 
of impeachment, the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea 
of not guilty.''
    Some have cited President Johnson's refusal to appear at the Senate 
trial as authority for the proposition that the President cannot be 
compelled to attend and testify. That inference is unsound because Rule 
8 refers to responding to the summons and filing an answer ``either in 
person or by attorney.'' So the attorney's action satisfies the rule 
without the appearance or other action by the President. Accordingly, 
the impeached party complied with the Senate rules in President 
Johnson's case which did not raise the issue of the Senate's power to 
compel the President to testify.
    There is no precedent for a case where the impeached official 
declined to testify and the Senate attempted to compel his testimony. 
The other impeachment cases offer no close analogy where, as here, 
critical facts are known to only two people, one of whom is the 
impeached official.
    Analogies from other, although dissimilar, trials suggest the 
President would be subject to being subpoenaed. The Supreme Court of 
the United States held President Nixon was subject to compulsory 
process to turn over the famous tapes under the established principle: 
``That the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.''
    President Nixon's case, although not dealing with impeachment, is 
further instructive in the Supreme Court's sweeping language on the 
need for all the facts:
    ``The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would 
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative 
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system 
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all 
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure 
that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts 
that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence 
needed either by the prosecutions or the defense.''
    Since this is not a criminal trial, there would be no rule that a 
defendant has the right not to testify. Although not a controlling 
analogy, a party in a civil case may be called involuntarily to the 
witness stand by his/her opponent ``as on cross'' which means he/she 
may be cross-examined.
    In my legal judgment, President Clinton could be compelled to 
testify based on Senate Rule 6, analogies to compulsory process in 
President Nixon's case and civil litigation and the fact that President 
Clinton was subject to compulsory process in the Paula Jones case and 
Starr grand jury. Consideration of enforcing such a subpoena can be 
left to a later day if, as and when the issue arises.
    If the President did testify, it could have a profound effect on 
the public's view of the case and on the Senator-jurors. The 
President's lawyers could not shield him from cross-examination and he 
could not avoid the specifics on his contacts with Ms. Lewinsky as he 
did in his abbreviated grand jury testimony.
    If the President sticks to his story that he did not have sex with 
Ms. Lewinsky and did not lie under oath at his deposition in the Paula 
Jones case, his credibility could be severely impugned by pointed 
cross-examination and he could be viewed very negatively by the public 
and the Senator-jurors. Or, it may be that the public and many Senator-
jurors would not be any more adversely affected by his Senate trial 
testimony than they were by the videotapes of his grand jury testimony.
    At this moment, it is impossible to judge what the feel or tenor of 
the trial would be on subpoenaing the President if, as and when he 
declined to testify after serious incriminating evidence was presented 
against him. If subpoena sentiments formed along party lines, it would 
be the most severe test of acting only with a bipartisan consensus.
    Over several centuries, litigation experience has demonstrated the 
unpredictability of trials. That is why they are called trials. A two-
thirds majority may not appear out of thin air, as noted by Congressman 
DeLay, but it could appear from forceful presentation of the key 
evidence including cross-examination of the President. If the trial 
turned heavily against the President, it is conceivable, although 
highly unlikely at this point, that a plea bargain could be structured 
with the Independent Counsel's concurrence that the President would 
resign with his pension, his law license and immunity from prosecution.
    Once a trial starts, the genie is out of the bottle and anything 
can happen. Emotions in all directions are at an all-time high with 
Republicans, the President, Democrats or anybody else in the line of 
fire at risk for the ultimate public scorn. And the public's other 
business would not be attended to forever how long the trial took.
    That is why I continue personally to favor putting off holding the 
President accountable until after his term ends through the criminal 
process. That accommodates the public's short-term desires for the 
Congress, the President and the Supreme Court to focus on the nation's 
business and the long-term national interest to later hold the 
President accountable for the serious charges through indictment if the 
grand jury so decides, and to sentencing by a judge if a jury convicts.
                          the public reaction
    Prospects are reasonably good that the public would not react 
unfavorably to a non-partisan, judicious, focused, relatively brief 
Senate trial. In addition, the public would likely understand the 
Senate has an explicit Constitutional duty to hold a trial after 
Articles of Impeachment are passed by the House. There has already been 
a bipartisan recognition of this duty by Senators who are Democrats.
    Public reaction, as gauged by the polls, was adverse to the House 
proceedings, at least in part, because of their highly partisan, 
strident tenor; and because the House never zeroed in or highlighted 
the highly incriminating evidence. There may even be some grudging 
public approval that Congress is willing to take action on a 
significant matter contrary to the polls.
    A favorable public reaction will depend largely if not exclusively 
on the public's feeling that the proceedings are bipartisan, so the 
Senate must take extreme care to make the trial bipartisan. As the 
majority party, we Republicans should bend over backwards to avoid even 
the appearance of seeking partisan advantage which marred the House 
proceedings.
    I strongly support the suggestion that there should be no separate 
party caucuses on impeachment issues. It would be useful to convene all 
Senators at an early date, such as January 8, 1999, when we will all be 
in town, to discuss ideas on how to proceed. I recollect one such 
meeting of all Senators from both parties a couple of years ago on 
appropriations or budget issues near the end of the session.
                               conclusion
    History will cast a long shadow on what the Senate does in this 
impeachment proceeding.
    The Senate should not, in effect, sweep the matter under the rug by 
relying on the hearsay Starr Report for the key facts. Some say the 
Starr Report is a sufficient factual basis for Senate action because 
the facts are not in dispute. That is not true. A close reading of the 
President's grand jury testimony and his famous 82 answers to 
interrogatories demonstrate that he has not conceded the accuracy of 
the key incriminating evidence.
    As detailed above, the Senate can leave it to the criminal courts 
to put the facts on the historical record and have the indicting grand 
jury, trial jury and presiding judge hold the President accountable to 
whatever extent warranted after his term ends.
    A rush-to-judgment censure plea bargain would complete the trifecta 
of inappropriate action by the Senate as well as the House and 
President.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Carl Levin

    Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, first a personal 
note to our leaders: How proud I am of them, and we all are of 
you, for holding us together during this very, very difficult 
time. We will all be closer for having come through this, 
regardless of what this vote is or how we individually vote.
    The burden of proof on the House that the President has 
committed high crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed 
from office is a heavy burden, because the effect is so dire in 
a democracy that depends upon the election of the President. In 
my judgment, the House of Representatives has not carried that 
burden of proof as to the specific allegations against the 
President. The House repeatedly relies on inferences while 
ignoring direct testimony to the contrary. There is nothing 
unusual about the reliance on inferences. It happens in trials 
all the time. What is unusual here is that the House's case 
relies on inferences from the testimony of people whose direct 
testimony contradicts the inference. Let me just cite some 
examples in the obstruction of justice article.
    First, the House managers in their report, in their brief, 
made the following statements: ``As evidenced by the testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky, the President encouraged her to lie.'' That 
is the words of the House brief. Second, ``The testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky leads to the conclusion that it was the 
President who initiated the retrieval of the gifts and the 
concealment of the evidence.'' Third, ``The President needed 
the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the false affidavit and 
that was assured by the efforts to secure her a job.''
    Those are all direct quotes. Each one of those relies on 
inferences. Each one of them is contradicted by the explicit 
testimony of people from whom those inferences are drawn.
    Let's just take them one by one. The House managers' 
inference that the President ``encouraged''--that is their 
word--Monica Lewinsky to lie was contradicted by Monica 
Lewinsky's proffer, which was then incorporated into her grand 
jury testimony, that the President ``never'' encouraged her to 
lie. That is her word. They say by inference the President 
encouraged her to lie. She says, ``The President never 
encouraged me to lie.''
    The House managers' inference that it was, ``President 
Clinton who initiated the retrieval of the gifts and the 
concealment of the evidence on December the 28th,'' was 
contradicted by Monica Lewinsky's direct testimony that she 
initiated the concealment of the gifts. It is uncontested that 
on December 22 she took some of the gifts and concealed the 
rest--some of the gifts to her lawyer's office. She decided on 
her own that she would not turn over the gifts in response to 
that subpoena because they would embarrass her, or they would, 
in her words, disclose that there was a special relationship. 
So on the 22nd she decided on her own to withhold some of the 
gifts. And yet we are told by the managers by inference that 
somehow or other it is the President who initiated the 
withholding and the concealment of the gifts.
    And then on the 28th, when they met at the White House, it 
was Monica Lewinsky who said, ``Maybe I should get some of the 
gifts to Betty.'' She initiated the issue. And then the 
President said either nothing or, ``Let me think about it.'' 
And then the question came up: Well, who then made the phone 
call relative to the pickup of the gifts? Was it Monica 
Lewinsky calling Betty Currie or was it Betty Currie calling 
Monica Lewinsky?
    Here is where another inference is drawn, that if in fact 
it was Betty Currie who initiated the call, then the inference 
is that the President told Betty Currie to call Monica 
Lewinsky. There is a conflict there between Betty Currie and 
Monica Lewinsky.
    One of the most intriguing issues in this whole matter, one 
that I have really given a lot of thought to, is the question: 
Why would the President give Monica Lewinsky gifts on December 
28 if he was concerned about it and wanted to withhold and hide 
the gifts? It is one of the questions that didn't get a lot of 
focus up here, by the way.
    The President gave Monica Lewinsky at least three things 
that day: a bear carving that Dale Bumpers referred to that 
came from Vancouver, a small blanket, and a stuffed animal.
    Here is the way the House addressed that issue. They asked 
themselves in their brief the question: Why would the President 
give Ms. Lewinsky gifts at the same time he was asking her to 
conceal others that he had already given her? Answer from the 
House in their brief: The only logical inference--only logical 
inference--is that the gifts, including the bear, symbolizing 
strength, were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would 
deny the relationship even in the face of a Federal subpoena. 
That is the inference that they say is the only logical 
inference from giving three gifts to Monica Lewinsky, including 
a bear.
    There is a real problem with that. First of all, that bear 
was obtained by the President in Vancouver weeks before there 
was a witness list. We are not even offered speculation as to 
how the President could foresee that Monica Lewinsky would be 
on a witness list and pick up a symbol of strength while in 
Vancouver so that he could give it to her as a reminder to deny 
their relationship in the face of some future, unforeseen 
Federal subpoena.
    Even more to the point, Monica Lewinsky was asked directly 
at the grand jury--directly--this question as to whether or not 
she interpreted the gift of that bear as a signal to her to 
``be strong in your decision to conceal the relationship.'' Her 
direct, one-word answer was ``no.'' And yet the managers come 
here saying the only logical inference that can be drawn from 
three gifts being given from the President on the 28th is that 
the President was signaling to her to be strong in the face of 
a Federal subpoena. That is the kind of inference we are asked 
to draw.
    I was raised on the burden of proof, both as a prosecutor 
in civil rights cases and as a defense lawyer. The House cannot 
carry the burden of proof on the critical allegations of 
criminal misconduct that they have made when they depend on 
those kinds of inferences, a pile of inferences that run 
directly contrary to direct testimony on critical points. 
Impeachment and removal should be based on sturdier foundations 
than that kind of a heap of inferences. They would have us 
overlook the forest of direct testimony while getting lost in 
the trees of their multiple inferences.
    The December 11 issue has been discussed here. It was 
extraordinary to me, listening here as both factfinder and 
judge, that it could be represented to us that on December 11, 
the first activity calculated to actually help Monica Lewinsky 
get a job occurred. That is what they alleged on the floor of 
the Senate. The first activity--these are their words--
calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually get a job took place 
on December 11, and that something happened on that day to 
trigger Vernon Jordan's meeting and real activity. Something 
happened that day. What was it? Judge Wright's order.
    In their House brief, it is said that that order came in 
the morning, which was wrong, and in the presentation here in 
the opening arguments Manager Hutchinson said the following: 
``The witness list came in, the judge's order came in. That 
triggered the President to action. And the President triggered 
Vernon Jordan into action. That chain reaction here is what 
moved the job search along.''
    Wrong. It disintegrated here. Vernon Jordan's meeting was 
before the judge's order. And yet that is what we are asked to 
base the removal of a President on. And then the thinking 
shifts to another theory. Removal of an elected President from 
office has got to be made of sturdier stuff than those kinds of 
inferences.
    Finally, on the double standard issue--and I think we all 
must be concerned about that--a former prosecutor who appeared 
in front of the House said the following. And Senator Sarbanes 
quoted one line of this, and I want to repeat that, because it 
is so important, and then add one other thing that they said. 
``In conversations with many current and former Federal 
prosecutors in whose judgment I have great faith, virtually all 
concur that if the President were not involved, if an ordinary 
citizen were the subject of the inquiry, no serious 
consideration would be given to a criminal prosecution arising 
from alleged misconduct in discovery in the Jones civil case 
having to do with an alleged coverup of a private sexual affair 
with another woman or the follow-on testimony before the grand 
jury. I believe the President should be treated in the criminal 
justice system in the same way as any other U.S. citizen.
    ``If that were the case here,'' these former prosecutors 
said, ``it is my view that the alleged obstruction of justice 
and perjury would not be prosecuted by a responsible U.S. 
attorney.''
    I know this is not a criminal case, this is an impeachment 
trial, but I would think that our standards should be at least 
as high as they would be in a criminal case, and that if this 
President would not be prosecuted, much less convicted for 
these specific charges--and these were criminal charges that 
were very specifically made by the managers against the 
President--if that prosecution and conviction would not take 
place in a criminal case, we should be loathe, I believe, and 
very, very cautious and careful before we remove an elected 
President from office.
    I learned about the burden of proof and presumption of 
innocence as a young boy, long before law school, when my 
father, who was a lawyer, taught me that American justice is 
dependent on these principles. As I grew up and became a lawyer 
myself, I experienced firsthand the significance of these 
bedrock principles and learned that it applies to all Americans 
accused of crimes, including the President. These principles of 
the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence help guide 
me now as we exercise our constitutional duty to judge the 
specific accusations of criminal behavior lodged against the 
President of the United States.
    The burden of proof on the House of Representatives that 
the President has committed serious crimes and should be 
removed from office is a heavy one, because overturning an 
election in a democracy is a drastic and dire action. The House 
has not carried that burden of proof as to the specific 
accusations against the President.
    The arguments of the House managers in support of the 
articles suffer from fundamental weaknesses. They repeatedly 
rely on inferences while ignoring direct testimony to the 
contrary; they omit key materials which contradict their 
charges; and they contain serious misstatements of key facts. 
In a matter of such consequence as the removal of an elected 
President from office, such a case should not lead to 
conviction.
    Let me cite some key examples from article II, the 
allegation of obstruction of justice. First, the House managers 
in their report, brief, and arguments to the Senate repeatedly 
rely on inferences to prove key points and ignore direct 
testimony to the contrary. In opening arguments, House Manager 
Hutchinson made the following claims:

    As evidenced by the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, [the President] 
encouraged her to lie.
    . . . [T]he testimony of Monica Lewinsky . . . leads to the 
conclusion that it was the President who initiated the retrieval of the 
gifts and the concealment of the evidence.
    . . . The President needed the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the 
false affidavit, and that was assured by the efforts to secure her a 
job.

    Mr. Hutchinson's arguments rely on inferences. Relying on 
inferences is not unique to proving a case. What is unique is 
that in this case, the House managers use inferences primarily 
from bits and pieces of testimony of people who explicitly deny 
those inferences in their direct testimony. The House managers' 
inference that the President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to lie 
was contradicted by Monica Lewinsky's direct testimony that the 
President never ``encouraged'' her to lie.
    The House managers' inference that ``it was President 
Clinton who initiated the retrieval of the gifts and the 
concealment of the evidence on December 28, 1997,'' was 
contradicted by Monica Lewinsky's direct testimony that she 
initiated the concealment of gifts. Not only is it an 
uncontested fact based on direct testimony that it was Monica 
Lewinsky who on December 22, 1997, following the receipt of a 
subpoena for gifts and having decided on her own to withhold 
gifts which would ``give away any kind of special 
relationship,'' brought to her attorney only those gifts that 
were ``innocuous'' and typical of the kind of gifts an intern 
might receive. It is also an uncontested fact based on direct 
testimony that it was Monica Lewinsky who, on December 28, 
1997, expressed her interest in wanting to hide the gifts when 
she said to the President that maybe she should transfer the 
gifts to Betty Currie. Ms. Lewinsky testified that the 
President either didn't respond to her comment or said he'd 
think about it.
    But what makes the managers' inference even more 
speculative is the fact that at the December 28 visit, the 
President gave Ms. Lewinsky even more gifts, including a bear 
carving from Vancouver, a small blanket and a stuffed animal. 
Why would the President give Ms. Lewinsky gifts at the same 
time he is asking her to conceal others he had already given 
her? I was struck by the House's answer. ``The only logical 
inference,'' according to the House managers, ``is that the 
gifts--including the bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit 
reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would deny the 
relationship--even in the face of a federal subpoena.''
    That inference, called ``the only logical inference,'' is 
not only the rankest form of speculation, it is also contrary 
to the direct evidence.
    The undisputed grand jury testimony was that the bear 
carving was brought back by the President from Vancouver, a 
trip which occurred weeks before Monica Lewinsky's name 
appeared on any witness list. We're not even offered 
speculation as to how the President could foresee that Monica 
Lewinsky would be on a witness list, and pick up a symbol of 
strength while in Vancouver so that he could give it to her as 
a reminder to deny their relationship in the face of some 
future, unforseen federal subpoena. But even more to the point, 
when Ms. Lewinsky was asked the direct question at the grand 
jury whether she interpreted the gift of the Vancouver bear 
carving as a signal to her to ``be strong in your decision to 
continue to conceal the relationship,'' her direct, one-word 
answer was ``no.''
    The managers' reliance on inferences from testimony of 
persons whose direct testimony contradicts the inferences was a 
recurring pattern during this trial. The managers alleged that 
the signing of the affidavit and the obtaining of the job for 
Ms. Lewinsky were linked, based on inference from bits and 
pieces of testimony of Monica Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan. But 
Vernon Jordan and Monica Lewinsky explicitly denied any such 
linkage. Ms. Lewinsky said, ``There was no agreement with the 
President, Jordan, or anyone else that [I] had to sign the 
Jones affidavit before getting a job in New York.'' Mr. Jordan 
told the grand jury in answer to the question whether the job 
search and affidavit signing were linked, ``unequivocally, 
indubitably, no.''
    Impeachment and removal should be based on sturdier 
foundations than the heap of inferences that have been placed 
before us, when those inferences are pieced together from bits 
of testimony of witnesses whose direct, explicit testimony 
contradicts the inferences. The House managers would have us 
overlook the forest of direct testimony while getting lost in 
the trees of their multiple inferences.
    The House managers' case also omitted directly relevant, 
contradictory material and misstated key facts. For instance, 
the House managers argued in their brief that relative to the 
job search assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, ``nothing happened in 
November of 1997.'' But, in fact, our Ambassador to the United 
Nations, at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
White House, offered Ms. Lewinsky a U.N. job on November 3.
    The House managers' report explicitly represented that 
``[t]he first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually 
get a job took place on December 11,'' and that ``[s]omething 
happened that changed the priority assigned to the job 
search.'' What happened, the managers argued, was a court order 
``on the morning of December 11'' by Judge Wright requiring 
President Clinton to provide information about prior 
relationships involving state and federal employees. The Senate 
was told by the House managers that ``[s]uddenly, Mr. Jordan 
and President Clinton were now very interested in helping Ms. 
Lewinsky find a good job in New York'' and that Vernon Jordan 
got active on the afternoon of December 11 when he and Ms. 
Lewinsky met.
    Manager Hutchinson said in his argument to the Senate:

    The witness list came in. The judge's order came in. That triggered 
the President to action. And the President triggered Vernon Jordan into 
action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job search along.

    But that key argument disintegrated before our eyes when it 
turned out that Judge Wright's December 11 order came late in 
the day, well after the meeting between Vernon Jordan and 
Monica Lewinsky, and in addition, the meeting had been 
scheduled many days before.
    With respect to the perjury article, the House managers 
failed to meet their burden as well. The President admitted to 
the grand jury that he did have ``inappropriate intimate 
contact'' with Monica Lewinsky when he was alone with her, and 
the House managers failed to identify specific statements that 
would meet the requirements of a perjury charge.
    The lack of substantive evidence supporting the charges 
explains why a panel of five highly regarded former Democratic 
and Republican federal prosecutors, who appeared before the 
House Judiciary Committee, testified that this case against the 
President would not have been pursued by a responsible federal 
prosecutor. Thomas Sullivan, who served for 4 years as U.S. 
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and whom 
Chairman Hyde described as having ``extraordinarily high'' 
qualifications had this to say:

    . . . [I]n conversations with many current and former Federal 
prosecutors in whose judgment I have great faith, virtually all concur 
that if the President were not involved--if an ordinary citizen were 
the subject of the inquiry--no serious consideration would be given to 
a criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in discovery in 
the Jones civil case, having to do with an alleged coverup of a private 
sexual affair with another woman or the follow-on testimony before the 
grand jury . . . I believe the President should be treated in the 
criminal justice system in the same way as any other United States 
citizen. If that were the case here, it is my view that the alleged 
obstruction of justice and perjury would not be prosecuted by a 
responsible United States Attorney.

    Finally, I have had a deep concern about the impeachment 
process which formed the basis of this trial. While my decision 
to reject the articles is based on the inadequate proof of the 
crimes alleged, the process which brought this matter to trial 
was deeply flawed.
    The articles of impeachment before us are based on 
materials, the so-called Starr Report, compiled by an outside 
prosecutor, not by the legislative branch itself, which has 
under the Constitution the ``sole'' responsibility for 
impeachment. Instead of doing an independent investigation, the 
House of Representatives unwisely delegated, in my judgment, 
the critically important investigative function to an outside 
prosecutorial foe of the President and an actual advocate of 
his impeachment. The House took that prosecutor's record and 
his testimony and made them the basis of articles of 
impeachment presented to us.
    The contrast to the Watergate investigation and the 
impeachment of President Nixon is stark. In the Watergate 
investigation, the Senate convened a select committee in 
February 1973 to investigate the Watergate break-in and other 
campaign irregularities in the 1972 election. That committee 
took testimony for a year. In February 1974, the House voted to 
direct the House Judiciary Committee to conduct an inquiry into 
impeachment. The committee conducted its own investigation, 
including subpoenaing the White House tapes and calling 
numerous fact witnesses. The committee also obtained the report 
of the grand jury meeting under the authority of Leon Jaworski, 
the Watergate prosecutor. In deciding to allow the grand jury 
report to be forwarded to the House Judiciary Committee, Judge 
Sirica found that the report:

    ``draws no accusatory conclusions . . . contains no 
recommendations, advice or statements that infringe on the prerogatives 
of other branches of government . . . (and) renders no moral or social 
judgments. The Report is a simple and straightforward compilation of 
information gathered by the Grand Jury, and no more . . .'' (In re 
Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972, Grand Jury Concerning 
Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, U.S. District 
Court, District of Columbia, March 18, 1974.)

    The report sent to the House of Representatives in the 
matter before us violated almost every standard followed by 
Judge Sirica. The Starr Report didn't present the evidence in 
an impartial manner as contemplated in the independent counsel 
law. It drew a host of ``accusatory conclusions'' and rendered 
judgments. The report contained a large volume of needlessly 
salacious detail and omitted or dismissed important exculpatory 
evidence. The impeachment process has suffered as a result.
    Moreover, the House made a significant and irreparable 
mistake in the actual drafting of the articles. Each article 
alleges multiple acts of wrongdoing. Thus, it would be 
impossible to determine after a vote on the articles whether a 
two-thirds majority of the Senate actually agreed on a 
particular allegation. Article I, for example, charges that 
President Clinton committed one or more of the four possible 
acts of perjury; article II charges that President Clinton 
committed one or more of seven possible acts of obstruction. 
Without separate votes on each of the alleged acts, it would be 
impossible to determine whether two-thirds of the Senate agreed 
that the President had committed any of the actions alleged. 
Since the Constitution requires conviction upon a vote of two-
thirds of the Senate, the articles as drafted do not allow us 
to guarantee to the American people that we are complying with 
the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. This is a flaw that 
cannot be fixed, because the Senate does not have authority to 
amend the articles.
    Alexander Hamilton, in ``The Federalist Papers,'' asked 
this question: ``Where else than in the Senate could have been 
found a tribunal . . . [which] . . . would be likely to feel 
confidence enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and 
uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual 
accused and . . . his accusers?''
    Each of us, however we vote, will soon answer that 
question, as we stand between the accuser and the accused, 
weighing the evidence. The issue before us is not whether the 
President's conduct was reprehensible; that is clear beyond any 
reasonable doubt. The issue is whether the President committed 
the alleged crimes for which he should be removed from office, 
a proposition which places on his accusers a heavy burden of 
proof. It is a burden the House managers have not met, and I 
will, therefore, vote against the articles of impeachment.
    I would like to add my thoughts on censure as well, since 
this may be the only appropriate opportunity to do so. I 
support the censure resolution authored by Senator Feinstein, 
and I commend her for her openness, diligence and hard work in 
bringing to fruitition a bipartisan product. The President 
should know, the American people should know, and history 
should know that by voting to acquit on impeachment, we did not 
vote to acquit the President for his egregious conduct. I know 
of no Senator who is not deeply troubled by the President's 
conduct. While I do not believe the President's conduct in his 
private, consensual sexual relationship should have become the 
business of the American public, it did in fact become so, and 
when it did the President had the duty to tell the truth. And 
no matter how wrong or improper that disclosure of the 
President's private life was, it does not justify the lies the 
President told to the American people, his family and his 
staff.
    I hope that our votes today on impeachment will conclude 
this unfortunate chapter in our political history and that the 
President, through a forthright acknowledgment of the 
wrongfulness of his behavior, will lead the nation toward 
healing the wounds these events have opened. I believe the 
American people want an end to this matter more than anything, 
and that any further criminal investigation of the President 
with respect to the matters under Mr. Starr's jurisdiction 
should be immediately concluded. While Senator Feinstein's 
censure resolution states that President Clinton remains 
subject to criminal indictment, that is in the resolution as a 
statement of fact and not as a statement of encouragement. 
Indictment after this impeachment trial would not be 
appropriate nor would it be in the public interest. Today's 
votes should bring this tragic episode to an end.
    Mr. Chief Justice, as we close this chapter in the Senate's 
life and prepare our records for the annals of history, there 
are several points which I wish to highlight in a series of 
appendices.
    I ask unanimous consent that the appendices be printed in 
the Record.
    There being no objection, the appendices were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                               Appendix A

    The indisputable, underlying reality of the impeachment case was 
that Monica Lewinsky's denial of a sexual relationship with the 
President was part of a long-term understanding and pattern, long 
before the subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
    ``Q. Had you talked with him earlier about these false explanations 
about what you were doing visiting him on several occasions?
    ``A. Several occasions throughout the relationship. Yes. It was a 
pattern of the relationship to sort of conceal it.''--Grand Jury 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, 
Page 844.
    ``A Juror: Did you ever discuss with the President whether you 
should deny the relationship if you were asked about it?
    ``A. I think I always offered that.''--Grand Jury Testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 1077.
    ``A. And she [Linda Tripp] told me that I should put it in a safe 
deposit box because it could be evidence one day. And I said that was 
ludicrous because I would never--I would never disclose that I had a 
relationship with the President. I would never need it.''--Grand Jury 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, 
Page 1107.
    ``A Juror: And what about the next sentence also? Something to the 
effect that if two people who are involved say it didn't happen, it 
didn't happen. Do you recall him saying that to you?
    ``A. Sitting here today, very vaguely . . . And this was--I mean, 
this was early--obviously not something we discussed too often, I 
think, because it was--it's a somewhat unpleasant thought of having to 
deny it, having it even come to that point.
    ``A Juror: Is it possible that you also had these discussions after 
you learned that you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
    ``A. I don't believe so. No.
    ``A Juror: Can you exclude the possibility?
    ``A. I pretty much can.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 
Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 1119.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix B

    Did Ms. Lewinsky think her affidavit in the Paula Jones case was 
false when she signed it?
    ``Ms. L had a physically intimate relationship with the President. 
Neither the Pres. nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or 
encouraged Ms. L to lie. Ms. L was comfortable signing the affidavit 
with regard to the `sexual relationship' because she could justify to 
herself that she and the Pres. did not have sexual intercourse.''--
Proffer of Monica Lewinsky to the Independent Counsel.
    ``Q. When he said that you might sign an affidavit, what did you 
understand it to mean at that time?
    ``A. I thought that signing an affidavit could range from anywhere 
between maybe just somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous things or 
going as far as maybe having to deny any kind of relationship.''--Grand 
Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel 
Appendices, Page 844.
    ``Q. You were trying to be truthful throughout [the proffer]?
    ``A. Exactly.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; 
Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 1142.
    ``A. But I did some justifying in signing the affidavit, so--
    ``Q. Justifying--does the word `rationalizing' apply as well?
    ``A. Rationalize, yes.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 
Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 925.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix C

    House Managers implied that when the President allegedly told John 
Podesta Ms. Lewinsky threatened him, the President was lying. But 
Monica Lewinsky did write a threatening letter to President Clinton.
    ``If you believe the aides testified truthfully to the grand jury 
about what the President told them about his relationship, the 
President told them many falsehoods, absolute falsehoods. So when the 
President described them under oath to the grand jury as truths, he 
lied and committed the crime of perjury. One example of this comes from 
Deputy Chief John Podesta . . . [a]nother is Sidney Blumenthal. His 
testimony was that on January 23 the President told him that . . . 
Lewinsky threatened him and said that she would tell people that they 
had had an affair . . .''--House Manager McCollum, Congressional 
Record, January 15, 1999, Page S266.
    ``Q. You mentioned that in that July 3rd letter that you sent to 
the President through Betty you made a reference to the fact that you 
might have to explain things to your parents. What did you mean by 
that? . . . Were you meaning to threaten the President that you were 
going to tell, for example, your father about the sexual relationship 
with the President?
    ``A. Yes and no.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part 
One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 807.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix D

    There was much debate about the consequences of calling live 
witnesses. The President's lawyers argued that calling witnesses would 
require them to engage in extensive discovery and would significantly 
stretch out the trial. It is relevant in evaluating that claim to look 
at the impeachments of Judge Nixon and Judge Alcee Hastings. In both of 
those cases, the Judges' attorneys were given extensive discovery, 
including Justice Department files, to prepare their defense. See 
letter of Senator Wyche Fowler, Chairman of the Senate Impeachment 
Trial Committee, and letter of Professor Terence Anderson, University 
of Miami School of Law, below:

                                               U.S. Senate,
                                     Washington, DC, July 18, 1989.
John C. Keeney,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of 
        Justice, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Keeney: As Chairman of the Senate Impeachment Trial 
Committee on the Articles of Impeachment against Judge Nixon, I write 
to request the Department's assistance in the Committee's efforts to 
assure that Judge Nixon receives a fair trial in the Senate. The 
Committee has determined that it would make a useful contribution to 
the trial process if the Department were willing to permit the 
Committee, through its staff, to review the documents (excluding grand 
jury materials governed by Rule 6(e)) in the possession of the 
Department, including those possessed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, that were requested by Judge Nixon in his June 1, 1989 
letter to the Attorney General, which was the subject of your response 
on June 21, 1989.
    The review would be consistent with that conducted in the case of 
the Hastings impeachment matter. That is, the focus of the review would 
be to determine if there is evidence that the investigations were 
conducted in a manner intended to mislead a court or trier of fact as 
to Judge Nixon's guilt or innocence. In the event that it is determined 
that particular documents should properly be made part of the pending 
impeachment proceedings, and accordingly made available to the parties 
for use at trial, the committee would hear from the Department prior to 
disclosing any documents that you believe contain particularly 
sensitive matters, so that we may address any continuing concerns that 
you have. No documents or portions of documents would be made available 
to the parties without the consent of the Department.
    Your expeditious response to this request would be most helpful to 
the committee in attempting to complete discovery by July 31st.
            Sincerely,
                                                  Wyche Fowler, Jr.
                                 ______
                                 
                     The University of Miami School of Law,
                                Coral Gables, FL, January 28, 1999.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate.

                   Discovery Precedents From Hastings

    Dear Senator Levin: Ms. Linda Gustitus asked that I describe the 
process by which and the materials to which I was given access as 
counsel for then Judge Hastings during the impeachment trial 
proceedings before the United States Senate. After the matter was 
referred to an Impeachment Trial Committee, I submitted requests for 
production of documents to the House, to the Investigating Committee of 
the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Justice Department. Over the initial objections 
of the House Managers, at the ``request'' of the Impeachment Trial 
Committee I received documents from all but the Justice Department. In 
lieu of direct production, the Impeachment Trial Committee examined the 
sensitive Justice Department materials to determine what should be 
supplied. I was also permitted to take at least three discovery 
depositions. The proceedings that resulted in this production are 
reported in Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, S. Hrg. 101-
194, Pt. I (Pretrial Matters).
    By way of illustrations I enclose an appendix to a memorandum that 
I submitted to the Impeachment Trial Committee. That appendix describes 
in some detail the materials that I received from the FBI and my 
estimate that in the aggregate the production amounted to about 16,000. 
The enclosed copy was reproduced from S. Hrg. 101-194, Pt. I at 433-
436. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.
            Sincerely,
                                       Terence J. Anderson.
                                                  Professor of Law.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix E

    Many of us in the Senate thought the House of Representatives 
failed to meet its responsibilities by not calling witnesses before the 
House Judiciary Committee. A review of impeachments shows that in every 
impeachment but the one (where the subject of the impeachment was 
mentally incompetent and the House relied on the record of his 
decisions as a judge), the House called fact witnesses. According to 
information obtained by my staff from the Congressional Research 
Service, there have been 16 impeachments by the House. Fourteen of 
those impeachments have resulted in trials in the Senate; two did not 
because the impeached officials resigned.
    Fifteen of those impeachments had fact witnesses in the House; one 
didn't. That was the case of Judge Pickering. He was impeached for 
being mentally incapacitated. There were charges of drunkenness and 
``ungentlemanly language'' in the courtroom. The articles against him, 
however, all dealt with his rulings and decisions that ``proved'' he 
was mentally incompetent. During the House inquiry, a number of 
affidavits were presented.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix F

    Independent counsel Kenneth Starr intervened in the Senate 
impeachment trial by obtaining a court order addressed to Monica 
Lewinsky requiring her to meet privately with House Managers, based on 
a motion and ex parte hearing with no notice to the Senate counsel or 
White House counsel. The independent counsel then mischaracterized his 
own action in seeking that order, describing it as seeking an 
``interpretation'' rather than an ``order''.
    See the letters to Kenneth Starr, Robert Bittman, Jacob Stein, & 
Robert Bittman; the Emergency Motion on Immunity Agreement; the letter 
to Congressman Henry Hyde; the letter to Sen. Daschle; Congressman 
Hyde's press release; the order of Judge Norma Holloway Johnson and the 
transcript of Mr. Starr's remarks as follow:
                                            Washington, DC,
                                                  January 21, 1999.
Hon. Kenneth W. Starr,
Office of Independent Counsel,
Washington, DC.

Re Interview of Monica Lewinsky
    Dear Independent Counsel Starr: I am writing to you as the Lead 
Manager of the Managers of the Impeachment Trial of William Jefferson 
Clinton, currently underway in the United States Senate. We are in the 
process of selecting witnesses for testimony in these proceedings. The 
attorneys for Monica Lewinsky have declined to make her available for 
an interview.
    We have reviewed a copy of Ms. Lewinsky's Immunity Agreement. 
Pursuant to paragraph 1(c) of that Agreement, it would appear that she 
is required to submit to interviews and debriefings if so requested by 
the Office of Independent Counsel.
    We would like to arrange an interview with Ms. Lewinsky prior to 
any such testimony. We would be happy to accommodate her wishes as to 
the precise time and location of that interview. However, it is 
important that this interview be scheduled to take place on the 
earliest possible date, specifically Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Your 
assistance with this interview will be appreciated.
    Thank you for your prompt attention.
            Sincerely,
                                     Henry H. Hyde,
                                  On Behalf of the Managers
                                          on the Part of the House.
                                 ______
                                 
                             Law Offices of Plato Cacheris,
                                  Washington, DC, January 21, 1999.
Robert J. Bittman, Esquire,
Deputy Independent Counsel, Office of the Independent Counsel, 
        Washington, DC.
    Dear Bob: In your call today you mentioned that the managers 
requested Ms. Lewinsky's cooperation by way of an interview. As I told 
you, we believe it is inappropriate for Ms. Lewinsky to be placed in 
the position of a partisan--meeting with one side and not the other--in 
this unique proceeding. Therefore, we have recommended against 
interviews with either side.
            Sincerely,
                                   Jacob A. Stein.
                                   Plato Cacheris.
                                 ______
                                 
                                       Independent Counsel,
                                  Washington, DC, January 21, 1999.
Jacob A. Stein, Esq.,
Stein, Mitchell & Mezines,
 Washington, DC.
Plato Cacheris, Esq.,
Law Offices of Plato Cacheris,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Jake and Plato: Pursuant to her Immunity Agreement with this 
Office, we hereby request that Monica Lewinsky meet for an interview 
with the House of Representatives' Impeachment Managers this Friday, 
Saturday, or Sunday, January 22, 23, or 24, 1999.
    As you will recall, both parties contemplated congressional 
proceedings at the time we entered into the Immunity Agreement. The 
Agreement specifically requires Ms. Lewinsky to ``testify truthfully . 
. . in any . . . congressional proceedings.'' It further requires Ms. 
Lewinsky to ``make herself available for any interviews upon reasonable 
request,'' and stipulates that these interviews may include 
``representatives of any other institutions as the OIC may require.''
    While I understand Ms. Lewinsky's misgivings, I must disagree with 
one statement in your letter to me today: your assertion that 
submitting to an interview would make Ms. Lewinsky into a partisan. The 
Managers are acting on behalf of the House of Representatives as a 
whole, not on behalf of a political party. Their task is constitutional 
in nature.
    Please feel free to call me if you have any questions.
            Sincerely,
                                         Robert J. Bittman,
                                        Deputy Independent Counsel.
                                 ______
                                 
                                 Stein, Mitchell & Mezines,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 1999.
Robert J. Bittman, Esquire,
Office of the Independent Counsel,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Bob: 
    1. We have your January 21, 1999 letter.
    2. The Agreement does not require Ms. Lewinsky to be interviewed by 
the House Managers or any Congressional body.
    3. Paragraph 1.C. of the Agreement states: ``Ms. Lewinsky will be 
fully debriefed concerning her knowledge of and participation in any 
activities within the OIC's jurisdiction. This debriefing will be 
conducted by the OIC, including attorneys, law enforcement agents, and 
representatives of any other institutions as the OIC may require. Ms. 
Lewinsky will make herself available for any interviews upon reasonable 
requests.''
    4. This paragraph deals with OIC debriefings, not OIC's acting as 
an agent for others.
    5. The Senate itself has provided its own rules for witness 
interviews. As we understand them, there first must be a deposition 
with equal access. As of now the Senate has not voted for depositions.
    6. Ms. Lewinsky will, of course, respond to a subpoena to appear 
and testify before the Senate. Yesterday, we raised with you the issue 
of immunity for any proposed congressional testimony. You opined that 
your office could grant such immunity in conformance with Title 18 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6002, 6005. It is our understanding that only the 
Senate by majority vote can do that. We would appreciate your supplying 
your legal authority for your position.
            Sincerely,
                                   Jabob A. Stein.
                                   Plato Cacheris.
                                 ______
                                 
  [In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
                         Misc. No. 99-  (NHJ)]

                      In Re Grand Jury Proceedings

  emergency motion of the united states of america for enforcement of 
                           immunity agreement
    The United States of America, by Kenneth W. Starr, Independent 
Counsel, respectfully submits this motion for an order requiring Ms. 
Lewinsky to comply with the terms of her Immunity Agreement (the 
``Agreement'') with the Office of the Independent Counsel (``OIC''). 
Ms. Lewinsky has refused an OIC request that she be debriefed by the 
House of Representatives, as required by the Agreement. The United 
States respectfully requests that this Court orders Ms. Lewinsky to 
comply with the Agreement by allowing herself to be debriefed.
I. Factual background
    As this Court is no doubt aware, the United States Senate is 
currently conducting an Impeachment Trial of the President of the 
United States. According to public reports, it is expected that the 
House will be required to submit to the Senate its motion to call 
witnesses as early as Monday, January 25. Again according to public 
reports, some potential witnesses have spoken with the House Managers 
as the Managers attempt to determine which witnesses should be 
mentioned in their motion to the Senate.
    On January 21, 1999, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J. 
Hyde, on behalf of the House of Representatives, as represented by its 
duly-appointed Managers, asked for the OIC's assistance in having Ms. 
Lewinsky debriefed by the House. See letter from Henry J. Hyde to 
Kenneth W. Starr (Jan. 21, 1999) (Attachment A). The House stressed 
that it needs this debriefing to occur no later than Sunday, January 
24.
    That same day, the OIC sent a letter to Ms. Lewinsky's counsel 
requesting that Ms. Lewinsky allow herself to be debriefed by the House 
Managers. See letter from Robert J. Bittman, Deputy Independent 
Counsel, to Jacob A. Stein, Esq. and Plato Cacheris, Esq. (Jan. 21, 
1999) (Attachment C). At approximately 1:20 p.m. this afternoon, Ms. 
Lewinsky informed the OIC that she does not intend to comply with this 
request. See letter from Jacob A. Stein and Plato Cacheris to Robert J. 
Bittman (Jan. 22, 1999) (Attachment D).
II. The immunity agreement plainly requires Ms. Lewinsky to be 
        debriefed by any institution that the OIC specifies
    Ordinary contract law principles govern immunity agreements. See In 
re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, Misc. No. 98-59 (NHJ), slip op. at 
12 (D.D.C. May 1, 1998) (under seal) (``Courts generally interpret 
immunity and proffer agreements, like plea agreements, under principles 
of contract law.''), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Sealed Case, 144 
F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); accord United States v. Black, 
776 F.2d 1321, 1326 (6th Cir. 1985) (``Like a plea agreement, an 
immunity agreement is contractual in nature and may be interpreted 
according to contract law principles.''); United States v. Irvine, 756 
F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (``Generally speaking, a 
cooperation-immunity agreement is contractual) in nature and subject to 
contract law standards.''); United States v. Hembree, 754 F.2d 314, 317 
(10th Cir. 1985) (characterizing an immunity agreement as ``simply a 
contract'').
    Under contract law, an agreement is interpreted according to its 
plain terms. See Nicholson v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 180, 191 
(1993). The operative portion of the Immunity Agreement states: ``C. 
Ms. Lewinsky will be fully debriefed concerning her knowledge of and 
participation in any activities within the OIC's jurisdiction. This 
debriefing will be conducted by the OIC, including attorneys, law 
enforcement agents, and representatives of any other institutions as 
the OIC may require. Ms. Lewinsky will make herself available for any 
interviews upon reasonable request.'' Immunity Agreement para. 1.C 
(emphasis added) (Attachment E). This provision follows paragraph 1.B, 
which expressly requires Ms. Lewinsky to ``testify truthfully . . . in 
. . . congressional proceedings.''
    By the plain terms of the Agreement, Ms. Lewinsky has agreed to be 
debriefed by representatives of any institution, when so required by 
the OIC. She is also required to ``make herself available for any 
interviews upon reasonable request.'' The duly-appointed House Managers 
represent the House of Representatives, which plainly is an 
institution. The OIC has unambiguously requested that Ms. Lewinsky 
submit to each debriefing. Accordingly, Ms. Lewinsky must allow herself 
to be debriefed by the House Managers or she will have violated the 
Agreement.
    To be sure, Ms. Lewinsky has the right to have her ``debriefing . . 
. conducted by the OIC.'' The OIC, of course, is fully willing to 
conduct these debriefings, if Ms. Lewinsky so desires. The suggestion 
in her counsel's letter that this provision is void if the OIC is 
``acting as an agent for other,'' Attachment D at para. 4, is contrary 
to the Agreement, as there is no such limitation on Ms. Lewinsky's 
duties. A party to an agreement may not invent clauses to a contract 
that are not contained therein.
    In any event, the OIC is not acting as an agent for the House 
Managers. The OIC has its own continuing duty to provide the House with 
information relating to impeachment. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c).
    Ms. Lewinsky's counsel's other suggestion--that a debriefing would 
be contrary to Senate Rules, see Attachment D at para. 5--is equally 
without merit. Senate Resolution 16 (106th Cong.) states, in relevant 
part: ``If the Senate agrees to allow either the House or the President 
to call witnesses, the witnesses shall first be deposed and the Senate 
shall decide after deposition which witnesses shall testify, pursuant 
to the impeachment rules.'' Although it is plain that depositions may 
not be conducted absent a vote of the Senate, nothing in this 
resolution restricts the ability of the House to debrief witnesses in a 
nondeposition setting. Indeed, it would be strange for the Senate to 
prohibit the House and the President from doing the investigation 
necessary to determine whether they wish to call witnesses and which 
witnesses to list in their motions.
III. This court should grant an order requiring Ms. Lewinsky to comply 
        with the immunity agreement or forfeit its protection
    Under the Agreement, this Court has the authority to determine 
whether Ms. Lewinsky has ``violated any provision of this Agreement.'' 
Immunity Agreement para. 30. ``[A] declaratory judgment will ordinarily 
be granted only when it will either serve a useful purpose in 
clarifying the legal relations in issue or terminate and afford relief 
from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving right to the 
proceeding.'' Tierney v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, a declaratory 
judgment will resolve the uncertainty arising from this controversy 
between the OIC and Ms. Lewinsky by settling whether she has the right 
to refuse to be debriefed without forfeiting the protections of the 
Agreement.
    Indeed, declaratory judgment is a common remedy when a party to a 
contract intends conduct that may be a breach: `` `(A) party to a 
contract is not compelled to wait until he has committed an act which 
the other party asserts will constitute a breach, but may seek relief 
by declaratory judgment and have the controversy adjudicated in order 
that he may avoid the risk of damages or other untoward consequence.' 
'' (Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.) 
331 F.2d 1000, 1002 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (quoting Keener Oil & Gas v. 
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 190 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1951)); 
see Gilbert, Segall & Young v. Bank of Montreal, 785 F. Supp. 453. 462 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Fine v. Property Damage Appraisers, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 
1304, 1309-10 (E.D. La. 1975). Accordingly, this Court has the power to 
issue a declaratory judgment before Ms. Lewinsky's actions become 
irreversible.
IV. Conclusion
    The Immunity Agreement plainly requires that Ms. Lewinsky allow 
herself to be debriefed by any institution at the request of the OIC. 
Ms. Lewinsky has the right to insist that the OIC conduct the 
debriefing, but she must comply with the plain terms of the Immunity 
Agreement. Accordingly, the United States respectfully requests that 
this Court enter an order requiring Ms. Lewinsky to submit to 
debriefing by the House.
    The Senate's schedule requires the House to submit its motion to 
call witnesses as early as Monday, and the House has stressed its need 
to debrief Ms. Lewinsky this weekend. Accordingly, the United States 
respectfully requests that this Court act on this motion as an 
emergency matter. Specifically, we request a hearing on this matter 
today.
    Respectfully submitted,
                                   Kenneth W. Starr,
                                           Independent Counsel.
                                   Robert J. Bittman,
                                           Deputy Independent Counsel.
                                   Joseph M. Ditkoff,
                                           Associate Independent 
                                               Counsel.
                                   Richard C. Killough,
                                           Assistant Independent 
                                               Counsel.
                                 ______
                                 
                                            Washington, DC,
                                                  January 23, 1999.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Manager Hyde: We understand that the Office of Independent 
Counsel, on behalf of the House Managers, sought a court order to 
compel Ms. Lewinsky to submit to an interview with the Managers in 
preparation for her possible testimony. We further understand that 
Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson has granted the order sought by the 
Independent Counsel.
    As you know, Senate Resolution 16, which was passed by a 100-0 vote 
just over two weeks ago, expressly deferred any consideration or action 
related to additional witness testimony until after opening 
presentations, a question-and-answer period and an affirmative vote to 
compel such testimony. These actions by the Managers, undertaken 
without notice to the Senate or the President's Counsel, raise profound 
questions of fundamental fairness and undermine the ability of this 
body to control the discovery procedures that will take place under the 
imprimatur of its authority.
    In light of these concerns, we ask that you withdraw any and all 
requests to Mr. Starr that he assist your efforts to interview Ms. 
Lewinsky. The Senate, in a matter of days, will have an opportunity to 
formally address this issue pursuant to the procedures established by 
Senate Resolution 16. Moreover, we insist that you take no action 
related to the proposed interview of any witness until such time as the 
Senate has given you the authority to do so.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Harry Reid.
    [Also signed by 43 Senators.]
                                 ______
                                 
                                            Washington, DC,
                                                  January 23, 1999.
Hon. Tom Daschle,
Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Democratic Leader: I am in receipt of your letter of today 
expressing your concern with the House of Representatives' request to 
interview Monica Lewinsky.
    It has always been the position of the House Managers that a full 
trial with the benefit of relevant witnesses is in the best interest of 
the Senate and the American people. Representatives of President 
Clinton and many Senators have publicly stated that they want the 
Senate to preclude the testimony of witnesses. Many other Senators have 
made it clear that they prefer the witness lists for both sides to be 
sharply focused and limited to only the most relevant witnesses. The 
Managers have been mindful of these Senators' concerns.
    It is clear that the two most important witnesses in this trial are 
President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky. Yesterday, I wrote to Majority 
Leader Lott and you to express the Managers' willingness to participate 
in the fair examination of the President if the Senate chooses to 
invite him to testify. The presentation of the President's counsel 
ended just two days ago. We are in the process of evaluating that 
presentation and determining what witnesses we will request the Senate 
to call. We believe that interviewing Ms. Lewinsky will help us make 
this determination. Counsel for the President may have already 
interviewed witnesses or may wish to interview witnesses they will 
propose to the Senate. That is their prerogative. The Senate has 
required us to submit a proffer of anticipated testimony of any 
proposed witnesses. Interviews of potential witnesses will assist the 
parties in providing the Senate with informative proffers.
    The House of Representatives has not violated S. Res. 16. When the 
House passed H. Res. 10 appointing the Mangers, it authorized that the 
Managers may ``in connection with the preparation and the conduct of 
the trial, exhibit the articles of impeachment to the Senate and take 
all other actions necessary, which may include . . . sending for 
persons and papers . . .'' Implicit in this authority is the ability to 
conduct interviews and gather additional information relevant to the 
articles of impeachment.
    The Managers, who represent the House of Representatives, retain 
powers separate and apart from the Senate. The Managers are not, just 
as the President's Counsel are not, an office or subset of the Senate. 
The Managers, like the President's Counsel, may conduct activities, 
such as further investigation and legal research, that are not 
specifically authorized by the Senate.
    Senate Resolution 16 does not prohibit the Managers from conducting 
further investigation or interviews of witnesses. If the resolution was 
intended to restrict the Managers in this way, we believe that it would 
violate principles of bicameralism, the ability of each House to 
establish its own rules of procedure, and would therefore be an 
unconstitutional infringement on the prerogatives of the House.
    Implicit in the right of the Managers to report to the House 
amendments to articles of impeachment, is the right of the Managers to 
receive and evaluate additional information. For example, if the 
Managers received additional exculpatory or inculpatory information, 
they could file amendments to the articles of impeachment in the House.
    Senate Resolution 16 set a schedule for deciding whether to depose 
witnesses. The decision to depose witnesses is subject to a request 
from the House Managers. The House Managers have decided that they need 
to talk with Ms. Lewinsky before making a recommendation to the Senate 
to depose her. The action of the House Managers is not unusual. It is 
not unfair, and it is not contrary to the rules of the Senate.
    With all due respect to the Senate, the rules and the 
constitutional principles of bicameralism do not require that the House 
obtain the permission of the Senate merely to conduct an interview of a 
potential witness. A decision to merely interview a witness as opposed 
to conducting a deposition, does not interfere with the Senate's 
ability to control the procedures set forth under S. Res. 16.
            Sincerely,
                                     Henry J. Hyde,
                           On behalf of the Managers on the
                              Part of the House of Representatives.
                                 ______
                                 
 [From the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 
                        Henry J. Hyde, Chairman]

                  Managers' Response to Judge's Ruling

    (Washington, D.C.)--Paul McNulty, chief spokesman for the House 
Managers, made the following statement today following Judge Johnson's 
ruling that Monica Lewinsky must cooperate with the managers' request 
for an interview, in keeping with her immunity agreement:
    ``Monica Lewinsky received extraordinary protection in exchange for 
her truthful testimony. Judge Johnson ruled that she has an obligation 
to cooperate in the search for truth.
    ``Ms. Lewinsky's testimony has never been more important than it is 
now. In the last four days, the White House has challenged the 
reliability of her testimony in a number of key instances relating to 
her conversations with the President and Ms. Currie.
    ``Ms. Lewinsky can resolve some of these crucial conflicts, and 
House Managers have a responsibility to interview her before deciding 
to call her as a witness. This is Lawyering 101--any good lawyer would 
talk to a witness before deciding to put her on the witness stand. When 
the House of Representatives appointed the Managers, it also granted 
them the investigative authority necessary to find the truth.
    ``The White House's protests are psuedo-objections designed to 
divert attention from the President's behavior.''
                                 ______
                                 
  [In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
                         Misc. No. 99-32 (NHJ)]

                      In re Grand Jury Proceedings

                                 order
    Upon consideration of the Emergency Motion of the United States of 
America for Enforcement of Immunity Agreement, it is hereby ordered 
that the Motion is granted. It is further ordered that Monica S. 
Lewinsky allow herself to be debriefed by the House Managers, to be 
conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel if she so requests, 
or forfeit her protections under the Immunity Agreement between Ms. 
Lewinsky and the OIC.

January 23, 1999.
                                    Norma Holloway Johnson,
                                                       Chief Judge.
                                 ______
                                 

          Excerpt from CBS Radio Transcript, January 24, 1999

 kenneth starr delivers remarks concerning the upcoming interview with 
                   monica lewinsky; washington, d.c.
    QUESTION: Sir, people are saying on Capitol Hill that you're trying 
to influence the trial by bringing back Monica, before they had a 
chance to vote.
    What do you say about that?
    STARR: Well, as I indicated, we had a request from the Lead 
Manager, Chairman Hyde, it was a formal request. And we responded as I 
felt that we were obligated to do to that request. And we then took 
what I felt was the appropriate action and we went to court.
    I want to make it very clear that Chief Judge Johnson has only 
interpreted the agreement between Ms. Lewinsky, who's advised by her 
very able lawyers, and our office. She did not direct an order in any 
sense other than to interpret the meaning of the agreement, which we 
asked her to interpret. So, I want it to be very, very clear that the 
judge was simply acting at our request to interpret the terms of the 
agreement, which we believe are quite clear.
    QUESTION: Senator Harkin said yesterday that Judge Johnson may not 
have acted, you know, constitutionally. Do you have any comment on 
that?
    STARR: Well we think that we have taken the appropriate action in 
going to the court and the court acted appropriately in interpreting 
the agreement, which is all that she did. So if there is an issue, the 
issue has to be one that's entrusted to the wisdom of the Senate. And 
their relationship with the House managers.
    But from our standpoint, the agreement we felt was clear, we asked 
the judge to determine whether our interpretation of the agreement was 
clear. And she has issued her ruling.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix G

    Although the House Managers argued strenuously about the need to 
call witnesses in the Senate trial, their position in the House of 
Representatives on the same subject was the opposite.
    ``Well, they've already testified . . . I don't think we need to 
reinvent the wheel. To keep calling people to reiterate what they've 
already said under oath.''--Rep. Henry Hyde, CNN, October 10, 1998.
    ``I don't really believe that we need more live testimony from 
those type of witnesses. We have sworn testimony from Monica Lewinsky, 
from Betty Currie, from all the principal players. We also have sworn 
testimony from corroborating witnesses to their testimony . . . And--
and . . . I don't think we need any former witnesses. I don't think we 
need to bring any in.''--Rep. Bill McCollum, NBC ``Saturday Today'', 
November 28, 1998.
    ``Bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already 
concretely in the record would be a waste of time and serve no purpose 
at all.''--Rep. George Gekas, New York Times, November 6, 1998.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix H

    Although the House Managers argued strenuously about the need to 
call witnesses in the Senate trial, they also claimed that the record 
conclusively proved the President's guilt.
    ``A reasonable and impartial review of the record as it presently 
exists demands nothing less than a guilty verdict.''--House Manager 
Bryant, Congressional Record, January 14, 1999, Page S232.
    ``Finally, before turning to that merger of the law and the facts, 
which I believe will illustrate conclusively that this President has 
committed and ought to be convicted on perjury and obstruction of 
justice . . .''--House Manager Barr, Congressional Record, January 15, 
1999, Page S274.
    ``[L]adies and gentlemen of the Senate, there are conclusive facts 
here that support a conviction.''--House Manager Bryant, Congressional 
Record, February 8, 1999, Page S1358.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix I

    At times, the House Managers took different and oft-time 
conflicting positions on the need to call witnesses in the Senate 
trial.
    ``I submit that the state of the evidence is such that unless and 
until the President has the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and himself, to testify if he desires, 
there could not be any doubt of his guilt on the facts.''--House 
Manager Bryant, Congressional Record, January 14, 1999, Page S232.
    ``[I]f we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--which I hope to be 
able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his loyalties 
lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his eyes and determine 
the truthfulness of his statements. You must decide whether he is 
telling the truth or withholding information.''--House Manager 
Hutchinson, Congressional Record, January 14, 1999, Page S234.
    ``The case against the President rests to a great extent on whether 
or not you believe Monica Lewinsky. But it is also based on the sworn 
testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie, Sidney Blumenthal, John 
Podesta and corroborating witnesses. Time and again, the President says 
one thing and they say something entirely different. . . . But if you 
have serious doubts about the truthfulness of any of these witnesses, 
I, again, as all my colleagues do, encourage you to bring them in 
here.''--House Manager McCollum, Congressional Record, January 15, 
1999, Page S266.
    ``[O]n the record, the weight of the evidence, taken from what we 
have given you today, what you can read in all these books back here . 
. . I don't know what the witnesses will say, but, I assume if they are 
consistent, they'll say the same that's in here.''--House Manager 
McCollum, Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S266-S267.
    ``[N]o one in this Chamber at this juncture does not know all the 
facts that are pertinent to this case. That is a magnificent 
accomplishment on the part of the managers.''--House Manager Gekas, 
Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S267.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix J

    The House of Representatives articles were intended to charge 
President Clinton with specific crimes.
    ``[T]his honorable Senate must do the right thing. It must listen 
to the evidence; it must determine whether William Jefferson Clinton 
repeatedly broke our criminal laws and thus broke his trust with the 
people.''--House Manager Sensenbrenner, Congressional Record, January 
14, 1999, Page S227.
    ``Moreover, in engaging in this course of conduct, referring here 
to the words of the obstruction statute found at section 1503 of the 
Criminal Code, the President's actions constituted an endeavor to 
influence or impede the due administration of justice in that he was 
attempting to prevent the plaintiff in the Jones case from having a 
`free and fair opportunity to learn what she may learn concerning the 
material facts surrounding her claim'. These acts by the President also 
constituted an endeavor to `corruptly persuade another person with the 
intent to influence the testimony they might give in an official 
proceeding'. Such are the elements of tampering with witnesses found at 
section 1512 of the Federal Criminal Code.''--House Manager Barr, 
Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S274-S275.
    ``Under both sections of the Federal Criminal Code, that is, 1503, 
obstruction, and 1512, obstruction in the form of witness tampering, 
the President's conduct constituted a Federal crime and satisfies the 
elements of those statutes.''--House Manager Barr, Congressional 
Record, January 15, 1999, Page S275.
    ``The evidence, however, clearly establishes that the President's 
statement constitutes perjury, in violation of section 1623 of the U.S. 
Federal Criminal Code for the simple reason the only realistic way Ms. 
Lewinsky could get out of having to testify based on her affidavit. 
There was no other way it could have happened. The President knew this. 
Ms. Lewinsky knew this. And the President's testimony on this point is 
perjury within the clear meaning of the Federal perjury statute. It was 
willful, it was knowing, it was material, and it was false.''--House 
Manager Barr, Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S275.
    ``Please keep in mind also, it is not required that the target of 
the defendant's actions actually testify falsely. In fact, the witness 
tampering statute can be violated even when there is no proceeding 
pending at the time the defendant acted in suggesting testimony. As the 
cases discussed by Manager Cannon demonstrate, for a conviction under 
either section 1503, obstruction, or 1512, obstruction by witness 
tampering, it is necessary only to show it was possible the target of 
the defendant's actions might be called as a witness. That element has 
been more than met under the facts of this case.''--House Manager Barr, 
Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S276.
    ``In my opening statement before this body, I outlined the four 
elements of perjury: An oath, intent, falsity, materiality. In this 
case, all those elements have been met.''--House Manager Chabot, 
Congressional Record, February 8, 1999, Page S1341.
    ``In the past month, you have heard much about the Constitution; 
and about the law. Probably more than you'd prefer; in a dizzying 
recitation of the U.S. Criminal Code: 18 U.S.C. 1503. 18 U.S.C. 1505. 
18 U.S.C. 1512. 18 U.S.C. 1621. 18 U.S.C. 1623. Tampering. Perjury. 
Obstruction. That is a lot to digest, but these are real laws and they 
are applicable to these proceedings and to this President.''--House 
Manager Barr, Congressional Record, February 8, 1999, Page S1342.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix K

    Though written in his diary almost 200 hundred years ago, John 
Quincy Adams' thoughts on the impeachment of Justice Samuel P. Chase, 
who was acquitted, are relevant to the impeachment of President 
Clinton.
    On the day that Justice Chase was acquitted in 1805, John Quincy 
Adams wrote the following:
    ``. . . This was a party prosecution, and is issued in the 
unexpected and total disappointment of those by whom it was brought 
forward. It has exhibited the Senate of the United States fulfilling 
the most important purpose of its institution . . . It has proved that 
a sense of justice is yet strong enough to overpower the furies of 
factions; but it has, at the same time, shown the wisdom and necessity 
of that provision in the Constitution which requires the concurrence of 
two-thirds for conviction upon impeachments.''
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix L

 additional statement of senator carl levin regarding the independent 
                                counsel
    Mr. President, four and one half years ago, the Special Court under 
the independent counsel law appointed Kenneth Starr to investigate 
certain specific and credible allegations concerning President 
Clinton's involvement in the Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan 
Association of Little Rock, Arkansas. Three and half years later--and 
after what appears to be the most thorough criminal investigation of a 
sitting President, Mr. Starr was unable to find any criminal wrongdoing 
on the part of the President in what came to be known as 
``Whitewater.'' A similar conclusion was reached by Mr. Starr with 
respect to additional investigations assigned to Mr. Starr along the 
way--namely, allegations with respect to the White House use of FBI 
files and the discharge of White House employees from the White House 
Travel Office.
    A year ago Mr. Starr's investigation was coming to an end. That's 
when Linda Tripp walked through Mr. Starr's door with promises of taped 
phone conversations between Ms. Tripp and Monica Lewinsky about Ms. 
Lewinsky's sexual relationship with President Clinton. And what was the 
alleged crime? That President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky were about to 
lie about their relationship--if they were asked about it by the 
attorneys for Paula Jones in her sexual harassment case against 
President Clinton. Mr. Starr had to know that the relationship between 
President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky had been a consensual one. Mr. 
Starr had to know that, because Ms. Tripp was informed by Ms. Lewinsky 
of every aspect of her relationship with President Clinton. And at this 
point--January 12, 1998--neither Monica Lewinsky nor President Clinton 
had been deposed.
    I am convinced that no ordinary federal prosecutor, if confronted 
with the same situation involving a private citizen, would have pursued 
this case. But Mr. Starr was no ordinary federal prosecutor. Without 
jurisdiction with respect to these matters, he immediately gave Ms. 
Tripp immunity in exchange for access to her tapes, and he wired her to 
tape a private luncheon conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. Shortly after 
Mr. Starr wired Ms. Tripp, he confronted Ms. Lewinsky and, according to 
her, threatened her with 27 years in prison and the prosecution of her 
mother in order to get her cooperation and to tape Betty Currie, the 
President, and/or Vernon Jordan. Mr. Starr brought his enormous 
criminal investigative resources to bear on testimony yet to be given 
in a civil lawsuit involving a consensual, sexual relationship.
    At the time Ms. Lewinsky was threatened by Mr. Starr, her affidavit 
in the Jones case had not been filed. She was still in a position to 
retrieve it or amend it. Also, President Clinton had not been deposed. 
He had not given his testimony in the Paula Jones suit. In effect, Mr. 
Starr and his agents lay in wait--waiting for the President to be 
surprised at the Jones deposition with information about Monica 
Lewinsky. And how did that information about Monica Lewinsky get in the 
hands of the Jones attorneys? Ms. Tripp gave them the information. And 
she was able to do that even though she was under an immunity 
arrangement with Mr. Starr, because--as Mr. Starr acknowledged to the 
House Judiciary Committee under questioning--Mr. Starr's agents never 
directed Ms. Tripp to keep her information confidential, even though 
Mr. Starr had a major concern that the Lewinsky matter would leak to 
the press. Mr. Starr's agents did not tell Ms. Tripp not to talk to the 
Jones attorneys or anyone else in order to ensure that the story would 
not leak to the press.
    So the enormous criminal investigative resources of the federal 
government were brought to bear on the President of the United States 
to catch him by surprise in a future deposition in a civil proceeding 
on a matter peripheral to the lawsuit, prior to any of the suspected 
unlawful conduct.
    Once the President testified in that civil suit, Mr. Starr convened 
a grand jury to investigate the truthfulness of Mr. Clinton's 
testimony. Again, using the virtually unlimited resources of the 
federal government with respect to a criminal investigation, Mr. Starr 
called countless witnesses before the grand jury--recalling numerous 
witnesses multiple times. Betty Currie testified on 5 different 
occasions; so did Vernon Jordan. Monica Lewinsky testified 3 times and 
was interviewed over 20 separate times. I don't believe any regular 
prosecutor would have invested the time and money and resources in the 
kind of investigation that Kenneth Starr did.
    At the end, Mr. Starr wrote a report arguing for impeachment to the 
House of Representatives. He didn't just impartially forward evidence 
he thought may demonstrate possible impeachable offenses.
    The Starr report spared nothing. Lacking good judgment and balance, 
the Starr report contained a large amount of salacious detail, and 
skipped over or dismissed important exculpatory evidence, such as 
Monica Lewinsky's statement that no one asked her to lie and no one 
promised her a job for her silence. Mr. Starr violated the standards 
enunciated by Judge Sirica when he addressed the status of the grand 
jury report in the Watergate matter. In that case, Judge Sirica wrote 
in granting Leon Jaworski, the Watergate prosecutor, the right to 
forward grand jury information to the House of Representatives:
    ``It draws no accusatory conclusions. . . . It contains no 
recommendations, advice or statements that infringe on the prerogatives 
of other branches of government. . . . It renders no moral or social 
judgments. The Report is a simple and straightforward compilation of 
information gathered by the Grand Jury, and no more. . . . The Grand 
Jury has obviously taken care to assure that its Report contains no 
objectionable features, and has throughout acted in the interests of 
fairness. The Grand Jury having thus respected its own limitations and 
the rights of others, the Court ought to respect the Jury's exercise of 
its prerogatives.'' (In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972, 
Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to the House of 
Representatives, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, March 18, 
1974.)
    What a far cry the Watergate grand jury report was from Mr. 
Starr's. The Starr Report violates almost every one of the standards 
laid out by Judge Sirica in the Watergate case.
    The House of Representatives the Judiciary Committee then almost 
immediately released the Starr report and the thousands of pages of 
evidence to the public.
    Because of that release--enormous damage had been done to the 
public's sense of decorum and to appropriate limits between public and 
private life.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Herb Kohl

    Mr. KOHL. Mr. Chief Justice, throughout this process my 
colleagues from both sides of the aisle have conducted 
themselves with decency and dignity, exactly the qualities 
President Clinton's conduct lacked. But we risk opening the 
floodgates to more party-line impeachments if we oust a 
President from office for behavior that--while truly 
deplorable--isn't truly removable. Lowering the standard would 
do as great a disservice to the Constitution as the President's 
behavior has done to the Oval Office. So I am voting to acquit 
on both articles.
    I state these conclusions with a certainty I do not feel. 
We have heard many say these votes are the most difficult they 
will ever cast, and I agree. This case is made up of many small 
questions, matters of opinion and fact: Did the President lie? 
Did he commit perjury? Did he obstruct justice? Did he weaken 
the judicial system? Did he undermine the Constitution? Are 
these ``high'' crimes? Is this what the founders envisioned 
when they talked about removal of a President?
    Most of us have answers for each of these questions. Most 
of us will lay them out in well-worded, well-argued statements. 
But the sum of the answers is not the sum of this case. The sum 
of our opinions, our findings of fact, and our legal briefs 
cannot sum up the deep disquiet I feel about the failings, 
lies, and weakness displayed by the President. Under the cold 
body of evidence before us runs the bad blood of bad character, 
and that deeply disturbs me.
    The evidence does not prove high crimes, but it does prove 
low character in our highest office--and that matters, it is 
relevant, it is material. This Nation is not defined merely by 
demographics, boundaries, geological features, and government 
regulations; it is also about families and individuals who 
struggle to be larger, braver, and stronger than their 
circumstances. It is a nation that has a history of putting 
lives, faith, and hope in causes bigger than any one person: 
justice, democracy, freedom. Similarly, the Office of the 
Presidency is not just a set of protocols, formalities, and 
policies. It is the human face we put on our country, and that 
face ought to be as honest, just, strong and brave as we all 
aspire to be--and as our history demands that we be.
    That's why character matters. I cannot find a way to fit my 
concern for that spirit into these very formal, legal 
proceedings, but I also cannot, in good conscience, let go of 
my deep concern for the harm and the loss this President has 
caused. I will not vote for either article of impeachment, but 
I also will not let go of my firm belief that this President 
has done real damage to the Office of the Presidency. And I 
will not let go of a commitment to do everything I can to 
restore and protect the idea that good character is essential 
in those who ask to serve and represent this country.
    Let me explain in more detail why I am voting against both 
articles. First, removing a President is a drastic measure, 
called for in only the most extraordinary circumstances. And 
our Founding Fathers clearly wanted it to be used sparingly: 
that's why they limited impeachment to only ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' involving abuse of power, incapacity to hold 
office, or a serious threat to our Constitution or system of 
government.
    But the President's conduct, however reprehensible, related 
to purely personal matters. He lied to the American people. He 
lied to his family, his friends and his staff. He lied under 
oath and evidence suggests that he may have obstructed justice. 
Simply put, his conduct was disgraceful and, possibly, illegal.
    However, his actions did not relate to abuse of power. They 
had nothing to do with his official acts or his capacity to 
hold office. They did not threaten our Constitution or system 
of government. Though serious offenses to our American values 
and decency, they do not rise to the level of constitutional 
``high'' crimes.
    Some of my colleagues have a different view, and I respect 
their position. But even the House prosecutors respect mine. In 
response to one of my questions, House Manager Graham 
acknowledged that ``reasonable people can disagree'' about 
whether the President should be removed. In fact, he went on to 
say:

    ``[I]f I was sitting where you're at, I would probably get down on 
my knees before I made that decision, because the impact on society is 
going to be real either way. And if you find the President guilty in 
your mind from the facts, that's he a perjurer and he obstructed 
justice, you've got to somehow reconcile continued service in light of 
that event. And I think it's important for this body not to have a 
disposition plan that doesn't take in consideration the good of this 
Nation. . . . [Y]ou've got to consider what's best for this Nation.''

    Representative Graham deserves credit for putting candor 
above partisanship, and inviting us to decide ``what's best for 
this Nation.'' To do that, it makes sense to consider the views 
of the American people. Most of them know what this case is 
about and most of them oppose this impeachment. Nothing we've 
heard clearly justifies rejecting the overwhelming weight of 
their opinion and removing a twice-elected President.
    Indeed, if ``reasonable people can disagree,'' as the House 
prosecutors concede, have we really met the high threshold 
established for removal?
    To ask that question is to answer it.
    It is true, of course, that we have removed judges for 
lying under oath; for example, 10 years ago the Senate removed 
Judge Nixon on that basis. But impeaching the President, our 
highest elected official, is far different. Judge Nixon was 
appointed. He held office during ``good Behaviour.'' At the 
time of his Senate trial, he was already convicted and sitting 
in jail. He lied about bribery, not sex. And most importantly, 
the only way a judge can be removed is by impeachment. A 
President, on the other hand, can be removed every 4 years 
through an election, and is automatically removed after 8 years 
by the 22d amendment.
    Second, in addition to the constitutional problems, the 
prosecution has not proved its allegations by clear and 
convincing evidence. This is especially true on the 
``obstruction of justice'' charge, which is by far the more 
serious allegation. The House managers argue that more 
witnesses would have made a difference in bolstering their 
case, and they may be right. But why then did the House choose 
not to call witnesses in its own proceedings, even though it 
had called ``fact'' witnesses in nearly every other 
impeachment?
    Third, as many of us told the House in the Judge Nixon 
impeachment trial, lumping together a series of charges in each 
article--at least four perjury charges and seven obstruction of 
justice charges here--isn't fair or responsible. Alarmingly, 
the President could be found guilty without a two-thirds 
majority believing any single charge. For example, in theory, 
even if each obstruction charge were rejected by a 90 to 10 
margin, the President could be convicted--because ten different 
Senators convicting on each of seven separate charges adds up 
to 70--more than a two-thirds majority.
    Mr. Chief Justice, this kind of ``one from column A and two 
from column B'' approach may work for a Chinese restaurant, but 
not for removing a President--or a judge. And this lack of 
specificity shortchanges the American people, who may never 
understand which charges were believed and which ones weren't.
    Still, President Clinton is not ``above the law.'' His 
conduct should not be excused, nor will it. The President can 
be criminally prosecuted, especially once he leaves office. In 
other words, his acts may not be ``removable'' wrongs, but they 
could be ``convictable'' crimes. Moreover, the House vote of 
impeachment--and the President's misconduct with Monica 
Lewinsky--will forever scar this President's legacy. Finally, 
the Senate can and should censure the President, and we ought 
make our condemnation of his conduct as strong as possible.
    In sum, Mr. Chief Justice, President Clinton's conduct was 
wrong, reckless and indefensible. Under the Constitution it 
does not justify removal. But for those who love this country, 
it demands outrage and disappointment. It demands a commitment 
from this President and future Presidents, this Congress and 
future Congresses--not now, and not ever again, to let personal 
weakness and personal failing stain or shake our democracy. 
Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Fred Thompson

    Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chief Justice, in 1994, Paula Corbin 
Jones sued President Clinton for sexual harassment which she 
alleged he committed against her in 1991, when he was Governor 
of Arkansas. The Supreme Court of the United States permitted 
the lawsuit to proceed in 1997.
    Monica Lewinsky began work as a White House intern on July 
10, 1995. At the time, she was 21 years old. She later worked 
in the Office of Legislative Affairs at the White House. In 
1996, she left the White House for a job at the Department of 
Defense.
    The first day that Ms. Lewinsky spoke with President 
Clinton, November 15, 1995, she and the President engaged in 
sexual relations. Their sexual relationship lasted until 1997. 
The two also engaged in telephone sex at least 17 times, and 
they exchanged numerous gifts. The two agreed to keep their 
relationship secret through the use of cover stories. Ms. 
Lewinsky, if discovered in the Oval Office, was to say that she 
was delivering papers, although her job duties never included 
delivering papers. Once she left the White House, her visits to 
the President were disguised as visits to Presidential 
secretary Betty Currie.
    The President told Ms. Lewinsky that she could return to 
the White House after the 1996 election had concluded. Although 
Ms. Lewinsky tried numerous times to regain employment at the 
White House, she was never able to do so. After being informed 
by a friend, Linda Tripp, that she would never be permitted to 
return to the White House, Ms. Lewinsky decided to seek 
employment in New York, initially receiving and rejecting a job 
offer with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. 
She then decided to seek employment in New York in the private 
sector. On November 5, 1997, she met with Vernon Jordan, a 
prominent Washington lawyer and friend of President Clinton, to 
seek his assistance in securing such a position. This meeting 
was arranged by Ms. Currie. Mr. Jordan took no action to help 
her in November, and does not remember meeting her at this 
time.
    On December 5, 1997, attorneys for Ms. Jones notified the 
President's attorneys of their list of witnesses. That list 
included Ms. Lewinsky. Although she was unaware at the time 
that her name was on the Jones litigation witness list, 
Lewinsky coincidentally decided to terminate her relationship 
with the President the following day, but was unable to see him 
at the White House. President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky 
initially exchanged angry words that day over the telephone, 
but later that day, she came to the White House at his 
invitation. During this meeting, Ms. Lewinsky told the 
President that Mr. Jordan had not appeared to have done 
anything to help her in her job search. In a conversation Ms. 
Lewinsky described as ``sweet'' and ``very affectionate,'' he 
told her that he would speak to Mr. Jordan about her job 
situation. The President did not at that time inform Ms. 
Lewinsky that her name was on the witness list.
    Ms. Currie again called Mr. Jordan, and on December 8, 
1997, Ms. Lewinsky called to set another appointment with Mr. 
Jordan for December 11. Although Ms. Lewinsky provided Mr. 
Jordan with a list of corporations in which she was interested 
in obtaining employment, Mr. Jordan determined based on his own 
contacts which companies he would pursue on Ms. Lewinsky's 
behalf. Following his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, acting by his 
own admission at the behest of the President, Jordan called 
three corporate executives in New York. He also called the 
President to report on his efforts on behalf of Ms. Lewinsky.
    December 11, 1997, was also the date on which Judge Susan 
Webber Wright, the presiding judge in the Jones litigation, 
issued an order permitting Jones' attorneys to pursue discovery 
concerning the names of any state or federal employees with 
whom the President had had sexual relations, proposed sexual 
relations, or sought to have sexual relations.
    On December 17, 1997, between 2 and 2:30 a.m., the 
President telephoned Ms. Lewinsky. He informed her that Ms. 
Currie's brother had been killed, as well as that her name was 
on the Jones witness list. The President indicated that if Ms. 
Lewinsky were subpoenaed, she should let Ms. Currie know. He 
also told her that she might be able to sign an affidavit in 
that event to avoid testifying. In addition, he suggested that 
she could say that she was coming to see Betty or was bringing 
him papers. Ms. Lewinsky says that she understood implicitly 
that she was to continue to deny their relationship.
    Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in the Jones 
litigation on December 19, 1997. The subpoena also required Ms. 
Lewinsky to produce all gifts that she had received from the 
President, and enumerated one specific gift that the President 
had given Ms. Lewinsky, a hatpin. Because Ms. Currie was in 
mourning, Lewinsky called Jordan, who invited her to his 
office. She was in a highly emotional state, and that fact, 
combined with her statements in the conversation that 
demonstrated her personal fascination with the President, 
prompted Jordan to ask whether she, a person for whom he was 
providing job assistance, had had sexual relations with the 
President. He says she denied such relations. Jordan took a 
telephone call from the President during that meeting, and made 
plans to see him that night. Jordan later called Frank Carter, 
a Washington lawyer, to arrange a meeting at which he would 
refer Ms. Lewinsky to Mr. Carter as a client.
    Notwithstanding Ms. Lewinsky's denial of sexual relations 
with the President, Jordan asked President Clinton that same 
evening the same question. The President also denied having had 
sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. Jordan also conveyed a 
number of Lewinsky's statements to the President, and informed 
Clinton that Lewinsky had received a subpoena to testify in the 
Jones case. Following a discussion in which Lewinsky informed 
Jordan of the nature of the telephone calls she had had with 
the President, Jordan drove Lewinsky to a meeting at Mr. 
Carter's office on December 22.
    The President met with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, 1997, 
at which time they again exchanged gifts. They discussed the 
subpoena, and she expressed concern, which the President 
shared, about the specific enumeration of the hatpin, since 
that suggested that someone knew details of their relationship. 
Ms. Lewinsky then suggested taking the gifts out of her 
apartment or giving them to Ms. Currie. The President 
responded, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' 
Later that same day, Ms. Lewinsky's consistent recollection is 
that Ms. Currie called her and stated, ``I understand you have 
something to give me'' or ``the President said you have 
something to give me.'' Ms. Currie later drove to Ms. 
Lewinsky's apartment, picked up a box containing gifts the 
President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and hid that box under her 
bed without asking any questions.
    On December 31, 1997, Jordan and Lewinsky had breakfast. 
Lewinsky, fearing that her relationship with the President 
would become known and wanting to ensure that she not appear 
responsible for its becoming known, told Jordan that she 
possessed notes she had addressed to the President that 
suggested the nature of their relationship. According to 
Lewinsky, Jordan told her to dispose of those notes. Jordan 
initially denied that he ever had breakfast with Lewinsky, but 
later recalled having done so when shown the receipt. But he 
denied ever telling Lewinsky to destroy any notes.
    Ms. Lewinsky pursued filing an affidavit to obviate the 
need for her to testify in the Jones case. On January 6, 1998, 
she communicated to Mr. Jordan concerns she had about the 
affidavit that Mr. Carter had drafted for her. Jordan 
telephoned Carter with her suggestions. Although Mr. Jordan 
denies the allegations, Ms. Lewinsky contends that she informed 
Jordan about the details of Carter's proposed affidavit, and 
that she and Jordan made changes to it prior to her signing it. 
Lewinsky also spoke with the President about Carter's questions 
to her about how she obtained her Pentagon job. The President 
told her that she ``could always say that the people in 
Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.''
    On January 7, 1998, Lewinsky signed an affidavit denying 
sexual relations with the President. She later testified that 
the affidavit was false. She showed Jordan the affidavit, and 
Jordan spoke with the President after conferring with Ms. 
Lewinsky about the changes. Lewinsky testified that she 
believed that the President would be satisfied with any 
affidavit that Jordan approved.
    The following day, Lewinsky was interviewed at a company 
that Jordan had called on her behalf. Believing that the 
interview had proceeded poorly, she called Jordan, who then 
called the head of the holding company of the firm with which 
she had interviewed. Jordan asked that a second interview be 
granted Lewinsky. She interviewed again the next day, and was 
made an informal job offer. Jordan testified that his ``magic'' 
was responsible for that offer. Lewinsky informed Jordan of her 
success, and he telephoned Ms. Currie to notify her: ``Mission 
accomplished.'' He later informed the President.
    The President was scheduled to be deposed in the Jones 
litigation on January 17, 1998. The President knew that one of 
the issues was his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. For the 
affidavit to successfully deflect questions to the President 
concerning that relationship, the affidavit would have had to 
have been filed in time for the court to consider it and for 
the President's lawyers to see it before the deposition. The 
President's lawyers called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney once on 
January 14, twice on January 15, and once on January 16. On the 
15th, Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Carter, sent President Clinton's 
counsel a copy of the affidavit. Mr. Carter also called the 
court twice on that day to ensure that the affidavit could be 
filed on January 17.
    During his deposition, President Clinton made numerous 
false statements while under oath. These included the sexual 
nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and whether they 
had exchanged gifts. He relied on the same cover stories as he 
had discussed with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's lawyer used 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in an attempt to deflect questions 
about the President's relationship with her, specifically 
stating that the President had already seen that affidavit. As 
the President appeared to be paying close attention, he did not 
contradict his attorney when he represented to the court that 
``there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape 
or form with President Clinton. . . .'' And he testified, when 
asked by his attorney, that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
absolutely true. However, the judge insisted that President 
Clinton answer additional questions about his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky. These questions were asked based on the judge's 
peculiar ruling that used only one-third of a standard 
courtroom definition of ``sexual relations'' and the 
plaintiff's attorneys' insistence in using that truncated 
definition as a reference for questions they posed to the 
President about the nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, rather than asking specific questions concerning what 
had occurred. In six instances, the President answered 
questions by referencing Betty Currie, such as in using the 
cover story that Ms. Lewinsky had come to the White House to 
visit Ms. Currie, and on one occasion, expressly stated that 
his questioners should ``ask Betty.'' Indeed, Ms. Jones' 
attorneys later placed Ms. Currie's name on their witness list.
    After the deposition, at 7 p.m. that evening, the President 
called his secretary, Betty Currie, at home. She later 
testified that she could not remember the President ever 
calling her at home so late on a Saturday. In that 
conversation, he asked Ms. Currie to see him in the Oval Office 
the following day, a Sunday. This was also an unusual 
occurrence. While in the Oval Office, and contrary to the 
admonition from the Jones case judge not to discuss his 
deposition testimony with anyone, the President made the 
following statements to Ms. Currie: (1) ``I was never really 
alone with Monica, right?'' (2) ``You were always there when 
Monica was there, right?'' (3) ``Monica came on to me, and I 
never touched her, right?'' (4) ``You could see and hear 
everything, right?'' (5) ``She wanted to have sex with me, and 
I could not do that.''
    Once the President met with Ms. Currie on January 18, Ms. 
Currie began to seek Ms. Lewinsky. She paged Ms. Lewinsky four 
times that night. Later than 11 p.m. that evening, the 
President called Ms. Currie at home to determine if she had yet 
reached Ms. Lewinsky. She had not. In a period of less than 2 
hours on the morning of the 19th, Ms. Currie paged Ms. Lewinsky 
an additional eight times. The President then called Mr. 
Jordan, who called the White House three times, paged Ms. 
Lewinsky, and called Mr. Carter, all within 24 minutes of 
receiving the President's call. Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter 
again that afternoon and learned that Mr. Carter had been 
replaced as Ms. Lewinsky's attorney. Mr. Jordan then called the 
White House six times in the next 24 minutes trying to relay 
this information. Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter again, and then 
called the White House again.
    On January 20, the White House learned that a story about 
the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would appear in 
the next day's edition of The Washington Post. On January 21, 
the President told his chief of staff and two deputies that he 
did not have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. He later told 
one of those deputies, John Podesta, that he had not had oral 
sex with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Later on January 21, the President told his aide, Sidney 
Blumenthal, that Lewinsky had made a sexual demand on him, and 
that he rebuffed her. The President told Blumenthal that 
Lewinsky had threatened him. President Clinton also indicated 
that Lewinsky said that she was known among her peers as the 
stalker, that she hated it, and that she would say that she had 
an affair with the President whether it was true or not, so 
that she would not be known as the stalker any more. He also 
told Blumenthal that he felt like a victim who could not get 
out the truth. Blumenthal later testified that he believes the 
President lied to him. The President testified that he was 
aware at the time that he made his statements that his aides 
might be summoned before the grand jury.
    The President also met with his political consultant, Dick 
Morris, on January 21. The President authorized that Morris 
conduct an overnight poll measuring potential public reaction 
to the affair. The poll concluded that the American people 
would forgive the President for adultery, but not for perjury 
or obstruction of justice. The President then indicated that 
``we just have to win, then.'' The President's lawyers could 
not answer Senators' questions why such a poll had been 
undertaken if the President had not committed any of these 
acts.
    Shortly after the President met with Mr. Blumenthal, press 
reports began to appear that, quoting White House sources, 
characterized Ms. Lewinsky as a stalker, and as an 
``untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.'' Although 
Mr. Blumenthal in his Senate deposition denied any knowledge of 
how White House sources were attributed to these stories, one 
journalist by the time of this writing has sworn to an 
affidavit stating that Mr. Blumenthal made such 
characterizations to him. A second similar affidavit has also 
been filed, corroborating the first one.
    Ultimately, Ms. Lewinsky was granted immunity from 
prosecution by the independent counsel. The independent counsel 
received from Ms. Lewinsky a dress that according to DNA 
testing was stained by the President's semen.
    On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the 
grand jury convened by the independent counsel. In a prepared 
statement, the President made a number of false statements. He 
stated that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ms. 
Lewinsky in 1996 and 1997, whereas the conduct actually began 
in 1995, when she was an intern. Based on Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony and the dress, he appears to have testified 
untruthfully about whether he engaged in sexual relations even 
as that term had been defined at his deposition in the Jones 
case. And he also testified that he was not paying attention to 
his attorney when the attorney described the affidavit; that 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky had originally begun as a 
``friendship;'' that he made the statements to Ms. Currie after 
his deposition in an effort to refresh his recollection; and 
that he told his aides statements that were true about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Nonetheless, when testifying 
before the grand jury, the President no longer made a number of 
the assertions that he had made in the deposition, including 
denying that he was ever alone with Ms. Lewinsky. With respect 
to his deposition testimony, the President told the grand jury 
that his ``goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not 
particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the 
mine field of this deposition without violating the law, and I 
believe I did.''
    The independent counsel filed a report with the House of 
Representatives that referred allegations of possible 
impeachable offenses. The House of Representatives voted to 
pass two articles of impeachment against President Clinton, for 
perjury before the grand jury and for obstruction of justice. 
Two other articles of impeachment, which had been based on 
perjury in his deposition in the Jones case and misstatements 
to the House in response to questions propounded to the 
President by the House of Representatives, failed to pass the 
House.
    The most fundamental question, against which the 
President's actions must be measured, is, ``What constitutes an 
impeachable offense?'' The Constitution makes impeachable 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes or misdemeanors.'' The 
Constitution also says that upon conviction in the Senate the 
President ``shall be removed.'' Therefore, the question 
becomes, in effect, ``What actions constitute grounds for 
removal?''
    It should be noted at the outset that what we have in 
effect is a ``mandatory sentence'' wherein if there is a 
finding of guilt then one particular sentence must be imposed--
in this case removal from office. However, unlike judges in a 
criminal case, the Senate may take into consideration the 
``punishment'' in determining guilt. Some have contended that 
the President may be guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, 
but his actions may not be sufficient for removal. I believe 
the better analysis is that the Senate may conclude that the 
President's conduct is not sufficient for removal and that that 
determination, by definition, means that the President is not 
guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. I believe that this 
analysis is important in understanding the scope of our 
discretion and helps us get away from the notion that there is 
an objective standard for high crimes and misdemeanors if we 
could only find it. Historical analysis covering over 600 years 
reveals that there is no ``secret list'' of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, but rather our forefathers perpetuated a 
framework that allows for a certain amount of subjectivity 
which may encompass changing times and differing circumstances.
    Such a conclusion emerges from an examination of English 
law, original State constitutions, our Federal Constitutional 
Convention, the ratification debates, American impeachment 
precedents and scholarly commentary.
    The phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' can be traced 
back to the thirteen hundreds in England. It was clear from the 
outset that the phrase covered serious misconduct in office 
whether or not the conduct constituted a crime. Commentators 
say that the English impeachment tradition covered political 
crimes against the state and injuries to the state. Beyond 
that, it is difficult to glean covered conduct from the English 
tradition.
    Apparently there was only one discussion during the 
Constitutional Convention that dealt with the phrase ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors,'' and that occurred on September 8, 
1787. As reported out of committee, impeachable offenses 
included only ``treason and bribery.'' Mason wanted to add 
``maladministration,'' which was also contained in many state 
constitutions. Madison was under the impression that such 
language would leave the President at the mercy of the Senate. 
Madison relented and we wound up with the phrase as we have it 
today. The founding fathers quite clearly rejected impeachment 
for congressional disapproval of policy. Impeachable offenses 
were ``political'' offenses and, as under English law, not 
necessarily criminal. Other guidance that can be derived from 
the Convention is the fact that the founders were acutely aware 
of their rejection of bills of attainder as existed in the 
English system and, therefore, they thought that impeachable 
offenses should be something that any reasonable man could 
anticipate. He should not be punished for some crime made up 
after the fact. Also, there was to be a requirement for 
``substantiality.'' This mechanism was not designed for trivial 
offenses.
    We cannot determine the precise intent of the framers 
because their deliberations were in secret and nothing was 
printed from their deliberations. They intended for the 
ratifiers at the State Conventions to be the more authoritative 
voice for interpretation of the provisions in the Constitution. 
It is fair to conclude that the attitude of the ratifiers was 
reflected to a certain extent in ``The Federalist Papers.'' The 
most definitive comments concerning impeachment were by 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 wherein he stated:

    The subjects of [impeachment] are those offenses which proceed from 
the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may be with 
peculiar propriety denominated political, as they relate chiefly to 
injuries done immediately to the society itself.

    The ratifiers at the North Carolina convention spoke in 
terms of serious injuries to the Federal Government. James 
Iredell, later to become an Associate Justice on the Supreme 
Court, stated that impeachment was ``calculated to bring [great 
offenders] to punishment for crimes which it is not easy to 
describe but which everyone must be convinced as a high crime 
and misdemeanor against governments . . . the occasion for its 
exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the 
community.'' He gave as an example of an impeachable offense 
the giving of false information to the Senate. Impeachment was 
not for ``want of judgment'' but rather to hold him responsible 
for ``willfully abusing his trust.'' Iredell also called 
attention to the complexity if not impossibility of defining 
the scope of impeachable offenses with any more precision than 
the above. And the ratifiers at the Virginia Convention clearly 
agreed that a President could be impeached for nonindictable 
offenses.
    There was continued discussion and debate after 
ratification concerning the impeachment process. James Madison 
contended that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would 
subject a President to impeachment and removal from office. 
Forty years later, Justice Story, in his ``Commentaries'' 
insisted that ``not every offence'' is a high crime and 
misdemeanor, that ``many offences, purely political . . . have 
been held to be within the reach of parliamentary impeachments, 
not one of which is in the slightest manner alluded to in our 
statute book,'' that ``the only safe guide'' in determining 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' ``must be the common law,'' 
and left open the possibility that actions a civil officer took 
that were unconnected to his office might be properly the 
subject of impeachment.
    Therefore, it seems that despite the framers' and 
ratifiers' incomplete discussion, our inability to put our 
hands on documentation reflecting some of their thoughts, and 
the fact that perhaps they simply did not think of some of the 
problems that might arise in the future, we see a certain 
framework develop--certain perimeters within which our decision 
should be made.
    The Senate's own precedents do not change this evaluation 
because they are not terribly instructive either. In 
impeachment cases, the Senate has convicted on seven occasions, 
acquitted on five, dismissed two cases on jurisdictional 
grounds and one case was withdrawn because of resignation. An 
acquittal serves very little value as precedent beyond the 
facts of the case since an acquittal can be based on any number 
of grounds--jurisdictional, failure to prove the factual 
allegations, offenses not rising to the level of impeachable 
conduct, etc.--and the motivation for the vote is not reflected 
when the verdict is rendered ``not guilty.'' There is little 
more help derived from convictions, in terms of precedential 
value. There has only been one impeachment trial for a 
President, that of Andrew Johnson, and that, of course, 
resulted in an acquittal. A large majority of the remainder of 
the cases have been those of Federal judges.
    The question has arisen whether judicial impeachments are 
to be considered by the same standards as presidential 
impeachments. It seems to me that certainly the application of 
the standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' for a 
President must differ from that of a judge. Removing the 
President removes the elected head of the Nation. Removing a 
single judge does not carry the same implications for the 
country. And while a President should act according to the 
highest standards of probity, it is quite easy to imagine 
circumstances that would warrant judicial impeachment that 
would not justify presidential impeachment, such as making 
official decisions based purely on political considerations. It 
is also possible that certain crimes would be impeachable if a 
judge committed them, because of the specific nature of the 
judicial office in our system of government, but would not be 
impeachable for a President.
    It has been argued that the standard should be different 
for Presidents than judges because the former serves for a 
fixed term and the latter serve ``during good behavior.'' I do 
not share that view. The standard itself is the same for each 
category: treason, bribery, and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. But the difference in tenure is relevant in a 
way. Because impeachment is not punishment and is political, 
the framers vested the process in the legislative branch. 
Prosecution for crimes was lodged in the judiciary. Thus, a 
President, who cannot be prosecuted while in office, can be 
impeached and removed from office before he faces criminal 
prosecution. While a judge can also be impeached and removed 
before being convicted of a crime, it is also the case that 
criminal punishment can be, and has been, imposed on sitting 
judges. But since courts were expressly not given the power to 
remove civil officers, Federal judges who have been criminally 
convicted and have refused to resign have continued to draw 
their salary ``during good behavior,'' i.e., until they were 
impeached. That is the only significance with respect to 
impeachment of judges and of Presidents based on their 
differing terms of service.
    Scholars have looked to the purposes to be served by the 
impeachment process as well as history in making their own 
analysis as to the meaning ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' 
For Charles Black they would include offenses: (1) which are 
extremely serious, (2) which in some way corrupt or subvert the 
political and governmental process, and (3) which are plainly 
wrong in themselves to a person of honor or to a good citizen 
regardless of words on the statute books.
    Also qualifying according to Professor Black would be 
``serious offense against the Nation or its governmental or 
political processes.'' Furthermore, he would include purely 
personal actions that would make a President unviable as a 
national leader. Murder, of course, would be the prime example 
here. He would also include a totally different category of 
offenses which seriously threaten the order of political 
society as to make dangerous the continuation in power of the 
President. Finally, he would include actions that would 
``undermine government and confidence in government'' such as 
serious tax fraud.
    Professor Michael J. Gerhardt on the issue of purely 
personal conduct of the President states:

    Even if such a crime were unrelated to the President's 
Constitutional duties, his criminal act considerably cheapens the 
Presidency, destroys his credibility with the other branches (and other 
nations, for that matter), and shows such lack of respect for human 
life and disdain for the law (which he has sworn to enforce faithfully) 
that Congress could reasonably conclude that he had seriously breached 
his trust and no longer deserves to hold office.

    Again, murder was the easy example.
    However, he contends further that an official may be 
impeached for conduct in office that does not relate to his or 
her former responsibilities if an office holder violates his 
public trust and loses the confidence of the people. Then he 
must forfeit the privilege of holding at least his or her 
present office. ``In this context, conduct that may plainly be 
unrelated to the responsibilities of a particular office may 
still relate to an official's capacity to fulfill the functions 
of that office and to hold the people's trust.'' He gives the 
example of income tax fraud.
    Gerhardt points out that not all statutory crimes 
demonstrate unfitness for office, but that on the other hand, 
there are some indictable offenses for which certain high level 
government officials may be impeached. Among them are offenses 
which ``demonstrate serious lack of judgment or disdain for the 
law and the commission lowers respect for the office.'' In 
other words, there are certain statutory crimes, that, if 
committed by public officials, reflect, in Congress' estimation 
such lapses of judgment, breaches of the public trust and 
disregard for the public welfare, the law, and the integrity or 
reputation of the office held, that the occupant may be 
impeached.
    What I derive from this is that there is no ``holy grail'' 
of impeachable offenses. The framers provided the Senate with a 
framework within which to operate and history provides us with 
a map, but not a destination. Our conclusions must depend upon 
the particular circumstances of the case, the nature of the act 
or acts involved, and their effects on society or integral 
parts of our political structure.
    Today we are faced with an unprecedented situation. The 
President engaged in inappropriate personal conduct. It had 
nothing to do with his official duties, but it did involve a 
federal employee under his supervision, government time and 
government facilities. In an attempt to conceal and cover up 
that activity, he lied, misled and helped conceal evidence both 
physical and testimonial in a court proceeding. In doing so he 
elicited the help of other government employees. Therefore, the 
subject matter was essentially private, but the forum, a United 
States court, became public. One side says that he ``only lied 
about sex,'' and it had nothing to do with his official duties, 
therefore, it ``clearly does not rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense.'' The other side says that any perjury and 
any obstruction of justice ``clearly does rise to the level of 
an impeachable offense.'' I do not think that either position 
is consistent with history or proper analysis.
    For example, I agree with Professor Black that not every 
imaginable act that might technically constitute obstruction of 
justice would necessarily be impeachable.
    On the other hand, opponents of conviction in the present 
case, have raised the bar for impeachment to unreasonable 
heights. Usually they concede that an impeachable offense does 
not have to be a crime, but often it is maintained that the 
abuse of power has to come from his public position such as 
Nixon's abuse of the CIA or FBI. Of course, this immediately 
runs headlong into the murder hypothetical and many other 
hypotheticals of serious, although totally personal, conduct as 
well.
    They then make the further argument that the violation has 
to be ``an offense against the state.'' While I agree that an 
offense against the state is one of the categories of offenses 
that impeachment was primarily designed to cover, offenses 
against the state's governmental and political processes, 
including the court system, as well as attempts to subvert 
them, are also impeachable. Besides, it would seem to me, that 
subversion or serious damage to our governmental institutions 
constitute offenses against the state.
    They also point out that one of the purposes of impeachment 
is to protect the Nation from the offender President. I agree 
again that this may be one of the purposes of impeachment. 
However, it is not the only purpose, and protection of the 
public is not always a requirement. If an offense has been laid 
bare and totally exposed, and the President is completely 
incapable of continuing his conduct, this lack of imminent 
threat to the Nation does not necessarily mean that he should 
not and cannot be impeached. President Nixon probably would not 
have been forced from office if that were the only criteria.
    Opponents of conviction also overlook the fact that we may 
look to the effects of the President's conduct. Actions, even 
private actions, that serve to undermine the government or the 
people's confidence in the government or the President, may 
also be impeachable. In other words, opponents of impeachment 
rightly point out some of the categories that are applicable in 
impeachment cases, but they set them forth as exclusive when, 
in fact, they are not.
    The impeachment bar has been raised even higher most 
recently by respected commentators in the media. The New York 
Times editorial page, for example, takes a position that the 
President's action must ``threaten the welfare or stability of 
the state.'' On another occasion, they stated that the 
President's actions must ``show some fundamental harm to the 
security interest or stability of the state or some attempt to 
undermine the Constitution.'' The problem with this is that 
there is absolutely no authority to support such a contention. 
Such a theory relies exclusively upon the ``protect the 
Nation'' theory of impeachment. The founders certainly did not 
mean that the President had to be on the verge of throwing the 
Nation into chaos or endangering national security in order to 
be impeached.
    It is extremely important that we refrain from latching 
onto a definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' simply 
because it leads us inexorably to a conclusion which we may 
desire. Clearly, a President's offense or offenses must be 
serious and/or have serious consequences. Also, while they do 
not have to be crimes, my own opinion is that in most cases 
they will be crimes. They must be crimes against the state, but 
we cannot adopt an unreasonable restriction of that term. The 
President does not have to order tanks to move on the J. Edgar 
Hoover Building. Offenses against the state can include 
activity which will undermine our governmental institutions. 
How can we say that bribing a judge to effect an outcome in a 
law suit involving a President's purely personal conduct 
constitutes an impeachable offense, but say that insinuating 
perjury into that same law suit to effect the same outcome is 
clearly not impeachable? And while it is true that the founders 
meant to cover ``public'' behavior, I believe they also meant 
to cover behavior that has a negative effect on the public if 
it is of sufficient gravity. Furthermore, if the President's 
conduct poses a threat and danger to a country, that certainly 
is a legitimate, though not exclusive, consideration. If that 
same conduct serves to undermine the President's credibility 
and moral authority, that could also pose a danger to the 
country and is similarly a legitimate consideration. And, again 
his conduct does not necessarily have to deal with his office. 
In the Constitution, a named offense is bribery--treason, 
bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors--and bribery 
itself does not necessarily have to do with the President's 
official capacity, if the President is making the bribe.
    I believe that the founders did not intend to make our job 
easy. They provided no list of offenses. They refused to spare 
us from the difficult analysis that we must now go through. We 
must take into consideration the offense or offenses, the 
capacity in which they were committed, the effect on our public 
institutions, the effect on our people and our people's 
attitude toward the Presidency and our other institutions, 
whether the President's conduct was one or more isolated 
events, or a pattern of conduct, the period of time over which 
the conduct was carried out and ultimately decide whether in 
view of all of these circumstances, it is in the best interest 
of the country to remove this President.
    The significance of a ``pattern of conduct'' is recognized 
by John R. Labovitz in his book ``Presidential Impeachment.'' 
Labovitz concluded that focusing on whether the President has 
committed ``an impeachable offense'' is of limited usefulness, 
since few individual crimes warrant removal, such as a single 
act of treason or a single act of bribery. Even in the case of 
President Nixon, ``[i]t was necessary to combine distinct 
actions into a pattern or course of conduct to establish 
grounds for removal from office.'' As he also wrote:

    The concept of an impeachable offense guts an impeachment case of 
the very factors--repetition, pattern, coherence--that tend to 
establish the requisite degree of seriousness warranting the removal of 
a president from office. Just as a recidivist deserves a more stringent 
sentence than a first offender, so presumably a repeated offender is 
more likely to deserve removal from an office of public trust, and 
especially the highest trust in the land. . . . [I]t is necessary to 
take a less divided view of the charges. Because the remedy is not 
additive, the offenses must be considered cumulatively in deciding 
whether or not it should be imposed. The House must decide whether or 
not to prosecute an impeachment on the basis of the charges taken as a 
whole. And, unless the Senate is to take the determination of the House 
without question, it too must judge the combined seriousness of the 
wrongdoing that is proved.

    I believe that this statement is very relevant to the 
obstruction of justice charge, which I will discuss later.
    Article I, after alleging generally that President Clinton 
violated his oath of office and failed to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed by manipulating the judicial 
process for his personal gain, alleges that on August 17, 1998, 
following taking an oath to tell the truth, he

willfully provided perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury concerning one or more of the following: (1) the nature and 
details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) 
prior perjurious, false, and misleading testimony that he gave in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal 
judge in that civil rights action and (4) his corrupt efforts to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence in that civil rights action.
    In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

    Never has the Senate convicted on an article worded such as 
this. Several crimes or categories of crimes--the exact number 
cannot be determined from reading the article--are charged in 
this one article. The perjurious statements are not described, 
nor are their dates. In large part, this article charges that 
the President committed perjury because he denied prior 
perjury.
    At the outset, it is clear that a count such as this in an 
indictment would not survive court challenge. However, it is 
equally clear that the Senate is not bound to follow normal 
legal rules. Impeachment, Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 65, 
``can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the 
delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the 
construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to 
limit discretion of courts in favor of personal security.'' 
Nevertheless, we should examine the basis for such rules and 
determine the extent, if any, we should apply them to our 
deliberations.
    The reason for rules against charging several offenses in 
one article is clear. A group of Senators, as few as 17, could 
conclude that the President was guilty of one offense in the 
article, and a group of other Senators could conclude that the 
President was guilty of another offense in the article and so 
on. This could result in the President being found guilty on 
one article without two-thirds of the Senators ever agreeing 
upon a single offense that the President committed.
    Compounding this problem, the individual items alleged in 
the article are vague because they could reach different 
instances of objectionable conduct within a general heading. 
The problem with failing to specifically identify the offenses 
charged is that it does not give the person charged fair 
notice. Although I believe that the President had actual notice 
for the most part, what is actually being charged in this 
article has not been without dispute.
    The articles pending against President Clinton are unique. 
Never has the Senate considered articles that are 
simultaneously omnibus, vague, and based upon ``one or more'' 
of the charges being proved.
    Again, we have substantial leeway in considering these 
matters, but we must be fair. We are creating precedent, and 
this is not good practice. The rule of law must apply to the 
President when it inures to his benefit just as when it inures 
to his detriment.
    The House relies on rule XXIII of the Senate's impeachment 
rules as granting this body's tacit approval for the drafting 
of impeachment articles in the form of those from President 
Nixon's impeachment proceedings. The House also argues that its 
committee report provided adequate notice of charges, occupying 
20 pages just to list ``the most glaring instances of the 
President's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony before 
a Federal grand jury and requir[ing] 13 pages just to list the 
most glaring incidents in the President's course of conduct 
designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of 
justice.'' But this argument underlines the problem. These 
allegations were not made in the articles themselves, and even 
now, can it truly be said that these were the entirety of the 
charges that could have been raised at trial, or even in a 
later impeachment?
    Articles of impeachment henceforth should not permit 
conviction based upon ``one or more'' findings of guilt. They 
should list specific conduct, preferably in separate articles. 
Removal of elected or appointed government officials, 
especially a President, should occur only when the public can 
be sure that the process has been appropriate. Articles such as 
those before the Senate in this case do not further that goal. 
The Senate should amend rule XXIII to permit impeachment 
articles to be divided, so as to eliminate any incentive for 
the House to adopt duplicitous articles of impeachment.
    In prior impeachments charging false statements, the House 
has always delineated the date and substance of the false 
statement. Indeed, in every impeachment proceeding since Judge 
Pickering in 1803, articles of impeachment exhibited by the 
House have included allegations of specific misconduct. 
Although the Senate has at times voted in favor of articles 
containing multiple or cumulative allegations, it has only done 
so where specific allegations were made in other separate 
articles and where the omnibus article was written in the 
conjunctive. Never has the Senate voted for conviction on an 
article that charged an individual with ``one or more'' 
improper actions.
    Unfortunately, instead of following precedent, the House in 
the case before us deviated from previous practice. In prior 
cases, the House avoided lumping together several amorphous 
charges into one article, with conviction permitted if ``one or 
more'' alleged offenses had been proved--in all cases but one: 
Richard Nixon. Here, the House explicitly followed the 
Watergate example, probably thinking that they would be on safe 
ground. Unfortunately, the articles drafted against President 
Nixon were deficient in the extreme.
    The first article of impeachment against President Nixon 
charged that the President had ``engaged in a course of conduct 
or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct investigations 
of [the] unlawful entry [of the headquarters of the Democratic 
National Committee]; to cover up, conceal and protect those 
responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other 
unlawful activities. The means used to implement this course of 
conduct or plan have included one or more of the following.'' 
The article of impeachment then listed nine separate charges, 
each extremely broad. The second Nixon article charged dozens 
of indeterminate criminal offenses within several wide-ranging 
categories.
    The charges contained in the Nixon articles are alarmingly 
vague and duplicitous. The articles before us are not that 
deficient, but they represent a second step down a road we 
should not take. While these problems with article I in 
isolation may not be sufficient to defeat this article, they 
are more than technicalities, and pose potentially serious 
consequences for the future.
    The Senate, of course, did not have occasion to consider 
the impeachment articles against President Nixon. Only once in 
its history has the Senate actually considered an article of 
impeachment charging violations of ``one or more'' alleged 
acts. Among the articles of impeachment against Judge Walter 
Nixon in 1989 was an article alleging that Judge Nixon made 
``one or more'' false statements. Unlike the articles against 
Presidents Nixon or Clinton, however, the article in question 
in the case of Judge Nixon specifically enumerated the alleged 
material false statements, including the date and nature of the 
statement made. The Senate, though defeating a motion to 
dismiss the article, nevertheless acquitted Judge Nixon on this 
article. Several Senators explained their votes to acquit on 
this article due to the multiplicitous--actually, duplicitous--
and disjunctive ``one or more'' form of the article.
    I agree with those Senators who criticized the form of the 
omnibus article of impeachment that was brought against Judge 
Nixon. An article of impeachment charging a defendant with 
``one or more'' acts is not only unfair to the defendant, but 
it does not permit Senators to perform adequately their 
constitutional duty and the American people to understand their 
actions. If the Senate were to convict on a ``one or more'' 
acts count of an article of impeachment, the votes to convict 
would obscure the real basis for each Senator's vote. 
Ultimately, the American people would be deprived of knowing 
the basis on which the President they duly elected was removed 
from office.
    The Senate also has never been asked to convict someone for 
conduct that formed the basis for an article of impeachment 
that was rejected by the House. Although in a literal sense, no 
such article is before the Senate, in a practical sense that is 
the situation. The House failed to pass an article of 
impeachment against President Clinton that accused him of, on 
January 17, 1998, ``willfully provid[ing] perjurious, false, 
and misleading testimony in response to questions deemed 
relevant by a Federal judge concerning the nature and details 
of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee, his 
knowledge of that employee's involvement and participation in 
the civil rights action brought against him, and his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of that employee.'' Yet, in 
article I, the Senate is asked to convict the President based 
on ``one or more'' sets of actions, one of which is the 
President's ``prior perjurious, false, and misleading testimony 
he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him.'' 
That portion of article I has resulted in the House recharging 
all the allegations of perjury made by the President in his 
civil deposition that were dismissed when the House rejected an 
article of impeachment that was based on that deposition. The 
House does so explicitly: ``In addition to his lie about not 
recalling being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, the President told 
numerous other lies at his deposition. All of those lies are 
incorporated in Article I, Item 2.'' (House Trial Memo., p. 
61.) The House claims that the President's statement in his 
grand jury testimony that he intended to be unhelpful but 
truthful in his deposition, and that he did not violate the law 
in his deposition, amount to perjury in the grand jury if a 
single statement in his deposition was perjurious. However, the 
President did not broadly reaffirm the truth of all his 
deposition testimony. Indeed, before the grand jury, the 
President revised many statements he had made in the Jones 
deposition.
    Two perjury statutes have been enacted as part of the 
federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 1623 and 1621. The elements of 
section 1623 are that the defendant: (1) knowingly make a (2) 
false (3) material declaration (4) under oath in a proceeding 
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United 
States. Statements which are misleading but literally true 
cannot form the basis for a perjury conviction. Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). The most difficult element 
of the offense is materiality. A statement is said to be 
material ``if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is 
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body 
to whom it is addressed.'' United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d 
1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 1998); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 
759 (1988). The Supreme Court has characterized the conduct 
prohibited by section 1621 as follows: ``A witness testifying 
under oath or affirmation violates this section if she gives 
false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.'' United States v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). As with section 1621, 
testimony that is misleading but literally true does not fall 
within the ambit of section 1623.
    A preliminary matter before consideration of these charges 
concerns the burden of proof of the charges in the articles of 
impeachment which I believe should apply. It is well 
established that Senators are free to weigh the evidence in 
particular cases under a standard they consider appropriate. My 
own view is that different cases will be considered under 
different standards, depending on the nature of the particular 
charge. Impeachment is neither a civil nor a criminal 
proceeding, but a hybrid. It is therefore inappropriate to 
always apply one or the other of the criminal or civil burdens 
of proof. When the consequences to the nation of the alleged 
conduct are most serious, such as treason, then the Senate 
should consider the case under a clear and convincing standard, 
for fear of leaving a likely traitor in office simply because 
his guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
By contrast, when the charges allege harms that are not 
imminently serious to the national well-being, it becomes more 
appropriate to apply the criminal burden of proof: beyond a 
reasonable doubt. I concede that the charges alleged here, 
while serious, do not fall within the former category, and I 
will therefore review the facts under the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.
    With that background, I now consider the facts relating to 
the three perjury specifications concerning the President's 
grand jury testimony that are properly before the Senate. The 
first is his testimony concerning ``the details and nature of 
his relationship with a subordinate Government employee.'' The 
President admitted in the grand jury that he had an 
inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    To be sure, President Clinton contended that the 
relationship began in 1996, rather than 1995. The House 
managers note that this is significant because Ms. Lewinsky was 
an intern in 1995. The House also points out that the President 
admitted inappropriate conduct ``on certain occasions,'' when, 
in reality, there were eleven such occasions, and that he had 
``occasional'' telephone encounters with Ms. Lewinsky when 
there were at least seventeen that contained sexual banter. I 
do think that these statements constitute perjury. They were 
false, were made willfully, and were material. Something that 
happens 17 times in a year does not occur ``occasionally.'' 
Given the sensitivity of Ms. Lewinsky's status as an intern, I 
believe that the President deliberately told the grand jury 
that his relationship with her began in 1996, when she no 
longer had that status. Finally, the statement is material 
because it concerns a matter that the grand jury was 
investigating as part of its work: the nature of the 
President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. For these reasons, 
the statement was perjurious.
    The President's statement to the grand jury that he 
regretted that what began as a friendship changed into an 
inappropriate sexual relationship was also knowingly false, 
since the two engaged in sexual relations twice on the same day 
that they first spoke. Thus, the statement was made to deceive, 
and given that it related to a subject of the grand jury's 
inquiry, it was material. Therefore, I agree that this 
statement also constitutes perjury, so that the first item of 
article I has been proved. The second item charged in article I 
addresses statements the President made in the grand jury 
regarding the truth of his deposition testimony. For the 
reasons above stated, I consider finding perjury based on an 
article of impeachment that the House rejected to be 
questionable.
    The third item charged in article I concerns grand jury 
testimony involving ``false and misleading statements he 
allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil 
rights action.'' Before the grand jury, President Clinton 
testified that he was ``not even sure I paid attention to what 
he [Mr. Bennett] was saying'' when his attorney represented to 
the court that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit stated that there was 
no sex of any kind between her and the President. As a factual 
matter, given the videotape that shows the President 
concentrating very carefully on his attorney's words and the 
great importance that he placed on that affidavit and its 
filing in time, this statement's characterization of the 
President's attention was certainly false. However, the 
President said that he ``was not even sure'' that he was paying 
attention. It is possible, although unlikely, that he was not 
sure in August that he was paying attention to that specific 
statement in January. That would make the statement literally 
true and thus, by definition, not perjurious. And in any event, 
I cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that his statement 
was perjurious. Indeed, the real issue is whether President 
Clinton used the affidavit to obstruct justice: whether he 
actually was paying attention to his unsuspecting attorney when 
the affidavit was actually used to obstruct justice is of 
questionable materiality.
    The fourth item of the perjury allegations in article I 
concerns ``his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil 
rights action.'' The first set of facts under this category 
evidently concerns President Clinton's statements to Ms. Currie 
on January 18, 1998, which he described as having been made to 
refresh his recollection. The President's stated reason for 
making these statements to Ms. Currie was false. He knew that 
they were not true, and the President knew that Ms. Currie 
could not testify to their truthfulness. Thus, his statement of 
purported purpose for making them, as communicated to the grand 
jury, was made willfully, with the intent to deceive the grand 
jury. They were material as well, since they went to the issue 
of whether he had committed a Federal crime. They thus 
constitute perjury.
    The second set of facts at issue in item 4 of article I 
apparently concerns whether the President truthfully told the 
grand jury that when the subject of the subpoenaed gifts arose 
at his December 28, 1997, meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, he told 
her ``if they asked her for the gifts, she'd have to give them 
whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' Although Ms. 
Lewinsky never testified that the President said this to her, 
she once indicated that it sounded familiar. Thus, I am not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the President lied 
when he testified that he made this statement.
    The third set of facts in item 4 of article I addresses 
alleged lies that he made to the grand jury concerning the 
truth of statements that he made to White House aides. Before 
the grand jury, the President stated that he had told his aides 
that he did not have sex with Ms. Lewinsky as he defined it, 
and that he told them ``things that were true about this 
relationship.'' In reality, the President told them false 
statements, such as a broader denial of sexual activity than 
that defined as even he had defined it, and that Ms. Lewinsky 
was a stalker who came on to him, but whom he rebuffed. The 
President's statements to the grand jury in this regard were 
false, and were intended to deceive the grand jury about a 
Federal crime of obstruction of justice through the telling of 
false statements to persons he knew might become witnesses 
before that grand jury, and therefore committed perjury.
    As noted above, not all impeachable offenses are crimes, 
and not all crimes are impeachable offenses. While I conclude 
that one of the three sets of facts at issue in item 4 of 
article I does not constitute perjury, I conclude that the 
statements concerning Betty Currie, and the statements 
concerning what he told his aides do constitute perjury. I also 
find that the President committed perjury with respect to item 
1 of article I with respect to his statements that he and Ms. 
Lewinsky's relationship began as a friendship, that it started 
in 1996, and that he had ``occasional'' encounters with her. 
These are the only examples of grand jury perjury that I 
believe have been proved in the entirety of article I. The 
question then is whether these examples of perjury warrant 
removal of the President for the commission of high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    Make no mistake, perjury is a felony, and its commission by 
a President may sometimes constitute high crimes and 
misdemeanors. But is removal appropriate when the President 
lied about whether he was refreshing his recollection or 
coaching a witness about the nature of a sexual relationship? 
Is removal appropriate when the President lied to the grand 
jury that he denied to his aides that he had engaged in sex 
only as he had defined it, when in fact he had denied engaging 
in oral sex? Is removal warranted because the President stated 
that his relationship began as a friendship in the wrong year 
and actually encompassed more telephone encounters than could 
truthfully be described as ``occasional''? To ask the question 
is to answer it. In my opinion, these statements, while wrong 
and perhaps indictable after the President leaves office, do 
not justify removal of the President from office.
    In no way does my conclusion ratify the White House 
lawyers' view that private conduct never rises to impeachable 
offenses, or that only acts that will jeopardize the future of 
the nation warrant removal of the President. It simply 
recognizes how the principles the Founding Fathers established 
apply to these facts.
    I therefore vote to acquit the President of the charges 
alleged against him in article I.
    Article II charges that President William Jefferson 
Clinton, in violation of his oath of office, and in violation 
of his constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed:

has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, 
and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates 
and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly 
instituted judicial proceeding.
    The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme 
included one or more of the following acts:
    (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he 
knew to be perjurious, false, and misleading.
    (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and 
when called to testify personally in that proceeding.
    (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him.
    (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through 
and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified 
and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a 
time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
harmful to him.
    (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent 
questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading 
statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a 
communication to that judge.
    (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.
    (7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in 
a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.
    In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

    Section 1503(a) of title 18 of the United States Code 
states:

    Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening 
letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede 
any grand or petit juror, or officer of any court of the United States, 
or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding 
before any United States magistrate judge or other committing 
magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or 
petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or 
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having 
been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or 
other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the 
performance of his official duties . . . shall be punished as provided 
in subsection (b).

    Courts have interpreted this provision to require the 
Government to prove: ``(1) that there was a pending judicial 
proceeding, (2) that the defendant knew this proceeding was 
pending, and (3) that the defendant then corruptly endeavored 
to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of 
justice.'' United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 387 (6th Cir. 
1998).
    Here, there is no doubt that a judicial proceeding was 
pending and that President Clinton knew that the proceeding was 
pending. The question is whether he corruptly intended to 
influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of 
justice. Courts have held that to act corruptly means to act 
with the intent to influence, obstruct, or impede the 
proceeding in question. United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 
1369 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Littleton, 76 F.3d 614, 
619 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 435 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). Because the prohibited intent is so closely 
related to the prohibited act, courts have required a nexus 
between the obstructing conduct and the target proceedings. 
Thus, the defendant's acts must have the ``natural and probable 
effect'' of interfering with the due administration of justice. 
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). But the 
defendant need only endeavor to obstruct justice to commit this 
offense. There is no requirement that he actually succeed in 
obstructing justice. (Id. at 599, 600.)
    Among the acts that courts have concluded violate section 
1503(a) include the creation of false documents to be presented 
in evidence, United States v. Chihak, 137 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 
1998); and instructing a subordinate to conceal evidence, 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 1997). These 
actions are alleged to have occurred in article II.
    Section 1512(b) of title 18 prohibits witness tampering. 
Specifically, it prohibits knowingly using one or more of the 
prohibited forms of persuasion with the intent to prevent a 
witness's testimony from being presented at official Federal 
proceedings or with the intent to prevent a witness from 
reporting evidence of a crime to Federal authorities. United 
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1996). Unlike 
section 1503, section 1512(b) does not require that the 
defendant be aware of the pendency of Federal proceedings. 
United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts 
differ about the standard of corrupt persuasion, but even the 
more stringent courts agree that it is sufficient if the 
defendant attempts to persuade a witness ``to violate her legal 
duty to testify truthfully in court.'' United States v. 
Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Contrary to the 
representations of White House counsel at the impeachment 
trial, it is not necessary that the defendant threaten or cause 
physical harm to a witness to fall within subsection (b). When 
the defendant's misconduct takes the form of deceiving a 
potential witness with the intent that the witness later repeat 
the deception in federal proceedings, the crime does not 
require that the potential witness was in fact deceived, nor 
that there was any particular likelihood that that potential 
witness would in fact ever be called upon to testify. United 
States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1997). The 
prohibited intent of this subsection is intent to obstruct a 
federal proceeding.
    There are seven specifications of obstruction of justice in 
article II. The first two charge that on or about December 17, 
1997, President Clinton corruptly urged a witness in a Federal 
civil rights action to execute a false affidavit and to give 
false testimony if called to testify. That is the day he 
informed Ms. Lewinsky that she was on the Jones witness list, 
that she should contact Ms. Currie if she were subpoenaed, and 
that she could file an affidavit in the case to avoid 
testifying. In this conversation, the President told Ms. 
Lewinsky that she could ``always say you were coming to see 
Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
    The President conducted an improper relationship with an 
employee of the Federal Government, Monica Lewinsky. He carried 
on that relationship off the Oval Office. He engaged in sexual 
banter over unsecured telephone lines to Ms. Lewinsky's 
residence, compromising himself and making himself susceptible 
to blackmail.
    And on December 17, 1997, the President raised to Ms. 
Lewinsky both the cover stories and filing an affidavit to 
prevent these facts from being disclosed. While Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that he did not expressly tell her to raise the cover 
stories in the affidavit, his intent was unmistakable: to 
corruptly endeavor to influence Ms. Lewinsky to file an 
affidavit that would prevent Paula Jones's attorneys from 
learning of the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, a 
relationship of the type that the judge in her case had ruled 
to be relevant. And even if not directly linked to the 
affidavit, there is no question from Ms. Lewinsky's consistent 
testimony that the President was asking her to use those cover 
stories if she were ultimately asked to testify, since that was 
the context of the conversation. The White House's repeated 
retort that the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was consensual, 
while the allegations by Ms. Jones were of nonconsensual sex, 
is therefore irrelevant. President Clinton did not tell Ms. 
Lewinsky to lie, but neither did he need to, as she understood 
that she was to raise the cover stories. Ms. Lewinsky admitted 
that the affidavit was indeed false. And since Lewinsky's 
truthful testimony would have definitely led to her being 
called as a witness, the President clearly understood that Ms. 
Lewinsky would file an affidavit he had strong reason to 
believe would be false. That is obstruction of justice, as 
shown by the cases that have held creation of false documents 
to be presented in evidence to fit within the statutory 
prohibition. Moreover, this charge must be considered in 
connection with the President's discussions with Ms. Lewinsky 
as her affidavit was being prepared, his conversation with Mr. 
Jordan after he spoke with her, and his lawyer's deep 
involvement in ensuring that the affidavit was filed and that 
the President had an opportunity to see it before that 
occurred, all of which shed light on what the President 
intended Ms. Lewinsky to do in that affidavit and if she 
testified.
    The third item of article II charges that President 
Clinton, on or about December 28, 1997, corruptly engaged in, 
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had 
been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action against him. 
That is the day the President discussed the subpoenaed gifts 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and there is no doubt that the President 
indicated that he was ``bothered'' by the specific gift, a 
hatpin, that the subpoena requested. In none of the many times 
that Ms. Lewinsky testified did she ever say that the President 
told her to turn over the gifts, although once she said that 
the remark seemed familiar, and a number of times she testified 
that he asked to think about her suggestion that she give the 
gifts to Ms. Currie. The gifts, of course, ultimately were 
secreted under Ms. Currie's bed, and there is no doubt in Ms. 
Lewinsky's mind that Ms. Currie initiated the call that led to 
that exchange of the gifts. Since only the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky were present when the subject of giving the gifts to 
Ms. Currie was raised, and since Ms. Lewinsky did not call Ms. 
Currie, the only way that Ms. Currie could have called Ms. 
Lewinsky and not be surprised to obtain the gifts was if the 
President had told her to contact Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve 
them. This is also consistent with the President's course of 
conduct in this matter.
    The President thus corruptly acted to obstruct the Jones 
case by asking Ms. Currie to retrieve and secret the gifts. 
That constitutes obstruction of justice, as demonstrated by the 
cases that have convicted defendants of that charge for having 
instructed subordinates to conceal evidence.
    The White House's arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive. It is irrelevant that the President did not 
initiate the subject of the gifts in his conversation with Ms. 
Lewinsky. It is also irrelevant that he did not tell her to 
conceal the gifts. What is relevant is that the President, 
after thinking about the gifts, instructed Ms. Currie to 
retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. The President's and Ms. 
Currie's denials simply cannot be squared with the evidence.
    Also irrelevant is the fact that Ms. Currie's cell phone 
call to Ms. Lewinsky occurred at 3:30 p.m., whereas Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that the gift pickup occurred at 2 p.m. 
Notwithstanding the White House's willingness to excuse the 
President's error by two or more months concerning when his 
improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began, while insisting 
that the cell phone call's 90-minute mistiming is fatal to the 
theory that Ms. Currie instituted the gift exchange, the cell 
phone call at 3:30 does not prove that Ms. Lewinsky instituted 
the gift exchange. First, Ms. Lewinsky testified that she might 
have been mistaken about the time that Ms. Currie picked up the 
gifts. Second, there is no evidence that the cell phone call 
was the one in which Ms. Currie's gift pickup was proposed. Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that she received other telephone calls from 
Ms. Currie that day to learn when Ms. Currie was coming to her 
apartment and also to know when she should actually come 
outside to meet Ms. Currie.
    The White House also maintains that the President would not 
have given Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, if he 
planned to hide the gifts. The facts do not support that 
theory. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky those gifts before, 
pondering Ms. Lewinsky's idea, he determined that he would ask 
Ms. Currie to retrieve them. Since he had no intent to retrieve 
the gifts at the time he gave her the gifts on December 28, 
there is no inconsistency with his later direction to Ms. 
Currie to pick them up.
    The fourth item of article II alleges that the President, 
beginning on December 7, 1997, and continuing through January 
14, 1998, intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony 
of that witness. Following a meeting with Ms. Lewinsky in 
November in which she sought his assistance, Mr. Jordan took no 
action and provided no help. He does not even remember this 
meeting. Thus, he made no serious effort to find her a job 
until after December 7, once the President, not Ms. Lewinsky, 
asked him to conduct a job search for Ms. Lewinsky. That 
followed Ms. Lewinsky's appearance on the Jones lawyers' 
witness list, and followed the President's promise to Ms. 
Lewinsky that he would ask Mr. Jordan to do more to help her 
find a job.
    Although Ms. Currie, not the President, called Mr. Jordan, 
he was aware that the request came from the President and that 
he acted at the behest of the President. Jordan did not call 
the companies Ms. Lewinsky suggested, but rather, the companies 
where he was likely to produce a job for her. After December 
19, Jordan obviously became aware that the President may have 
been asking him to assist Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job because he 
may have had a sexual affair with Ms. Lewinsky. That prompted 
him to ask both Ms. Lewinsky and the President whether such a 
relationship had occurred. Jordan continued to help find Ms. 
Lewinsky employment once they both denied that this was the 
case. However, he took no additional action until the day after 
Ms. Lewinsky signed the affidavit, when he called the CEO of 
MacAndrews & Forbes to successfully obtain a second interview 
for her at Revlon after she told him that the first had 
proceeded badly. Thus, it is true that Mr. Jordan intensified 
his job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky at the President's request, 
following the President's, but not Mr. Jordan's knowledge, that 
she appeared on the Jones witness list. Jordan took no further 
action on her behalf until satisfying himself that each had 
denied that there had been any sexual relationship. He then 
obtained a job for Ms. Lewinsky by calling the CEO of the 
holding company of the company that offered Ms. Lewinsky a job. 
That call was made the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed her 
affidavit. Because President Clinton did ask Mr. Jordan to 
intensify his job efforts to assist Ms. Lewinsky to obtain a 
job after he knew she was on the Jones witness list, the 
President corruptly obstructed justice by attempting to 
influence the testimony of a witness in a case against him.
    The White House responses to this charge miss the mark. 
That Ms. Lewinsky had begun her job search in July, and after a 
few months had not landed a job of her liking is irrelevant to 
whether, not having obtained a job, the President took steps to 
make sure she did obtain one once her name appeared on the 
witness list. That Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one ever 
promised her a job in return for her silence does not change 
the fact that these efforts were undertaken. That Linda Tripp 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky originally speak with Mr. Jordan 
means nothing because he took no action following that meeting; 
only after the President requested that Mr. Jordan assist Ms. 
Lewinsky once her name appeared on the witness list did he do 
so. That Mr. Jordan testified that he acted with no sense of 
urgency is also of no import: it was the President who acted 
with a sense of urgency, using Mr. Jordan as his agent. Nor is 
it of consequence that Mr. Jordan placed no undue pressure on 
the persons he contacted in support of Ms. Lewinsky. The 
corrupt influence in obstruction of justice that matters is 
directed to the witness, not to the prospective employer of the 
witness. President Clinton knew, and Mr. Jordan knew, that the 
``Jordan magic'' in finding people employment did not depend in 
any way on undue pressure being applied. Thus, the White 
House's contention that there was no connection between Ms. 
Lewinsky obtaining her Revlon offer and Mr. Jordan's call to 
Mr. Perelman is denied by Mr. Jordan himself. President Clinton 
could be sure that Mr. Jordan would find Ms. Lewinsky a job 
when her testimonial support of his denials was critical 
without his own need to do anything. It is also irrelevant that 
she did not obtain a job offer in each company Mr. Jordan 
called. Nothing in the record shows that the President ever 
requested Mr. Jordan to find employment for any White House 
intern who was not on a witness list in a federal case pending 
against him. The President obstructed justice through using Mr. 
Jordan to find Ms. Lewinsky a job once her name appeared on the 
Jones witness list.
    The fifth item of article II claims that the President 
obstructed justice by corruptly allowing his attorney to make 
false and misleading statements to a Federal judge. In the 
President's presence, his attorney represented to the court, 
based on Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, that the President had seen 
the affidavit, and that it showed that ``there is absolutely no 
sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with President 
Clinton,'' a statement his lawyer later retracted out of 
professional ethics obligations. The affidavit stated, inter 
alia, that ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
President, he did not propose that we have a sexual 
relationship . . .'' and ``the occasions that I saw the 
President after I left my employment at the White House in 
April 1996, were official receptions, formal functions or 
events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was 
working at the time. There were other people present on those 
occasions.'' The President testified that the affidavit was 
``absolutely true.'' The President knew that Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit would be used to perpetrate a fraud on the court, and 
because he was briefed on its contents by his attorney in 
advance, he knew that his attorney misunderstood the affidavit, 
and would inadvertently present the affidavit to the court in a 
false light. Yet, he took no action to either change his 
lawyer's understanding or to prevent the use of the affidavit 
under those conditions. Moreover, with knowledge that the 
affidavit used the cover stories that he had reminded Ms. 
Lewinsky to continue on December 17, he testified to those same 
cover stories. Regardless of whether he was paying attention at 
the moment that this happened, the President clearly knew at 
the time the deposition commenced that the affidavit would be 
used in a way that perpetrated a fraud on the court and on Ms. 
Jones's proceedings. He corruptly impeded Ms. Jones's efforts 
to prove the fact relevant to her case that Mr. Clinton had had 
a sexual relationship with another government employee. He did 
so intentionally by allowing that affidavit to be portrayed by 
an officer of the court as proof that there was in fact no 
sexual relationship between the President and another 
government employee. That is obstruction of justice. The White 
House has addressed these facts only with respect to whether 
the President's statement denying that he was in fact paying 
attention to his attorney as opposed to looking at him 
constituted perjury, but has never refuted the President's 
knowledge that a false affidavit would be used in the 
deposition to obstruct the proceeding.
    The sixth item of article II concerns the President's 
obstruction of justice by relating false and misleading 
statements to Betty Currie in order to corruptly influence her 
testimony. The President's conversation with Ms. Currie 
followed his telephone call to her, a call that she testified 
was made later on a Saturday than any call she had ever 
received from the President at home. The conversation occurred 
on a Sunday, when it was rare for Ms. Currie to come to the 
White House. The conversation occurred in the Oval Office, 
where the President would exercise the full powers and 
trappings of his office in the presence of a subordinate. The 
conversation addressed issues from the President's testimony in 
the Jones case, despite the fact that at the end of his 
deposition, the presiding judge ordered him not to discuss his 
testimony with anyone. In that conversation, the President told 
Ms. Currie statements that he knew to be false about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and that she also knew were 
false. Two or three days later, that is, the day the President 
learned that the court had permitted Independent Counsel Starr 
to expand his inquiry into the Lewinsky matter or the day 
after, the President repeated these same statements to Ms. 
Currie.
    The President's call to Ms. Currie followed rapidly upon 
his deposition in the Jones case, its questions concerning Ms. 
Lewinsky, and his repeated answers to such questions by 
invoking Ms. Currie's name, one of which invited the Jones 
attorneys to ``ask Betty.'' In fact, Ms. Jones' lawyers placed 
Ms. Currie's name on their witness list. The ``questions'' that 
he asked were leading, and even according to Ms. Currie, were 
more like statements than questions. He asked her to agree that 
he was never really alone with Ms. Lewinsky, even though they 
both knew that he had been alone with her. He asked her to 
agree that she was always there when Ms. Lewinsky was there, 
even though she could not logically know whether Ms. Lewinsky 
had ever been there when Ms. Currie was absent. He asked her to 
agree that Ms. Lewinsky came on to him and that he never 
touched her, even though Ms. Currie would have had no ability 
to know those ``facts.'' He asked her to agree that she had 
seen and heard everything, when that was also not the case. And 
he suggested to her that Ms. Lewinsky wanted to have sex with 
him and that he could not do that.
    These statements constitute witness tampering. The 
President engaged in misleading conduct, through the use of 
false statements and omissions to mislead, toward Ms. Currie, 
with intent to influence her testimony in a federal court 
proceeding. He acted corruptly, because he acted with the 
improper purpose of obtaining false testimony from a witness 
who would corroborate the lies he issued in the Jones 
deposition to obstruct that case. As stated above, witness 
tampering convictions need not rest on the defendant's actually 
having deceived the potential witness or any particular 
likelihood that the potential witness would in fact ever be 
called upon to testify. United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 
102-03 (2d Cir. 1997).
    The White House arguments in response to these facts are 
inadequate. It is inadequate as a matter of law for the White 
House to contend that the President did not know that Ms. 
Currie was an ``actual or contemplated witness,'' and is 
difficult to accept that proposition factually. Nor as a matter 
of law is it ``critical,'' as the White House contends, that 
Ms. Currie testified that she felt no pressure to agree with 
the President. Witness tampering under section 1512 can be 
accomplished through ``misleading conduct,'' which includes the 
making of false statements or intentional omissions that make 
statements misleading. The White House counsel repeatedly 
argued that threats are necessary for witness tampering, even 
after senatorial questions demonstrated the White House's 
misstatements of the law. The White House also misstated the 
law of witness tampering by claiming that there ``must be a 
known proceeding.'' In fact, the defendant need not know that 
there is any pending federal proceeding to constitute witness 
tampering. United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). The White House contends that the President could 
not have tampered with Ms. Currie in the proceeding in which 
she was ultimately a witness, the independent counsel's 
investigation, since the President could not have known that it 
existed, at least as of January 18. But the statute does not 
require that the defendant know of any pending or even 
contemplated proceedings so long as he engages in misleading 
conduct with respect to a potential witness. United States v. 
Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1995).
    The White House's factual defense to this charge is also 
insufficient. The President could not have made these false 
statements to Ms. Currie for the purpose of refreshing his 
recollection. Nor could he have spoken with her for the purpose 
of seeking information for the same reason. These claims also 
do not explain why he simply did not ask her the questions over 
the telephone on the night of the seventeenth, if that was his 
intention, or explain why he spoke with her a second time.
    The seventh item of article II alleges that the President 
obstructed justice by relaying false and misleading statements 
to his aides. On January 21, the President told his chief of 
staff and two deputies that he had not had sexual relations 
with Ms. Lewinsky. On January 23, he told one of those deputy 
chiefs of staff, John Podesta, that he did not engage in oral 
sex with Ms. Lewinsky. The President on January 21 told his 
aide, Sidney Blumenthal, that Ms. Lewinsky had threatened him. 
President Clinton also indicated that Lewinsky was known among 
her peers as the stalker, and that she would say that she had 
an affair with the President whether it was true or not, so 
that she would not be known as the stalker any more. Blumenthal 
later testified that he believes the President lied to him. The 
President testified that he was aware at the time that he made 
his statements that his aides might be summoned before the 
grand jury. These facts constitute paradigmatic witness 
tampering. The President knowingly engaged in misleading 
conduct, as defined in the statute, towards his aides, with 
intent to influence the testimony of those aides in an official 
proceeding.
    Once again, the White House's arguments to the contrary are 
unavailing. The charge is not that the President lied to his 
friends, as the White House maintains, but that he lied to 
potential witnesses about his conduct that the grand jury was 
investigating. It is not relevant, as the White House contends, 
that the President did not attempt to influence his aides' own 
personal knowledge, only their knowledge of the President's 
views, nor, as stated above, is it relevant as a matter of law 
that the President did not know that any of these individuals 
would ultimately become witnesses. Most surprising was the 
claim that White House Counsel Mr. Ruff raised for the first 
time in closing argument that the President could not be 
convicted of obstructing justice with respect to his 
conversations with Mr. Blumenthal because the fact that the 
President claimed executive privilege with respect to his 
conversation with Mr. Blumenthal meant that he never expected 
the grand jury to hear about it. The President's conversation 
with Mr. Blumenthal was not subject to a legitimate claim of 
executive privilege for two independent reasons. First, it was 
not a discussion that related to the President's official 
duties. Second, it constituted evidence of crime in and of 
itself. There was no possibility that any court would have ever 
upheld such a personally self-serving and frivolous misuse of 
executive privilege, and the President, as a former 
constitutional law professor during the time of Watergate fully 
understood that, as does Mr. Ruff. Indeed, Mr. Blumenthal was 
required to testify to the grand jury about this conversation 
notwithstanding the fact that the President did invoke an 
unwarranted executive privilege claim in an attempt to prevent 
its disclosure. Nor is there evidence that the President 
intended to claim executive privilege at the time that he had 
his conversation with Blumenthal. In any case, there was no 
reason for the President to tell this tale to Mr. Blumenthal 
except to disseminate it to his press contacts and on any 
occasion when he might appear before the grand jury.
    Each and every allegation of obstruction of justice and 
witness tampering has thus been proven. The question then 
arises whether the conclusion that the President has broken the 
law in this respect warrants his removal from office. Since all 
have been proven, I am far less concerned that the ``one or 
more'' language appears in this article. It is appropriate to 
charge an omnibus article in which a series of specific charges 
are leveled, a finding of guilt on each of which is required 
for conviction.
    President Clinton has committed a pattern of acts of 
obstruction of justice. The record demonstrates that the 
President, when his misconduct became relevant to a civil court 
proceeding in which he was a defendant, used all the methods at 
his disposal, including his status as President, to obstruct 
these proceedings and to keep the truth from emerging, 
including:
    Coaching and encouraging a witness, another Federal 
employee, Betty Currie, to give false testimony;
    Facilitating and encouraging Monica Lewinsky to submit an 
affidavit that he had reason to believe would be false;
    Through Vernon Jordan, securing employment for Monica 
Lewinsky in order to keep her from divulging to the court the 
true nature of their relationship;
    Using Government employees to transfer false information to 
the grand jury;
    Allowing a false affidavit to be used to perpetrate a fraud 
on a Federal court;
    After lying in a civil deposition, authorized a poll and 
made a cold, calculated decision based on those poll results to 
continue his obstruction;
    Attempting to speak to Monica Lewinsky before she might 
testify truthfully to the independent counsel about their 
relationship;
    Following his inability to contact Monica Lewinsky, telling 
defamatory lies about her in order to discredit her with his 
aides and with the public;
    Facilitating the hiding of evidence in a civil lawsuit;
    Providing false and misleading testimony in both a civil 
deposition and before a grand jury in order to protect his 
personal interests;
    Lying to the American people in order to cover up his own 
personal misconduct;
    Still failing to acknowledge that he committed the above 
actions, while admitting only as little as he has been forced 
to by the discovery of definitive physical evidence.
    For at least 9 months and in some respects up until today, 
the President has done everything within his power to bring 
about a miscarriage of justice in both a civil court proceeding 
and a criminal court proceeding. He took these actions for the 
sole purpose of protecting himself personally, politically and 
legally. For those who emphasize the private nature of his 
original misconduct, I would ask if he should be protected 
because he obstructed justice for such a low purpose? Time and 
again, and with premeditation, he was willing to use government 
personnel to assist in his coverup and his lies, acknowledging 
part of the truth only when confronted with physical evidence. 
And he carried his lies and cover up right on into legal 
proceedings with the grace and ease of someone who regarded a 
court of law as deserving of no more respect than if he were 
dealing with a stranger on the street. It is this persistent 
relentless, remorseless pattern of conduct that requires a 
verdict of guilty. He was willing to lie, defame, hide evidence 
and enlist anyone necessary, including government employees 
over and over again. At every juncture when he had the 
opportunity to stop, relent or come clean with a forgiving 
public, he chose instead to go forward. And even today he 
refuses to acknowledge the damage he has done to the Presidency 
and the judiciary, choosing instead to rely upon his high job 
approval rating and acknowledging only what he is forced to 
after the production of physical evidence.
    Consider what those who oppose impeachment say about his 
actions:
    Senator Bumpers, one of the counsel for the President 
during his trial, described the President's conduct as 
``indefensible, outrageous, unforgivable, shameless.'' The New 
York Times editorialized that ``President Clinton behaved 
reprehensibly, [and] betrayed his constitutional duty to uphold 
the rule of law. . . .'' A censure resolution offered by 
Members of his own party in the House, including one of the 
strongest opponents of impeachment in the Judiciary Committee, 
concluded that President Clinton ``egregiously failed in [his] 
obligation'' ``to set an example of high moral standards and 
conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect for the 
truth;'' ``violated the trust of the American people, lessened 
their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the 
office which they have entrusted to him;'' ``made false 
statements concerning his reprehensible conduct with a 
subordinate;'' and ``wrongly took steps to delay discovery of 
the truth.'' Respected members of the President's party in this 
body expressed or shared the expression of the view that his 
actions were ``disgraceful,'' that it was ``dismay[ing]'' to 
consider ``the impact of his actions on our democracy and its 
moral foundations,'' that it was ``immoral'' and ``harmful'' 
since ``the President's private conduct can and often does have 
profound public consequences'' and ``compromised his moral 
authority,'' and they described his deception as ``intentional 
and premeditated.''
    So we castigate the President in the most bitter terms; 
decry his disgraceful conduct and his damage to the 
institutions we hold most dear; disgrace him with the most 
condemnatory language at our command and yet refuse to even 
consider his removal from office? By such action we treat the 
loss of public office as the worst fate imaginable, reserved 
for only the most treasonous of villains. Has public office 
become so precious in the United States that we treat it as a 
divine right? Actually, by such treatment we cheapen it.
    At a time when all of our institutions are under assault, 
when the Presidency has been diminished and the Congress is 
viewed with scepticism, our judiciary and our court system have 
remarkably maintained the public's confidence. Now the 
President's actions are known to every schoolchild in America. 
And in the midst of these partisan battles, many people still 
think this matter is just ``lying about sex.'' But little by 
little, there will be a growing appreciation that it is about 
much more than that. And in years to come, in every court house 
in every town in America, juries, judges, and litigants will 
have the President's actions as a bench mark against which to 
measure any attempted subversion of the judicial process. The 
notion that anyone, no matter how powerless, can get equal 
justice will be seen by some as a farce. And our rule of law--
the principle that many other countries still dream about--the 
principle that sets us apart, will have been severely damaged. 
If this does not constitute damage to our government and our 
society, I cannot imagine what does. And for that he should be 
convicted.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

              Statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

    Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I speak to the 
matter of prudence. Charles L. Black, Jr. begins his masterful 
account ``Impeachment: A Handbook'' with a warning: ``Everyone 
must shrink from this most drastic of measures. . . . [t]his 
awful step.''
    For it is just that. The drafters of the American 
Constitution had, from England and from Colonial government, 
fully formed models of what a legislature should be, what a 
judiciary should do. But nowhere on earth was there a nation 
with an elected head of an executive branch of government.
    Here they turned to an understanding of governance which 
marks the American Constitution as a signal event in human 
history--what the framers called ``the new science of 
politics.'' What we might term the intellectual revolution of 
1787. The victors in the Revolution could agree that no one, or 
not many, wanted another monarchy in line with the long 
melancholy succession since Rome. Yet given what Madison termed 
``the fugitive and turbulent existence of . . . ancient 
republics,'' who could dare to suggest that a modern republic 
could hope for anything better?
    Madison could. And why? Because study had produced new 
knowledge, which could now be put to use. This great new claim 
rested upon a new and aggressively more ``realistic'' idea of 
human nature. Ancient and medieval thought and practice were 
said to have failed disastrously by clinging to illusions 
regarding how men ought to be. Instead, the new science would 
take man as he actually is, would accept as primary in his 
nature the self-interestedness and passion displayed by all men 
everywhere and, precisely on that basis, would work out decent 
political solutions.
    This was a declaration of intellectual independence equal 
to anything asserted in 1776. Until then, with but few 
exceptions, the whole of political thought had turned on ways 
to inculcate virtue in a small class that would govern. But, 
wrote Madison, ``If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.'' We would have to work with the material at hand. 
Not pretty, but something more important: predictable. Thus, 
men could be relied upon to be selfish; nay, rapacious. Very 
well: ``Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.'' 
Whereupon we derive the central principle of the Constitution, 
the various devices which in Madison's formulation offset ``by 
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives.''
    Impeachment was to be the device whereby the Congress might 
counteract the ``defect of better motives'' in a President. But 
any such behavior needed to be massive and immediately 
threatening to the state for impeachment ever to go forward. 
Otherwise a quadrennial election would serve to restitute 
wrongs.
    Further, they had a model for this process in the 
impeachment of Warren Hastings which had begun in April of 1786 
with Edmund Burke presenting 22 ``Articles of Charge of High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The debate in the House of Commons 
continued into 1787 and was reported in the Pennsylvania 
Gazette.
    Burke was hardly a stranger to the Americans at 
Philadelphia. He had championed the cause of the American 
colonies during the Revolution, and was now doing much the same 
as regards the governance of British India. He accused the 
Governor General of the highest crimes possible against, inter 
alia, the peoples of India.
    At Philadelphia, the standard for impeachment was discussed 
only once--on Saturday, September 8, 1787. At that point in the 
convention, the draft of the clause in the Constitution 
pertaining to impeachment referred only to ``treason and 
bribery.''
    Here are Madison's notes of the debate that day:

    The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments 
against the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up.
    Col. MASON. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery 
only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great 
and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to 
subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. As bills 
of attainder which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, 
it is the more necessary to extend: the power of impeachments. He mov.d 
to add after ``bribery'' ``or maladministration.'' Mr. GERRY seconded 
him.
    Mr. MADISON. So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during 
pleasure of the Senate.
    Mr. GOV. MORRIS. It will not be put in force & can do no harm. An 
election of every four years will prevent maladministration.
    Col. MASON withdrew ``maladministration'' & substitutes ``other 
high crimes & misdemeanors ag.st the State.''

    The convention later replaced the word ``State'' with 
``United States.'' And on September 12, 1787, the Committee of 
Style--which had no authority to alter the substantive meaning 
of the text--deleted the words ``against the United States.''
    Thus the framers clearly intended that a President should 
be removed only for offenses ``against the United States.'' It 
may also be concluded that the addition of the words ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' was intended to extend the 
impeachment power of Congress so as to reach ``great and 
dangerous offences,'' in Mason's phrase.
    The question now before the Senate is whether the acts that 
form the basis for the articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton rise to the level of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' which is to say ``great and dangerous 
offences'' against the United States.
    Over the course of 1998, as we proceeded through various 
revelations, thence to impeachment and so on to this trial at 
the outset of 1999, I found myself asking whether the assorted 
charges, even if proven, would rise to the standard of ``great 
and dangerous offences'' against the United States. More than 
one commentator observed that we were dealing with ``low 
crimes,'' matters that can be tried in criminal courts after 
the President's term expires. Early in his address to the 
Senate our distinguished former colleague Dale Bumpers made 
this point:

    Colleagues, you have such an awesome responsibility. My good 
friend, the senior Senator from New York, has said it well. He says a 
decision to convict holds the potential for destabilizing the Office of 
the Presidency.

    The former Senator from Arkansas was referring to an 
article in The New York Times on December 25 in which I said 
this:

    We are an indispensable nation and we have to protect the 
Presidency as an institution. You could very readily destabilize the 
Presidency, move to a randomness. That's an institution that has to be 
stable, not in dispute. Absent that, do not doubt that you could 
degrade the Republic quickly.

    This could happen if the President were removed from office 
for less than the ``great and dangerous offences'' contemplated 
by the framers.
    In ``Grand Inquests,'' his splendid and definitive history 
of the impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase in 1804, and of 
President Andrew Johnson in 1868, Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
records how narrowly we twice escaped from a precedent that 
would indeed have given us a Presidency, and a Court, subject 
to ``tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.''
    It is startling how seductive this view can be. In 1804 it 
was the Jeffersonians, including Jefferson himself, who saw 
impeachment as a convenient device for getting rid of a Justice 
of the Supreme Court with whose opinions they disagreed. Not 
many years later radical Republicans sought the same approach 
to removing a President with whom they disagreed over policy 
matters.
    It could happen again. Impeachment is a power singularly 
lacking any of the checks and balances on which the framers 
depended. It is solely a power of the Congress. Do not doubt 
that it could bring radical instability to American Government.
    We are a blessed Nation. But our blessings could be our 
ruin if we do not see how rare they are. There are two nations 
on earth, the United States and Britain, that both existed in 
1800 and have not had their form of government changed by force 
since then. There are eight--I repeat eight--nations which both 
existed in 1914 and have not had their form of government 
changed by violence since then: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, 
and Switzerland.
    Senators, do not take the imprudent risk that removing 
William Jefferson Clinton for low crimes will not in the end 
jeopardize the Constitution itself. Censure him by all means. 
He will be gone in less than 2 years. But do not let his 
misdeeds put in jeopardy the Constitution we are sworn to 
uphold and defend.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Bob Graham

    Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice: ``We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among 
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.''
    Those words were a radical declaration when spoken in 1776. 
Never before had it been asserted that the purpose of 
government was to secure the individual freedoms and liberties 
of its citizens. To the contrary, previous governments existed 
for the opposite purpose, to control the people and suppress 
their aspirations.
    Eleven years after the Continental Congress approved these 
revolutionary sentiments--and after a violent war which severed 
the colonies' tie to King George III--many of the same 
individuals who had declared independence gathered again in 
Philadelphia to secure those rights so recently and tenuously 
won.
    The governmental structure they constructed during those 
weeks in the oppressive summer heat was far from simple. But 
its complexity wasn't an accident, or simply a result of the 
diverse geographical and economic interests represented at the 
Constitutional Convention. As our colleague Senator Patrick 
Moynihan has so aptly observed, our Government was the first to 
insert conflict as a conscious element, to achieve inefficiency 
by design.
    Our Nation's founders had personal knowledge of and 
experience with English history, in which both kings and 
parliaments had at times exerted excessive power over the 
people. They realized that liberty would be enhanced if 
political power was divided instead of centralized.
    Unlike other forms of democracy, where a no confidence vote 
of the national legislature can bring down a government at any 
time, the framers took great pains to establish a delicate 
balance of powers--and a careful system of checks and 
balances--between the Nation and the States and among the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal 
Government. They created a structure in which every branch 
would have the strength needed to keep excessive power from 
flowing into the hands of any other branch and thus threatening 
the liberties of the people.
    This determination to achieve balance is reflected in the 
discussion of impeachment and removal from office in article I, 
section 3 of the Constitution. By requiring action from both 
houses of Congress, and mandating a two-thirds Senate majority 
for removal, the framers purposely made it difficult for 
Congress to undo the results of a properly constituted 
Presidential election--one of the most disruptive acts 
imaginable in a democracy--and relieve a President of his or 
her constitutional duties. The framers wisely recognized that 
impeachment, when improvidently used, could create an 
overbearing Congress from the ruins of a destabilized and 
delegitimized Presidency.
    But the framers' attention to balance was not limited to 
the procedures of impeachment. They also made clear their 
belief that impeachment and removal from office should only be 
an option in situations in which a President becomes a threat 
to the Government and the people it serves. We see this in 
their small number of enumerated offenses--``Treason, Bribery, 
other High Crimes and Misdemeanors''--and in their commentary.
    For example, at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, 
George Mason said that the term ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' referred to ``great and dangerous offenses'' and 
``attempts to subvert the Constitution.''
    Mr. Chief Justice, the President's self-indulgent actions 
were immoral, disgraceful, reprehensible. History should--and, 
I suspect, will--judge that William Jefferson Clinton 
dishonored himself and the highest office in our American 
democracy.
    But despite their disreputable nature, President Clinton's 
actions should not result in his conviction and removal from 
office. After careful objective study of each article presented 
by the House of Representatives, I have concluded that the 
charges against the President do not meet the high 
constitutional standards established by the framers. Removal of 
this President on the grounds established by the House managers 
would upset the delicate balance of powers so meticulously 
established 212 years ago.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the framers set high standards for 
removal because they understood that the office of the 
Presidency would be held by imperfect human beings. They 
assembled a Government that could withstand personal failings.
    We should be outraged that William Jefferson Clinton's 
personal failings debased himself and his office. But they did 
not cause permanent injury to the proper functioning of our 
Government. He did not upset the constitutional balance of 
powers.
    I hope that the Chief Justice, my colleagues, and the 
American people will not misinterpret my comments. While it has 
not been proven that President William Jefferson Clinton 
committed the high crimes and misdemeanors required for removal 
from office, he is not above the law. His acquittal in this 
impeachment trial is not exoneration.
    The framers made this clear in Article I of the 
Constitution. They established that an impeached President, 
even if convicted and removed from office, would still ``be 
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and 
Punishment, according to law.'' When this President leaves 
office, he could face sanction or conviction for his actions.
    Mr. Chief Justice, during the questioning phase of this 
trial, I sought assurances from the President, through White 
House Counsel, Mr. Charles Ruff, that he would not attempt to 
circumvent this judicial process by seeking a pardon for his 
actions. Counsel Ruff responded as follows:

    I have stated formally on behalf of the President in response to a 
very specific question by the House Judiciary Committee that he would 
not, and, indeed, we have said in this Chamber, and we have said in 
other places, that the President is subject to the rule of law like any 
other citizen and would continue to be on January 21, 2001, and that he 
would submit himself to whatever law and whatever prosecution the law 
would impose on him. He is prepared to defend himself in that forum at 
any time following the end of his tenure. And I committed on his 
behalf, and I have no doubt that he would so state himself, that he 
would not seek or accept a pardon.

    I take Counsel Mr. Charles Ruff at his words. Once the 
President leaves office, he will be subject to the same 
prosecutorial and judicial review that all Americans face.
    Mr. Chief Justice, now that we are at the end of this 
divisive and unpleasant experience, what have we learned?
    We have learned that the Constitution works. The framers 
made it clear that the President should only be impeached and 
removed from office in cases where he becomes a threat to the 
government and the governed. The President's acquittal will 
uphold the sanctity of the office and prevent a weakening of 
the balance of powers that protects our individual rights and 
liberties.
    We have reaffirmed the principle that no man is above the 
law. While I believe that the President is not guilty of high 
crimes and misdemeanors in this court of impeachment, he will 
be subject to legal sanction in other forums when he becomes a 
private citizen.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the President's misdeeds will affect his 
standing in history. But they do not justify the first removal 
of a President of the United States from the office to which he 
was elected by the American people. When my name is called on 
the roll, I will vote ``not guilty'' on both articles of 
impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Wayne Allard

    Mr. ALLARD. Mr. Chief Justice, as we all know, this 
impeachment trial has been a difficult process for the Senate 
and for our nation.
    As this trial draws to a close each of us has the solemn 
duty of voting our conscience according to the dictates of the 
Constitution. I do not take this responsibility lightly.
    For me, the vote in this trial will be the second most 
important of my congressional career. The only other vote to 
rank higher was my vote to authorize the Gulf War and thereby 
send American soldiers into combat.
    My ultimate goal as we moved into this process was to 
maintain precedent and not shatter a very thoughtful process 
laid out in the Constitution and within Senate rules.
    At the start of this Senate impeachment trial I took an 
oath to do impartial justice according to the Constitution and 
laws. I worked hard to adhere to that oath, and I pray that I 
have kept that oath.
    This is particularly important to me since much of my 
thinking in this case centers on my conclusion that the 
President has violated his oath of office.
    I have determined to base my decision on the facts of the 
case, not the polls, the performance of the economy, the 
President's popularity or where he is in his term of office.
    Finally, I have felt that if any of the parts of an article 
constitute grounds for impeachment, then an affirmative vote on 
the article is warranted.
    While the Senate is clearly divided on conviction and 
removal, one thing we have all learned is the importance of the 
Constitution.
    We may be separated by political party or ideology, but we 
are united in our belief in the Constitution as the governing 
charter of our Republic.
    Presidents come and go, and Senators come and go. The 
Constitution remains. It is the foundation of our political 
system.
    The Constitution is what preserves the rule of law, and 
guarantees that we remain a nation of laws, not of men.
    And, as we have all learned, in the impeachment and trial 
of a President, the Constitution is the document that directs 
how we shall proceed as members of the Congress.
    Some have argued that this trial has divided America. In 
the short run, yes. But in the long run, it has united us and 
made us stronger.
    We are stronger because we have once again demonstrated 
that we determine who shall lead this nation by democratic 
means, not by force of arms.
    During the past month, I have listened to the evidence and 
I have weighed it carefully. It is now time for me to cast my 
vote and to explain my reasoning to my colleagues and to my 
constituents.
    We have before us two articles of impeachment. The first 
deals with perjury, the second with obstruction of justice.
    The first article alleges that the President violated his 
Constitutional oath and his August 17, 1998 sworn oath to tell 
the truth before a Federal grand jury.
    He did so by willfully providing perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony in one or more of the following: (1) the 
nature and details of his relationship with a subordinate 
government employee; (2) prior perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him; (3) prior false and misleading statements he 
allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil 
rights action; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the 
testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence 
in that civil rights action.
    In my view the House managers demonstrated that at least 
three of the four provisions are true. The physical evidence is 
there, and the testimony supports that position.
    I realize that with enough lawyers, one can certainly cloud 
things, and confuse and distract, but I believe the facts speak 
for themselves.
    To me, once you cut through all the legal details and hours 
and hours of argument, this case is very clear. The President 
lied under oath. He lied not once, but repeatedly.
    On this article, the only question for me is whether it 
rises to the level of an impeachable offense. I believe that it 
does. And this has certainly been the prior view of the Senate 
since it has on several occasions convicted and removed Federal 
judges for perjury.
    Most recently in 1989, when Federal District Judge Nixon 
was convicted and removed from office for ``knowingly and 
contrary to his oath mak[ing] a material false or misleading 
statement to a grand jury.''
    Here the judge's violation of the oath ``to tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth'' was deemed an 
impeachable offense. I simply cannot justify a different 
standard for the President.
    Some have argued that the standard for him should be lower 
because he is elected by the people, while Federal judges are 
appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate to 
serve for life. While I respect those who hold this view, I 
cannot agree with it.
    I hold the President to a higher standard because he is the 
chief law enforcement official of the Nation. If he is above 
the law, then we have a double standard; one for the powerful, 
and one for the rest.
    Now let me address the second article. The charge is that 
the President violated his Constitutional oath in that he 
prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of 
justice.
    Obstruction of justice is clearly an impeachable offense. 
History and prior practice support this view, and it seems that 
many members of this body agree that obstruction does warrant 
removal from office.
    The question then is whether the House managers have 
demonstrated obstruction of justice. I believe that they have.
    When we review the witness depositions of Monica Lewinsky, 
Vernon Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal, we compare those with the 
depositions of the President, and when we review all the 
evidence gathered and presented by the House managers, and by 
the independent counsel and the grand jury, there are at least 
four areas of obstruction by the President.
    These relate to the encouraging of a false affidavit, the 
concealment of gifts, the assistance in employment, and the 
attempt to refresh the memory of his secretary Betty Currie 
which done a second time several days later is pure and simple 
trying to influence her testimony.
    While we may never know with absolute certainty what 
occurred, the evidence is overwhelming that the President took 
numerous actions designed to impede the administration of 
justice.
    I am also of the view that if the President committed 
perjury, then he obstructed justice. Perjury is a form of 
obstruction of justice.
    I will therefore vote for conviction on both articles. I 
don't believe I will be voting to undo an election. We have a 
process of succession to the Presidency which maintains control 
in the Vice President of the same party with the same agenda.
    Let me now explain why I feel conviction is so important in 
this case. It has to do with the role of the oath in our 
society. This is why the President's removal is necessary to 
protect the republic.
    When I was sworn in as a United States Senator I took the 
following oath to uphold the Constitution as did each one of 
you:

    I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the Constitution 
of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this 
obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of 
evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of 
the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

    I took the same oath on three occasions when I served in 
the U.S. House of Representatives. The President takes a 
similar oath when he enters office:

    I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the Office of 
President of the United States, and will to the best of my ability, 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.

    Both of these oaths are required by the Constitution.
    Article VI of the Constitution requires that all Senators, 
Representatives, members of the State legislatures, and all 
executive and judicial officers of the United States and the 
States shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the 
Constitution. The oath of office lies at the center of this 
impeachment debate.
    As George Washington stated in his Second Inaugural Address 
on March 4, 1793:

    Previous to the execution of any official act of the President the 
Constitution requires an oath of office. This oath I am now about to 
take, and in your presence: That if it shall be found during my 
administration of the Government I have in any instance violated 
willingly or knowingly the injunctions thereof, I may (besides 
incurring constitutional punishment) be subject to the upbraidings of 
all who are now witnesses of the present solemn ceremony.

    The sworn oath is central not only to our Constitution, but 
also to the administration of justice. Our legal system would 
not function without it.
    Witnesses in trials swear under oath to ``tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.''
    Similarly, parties in civil lawsuits answer written 
questions or ``interrogatories'' put to them by their 
opponents. All answers are given under penalty of perjury. The 
answering party must sign a statement attesting to the 
truthfulness of the answers.
    Testimony before a Federal grand jury is given under oath, 
with the witness swearing to ``tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth.'' And the citizens who sit on a 
grand jury take an oath to seek the truth.
    The Federal Rules of Evidence make reference to the 
importance of the oath in our judicial system.
    Rule 603 states that the oath is ``calculated to awaken the 
witness' conscience and impress the witness' mind with the 
duty'' to tell the truth.
    The Supreme Court has commented in a number of cases on the 
question of perjury. In the 1975 case of United States v. 
Mandujano, the Court opinion noted:

    In this constitutional process of securing a witness' testimony, 
perjury simply has no place whatever. Perjured testimony is an obvious 
and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings. 
Effective restraints against this type of egregious offense are 
therefore imperative.

    In the much earlier 1937 case of United States v. Norris, 
the Court observed:

    There is occasional misunderstanding to the effect that perjury is 
somehow distinct from ``obstruction of justice.'' While the crimes are 
distinct, they are in fact variations on a single theme: preventing a 
court, the parties, and the public from discovering the truth. Perjury, 
subornation of perjury, concealment of subpoenaed documents, and 
witness tampering are all forms of obstruction of justice.

    As the House prosecutors have argued, the principle of 
``Equal Justice Under Law'' is at the very heart of our legal 
system.
    In order to survive it requires not only an impartial 
judiciary and an ethical bar, but also a sacred oath. Without 
the sanctity of the oath, ``Equal Justice Under Law'' cannot be 
guaranteed.
    In addition to our legal system, other sectors of our 
society rely on oaths to ensure truthfulness and uphold values.
    At a very early age we frequently ask our young people to 
take an oath. The Boy Scout Oath is as follows:

    On my honor I will do my best
    To do my duty to God and my country
    and to obey the Scout Law;
    To help other people at all times;
    To keep myself physically strong,
    mentally awake, and morally straight.

    And the Girl Scout Promise:

    On my honor, I will try:
    To serve God and my country,
    To help people at all times,
    And to live by the Girl Scout Law.

    Members of our armed forces take the following oath of 
enlistment:

     1I do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and 
that I will obey the orders of the President of the United States and 
the orders of the officers appointed over me, according to regulations 
and the Code of Military Justice. So help me God.

    Police officers, local officials and members of many civic 
organizations take an oath.
    What is the purpose of an oath, and why do we rely on an 
oath in so many sectors of our society?
    The oath in legal proceedings is designed to ensure 
truthfulness.
    The oath taken by public officials and the military is 
designed to uphold the Constitution and preserve the rule of 
law.
    The oath taken by scouts and members of civic organizations 
is designed to encourage values and good citizenship.
    A violation of these oaths is taken seriously, and is often 
punished under the law. Why? To protect the organization, to 
protect the government, to protect the republic.
    The President's oath is the most important oath any person 
takes in our Constitutional system. If that oath can be ignored 
it will set a very damaging precedent for our society.
    Throughout this impeachment process there have been many 
proposals concerning the best means of resolution.
    At each turn however, Members of the Congress have 
ultimately recognized that the appropriate path to take is the 
path laid out in the Constitution. That path was a full trial 
in the U.S. Senate.
    I am proud to have been among those who argued for a trial.
    Whatever the outcome, I will leave this process confident 
that the system has worked. While I may disagree with the final 
vote, I will respect that vote and I will urge that we move 
forward united and determined to do the people's business.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Mitch McConnell

    Mr. McCONNELL. Mr. Chief Justice, as the senior Senator 
from Kentucky, it is my distinct privilege today to rise and 
speak at the desk formerly occupied by one of the greatest 
Senators in the history of our country and the greatest Senator 
from the Commonwealth of Kentucky: Henry Clay.
    Henry Clay is best remembered for two things: (1) the 
Compromise of 1850, and (2) a famous statement he made after 
being told that advocating the Compromise of 1850 would doom 
his chances for the presidency. At that critical moment Clay 
replied: ``I had rather be right than be President.''
    In many respects, William Jefferson Clinton had a similar 
choice over the past several months. He could do the right 
thing. Or he could cling to his Presidency--regardless of the 
costs and regardless of the consequences. Consequences to his 
family, to his friends, to his aides, to his Cabinet, and, most 
importantly, to his country.
    Time after time, the President came to a fork in the road. 
Time after time, he had the opportunity to choose the noble and 
honorable path. Time after time, he chose the path of lies and 
lawlessness--for the simple reason that he did not want to 
endanger his hold on public office.
    Nowhere is the President's cold, calculated choice more 
clear than in the private conversation he had with his 
confidant and long-time advisor, Dick Morris, just after he 
raised his right hand to God and testified under oath in a 
civil rights lawsuit that he had not had any sexual relations 
with a young intern named Monica Lewinsky.
    After that critical denial, the President did what he does 
best: he put his finger to the wind to determine which path he 
should take. He asked Mr. Morris to conduct a poll to determine 
whether the American people would forgive him for adultery, for 
perjury, and for obstruction of justice. Morris came back with 
bad news.
    The public, in Morris's words was ``just not ready for 
it.'' They would forgive him for adultery, but not for perjury 
and obstruction of justice.
    The President then faced a fundamental choice. He could 
tell the truth--and admit that he perjured himself in the Jones 
suit. Or he could cling to public office--and deny, delay and 
obstruct.
    The choice for President Clinton was clear. He told Morris: 
``Well, we just have to win.''
    And, thus the course was charted. The President would seek 
to win at any cost. If it meant lying to the American people. 
If it meant lying to his Cabinet. If it meant lying to a 
Federal grand jury. If it meant tampering with witnesses and 
obstructing justice. If it meant falsely branding a young woman 
with the scarlet labels of liar and ``stalker.'' The name of 
the game was winning. Winning at any cost.
    Based on the evidence before the Senate, I want to walk you 
down the road that Bill Clinton has traveled these past several 
months. That twisted, tortured road that he has forced the 
American people and their government to plod along--for what 
seems to many of us like an eternity.
    The first fork in the President's road came on November 15, 
1995, when he met a young, White House intern named Monica 
Lewinsky. He could be her President. He could be her boss. He 
could even be her friend. Or, he could choose to be in a 
relationship with her that was clearly inappropriate.
    The President chose the wrong path. As we heard Ms. 
Lewinsky testify, on the day of their first meeting, which also 
happened to be the day of their first sexual encounter, 
President Clinton looked at Ms. Lewinsky's intern pass, tugged 
on it and said, ``This is going to be a problem.''
    But the President persisted down that problematic path. He 
had approximately 10 more sexual encounters with Ms. Lewinsky 
over the next 21 months.
    It is important, however, to note that had the President 
stopped there, we would not be here. At that point, the 
President's defenders could have credibly argued, ``it's a 
private matter; it's just about sex.''
    But, Bill Clinton didn't stop there.
    In December of 1997, the President came to another fork. At 
that time, he learned the following critical facts:
    One: Ms. Lewinsky had been placed on the witness list in 
the Jones case;
    Two: Judge Susan Webber Wright had ordered the President to 
provide information concerning any government employee with 
whom he had engaged in sexual activity; and
    Three: Ms. Lewinsky had been served with a subpoena and 
ordered to produce any gifts she had received from the 
President.
    At this point, the President had a choice. He could tell 
Ms. Lewinsky to obey the law, tell the truth, and turn over the 
gifts. Or, he could not.
    Again, President Clinton chose the path of lies and deceit. 
Let's, again, hear this account from Ms. Lewinsky:

    ``[I]t wasn't as if the President called me and said, `You know, 
Monica, you're on the witness list, this is going to be really hard for 
us, we're going to have to tell the truth. . . .' And by him not 
calling me and saying that, you know, I knew what that meant. . . .
    [A]s we had on every other occasion and every other instance of 
this relationship, we would deny it.''

    The evidence indicates that the President was not 
interested in the truth, but rather, was only interested in 
getting Ms. Lewinsky to sign a false affidavit and getting her 
a job in New York where, from the President's way of thinking, 
she was less apt to be contacted by the Jones lawyers.
    I must say that I am baffled at how the President of the 
United States--the leader of the free world--was intimately 
involved in both of these efforts. The evidence indisputably 
establishes that the President worked with his close friend 
Vernon Jordan to secure: (1) a job offer for Ms. Lewinsky in 
New York, and (2) a lawyer for Ms. Lewinsky to prepare and file 
her false affidavit. As Mr. Jordan's testimony made clear, his 
efforts on behalf of Ms. Lewinsky were at the behest of the 
President.
    The evidence also indicates that during this same time 
period the President participated in a scheme to conceal gifts 
in the Jones civil rights suit. Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is 
clear that she met with the President on December 28, and 
suggested to him that she could ``put away or maybe give to 
Betty or give to someone the gifts[.]'' Ms. Lewinsky further 
testified that later that same day the President's loyal 
secretary, Betty Currie, initiated a call to her to pick up the 
gifts. I find Ms. Lewinsky's testimony to be credible. 
Moreover, it is corroborated by Ms. Currie's cell phone record.
    And, of course, the President didn't stop there.
    The President came to another fork in the road where he had 
to decide whether to testify truthfully under oath regarding 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. And, again, the President 
chose the path of lies and deceit.
    He walked into the deposition room, raised his right hand, 
swore to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth, and then proceeded to give false statements. In a civil 
case about alleged sexual misconduct with a subordinate 
government employee, the President testified under oath that he 
never had a ``sexual relationship'', a ``sexual affair'' or 
``sexual relations'' with a subordinate government employee 
named Monica Lewinsky.
    But, again, as egregious as those actions were, had the 
President stopped there, we still might not be here.
    The stakes for President Clinton continued to go higher and 
higher. Following his deposition, the President had to decide 
what to do with his loyal secretary, Ms. Betty Currie. And, 
again, the undisputed evidence shows that the President took 
the path of lies and deceit.
    Contrary to Federal obstruction of justice laws and 
contrary to Judge Wright's protective order instructing 
President Clinton ``not to say anything whatsoever about the 
questions . . . asked, the substance of the deposition, . . . , 
[or] any details. . . ,'' President Clinton left the 
deposition, went back to the White House, and called Ms. Currie 
at home to ask her to come to the White House the next day--
which, I might add, was a Sunday.
    At that somewhat surreal Sunday afternoon meeting, the 
President--in violation of Judge Wright's protective order--
told Ms. Currie that he had been asked several questions about 
Monica Lewinsky at his deposition. Then the President--in 
violation of the Federal obstruction of justice law--fired off 
a string of fundamentally declarative statements to his 
secretary.

    ``You were always there when she was there, right? We were never 
really alone.
    ``You could see and hear everything.
    ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    ``She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do that.''

    And, of course, the President didn't stop there. According 
to Ms. Currie, the President again called her into the Oval 
Office a few days later, and again, repeated the same false 
statements to her that he had made under oath in his civil 
deposition.
    The winding road continued its perilous twists and turns. 
The President next came to a point where he had to decide 
whether to tell the truth to his Cabinet, his top aides, and, 
most importantly, to the American people.
    Again, the President rejected the right path, telling his 
Cabinet and staff that the allegations were untrue. He claimed 
to his then-Deputy Chief of Staff, John Podesta, for example, 
that he ``never had sex with [Ms. Lewinsky] in any way 
whatsoever.'' Specifically, he told Podesta that ``they had not 
had oral sex.'' And, the President admits in his grand jury 
testimony that he knew that his aides could be called to 
testify before the grand jury. Ultimately, his top aides were 
called to testify, and they repeated his lies.
    And, as everyone in America knows, the President lied to 
the Nation. I do not need to recite the defiant, indignant, 
finger-wagging denial that the President gave to 270 million 
Americans who had placed their trust in him as the chief law 
enforcement officer of this land.
    But, it didn't have to go any further. I think that there's 
still a chance that had the President stopped there at that 
awful, disgraceful moment, we would not be here, today.
    On August 17, 1998, the President came to the most 
important crossroads. He stood before a Federal criminal grand 
jury--a Federal criminal grand jury that was trying to 
determine whether he had committed perjury and obstructed 
justice. He had one last chance to do the right thing. He could 
tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth to 
the grand jury. Or, he could commit perjury.
    Again, President Clinton chose the wrong path. During that 
criminal probe, the President admitted to an ``inappropriate'' 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, but continued to falsely deny 
ever having sexual relations with her, in the face of 
corroborating evidence that included an undisputed DNA test and 
the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky and two of her therapists.
    The President's strained, persistent, and--in the words of 
his own lawyer--``maddening'' denials of the obvious were 
blatantly and patently false.
    The President also declared under oath to the grand jury 
that his post-deposition coaching of Betty Currie about his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky was a mere attempt to refresh 
his ``memory about what the facts were.'' This statement is 
also blatantly and patently false.
    In fact, there is no reasonable interpretation that would 
make the President's statements about coaching Ms. Currie to be 
true. Ms. Currie was not always there. She could not always see 
and hear everything. She could not know whether the President 
ever touched Ms. Lewinsky. And, she did not know whether Ms. 
Lewinsky ever had sex with the President. It is difficult to 
comprehend how the President could be refreshing his own memory 
through the act of making false statements to a potential 
witness.
    Moreover, it is my opinion that these false statements by 
the President under oath were clearly material. A false and 
misleading denial of a sexual relationship with a subordinate 
government employee and a false and misleading denial of 
tampering with a potential witness goes to the very heart of 
whether the President obstructed justice or committed perjury.
    Based on the evidence in the record, I am firmly convinced 
that the President has committed both perjury and obstruction 
of justice. He lied to the grand jury about the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He lied to the grand jury about 
coaching his loyal secretary, Betty Currie. He obstructed 
justice by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to give false testimony, by 
participating in a scheme to conceal gifts that were 
subpoenaed, by tampering with his secretary on two occasions, 
and by lying to top aides that he knew could be called to 
testify before the grand jury.
    The Senate's inquiry, however, does not end there. We must 
decide whether perjury and obstruction of justice are high 
crimes and misdemeanors. Based on the Constitution, the law, 
and the clear Senate precedent, I conclude that these offenses 
are high crimes and misdemeanors.
    First, Senate precedent establishes that false statements 
under oath by a public official are high crimes and 
misdemeanors. In 1986, I sat on the impeachment committee that 
heard the evidence against Judge Harry Claiborne. After hearing 
the evidence, I, along with an overwhelming number of my 
colleagues, concluded that Judge Claiborne had made false 
statements under the pains and penalties of perjury by failing 
to disclose certain amounts of income on his tax forms. The 
Senate--understanding the gravity of a public official making 
false statements under oath--voted to remove Judge Claiborne 
from office.
    In 1989, the Senate held impeachment trials against Judge 
Hastings and Judge Nixon--both of whom had been accused of 
making false statements under oath. In Judge Nixon's case, the 
false statements were made directly to a criminal grand jury. 
The Senate--again understanding the gravity of a public 
official, who has sworn to uphold the laws, violating those 
very laws by lying under oath--voted to remove Judge Hastings 
and Judge Nixon from office.
    My colleagues on both sides of the aisle had no hesitation 
about removing these Federal officials for making false 
statements under oath. As Senator Herb Kohl explained:

    ``One might argue, as Judge Nixon does, that his false statements 
were not material. . . . But Judge Nixon took an oath to tell the truth 
and the whole truth. As a grand jury witness, it was not for him to 
decide what would be material. That was for the grand jury to decide. . 
. .
    So I am going to vote `guilty' on articles I and II. Judge Nixon 
lied to the grand jury. He misled the grand jury. These acts are 
criminal and warrant impeachment.''

    I think Senator Kohl's statements accurately reflect the 
sentiment of the 89 Senators who voted to convict Judge Nixon 
for lying to a Federal grand jury. And, I might add, one of 
those Senators voting to remove Judge Nixon for perjury was 
then-Senator, now-Vice President Al Gore.
    Of those 89 Senators, 48 of us are still here in this 
distinguished body. Will we send the same message about the 
corrosive impact of perjury on our legal system or will we 
simply lower our standards for the Nation's chief law 
enforcement officer?
    Second, article II, section 4 of the Constitution plainly 
sets forth that bribery is a high crime and misdemeanor, and 
our Federal laws tell us clearly that perjury and obstruction 
of justice are equivalent offenses to bribery. In fact, the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines actually mandate a harsher 
punishment for perjury than for bribery and a harsher 
punishment for obstruction of justice than for bribery. So, I 
am completely and utterly perplexed by those who argue that 
perjury and obstruction of justice are not high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    If Federal law mandates a harsher penalty for perjury and 
obstruction of justice, how can this Senate--who drafted, 
debated, and passed those Federal laws--now argue that perjury 
and obstruction of justice are lesser offenses than bribery?
    Listen to the Supreme Court's declaration: ``[f]alse 
testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable.'' ABF Freight 
System v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994). Moreover, the high 
Court has labeled perjury as an ``egregious offense,'' United 
States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576 (1976), calling it ``an 
obvious and flagrant affront to the basic concepts of judicial 
proceedings.'' (Id.)
    Even the President's own Justice Department understands 
that our Nation of laws cannot tolerate perjury and obstruction 
of justice. President Clinton and his Justice Department have 
prosecuted approximately 600 cases of perjury since he came to 
office. And today--as we debate whether perjury is a serious 
offense--over 100 people are locked behind bars in Federal 
prison for committing the criminal act of perjury.
    Perjury and obstruction hammer away at the twin pillars of 
our legal system: truth and justice. Every witness in every 
deposition is required to raise his or her right hand and swear 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
so help them God. Every witness in every grand jury proceeding 
and in every trial is required to raise his or her right hand 
and swear to tell the truth. Every official declaration filed 
with the court is stamped with the express affirmation that the 
declaration is true. In the words of our nation's first Supreme 
Court Chief Justice, John Jay: ``if oaths should cease to be 
held sacred, our dearest and most valuable rights would become 
insecure.''
    The facts clearly show that the President did not value the 
sacred oath. He was interested in saving his hide, not truth 
and justice. I submit to my colleagues that if we have no truth 
and we have no justice, then we have no nation of laws. No 
public official, no President, no man or no woman is important 
enough to sacrifice the founding principles of our legal 
system.
    On this point, I am proud to quote Justice Louis Brandeis--
a native of my hometown of Louisville and the man for whom the 
University of Louisville Law School is named:

    ``In a government of laws, existence of the government will be 
imperiled if it fails to observe the laws scrupulously. Our government 
is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches 
the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the government 
becomes a lawbreaker; it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man 
to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.''

    William Jefferson Clinton is not and should not be a law 
unto himself.
    President Clinton's decisions have led the United States 
Senate to its own critical crossroads. And, now we must choose 
our path.
    We can do the right thing. Or we can lower our standards 
and allow Bill Clinton to cling to public office--regardless of 
the consequences to our Nation, to our system of justice, and 
to our future generations.
    More than 150 years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville wisely 
observed that ``man rarely retains his customary level in very 
critical circumstances; he rises above or sinks below his usual 
condition, and the same thing is true of nations.''
    So what will we do this day? Will we rise above or will we 
sink below? Will we condone this President's conduct or will we 
condemn it? Will we change our standards or will we change our 
President?
    As most of you will recall, the Senate faced a similar 
choice just a few short years ago. It was one of our own who 
had clearly crossed the line. It was one of our own who had 
engaged in sexual misconduct and obstruction of justice.
    He, like President Clinton, was an intelligent and 
accomplished man. Senator Carol Moseley-Braun called him 
``brilliant'' and said he was a man who ``ha[d] certainly been 
fair.'' But, that brilliant and fair man had crossed the line.
    At that critical moment in Senate history, we could have 
taken the wrong path and called it a private matter, saying 
``it's just about sex.'' But my friend, Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, was right when she said: ``This is not private, 
personal conduct. This is conduct that took place in public 
service, and many of the people involved are themselves Federal 
employees.''
    At that moment, the Senate could have said, ``He lied about 
his conduct to everybody, so lying in an official proceeding is 
OK.'' Or, we could have said, ``He was covering it up before 
the investigation, so it's irrelevant and immaterial that he's 
covering it up during the investigation.''
    The Senate could have said, ``We can't overturn a Federal 
election. After all, he'll be out of office in a few years.'' 
Or: ``He may be prosecuted in the courts, so there's no reason 
for us to act.''
    And, finally, the United States Senate could have defended 
its own Member by arguing that, ``A United States Senator 
should be held to a lower standard than others, not a higher 
standard. After all, there are only 100 U.S. Senators in the 
country. Any one of them is just too precious to lose.''
    But, we didn't say any of those things. Those doubletalking 
defenses were reserved exclusively for President Clinton.
    During the Packwood debate, we made the tough choice. And, 
I have to say, that decision was one of the most difficult 
things I have ever had to do in my career in public service. To 
recommend expelling from the United States Senate a colleague, 
a member of my own party, and most importantly, a friend with 
whom I had served in the Senate for over a decade.
    We sent a clear message to the Nation that no man is above 
the law. That no man is so important to the well-being of our 
strong and prosperous Nation that we have to compromise the 
fundamental, founding principles of truth and justice. We chose 
to rise above, not sink below. Rather than change our 
standards, we changed our Senator.
    Let me also make a political point, here. We Republicans 
were aware during the Packwood debate that we would likely lose 
that Senate seat if Senator Packwood was removed from office. 
So, we had a choice: Retain the Senate seat or retain our 
honor. We chose honor, and never looked back.
    I think that the United States Senate has a clear choice 
today. Do we want to retain President Clinton in office, or do 
we want to retain our honor, our principle, and our moral 
authority?
    For me, and for many members in my impeachment-fatigued 
party, I choose honor.
    I want to close my remarks today with an insightful and 
fascinating statement from Richard Nixon. A few years after his 
tragic downfall, President Nixon explained:

    It's a piece of cake until you get to the top. You find you can't 
stop playing the game the way you've always played it. So you are lean 
and mean and resourceful, and you continue to walk on the edge of the 
precipice, because over the years, you have become fascinated by how 
closely you can walk without losing your balance.

    Ladies and gentleman of this fine and distinguished body, I 
submit to you that William Jefferson Clinton has lost his 
balance. He has lost his sense of right and wrong, of truth and 
justice. And, by doing so, he has--to paraphrase Alexander 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 65--abused and violated the trust of 
the American people.
    Again, let me quote my esteemed colleague, Senator Dianne 
Feinstein, who said just a few months ago: ``My trust in his 
credibility has been badly shattered.''
    Senator Feinstein is not an island on this issue of 
shattered trust. There are many others who have expressed 
similar sentiments. A recent poll confirms what we all know, 
that is, the American people do not trust their Commander in 
Chief. A majority of Americans believe that President Clinton 
has lied to the country and that he will lie to the country 
again.
    The New York Times, which I rarely ever quote, had this to 
say about the President's violation of the public trust:

    ``The American President is a person who sometimes must ask people 
in the ranks to die for the country. The President is a person who asks 
people close around him to serve the government for less money than 
their talents would bring elsewhere. The President sometimes requires 
that people out in the country sacrifice their dollars or their 
convenience for national goals. All he is asked to provide in return is 
trustworthiness, loyalty and judgment. . . . President Clinton has 
failed that simple test abjectly, not merely with undignified private 
behavior in a revered place, but with his cavalier response to public 
concern.''

    In 1829, at his home in Lexington, Kentucky, Henry Clay 
opined that ``[g]overnment is a trust, and the officers of the 
government are trustees[.]'' I believe that fundamental 
principle to be true, and I believe that William Jefferson 
Clinton has abused and violated that public trust.
    His cold, calculated actions betrayed the trust vested in 
him by the American people and the high office of the 
presidency. The President of the United States looked 270 
million Americans in the eye, and lied--deliberately and 
methodically. He took an oath to faithfully execute the laws of 
this Nation, and he violated that oath. He pledged to be the 
Nation's chief law enforcement officer, and he violated that 
pledge. He took an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, and he willfully and repeatedly violated 
that oath.
    I firmly believe that the evidence establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that William Jefferson Clinton made statements 
to the Federal grand jury regarding the nature of his 
relationship with a subordinate government employee and the 
purpose of his post-deposition conversation with a loyal 
secretary that were false, misleading, and perjurious, and 
warrant removal from office. Thus, I find the President guilty 
under article I.
    I believe with equal conviction that the evidence 
establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that William Jefferson 
Clinton willfully engaged in a deliberate course of conduct 
designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence 
of evidence and testimony relating to a Federal civil rights 
action against him, and that this conduct warrants removal from 
office. Thus, I find the President guilty under article II.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Edward M. Kennedy

    Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. Chief Justice, every 4 years, citizens of 
our country exercise one of the most important rights of our 
democracy--the right to vote for the President of the United 
States. This constitutional privilege is valued by all 
Americans and envied by millions around the world. It proves 
that the will of the majority will prevail, and that power will 
be transferred peacefully through the election process from one 
President to the next, time and again.
    The essence of our democracy is the power of the right to 
vote. Many of our greatest battles in the Senate and the 
country in recent decades have been waged to extend and protect 
that right.
    I think especially of the Voting Rights Acts, which have 
been at the heart of our civil rights debates. I think of our 
success in 1970 in lowering the voting age to 18, so that young 
Americans who were old enough to fight in the Vietnam War would 
be old enough to vote about that war, which America never 
should have fought. I think of the Supreme Court's great 
decision on one person, one vote, and our efforts in Congress 
to protect it.
    I also think of the success of democracy in other lands--in 
Chile and Argentina and other nations in our hemisphere--and in 
Greece, in South Africa, and in many other countries.
    The framers of the Constitution clearly understood the 
fundamental place of the right to vote in the new democracy 
they were creating. They clearly did not intend the Impeachment 
Clause to nullify the vote of the people, except in the most 
extraordinary cases of great danger to the nation.
    The entire history of the debates at the Constitutional 
Convention demonstrates their clear intent to limit impeachment 
as narrowly as possible, to prevent a willful partisan majority 
in Congress from undermining the right to vote and the power of 
the President the people had elected.
    The framers of the Constitution also made clear that the 
President was not to be subordinate to the Senate or the House 
of Representatives. The new government they created was based 
on another fundamental principle as well--the principle of 
separation of powers among the three coequal branches of 
government--the executive branch, the legislative branch, and 
the judicial branch. They specifically did not create a 
parliamentary system of government, in which the President 
would serve at the pleasure of Congress.
    In their wisdom, the framers recognized that in certain 
extreme cases, a narrow exception to the orderly transfer of 
Presidential power through national elections every 4 years was 
necessary to protect the nation from an abusive President. And 
so they created the impeachment process, by which the President 
could be removed from office by the Senate and the House of 
Representatives in extreme cases where the President had 
committed ``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors''.
    The framers of the Constitution made clear that the orderly 
transfer of presidential power through national elections was 
to be scrupulously followed. They took great care to guarantee 
that this transfer would rarely, if ever, be undermined by the 
impeachment of the President. Removal of the President would 
come only after the House of Representatives--with the sole 
power to impeach--and the Senate--with the sole power to 
conduct a trial--found that the President had committed 
``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' a 
term borrowed from the English impeachment experience.
    Clearly, the framers intended the House and the Senate to 
use the impeachment power cautiously, and not wield it 
promiscuously for partisan political purposes. Sadly, in this 
case, Republicans in the House of Representatives, in their 
partisan vendetta against the President, have wielded the 
impeachment power in precisely the way the framers rejected--
recklessly and without regard for the Constitution or the will 
of the American people.
    First, Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee 
essentially swallowed the referral of independent counsel 
Kenneth Starr whole, without seriously questioning it or 
calling any witnesses. They used the referral as the foundation 
for articles of impeachment which were released to the public 
before the White House counsel had an opportunity to complete 
their testimony before the Committee.
    Why were the House Judiciary Committee and the House of 
Representatives on the fast track to impeachment? Because, as 
House Manager Hyde told the Senate, ``we were operating under 
time constraints which were self-imposed but I promised my 
colleagues to finish it before the end of the year. I didn't 
want to drag it out.'' In the battle between speed and 
fairness, should speed have prevailed over fairness? Clearly 
not. But the lame duck Republican House of Representatives was 
bent on acting before the last Congress ended, fearful that 
their slimmer majority in the current Congress would not 
approve any articles of impeachment at all.
    In their most blatant attempt of all to stack the deck 
against the President, the House Republican leadership refused 
to allow a fair vote on censure as an alternative to 
impeachment, an alternative that would have ended this unseemly 
charade two months ago. Instead, Members of the House were 
given a single choice--a vote to impeach the President or do 
nothing.
    After their partisan victory in the House of 
Representatives, the House managers brought their vendetta 
against the President to the Senate. They brought thousands of 
pages of evidence, containing 22 statements by Monica Lewinsky, 
6 statements by Vernon Jordan, 3 statements by Sidney 
Blumenthal, the videotaped deposition of President Clinton in 
the Jones case, and the videotaped record of his appearance 
before the grand jury. Their opening statements attempted to 
shed the most favorable light on the evidence, but it was 
quickly apparent that they had not and could not persuade two-
thirds of the Senate to remove the President.
    While trying to persuade Senators to convict President 
Clinton, the House managers argued relentlessly for the 
opportunity to examine witnesses during the trial. The 
hypocrisy in the position of the House managers on witnesses 
was obvious. They did not think it was necessary to call 
witnesses in the House proceedings. They demeaned the House by 
their partisan excesses. But they were shameless in their 
attempt to force the Senate to wallow in witnesses.
    Our Republican friends have desperately been trying to 
produce a two-thirds majority to remove the President from 
office. But their efforts have succeeded only in turning a 
serious constitutional process into a partisan process that 
demeaned both the House and the Senate and became a painful 
ordeal for the entire country.
    In pursuing the allegations of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, the House managers presented an ever changing, 
constantly shifting list of charges to the Senate. Veteran 
prosecutors testified before the House Judiciary Committee that 
they would never prosecute such a case, and that it would be 
irresponsible for the Senate to attempt to use these 
allegations as a basis to remove the President from office.
    Some of the allegations of perjury by the House managers 
were laughable. Clearly, it was not perjury for the President 
to use the phrase ``certain occasions'' to describe the 
frequency of his contacts with Miss Lewinsky, or to use the 
word ``occasional'' to describe the frequency of his telephone 
conversations with her.
    Even the few allegations of perjury and obstruction of 
justice that are arguably more serious are far from proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the standard that I believe 
should be applied by the Senate in considering the facts of 
this case. Indeed, I do not believe they were proved by clear 
and convincing evidence. But even if any such allegations were 
true, they still fall far short of the constitutional standard 
required for impeaching a President and removing him from 
office.
    President Clinton's behavior was wrong. All of us condemn 
it. None of us condones it. He failed to tell the truth about 
it, and he misled the country for many months. But nothing he 
did rises to the high constitutional standard required for 
impeachment and removal of a President from office.
    I believe that conclusion is required by the Constitution. 
At the time of the Constitutional Convention in 1787, the 
framers engaged in a vigorous debate about the role of the 
President, the new chief executive they were creating. In 
addition to determining the basic powers of the office, many of 
those at the convention debated whether or not impeachment 
should apply at all to the President. As University of Chicago 
Law School Professor Cass Sunstein told the House Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution, ``Many of the framers wanted 
no impeachment power whatsoever . . . [t]hey suggested that in 
a world of separation of powers and election of the President, 
there was no place for impeachment. . . . That position was 
defeated by reference to egregious hypotheticals in which the 
President betrayed the country during war or got his office 
through bribery. Those are the cases that persuaded the swing 
votes that there should be impeachment power.'' In the end, the 
framers reluctantly agreed that there might be limited 
circumstances in which a President should be removed from 
office by Congress in order to protect the country from great 
harm, without waiting for the next election.
    Once the framers concluded that the President could be 
removed by the legislature in such cases, they debated the 
standard for impeachment. Nine days before the final 
Constitution was signed, the impeachment provision was limited 
only to treason and bribery. George Mason then argued that the 
provision was too restrictive, and should be amended to include 
the phrase, ``or maladministration.'' But, vigorous opposition 
came from others who believed that such a vague phrase would 
give Congress too much power to undermine the President. Mason 
withdrew his original proposal and substituted the phrase, 
``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors against the State''--a 
phrase well-known from English law.
    The Constitutional Convention adopted the modification by a 
vote of eight States to three--confident that only serious 
offenses against the Nation would provide the basis for 
impeachment. Later, the Committee of Style removed the words, 
``against the State,'' but because the committee had been 
instructed not to change the meaning of any provision, the 
impeachment clause should be interpreted as it was originally 
drafted.
    The debate surrounding the impeachment clause was 
significant. By first expanding and then narrowing the clause, 
the framers clearly intended that the President could be 
removed from office for ``crimes'' beyond treason and bribery, 
but that he could not be removed for inefficient administration 
or administration inconsistent with the dominant view in 
Congress. Impeachment was not to be the illegitimate twin of 
the English vote of ``no confidence'' under a parliamentary 
system of government. The doctrine of separation of powers was 
paramount. The President was to serve at the pleasure of the 
people, not the pleasure of the Congress, and certainly not at 
the pleasure of a willful partisan majority in the House of 
Representatives.
    As Charles Black stated in his highly regarded work on 
impeachment, the two specific impeachable offenses--treason and 
bribery--can help identify both the ``ordinary crimes which 
ought also to be looked upon as impeachable offenses, and those 
serious misdeeds, not ordinary crimes, which ought to be looked 
on as impeachable offenses . . .'' Using treason and bribery as 
``the miners' canaries,'' Professor Black states that ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors, in the constitutional sense, ought to 
be held to be those offenses which are rather obviously wrong, 
whether or not `criminal,' and which so seriously threaten the 
order of political society as to make pestilent and dangerous 
the continuance in power of their perpetrator.''
    The distinguished historian, Professor Arthur Schlesinger, 
told the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, the 
``[e]vidence seems to me conclusive that the Founding Fathers 
saw impeachment as a remedy for grave and momentous offenses 
against the Constitution; George Mason said, great crimes, 
great and dangerous offenses, attempts to subvert the 
Constitution.''
    In addition to Professor Schlesinger, over 430 law 
professors and over 400 historians and constitutional scholars 
have stated emphatically that the allegations against President 
Clinton do not meet the standard set by the Constitution for 
impeachment. The scholarly support for the argument that the 
charges against President Clinton do not rise to the level of 
impeachable offenses--even if they are true--is overwhelming, 
and it cannot be ignored.
    The law professors wrote, ``[i]t goes without saying that 
lying under oath is a very serious offense. But even if the 
House of Representatives had the constitutional authority to 
impeach for any instance of perjury or obstruction of justice, 
a responsible House would not exercise this awesome power on 
the facts alleged in this case.''
    The historians wrote, ``[t]he framers explicitly reserved 
[impeachment] for high crimes and misdemeanors in the exercise 
of executive power. Impeachment for anything else would, 
according to James Madison, leave the President to serve 
`during the pleasure of the Senate,' thereby mangling the 
system of checks and balances that is our chief safeguard 
against abuses of power . . . Although we do not condone 
President Clinton's private behavior or his subsequent attempts 
to deceive, the current charges against him depart from what 
the framers saw as grounds for impeachment.''
    The House managers apparently made no attempt to obtain 
scholarly support for their opposition. It is a fair inference 
that they did not do so because they knew they could not obtain 
it.
    The House managers argue that because the Senate convicted 
and removed three federal judges for making perjurious 
statements, we must now convict and remove the President. But, 
to determine whether or not President Clinton should be removed 
from office requires the Senate to do more than make simplistic 
analogies to federal judges.
    Removal of the President of the United States and removal 
of a Federal judge are vastly different. The President is 
unique, and his role is in no way comparable to the role of the 
over 900 Federal judges we have today. The impact on the 
country of removing one of 900 Federal judges is infinitesimal, 
compared to the impact of removing the only President we have. 
And the people elect the President for a specific 4-year term, 
while Federal judges are appointed for life, subject to good 
behavior. These distinctions are obvious, and they make all the 
difference.
    Other precedents also undermine the House managers' 
insistence that the Senate is bound to remove President Clinton 
from office. The House Judiciary Committee refused on a 
bipartisan basis to impeach President Nixon for deliberately 
lying under oath to the Internal Revenue Service, although he 
underreported his taxable income by at least $796,000. During 
the 1974 Judiciary Committee debates, many Republican and 
Democratic members of the Committee agreed that tax fraud was 
not the kind of abuse of power that impeachment was designed to 
remedy.
    Finally, the House managers argue that President Clinton 
must be removed to protect the rule of law and cleanse the 
office. It is not enough, they say, that he can be prosecuted 
once he leaves office. But protecting the rule of law under the 
Constitution is not the proper standard for removal of the 
President. Before impeaching and convicting the President, the 
Senate must find that he committed ``Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' As Professor Laurence Tribe 
testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the 
Constitution, ``[i]f the proposition is that when the President 
is a law breaker, has committed any crime, then the rule of law 
and the take care clause requires that one impeach him, then we 
have rewritten the [impeachment] clause.''
    The Constitution has guided our country well for two 
centuries. The decision we make now goes far beyond this 
President. As we decide whether President Clinton will be 
removed from office, the future of the Presidency and the well-
being of our democracy itself are at stake.
    How will history remember this Congress? The Radical 
Republicans in the middle of the 19th century were condemned in 
the eyes of history for using impeachment as a partisan 
vendetta against President Andrew Johnson. And I believe the 
Radical Republicans at the end of the 20th century will be 
condemned even more severely by history for their partisan 
vendetta against President Clinton.
    The impeachment process was never intended to become a 
weapon for a partisan majority in Congress to attack the 
President. To do so is a violation of the fundamental 
separation of powers doctrine at the heart of the Constitution. 
It is an invitation to future partisan majorities in future 
Congresses to use the impeachment power to undermine the 
President. It could weaken Republican and Democratic Presidents 
alike for years to come.
    This case is a constitutional travesty. We deplore the 
conduct of President Clinton that led to this year-long 
distraction for the Nation. But we should deplore even more the 
partisan attempt to abuse the Constitution by misusing the 
impeachment power.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Susan M. Collins

    Ms. COLLINS. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, the issue 
now before the Senate may well be the most significant of our 
public careers. Other than declaring war, it is difficult to 
imagine a weightier decision that could come before us than 
whether to remove the President of the United States from 
office.
    Our founders designed impeachment to protect our system of 
government against officials who lose their moorings in the law 
or who endanger our most basic institutions. They designed it 
neither as a popular referendum nor as a mechanism by which--as 
in parliamentary systems--the legislature can remove the head 
of government based on nothing more than a policy difference. 
Instead, this process is a check upon rogue chief executives, 
designed equally to remove the politically popular malefactor 
and to protect the innocent, but unpopular, official. It is a 
vital, but extraordinary, remedy that should neither be shunned 
out of political expediency nor invoked for political gain.
    The question before us is not whether President Clinton's 
conduct was contemptible or utterly unworthy of the great 
office he holds. It was. The question before us is whether the 
President has committed an impeachable offense for which he 
should be removed from that office.
    The framers thought carefully about where to vest the 
ultimate power to remove a President. They chose the United 
States Senate. This was not an obvious choice. The power to 
convict and remove could as easily have been assigned to a 
court of law, where a jury would apply the law to the facts in 
the ordinary way.
    But the framers gave the power to try impeachments to the 
Senate. They did so because they recognized that an impeachment 
trial should not be an ordinary trial, requiring an ordinary 
application of law to fact. The framers wanted the Senate to 
make not only a determination of guilt, but also a judgment 
about what is best for our nation and its institutions.
    Throughout this impeachment trial, in order to lessen the 
ambiguity in this process, I have sought to find a way to allow 
the Senate to express its view of the facts we have so 
carefully considered for the past month. The vote we now 
approach is to convict or acquit. It is a blunt instrument that 
does not allow me to express clearly my belief that President 
Clinton willfully lied to a Federal grand jury, and that he 
wrongfully tried to influence testimony and to conceal evidence 
related to Paula Jones' lawsuit.
    As this case has been argued in this chamber, I have become 
convinced that the perjury charges of article I are not fully 
substantiated by the record. The President's grand jury 
testimony is replete with lies, half-truths, and evasions. But 
significantly, not all evasion is lying, and not all lying is 
perjury. Even blatantly misleading testimony that all fair-
minded people would consider dishonest may not actually 
constitute perjury, as the law defines it.
    Time and time again, the attorneys questioning President 
Clinton before the grand jury--perhaps out of a misguided sense 
of deference--neglected to pin him down as he gave 
nonresponsive, evasive, confusing, or simply absurd responses. 
The only remedy for imprecise answers is more precise 
questioning. Unfortunately, this did not occur, and 
consequently, the record is too murky to require the 
President's removal based on article I.
    The evidence supporting article II is more convincing. 
Indeed, the case presented by the House managers proves to my 
satisfaction that the President did, in fact, obstruct justice 
in Paula Jones' civil rights case. While the circumstances 
surrounding Monica Lewinsky's filing of a false affidavit are 
unclear, there is no doubt in my mind that the frantic efforts 
to find Ms. Lewinsky a job, the retrieval and concealment of 
gifts under the bed of the President's secretary, and, most 
egregious, the President's blatant coaching of Betty Currie--
not once, but twice--were clear attempts to tamper with 
witnesses and obstruct justice. Indeed, if I were a juror in an 
ordinary criminal case, I might very well vote to convict faced 
with these facts.
    Nevertheless, I do not think that the President's actions 
constitute a ``high crime'' or ``misdemeanor'' as contemplated 
by article II, section 4 of the Constitution. This is, I 
readily acknowledge, a judgment that can neither be made nor 
explained with anything approaching scientific precision. But I 
can point to two factors that influence my conclusion.
    First, obstruction of justice is generally more serious in 
a criminal case, as opposed to a civil case, as it interferes 
with the effective enforcement of our Nation's laws and not 
solely with the adjudication of private disputes. Consistent 
with this conclusion, the vast majority of obstruction 
prosecutions involve underlying criminal actions, and the 
statutory penalties are more severe in the context of criminal 
trials. This is not to suggest for a moment that we should 
tolerate obstruction of justice in civil cases, but only to 
observe that our legal system treats it as a less serious 
offense.
    Second, I believe that for impeachment purposes, 
obstruction of justice has more ominous implications when the 
conduct concealed, or the method used to conceal it, poses a 
threat to our governmental institutions. Neither occurred in 
this case.
    Therefore, I will cast my vote not for the current 
President, but for the presidency. I believe that in order to 
convict, we must conclude from the evidence presented to us 
with no room for doubt that our Constitution will be injured 
and our democracy suffer should the President remain in office 
one moment more.
    In this instance, the claims against the President fail to 
reach this very high standard. Therefore, albeit reluctantly, I 
will vote to acquit William Jefferson Clinton on both counts.
    In voting to acquit the President, I do so with grave 
misgivings for I do not mean in any way to exonerate this man. 
He lied under oath; he sought to interfere with the evidence; 
he tried to influence the testimony of key witnesses. And, 
while it may not be a crime, he exploited a very young, star-
struck employee whom he then proceeded to smear in an attempt 
to destroy her credibility, her reputation, her life. The 
President's actions were chillingly similar to the White 
House's campaign to discredit Kathleen Willey.
    As much as it troubles me to acquit this President, I 
cannot do otherwise and remain true to my role as a Senator. To 
remove a popularly elected President for the first time in our 
Nation's history is an extraordinary action that should be 
undertaken only when the President's misconduct so injures the 
fabric of democracy that the Senate is left with no option but 
to oust the offender from the office the people have entrusted 
to him.
    President Clinton has written a shameful and permanent 
chapter of American history. He alone is responsible for this 
year of agony that the American people have endured. I do not, 
however, take solace in the prospect of a censure, nor do I 
take comfort in the possibility that the President may be 
prosecuted for his wrongdoing after he leaves office. Rather, I 
look to the verdict of history to provide the ultimate 
punishment for this president, a verdict that no public 
relations gloss or smear campaign can obscure. As Maine's great 
poet, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, wrote in 1874, ``Whatever 
hath been written shall remain, nor be erased, nor written o'er 
again.'' When the history of the Clinton presidency is written, 
every book will begin with the fact that William Jefferson 
Clinton was impeached, and that will be not only the ultimate 
censure but also the final verdict on this sad chapter in our 
Nation's history.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Tom Harkin

    Mr. HARKIN. Mr. Chief Justice, a few weeks ago, I used a 
barnyard term that is quite known in Iowa to describe what I 
thought of this case. The longer this case has gone on, the 
more I am convinced this characterization is correct.
    This case should never have been brought before the Senate. 
I think it is one of the most blatant partisan actions taken by 
the House of Representatives since Andrew Johnson's case was 
pushed through by the radical Republicans of his time.
    I think it is important for us to take a look at how this 
case got here. One might ask why is it important how it got 
here?
    Well, if you believe that the end justifies the means, it 
is probably not very important. But if you believe the end 
doesn't justify the means, that those who are charged with 
enforcing the law cannot break the law in order to bring 
someone to the bar of justice, and if you believe the rule of 
law applies not only to the defendant, the President in this 
case, but also to the prosecutors and those sworn to uphold 
that rule of law, then it is important to look at how the case 
got here.
    First, we have a statute, the independent counsel statute 
which at best I believe is flawed and at worst unworkable which 
allows someone to be targeted without regard to money or time. 
In fact, it has essentially created a fourth branch of 
Government with no checks or balances.
    Again, the conduct, I want to point out, of Ken Starr does 
not excuse the behavior of the President but has everything to 
do with our perspective on the case and how we approach it, how 
we weigh our decision. We are not jurors, we are judges and the 
supreme court of impeachment, which has some of the elements of 
a court of equity. If somebody approaches this court, they 
better do it with clean hands.
    Where the political motivation is so blatant, as it has 
been in this case, I think we in the Senate should have our 
guard up, not only on what the case is about, but how it got 
here. This is the sort of political impeachment case that 
Madison and Hamilton wanted to avoid, and I refer you to 
Federalist No. 65, and Hamilton warned the greatest danger 
would be ``that the decision will be regulated more by the 
comparative strength of parties than by the real demonstrations 
of innocence or guilt.'' That is why he argued for it to come 
to the Senate and have a two-thirds requirement in order to 
convict and remove.
    So in the beginning, Ken Starr is picked by a three-judge 
panel to investigate Whitewater. Whitewater turns into 
Travelgate. Travelgate turns into Filegate, and then one 
wonders, how did Monica Lewinsky ever drop in on this?
    If we look back, when Ken Starr was a private attorney, in 
1994, he had dealings with Paula Jones' attorneys in terms of 
her then-pending lawsuit. So he had prior involvement himself 
with the Paula Jones case.
    So the Paula Jones case proceeds forward. And in October of 
1997, an entity called the Rutherford Institute, funded by 
conservative forces in the United States, found some new 
attorneys for Paula Jones and became heavily involved in the 
case.
    Now some time around that time, Linda Tripp, with whom 
Monica Lewinsky had shared her most intimate details of her 
involvement with the President, begins talking with these 
attorneys. That is sort of the status of the case as of 
December 1997.
    And here I ask unanimous consent to have printed an article 
from the New York Times, dated January 24, which more or less 
documents this.
    There being no objection, the article was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:
                [From the New York Times, Jan. 24, 1999]

  Quietly, Team of Lawyers Who Disliked Clinton Kept Jones Case Alive

                (By Don Van Natta Jr. and Jill Abramson)
    Washington, Jan. 23.--This time last year, Hillary Rodham Clinton 
described, in a now-famous appearance on the NBC News program 
``Today,'' how a ``vast right-wing conspiracy'' was trying to destroy 
her husband's Presidency.
    As it turns out, some of the most serious damage to Bill Clinton's 
Presidency came not from his high-profile political enemies but from a 
small secret clique of lawyers in their 30's who share a deep antipathy 
toward the President, according to nearly two dozen interviews and 
recently filed court documents.
    While cloaking their roles, the lawyers were deeply involved--to an 
extent not previously known--for nearly five years in the Paula Jones 
sexual misconduct lawsuit. They then helped push the case into the 
criminal arena and into the office of the independent counsel, Kenneth 
W. Starr.
    The group's leader was Jerome M. Marcus, a 39-year-old associate at 
the Philadelphia law firm of Berger & Montague, whose partners are 
major contributors to the Democratic Party.
    Although Ms. Jones never met him or knew he had worked on her 
behalf, Marcus drafted legal documents and was involved in many of the 
important strategic decisions in her lawsuit, according to billing 
records and interviews with other lawyers who worked on the case. As 
much as any of Ms. Jones's attorneys of record, Marcus helped keep Ms. 
Jones's case alive in the courts.
    Marcus recruited others to assist his efforts, including several 
friends from the University of Chicago Law School. One of those who was 
approached, Paul Rosenzweig, briefly considered doing work for Ms. 
Jones in 1994, according to billing records and interviews, but decided 
not to. In November 1997, Rosenzweig joined Starr's office, where he 
and Marcus had several telephone conversations about the Jones case.
    It was Rosenzweig who fielded a ``heads-up'' phone call from Marcus 
on Jan. 8, 1998, that first tipped off Starr's office about Monica S. 
Lewinsky and Linda R. Tripp. The tip was not mentioned in the 445-page 
Starr report, even though the information revived a moribund Whitewater 
investigation that would not have produced, it now seems, an 
impeachment referral to Congress.
    Marcus did make his views known publicly last month when he wrote 
an impassioned commentary in The Washington Times urging the 
impeachment of Clinton. ``The cancer is deadly,'' Marcus wrote. ``It, 
and its cause, must be removed.'' He identified himself in the 
newspaper simply as ``a lawyer in Philadelphia.''
    In his long efforts to promote Ms. Jones's lawsuit, and helping 
Mrs. Tripp find her way to Starr, Marcus found other allies, including 
another Chicago law classmate, Richard W. Porter. Porter had worked as 
an aide to former Vice President Dan Quayle and was a partner of 
Starr's at the law firm of Kirkland & Ellis, based in Chicago.
    George T. Conway 3d, a New York lawyer educated at Yale, shared 
Marcus's low view of President Clinton. When the Jones case led to Ms. 
Lewinsky, Marcus and Conway searched for a new lawyer for Mrs. Tripp. 
Marcus and Porter helped arrange for Mrs. Tripp to take her explosive 
allegations to Starr.
    Their efforts are only now coming into focus, as a few of their 
associates have begun to discuss their activities and their names 
appear repeatedly in the final legal bills submitted by the original 
Jones legal team. Messrs. Marcus, Porter and Conway did not respond to 
numerous requests for comment.
    In their arguments before the Senate this week, the President's 
lawyers said that there was collusion between Starr's office, Mrs. 
Tripp and the lawyers for Ms. Jones in the weeks leading up to the 
President's deposition last January. If witnesses are called in the 
Senate impeachment trial, the President's lawyers may explore the issue 
further, several Clinton legal advisers said.
    Charles G. Bakaly 3d, the spokesman for Starr, denied there was 
collusion between the independent counsel's office and the Jones team, 
including Marcus. ``There was absolutely no conspiracy between the 
Jones lawyers and our office,'' Bakaly said. ``Judge Starr has 
testified to the circumstances as to how this matter came to our 
attention, and the actions that we took thereafter.''
    Clinton said in his grand jury testimony in August that his 
political enemies ``just thought they would take a wrecking ball to me 
and see if they could do some damage.'' That wrecking ball was wielded 
by Marcus and his colleagues, who managed to drive Paula Corbin Jones's 
allegation of sexual misconduct into the courtroom and beyond.
    Marcus, Porter and Rosenzweig were classmates at the University of 
Chicago Law School, graduating in 1986. Conway met the others through 
the Jones case. Some of the lawyers were also involved with the 
Federalist Society, a legal group that includes conservative and 
libertarian luminaries like Starr, Robert H. Bork and Richard Epstein, 
a University of Chicago law professor.
    Porter was the most overtly political member of the group, having 
worked on the staff of Vice President Quayle and on the Bush-Quayle 
campaign, where he did opposition research.
    Porter was also an associate of Peter W. Smith, 62, a Chicago 
financier who was once the chairman of College Young Republicans and a 
major donor to Gopac, a conservative political group affiliated with 
former Speaker Newt Gingrich. Beginning in 1992, Smith spent more than 
$80,000 to finance anti-Clinton research in an effort to persuade the 
mainstream press to cover Clinton's sex life. Among others, his efforts 
involved David Brock, the journalist who first mentioned the name 
``Paula'' in an article on Clinton.
    Smith declined an interview request.
    In 1993, Brock said, Smith helped introduce him to the Arkansas 
state troopers who accused Clinton of using them to procure women when 
he was Governor of Arkansas. Brock wrote an article based on the 
troopers' account of Clinton's sexual escapades that was published in 
the January 1994 issue of The American Spectator, a conservative 
magazine. According to Brock, Smith wanted to establish a fund for the 
troopers, in case they suffered retribution. Brock said he opposed 
payments because they would undermine the troopers' credibility.
    To allay his concerns, Brock said, Smith urged him to speak to 
Porter, who was then working at Kirkland & Ellis, the Chicago law firm 
that employed Starr in its Washington office. Brock said he had hoped 
his talk with Porter would put an end to any planned payments to the 
troopers, but Smith did pay them and their lawyers $22,600.
    In 1992, Smith also paid Brock $5,000 to research another bit of 
Arkansas sex lore regarding Clinton, a rumor that has since proved to 
be baseless.
    Brock did not pursue the article.
    Brock's trooper article in The American Spectator mentioned a woman 
identified as ``Paula,'' and in May 1994, Ms. Jones filed her lawsuit 
against President Clinton. Ms. Jones's lawyers of record were from the 
Washington area, Gilbert K. Davis and Joseph Cammarata, whom Marcus had 
helped recruit.
    The Davis and Cammarata billing records show that from their 
earliest involvement in the case, they were consulting with Marcus and 
Porter. Conway also helped draft briefs, Cammarata said.
    ``Marcus was involved,'' Cammarata said, ``but he insisted that he 
not be identified. But that was fine with me. We were just two guys 
involved in the middle of a world war. We welcomed his help.''
    No one was more important to the Jones case than Marcus. Besides 
helping to write several important briefs, Marcus spoke numerous times 
at the most critical moments in the case with Cammarata and Davis, 
offering legal advice that Cammarata said was ``vital.''
    According to the billing records, Porter also offered ``legal 
strategy'' and once wrote a memo on ``investigative leads'' that might 
embarrass the President.
    ``Porter was a cheerleader,'' Cammarata said. ``He used to call up 
and say, `Maybe we can find you some money.' ''
    One of President Clinton's legal advisers said he noticed a marked 
difference in quality between the routine legal pleadings filed by the 
Cammarata and Davis team, and the polished, scholarly briefs written by 
the shadow legal team headed by Marcus and Conway.
    Marcus, meanwhile, was so successful at keeping the extent of his 
role a secret that even Cammarata only found out recently that Marcus 
had trouble finding lawyers to agree to represent Ms. Jones. ``No one 
wanted to touch this case,'' Cammarata said. ``No one wanted to take on 
the President of the United States.''
    Another friend of Marcus also briefly considered assisting the 
Jones lawyers.
    In June 1994, Rosenzweig, a lawyer at a small law firm in 
Washington, with experience working in the Justice Department, 
expressed interest in doing legal work on behalf of Ms. Jones, but he 
did none, lawyers involved in the case said.
    Conway wanted his role kept hidden as well, because his New York 
law firm, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, included influential 
Democrats like Bernard W. Nussbaum, a former White House counsel. 
Conway's name does not appear on any billing records.
    Although the billing records show communication between Porter and 
the Jones lawyers from 1994 to 1997, he denied in a written statement 
last fall doing legal work for Ms. Jones.
    Because Porter is a partner at the firm where Starr worked until he 
took a leave of absence last August, any role played by Porter in the 
Jones case could have posed a conflict of interest for Starr once he 
became independent counsel. Starr has said he did not discuss the Jones 
case with Porter.
    Starr has acknowledged contacts with Davis, specifically six 
telephone discussions the two had in 1994, before Starr became 
independent counsel. In fact, Starr has been criticized for not 
disclosing the phone conversations to Attorney General Janet Reno when 
he was seeking to expand his investigation to the Lewinsky matter. 
Starr has said it did not occur to him to mention the conversations 
because he did not do work on the Jones case and simply offered his 
publicly stated position on a point of constitutional law that 
Presidents are not immune from civil lawsuits.
    Before the Jones lawyers argued before the Supreme Court in May 
1996, paving the way to the fateful 9-0 decision that the President was 
not immune from civil lawsuits, Conway went to Washington for a 
practice argument. He joined Davis, Cammarata, Judge Robert Bork and 
Theodore Olson, a Washington lawyer and friend of Starr, at the Army-
Navy Club here.
    When Cammarata and Davis quit as Ms. Jones' lawyers after she 
failed to reach a settlement with President Clinton's lawyers in 1997, 
Marcus and his colleagues established ties to her new lawyers at the 
Dallas law firm of Rader, Campbell, Fisher & Pyke and the Rutherford 
Institute of Charlottesville, Va., which helped pay her legal expenses.
    In November 1997, Rosenzweig went to work as a prosecutor in 
Starr's office. And from November to January, Rosenzweig spoke several 
times by telephone with Marcus and discussed the Jones case, a lawyer 
with knowledge of the conversations said. But Bakaly, a spokesman for 
Starr, said that Rosenzweig did not tell any of his colleagues about 
what he learned about developments in the Jones case.
    By this time, Mrs. Tripp was cooperating with the Jones lawyers. 
She was also taping her conversations with Ms. Lewinsky, which her 
friend, Lucianne Goldberg, a Manhattan literary agent, had incorrectly 
assured her was legal. In December, Mrs. Tripp became frantic that she 
might be prosecuted because such taping is illegal in Maryland, where 
Mrs. Tripp lives. Mrs. Tripp and Ms. Goldberg thought of a possible 
solution: perhaps she could receive immunity from prosecution from 
Starr.
    Ms. Goldberg called Smith, the Chicago financier, and Porter for 
advice on how Mrs. Tripp might approach Starr. In a teleconference 
during the first week of January 1998, Ms. Goldberg talked to Porter 
and Marcus. Meanwhile, Marcus sought new lawyers for Mrs. Tripp. Conway 
suggested an old friend, James Moody, a Washington lawyer and fellow 
Federalist Society member, whom Mrs. Tripp retained.
    Because he was Starr's former law partner, Porter did not want to 
be the first one to call the independent counsel's office on behalf of 
Mrs. Tripp. So Marcus made the call to Rosenzweig.

    Mr. HARKIN. So now we have the involvement of Linda Tripp 
giving information to Paula Jones' attorneys. From about late 
October, early November until January 1998, a lawyer by the 
name of Jerome Marcus in Philadelphia, who has done extensive 
work for the Jones legal team, had been talking to a friend of 
his, Paul Rosenzweig, a prosecutor in Mr. Starr's office, about 
the Lewinsky matter. We didn't know the exact nature of these 
discussions, but we do know they talked a number of times. But 
we do know that on January 8 Marcus contacted Rosenzweig and 
told him about the relationship of Monica Lewinsky and the 
President.
    Right after this, Linda Tripp contacts the Office of 
Independent Counsel to talk about Lewinsky and tells them about 
the tapes she has made, the telephone tapes, the tapes of her 
telephone conversations with Monica Lewinsky. The day after 
that, Tripp is wired by FBI agents working with Starr, meets 
with Lewinsky, and records their conversation without 
Lewinsky's knowledge--and doing this without any authorization 
to do it. They didn't get it until 4 days later.
    Now, all this is done prior to President Clinton ever 
giving a deposition or testifying before a grand jury. And so 
Clinton has done nothing yet in terms of testifying. So one 
might ask, What was Starr and his team after? If, in fact, this 
was a consensual sexual relationship between Clinton and a 
young woman who was an adult, what did it have to do with 
Whitewater or anything else they were investigating?
    Well, here is why it had something to do with it. Let me 
quote from an article written by Joseph Isenburgh, a professor 
of law at the University of Chicago. I happen to have read it 
because he was supporting this findings of fact procedure, and 
I wanted to see what his thoughts were. But later on in his 
treatise he said this:

    What is perverse about the impeachment of President Clinton is the 
idiotic premise on which it rests. The President wasn't forced to 
respond to judicial process in the Paula Jones sexual harassment suit 
because he committed a crime of paramount public concern. That case, 
remember, was dismissed as meritless.

    I am continuing to quote him:

    The misconduct at issue here had no independent significance. It 
is, itself, merely a byproduct of a judicial process directed at the 
President, essentially of a ``sting'' set-up in the courts.

    ``A `sting' set-up in the courts.'' That is what Ken Starr 
and the Jones attorneys, working in tandem, were doing, setting 
him up. And you can see this clearly when you watch Clinton on 
videotape in the deposition before the Paula Jones attorneys. 
They present him with this definition of ``sexual relations'' 
that even the judge herself said was confusing. They knew what 
they were going after. But President Clinton did not know that 
they had all this information about his involvement with Monica 
Lewinsky--a classic sting operation.
    Also, keep in mind that Linda Tripp briefed the Paula Jones 
attorneys the night before that deposition and gave them the 
tapes of her telephone conversations. In light of this, it is 
interesting to note that in today's New York Times, February 
10, the conduct of the independent counsel is so suspect and 
potentially violative of Justice Department policy and law that 
he now is under investigation for a number of reasons which I 
won't read. But I ask unanimous consent that it be printed in 
the Record. And you can read it in today's New York Times.
    There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

              [From the New York Times, February 10, 1999]

        Inquiry to Ask Whether Reno Was Misled by Starr's Office

               (By David Johnston and Don Van Natta, Jr.)
    Washington, Feb. 9.--The Justice Department has decided to begin an 
inquiry to determine whether Kenneth W. Starr's prosecutors misled 
Attorney General Janet Reno about possible conflicts of interest when 
they obtained permission to investigate the Lewinsky matter in January 
1998, Government officials said today.
    Among other concerns, the inquiry will focus on whether the 
prosecutors should have disclosed the contacts between Mr. Starr's 
office and the Paula Jones legal team in the weeks leading up to Mr. 
Starr's decision to ask Ms. Reno to expand his inquiry beyond the 
Whitewater matter, said the officials, who spoke on the condition of 
anonymity.
    In recent months, documentation has emerged indicating that there 
were conversations between a prosecutor in Mr. Starr's office and a 
lawyer working behind the scenes with the Jones legal team from 
November 1997 to January 1998.
    But a series of newly disclosed notes taken at the initial meetings 
on Jan. 15 and Jan. 16, 1998, between Mr. Starr's prosecutors and 
Justice Department officials, shows that the prosecutors flatly 
asserted that there had been no contacts with the Jones team.
    For example, Eric H. Holder, Jr., the Deputy Attorney General, 
wrote in this three pages of notes of a Jan. 15, 1998, meeting with Mr. 
Starr's prosecutors: ``They've had no contact with plaintiff's attys.''
    Handwritten notes by two other Justice Department officials, Monty 
Wilkinson and Josh Hochberg, corroborate the statements attributed to 
Mr. Starr's prosecutors.
    Moreover, notes taken by another participant in the meeting, Steven 
Bates, a prosecutor in Mr. Starr's office, indicate that Jackie M. 
Bennett, one of Mr. Starr's deputies, told the Justice Department 
officials: ``We've had no contact with the plaintiffs' attorneys. We're 
concerned about appearances.''
    The notes have become crucial evidence in the Justice Department 
inquiry, which will be conducted by the Office of Professional 
Responsibility, which investigates prosecutorial misconduct. The 
lawyers' notes became public just last month as part of the Senate 
record of documents related to the impeachment trial of the President.
    The truthfulness of Mr. Starr's prosecutors is one of several 
issues that the department wants to examine, the Government officials 
said. Lawyers in the ethics office also intend to investigate whether 
Mr. Starr abused his authority to convene grand juries, or improperly 
pressed witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and disclosed secret grand jury 
information to reporters, the officials said.
    Mr. Clinton's lawyers and supporters have long contended that there 
was collusion between Mr. Starr's office and the conservative Jones 
lawyers, noting that Linda R. Tripp found her way to the Office of 
Independent Counsel through a group of private lawyers who performed 
legal work on the Jones case. Mr. Starr has insisted that his office 
sought permission from Ms. Reno to expand his jurisdiction when he 
learned of allegations that President Clinton's close friend Vernon E. 
Jordan, Jr. was helping Monica S. Lewinsky find a job in exchange for 
her silence as a possible witness in the Jones lawsuit.
    Charles G. Bakaly 3d, a spokesman for Mr. Starr's office, would not 
comment on the Justice Department's plans to start an investigation. 
But Mr. Bakaly said the notes showed that prosecutors had supplied the 
Justice Department with a thorough status report on the then-nascent 
inquiry.
    ``I don't know how else to put it,'' Mr. Bakaly said. ``There was 
no misleading of Justice. This was a very fluid evolving situation. 
Unlike most public corruption cases, this one was ongoing; felonies 
were still possibly being committed.''
    This latest inquiry has exacerbated tensions that have existed 
between the Justice Department and the Office of Independent Counsel 
almost since the beginning of the Lewinsky scandal.
    At one point last spring, Ms. Reno asked her senior aides to 
research whether she had the authority to discipline Mr. Starr in some 
way that stopped short of removing him, said a former Justice 
Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity.
    Some aides told her that it would be a mistake, comparing it to the 
``Saturday Night Massacre'' when President Nixon ordered the firing of 
the Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox in October 1973.
    But, the official said, Ms. Reno shot back: ``I'm not asking you to 
make a political judgment. I'm asking you to make a legal judgment.''
    Deepening hostilities between the Justice Department and Mr. 
Starr's office delayed the start of the new ethics inquiry. The ethics 
investigators recently wrote to Mr. Starr outlining the scope and 
authority for the investigation, the officials said. Mr. Starr's 
prosecutors are challenging the inquiry, asserting that the Attorney 
General does not have the authority to delve into highly sensitive 
grand jury material or investigative decisions that led Ms. Reno to 
refer the case to Mr. Starr.
    Ms. Reno's aides have said that investigative authority is implied 
by language in the independent counsel statute, which gives the 
Attorney General the sole responsibility to remove an independent 
prosecutor.
    Over time, Justice Department officials, including Ms. Reno, have 
become troubled by what they view as possible violations of Justice 
Department guidelines. From issues like calling the Secret Service 
before the grand jury to the crossfire over leaks to reporters, Mr. 
Starr's prosecutors and Justice Department officials have feuded 
privately.
    ``As time went on, people became more and more frustrated with 
him,'' the Justice Department official said of Mr. Starr. ``He seemed 
less concerned with Department of Justice policies.''
    The ethics lawyers are trying to determine whether prosecutors in 
Mr. Starr's office had a vested interest in the outcome of the Jones 
case, an interest that would have undercut their ability to impartially 
investigate allegations related to the lawsuit. If that conflict 
existed, the officials said, it would have been an important factor as 
Ms. Reno weighed whether to recommend to a three-judge panel that Mr. 
Starr take on the Lewinsky matter.
    At this point, the ethics unit of the Justice Department must 
determine whether Mr. Starr and his prosecutors violated departmental 
rules and prosecutorial guidelines. Their findings could lead to 
recommendations for disciplinary action, like reprimands or suspension 
of employment.
    The relationship between Ms. Reno and Mr. Starr began as a wary but 
cordial one that a Government official compared to ``Thatcher and 
Gorbachev.''
    At times, Ms. Reno has expressed exasperation over Mr. Starr's 
conduct, fuming over letters sent by Mr. Starr's prosecutors accusing 
the Justice Department of trying to undercut the inquiry.
    Mr. Starr's prosecutors had also grown angry and suspicious about 
Ms. Reno's aides, suggesting that the Justice Department was under the 
control of the White House and had quietly tried to squelch Mr. Starr's 
effort, the officials said.
    Since October, several news organizations have reported how Mr. 
Starr's office first learned about the Lewinsky matter. On Jan. 8, 
1998--four days before Linda R. Tripp contacted Mr. Starr's office--
Jerome M. Marcus, a Philadelphia lawyer who did extensive work for the 
Jones legal team, informed Paul Rosenzweig, a prosecutor in Mr. Starr's 
office, about the Lewinsky accusations.
    The early tip was not disclosed in Mr. Starr's 445-page referral to 
Congress. Nor was it disclosed to the Justice Department. And The New 
York Times reported last month that there were several conversations 
between Mr. Marcus and Mr. Rosenzweig from November 1997 to January 
1998.
    David E. Kendall, one of the President's personal lawyers, 
complained to Ms. Reno in October that ``very serious questions'' were 
raised about those contacts.
    The allegations of collusion prompted lawyers at the Justice 
Department to turn their attention to their own recollections and their 
own handwritten notes, of statements made by Mr. Starr's 
representatives on Jan. 15, 1998, officials said today.
    One former Justice Department lawyer said in an interview that Ms. 
Reno was especially disappointed in the fact that the early phone call 
was not shared with her senior aides in January 1998.
    Last month, The New York Times reported that Mr. Marcus was the 
leader of a small secret group of lawyers working behind the scenes on 
the Jones case. Mr. Marcus drafted legal documents and was involved in 
many of the most important strategic decisions in the Jones lawsuit, 
according to billing records in the Jones case and interviews with 
other lawyers who worked with him.
    Mr. Marcus recruited other conservative lawyers to assist with his 
efforts, approaching among others, Paul Rosenzweig, who briefly 
considered doing work for Ms. Jones in 1994, the billing records show, 
but decided not to.
    In November 1997, Mr. Rosenzweig joined Mr. Starr's office, where 
he and Mr. Marcus had several conversations about the Jones case, said 
a lawyer familiar with their discussions.
    Mr. Bakaly, the spokesman for Mr. Starr, has adamantly denied any 
suggestion of collusion. When Mr. Starr testified before the House 
Judiciary Committee on Nov. 19 of last year, he was asked by the chief 
counsel for the minority, Abbe D. Lowell, about the ``substantial 
contacts'' that Mr. Starr had had with Jones lawyers.
    In a series of questions, Mr. Lowell tried to suggest that Mr. 
Starr should have revealed the contacts to the Justice Department in 
January 1998, and that Richard W. Porter, a partner of Mr. Starr's at 
the law firm, Kirkland & Ellis, had declined a request to represent Ms. 
Jones.
    ``I know Richard Porter; I've had communications with him from time 
to time,'' Mr. Starr testified. ``But in terms of a specific discussion 
with respect to what the law firm may be doing or may not be doing, I'm 
not recalling that specifically, no.''
                                 ______
                                 
                [From the New York Times, Feb. 9, 1998]

     Tracing the Past: How Legal Paths of Jones and Lewinsky Joined

                   (By Tim Weiner with Neil A. Lewis)
    Washington, Feb. 8.--Shortly after 10 a.m. on Jan. 17, a Saturday, 
the president of the United States stepped out of the White House into 
the back of a black limousine and rode a block to his lawyer's office 
to undergo a six-hour grilling in the case of Paula Jones vs. William 
Jefferson Clinton.
    For six weeks, the president's lawyers had known that he might be 
asked a startling question: Did you have a sexual relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky? When the question came, the president's body tensed 
and his jaw tightened, said a lawyer involved in the case, and, under 
oath, he denied it.
    The questions continued: Had the president been alone with 
Lewinsky? Had he given her gifts? He said he might have been alone with 
her briefly while she performed some clerical task, and he might have 
given her some presidential souvenirs, the lawyer recalled.
    The deposition ended, President Clinton returned to the White 
House, canceled dinner plans with his wife and called his personal 
secretary, Betty Currie, asking her to meet him at the White House the 
next morning.
    When they met, the president asserted that he had never been alone 
with Lewinsky at the White House, said lawyers familiar with Mrs. 
Currie's account. But that assertion did not square with Mrs. Currie's 
recollection.
    In addition, Mrs. Currie had turned over to investigators a hat 
pin, a brooch and a dress she retrieved from Lewinsky, the lawyers 
said, items that are believed to have been given to her by the 
president but which do not fit his description of have been given to 
her by the president but which do not fit his description of White 
House souvenirs. It is not clear who, if anyone, instructed Mrs. Currie 
to retrieve the gifts.
    Was Clinton less than truthful about his relationship with 
Lewinsky, the 24-year-old former White House intern? Was he using his 
trusted secretary to hide evidence from Mrs. Jones, the former Arkansas 
state employee suing him over what she says was a crude sexual advance 
nearly seven years ago?
    The president's battle with the Whitewater independent counsel, 
Kenneth Starr--and, perhaps, Clinton's place in history--may depend on 
the answers. If he lied, or if he urged others to lie or conceal 
evidence, he could face the threat of impeachment.
    How did Clinton become the first president forced to testify under 
oath about his private life? How did the Jones case--once demeaned by 
the president's lawyers as third-rate ``tabloid trash''--come to 
threaten Clinton's presidency? The answers lie in a detailed look at 
the recent past.
    When Mrs. Jones' lawyers learned of Lewinsky's existence, it was as 
if two live wires had met in an incendiary tangle.
    The lawyers' hunt for information about Lewinsky, which they sought 
to buttress Mrs. Jones' charge of sexual misconduct by Clinton, led 
directly to Starr's investigation into the possibility of perjury and 
obstruction of justice at the highest levels. Now Starr is demanding 
that Mrs. Jones' lawyers turn over everything they have learned in 
their search for women who contend they have had sexual encounters with 
Clinton.
    The two cases merged that Saturday morning. As the president 
testified, with Mrs. Jones staring him in the face during the 
deposition, Lewinsky was at home at the Watergate, recovering from the 
shock of her life.
    Twelve hours earlier, she ended an intense encounter with federal 
investigators pursuing the president on Starr's behalf. The 
investigators confronted Lewinsky with the devastating news that her 
colleague and confidante Linda Tripp had been taping their intimate 
telephone conversations for months.
    Tripp had told Starr's investigators that Lewinsky lied in her 
affidavit in the Jones case by denying that she had ever had sex with 
Clinton. While Tripp was working undercover for Starr, she was 
preparing to file an affidavit in Jones vs. Clinton, swearing that 
Lewinsky ``had a sexual relationship with President Clinton.''
    The tapes presented the threat of prison for Lewinsky unless she 
disavowed her affidavit and cooperated with Starr. The tapes recorded 
Lewinsky saying that the president ``won't settle'' the Jones case 
because ``he's in denial,'' according to published excerpts of the 
tapes. If so, refusal had turned that private lawsuit into a potential 
personal and political disaster.
    The miasma enveloping the White House began rising four months ago.
    On Oct. 1, the Rutherford Institute, a conservative legal center in 
Virginia, publicly offered to help Mrs. Jones. The institute found Mrs. 
Jones new lawyers from the Dallas firm of Rader, Campbell, Fisher & 
Pyke and offered to pay her legal expenses.
    In the first week of October, a woman telephoned the Rutherford 
Institute with an anonymous tip: a woman named Monica had had sex with 
the president in the White House. The same tipster, described by the 
man who took the call as ``a nervous young woman,'' called back in late 
October, providing a surname: Lewinsky.
    Days after the first tip, the Dallas lawyers telephoned Tripp. 
Newsweek quoted her in its Aug. 11 issue as a witness to a supposed 
sexual encounter between the president and Kathleen Willey, a White 
House volunteer. A lawyer involved in the chain of events said Tripp 
later gave the lawyers Lewinsky's name. Tripp's lawyer, James Moody, 
denies that. The question is unresolved.
    On Oct. 7, Lewinsky sent the first of nine packages from her office 
at the Pentagon to the White House and to the office of Vernon Jordan, 
Clinton's friend and confidant. The packages contained, among other 
things, letters and documents relating to her search for a new job. A 
key question for Starr is whether the White House and Jordan helped her 
find a job for reasons beyond altruism.
    Two weeks later, Lewinsky secured a job interview with Bill 
Richardson, the chief U.S. delegate to the United Nations, arranged by 
a White House deputy chief of staff, John Podesta, at Mrs. Currie's 
request.
    On Oct. 22, Richardson had a 40-minute interview with Lewinsky in 
Richardson's living room at the Watergate apartment and hotel complex, 
where she lives and where he maintains an apartment. In November, 
Lewinsky was offered a job on Richardson's public relations staff.
    But Lewinsky eventually declined the offer. She wanted a better-
paying position in the private sector in New York.
    In early December, Jordan talked to Lewinsky about helping her find 
that job. The go-between for their discussions was again Mrs. Currie. 
Jordan set up interviews for Lewinsky at three companies where he had 
personal and corporate connections: Revlon, American Express and Young 
& Rubicam, the advertising agency.
    Dec. 5 was the deadline for submitting witness lists in the Jones 
case. And on that list, on that day, the president's lawyers saw 
Lewinsky's name for the first time.
    From that moment on, the paths of two people from two different 
worlds--Paula Jones from Lonoke, Ark., and Monica Lewinsky from Beverly 
Hills, Calif.--were on course to collide at the White House.
    Dec. 19, a Friday, Mrs. Jones' lawyers served Lewinsky with a 
subpoena requesting information, including any gifts from the 
president. She called a Washington lawyer, Francis Carter, on Jordan's 
recommendation.
    Christmas Eve was Lewinsky's last day of work at the Pentagon. She 
still did not have a new job.
    On or about Dec. 28, a Sunday, she had a private talk with Clinton 
at the White House, said lawyers in the case. The president told her 
not to worry about being drawn into a lawsuit and advised her to 
describe her earlier White House visits as meetings with Mrs. Currie, 
the lawyers said.
    As for the subpoenaed gifts, the president said Lewinsky could not 
produce them if she no longer had them, according to the lawyers' 
account. Mrs. Currie has told investigators that she retrieved a box of 
gifts from Lewinsky--including the dress, the brooch and the hat pin--
and subsequently turned the items over to Starr.
    On Jan. 7, a Wednesday, Lewinsky completed an affidavit saying she 
never had sex with the president, said her lawyer William Ginsburg. The 
affidavit was not immediately filed with Mrs. Jones' lawyers.
    The judge in the case had suggested that testimony be limited to 
accounts of sexual favors received by Clinton in exchange for 
government jobs. Lewinsky contended she knew nothing of the sort, 
Ginsburg said; her affidavit was intended to keep her out of the Jones 
trial.
    Tripp has suggested to lawyers in the case that Lewinsky did not 
intend to file the affidavit until she had secured a job. That 
suggestion has not been independently corroborated by Lewinsky or 
anyone else.
    On Jan. 8, Lewinsky had a final job interview at Revlon, and Jordan 
made telephone calls on her behalf to the company, where he serves as a 
director. One of those calls went to Revlon's chairman, Ronald O. 
Perelman. A few days later, Revlon offered Lewinsky a job.
    Now events approached critical mass.
    On Jan. 12, Tripp made contact with Starr's office, saying that 
Lewinsky had had an affair with the president and that she, Tripp, had 
secret tapes to prove it. The same day, Carter told Mrs. Jones' lawyers 
that Lewinsky had denied any sexual relationship with the president in 
her affidavit.
    On Jan. 13, Tripp, with a tiny tape recorder provided by Starr's 
office, met Lewinsky for a long lunch, during which Lewinsky is said to 
have described her conversations about her affidavit with Jordan.
    On Jan. 14 or Jan. 15, Lewinsky handled Tripp three pages of 
``talking points,'' aimed at persuading Tripp to deny any knowledge of 
sexual impropriety by Clinton in the Jones lawsuit. It is unclear who 
wrote the document.
    On Jan. 15, Starr's office told the Justice Department about 
Tripp's accusations. A panel of federal judges authorized Starr to 
investigate whether Clinton and Jordan had encouraged Lewinsky to lie 
under oath in her affidavit.
    On Jan. 16, a Friday, the case reached an explosive state. The 
Federal Bureau of Investigation confronted Lewinsky. That day and the 
next, reporters began asking White House officials pointed questions, 
including whether the president had tried to influence other people's 
testimony in Jones vs. Clinton, a former White House official said. 
News of Starr's expanded investigation had already leaked.
    Clinton knew none of this. Nor did he know, as he confronted Mrs. 
Jones on Jan. 17, that he would be so extensively questioned about 
Lewinsky. Mrs. Jones lawyers appeared to know more details about 
Lewinsky than the president's lawyers had anticipated.
    The next morning, Clinton summoned Mrs. Currie to the White House 
and reviewed with her some of the questions and answers he had given 
the previous day about Lewinsky, said lawyers familiar with Mrs. 
Currie's account. The president told her he had never been alone with 
Lewinsky and that he had resisted her sexual advances, these lawyers 
said.
    If this was an effort at damage control, it failed. The story of 
Tripp's tapes was already leaking out, and Starr was already aiming 
this investigation directly at the White House, preparing to summon a 
parade of aides, including Mrs. Currie, to a grand jury.
    On Jan. 21, a Wednesday, the inquiry was national news. That day, 
Tripp signed an affivadit for Mrs. Jones' lawyers. It said Lewinsky had 
``revealed to me in detailed conversations that she had a sexual 
relationship with President Clinton since November 15, 1995.''
    If that is so, the president ``committed perjury'' in his sworn 
deposition, and ``embarked on a very aggressive cover-up campaign'' 
afterward, one of Mrs. Jones' lawyers, Donovan Campbell, said in court 
papers filed last Thursday.
    Those charges are now at the heart of one of the strangest 
investigations ever carried out against a president of the United 
States.

    Mr. HARKIN. So I just want to end this part of my 
discussion by saying we have heard a lot about the rule of law 
recently, about how it applies. Now, how about how it applies 
to those who are supposed to enforce the law, how it applies to 
Ken Starr and the Office of Independent Counsel?
    Mr. Hyde went on many times in his opening and closing 
arguments about what this teaches our kids about honesty and 
truthfulness, that the rule of law means something. Well, yes, 
it means something. It means something to our kids and future 
generations that honesty and truthfulness and the rule of law 
also applies to those who are cloaked with the authority to 
enforce that law. We must teach our kids that the ends do not 
justify the means, that law enforcement officials cannot break 
the law in order to bring someone to the bar of justice.
    So now, in this long process, the case is before the House 
Judiciary Committee. And only Ken Starr testifies on the facts. 
He gives them all these documents. But it is interesting to 
note, he does that before the election. He waits until after 
the election to give them all the Whitewater, Filegate, and 
Travelgate charges, which he drops. That happens after the 
election. They hear Ken Starr. And it is interesting to note 
that at the end of his long testimony, every Republican on the 
House Judiciary Committee gives him a standing ovation. What 
kind of political statement does that make? This was nothing 
like the kind of balanced evidentiary material given the 
Judiciary Committee in the House by Leon Jaworski in the 
Watergate case concerning then-President Nixon.
    So in summary, what we have here is an out-of-control 
independent counsel with his own political agenda and vendetta, 
a blank check to spend millions to look into every nook and 
cranny of President Clinton's public as well as personal life. 
You add this to a zealous group of House Republican Judiciary 
Committee members who fanned the flames, and some Members who 
already, prior to this, filed a resolution to impeach the 
President. What you have here is a blatant, vindictive 
political case.
    The American people figured it out a long time ago. They 
know the truth of what happened. And the truth is very simple. 
The President had a consensual, illicit affair with a young 
woman. He tried to cover it up. He misled others to cover it 
up. That is the truth. All this other stuff we are delving into 
is the details of about who touched who where, how many times 
they met, who exchanged gifts. The truth is simple and 
straightforward, and the American people figured it out, and 
they have a judgment about this.
    They said it is wrong, but it's personal. And he violated 
his marriage oath, not his oath of office. It is a sin, but not 
a crime. It is between him and his wife and his family and his 
God. And it is not an impeachable offense. I have said many 
times the American people can abide sin but not hypocrisy.
    Throughout this entire case, hypocrisy abounds. Much has 
been said about the rule of law and the truthfulness and 
honesty regarding President Clinton. How about as it applies to 
Starr? How about truthfulness, when he doesn't include, in his 
presentation, that very important statement that Monica 
Lewinsky said: ``No one ever asked me to lie''? How about 
honesty when it comes to him not providing exculpatory 
material?
    Having failed to get Bill Clinton on the stated reasons for 
the independent counsel--on Whitewater, Travelgate and 
Filegate--they shift to illicit sex and a classic sting 
operation.
    So we are left with two charges: perjury. This falls far 
short, and there is no evidence to support the fact that he 
perjured himself before the jury. Evasive? Yes. Dodging? Yes. 
But not knowingly making a false statement under oath material 
to the case. Doesn't fit.
    Second article: obstruction of justice. The House managers 
built their case on what they called the seven pillars of 
obstruction, which we have seen turned out to be seven sand 
castles of speculation. I think the most telling point was 
Monica Lewinsky, on her own tape last Saturday, when Mr. Bryant 
asked her, ``You didn't have a personal reason to file a false 
affidavit?'' And she said, ``Yes, I did.'' He said, ``Why?'' 
She said, ``Because I didn't want to get involved with the 
Jones case. I didn't think it was any of their business.'' End 
of story on obstruction because everything else rests on that.
    That is why I have said, the more we look at this case, the 
more it is a counterfeit case. Like a counterfeit dollar bill, 
even to a trained eye, you look and it may look real, but you 
put it under a microscope and you see it's counterfeit. That's 
what happened in this case.
    The House managers' case was based on inferences and 
conjecture. The White House's case was based on direct facts in 
evidence, and that is the difference.
    In closing, two wrongs don't make a right. President 
Clinton did have an illicit affair. It was wrong and demeaning. 
Ken Starr abused justice, set up a sting operation, the wiring 
of Linda Tripp, the leaks, the salacious material.
    Clinton's wrong, I submit, was more of a sin. Ken Starr's 
wrong is more of a crime. The damage to the rule of law is done 
more by Ken Starr than by Bill Clinton. At the beginning, I 
said the House had a heavy burden, given the history and 
partisanship of this case, to prove articles I and II and that 
they rise to an impeachable level. They never met that burden. 
Accordingly, I will vote not guilty on both charges.
    Finally, as you know, there has been much talk of a censure 
resolution. As I said before, I said I believe the appropriate 
form is for each Senator to express his or her opinion on this 
matter. I personally see no need to join 99 others, and in 
doing so, set a dangerous precedent that could be easily abused 
in the future. So here is my censure of the President.
    I want to state emphatically, I do not condone his behavior 
that has been so thoroughly exposed and seared in the American 
conscious ad nauseam. It is the sordid affair of all sordid 
affairs. The President brought dishonor to himself. He brought 
tremendous pain and embarrassment to his family, friends and 
colleagues. And rather than ennobling the Presidency, his 
behavior has been the butt of jokes and ridicule.
    This behavior was totally at odds with his many 
achievements and conduct in his official capacity as President. 
The President has stated clearly he has sinned and that he has 
misled his family, his friends, his staff, and the American 
people. He has said that he is sorry and he has asked for 
forgiveness.
    I do so now and say it is time to put this sad chapter 
behind us; move on to the important work of this Nation.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Harry Reid

    Mr. REID. Mr. Chief Justice, I extend to you my personal 
appreciation for the dignity that you have extended to each of 
us during these proceedings. I also say that I have been 
disappointed. It appears the vote is going to be very 
comparable to the vote in the House, down partisan lines, even 
though during the break I understand two of my colleagues from 
the other side of the aisle announced that they would not vote 
for conviction on the articles of impeachment.
    But in spite of this, I want to extend my appreciation to 
the Republican leaders. Senator Nickles has been available any 
time that there is a problem that has arisen during this 
proceeding. And you, Senator Lott, have 10 more votes than we 
have and you on many occasions during this proceeding could 
have steamrolled us. You chose not to do that. I think that is 
the reason we have had this feeling of harmony, even though we 
have had some disagreement on what is going to transpire. So I, 
again, on behalf of all Democratic Senators, express our 
appreciation to you for the work you have done.
    Often as I stand before this body, I am reminded of the 
lessons of great books. Today, though, the beginning of a novel 
keeps running through my mind--Charles Dickens' ``A Tale of Two 
Cities'':

    It was the best of times, it was the worst of times.

    I have often felt, these last weeks, as if I were trapped 
in a work of fiction. Like all really interesting fiction, the 
story now before us reduces itself to an examination of the 
human soul--or, to be more accurate, to an examination of human 
souls. I use the plural because this trial has been about the 
flaws of two people, each with the gifts to make them great, 
and of the contrast between them--one who has failed to rise 
above his flaws and the other who has embraced them. Much of 
what we call great literature is about the petty failings which 
destroy great men. It is about how common sins, of which we are 
all to some degree guilty, bring low the mighty and turn to 
ashes the fruits of victory in the mouths of monarchs.
    We have heard much in this historic Senate Chamber about 
the judgment of history, but I daresay that, even more than by 
historians, the truest judgment of these events will be written 
as novels and plays. On the one level, these works will deal 
with some or all of the seven deadly sins: Pride, anger, greed, 
gluttony, sloth, envy, and, yes, especially lust.
    But on another level, those plays and novels will deal with 
the theme of all literature. They will be written about 
conflicts between great men, great men who are flawed; great 
men, each with their own public and private failings. We are 
here to sit in judgment of the President of the United States, 
a very public man, for his very private failings. Bill Clinton 
fell from grace. Driven by the private sin of lust, he violated 
his marriage vows and when his sins were uncovered by his 
enemies, he tried to conceal them by lying to his wife, his 
friends, and ultimately to all of us. It is a common story, the 
sin of lying. It begins in the Old Testament with many 
examples--Cain, of course, is a good example, who asked, ``Am I 
my brother's keeper?''--and with the lie, the kiss of Jesus by 
Judas Iscariot in the New Testament.
    It may be the beginning of a great work of art, it may be 
the first chapter in a summer day's light reading, but it is 
not a good reason, it is not the beginning of a good reason, 
for removing an elected President of the United States.
    The core issue is one which has apparently eluded many in 
this Capitol, but which is obvious to the American people. 
Great dreams are dreamed by people with human flaws. Great 
policies and actions are sometimes set in motion by those with 
broken souls. Great deeds are not always done by good men. 
Recent history gives us many examples. Winston Churchill, one 
of my heroes, a man who initially stood alone in leading the 
defense of Western civilization, was by most standards an 
alcoholic--at least modern standards. Franklin Roosevelt, 
Churchill's stalwart comrade and the author of policies which 
saved the very lives of families of many in this Chamber today, 
died in the arms of his lover. Each of us, each one of us in 
this Chamber, every human being, is flawed. Each of us needs 
all the forgiveness and forbearing we can be granted by the 
charity of others.
    Bill Clinton has been a friend of the State of Nevada. He 
has been a friend to me. But he has committed grievous wrongs 
against his family and his friends. He has dishonored his high 
office and lowered the standard of public behavior. I have no 
doubt that he has strayed from the path of goodness. But I do 
have very real doubts as to whether he perjured himself or 
suborned perjury. But I have no doubt whatsoever that, under 
the circumstances of this case, the crimes alleged do not rise 
to the level of an impeachable offense. Because of what the 
President did in public and in violation of the public trust, 
if I have the opportunity I will vote to censure. I will not 
vote to impeach.
    I said a few moments ago that great men are not always good 
men. But there is an obvious corollary: Good men are not always 
capable of doing great deeds and they are not even always 
capable of doing good. I began today by saying this trial was 
about the flaws of two people. Both are men with God-given 
gifts. Both are extraordinary in their intellect, perseverance, 
and dedication to certain core values. Both are capable of 
great goodness and even good greatness. Both have sinned. One 
is the President of the United States. His sins are of the 
flesh and of the spirit. About these I have already spoken. The 
other is the special prosecutor, Ken Starr, who has pursued the 
President beyond all bounds of reason and decency. His are the 
sins of unremitting, undiluted, unrepentant McCarthyism. They 
are the sins of pride, the sins of anger--they are damning sins 
indeed.
    I don't use lightly McCarthy's name or accuse others of his 
tactics. I am old enough to remember how he misused and abused 
this sacred Chamber. My friend and my client, the late 
newspaper publisher, Hank Greenspun, was a victim of his lies, 
a victim who had the courage to stand up and fight back. Others 
fought, but many also suffered irreparable harm because of 
Senator McCarthy.
    I know McCarthy's tactics were the back room stab, the 
whispered smear, the half-truth, the leaked calumny. I know 
that he subpoenaed witnesses and forced them to choose between 
betraying their friends or committing perjury. I know he 
destroyed the careers of innocent men and women, drove some to 
suicide and sent others to jail. But at least McCarthy had an 
excuse, of sorts. For all his lies, leaks and libels, there 
really was a Communist threat. There really were Communist 
spies. Some of the people he accused really did commit treason. 
They were guilty of treason. At least, Mr. Chief Justice, 
McCarthy and his cohorts had that excuse. Kenneth Starr doesn't 
have an excuse.
    Before I came to the national legislature 17 years ago, I 
was a trial lawyer. At various times, I prosecuted and defended 
people charged with crimes. Long before that, I served as a 
police officer. I never argued a case in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but I tried more than 100 jury trials, hundreds of other 
cases before various courts, and argued before different 
appellate courts. I tried criminal cases, lots of them, and I 
know something about when a case should be pursued and when it 
should be dismissed. I know something about the impact that a 
criminal charge has on any man or woman, about how they agonize 
over telling their children, how they struggle to face the 
community. I know something about prosecutorial misconduct, and 
I know something about prosecutorial discretion.
    Every American is entitled to equal justice, no matter 
their rank in society; equal justice but not equally unfair 
justice.
    The independent counsel's argument throughout his tenure 
seems to be that any U.S. attorney, any criminal prosecutor 
would treat any defendant in the same unredeemedly savage and 
unfair fashion in which Mr. Starr and his office have treated 
the witnesses, the defendants in peripheral cases and the 
President of the United States. Almost $60 million has been 
spent--Whitewater, Filegate, Travelgate and now this. I think 
not.
    No prosecutor of integrity, of principle, of fairness would 
have tried to bootstrap a sexual affair into something 
criminal. A truly independent prosecutor would not make deals 
time after time with organizations established to embarrass the 
President, cavort with attorneys for Paula Jones, do business 
with Linda Tripp and others to entrap the President. A 
fairminded prosecutor would not have leaked salacious details 
to the press in an effort to force the target to resign from 
office. And, most fervently, a principled prosecutor would have 
the common sense and the common decency not to misuse their 
office to go all out, no holds barred, to ``get'' that targeted 
individual out of pride, anger and envy.
    I invite each of you to look at Justice Scalia's brilliant 
dissent in the Morrison versus Olson case where he talks about 
the constitutionality of the independent prosecutor. He 
predicted what we are now witnessing. Justice Scalia was 
visionary. Here is one of the things he said:

    The context of this statute is acrid with the smell of threatened 
impeachment.

    He was right. What else did he say? His opinion was 8 or 9 
years ago. He said then:

    . . . Congress appropriates approximately $50 million annually for 
general legal activities, salaries, and expenses of the Criminal 
Division of the Department of Justice.

    Fifty million dollars the whole year covers everything for 
the whole civil division of the Department of Justice. We are 
spending more than that to go after one man. Scalia could see 
that coming.
    He also said, and my friend, the Senator from Vermont, 
earlier today talked about what Justice Jackson had said, but 
he also quoted Scalia. Scalia said:

    If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his case, it follows that he 
can choose his defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the 
prosecutor: that he will pick people that he thinks he should get, 
rather than cases that need to be prosecuted. . . . [I]t is not a 
question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for 
the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and 
then searching the law books, or putting investigators to work, to pin 
some offense on him.

    Justice Scalia could see this coming, and we got just what 
he said we would get.
    This is a bad situation. When you have someone of the 
brilliance of Ken Starr and the viciousness of Ken Starr, you 
get what we have here today.
    I want to use this occasion to say something to the 
American people, to the people of the State of Nevada, to leave 
them with the hope that those in high office have not been 
bereft of all reason, sense and sensibility. What the President 
did was wrong. It was immoral. I don't believe it constitutes a 
crime justifying his removal from office. What Mr. Starr did, 
and continues to do, is also wrong, and it is also immoral.
    But their conduct is not the standard to which we must hold 
ourselves. We, all of us in Government, can do better. We must 
do better. The American people have the right to expect that or 
it doesn't matter how great we are, how great our ideas or how 
powerful our values. Set the standard high and judge by that 
standard. That is how the system is supposed to work, and in 
the long run it is how our constitutional form of government, 
with a legacy of more than 200 years, has worked and, with the 
help of a Power greater than any of us, will continue to work.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator John Edwards

    Mr. EDWARDS. I add my praise, Mr. Chief Justice, for the 
work you have done, but I would add one other thing. The last 
time I saw you before this impeachment trial you were leading a 
sing-along at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference. I thought 
it might be a good idea for this group.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. A healing device. [Laughter.]
    Mr. EDWARDS. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I have prepared 
remarks. But I am not going to use them. I made that decision 
about 20 minutes ago.
    I have been sitting, listening to my fellow Senators speak, 
and I want to speak to you from the heart. I want to speak to 
you about a struggle, because I have been through a struggle. 
It is a real struggle. And I suspect that there are an awful 
lot of you who have been through the same struggle--both before 
we voted on the motion to dismiss and, for me, since we voted 
on the motion to dismiss.
    For me, the law is a sacred thing. And that is part of my 
life. I have seen what the law can do. It is a powerful, 
powerful thing. It can do extraordinary things for ordinary 
people. And I believe we have been given a sacred 
responsibility. I will tell you what that sacred responsibility 
means to me personally. It means that when I walked in here the 
first day of this impeachment trial I was 100 percent 
completely open to voting to remove this President.
    And I have to tell you all something, my friends on this 
side of the aisle, that wasn't a hard thing for me to do. I 
think this President has shown a remarkable disrespect for his 
office, for the moral dimensions of leadership, for his 
friends, for his wife, for his precious daughter. It is 
breathtaking to me the level to which that disrespect has 
risen.
    So I said to myself, what is the right and fair thing to 
do? And this is what I have done. I have looked--many times 
until 3 a.m. in the morning--at the evidence in this case. 
Because I think that is the way we need to make this decision.
    The perjury charge, I believe, is just not there. The 
evidence is not there to support it. I know many of you believe 
it is there. I respect your view on that. I don't believe it is 
there. The obstruction charge is a totally different matter. 
And this is the way I have thought about the obstruction 
charge.
    I view, in my mind's eye, the scales of justice. And on one 
side, where the prosecution makes an allegation, I put their 
evidence. On the other side I put the defense evidence. And I 
do believe that for a charge this serious that the proper 
standard is beyond a reasonable doubt.
    So after that evidence is put on both sides of the scale of 
justice, what happens? I want to just very briefly go through 
what I think are the four main charges for obstruction.
    First, the false affidavit. The prosecution side: There is, 
in my judgment, clearly a false affidavit. The President had a 
conversation with Monica Lewinsky about filing an affidavit 
where he said to her, ``You can file an affidavit; that might 
be a way for you to avoid testifying.'' That is on the 
prosecution side.
    I want to make a really important point for me personally 
here. I think there is an enormous difference between what has 
been proven and what we suspect, because I have to tell you 
all, I suspect a lot that has not been proven.
    What is on the defense side? On the defense side: what has 
been proven in this case is that President Clinton never saw 
the affidavit, never had a discussion with anyone about the 
contents of that affidavit. He didn't know what was in it. He 
never told, according to her, Monica Lewinsky or anyone what 
should be in the affidavit.
    So that is the evidence on the scales of justice: One for 
the prosecution; that evidence for the defense. For me it is a 
very clear thing. The scales tilt in favor of the defense, and 
they certainly don't tilt strongly enough to be beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
    The second charge--and the one that bothers me the most--
coaching Betty Currie. The evidence on the side of the 
prosecution: President Clinton has a conversation with Betty 
Currie just after he has been questioned in his deposition 
where he makes very declarative statements to her--it happens 
twice--very declarative statements to her about what he 
remembers, many of which we now know to be false. And his 
explanation for that conversation lacks credibility, to say the 
least, that he was trying to refresh his memory. I doubt if 
anybody buys that. That is on one side, that is on the 
prosecution side.
    What is on the other side? On the other side we have Betty 
Currie saying it had no influence on her. But that is not the 
most troublesome thing for me. The troublesome thing is this: 
For that conversation to be obstruction of justice, it must 
have been proven that it was President Clinton's intent to 
affect her sworn testimony.
    Now, what are the other possibilities? We have a man who 
has just been confronted with this problem, who is political by 
nature. And do we really believe that the first thing he 
thought about is, ``I'm going to go protect myself legally''? I 
suspect the first thing he thought about is, ``I'm going to 
protect myself politically.'' He was worried about his family 
finding out. He was worried about the rest of the staff finding 
out. He was worried about the press finding out. Do I know 
which of these things are true? Absolutely not. I don't know 
which of them are true. Doesn't that answer the question? If we 
don't know which of those things are true, have they been 
proven? If we don't know what was in his head at that moment, 
how can we find that the prosecution has proven intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt?
    The third charge, the job search. On the prosecution side 
of the scales of justice, we have an intensified effort to find 
a job for Monica Lewinsky. I think that has been proven. I 
think that has been proven clearly. On the other side, we have 
testimony from Monica Lewinsky that she was never promised a 
job for her silence. We have evidence that the job search, 
although not as intense, was going on before anyone knew she 
would be a witness. We have Vernon Jordan testifying under 
oath--I sat there and watched it and looked him in the eye--
that there was never a quid pro quo, that the affidavit was 
over here and the job search was over here.
    The reality is, when you put all that evidence on the 
scale--prosecution evidence on one side, defense evidence on 
the other--at worst the scale stays even. And the prosecution 
has got to prove this case in order to remove the President of 
the United States beyond a reasonable doubt. They just have not 
proven it no matter what we suspect. No matter what we suspect. 
So that is the false affidavit which we have talked about, 
coaching Betty Currie, the job search.
    Now to the gifts. Let's see what the proof is. What is the 
proof--not the suspicion. On the prosecution side, we know that 
the President's secretary went to Monica Lewinsky's house, got 
the gifts, took them home and hid them under her bed. I have to 
tell you, on its face, that is awful suspicious, and it is 
strong, heavy evidence. The problem is, there is evidence on 
the other side. That evidence doesn't stand alone.
    First, we have the testimony of Betty Currie that Monica 
Lewinsky called her. Second, we have the fact that President 
Clinton gave her other gifts on that Sunday, which makes no 
sense to me. I heard the House managers try to explain it away. 
I have been a lawyer for 20 years, and I have been in that 
place of trying to explain away something that makes no sense. 
It doesn't make sense. Monica Lewinsky, herself, testified that 
she brought up the issue of gifts--not President Clinton--and 
that the most President Clinton ever said was something to the 
effect of ``I'm not sure. Let me think about that.''
    Now when that evidence goes on the defense side and the 
only evidence on the prosecution side is the fact that those 
gifts are sitting under the bed of Betty Currie, what happens 
to the scale? At best, the scale stays even. In my judgment, it 
actually tilts for the defense. There is no way it rises to the 
level of ``beyond a reasonable doubt.''
    Every trial I have ever been in has had one moment, one 
quintessential moment when the entirety of the trial was 
described, and in this case we have such a moment. There was a 
question that had my name on it. The reality is, Senator Kohl 
wrote it--I tagged on--but it was a great question. The 
question was, ``Is this a matter about which reasonable people 
can differ?'' I will never forget Manager Lindsey Graham coming 
to this microphone and his answer was ``Absolutely.'' Now if 
the prosecution concedes that reasonable people can differ 
about this, how can we not have reasonable doubt?
    These things all lead me to the conclusion that however 
reprehensible the President's conduct is, I have to vote to 
acquit on both articles of impeachment.
    I have one last thing I want to say to you all, and it is 
actually most important. If you don't remember anything else I 
said, and you weren't listening to anything else I have said, 
please listen to what I am about to say because it is so 
important to me.
    I have learned so much during the 30 days that I have been 
here. I have had a mentor in Senator Byrd, who has probably 
been a mentor to many others before me. I have formed 
friendships with people on both sides. Senators Leahy and Dodd, 
who I worked with on these depositions--wonderful, wonderful 
Senators. I have learned what leadership is about from these 
two men sitting right here--Senators Lott and Daschle. I have 
loved working with Senators DeWine and Thompson. And Senator 
Specter and I worked together on a deposition. He showed me 
great deference and respect. I have no idea why, but he did; 
and I appreciate it. I have deep respect and admiration for my 
senior Senator from North Carolina, who has been 
extraordinarily kind and gracious to me since I arrived here.
    Let me tell you what I will be thinking about when my name 
is called and I cast my vote, hopefully tomorrow. I will be 
thinking about juries all over this country who are sitting in 
deliberation in rooms that are not nearly as grand as this but 
who are struggling, just as you all have and I have, to do the 
right thing. I have to say, I have a boundless faith in the 
American people sitting on those juries. They want to do what 
is right. They want to do what is right in the worst kind of 
way.
    An extraordinary thing has happened to me in the last 30 
days. I have watched you struggle, every one of you. I have 
watched you come to this podium. I have listened to what you 
have had to say. I talked to you informally; I watched you 
suffer. I believe in my heart that every single one of you 
wants to do the right thing. The result of that for me is a 
gift. And that gift is that I now have a boundless faith in 
you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Daniel K. Akaka

    Mr. AKAKA. Mr. Chief Justice and esteemed colleagues, I 
rise to offer my thoughts on the momentous decision we will 
render shortly. At the start, I deeply regret that the American 
people have been denied the opportunity to hear the Senate's 
final deliberations on the impeachment charges against 
President Clinton. I say this because I have been thoroughly 
impressed with the thought, tenor, and passion brought to this 
deliberation by my colleagues on both sides of the aisle. I 
wish the American people could have the opportunity to observe 
what I have had the privilege of witnessing for the past two 
days. Whether seated in the gallery, watching on television, 
listening on radio, or following on-line, the public would have 
benefitted tremendously from the opportunity to hear, in real 
time and full context each of our remarks. The opportunity to 
read a transcript later this week in the Record will not come 
close to viewing these proceedings. It lacks the power of the 
moment.
    When I took the oath to do impartial justice on January 7, 
1999, I knew, as one of 100 Senators, that I was assuming the 
unique role of judge and juror in the Senate impeachment trial 
of William Jefferson Clinton. Over these weeks, I have listened 
to the presentations by the House managers, the White House 
counsel, and the President's defense team without prejudice. I 
have analyzed the video testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Vernon 
Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal, and read numerous grand jury 
transcripts, the referral from the independent counsel, and the 
House report and related documents.
    The House of Representatives approved two articles of 
impeachment by straight party line votes after bitter and 
divisive partisan debate, forwarding to the Senate the 
impeachment articles to remove the President of the United 
States as authorized by the Constitution. At the same time, the 
partisan nature of the House action invites challenge to its 
legitimacy. And, although we have more often than not voted 
along party lines during the impeachment trial, I am proud of 
this body and its genuine effort to pursue a bipartisan course 
during our trial of the President. We have disagreed without 
being disagreeable.
    The body has not strayed too far from the comity and tone 
that marked our first bipartisan caucus to set the framework 
for this proceeding.
    We have taken the admonition of the senior Senator from 
West Virginia to heart and avoided descending into the pit of 
caustic partisanship and recrimination.
    After reviewing volumes of evidence and weighing weeks of 
presentations before the Senate, I have concluded that a case 
has not been made on either of the articles of impeachment 
against President Clinton. Conviction and removal from office, 
as charged by the House managers, is simply not warranted.
    The record does not sustain the level of proof necessary to 
convict and remove the President. Certain facts are 
indisputable: the President lied to the American people and to 
his wife and daughter about an extramarital affair; he lied to 
his staff; and he was misleading in his deposition in the Jones 
v. Clinton civil suit and his grand jury testimony.
    However, impeachment is not a Constitutional means to 
punish a President ``when he gets out of bounds,'' as proposed 
by the House managers. The constitutional standard is whether 
high crimes and misdemeanors were committed, and that test has 
not been met.
    In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee rejected an article 
of impeachment against President Nixon based on the filing of a 
false tax return. It was reasoned that the President's 
misleading tax return was unrelated to his duties as President, 
although a minority believed the count was unsupported by the 
evidence. Thus we see that all crimes that may be punishable by 
the courts are not punishable by impeachment.
    Rather, impeachment is narrowly limited by the Constitution 
to offenses of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. After listening to many presentations on this 
issue, I am convinced that impeachment and removal from office 
should only be used for crimes against the country or threats 
to our national security.
    Our Founding Fathers carefully defined the terms of 
impeachment in a manner that establishes a high threshold and 
requires the charges to be of an egregious nature. That is why 
the Senate has only once before held an impeachment trial for a 
President.
    The House managers recommend impeachment because it is the 
only way in which the President's misconduct can be punished. 
Yet, I remind my colleagues that the President remains subject 
to criminal and civil penalties after he leaves office in 2 
years.
    As I will point out, the facts and other evidence 
accumulated and presented to the Senate do not meet the 
constitutional standard for impeachment and removal that our 
founding fathers established.
    Article I charges the President with perjury before the 
grand jury in August 1998, for willfully giving false testimony 
under oath in a judicial proceeding. Yet to prove this charge 
the House Managers introduced material from the Jones suit 
during their Senate presentation even though the House rejected 
an article of impeachment dealing with the Paula Jones suit. 
Nonetheless, despite this blurring of the lines between 
criminal and civil matters, a perjury conviction requires that 
the testimony be material to the case at hand. Judge Susan 
Webber Wright's rulings in the Jones case specifically excluded 
evidence concerning Monica Lewinsky because it was immaterial.
    Furthermore, Thomas Sullivan, former U.S. Attorney for the 
Northern District of Illinois, testified before the House 
Judiciary Committee that perjury ``can be particularly arcane, 
including the requirements that the government prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his testimony to be 
false at the time he or she testified, that the alleged false 
testimony was material, and that any ambiguity or uncertainty 
about what the question or answer meant must be construed in 
favor of the defendant.'' Mr. Sullivan also noted that 
generally, ``federal prosecutors do not use the criminal 
process in connection with civil litigation involving private 
parties,'' because, ``there are well established remedies 
available to civil litigants who believe perjury or obstruction 
has occurred.''
    Article II charges the President with seven different 
instances of obstruction of justice. The House managers insist 
that the evidence shows that these separate acts constitute a 
deliberate attempt by the President to obstruct justice. The 
White House argues that the President did not seek to influence 
witnesses nor impede discovery. Legal scholars have argued that 
the lumping together of these seven charges would cause most 
courts to throw out the charges, and witness testimony 
undermines the House charges. After the smoke cleared from the 
charges and countercharges, it was evident to me that the 
connections between the actions of the President and the 
actions by the witnesses were circumstantial, at best.
    Moreover, I agree with White House Counsel Charles F. Ruff, 
who in his closing arguments said of the House managers, ``I 
believe their vision to be too dark, a vision too little 
attuned to the needs of the people, too little sensitive to the 
needs of our democracy.''
    In the obstruction of justice count, the managers charge 
the President with asking Monica Lewinsky to lie, a charge that 
she denies in two dozen depositions, and testimony given under 
the protection of immunity. There is no evidence that the 
President ever asked her to provide a false affidavit in the 
Jones case or to testify falsely. Vernon Jordan, the 
President's close friend and advisor, testified that although 
he met with Ms. Lewinsky and was given a draft of the 
affidavit, he refused to review the document and referred the 
young woman to her attorney for advice and counsel.
    The House managers say the President is guilty of 
obstructing justice when he ordered his secretary, Betty 
Currie, to retrieve gifts given by the President to Monica 
Lewinsky. However, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, on a number of 
occasions, indicates that it was she who asked Ms. Currie to 
keep the gifts, not the President.
    The House states that the President asked Vernon Jordan to 
intensify an on-going job search in Ms. Lewinsky's behalf after 
Judge Webber Wright ruled that Paula Jones's attorney could 
investigate the President's sexual relations with State or 
Federal employees.
    Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky first met in November 1997, a 
month before Ms. Lewinsky was listed as a witness in the Jones 
case. Sinister motives do not appear to be involved in the 
inquiries by Mr. Jordan on her behalf that led to two job 
rejections and one job offer. Efforts by the House managers to 
link the job search and the affidavit unravel when the dates on 
which Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky first met, when Ms. 
Lewinsky's name first appeared on the Paula Jones case witness 
list, and the drafting of the affidavit are analyzed.
    The President, Ms. Lewinsky, and Mr. Jordan have testified 
that no one was seeking Ms. Lewinsky's silence, and Ms. 
Lewinsky further testified that she realized in October 1997 
that she would not be returning to the White House for 
employment and she renewed her job search in New York City.
    The additional testimonies of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, and 
Mr. Blumenthal added no new information to the case against the 
President. I voted against deposing these witnesses since they 
already had been deposed many times.
    Moreover, we each received thousands of pages of testimony 
from the grand jury, various depositions, statements given 
under oath, and documents relating to the impeachment charges. 
We know that Ms. Lewinsky had been questioned on at least 23 
separate occasions, including after the President's grand jury 
testimony and as recently as January 22, 1999, by the House 
prosecutors before testifying February 1, 1999, on video. 
During arguments in favor of deposing Ms. Lewinsky, House 
Manager Bryant urged the deposition because he believed the 
Senate should observe her demeanor, her tone, and her tenor in 
responding to questions.
    I respectfully disagreed with Mr. Bryant then, as I do now. 
My decision was bolstered when I viewed Ms. Lewinsky's 
videotaped testimony in which she reaffirmed her grand jury 
testimony. I saw no purpose in bringing her to the witness 
table again, nor Mr. Jordan, who had been questioned five 
times, nor Mr. Blumenthal, who has answered questions under 
oath four times. These witnesses did not change their 
testimonies, nor did they provide information that was omitted 
in previous testimony.
    The witnesses' statements are a matter of record, and they 
comprise thousands of pages encompassed in the volumes of 
testimony and sworn affidavits that are the basis of the House 
articles of impeachment. I concur with House majority counsel 
David Schippers who said during the House Judiciary impeachment 
proceedings, ``As it stands, all of the factual witnesses are 
uncontradicted and amply corroborated.''
    In conclusion, I cannot overstate my disappointment with 
the actions of the President. He deliberately misled the 
American people and greatly diminished the public's trust in 
the office of the Presidency. However, I have concluded that 
the two articles of impeachment, as drafted and presented by 
the House, fail to meet the level of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, and I will vote to acquit the President.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy*

    Mr. LEAHY. Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Leahy submitted additional statements on February 12 and 
February 23, see pp. 2996, 3090, and 3102, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I ask unanimous consent that a fairly lengthy brief on this 
issue be printed in the Record at the conclusion of my remarks.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
    (See Appendix.)
    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, like others, I want to thank 
you for your professionalism and good humor in these 
proceedings even though I suspect there are days that both you 
and I wish we were back at our homes in Vermont rather than 
here.
    But I want to tell the Senators also of an extraordinary 
day that my good friend, Senator Stevens of Alaska, and I 
spent. We left Sunday afternoon from Washington for the funeral 
of King Hussein of Jordan. We came back at about 2 o'clock 
yesterday morning. The delegation was an extraordinary one: Two 
other Members of Congress, senior members of the President's 
staff; even the parents of the King's widow, Queen Noor of 
Jordan, were with us.
    And the airplane, Air Force One, that is so recognizable 
around the world as a symbol of America, underscored our 
country's presence even as it landed. And Ted will recall the 
TV was on in the plane. We could see they interrupted national 
television in Jordan to show our plane landing. What was most 
remarkable to the people assembled from around the world for 
the funeral was the dramatic appearance not only of the 
President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton, but 
three former U.S. Presidents--Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter and 
George Bush--they joined with President Clinton as an 
extraordinary demonstration not only of bipartisanship but of a 
united American commitment to the peace policies of King 
Hussein, and the U.S. role in a continuing peace process.
    The symbol of American presence and the American continuity 
could not have been stronger with these four Presidents. It was 
a privilege to be there, a privilege I will always cherish.
    In the frenetic hours on the ground, I observed the leaders 
from the Middle East and around the world.
    I saw leader after leader making a strong effort to come to 
President Clinton and to speak with him. I listened to his 
conversation. It was clear to me he had a very good 
understanding of the issues that faced not only our country, 
but their country, and an understanding about how America's 
interest affect all of us.
    Probably the greatest contrast was in President Clinton's 
brief meeting with Boris Yeltsin, the President of Russia, a 
country that long symbolized our polar opposite during the cold 
war. We saw an aging President Yeltsin, unable to stand without 
two men helping him, a man who had to leave very shortly 
thereafter--well before the funeral was over--because his 
strength had faded. What a contrast.
    We saw a dynamic Tony Blair, the Prime Minister of England. 
We saw the leaders of Israel, Japan, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, India, Germany, France, Ireland, 
Egypt, and others coming together, brought together by their 
respect for King Hussein. Much of their attention was focused 
on the leader of the United States.
    The questions raised by this trial came back to me. I 
thought, do we abandon our elected leader because of concern 
about his personal conduct? Now, if this question was in my 
mind, it was in the minds of a lot of people there. I have been 
privileged to know many of them, and many asked me the 
question, Are we really serious about impeachment and removal? 
They asked that because they said the United States is not a 
parliamentary system of government, and the one thing that they 
can rely on is when we elect a President, even if it is not the 
President they wished we had elected, there are 4 years to deal 
with him and they can determine their foreign policy with the 
most powerful Nation on Earth accordingly.
    They said they have great respect for our strength and 
leadership, and they asked if it is really possible that 
partisanship in the Congress could destroy that heritage 
overnight.
    In my notes, as I flew back throughout the dark night, I 
asked myself, Are we going to spend our heritage of continuity 
and strength this way? Are we going to convict the President on 
these charges in this record? Are we going to destroy a 
heritage and continuity we earned, from our own Revolution, 
through a Civil War, through World Wars, through deaths and 
assassinations of Presidents, through great economic prosperity 
and devastating recession and depression. I completed my notes 
by writing, ``It is no longer a question of whether we do this 
to Bill Clinton, but whether we do it to ourselves.''
    The record of this impeachment trial is a time capsule. We 
leave it for succeeding generations. As the trial began, we 
reopened the records of 1868. I looked at those records. I 
thought, someday someone will review ours in the same way. We 
leave behind a trail of precedents. Our successors will try to 
understand them. If we act wisely, they will try to emulate it. 
Our actions can stir a chord that will vibrate throughout the 
history of our Republic.
    So in explaining my decisions in this trial, I know that I 
am addressing myself to fellow Vermonters and fellow Senators, 
but also to future generations. In that future generation is my 
own grandson and perhaps even his grandchildren.
    The conclusion I have reached on the articles of 
impeachment is imbued with this solemn knowledge and sense of 
duty. My conclusion is we must not avenge the faults of William 
Jefferson Clinton upon our Nation, our children and our 
Constitution.
    Extreme partisanship and prosecutorial zealotry have 
strained this process in its critical early junctures. Partisan 
impeachments are lacking in credibility. The framers knew this. 
We all know this.
    Socrates said: ``The greatest flood has soonest ebb; the 
sorest tempest, the most sudden calm.''
    In many ways, I say to my friends, especially our two 
distinguished leaders who worked so hard on this, in many ways 
the Senate's work has been the calm after the storm. We began 
the 106th Congress, the last of the 20th century, facing a 
challenge no Senate has been called upon to address since the 
aftermath of the Civil War. We took a special oath administered 
to Senators who must determine whether to override the election 
by the people of the United States of their President and 
remove him from office.
    The Constitution purposely restrains the Congress, and 
carefully circumscribes our powers to remove the head of the 
executive branch of the Federal Government. The Constitution 
intentionally makes it difficult to override the electoral 
judgment of the American people. I will cast my vote wary of 
the dangers posed by the House managers' seductive invitation 
to vote to remove the President for symbolic purposes.
    We all agree the President's conduct was inexcusable. It 
was deeply disappointing, especially to those who know the 
President and who support the many good things he has done for 
this country and the world. His conduct in trying to keep this 
relationship secret from his wife and family, his friends and 
associates, from the public glare of a politically charged 
lawsuit, may be understandable on the human level, but it has 
had serious consequences for him personally and for the legacy 
of his Presidency.
    The President has admitted before a Federal grand jury 
terribly embarrassing personal conduct and has seen a videotape 
of that grand jury testimony broadcast to the entire Nation, 
with excerpts replayed over and over again. This modern day 
version of the public stockade has been difficult to witness 
for those who know this man and his family and care about them.
    The Jones lawsuit has now been settled and $850,000 has 
been paid on a case that the District Court judge had dismissed 
for failing to state a claim.
    The Clinton Presidency has been permanently tarnished. The 
Senate trial provided a forum to replay the embarrassing and 
humiliating facts of the President's improper relationship. No 
one can say the Presidency has emerged unscathed.
    For me, the most regrettable action is the nationally 
televised statement to the American people, where he shook his 
finger defiantly and said the allegations were untrue. That was 
not charged in the articles of impeachment, but it was intended 
to mislead the American people. That statement was wrong. And 
even though he later apologized for his action, I feel strongly 
that no President should so intentionally deceive the American 
people.
    But condemning the President is not the purpose of the 
impeachment trial. Impeachment cannot be about punishing the 
officeholder. One predecessor of mine and of Senator Jeffords, 
Senator George Edmunds of Vermont, explained in 1868, that:

    [p]unishment by impeachment does not exist under our Constitution. 
. . . [The accused] can only be removed from the office he fills and 
prevented from holding office, not as punishment, but as a means merely 
of protection to the community. . . .

    So our focus has to be on whether conduct which the House 
has charged has been proven and warrants President Clinton's 
removal from office to protect the public.
    The President's indiscretions alone did not bring us to 
this point. Raising this matter to the level of a 
constitutional impeachment only began with the referral from 
the special prosecutor, Kenneth Starr. Justice Robert Jackson, 
when he was attorney general, observed that the most dangerous 
power of prosecutors is the power to ``pick people that he 
thinks he should get rather than cases that need to be 
prosecuted.'' I am concerned that is what has happened in the 
case of President Clinton.
    Does anyone recall after the fruitless years of 
investigation of this President, the past year of upheaval, 
that it was the talking points given to Ms. Tripp by Ms. 
Lewinsky which were supposed to be the smoking gun that proved 
a vast conspiracy to suborning perjury? I don't think anybody 
doubts Ms. Lewinsky's account that she wrote the talking points 
based on her discussions with Ms. Linda Tripp, and she never 
discussed them with the President.
    Monica Lewinsky consistently maintained that no one ever 
asked or encouraged her to lie; she was never promised a job 
for her silence. Indeed, in her 24th interview, the Senate 
videotaped deposition demanded by the House managers, she 
testified to her own purposes in keeping her relationship 
secret. She acted in what she thought was her own best 
interests. She sought to conceal this relationship because she 
did not want to be humiliated in front of the whole world. And 
the record establishes it was Linda Tripp rather than President 
Clinton who acted in the conflicting roles as Ms. Lewinsky's 
intimate confidante and ultimate betrayer.
    As a former prosecutor, one of the questions I asked is 
whether these criminal charges of perjury and obstruction would 
have been brought against Bill Jones rather than Bill Clinton. 
Experienced prosecutors, Republican and Democrat, testified 
before the House Judiciary Committee that no prosecutor would 
have proceeded based on the record compiled by Mr. Starr, and 
prosecutors I have talked to have said they wouldn't even get 
to a jury with it. As a former prosecutor, I agree and note 
that during the course of the Senate proceeding, the case has 
gotten weaker.
    The testimony in the record shows that Ms. Lewinsky had no 
intention of revealing her relationship with the President. She 
is the person who originated and carried out the plan to hide 
certain gifts from the Jones lawyers. The only crimes shown to 
possibly have occurred are not high crimes but those for which 
Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp have already received immunity from 
prosecution from Ken Starr. To influence our judgment, the 
managers have argued that the consequences of the President's 
acquittal of their unproven charges would be dire for our 
children, I have been married for 37 years to a woman I love; 
my wife and I have raised three wonderful children. I don't 
need the House of Representatives to tell me how to raise my 
children. I trust the parents of America to raise their 
children, to explain what the President did was wrong, to point 
out the humiliation and other consequences brought on himself 
and his Presidency. That is not our the Congress' job. That is 
the job for parents in this country.
    I don't believe the Constitution calls upon us to remove a 
duly elected President for symbolic purposes. Rather, I believe 
the precedent set by conviction without proof and removal 
without constitutional justification would be far more 
dangerous for our Republic than his actions.
    The House managers have warned that should the President be 
acquitted, it would damage the ``rule of law.'' I strongly 
disagree, because the supreme rule of law in this country is 
the Constitution; that is what we have to uphold.
    Partisan impeachment drives are doomed to fail. The Senate 
must restore sanity to this impeachment process. We must 
exercise judgment and do justice. We have to act in the 
interest of the Nation. History will judge us based on whether 
this case was resolved in a way that serves the good of the 
country, not the political ends of any party or the fortunes of 
any person.
    We have all talked about President Andrew Johnson's 
impeachment. Few people will recall that after the unsuccessful 
effort to remove him from office, former President Johnson 
returned to serve this country as a U.S. Senator. I look 
forward to the day when the Senate can close our work as an 
impeachment court and that we can all return to our work--our 
important work we face as U.S. Senators representing our 
States.
    I have served here with 259 Senators, including the 100 
here now. I have respected all of you. I have had great 
affection for many of you on both sides of the aisle. I count 
among my best friends many Senators on both sides of the aisle. 
This is a difficult time. I will not question any Senator's 
vote on this. But the Senator from Vermont cannot vote to 
convict and I will not.
    Thank you.

                                Appendix

 Procedural and Factual Insufficiencies in the Impeachment of William 
 Jefferson Clinton--Analysis by Senator Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, 
                       Senate Judiciary Committee
                                contents
I. Oath of Office
II. How Did We Get Here?
    A. The President's Conduct
    B. Special Prosecutor Starr
    C. The House Judiciary Committee
    D. Vote by the House of Representatives
        1. Lame Duck House
        2. Rejected Charges
III. Secret Evidence
IV. The Articles Are Unfairly Drafted
    A. Article I is Defectively Vague
    B. Both Articles Charge Multiple Offenses
V. The Senate's Duty
    A. Standard of Proof
    B. The Charges Have Not Been Proven
        1. Article I
        2. Article II
    C. There Was No Need to Call Witnesses
    D. Removal Is Not Warranted
VI. Prior Judicial Impeachments for Perjury
VII. ``Findings of Fact'' Fallacies
VIII. Effect on Children and National Security
IX. Deliberations on Dispositive Trial Motions Should be Open
X. Conclusion
                           i. oath of office
    On the first day of this Congress, the Vice President of the United 
States administered the oath of office to the most recently elected 
Members of the Senate. I was honored by the people of Vermont to be 
among those Members and to take the oath of office to serve here as a 
representative of Vermont. With this oath I have again sworn to protect 
and defend the Constitution of the United States.
    We were reminded by the Majority Leader at the beginning of the 
last Congress that the oath we take was formulated in 1868 to help 
bring the country back together. As Senator Lott has noted, following 
the Civil War, some urged continued use of an ironclad test oath that 
barred those who had served the Confederacy from serving in the Federal 
Government. It took ``nearly a quarter of a century of confusion and 
acrimony'' for the Senate to settle upon the oath that we take 
today.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Footnotes at end of analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The same year in which our oath was developed, our country 
experienced its first, and until now, its only presidential impeachment 
trial. History has judged harshly the ``Radical Republicans'' who 
pursued that impeachment against President Andrew Johnson. A notable 
exception is William Maxwell Evarts, a Vermonter who was criticized by 
many Republican party leaders for defending a President of the opposite 
political party.
    I have been proud of another Vermonter, Gregory Craig, who has 
played a critical role in the defense of President Clinton.
    This Senate is the last of the 20th century. We began this first 
session of the 106th Congress facing a challenge that no other Senate 
in over 100 years has been called upon to address. To deal with that 
challenge, we all took another oath, an oath to do ``impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and laws.'' That is the oath administered 
to Senators who must determine whether to override the election of the 
President of the United States and remove him from office. That oath 
calls upon Senators to rise above partisan politics and our personal 
feelings about President Clinton.
    I focus first on the oaths we take to be Members of the Senate and 
to serve in this impeachment trial since the House Managers opened and 
closed their presentation to the Senate pointing to the oaths the 
President swore to uphold when he assumed on two occasions the office 
of the President.
    The Managers have emphasized that the President's inaugural oath of 
office imposes a constitutional duty to ``take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed.'' Their argument is that the presidential oath 
spelled out in Article II, section 1 of the Constitution establishes a 
special standard of conduct for the President, and when the President 
violates a law which he has sworn faithfully to execute, he should be 
removed.
    Frustrated by the restrictions placed on Congress's impeachment 
power, which limits the grounds for removal to ``Treason, Bribery or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' the Managers seek to find 
alternative constitutional footing to remove this President. But, the 
Constitution simply does not say that a President shall be removed for 
``Treason, Bribery, or other conduct inconsistent with his presidential 
oath and duties.'' Nor does it say that a President shall be removed 
for ``Treason, Felony, or other Crime,'' which is the formulation used 
in the Constitution's Extradition Clause.2
    The Framers purposely restrained the Congress and carefully 
circumscribed our power to remove the head of the co-equal Executive 
Branch of the Federal Government. As Professor Laurence Tribe pointed 
out last November, during a House subcommittee hearing on the history 
of impeachment, the presidential oath and Take Care clause cannot 
properly be invoked so as to make the President of the United States 
more vulnerable to impeachment and removal from office than other 
federal officials. ``[I]t simply cannot be the case under our 
Constitution that removing a sitting president should be easier, not 
harder, than removing a vice president, a cabinet officer, or a sitting 
federal judge.'' 3
    The Managers have invited the Senate to lower the bar for 
impeachment and removal of a President by distorting the constitutional 
text and using the presidential oath in a manner never contemplated by 
the Framers. I cast my vote mindful of the dangers this seductive 
invitation poses not only for this President but, more importantly, for 
the future of the Presidency and our constitutional framework.
    As my oaths demand, I will work to protect and defend the 
Constitution. I will continue to defend our constitutional democracy 
against encroachments from all sides.
    Over the last few years, we have seen scores of constitutional 
amendments introduced each Congress and several voted upon each year. I 
have spoken about the assault by amendment being made against the 
Constitution and defended the Constitution against these ``bumper 
sticker'' proposals for constitutional edits. The impeachment of the 
President is a matter of similar importance. What we do, in terms of 
the standards we apply and the judgments we make, will either follow 
the Constitution or alter the intent of the Framers and lower those 
standards for all time. I have heard more than one Senator acknowledge 
that in this sense it is not just the President but also the Senate on 
trial in this matter.
    In considering what to do we cannot and must not ignore how we 
arrived at this point lest our actions countenance repetition in the 
future. We are now in a position to write the lessons we want heeded by 
future Members who have the privilege to serve America in Congresses 
into the next century and millennium.
                        ii. how did we get here?
    When former Senator Dale Bumpers spoke to us about the task before 
us, he posed a question that many Senators have asked themselves over 
the course of these impeachment proceedings. He asked, ``How do we come 
to be here?'' 4 I raised virtually the same question in an 
opinion editorial published on December 13, 1998, in the Los Angeles 
Times. I noted Barbara Tuchman's gripping account in The Guns of August 
of how the world teetered into the catastrophe of World War I. She 
recalled a former German chancellor's question to his successor: ``How 
did it all happen?'' ``Ah, if only we knew,'' was the reply.
    Future generations may ask the same question of us as they ponder 
not only how but also why this sorry episode of admitted presidential 
misconduct led this great country to the brink of paralysis over the 
possibility of removing a popular President, whose leadership has given 
this country not just a balanced budget but a surplus two years 
running, the lowest unemployment in decades and the strongest economy 
in the world. Our economy is in the best shape in a generation in no 
small part because of the President's economic policies. We should be 
working with the President to make the hard choices and develop the 
bipartisan cooperation that are needed to move the country forward into 
the 21st Century with a secure Social Security, strong Medicare and 
needed investments in education.
    Instead, we find ourselves facing the first impeachment trial of a 
duly-elected President and only the second impeachment trial of a 
sitting President in the history of this country. We find ourselves in 
this situation due to the poor judgment of the President, whose 
personal conduct was inexcusable; the antics of a Special Prosecutor 
run amok; and the political posturing of partisan House Republican 
leaders, who misconstrued the constitutional role of the House and 
advanced a take-it-or-leave it strategy of impeachment or nothing. Each 
step of this unfortunate process has notably lacked one important 
element: the exercise of sound judgment.
    That is why the country has looked to the Senate to restore 
political sanity to this process. The demand on us is not simply to 
uphold the ``rule of law,'' about which the Managers have repeatedly 
lectured us. Our oath requires far more than the ministerial act of 
applying the law to the facts or accepting blindly the facts and 
conclusions presented by either side in this trial. We are required to 
evaluate the facts, not in isolation, but in the context of our 
precedent and the history of impeachments, and with our focus always on 
what is good for the country. In short, we are required to do what has 
been missing up to now: exercise judgment, and do so in an impartial 
fashion. The beginning point in this process must start with the 
President.
A. The President's Conduct
    We can all agree that the President's conduct with a young woman 
who was working in the White House was wrong. It was also deeply 
disappointing, especially to those who know the President and who 
support the many good things he has done for this country and the 
world. His conduct in trying to keep his inexcusable relationship 
secret from his wife and family, his friends and associates, and from 
the public glare of a politically-charged lawsuit, though 
understandable on a human level, has had terrible consequences for him 
personally and for the legacy of his Presidency.
    For me, one of the President's most regrettable actions was his 
nationally-televised statement to the American people in which he shook 
his finger and defiantly told us that the allegations were untrue. 
Although not charged in the Articles of Impeachment, that statement was 
intended to mislead the American people with respect to the nature of 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. While I understand the pressures 
that he was under at the time, that statement was wrong. Although the 
President later apologized for his actions, I feel very strongly that 
no President should intentionally deceive the American people and I 
condemn him for having done so.
    Senator Bumpers reminded us of the human costs that have been paid 
by this President and his family. The President has admitted before a 
Federal grand jury terribly embarrassing personal conduct and has seen 
a videotape of that grand jury testimony broadcast to the entire 
nation, with excerpts replayed over and over again. This modern day 
version of the public stockade has been difficult to witness for those 
who know this man and his family. His punishment has also taken its 
financial toll. The underlying lawsuit has now been settled and 
$850,000 paid on a case that initially sought only $75,000 in 
compensatory damages--a case that the District Court judge had 
dismissed for failing to state a claim.
    His Presidency has been permanently tarnished by impeachment. The 
Senate trial has provided a forum to replay the embarrassing and 
humiliating facts of the President's improper relationship. No one can 
say this President or his Presidency has emerged unscathed.
B. Special Prosecutor Starr
    But the President's indiscretions and conduct did not alone bring 
us to this point. Raising this matter to the level of a constitutional 
impeachment only began with an investigation and referral from Special 
Prosecutor Kenneth Starr.
    Justice Robert Jackson, when he was Attorney General in 1940, 
observed that the most dangerous power of the prosecutor is the power 
to ``pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than cases that 
need to be prosecuted.'' When this happens, he said, ``it is not a 
question of discovering the commission of a crime and then looking for 
the man who has committed it, it is a question of picking the man and 
then . . . putting investigators to work, to pin some offense on him.'' 
``It is here,'' he concluded, ``that law enforcement becomes personal, 
and the real crime becomes that of being unpopular with the predominant 
or governing group, being attached to the wrong political views, or 
being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the prosecutor 
himself.'' 5
    In the case of President Clinton, things became personal a long 
time ago. When Whitewater failed to produce, the President's detractors 
began searching for a scandal. ``Travelgate'' went nowhere. 
``Filegate'' was another dead end. Vincent Foster's tragic death was a 
suicide. Last summer, it was reported that the Special Prosecutor had 
his investigators scouring the countryside looking for women who may 
have been intimate with Bill Clinton at some point over the last 
several years. I spoke out then, noting my concern and trying to sound 
a cautionary note that the permanent investigation of the President was 
taking yet another wrong turn.6
    Finally, after four years of fruitless investigations, Special 
Prosecutor Starr renewed his acquaintance with Linda Tripp and began 
the Monica Lewinsky phase of his investigation. According to Mr. Starr, 
that contact with Linda Tripp began on January 8, 1998, days before Ms. 
Lewinsky had filed her affidavit in the Jones case and before the 
President's deposition in that matter.7 As an officer of the 
court, he could have immediately referred Ms. Tripp's information to 
others with authority over such matters. But he did not.
    Most law enforcement authorities strive to prevent crimes from 
occurring. Not so with Special Prosecutor Starr. He engaged all the 
influence, power and authority he could muster to get the President. He 
adopted Ms. Tripp as his agent, arranged to provide her with immunity 
from prosecution, and had her wear a wire and lunch with Monica 
Lewinsky while surreptitiously recording her. He then tried over an 
extended period of many hours to convince Ms. Lewinsky to agree 
likewise surreptitiously to record conversations and help him make a 
case against the President.
    Does anyone recall after the past year of upheaval the crimes the 
Special Prosecutor was seeking to find last January? Recall that the 
``talking points'' given to Ms. Tripp by Ms. Lewinsky were supposed to 
be the ``smoking gun'' showing that the President was involved in a 
vast conspiracy and cover-up to suborn perjury from Ms. Tripp. No one 
now doubts Ms. Lewinsky's account that she, and she alone, wrote the 
talking points based on her discussions with Ms. Tripp. Moreover, no 
one now doubts that Ms. Lewinsky never even discussed those talking 
points with the President, the President's attorneys, the President's 
friend Vernon Jordan, or anyone associated with the White House.
    Also recall that Mr. Starr justified his pursuit of this 
investigation based on Vernon Jordan helping Ms. Lewinsky find a job in 
New York. His theory, as described in his referral, was that Ms. 
Lewinsky was influenced to lie about her relationship with the 
President through the assistance of Mr. Jordan in finding her a 
job.8 Yet it was not the President but Linda Tripp who, in 
early October 1997, first suggested that Ms. Lewinsky move to New York 
and first discussed with Ms. Lewinsky that she enlist Mr. Jordan's help 
with her New York job search.9 Indeed, Linda Tripp's role in 
this scandal is a pivotal one.
    Fresh from conferring with Mr. Starr's investigators, armed with 
promises of immunity from prosecution, Linda Tripp met with the Jones 
lawyers on the eve of the President's deposition and briefed them on 
the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Even Mr. Starr 
eventually admitted that his office could--and should--have kept 
``better control'' of Ms. Tripp.10
    A number of concerns have been raised about how this investigation 
was initiated and conducted by the Special Prosecutor, including 
whether Mr. Starr withheld material information from the Attorney 
General when seeking to extend his jurisdiction over the Lewinsky 
matter, whether he concealed his prior consultations with the attorneys 
in the Jones case, threatened a potential witness with the loss of the 
custody of her child, and subpoenaed a minor at school. I have also 
expressed my concern over the aggressiveness and lack of prosecutorial 
discretion of his investigation in requiring the testimony of mother 
against daughter, attorney against client, and Secret Service 
protectors against protectee--the latter raising serious security 
issues that could jeopardize the future safety of presidents--and 
requiring bookstores to disclose their customers'' choice of reading 
material.11
    Finally, the persistent and politically damaging leaks of secret 
grand jury proceedings have tarnished Mr. Starr's investigation and 
fueled concern over his partisanship. Indeed, soon after he had been 
appointed as special prosecutor, leaks from ``law enforcement sources'' 
about the Whitewater investigation under his supervision prompted Mr. 
Starr to confirm publicly his understanding of the grand jury secrecy 
rules. He issued a press release on October 20, 1994, pledging that the 
Office of Independent Counsel (``OIC'') would ``abide by all of the 
obligations imposed upon us to protect the integrity of the grand jury 
process and our ethical obligations as professionals, including those 
requiring the secrecy of our proceedings.''
    Despite this pledge by Mr. Starr, a federal judge determined in 
June 1998 that the evidence established a prima facie case that Mr. 
Starr's office had violated federal secrecy rules prohibiting attorneys 
for the government from disclosing confidential grand jury material. A 
final adjudication of the matter has not been made.
    Then we come to the matter of the referral from Mr. Starr's office. 
The Independent Counsel statute authorizes an independent counsel to 
``advise the House of Representatives of any substantial and credible 
information . . . that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.'' 
12 This provision should not be construed to make an 
independent counsel the House's Grand Inquisitor, nor to require an 
independent counsel to become an advocate for impeachment. Rather, a 
simple, straightforward delivery of the facts collected by the 
independent counsel, unadorned by surmise, conjecture and conspiracy 
theories is all that is authorized.
    Nevertheless, Mr. Starr used this statutory authorization as a 
springboard to advocate impeachment. His conduct stands in stark 
contrast to that of the Special Prosecutor in Watergate. As Georgetown 
University Law Professor Robert Drinan, who served with distinction on 
the House Judiciary Committee, observed last November in testimony 
before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution:
    ``It is noteworthy that in 1974, the Special Prosecutor gave 
information and facts to the House Judiciary Committee. He did not, 
however, recommend impeachment. He knew that the power to recommend 
impeachment was committed solely to the House of Representatives by the 
Constitution itself.'' 13
    I am not alone in questioning Mr. Starr's conduct and his 
misinterpretation of his role. His own ethics advisor felt compelled to 
resign his position after Mr. Starr appeared before the House Judiciary 
Committee as the chief cheerleader for impeachment.
    Thereafter, Mr. Starr went from chief cheerleader to chief 
``talking head,'' making a lengthy television appearance on the news 
show 20/20. This was only days after he told the House Judiciary 
Committee, ``We [the OIC] go to court and not on the talk-show 
circuit.'' 14 In this regard, it bears mention that Mr. 
Starr's public relations advisor and his highly touted ``career 
prosecutors'' have also appeared on countless talk shows over the past 
year.
    Even during the Senate impeachment trial, Mr. Starr has overstepped 
his proper role and intruded into the Senate's prerogatives on how 
these proceedings should be conducted. In effect, he became the chief 
prosecutor for impeachment. In contravention of a unanimously adopted 
consent resolution on how the trial would proceed, the Managers 
enlisted Mr. Starr's help to force Monica Lewinsky to meet with them as 
part of her immunity agreement. If she did not say the right things, 
she subjected herself and her mother and father to prosecution.
    Press accounts make clear that while Mr. Starr's representatives 
were allowed to attend the interview of Ms. Lewinsky on January 24, 
1999, neither the Senate nor the President's counsel were extended such 
courtesy. This collusive move between the Managers and Mr. Starr was 
unfair to the President's counsel and contemptuous of the Senate, which 
had resolved to defer the issue of witnesses until later in the trial.
    Mr. Starr's continued meddling during the Senate impeachment trial 
has been roundly criticized by both Democrats and Republicans. With his 
appetite whetted by one weekend's interference with the Senate 
impeachment trial, the very next weekend, on Sunday, January 31, 1999, 
Mr. Starr's office leaked word to the New York Times that he had 
determined he could indict a sitting President. Even the House Managers 
balked at this interference, saying Mr. Starr's latest leak was ``not 
helpful at all.'' 15
C. The House Judiciary Committee
    The next protagonist in this constitutional saga was the House 
Judiciary Committee. In addition to the serious substantive concerns 
raised by the way the Committee drafted the Articles of Impeachment--
which I will discuss later--the Committee also made at least four 
critical procedural errors.
    First, the Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee used the 
muscle of the majority to force its partisan will. History tells us 
that, to be successful, impeachments must be handled in a bipartisan 
manner. Chairman Henry Hyde himself has observed on more than one 
occasion that bipartisanship is crucial to any impeachment proceeding 
because a political, partisan impeachment will not be trusted.
    The Framers anticipated that impeachments might be driven by 
partisanship rather than real demonstrations of guilt. The 
distinguished historian Arthur M. Schlessinger, Jr., stressed the need 
for bipartisanship in impeachment proceedings in his testimony before 
the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution on November 9, 
1998, stating:
    ``The Framers further believed that, if the impeachment process is 
to acquire popular legitimacy, the bill of particulars must be seen as 
impeachable by broad sections of the electorate. The charges must be so 
grave and the evidence for them so weighty that they persuade members 
of both parties that removal must be considered. The Framers were 
deeply fearful of partisan manipulation of the impeachment process. . . 
. The domination of the impeachment process by `faction' would in the 
view of the Framers deny the process legitimacy.'' 16
    In the 24 years that I have had the honor of serving as a United 
States Senator, there have been three impeachments, all of Federal 
judges. Questions have been raised about how our actions as a body and 
as individual Members in those prior judicial impeachments should serve 
as precedent for this impeachment trial. I will address the significant 
and dispositive factual differences between these trials later, but 
want to stress another significant difference: Those three judicial 
impeachments were, from beginning to end, handled in a bipartisan 
fashion. In each case, the House of Representatives was unanimous, or 
nearly so, in voting to impeach and there was strong bipartisan support 
in the Senate to convict. Unfortunately, this was not the model 
followed in the impeachment proceedings against President Clinton.
    Second, the Committee skirted the important threshold question 
whether, as a matter of constitutional interpretation, the accusations 
set out in Mr. Starr's referral stated a sufficient basis to justify 
the President's impeachment and removal. Despite the concurrence of 
over 800 historians and constitutional scholars that no impeachable 
offenses had been alleged,17 the majority on the House 
Judiciary Committee never questioned Mr. Starr's initial judgment that 
the President had committed impeachable offenses. Had the Committee 
addressed itself to this issue at the start, a factual inquiry may have 
been unnecessary.
    Third, having avoided this threshold issue, the Committee then 
failed to conduct an independent fact-finding inquiry, as it was 
instructed to do by House Resolution 581. This resolution, adopted on 
October 8, 1998, directed the Committee ``to investigate fully and 
completely whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of 
Representatives'' to impeach the President. For making such 
investigation, the resolution authorized the Committee to issue 
subpoenas for the attendance and testimony of any person, to take 
depositions of potential witnesses, to require the production of 
documents and other things, and to issue interrogatories.
    House Resolution 581 was patterned from the resolution adopted by 
the House in February 1974, directing the Judiciary Committee to 
investigate President Nixon. That Committee spent almost five months 
gathering its own evidence and hearing testimony from multiple 
witnesses before debating and voting to adopt articles of 
impeachment.18
    By contrast, the House Judiciary Committee in 1998 relied entirely 
on the referral of Special Prosecutor Starr. The Committee called not a 
single witness with first-hand knowledge of the facts to testify about 
the matters contained in Mr. Starr's referral. The Committee instead 
relied on the one-sided testimony procured by Mr. Starr's lieutenants 
in the grand jury. Though this testimony was under oath, it certainly 
was not tested by cross-examination nor was the Special Prosecutor's 
office interested in any information that might have been exculpatory 
to the President.
    The most probative testimony by Ms. Lewinsky before the grand jury, 
for example, about no one asking her to lie or promising her a job, was 
elicited by a diligent grand juror. Yet another startling omission of 
exculpatory information from Mr. Starr's referral was only discovered 
during the Senate deposition of Ms. Lewinsky. She testified in response 
to Manager Bryant's inquiry about whether the President told her she 
should turn the gifts over to the Jones lawyers that she had previously 
told Mr. Starr's agents that the President saying, ``Well, you have to 
turn over whatever you have,'' sounded familiar to her.19
    Nevertheless, the House Judiciary Committee gave a standing ovation 
to this Special Prosecutor, who misconstrued his statutory role on 
advising the House and who failed the most basic of a prosecutor's 
duties to be fair and to disclose exculpatory information in his 
possession.
    Fourth and finally, the House Judiciary Committee minimized the 
constitutional role of the House in the impeachment process. The 
Committee erroneously relegated the House to the role of mere 
``accuser'', leaving to the Senate the heavier responsibility of 
determining whether the conduct at issue warranted removal of the 
President. Chairman Hyde said, on September 11, 1998, at the beginning 
of the House impeachment process, ``We are acting as a grand jury . . . 
we are operating as a grand jury.'' 20 This view persisted 
during the House floor debate on the Articles of Impeachment against 
President Clinton. Manager Buyer told his colleagues that the House 
served ``the grand jury function.'' 21 Yet another House 
Member said, ``the role of the House and our duty to the American 
people is to act simply as a grand jury in reference to the impeachment 
charges presented.'' 22 This erroneous view of the role of 
the House of Representatives in the impeachment process has persisted 
even in this trial, with one Manager telling us that the House of 
Representatives ``operates much more like a grand jury than a petit 
jury.'' 23
    Having incorrectly analogized its role to that of a grand jury, the 
House then applied a grand jury ``probable cause'' standard in 
reviewing the evidence. Manager Barr confirmed this mistake, stating, 
``the House performed admirably in essentially reaching the conclusion 
that there is probable cause to convict the President of perjury and 
obstruction of justice.'' 24 Manager Hyde likewise described 
the House as having ``a lower threshold . . . which is to seek a trial 
in the Senate.'' 25
    Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe warned House Republicans 
against misinterpreting and minimizing their constitutional impeachment 
role. He testified before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on the 
Constitution that, ``the fallacy is that this is not, despite the loose 
analogies that some invoke, not like a grand jury.'' 26 His 
warning went unheeded.
    Minimizing the House's role has had serious consequences. It 
explains why the majority in the House Judiciary Committee forfeited 
the opportunity and shirked its responsibility to conduct any 
independent examination of the facts. The House's constitutional 
responsibility for charging the President should not be misinterpreted 
to justify applying only a grand jury's ``probable cause'' standard of 
proof.
    It also amounted to giving the House a ``free vote'' since they 
could duck any responsibility for actually removing the President. On 
the contrary, House Members who vote to impeach should also be 
convinced this President has so abused the public trust and so 
threatens the public that he should be removed. Sending impeachment 
articles to the Senate means exactly what the articles say: That based 
on the evidence reviewed by the House, the President has committed acts 
warranting his conviction and removal.
    Even some Republican Members of the House who voted for impeachment 
admitted, belatedly, in a letter to the Senate Majority Leader that 
they did not mean it. They said they actually did not want this 
President removed and urged the Senate to consider 
censure.27
    In spite of what the House Managers believe, the impeachment 
process is not a ``cause.'' It should not be about partisan political 
pique or about sending a message. Rather, along with the power to 
declare war, it is one of the gravest constitutional responsibility of 
the Congress. This impeachment asks the question whether the conduct 
charged in the Articles of Impeachment passed by the House require the 
Senate to override the judgment of the American people and remove from 
office the person they elected to serve as President.
    That is what the impeachment process is all about--removal from 
office. It is the Constitution's fail-safe device. It is not to be 
undertaken lightly or without justification for it has serious 
consequences.
    We suffered a lengthy Senate impeachment trial because House 
Republicans misinterpreted their constitutional role. House Republican 
leaders mistakenly relegated the House to a limited role, depreciated 
the function of impeachment and expressly left to the Senate 
responsibility for reviewing the charges and determining whether the 
charges warrant the President's removal from office. Articles of 
Impeachment are simply not an appropriate vehicle for the expression of 
political disapproval to be punted by a partisan vote in the House to 
the Senate for some face-saving compromise verdict.
    Not surprisingly, given their misinterpretation of their own role, 
the first ruling that the Chief Justice was called upon to make in this 
trial was to correct the Managers' mischaracterization of the role of 
the Senate. The Chief Justice sustained Senator Harkin's objection and 
corrected the Managers, stating, ``the Senate is not simply a jury; it 
is a court in this case. Therefore counsel should refrain from 
referring to the Senators as jurors.'' 28
D. Vote by the House of Representatives
    Proceedings in the full House were themselves a sorry spectacle. On 
December 19, 1998, a lame duck session of the House of Representatives 
approved two Articles of Impeachment against President Clinton on the 
slimmest of partisan margins.
            1. Lame Duck House
    The two Articles of Impeachment now before the Senate were decided 
by the votes of a handful of Members who were defeated in the November 
election or are no longer serving. Article I passed with an 11-vote 
margin, which is the number of House Republicans replaced by Democrats 
in the new Congress due to election defeats and retirements. Article 
III (now Article II in the Senate) passed with only a 5-vote margin, 
which is the number of House Republicans who lost their reelections in 
November and were replaced by Democrats. There is no record of any 
prior impeachment reaching the Senate on so slim a margin.
    The House Republican leadership pressed an extreme, all-or-nothing 
action through a lame duck House without allowing an opportunity to 
vote on a censure or other alternative.
    Those who claim that censure is unconstitutional are just plain 
wrong. There is ample historical precedent for censure. Both the House 
and the Senate have adopted resolutions expressing disapproval of 
various individuals, including sitting Presidents. The Senate censured 
Andrew Jackson in 1834; the House censured James Buchanan in 1860. As 
early as 1800, with ``Founding Fathers'' then serving in Congress, the 
House debated a resolution to censure John Adams, though this 
resolution was ultimately rejected.
    Perhaps it should not be surprising that the final votes in the 
divisive speakership of Newt Gingrich set the Congress and the nation 
on this course. Mr. Starr's investigation has dragged on for five 
years, with no end in sight. The entire House impeachment inquiry 
lasted a short three months. Why the sudden push to bring this matter 
to the floor? There were at least five good reasons--the five seats 
that the Republicans had lost in the election--which might have altered 
the outcome on at least one Article of Impeachment. The sixth reason is 
also clear: Speaker Gingrich had said he was resigning from the House, 
and his seat would be vacant when the new House convened.
    An impeachment resolution supported by only one political party 
against a twice-elected incumbent of the opposing party is divisive and 
damaging for the country. During Watergate, constitutional scholar 
Charles L. Black, Jr., wrote that a close vote along party lines 
``would go to the Senate tainted, or at least suspicious, and would be 
unlikely to satisfy the country, because party motives would be 
suspected.'' 29 The impeachment of a President must be 
bipartisan. A partisan impeachment cannot command the respect of the 
American people. It is no more valid than a stolen election.
    House Republicans have permanently marked this President as 
impeached, but I do not believe that history will judge them kindly 
either. Instead, the manner in which these impeachment proceedings were 
conducted in the House Committee on the Judiciary and in the full House 
of Representatives will serve as a model of mistakes that should be 
avoided in the future.
            2. Rejected Charges
    In the end, the House did not approve the 11 articles recommended 
by Special Prosecutor Starr or the 15 articles of impeachment 
recommended by the Republican Committee staff. The House rejected 
outright two of the four articles reported along party lines by the 
House Judiciary Committee, and authorized Managers to exhibit only two 
Articles of Impeachment in the Senate. In considering these two 
Articles, the Senate has been forced to sort through what is left of 
the allegations against the President in light of the matters rejected 
by the House.
                          iii. secret evidence
    Before the vote, press reports indicated that wavering House 
Members were escorted by Republican House Judiciary Members to review 
certain ``secret evidence'' that the President's counsel had never been 
allowed to review or given an opportunity to rebut.
    That action was fundamentally unfair. A bedrock principle of our 
system of justice is that the prosecutor, not the accused, has the 
burden of proof. The accused is presumed innocent unless and until 
adequate proof of guilt is presented. Such proof may take many forms--
direct or circumstantial, testamentary or physical. But whatever form 
it takes, it must be introduced, admitted into evidence, and subject to 
examination and inspection before it may be considered by the fact 
finders.
    I note that in 1974, the House Judiciary Committee made available 
to President Nixon and his counsel all the documents and other material 
considered by the Committee, whether in executive or open 
session.30 In short, during the House Judiciary Committee's 
investigation of Watergate, there was no secret evidence and President 
Nixon and his counsel were allowed to see--fully and completely--every 
item of evidence in the possession of the House Judiciary Committee.
    As both a judge and juror in the Senate, I take seriously my 
responsibility to ensure that the Senate's consideration of these 
Articles of Impeachment is fair. Part of that fairness requires that 
the only evidence we consider relates to the Articles actually approved 
by the House--not what the House refused to charge and not matters that 
are not charged by the Articles of Impeachment. During the depositions 
authorized by the majority in the Senate, I and the other Presiding 
Officers from both parties stood firm on this principle and insisted 
that the Managers' questions remain focused on the subject matters 
already in the Senate record and on the Articles before us.
    Certain House Republicans suggested before this trial began that 
Senators should review the ``secret evidence'' as part of their 
deliberative processes. This suggestion was first advanced at about the 
time that the ``secret evidence'' began leaking to the press. From what 
I have read about it, it seems as flimsy as it is inflammatory, and 
completely irrelevant to any issue now before the Senate. Clearly, 
Senators should not allow themselves to be influenced by shady 
accusations and innuendo that would be excluded from any judicial 
proceeding in the land. Consideration of the Articles must be based on 
only one record--the trial record--and evidence that is not admitted at 
trial must play no part in our deliberations.
    I should note that the House Managers have selectively tried to 
keep secret certain unfavorable evidence elicited during the Senate 
trial. For example, they argued strenuously and successfully to 
subpoena witnesses for depositions and for permission to introduce 
parts of those depositions into evidence. The parts they introduced do 
not, as the Legal Times pointed out ``tell the whole story.'' 
31
    As one of the Presiding Officers at those depositions, I am well 
aware of the parts of those depositions intentionally omitted by the 
Managers. In fact, following their presentation of the evidence 
obtained from the depositions, I asked unanimous consent that the 
record be made complete and include Vernon Jordan's brief remarks at 
the end of his deposition, ``defending his own integrity.'' 
32 There is no question but that the Managers attacked and 
impugned Mr. Jordan's word and his integrity. Senator Boxer echoed this 
unanimous consent request at the conclusion of the Managers' rebuttal 
presentation.33 Due to Republican objections, however, 
neither request was accepted and, unfortunately, the Senate trial 
record does not contain that moving and important part of Mr. Jordan's 
deposition.
                 iv. the articles are unfairly drafted
    Close examination of the Articles exhibited by the Managers 
reflects the underlying unfairness in the impeachment proceedings in 
the House.
A. Article I is Defectively Vague
    Article I is drafted with such vague accusations, a significant 
question arises whether Senators can responsibly and constitutionally 
pass judgment on it.
    The notion that William Jefferson Clinton committed perjury before 
the Starr grand jury has been a legal conclusion in search of a basis 
for some time. In his referral to the House of Representatives, Special 
Prosecutor Starr urged only three allegations of possible perjury 
before the grand jury as grounds for seeking to remove the President. 
Article I merges those three allegations into one generalized 
allegation that President Clinton gave false testimony ``as to the 
nature and details of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.'' In 
addition, the House Judiciary Committee has joined three additional 
categories of allegedly false testimony, without specifying the 
allegedly perjurious statements. Those additional categories cover 
statements that the President made or allowed his attorney to make 
during the Jones case, in spite of the fact that a majority of the 
House of Representatives rejected such statements as a basis for a 
separate article of impeachment.
    Since the outset of the Senate trial, the charges of grand jury 
perjury have continued to be a moving target. In their initial Trial 
Brief, the Managers alluded to 26 instances of grand jury perjury. 
Manager Rogan spoke of 34 instances. In their Reply Brief, the Managers 
tallied up 48 instances of grand jury perjury.
    Yet, Article I does not identify a single statement before the 
grand jury that the House of Representatives alleges to have been 
perjurious, false and misleading. All the Senate is told in Article I 
is that the allegedly perjurious statements fall into ``one or more'' 
of four broad categories. This is wholly inconsistent with criminal law 
and Senate standards for identifying perjury.
    First, requiring the President to defend himself against such an 
unspecified charge is fundamentally unfair. Vague, generalized charges 
of perjury, such as the charge now before the Senate, would never hold 
up in a court of law. Under federal law, a perjury indictment must set 
forth the precise falsehood alleged and the factual basis of its 
falsity with sufficient clarity to permit a jury to determine its 
veracity.34 The Justice Department's manual for Federal 
prosecutors acknowledges this basic principle of law.35
    This is not just a technical matter of proper, lawyerly pleading. 
It is a matter of fundamental fairness and due process. As the 
respondent in this proceeding, the President has been denied the basic 
fairness of having clear notice of the specific charges against him and 
of knowing in advance of the trial precisely what the House of 
Representatives accuses him of having done that merits removing him 
from the office to which the people of the United States have twice 
elected him.
    Providing specificity in perjury articles has been the practice in 
past impeachments. Two prior impeachments before the Senate, both of 
Federal judges, involved perjury charges. In both instances, the House 
of Representatives identified each alleged falsehood in a separate 
Article of Impeachment. In the case of Judge Alcee Hastings, 14 of the 
Articles alleged that he had committed perjury with respect to a 
different specific statement. In the case of Judge Walter Nixon, two of 
the Articles alleged perjury, again, each with respect to a single 
discrete statement.
    This time, however, the House of Representatives chose to be 
unacceptably vague. Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee flatly 
refused to pin themselves down to specific statements in the resolution 
they drafted or in their Committee debate. In fact, the only change the 
House Judiciary Committee made to Article I had the effect of making it 
even more ambiguous and obscure: They amended it to allege that the 
President testified falsely as to ``one or more'' of the four 
categories, rather than all of them. By so doing, they have undermined 
the basic fairness of these proceedings.
    Second, the lack of specificity in Article I makes it impossible to 
know whether the requisite majority of the House of Representatives 
agreed that any specific statement was perjurious. To impeach President 
Clinton under Article I, House Members had only to find that he made 
one or more of an unspecified number of unspecified false statements, 
broadly categorized. Accordingly, it is impossible to know whether the 
House properly exercised its exclusive, constitutional power of 
impeachment.
    If there are 3, 4, 7, 34 or possibly 48 allegations of perjury, but 
only one vote by the House, how can the Senate be sure, how can the 
President be sure, and, most importantly, how can the American people 
be sure that a majority of the House agreed on any single allegation of 
perjury? Only a narrow majority of 228 members of the prior House of 
Representatives voted in favor of Article I. If as few as 11 members of 
that slim majority did not agree on which of the 3 to 48 perjury 
allegations were to be forwarded to the Senate, that Article did not 
have the support of a majority of the House and should not be 
considered by the Senate.
    Third, the lack of specificity makes any Senate vote for conviction 
on Article I similarly constitutionally suspect. If, as the Managers' 
Reply Brief indicates, there are 48 separate allegations of perjurious 
statements by the President before the grand jury, then as few as two 
Senators could believe any particular allegation of perjury had been 
established and the Senate as a whole could nonetheless convict and 
remove the President--so long as enough other pairs of Senators thought 
alternative allegations were established. This falls far short of the 
two-thirds of the Senate required to concur before a President is 
removed from office.
    The Managers ignore the grave constitutional questions raised by 
the vagueness of Article I presented to the House and now to the Senate 
for a vote. Instead they defend the fairness of this Article by 
asserting that if President Clinton had suffered from any lack of 
specificity, he could have filed a motion in the Senate for a bill of 
particulars.36 Just as the Managers had to be corrected by 
the Chief Justice about the role of the Senate, they also overestimate 
their power to detail the particulars of the conduct underlying Article 
I.
    The Constitution vests the sole power of impeachment in the House 
of Representatives, not in a handful of managers appointed by that 
body. Just as prosecutors may not save a defective indictment without 
usurping the constitutional role of the grand jury, these Managers may 
not save a defective bill of impeachment without usurping the 
constitutional role of the full House. Put another way, 13 Members may 
not take it upon themselves to guess what was in the minds of over 200 
Members of the 105th Congress when they voted to impeach the President. 
The full House must pass on any amendments to the Articles.
    That is how it has always been done. In 1933, for example, 
impeached judge Harold Louderback moved the Senate to require the House 
to make one of its articles ``more definite and certain.'' In that 
instance, the Managers wisely consented to the motion. An amendment to 
the articles was then approved by the full House and presented to the 
Senate.37
    Similarly, in the case of Judge Nixon, it was the House of 
Representatives that amended its articles in light of evidence 
presented during the Senate proceedings. That amendment was made to 
correct the text of one of the statements that the House alleged to be 
false.
    The Managers do not have the power to make the Article more 
specific, nor have they tried. Instead, they have exploited the 
vagueness in Article I by continuing to add to the litany of alleged 
falsehoods by the President. Any advantage gained by the House Managers 
by purposely crafting Article I in this vague fashion diminishes the 
fairness of the entire proceeding.
B. Both Articles Charge Multiple Offenses
    Both of the Articles before us allege that the President committed 
``one or more'' of a laundry list of misdeeds. In fact, as I already 
mentioned, Article I was specifically amended in Committee to use this 
``one or more'' formulation. Manager Rogan tried to spin this as ``a 
technical amendment only,'' 38 but it was obviously much 
more.
    With this amendment, Article I not only fails to identify a single 
allegedly perjurious statement, it fails even to identify a single 
broad category of statements. It lists four broad categories that could 
allude to virtually every word the President said before the grand jury 
and says, in effect, take your pick. If you think he said something, 
anything, that was not true, then vote to convict. Article II, which 
lumps together seven alleged acts of obstruction, does the same.
    Manager McCollum treated the decision Senators must make on Article 
I like a choice diners would make from a Chinese take-out menu: choose 
some from column A and, if you like, some from column B. He explained 
that Senators could vote to remove the President if ``you conclude he 
committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed--not every 
one of them necessarily, but certainly a good quantity, and there are a 
whole bunch of them that have been charged.'' 39
    The Senate has made clear that it expects precision in articles of 
impeachment. In the last two impeachments, of Judges Hastings and 
Nixon, the House tacked on an omnibus or ``catchall'' charge that 
included all the others. I and other Senators expressed concern with 
this blunderbuss approach. During the Hastings proceedings, I 
specifically asked whether the catchall Article could be interpreted as 
requiring a finding of guilt as to all the allegations in order to 
convict. By asking the question, I hoped to avoid the constitutional 
problem that I just described, of conviction based on less than a two-
thirds vote. The Presiding Officer ruled that a Senator would be within 
his right to interpret the Article as I proposed, but expressed the 
view that a Senator could vote guilty based on any one of the alleged 
acts of misconduct.40 Ultimately, the Senate rejected the 
omnibus Articles against Judges Hastings and Nixon, while convicting 
them of more specific charges of perjury.
    Articles of impeachment that contain multiple allegations are 
troubling in several respects. First, they make it virtually impossible 
for the impeached person to prepare an adequate defense. Second, they 
permit the House to impeach, and the Senate to convict, based on less 
than the majority or super majority vote required by the Constitution. 
Third, they allow individual Members to avoid accountability to the 
American people, who may never know exactly which charges their 
representatives regarded as proven and warranting removal from office.
    President Kennedy, in Profiles in Courage, described the omnibus 
Article against President Andrew Johnson as a ``deliberately obscure 
conglomeration of all the charges in the preceding Articles, which had 
been designed . . . to furnish a common ground for those who favored 
conviction but were unwilling to identify themselves on the basic 
issues.'' 41 The House Managers in the Johnson case called 
for the first vote to be on that deliberately obscure Article because 
it was thought to be the easiest way to get a conviction. Today's 
Managers are hoping that this tactic works better in 1999 than it did 
in 1868, when President Johnson was acquitted.
    But impeachment is not a shell game. Deliberate obfuscation 
trivializes what should be a grave and solemn process.
    In 1989, after the Senate rejected the omnibus Article against 
Judge Nixon, then Minority Leader Bob Dole and others urged the House 
to stop bunching up its allegations and, from there on out, to charge 
each act of wrongdoing in a separate article.42 The House 
has unfortunately chosen to ignore this plea in this matter of historic 
importance, contrary to fundamental notions of fairness, proper notice, 
and justice.
                          v. the senate's duty
    The Senate does not sit as an impeachment court in a vacuum. The 
fairness of the process by which the Articles reached the Senate, and 
the specificity and care with which the Articles are drafted to 
identify the charges fairly to the respondent, are significant 
considerations in deciding whether to vote for conviction or acquittal. 
Senators are not merely serving as petit jurors who will be instructed 
on the law by a judge and are asked to find facts. Senators have a 
greater role and a greater responsibility in this trial. The Senate is 
the court in this case, as the Chief Justice properly observed. Our job 
is to do justice and be fair in this matter and to protect the 
Constitution.
    In casting our final votes on the Articles the Senate should be 
clear about the questions that our votes answer and equally clear about 
the questions not before us. The question is not whether Bill Clinton 
has suffered, for surely he has as a result of his conduct, nor whether 
he has suffered enough. The question is not even whether Bill Clinton 
should be punished and sent to jail on a criminal charge, for the 
Constitution does not confer that authority on this court of 
impeachment.
    This vote only and necessarily requires addressing the following 
questions: has the conduct charged in each Article been proven to my 
satisfaction; and, if so, does the charged conduct amount to a high 
crime or high misdemeanor warranting the President's conviction and 
removal from the office to which he was elected by the American people 
in 1996. I will address each of these questions in turn.
A. Standard of Proof
    In this impeachment trial, the President starts out with fewer 
rights than any criminal defendant in any court in this country. He 
starts out with no clear rules of evidence, conviction based on a mere 
two-thirds vote, rather than a unanimous verdict required for any 
criminal conviction, and no higher court of appeal. This makes the 
obligation imposed by our oath to make this process fair and impartial 
that much more important.
    Fulfilling our duty in the impeachment trial involves evaluating 
the evidence presented by the Managers and the President to determine 
whether the allegations have been proven. Juries in legal cases are 
asked to evaluate evidence presented according to a specific ``standard 
of proof.'' The Constitution is silent on the standard of proof to be 
applied in impeachment trials, and the Senate has refused to bind 
itself to a single standard for all impeachments. As a result, each 
Senator may follow the burden of proof he or she believes is 
appropriate to determine whether the House's charges have been 
adequately proven.
    The fact that each Senator may evaluate the evidence under any 
standard of proof of their choice presents a remarkable challenge to 
the Managers and to the President's counsel. One commentator has noted 
that, ``this practice can often work . . . to the disadvantage of all 
the participants in an impeachment trial by precluding them from 
knowing in advance what standard the Senate will actually apply.'' 
43
    The standard of proof in criminal proceedings is ``beyond a 
reasonable doubt'' and in civil proceedings is generally ``a 
preponderance of the evidence.'' An impeachment trial is neither a 
civil or criminal proceeding, leading some commentators to suggest that 
``a hybrid of the criminal and civil burdens of proof may be desirable. 
. . . Too lenient a proof standard would allow the Senate to impose the 
serious punishments for impeachment ``even though substantial doubt of 
guilt remained.'' Too rigid a standard might allow an official to 
remain in office even though the entire Senate was convinced he or she 
had committed an impeachable offense.'' 44
    The fact that the Senate has adopted no uniform standard of proof 
for each Member to follow is not for lack of attention. The Senate 
considered the standard of proof question when impeachment proceedings 
against President Nixon were contemplated, but adopted none. 
Thereafter, a member of the Watergate impeachment inquiry staff, now a 
professor of law, concluded that the standard of proof in impeachment 
trials will vary with the seriousness of the charges:
    ``If a president were charged with conduct amounting to treason, 
for example, it seems highly unlikely that a senator would insist on 
proof of treason beyond a reasonable doubt before he would vote for the 
president's removal from office. . . . On the other hand, a greater 
quantum of proof might be required for less flagrant wrongdoing.'' 
45
    More recently, in 1986, Judge Harry Claiborne moved to establish 
``beyond a reasonable doubt'' as the standard of proof at his 
impeachment trial. The Senate rejected that motion by a 17 to 75 vote. 
I joined those Members voting against adoption of a uniform standard of 
proof because I believe, as the Presiding Officer made clear at the 
time, that in fulfilling his or her oath each Senator is free to apply 
any standard of proof, including reasonable doubt.
    The charges here stem from alleged efforts by the President to 
conceal a personal inappropriate relationship. While the relationship 
itself may be fair game for public rebuke and censure, only when 
questions were raised about whether his conduct crossed the line into 
criminal activity did this matter become the subject of an impeachment 
inquiry. Indeed, Manager McCollum argued that the President must not be 
convicted and removed from office except upon a finding that he 
committed a crime.46 Fairness dictates that we use the 
exacting standard of proof that is used--and that is constitutionally 
mandated--in criminal trials.
    I note that Majority Leader Trent Lott reached the same conclusion 
25 years ago, as a young Member of the House Judiciary Committee 
considering articles of impeachment against President Nixon. He joined 
other Republican Members in writing:
    ``Because of the fundamental similarity between an impeachment 
trial and an ordinary criminal trial . . . the standard of proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt is appropriate in both proceedings. Moreover, the 
gravity of an impeachment trial and its potentially drastic 
consequences are additional reasons for requiring a rigorous standard 
of proof. This is especially true in the case of a presidential 
impeachment. . . . The removal of a President by impeachment in mid-
term . . . should not be too easy of accomplishment, for it contravenes 
the will of the electorate. In providing for a fixed four-year term, 
not subject to interim votes of No Confidence, the Framers indicated 
their preference for stability in the executive. That stability should 
not be jeopardized except on the strongest possible proof of 
presidential wrongdoing.'' 47
    Were the President accused of treason or serious public corruption, 
the best interests of the Nation might well demand a somewhat lower 
standard. He is not, however, accused of such crimes. We hundred 
Senators are stand-ins for over a quarter billion Americans. President 
Clinton has been twice elected to his office, and we should only undo 
that choice based on the charges before us on proof tested against the 
highest standard. Under the circumstances, in evaluating the evidence 
that could result in the impeachment and removal of the President of 
the United States, I will use the highest standard of proof used in any 
court of law in this country, that is, proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
B. The Charges Have Not Been Proven
    I do not believe that the Managers proved their case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. To reach their conclusions, they had to tease 
inculpatory inferences from exculpatory evidence and generally view the 
record in the most sinister light possible. Having taken an oath to do 
impartial justice, my vote must be based on the evidence in the record, 
not on speculation and surmise.
            1. Article I
    The record does not come close to supporting the allegations in 
Article I. Perjury is a complex charge, requiring more than just lying 
or even lying under oath. To constitute perjury, a lie must be both 
material and willful. Lying under oath about trivial or inconsequential 
matters, even if willful, is not a crime. Lying under oath as a result 
of confusion, mistake or faulty memory, even if about material matters, 
is also not a crime. In addition, there is no crime of perjury where a 
witness's answers are literally true, even if unresponsive, misleading 
or false by negative implication.
    The American people saw President Clinton's grand jury testimony 
when the videotape was made public by the House Judiciary Committee. We 
saw him admit that:
    He had engaged in wrongful conduct;
    He had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky on numerous occasions;
    His inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky lasted over a two-
year period;
    Many of their encounters involved inappropriate intimate contact; 
and
    He had given her a number of gifts.
    Given these admissions, the Managers had a heavy burden to prove 
that the President testified falsely about any material matter.
    Perhaps for this reason, the Managers repackaged the three alleged 
falsehoods identified by the Special Prosecutor in their Senate 
presentation. In their Reply Brief, the Managers claimed that the 
President perjured himself no less than 48 times during his grand jury 
appearance. They hoped that the sheer number of allegations would 
overcome the essential triviality of each individual charge. It does 
not.
    In this regard, the most remarkable charge leveled by the Managers 
is that the President's prepared statement, in which he made his many 
admissions, was itself perjurious. The President said that his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky ``began as a friendship''; Ms. Lewinsky 
disagreed, although she allowed for the possibility that the President 
had a different perception of how the relationship had 
evolved.48 The President said that the inappropriate 
intimate contacts occurred in early 1996 and 1997; Ms. Lewinsky claimed 
the contacts began on November 15, 1995. The President described being 
alone with Ms. Lewinsky only on ``certain occasions,'' and described 
their telephone conversations as ``occasional''; there is nothing in 
the record to the contrary. Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky used the same term to 
describe these events, since a few dozen meetings or telephone 
conversations over a two-year period may appropriately be described as 
``occasional''.
    Such allegations trivialize the serious business in which we are 
now engaged. Can anyone really believe that the President should be 
removed from office because of a six-week discrepancy as to when his 
admittedly inappropriate affair began? Or because of general statements 
that are allegedly contrary to specific numbers? Or because he did not 
inform the grand jury that the relationship began with a crude sexual 
overture by Ms. Lewinsky, as she herself was compelled to describe in 
humiliating detail, at the whim of the Special Prosecutor's inquisitors 
and for no legitimate investigatory purpose?
    Another set of statements that the Managers consider perjurious 
relate to the President's state of mind. The Managers claim, without 
support, that the President did not genuinely believe, for example, 
that Ms. Lewinsky could file a truthful affidavit that might relieve 
her of having to testify in the Jones case. Such unsupported 
speculation about what was in the President's mind is not, as the 
President's counsel stated, ``the stuff or fuel of a perjury 
prosecution.'' 49
    Asked to identify which of the President's statements were of 
particular importance to the perjury charge, Manager Rogan pointed to 
the President's explanations for his attorney Robert Bennett's 
statement, during the Jones deposition, that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit 
showed there ``is'' no sex of any kind. Never mind that, in general, a 
person cannot be held criminally liable for false statements or 
representations by the person's counsel to a judge or 
magistrate.50
    Manager Rogan first took issue with the President's argument that 
the statement at issue was technically accurate because his intimate 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky had been over for many months. While the 
President has been derided for legal hairsplitting over ``what the 
meaning of `is' is,'' no amount of derision can transform this sort of 
argumentative testimony into a perjurious statement.
    The President also testified that he had not paid much attention to 
what his attorney was saying and, indeed, did not focus on it until 
months after the deposition, when he read the transcript in preparation 
for his grand jury appearance. The Managers assert that the President 
was paying attention, and they base this on the President's blank stare 
at the time in question. How can we possibly know, from that, what was 
going on in his mind?
    Appreciating the weakness of their assertion, the Managers obtained 
an affidavit from Barry W. Ward, law clerk to the presiding judge in 
the Jones suit, and submitted it with their motion to expand the 
record. Mr. Ward's affidavit states that when he attended the 
deposition of President Clinton in that case, he ``observed President 
Clinton looking directly at Mr. Bennett while this statement was being 
made.'' The Managers used this statement to argue in their motion 
brief, at p. 21, that ``Mr. Ward's declaration proves that Mr. Ward saw 
President Clinton listening attentively while the exchange between Mr. 
Bennett and the presiding Judge occurred.'' According to a Legal Times 
report on February 1, 1999, Mr. Ward ``vigorously disputes that 
interpretation.'' Contrary to the Managers' assertion, Mr. Ward stated 
in a subsequent interview that, ``I have no idea if he was paying 
attention. He could have been thinking about policy initiatives, for 
all I know.'' 51
    The only explanation for the misleading characterization of Mr. 
Ward's affidavit in the Managers' motion brief is the same one offered 
by Senator Bumpers to explain yet another unsupported inference 
asserted by the Managers. He said, ``I am a trial lawyer and I will 
tell you what it is: it is wanting to win too badly.'' 52
    As a former prosecutor, one of the questions I have asked myself is 
whether, based on these facts, criminal charges of perjury or 
obstruction of justice would have been brought against any person other 
than the President of the United States. If William Jefferson Clinton 
were Billy Blythe or Bill Jones, would any prosecutor in the country 
have successfully brought such charges? Experienced prosecutors, 
Republican and Democratic, testified before the House Judiciary 
Committee that no prosecutor would have proceeded based on the record 
compiled by Mr. Starr. I agree and note that during the course of these 
Senate proceedings, the case has only gotten weaker.
            2. Article II
    The same is true of Article II, which charges the President with 
obstruction of justice. The Managers repeatedly urged Senators to look 
at ``the big picture,'' view the evidence as a whole, and not to get 
``hung up'' on the details. This is lawyer-speak for, ``my case does 
withstand scrutiny.''
    To begin with, the principal witnesses to the President's alleged 
scheme to obstruct justice testified that there was no such scheme. 
Monica Lewinsky has clearly and consistently maintained that no one 
ever asked or encouraged her to lie, and that she was never promised a 
job for her silence. Betty Currie, the President's secretary, and 
Vernon Jordan, a distinguished attorney, also exonerated the President 
of any wrongdoing or any conspiracy with them to obstruct justice. For 
example, Ms. Currie testified that the President did not ask her on 
December 28, 1997, or at any time, to obtain and hide gifts he had 
given Ms. Lewinsky, and Mr. Jordan testified that his involvement in 
Ms. Lewinsky's job search was unrelated to any participation by Ms. 
Lewinsky in the now-settled Jones case. The Managers argue that such 
exculpatory testimony ``may well take on a sinister, or even criminal 
connotation when observed in the context of the whole plot,'' 
53 but I fail to see why exculpatory testimony cannot be 
viewed for what it is: exculpatory.
    The Managers do their best to transmogrify other exculpatory 
testimony into evidence of criminality. For example, Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that the President declined to review her affidavit before 
she signed it and did not discuss the content of the affidavit with her 
``at all, ever.'' 54 Manager Rogan cited this as evidence of 
obstruction on the theory that the President would have reviewed the 
affidavit if he really believed it could be truthful. In case we 
rejected this theory, Manager McCollum speculated that the President 
had reviewed 15 prior drafts of the affidavit--speculation at odds with 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she did not show the President her 
affidavit in final or draft form. But neither Mr. Rogan's theory nor 
Mr. McCollum's speculation can overcome or obscure the fundamentally 
exculpatory nature of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on this point. Indeed, 
if the President had reviewed or discussed Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, 
the Managers would doubtless have trumpeted the incident as proof 
positive of obstruction.
    Unable to conjure inculpatory evidence out of the President's 
refusal to review Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, the Managers invited the 
Senate to infer guilt from the ``fact'' that it was the President, not 
Ms. Lewinsky, who benefitted from the filing of her affidavit. Manager 
Bryant went further, arguing that Ms. Lewinsky ``had no motivation, no 
reason whatsoever'' to want to avoid testifying in the Jones 
case.55 But when Manager Bryant questioned Ms. Lewinsky on 
this point, she corrected him:
    ``Q. [Y]ou didn't file the affidavit for your best interest, did 
you?
    A. Uh, actually, I did.
    Q. To avoid testifying.
    A. Yes.'' 56
    This testimony should have come as no surprise, since most people 
would want to avoid the time, expense, and embarrassment of being 
dragged into a civil lawsuit to testify about their private affairs. 
Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky had already made clear that she had sought to 
conceal her relationship with the President in a vain attempt to avoid 
being ``humiliated in front of the entire world.'' 57 On her 
own initiative, she devised code names for use when communicating with 
the President's secretary 58; deleted correspondence from 
her computer and urged Linda Tripp to do the same 59; and 
composed false and misleading ``talking points'' for Ms. Tripp to use 
in the Jones case. In fact, Ms. Lewinsky was admittedly ``so 
desperate'' for Linda Tripp not to reveal anything about the 
relationship that she ``used anything and anybody that [she] could 
think of as leverage with her.'' 60
    Equally unavailing was the Managers' insistence that the President 
must have known Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit would be false because no 
truthful affidavit could have saved her from having to testify. Both 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky testified that, in their view, it was 
possible to craft a truthful affidavit that might have accomplished 
this objective. The Managers have never explained why we should not 
credit this unrebutted testimony.
    The Managers have stretched the facts in other ways as well, most 
notably with respect to the timing of Ms. Lewinsky's job search. In 
their Trial Brief, in their opening presentations, and in their charts, 
the Managers posited that Mr. Jordan intensified his efforts to find 
Ms. Lewinsky a job on December 11, 1997, only after, and because, the 
judge in the Jones case ordered the President to answer far-ranging 
questions about other women. The same theory appeared at page 11 of the 
Majority Report prepared for the House of Representatives.
    The President's counsel, in their opening presentations to the 
Senate, made clear beyond any doubt that Mr. Jordan met with Ms. 
Lewinsky before the judge issued her ruling, and that the meeting had 
been scheduled several days before that. Without acknowledging their 
error, the Managers retreated to the argument that Mr. Jordan's 
assistance on December 11 was triggered not by Judge Wright's order, 
but rather by the appearance of Ms. Lewinsky's name on the witness list 
six days earlier. But the Managers themselves refuted this argument in 
their Trial Brief, which states that there was ``still no urgency to 
help Ms. Lewinsky'' after the witness list arrived on December 5. 
61 Moreover, although Manager Hutchinson later insinuated 
that Mr. Jordan and the President discussed Ms. Lewinsky's job search 
during their meeting on December 7, 62 the Managers' Trial 
Brief acknowledges that the December 7 meeting was ``unrelated'' to Ms. 
Lewinsky. 63
    More generally, the Managers failed to show any connection between 
Ms. Lewinsky's status as an affiant and possible deponent in the Jones 
case and her New York job search. Every witness to testify on this 
point, including the President, Ms. Lewinsky, and Mr. Jordan, agreed 
that those events were unrelated. Beyond this, the record is clear that 
Ms. Lewinsky first mentioned the possibility of moving to New York in 
early July 1997; that people other than Mr. Jordan tried to help Ms. 
Lewinsky get a job at the United Nations in early October 1997; and 
that Ms. Lewinsky notified her employer that she would be leaving her 
job and moving to New York in November 1997--all well before her name 
surfaced on the Jones witness list.
    The Managers have also stretched and distorted the evidence 
regarding the box of gifts that Ms. Currie retrieved from Ms. Lewinsky 
on or about December 28, 1997. The Managers have argued that the Senate 
``may reasonably presume'' that Ms. Currie retrieved the gifts, which 
had been subpoenaed by the Jones attorneys, at the behest of the 
President. 64 In making this argument, the Managers ask us 
to disregard Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that it was her idea to give the 
gifts to Ms. Currie; the President's testimony that he never told Ms. 
Currie to retrieve the gifts; Ms. Currie's testimony that it was Ms. 
Lewinsky, not the President, who asked her to retrieve the gifts; and 
the fact that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on the 
very morning that he is alleged to have asked for them back. They also 
ask us to ignore Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that she decided on her own 
to protect her own privacy by turning over only ``innocuous'' gifts to 
the Jones lawyers. 65 Finally, they ask us to ignore 
exculpatory information concealed by Mr. Starr and revealed to the 
Senate for the first time in Ms. Lewinsky's deposition that the 
President's statement, ``Well, you have to turn over whatever you 
have,'' sounded familiar to her.
    The Managers have made much of a conversation between Ms. Lewinsky 
and Mr. Jordan on December 31, 1997, that touched upon certain notes, 
or possibly drafts of notes, Ms. Lewinsky wrote to the President. 
According to Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan suggested ``something th[e] 
effect'' of, ``check to make sure they are not there,'' which Ms. 
Lewinsky interpreted to mean, ``get rid of whatever is there.'' 
66 Mr. Jordan recalled having discussed the notes with Ms. 
Lewinsky, but denied having told her to destroy them. Did Ms. Lewinsky 
misunderstand Mr. Jordan, or is one witness lying? The Senate need not 
decide, since by either account, the President was not a party to any 
conversation about notes and, indeed, neither the notes nor the 
December 31 conversation between Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan are 
mentioned in the two Articles of Impeachment approved by the House.
    Perhaps the longest stretch by the Managers is their theory 
regarding presidential aides Sidney Blumenthal, John Podesta, and Bruce 
Lindsey. It simply cannot be that the target of a grand jury 
investigation obstructs justice by making false or misleading denials 
of wrongdoing in personal conversations with friends and colleagues, 
even if he knows that they may be compelled to testify about those 
conversations. Indeed, until recently, most federal courts held that 
false denials of wrongdoing--even when made under oath or to a federal 
agent--could not be a basis for criminal liability.
    The Managers have focused particular attention on the President's 
conversation with Sidney Blumenthal on January 21, 1998, the day the 
Lewinsky scandal erupted. According to Mr. Blumenthal, the President 
said that Ms. Lewinsky had told him that she was called ``the stalker'' 
by her peers, and that she would claim they had an affair because then 
she would not be known as ``the stalker'' any more. Curiously, Ms. 
Lewinsky herself, in the now-famous ``talking points'' she prepared 
before her relationship with the President became public, encouraged 
Ms. Tripp to defuse questions about Ms. Lewinsky by saying, ``[S]he 
turned out to be this huge liar. I found out she left the W[hite] 
H[ouse] because she was stalking the P[resident] or something like 
that.'' 67 Ms. Lewinsky acknowledged in her original proffer 
to Mr. Starr that she was well aware of her reputation at the White 
House and sought a detail from the Pentagon ``so people could see Ms. 
L[ewinsky]'s good work and stop referring to her as `The Stalker.' '' 
68 Regardless, we can all agree that if the President tried 
to conceal his own misconduct by maligning Ms. Lewinsky, he acted 
shamefully. But this is a far cry from acting criminally.
    The Managers asked us to look at the ``big picture''. The ``big 
picture'' with respect to Ms. Lewinsky is that she had no intention of 
revealing her relationship with the President, regardless of whether he 
helped her find a new job; she acted independently and in her own best 
interests in filing her affidavit in the Jones case; she originated and 
carried out her plan to hide evidence from the Jones lawyers; and Linda 
Tripp rather than Bill Clinton was her principal advisor and ultimate 
betrayer. In fact, the only crimes shown to have possibly occurred are 
not high crimes but those for which Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Tripp have 
received immunity from prosecution from Mr. Starr.
    What remains when you sweep aside the cobwebs of unsupported 
speculation and conspiracy theory? To my mind, the case on obstruction 
boils down to the charge that the President, in the wake of his 
deposition in the Jones case, ``coached'' his secretary about what to 
say if asked about Ms. Lewinsky. The President has argued that Ms. 
Currie was not then a witness in the Jones case and was not likely to 
be one given the approaching deadline for completing discovery. 
Moreover, he did not know that Mr. Starr had initiated an 
investigation. In fact, once he learned that Mr. Starr was 
investigating and that Ms. Currie might be a witness, the President 
told Ms. Currie, ``Don't worry about me. Just relax, go in there and 
tell the truth.'' 69
    I was seriously troubled by the President's counsel's initial 
suggestion that Ms. Currie was never subpoenaed in the Jones case. 
Still, Mr. Ruff's candid correction and apology to the Senate stands in 
stark contrast to the Managers' refusal to correct their own misleading 
representations.
    In the end, reasonable minds may differ over why the President 
spoke to Ms. Currie as he did in mid-January 1998. His explanation--
that he was ``trying to think of the best defense we could construct in 
the face of what I thought was going to be a media onslaught'' 
70--is not implausible. Using a trusted employee as a 
sounding board to test responses that might later be made public is 
also not implausible nor criminal. The President also had a legitimate 
interest in determining whether Ms. Currie was the source of the Jones 
lawyers' apparent knowledge regarding Ms. Lewinsky. In the end, in 
light of the plausible and innocent explanations for these 
conversations, I do not accept as proven beyond a reasonable doubt the 
Managers' conclusion that they were criminal ``coaching'' sessions. I 
cannot vote to overturn a national election based on the ambiguous 
record of this discrete episode.
    Back on March 8th of last year, one of my Republican colleagues on 
the Judiciary Committee stated his view that no impeachment proceeding 
should be brought unless there was ``an open-and-shut case'' because 
``Americans cannot stand the trauma of an impeachment matter unless it 
is cut-and-dried.'' 71 Even more clearly, the country cannot 
tolerate a President's being removed from office based on the shifting 
patchwork of circumstantial evidence and surmise that the Managers have 
concocted.
C. There Was No Need to Call Witnesses
    Witnesses would not fill the holes in the Managers' case.
    The Managers only became interested in hearing from witnesses once 
they faced trouble obtaining a conviction in the Senate. They had an 
opportunity to interview witnesses when this matter was still before 
the House. But the House Judiciary Committee called no fact witnesses. 
The House of Representatives called no witnesses at all. Rather, the 
House Republicans voted out these Articles based on what they were told 
by Special Prosecutor Starr.
    They took the position that witnesses were not necessary. For 
example, in November 1998, Manager Gekas stated that ``[b]ringing in 
witnesses to rehash testimony that's already concretely in the record 
would be a waste of time and serve no purpose at all.'' 72 
Similarly, on December 19, 1998, during the floor debate on the 
articles, Manager Hyde stated:
    ``No fact witnesses, I have heard that repeated again and again. 
Look, we had 60,000 pages of testimony from the grand jury, from 
depositions, from statements under oath. That is testimony that we can 
believe and accept. We chose to believe it and accept it. Why 
reinterview Betty Currie to take another statement when we already had 
her statement? Why interview Monica Lewinsky when we had her statement 
under oath, and with a grant of immunity that if she lied she would 
forfeit?'' 73
    Having chosen to proceed in the House without witnesses, the 
Managers were in no position to demand that the Senate hear witnesses. 
A Senate impeachment trial is not a make-up exam for an incomplete 
inquiry by the House.
    In attempting to explain his inconsistent positions on witnesses, 
Manager Hyde said, ``we were operating under time constraints which 
were self-imposed but I promised my colleagues to finish it before the 
end of the year. I didn't want it to drag out.'' 74 But 
self-imposed time constraints do not begin to explain why Mr. Hyde's 
Committee declined to call a single fact witness. The Committee did 
hold two day-long hearings. It heard from a panel of convicted felons 
who testified, to nobody's surprise, that perjury is a crime. And it 
heard from the prosecutor, Kenneth Starr, who had no first-hand 
knowledge of any facts in the case, and had not even spoken with anyone 
who had. Those two days could have been spent hearing fact witnesses 
and surely they would have been, if the Committee majority thought for 
one moment that fact witnesses would have any new and incriminating 
evidence to share.
    Mr. Hyde's second justification for failing to call witnesses in 
the House was grounded in his mistaken view of that body's role in the 
impeachment process. According to Mr. Hyde, ``[t]he threshold in the 
House was for impeachment, which is to seek a trial in the Senate. . . 
. All we could do was present evidence sufficient to convince our 
colleagues that there ought to be a trial over here in the Senate.'' 
75 I have already explained the fallacy of this position. 
When these Articles of Impeachment fail, as I believe they must, I hope 
it will send a clear message to the House of Representatives not to do 
a slapdash, partisan job on something as momentous and wrenching for 
the nation as a presidential impeachment.
    Contrary to the suggestions of some Managers, there is no authority 
for the notion that the Senate must hear witnesses. It is true, as one 
Manager noted, that the Senate heard witnesses during the impeachment 
trial of President Johnson, notwithstanding the House's failure to do 
so. As most historians agree, however, the Johnson impeachment was an 
illegitimate attempt by the Reconstruction Republicans to unseat a 
President whose policies they disliked. It was hardly a model of 
procedural correctness.
    More recently, in the 1980's, the Senate removed three impeached 
federal judges without hearing any witnesses on the Senate floor. 
Indeed, in the impeachment trial of Judge Claiborne in 1986, a majority 
of the Senate approved a motion by then-Majority Leader Dole not to 
hear any live testimony. Instead, in each case, the Senate reviewed a 
written record of testimony prepared by a special committee of 
Senators. The Senate did this over the objections of the judges being 
removed.
    If the President is willing to forego the opportunity to cross-
examine the witnesses being relied upon by the Managers, that 
eliminates the most pressing need for further discovery in this matter. 
After all, Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie and other witness were interviewed 
multiple times by the Special Prosecutor's lawyers and investigators 
and then testified repeatedly before the grand jury. That is about as 
one sided as it gets--no cross examination, no opportunity to compare 
early statements with the way things are reconfigured and re-expressed 
after numerous preparation sessions with Mr. Starr's office.
    These witnesses testified under threat of prosecution by Mr. Starr. 
Ms. Lewinsky is still under a very clear threat of prosecution, even 
though she has a limited grant of immunity. This Special Prosecutor has 
shown every willingness to threaten and prosecute even those who have 
played minor, tangential roles in his investigations of the President, 
such as Julie Hiatt Steele, and those who have already been 
relentlessly pursued in serial prosecutions, such as Webster Hubbell 
and Susan McDougal.
    Thus, if the President has not initiated efforts to obtain more 
discovery and witnesses and is willing to have the matter decided on 
the current Senate record, the Managers carried a heavy burden to 
justify extending these proceedings further and requiring the 
reexamination of people who have already testified.
    During his opening remarks, Manager McCollum said, ``I don't know 
what the witnesses will say, but I assume if they are consistent, 
they'll say the same that's in here,'' 76 referring to the 
voluminous record before the Senate. Nevertheless, the majority in the 
Senate acceded to the Managers' request to conduct depositions, which 
only confirmed that subjecting the witnesses to further examination 
would not provide any new revelations.
    In fact, during the deposition of Ms. Lewinsky, Manager Bryant 
conceded, ``Obviously, you testified extensively in the grand jury, so 
you're going to obviously repeat things today. We're doing the 
depositions for the Senators to view.'' 77 Likewise, during 
Mr. Jordan's deposition, Manager Hutchinson acknowledged the witness's 
five prior grand jury appearances and conceded, ``I know that probably 
about every question that could be asked has been asked, but there are 
a number of reasons I want to go over additional questions with you, 
and some of them will be repetitious of what's been asked before.'' 
78
    There was no reason to protract this process further merely to hear 
more redundant testimony live on the floor of the Senate, in light of 
the President's agreement to forfeit this opportunity to examine the 
witnesses.
D. Removal Is Not Warranted
    The question each Senator must address is whether the conduct 
charged in the Articles meets the constitutional standard of high crime 
and misdemeanor warranting conviction and removal. The Managers, the 
President's counsel and, in particular, former Senator Dale Bumpers 
have provided us with erudite history lessons on the misconduct the 
Framers meant to cover by this standard.
    We have heard debate whether this standard covers only conduct 
performed in the President's public capacity or also covers private 
conduct. A strong case can be made that the Framers never intended that 
a President be subject to impeachment and removal for private conduct--
no matter how egregious. Instead, they purposely limited the ground for 
impeachment to offenses against the state or grave abuses of official 
power.
    But this argument presents the proverbial ``slippery slope.'' Does 
this mean that a President may not be removed for murder? The Framers 
may very well have responded ``no.'' In fact, during the impeachment 
trial of Chief Justice Samuel Chase, the presiding officer was then 
Vice-President Aaron Burr, who at the same time was under indictment in 
both New Jersey and New York for the murder of Alexander Hamilton in a 
duel in 1804. As Chief Justice Rehnquist notes in Grand Inquests, 
``This fact caused one contemporary wag to remark that whereas in most 
courts the murderer was arraigned before the judge, in this court the 
judge was arraigned before the murderer!'' 79 Nonetheless, 
Burr was not the subject of the impeachment trial, Chief Justice Chase 
was.
    No matter how the Framers would treat serious private misconduct, I 
do not hesitate to conclude that heinous crimes, such as murder, would 
warrant the remedy of removal. As Professor Charles Black explained:
    ``Many common crimes--willful murder, for example--though not 
subversive of government or political order, might be so serious as to 
make a president simply unviable as a national leader; I cannot think 
that a president who had committed murder could not be removed by 
impeachment. But the underlying reason remains much the same; such 
crimes would so stain a president as to make his continuance in office 
dangerous to public order.'' 80
    The House Judiciary Committee in 1974 summed up the thorny issue of 
how to evaluate the constitutional standard for impeachable and 
removable conduct as follows: ``Not all presidential misconduct is 
sufficient to constitute grounds for impeachment. There is a further 
requirement--substantiality.'' 81
    Professor Black also addressed the ``substantiality'' of the 
misconduct necessary to meet the constitutional standard for 
impeachment and removal, with the following illustration:
    ``Suppose a president transported a woman across a state line or 
even (so the Mann Act reads) from one point to another within the 
District of Columbia, for what is quaintly called an `immoral purpose.' 
Or suppose a president did not immediately report to the nearest 
policeman that he had discovered that one of his aides was a practicing 
homosexual--thereby committing `misprision of a felony.' Or suppose the 
president actively assisted a young White House intern in concealing 
the latter's possession of three ounces of marijuana--thus himself 
becoming guilty of `obstruction of justice.' . . . Would it not be 
preposterous to think that any of this is what the Framers meant when 
they referred to `Treason, Bribery, and other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors,' or that any sensible constitutional plan would make a 
president removable on such grounds?'' 82
    In my view, the charges that the President committed perjury and 
obstructed justice to conceal an illicit relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky not only fail as a matter of proof, but to the extent they 
raise legitimate questions about his conduct they fail the test of 
substantiality. As one Vermonter recently wrote to the editor of the 
Burlington Free Press, ``If there ever was a situation in which the 
phrase making a mountain out of a mole hill is apt, it is the 
impeachment trial to date.'' 83
    The Managers tried to address the criticism that the conduct 
underlying the Articles is so insubstantial as to leave the American 
public scratching their heads. Manager Canady conceded that no 
President ``should be impeached and removed from office for trivial or 
insubstantial offenses. . . . A President should not be impeached and 
removed from office for a mistake of judgment. He should not be 
impeached and removed from office for a momentary lapse.'' 
84 Similarly, Manager Graham acknowledged ``absolutely'' 
that reasonable people could disagree about whether the President 
should be removed, even were the charges proven. 85 Manager 
Graham further opined during questioning by Senators that:
    ``I would not want my President removed for any criminal 
wrongdoing. I would want my President removed only when there was a 
clear case that points to the right decision for the future of the 
country. . . . I would not want my President removed for trivial 
offenses, and that is the heart of the matter here.'' 86
    My decision on this matter should not be misinterpreted to mean 
that I countenance perjury or obstruction of justice, or that I do not 
appreciate the need for enforcement of our laws prohibiting such 
conduct for the functioning of our judicial system. If committed, these 
are serious crimes. Nevertheless, as Manager Graham recognized, 
reasonable people can and do disagree on the ultimate questions in this 
trial.
    I do not agree with the Managers that they have proven these crimes 
were committed or that the conduct at issue here is sufficiently 
heinous to warrant impeachment and removal of the President. Chairman 
Henry Hyde recognized that ``one hardly exhausts moral imagination by 
labeling every untruth and every deception an outrage.'' 87
    The American people understand this point instinctively. In my home 
State of Vermont, for instance, the majority of people are 
overwhelmingly opposed to the removal of this President from office. 
They were against it in August 1998, when the House posted Mr. Starr's 
salacious referral on the Internet. They were against it in November 
1998, when Mr. Starr appeared before the House Judiciary Committee to 
try to breath some life back into his case for impeachment. They were 
against it in December 1998, when the House Republicans made even 
shriller pitches for impeachment to the American people. And judging 
from the calls and mail I have received, Vermonters are more certain 
than ever that they want Bill Clinton to serve out his term.
    Of course, we must not be led by the polls. The Framers wanted 
impeachments to be tried in the Senate, not in the court of public 
opinion. This is not a referendum. Still, whether the evidence is 
sufficient to warrant the President's removal turns at least in part on 
whether it makes him unfit to govern, and on that question, the voice 
of the governed should be heard.
    The Managers have eloquently expressed their concern about the 
``kind of message'' it would send to America should the Senate refuse 
to convict and remove the President on the Articles. Chairman Hyde 
expressed his view that the message would be that ``charges of perjury, 
obstruction of justice are summarily dismissed--disregarded, ignored, 
brushed off'' and that there is a double standard for the President. 
88
    With all due respect for the Managers' belief on this score, I 
disagree. First, our assessment of whether the President's personal 
misconduct meets the constitutional standard for impeachment, 
conviction and removal should not be misconstrued to reflect our views 
on the seriousness of perjury or obstruction of justice. Professor 
Tribe, in his testimony last November before a House Judiciary 
subcommittee confronted this issue directly, stating:
    ``It is always possible to argue, when confronted by serious crime, 
that the system would crumble if everyone followed the wrongdoer's 
example. If everyone took President Richard Nixon's allegedly false 
filing of tax returns under oath, including backdating documents, as a 
model to emulate, the nation's tax system, and thus its defenses, would 
crumble. Yet there was no realistic basis to suppose that the Nixon 
example would start any such stampede, and the simple proposition that, 
if all did as Nixon had done, the consequences would be catastrophic 
did not mislead the House Judiciary Committee into treating the 
President's alleged tax evasion as an impeachable offense: By a vote of 
26-12, the Committee soundly declined to treat it as such.'' 
89
    Second, the Managers are also wrong that Senate acquittal of the 
President would essentially set-up a ``double-standard'' and put the 
President above the law. The Managers ignore the fact that the 
Constitution itself establishes a purposely high and difficult standard 
for the Senate to remove a duly elected head of a co-equal branch of 
government. In a court of law, not a Senate court of impeachment, the 
President, in his personal capacity, stands subject to the same 
standard as any American.
              vi. prior judicial impeachments for perjury
    Just ten years ago, the Senate voted to convict two Federal judges 
on charges of perjury. The Managers read those precedents to mean that 
perjury, if proved, is always an impeachable offense--that Presidents 
ought not be held to a lower standard of impeachability than judges. 
While the failure of proof in this case obviates the need to resolve 
the precedential effect, if any, that judicial impeachments may have on 
the impeachment of a President, the Managers' simplistic, ``one-size-
fits-all'' approach is unsound.
    Perjury is not included in the impeachment section of Article II of 
the Constitution, even though, as Manager Buyer noted, the Framers were 
familiar with the crime.90 Treason is the defining crime in 
the Constitution--it is a crime against and undermining the very 
existence of the Government. Bribery is also expressly included--no 
officer of the United States can continue if he is corrupted by 
accepting a bribe to do something other than faithfully execute his 
public duties. Perjury may, if proved, provide a basis for impeachment, 
but only if it is determined to be within ``other high Crimes or 
Misdemeanors.''
    In the recent judicial impeachments, the lies at issue were aimed 
at concealing gross abuses of official power. Judge Alcee Hastings lied 
to conceal his participation in a conspiracy to fix cases in his own 
court. Judge Walter Nixon lied to conceal his corrupt efforts to 
influence a state prosecutor to drop a case. Significantly, Judge Nixon 
had been convicted by a Federal jury and was serving a 5-year prison 
sentence at the time he was impeached and removed; he simply could not 
continue to function as a Federal judge and perform his duties.
    House Managers have also referred to the impeachment of a third 
judge, Judge Harry Claiborne, but he was impeached for filing a false 
tax return and not perjury per se. In any event, as with Judge Nixon, 
Judge Claiborne had been convicted after a jury trial and was serving a 
federal prison term when he was impeached.
    By contrast, President Clinton is not accused of lying to conceal 
public misconduct. He is accused of lying to conceal the ``nature and 
details'' of an extramarital affair--an affair that he admitted had 
occurred.
    Beyond this, there are very basic differences in terms and 
functions between Federal judges and the President. Judges are 
appointed for life. Presidents are elected for fixed terms and 
accountable in political terms. A President can be subject to review by 
the people if he runs for reelection. Moreover, removing an appointed 
Federal judge, while extremely serious, implicates none of the 
momentous, anti-democratic consequences of removing an elected 
President.
    Another difference between Federal judges and the President is 
that, under the Constitution, only the former ``hold their Offices 
during good Behaviour.'' 91 The proposition, however, that 
this clause creates a different constitutional standard for removal of 
judges than for removal of the President or other civil officers is 
dangerous. Such an interpretation would invite attacks on the 
independence of the federal judiciary and undermine the balance among 
the three co-equal branches of our federal government. Indeed, 
Alexander Hamilton opined in Federalist No. 79 that impeachment was the 
only provision for removal ``which we find in our own Constitution in 
respect to our own judges.''
    The past few years have seen unprecedented attacks on controversial 
decisions by Federal judges. Should such decisions be deemed 
malfeasance by the party in control of Congress, then impeachment 
proceedings against judges who render unpopular decisions could provide 
a platform for endless political posturing. More importantly, this 
would chill the independent operation of our Federal judiciary.
    As Professor Michael Gerhardt has explained, the good behavior 
clause does not mean that Federal judges may be impeached on the basis 
of a lower standard than the President, but it does suggest that they 
may be impeached ``on a basis that takes account of their special 
duties or functions.'' 92 A judge who lies under oath is 
uniquely unfit to continue in an office that requires him to administer 
oaths and sit in judgment. It is perfectly appropriate for the Senate 
when sitting as a court of impeachment to take into account the type of 
duties that the impeached official is called upon to perform and 
whether the charges, if proved, clearly impair the official's ability 
to perform those duties. The outcome of this analysis may very well 
differ depending on the job of the impeached official.
                  vii. ``findings of fact'' fallacies
    As the impeachment trial wore on, without any prospect of a 
conviction and removal, a popular Republican exit strategy was to force 
a preliminary vote on so-called ``findings of fact'' that the President 
committed perjury and obstructed justice, to be followed by a second 
vote on removal. I opposed this initiative because, in my view, it 
reflected a basic misunderstanding of the Senate's constitutional 
function when sitting as a court of impeachment.
    The Senate's constitutional role is to determine whether to convict 
the President of an impeachable offense and remove him from office. 
This is a unitary question, requiring a unitary answer. In recognition 
thereof, the Senate has rules prohibiting dividing articles of 
impeachment.
    A presidential impeachment trial is not an appropriate forum for 
``finding'' that a public official has committed a crime. Crime and 
punishment are issues expressly reserved by the Constitution to our 
criminal courts, where an accused is entitled to due process rights far 
in excess of the minimal procedural protections being accorded the 
President in the Senate trial. In the current case there are also 
additional complicating factors since the Senate made up its procedures 
as it went along and the specific charges against the President have 
constantly shifted.
    Impeachment is not about punishing the officeholder but about 
protecting the public. Senator George Edmunds of Vermont explained in 
1868 that ``[p]unishment by impeachment does not exist under our 
Constitution. . . . [The accused] can only be removed from the office 
he fills and prevented from holding office, not as punishment, but as a 
means merely of protection to the community. . . .'' 93 Our 
focus must be on whether the conduct with which the House has charged 
President Clinton has been proven and warrants his removal from office 
to protect the public.
    Branding the President is not the function of impeachment. On the 
contrary, a congressional finding of guilt for criminal conduct would 
be an illegitimate exercise in shaming the President and an abuse of 
the impeachment process in support of a future criminal prosecution, 
which recent leaks from prosecutor Starr's office confirm he is 
considering.
    A preliminary vote on guilt in the form of ``findings of fact'' 
would set the dangerous precedent that a Senate impeachment trial could 
be used for the purpose of criticizing conduct that the 
constitutionally-required number of Senators did not believe was 
impeachable. The last protection against impeachment by an opposing 
party with majority control of Congress would be eviscerated. This 
would trivialize the constitutional impeachment process and invite 
future illegitimate impeachments.
    ``Findings of fact'' that the President committed the acts charged 
in the Articles would be tantamount to conviction on the impeachment 
Articles themselves and more accurately described as ``findings of 
guilt'' without the remedy prescribed by the Constitution. As a matter 
of constitutional law and Senate practice, such ``findings'' cannot and 
should not be separated from the vote on removal. Article II, section 4 
of the Constitution provides that, upon conviction by the Senate, the 
President ``shall be removed from Office.'' By making removal mandatory 
upon conviction, the Constitution precludes the Senate from taking the 
politically-expedient, oxymoronic route of convicting without removing.
    Proponents of the Republican proposals pointed to eighteenth 
century precedents long ago repudiated. In the first three judicial 
impeachment trials that ended in conviction, the Senate, having voted 
to convict, took a separate vote on removal from office. But in each 
case, the first vote required a two-thirds supermajority, as specified 
by the Constitution, not a simple majority as is now proposed. 
Moreover, the Senate rejected this early precedent in 1936; since then, 
it has been the understanding of the Senate that removal follows 
automatically from conviction. The lack of solid precedent for 
``findings of fact'' speaks volumes.
    This unprecedented exit strategy was opposed by Republicans and 
Democrats who did not want to circumvent the Constitution merely to 
find a convenient end to this impeachment trial. Former Judge Robert 
Bork termed these proposals ``preposterous readings of the Constitution 
as well as utterly impractical.'' 94 Former Reagan Attorney 
General Edwin Meese cautioned that the Senate ``should not flirt with 
unconstitutional action, especially where conviction and removal of the 
President are at stake.'' 95
    Robert Frost said that the best way out is always through. In the 
end, the Senate's best way out was to fulfill its proper role in the 
impeachment process by voting on the Articles.
             viii. effect on children and national security
    My consideration of the Articles would be incomplete without 
addressing one final point raised by the House Managers about the 
effect of our decision. They have cautioned that should this President 
be acquitted, the consequences would be dire for our children, military 
morale, and the functioning of our judicial system. I reject these 
doomsday scenarios and believe that the precedent set by conviction 
without proof and removal without constitutional justification would be 
far more dangerous for our Republic.
    For example, when he was asked whether acquitting the President 
would endanger the stability of our government, Manager Hyde responded 
that it would, because it would set a bad example for our 
children.96 I was surprised by this answer. This is hardly 
the sort of danger that the Framers of the Constitution were concerned 
with when they met in Philadelphia in 1787. They had just paid a great 
price to liberate themselves from a tyrant. They wanted to ensure that 
their new Chief Executive could not become a tyrant. They wanted to 
ensure that he could be removed if he posed a threat to the democratic 
system of government that they had fought so hard to establish. They 
were not trying to ensure that the President would be a good role model 
for the nation's children.
    More importantly, as a father and grandfather, I work hard to be a 
role model for my children and grandchild. They do not need the 
President to serve that role. They do not have to look to the Congress 
to impeach and remove this President to know the difference between 
right and wrong.
    I trust the parents of America to raise their children, to explain 
what the President did was wrong, and to point out the humiliation and 
other consequences he has brought on himself and his Presidency for an 
entire year and for as long as history books are written. I do not 
believe that the Constitution calls upon us to remove a duly elected 
President for symbolic purposes.
    The Managers have also struggled to raise the specter that a vote 
of acquittal on the Articles would risk our national security by 
undermining the morale of our military, who would appear to be held to 
a double standard. I have more faith in our military. If the Managers' 
position were correct then we would have seen ill-effects from 
President Bush's pardon of former Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, 
who had been indicted on several counts, including for lying before a 
grand jury. But we did not.
    In fact, at that time, Manager Hyde applauded the decision to 
pardon Mr. Weinberger, saying, ``I'm glad the president had the 
chutzpah to do it.'' Far from censuring this accused perjurer or 
deploring the bad example he had set, Mr. Hyde denounced the 
Independent Counsel who had brought this ``political'' prosecution and 
stated: ``I just wish [us] out of this mess, this six years and this 
$30-40 million that has been spent [by independent counsel Lawrence E. 
Walsh]. It's endless and it is a bottomless pit for money, with no 
accountability.'' 97
    The fact that the Constitution sets a high standard for removal of 
a President has no bearing on the standard of conduct applicable to 
military service. In addition, it does not place the President above 
the law. Indeed, all of us in Congress have special immunity under the 
speech and debate clause. That has never been argued to place us above 
the law nor undermine military morale.
     ix. deliberations on dispositive trial motions should be open
    Accustomed as we and the American people are to having our 
proceedings in the Senate open to the public and subject to press 
coverage, the most striking prescription in the ``Rules of Procedure 
and Practice in the Senate when Sitting on Impeachment Trials'' has 
been the closed deliberations required on any preliminary question or 
motion, and now on the final question whether the Articles of 
Impeachment should be sustained or rejected.
    The requirement of closed deliberation, more than any other rule, 
reflects the age in which the rules were originally adopted in 1868. 
Even in 1868, not everyone favored secrecy. During the trial of 
President Johnson, the senior Senator from Vermont, George F. Edmunds, 
moved to have the closed deliberations on the Articles transcribed and 
officially reported ``in order that the world might know, without 
diminution or exaggeration, the reasons and views upon which we proceed 
to our judgment.'' 98 The motion was tabled.
    In the 130 years that have passed since that time, the Senate has 
seen the advent of television in the Senate Chamber, instant 
communication, distribution of Senate documents over the Internet, the 
addition of 46 Senators representing 23 additional States, and the 
direct election of Senators by the people in our States.
    Opening deliberations would help further the dual purposes of our 
rules to promote fairness and political accountability in the 
impeachment process. I supported the motion by Senators Harkin, 
Wellstone and others to suspend this rule requiring closed 
deliberations and to open our deliberations on Senator Byrd's motion to 
dismiss and at other points earlier in this trial. We were 
unsuccessful. Now that the Senate has approached final deliberations on 
the Articles of Impeachment, I had hoped that this secrecy rule would 
be suspended so that the Senate's deliberations would be open and the 
American people could see them. In a matter of this historic 
importance, the American people should be able to witness their 
Senators' deliberations.
    Some have indicated objection to opening the Senate's final 
deliberations because petit juries in courts of law conduct their 
deliberations in secret. Analogies to juries in courts of law are 
misplaced. I was privileged to serve as a prosecutor for eight years 
before I was elected to the Senate. As a prosecutor, I represented the 
people of Vermont in court and before juries on numerous occasions. I 
fully appreciate the traditions and importance of allowing jurors to 
deliberate and make their decisions privately, without intrusion or 
pressure from the parties, the judge or the public. The sanctity of the 
jury deliberation room ensures the integrity and fairness of our 
judicial system.
    The Senate sitting as an impeachment court is unlike any jury in 
any civil or criminal case. A jury in a court of law is chosen 
specifically because the jurors have no connection or relation to the 
parties or their lawyers and no familiarity with the allegations. 
Keeping the deliberations of regular juries secret ensures that as they 
reach their final decision, they are free from outside influences or 
pressure.
    As the Chief Justice made clear on the third day of the impeachment 
trial, the Senate is more than a jury; it is a court. Courts are called 
upon to explain the reasons for decisions. Furthermore, to the extent 
the Senate is called upon to evaluate the evidence as is a jury, we 
stand in different shoes than any juror in a court of law. We all know 
many of the people who have been witnesses in this matter; we all know 
the Managers--indeed, one Senator is a brother of one of the Managers--
and we were familiar with the underlying allegations in this case 
before the Managers ever began their presentation.
    Because we are a different sort of jury, we shoulder a heavier 
burden in explaining the reasons for the decisions we make here. I 
appreciate why Senators would want to have some aspects of our 
deliberations in closed session: to avoid embarrassment to and protect 
the privacy of persons who may be discussed. Yet, on the critical 
decisions we are now being called upon to make on our votes on the 
Articles themselves, allowing our deliberations to be open to the 
public helps assure the American people that the decisions we make are 
for the right reasons.
    In 1974, when the Senate was preparing itself for the anticipated 
impeachment trial of former President Richard Nixon, the Committee on 
Rules and Administration discussed the issue of allowing television 
coverage of the Senate trial. Such coverage did not become routine in 
the Senate until later in 1986. In urging such coverage of the possible 
impeachment trial of President Nixon, Senator Metcalf (D-MT), 
explained:
    ``Given the fact that the party not in control of the White House 
is the majority party in the Senate, the need for broadcast media 
access is even more compelling. Charges of a `kangaroo court,' or a 
`lynch mob proceeding' must not be given an opportunity to gain any 
credence whatsoever. Americans must be able to see for themselves what 
is occurring. An impeachment trial must not be perceived by the public 
as a mysterious process, filtered through the perceptions of third 
parties. The procedure whereby the individual elected to the most 
powerful office in the world can be lawfully removed must command the 
highest possible level of acceptance from the electorate.'' 
99
    Opening deliberation would ensure complete and accurate public 
understanding of the proceedings and the reasons for the decisions we 
make here. Opening our deliberations on our votes on the Articles would 
tell the American people why each of us voted the way we did.
    The last time this issue was actually taken up and voted on by the 
Senate was more than a century ago in 1876, during the impeachment 
trial of Secretary of War William Belknap. Without debate or 
deliberation, the Senate refused then to open the deliberations of the 
Senate to the public. That was before Senators were elected directly by 
the people of their State, that was before the Freedom of Information 
Act confirmed the right of the people to see how government decisions 
are made. Keeping closed our deliberations is wholly inconsistent with 
the progress we have made over the last century to make our government 
more accountable to the people.
    Constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt noted that ``the Senate is 
ideally suited for balancing the tasks of making policy and finding 
facts (as required in impeachment trials) with political 
accountability.'' 100 Public access to the reasons each 
Senator gives for his vote on the Articles is vital for the political 
accountability that is the hallmark of our role.
    I likewise have urged the Senate to adjust these 130-year-old rules 
to allow the Senate's votes on the Articles of Impeachment to be 
recorded for history by news photographers. This is a momentous 
official and public event in the annals of the Senate and in the 
history of the nation. This is a moment of history that should be 
documented for both its contemporary and its lasting significance.
    Open deliberation ensures complete accountability to the American 
people. Charles Black wrote that presidential impeachment ``unseats the 
person the people have deliberately chosen for the office.'' 
101 The American people must be able to judge if their 
elected representatives have chosen for or against conviction for 
reasons they understand, even if they disagree. To bar the American 
people from observing the deliberations that result in these important 
decisions is unfair and undemocratic.
    The Senate should have suspended the rules so that our 
deliberations on the final question of whether to convict the President 
of these Articles of Impeachment were held in open session. After this 
impeachment trial is over, I urge the Senate to re-examine the rule on 
closed deliberations in impeachment trials and revise the rule to 
reflect the open and accountable government that is now the pride and 
hallmark of our democracy.
                             x. conclusion
    The House Managers have warned that should the President be 
acquitted we will set a dangerous precedent and damage the ``rule of 
law.'' I strongly disagree. Instead, we will have set the following 
important precedent for the future: that partisan impeachment drives 
are doomed to failure.
    It is up to the Senate, now, to restore sanity to this process, 
exercise judgment, do justice and act in the interests of the nation. 
We all knew before the trial began that history will judge us on 
whether this case was resolved in a way that serves the good of the 
country, not the political ends of any party. I commend my colleagues 
in the Senate and in particular Majority Leader Lott and Minority 
Leader Daschle for working hard to maintain bipartisanship and fairness 
in our proceedings.
    In all the references to the first presidential impeachment trial, 
a little-known historical fact has been overlooked. After the 
unsuccessful effort to remove him from office, former President Johnson 
returned to serve this country as a United States Senator. I look 
forward to the day when the Senate has concluded the impeachment of 
President Clinton and the Senate can close its work as an impeachment 
court and turn to the other important work we face as Senators.
                               footnotes
    1. Cong. Rec., Jan. 7, 1997, p. S5.
    2. U.S. Constitution, Art. IV, sec. 2.
    3. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Hearing before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Background and History of Impeachment, 105th Cong., 2d 
Sess., Ser. No. 63, Nov. 9, 1998, p. 228 [hereinafter ``Hearing of Nov. 
9, 1998''].
    4. Cong. Rec., Jan. 21, 1999, p. S845.
    5. Robert Jackson, ``The Federal Prosecutor,'' Address Delivered at 
the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys, Apr. 1, 1940, 
quoted in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 728 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting).
    6. See Michael Frisby, ``Starr is Assailed for Reportedly Probing 
Alleged Extramarital Affairs by Clinton,'' The Wall Street Journal, 
June 26, 1997, sec. B, p. 2 (quoting Sen. Patrick Leahy).
    7. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Hearing on Impeachment Inquiry: 
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, Appearance 
of Independent Counsel, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 66, Nov. 19, 
1998, p. 28 [hereinafter ``Hearing of Nov. 19, 1998''].
    8. Referral of Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr, 105th Cong., 
2d Sess., House Doc. 105-310, Sept. 11, 1998, p. 145 [hereinafter 
``Starr Referral''].
    9. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, House Doc. 105-311, Sept. 
18, 1998, p. 710 (2/1/98 handwritten proffer by Monica Lewinsky: ``Ms. 
Linda Tripp informed Ms. L that a friend of Ms. Tripp's in the NSC . . 
. suggested to Ms. Tripp that Ms. L leave Washington, DC.''); id., p. 
824 (8/6/98 grand jury testimony of Ms. Lewinsky: ``I know I had 
discussed with Linda and either I had the thought or she had suggested 
that Vernon Jordan would be a good person who is a close friend of the 
President and who has a lot of contacts in New York, so that might be 
someone who might be able to help me secure a position in New York, if 
I didn't want to go to the U.N.''); id., p. 1393 (7/27/98 FBI interview 
of Ms. Lewinsky: ``LINDA TRIPP suggested to LEWINSKY that the President 
should be asked to ask VERNON for assistance'').
    10. Interview of Kenneth W. Starr by Diane Sawyer on ABC 20/20, 
Nov. 25, 1998, 10:00 p.m. ET.
    11. Statements by Sen. Patrick Leahy, Cong. Rec., Feb. 23, 1998, p. 
S803; Cong. Rec., Mar. 27, 1998, p. S2696; Cong. Rec., Sept. 24, 1998, 
p. S10873.
    12. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c).
    13. Hearing of Nov. 9, 1998, p. 113.
    14. Hearing of Nov. 19, 1998, p. 32.
    15. Lynn Sweet, ``Starr draws bipartisan fire,'' Chicago Sun-Times, 
Feb. 1, 1999, p. 13.
    16. Hearing of Nov. 9, 1998, p. 101.
    17. ``Historians in Defense of the Constitution,'' reprinted in 
Hearing of Nov. 9, 1998, pp. 334-339; Letter from Law Professors to 
House of Representatives, reprinted in Hearing of Nov. 9, 1998, pp. 
374-385.
    18. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Impeachment of Richard 
M. Nixon, President of the United States, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Report 
No. 93-1305, Aug. 20, 1974 [hereinafter ``Rodino Report''], pp. 8-9, 
reprinted in House Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment: Selected 
Materials, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 10, Nov. 1998, pp. 28-29.
    19. Cong. Rec., Feb. 4, 1999, p. S1228.
    20. Cong. Rec., Sept. 11, 1998, H7594.
    21. Cong. Rec., Dec. 19, 1998, p. H12036.
    22. Cong. Rec., Oct. 8, 1998, p. H10087 (statement by Rep. Cliff 
Stearns).
    23. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S273.
    24. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S273.
    25. Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1999, p. S887.
    26. Hearing of Nov. 9, 1998, p. 282.
    27. Letter from Reps. Sherwood Boehlert, Michael N. Castle, 
Benjamin A. Gilman, and James C. Greenwood to Sen. Trent Lott, 
reprinted in The New York Times, Dec. 22, 1998, sec. A, p. 28 (``We 
write as Republicans who voted to impeach President Clinton. . . . We 
are not convinced, and do not want our votes interpreted to mean that 
we view removal from office as the only reasonable conclusion of this 
case'').
    28. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S279.
    29. Charles L. Black Jr., Impeachment: A Handbook 8-9 (1974).
    30. See Rodino Report, pp. 8-9.
    31. T.R. Goldman, ``Outtakes From the Final Frame: Transcripts 
Don't Tell the Whole Story,'' Legal Times, vol. XXI, No. 37, Feb. 8, 
1999, p. 10.
    32. Cong. Rec., Feb. 6, 1999, p. S1315.
    33. Cong. Rec., Feb. 6, 1999, p. S1318.
    34. E.g., United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1416 (3d Cir. 
1994).
    35. Criminal Resource Manual Sec. 1746.
    36. E.g., Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1999, p. S872.
    37. Journal of the Senate, Apr. 18, 1933, pp. 317-318.
    38. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Impeachment Inquiry: William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States--Consideration of 
Articles of Impeachment, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Ser. No. 18, Dec. 10-
12, 1998, p. 279.
    39. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S260.
    40. Cong. Rec., Oct. 20, 1989, p. S13787.
    41. John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage 138 (1956).
    42. See Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., 101st Cong., 1st Sess., S. Doc. 101-22, 
Nov. 13, 1989, pp. 457-458 (statement of Sen. Bob Dole); see also Cong. 
Rec., Nov. 7, 1989, p. S27700 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl); Cong. 
Rec., Nov. 15, 1989, p. S29239 (statement of Sen. Joseph Biden); Cong. 
Rec., Nov. 21, 1989, p. S31652 (statement of Sen. Frank Murkowski).
    43. Michael Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A 
Constitutional and Historical Analysis 113 (1996).
    44. Black, supra, p. 17.
    45. John R. Labovitz, Presidential Impeachment 196 (1978).
    46. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S260.
    47. Rodino Report (Minority Views), pp. 379-380.
    48. Cong. Rec., Feb. 4, 1999, p. S1213.
    49. Cong. Rec., Jan. 20, 1999, p. S817.
    50. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1001(b).
    51. T.R. Goldman, `` `The Blank Stare' and Other Strange 
Evidentiary Tales from the Senate Trial,'' Legal Times, vol. XXI, No. 
36, Feb. 1, 1999, pp. 1, 18.
    52. Cong. Rec., Jan. 21, 1999, p. S846.
    53. Cong. Rec., Jan. 14, 1999, p. S64.
    54. Cong. Rec., Feb. 2, 1999, p. S1226.
    55. Cong. Rec., Jan. 14, 1999, p. S231.
    56. Cong. Rec., Feb. 4, 1999, p. S1219.
    57. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 954 (8/6/98 grand jury 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky).
    58. Supplemental Materials to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 555 (1/27/
98 grand jury testimony of Betty Currie).
    59. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 1187 (8/20/98 grand 
jury testimony of Monica Lewinky).
    60. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 901 (8/6/98 grand jury 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky).
    61. Cong. Rec., Jan. 14, 1999, p. S65.
    62. Cong. Rec., Feb. 6, 1999, p. S1293.
    63. Cong. Rec., Jan. 14, 1999, p. S65.
    64. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S277.
    65. Cong. Rec., Feb. 4, 1999, p. S1222.
    66. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 716.
    67. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 1243.
    68. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 710.
    69. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 591.
    70. Appendices to Starr Referral, Part 1, p. 591.
    71. Jim Abrams, ``GOP Senator: Congress Should Be Cautious About 
Impeachment,'' The Associated Press Political Service, Mar. 9, 1998.
    72. Eric Schmitt, ``Judiciary Chairman Asks Clinton to Admit or 
Deny 81 Findings,'' The New York Times, Nov. 6, 1998, sec. A, p. 1 
(quoting Rep. Gekas).
    73. Cong. Rec., Dec. 19, 1998, p. H12003.
    74. Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1999, p. S887.
    75. Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1999, p. S887.
    76. Cong. Rec., Jan. 15, 1999, p. S267.
    77. Cong. Rec., Feb. 4, 1999, p. S1212.
    78. Cong. Rec., Feb. 4, 1999, p. S1229.
    79. William H. Rehnquist, Grand Inquests 18 (1992).
    80. Black, supra, p. 39.
    81. House Comm. on the Judiciary, Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment: Report by the Staff of the Impeachment 
Inquiry, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Feb. 1974, p. 27.
    82. Black, supra, pp. 35-36.
    83. Burlington Free Press, Jan. 26, 1999.
    84. Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1999, p. S877.
    85. Cong. Rec., Jan. 23, 1999, p. S937.
    86. Cong. Rec., Jan. 22, 1999, p. S885.
    87. David G. Savage, ``Hyde View on Lying is Back Haunting Him,'' 
Los Angeles Times, Dec. 4, 1998, sec. A, p. 1.
    88. Cong. Rec., Jan. 25, 1999, p. S973.
    89. Hearing of Nov. 9, 1998, p. 227.
    90. Cong. Rec., Jan. 16, 1999, p. S283.
    91. U.S. Constitution, Art. III, sec. 1.
    92. Gerhardt, supra, pp. 106-107.
    93. Cong. Globe Supp'l, Impeachment Trial of President Andrew 
Johnson, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 4, p. 426.
    94. Robert H. Bork, ``Read the Constitution: It's Removal or 
Nothing,'' The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 1, 1999, sec. A, p. 21.
    95. Edwin Meese III & Todd Gaziano, ``Two Impeachment Votes Could 
Cause Long-Term Harm,'' Roll Call, vol. 44, No. 53, Feb. 4, 1999, p. 6.
    96. Cong. Rec., Jan. 23, 1999, p. S948.
    97. ``Hyde View on Lying is Back Haunting Him,'' supra.
    98. Cong. Globe Supp'l, Impeachment Trial of President Andrew 
Johnson, 40th Cong., 2d Sess., vol. 4, p. 424.
    99. Comm. On Rules and Administration and its Subcomm. On Standing 
Rules of the Senate, Hearings on Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable 
to Impeachment Trials, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., Aug. 5 and 6, 1974, p. 37.
    100. Gerhardt, supra, p. 174 .
    101. Black, supra, p. 17.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Charles E. Grassley

    Mr. GRASSLEY. Mr. Chief Justice, my fellow Senators, as 
this trial nears the end, we have to ask the question how we 
got here with a tragedy like this. There are many losers. There 
are no winners. There are surely no heroes. There are lots of 
lessons to be learned, and I think all of our prayers ought to 
go out to those who were ensnared in the web of controversy.
    In reflecting on this case and my role in it under the 
Constitution, the word ``sad'' comes to mind. I have not 
relished sitting in judgment of a twice-elected, popular 
President. I would prefer to make history in other ways. I also 
regret the nature of the subject of this case. It is not easy 
having our entire society suddenly thrust into an open, nonstop 
debate about things that ought to make all of us blush.
    Some say this impeachment effort is part of a right-wing 
conspiracy, it is a Republican plot to get a Democratic 
President. Let's look at how we got here and see if that 
argument holds up.
    We are here because the President did wrongful acts and he 
admits to that. We are here because of the independent counsel 
law. The President himself led the charge to reauthorize the 
Independent Counsel Act. Thirty-three of my colleagues on this 
side of the aisle were in the Senate at that particular time. 
All but one of you voted for reauthorization.
    On June 30, 1994, the President signed that reauthorization 
bill. He issued a statement and here is what he said:

    This law, originally passed in 1978, is a foundation stone for the 
trust between Government and our citizens . . .

    He says,

    Opponents called it a tool of partisan attack against Republican 
Presidents and a waste of taxpayer funds. It was neither. In fact, the 
independent counsel statute has been in the past and is today a force 
for Government integrity and public confidence.

    Those were the words of President Clinton, June 30, 1994.
    Before reauthorization, it was the President himself who 
advocated the appointment of a special prosecutor. That 
appointment was made by the President's own Attorney General. 
After reauthorization, the Attorney General supported the 
appointment of an independent counsel. The independent counsel 
was then appointed by a special three-judge panel, as required 
by law.
    Also under the law, the Attorney General can initiate the 
dismissal of an independent counsel if he oversteps his bounds 
or acts improperly. Not only was this never done by the 
President's Attorney General but, in contrast, she even agreed 
several times to expand his jurisdiction, including to cover 
the Monica Lewinsky matter.
    Also under the law, the independent counsel is obliged to 
send to the House any evidences of crimes that might be 
impeachable.
    In short, this case came about through a legitimate, legal 
process. It is a process that historically was vigorously 
defended by this side of the aisle. There are various checks 
and balances built into the process. They are designed to 
prevent abuse by the independent counsel, but they were never 
triggered, even though the President's own Attorney General 
could move for dismissal.
    No, this President is in this predicament because of his 
own private wrongdoing and because of public policy he pursued. 
There is no conspiracy.
    The President's actions are having a profound impact, of 
course, upon our society. His misdeeds have caused many to 
mistrust elected officials. Cynicism is swelling among the 
grassroots. His breach of trust has eroded the public's faith 
in the Office of the Presidency. The President's wrongdoing has 
painted all of us in Washington with a very broad brush.
    In the past 12 months, thousands of Iowans have registered 
their opinions with me. One letter from a middle school 
principal speaks volumes.
    At an assembly to mark the new school year, a video 
entitled ``Attitude is Everything'' was presented to the 
student body. The video was all about American heroes--college 
athletes, Olympic medalists, astronauts and world leaders.
    Logically, the video also included President Clinton. The 
school principal wrote to me the following. He said, when the 
President's picture appeared, the entire student body--ages 11 
to 14--snickered. He said their spontaneous reaction struck a 
chord. He wrote:

    Although they may not fully understand the adult connotations and 
political ramifications . . . they do know that if you want to be 
trusted and [if you want to be] respected, you must tell the truth. . . 
. [A]s an educator in Iowa's public schools for the past 16 years . . . 
our students' reaction to President Clinton's picture is one of the 
saddest moments I can recall. In that instant, I realized how deeply 
his conduct has affected our country.

    Mr. Chief Justice, there is that word ``sad'' again. It 
seems to come to the fore in people's minds over this case, 
over this President's conduct, and over the impact it has had 
on our country.
    The true tragedy in this case is the collapse of the 
President's moral authority. He undermined himself when he 
wagged his finger and lied to our people on national 
television, denying that relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. That 
did more damage to his credibility than any other single act.
    There was no better reason than that for the resignation of 
the President. I did not personally call for his resignation in 
August. That is something the President should decide on his 
own. But once you lose your moral authority to lead, you are a 
failure as a leader. FDR once spoke of the Presidency in this 
way:

    The Presidency is not merely an administrative office. . . . It is 
preeminently a place of moral leadership.

    Mr. Clinton should take note.
    Next, there is the issue of the abuse of power and 
authority. The President used his position to enter into an 
improper relationship with a subordinate--not just a 
subordinate, a young intern. He later used his power to find 
her a job.
    Another abuse of power: The full powers of the White House 
were on lease to stonewall the process and to attack the 
credibility of those who investigated him.
    This White House has perfected the art of stonewalling 
around the truth. I fear that future White Houses will learn 
much from these experts and will refine and improve their own 
truth-fighting arsenals. Truth and openness will be casualties.
    Last, there is the issue of the poor example the 
President's actions serve for the Nation, especially for our 
youth. Is it now OK to lie because the President does it? And 
in the same manner, by wordsmithing, by trying to figure out 
what the meaning is of the word ``is''?
    I received a call recently from a mother of a teenage son 
in Des Moines. All last year, she thought the investigation of 
the President was a wasteful, partisan witch-hunt. She was 
totally against the investigation and impeachment.
    And then her son got into some serious trouble, and it 
involved lying. She confronted him with the wrong. Her son 
responded: ``What I told you is the truth as I understood it at 
the time.''
    The mother grew furious, and she said at that moment she 
knew that we couldn't have a President like Bill Clinton. She 
knew firsthand the damage that his conduct had done to her 
family and to our country. At that point, she said she changed 
her position in favor of impeachment.
    These are all questions and issues that emerge from the 
broader contours of this case, outside the narrow charges in 
the articles.
    With respect to the impeachment charges, many of the 
President's arguments are based on contorted interpretations of 
the facts. These interpretations aren't credible. They 
represent lawyering at its best or, as some would say, at its 
worst.
    It is clear to me that the President committed serious 
crimes when he coached his secretary, Betty Currie, and when he 
misled his aides, Sidney Blumenthal and John Podesta. Each of 
these aides ended up being a witness in official court 
proceedings. I believe, based on the evidence before the 
Senate, that the President lied to these witnesses so they 
would repeat those lies before official court proceedings. That 
is obstruction of justice.
    In addition, I find it very interesting that a power lawyer 
like Vernon Jordan would be so active in the job hunt for Ms. 
Lewinsky. Regardless of what she felt or thought, I believe the 
President was arranging to get her a job. That way she wouldn't 
provide harmful testimony in the Paula Jones sexual harassment 
lawsuit. Again, obstruction of justice.
    Mr. Chief Justice, these actions weren't just outrageous, 
and, more important, morally wrong, but they were also illegal. 
They were a direct assault on the integrity of the judicial 
process. The President is guilty of the offenses charged under 
article II.
    The first article charges that the President committed 
perjury on several occasions. While I am not convinced he 
committed perjury on each occasion charged, I believe he did 
commit perjury when he lied about his efforts to obstruct 
justice. That is the fourth count.
    I don't believe the President's statement that he was 
merely trying to refresh his memory when he spoke with Betty 
Currie about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and I don't 
believe the President's statement that he was only trying to 
protect himself from embarrassment when he concocted elaborate 
lies about Ms. Lewinsky and then conveyed those lies to his 
aides.
    The President was not forthright when he testified before 
the grand jury. Time and time again, he gave answers that were 
misleading and sometimes deliberately false. The American 
people have a right to expect their President to be completely 
truthful, as they can expect you and me to be completely 
truthful. And the American people have a right to expect their 
President to be truthful, especially when placed under oath. I 
will vote guilty on article I as well.
    Mr. Chief Justice, these were not easy decisions. They are 
the product of soul-searching, as it is for all of you. So they 
leave me with a good conscience. I believe my votes reflect the 
truth of what happened in this case.
    The Senate is about to close this chapter in American 
history. It may or may not be the final chapter in this story. 
Nonetheless, our decision in this impeachment trial will stand 
against the test of time. You only truly understand the present 
when it is past. In that respect, future generations will serve 
as our jury and, in the end, history will serve as the final 
judge. Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Larry E. Craig

    Mr. CRAIG. Mr. Chief Justice, I promised to share with the 
people of Idaho and the Nation what comments I made in the 
closed session of the Senate deliberating on the impeachment of 
President Clinton.
    What I told my colleagues as we deliberated was this:
    If we were in a church, the minister would admonish us from 
the pulpit to hate the sin and forgive the sinner. But we're 
not in a church.
    If we were in a court of law, the judge would tell us to 
hate the crime and punish the criminal. But we're not in a 
court of law.
    We're part of a constitutionally directed impeachment 
tribunal, and our job is to love the Constitution and protect 
the Office of the President. Our decision should not be about 
saving or rejecting William Jefferson Clinton, but about 
protecting the Office of the President and keeping our 
Constitution strong.
    I believe he committed the crimes and acts charged in the 
articles of impeachment, and I will vote to convict and remove 
him from office.
    That was my statement to the Senators in closed 
deliberations, and I stand by it today.
    But this statement was not the full explanation of my vote 
and my reasoning that I believe is owed to the people of Idaho 
and the Nation. Therefore, let me take a few moments now to 
clarify why I voted to convict President Clinton on the 
articles of impeachment.
    First, I believe the House made its case on the facts. I 
was persuaded by what I saw, read, and heard that the President 
deliberately lied under oath in the case brought by Paula Jones 
to enforce her civil rights. I was also persuaded that he 
encouraged others to lie under oath and committed other acts 
designed to obstruct justice. In reaching these conclusions, it 
was important to me that the Senate is not bound to a specific 
constitutional or statutory standard in judging the evidence; 
instead, each Senator is left to his or her own experience and 
conscience. That is both the political and judicial nature of 
the impeachment process prescribed by the Constitution.
    However, reaching this conclusion about the facts does not 
trigger automatic conviction and removal of the President. A 
Senator must still resolve two questions: whether the acts 
committed were the kind of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
warranting removal from office, and whether the interests of 
the Nation are served by removal. Impeachment by the House 
expresses that Chamber's opinion on those two questions, but it 
is up to the Senate to render final judgment.
    And it is these two questions that have caused the most 
perplexity in this impeachment process--not to mention the most 
furious debate, handwringing, and logical contortions.
    For example, we have heard much during these proceedings 
about proportionality--in other words, about ensuring that the 
punishment or sanction fits the crime. Some of our colleagues 
have suggested that while the crimes of perjury and obstruction 
of justice may rise to the level of impeachable offenses, that 
conclusion is not inevitable on every set of facts. More to the 
point, they argue there is something in this particular case 
that diminishes the seriousness of the offense or renders it a 
private, as opposed to public, crime: perhaps the context of 
the misdeeds, or the subject matter of the perjury, or the 
motive behind the obstruction of justice.
    Yet considerations such as these have not prevented the 
Government from prosecuting citizens who committed such crimes. 
Furthermore, while we are not bound by statutory definitions of 
crimes here, these arguments frustrate the very goal our 
founders had in mind when they established the extraordinary 
remedy of impeachment: to protect the executive office and the 
Nation from a lawless President. The framers of the 
Constitution believed that governments are established in the 
first place to protect the rights of the governed. It follows 
that the most serious breach of duty in public office--the most 
serious threat to the order of society itself--is for the 
enforcers of the law to break the law. How much more grave that 
breach becomes when it is committed by the one individual in 
the Nation who personifies the Federal Government: the 
President. How much more abhorrent it is when, in covering up 
his crimes, that President exploited the very public trust he 
betrayed.
    There is no question in my mind that perjury and 
obstruction of justice are the kind of public crimes that the 
Founders had in mind, and the House managers have demonstrated 
these crimes were committed by the President. As for the 
excuses being desperately sought by some to allow President 
Clinton to escape accountability, it seems to me that creating 
such loopholes would require tearing holes in the 
Constitution--something that cannot be justified to protect 
this President, or any President.
    This brings me to the final question: whether the public 
interest will be served by the President's removal from office. 
Let me say there are those in my State who have been seeking 
this result ever since the President was elected, because they 
simply don't agree with him. I, too, generally disagree--
sometimes loudly--with President Clinton's approach to public 
policy.
    However, political and policy differences are emphatically 
not the focus of this question. Instead, the founders intended 
us to focus on the safety of the Nation. That is a very high 
threshold, appropriate to the serious impact of the vote we 
must case. In this case, many are arguing that our Nation is 
not at risk; we're prosperous; the Government is not 
collapsing; there is no immediate or external threat to the 
country.
    But I would submit that if a generation of young people are 
taught by our actions in this case that a lie carries no 
consequences, then the Nation is at risk. If our citizens 
conclude that lawlessness in the highest office is acceptable, 
that their elected representatives are complicit in that 
corruption, and that nothing can be done to stop it, then the 
Nation is at risk. If future Presidents think they can go 
further in lying or obstruction of justice when they apply the 
``Clinton Indicator,'' then the Nation is at risk. If the 
Executive Office of the President is occupied by an individual 
who is generally believed to have lied and betrayed the public 
trust--if the symbol, the icon of the Presidency is 
compromised, the Nation is at risk.
    Some have suggested that removing this President from 
office would put the Nation at risk. That is false argument and 
something no one should fear. Instead, we should place our 
faith in the Constitution and the wisdom of its framers, who 
provided a roadmap for a peaceful, swift, and orderly 
transition of power to the Vice President. That transition 
poses no threat to the Nation.
    On the other hand, I believe exonerating President Clinton 
with a vote for acquittal does create a threat to our Nation. 
In short, I am convinced that the Nation is at risk today--not 
because of the possibility of the President's removal through 
the impeachment process, but because of the damage he has 
caused to the Executive Office of the President, and the damage 
that continues to be done by his remaining in office.
    For all these reasons, I believe my vote to convict and 
remove this President from office is an appropriate response, a 
necessary response, a constitutionally compelled response.
    I said at the beginning of this process that it would be my 
goal to ensure that we proceeded in a fair and constitutional 
manner. I believe we have done so--and managed along the way to 
generally rise above partisanship and the politics of the day. 
While I fundamentally disagree with many of my colleagues in 
the final result, I salute them for their sincerity and the 
seriousness of their purpose. No matter what the result, the 
Senate discharged its constitutional duty well.
    However, reluctant as I am to say it, I do not believe this 
sorry chapter in our history is closed. On the first day of 
this trial, as I watched the Chief Justice take the chair, I 
was angry--profoundly angry that this President had brought 
this Nation to this point because of his own self-
gratification, setting what was good for himself above what was 
good for the Nation. It is unconscionable what the President 
has put the country through, continues to put the country 
through, and will continue to put the country through for his 
own personal and political ends. My differences with the 
President on this point transcend party or policy; I am 
saddened that this sorry chapter will continue, that the book 
will be open and the pages of this chapter will be turning as 
long as this President remains in office. Our young people, our 
citizens, our Constitution deserve a better end to a better 
story.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd*

    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, 33 days ago, at about this 
hour, we gathered in the Old Senate Chamber in a closed session 
to begin the journey that has brought us to where we are today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Dodd submitted additional statements on February 23, see pp. 
3099 and 3100, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We are only hours away from casting what Robert C. Byrd has 
appropriately described as the most important vote any of us 
have cast or are likely to cast in our service as U.S. 
Senators.
    For only the second time in our Nation's glorious history, 
we, as temporary custodians of these 100 seats, will decide 
whether to take the most extraordinary and grave action that 
could ever be asked of us as Senators. The decision to declare 
war or amend our Constitution pales in comparison to trying the 
impeachment of a popularly elected President of the United 
States.
    Unlike the House of Representatives, we did not decide to 
initiate this impeachment action. We did not seek this burden. 
It has been thrust upon us. Our responsibilities were limited 
to how to proceed in this trial and what verdict to render.
    Despite our procedural differences along the way, the 
Senate has fulfilled Alexander Hamilton's vision as a 
``tribunal sufficiently dignified.'' The credit for that result 
belongs primarily to Tom Daschle, the Democratic leader, and 
Trent Lott, the majority leader.
    Let history record that these two leaders, saddled with 
different challenges, led us with patience, fairness, good 
humor and dignity.
    I have listened intently to those of you who have spoken on 
this matter, and I would urge all Senators to add the reasoning 
for your vote to this record. For in many respects, it will be 
our words, our thinking, our rationale that will be revisited 
in the coming millennium when and if those who succeed us in 
this Chamber are ever asked to confront the judgment that is 
upon us.
    The contemporary press will record what decisions we have 
reached. But the cold, dispassionate eye of history will also 
scrutinize why collectively and individually we reached our 
conclusion, and what impact this ordeal has had on the 
Constitution, the Congress, the courts, the Presidency and the 
maintenance of our tripartite federal system of government.
    I agree heartily with those who say we should not decide 
this matter only on the polls and the popularity of this 
President. But nor should we totally disregard the voices of 
those who elected this President or who have sent us here to 
represent them--including the voices of those who voted against 
us.
    It is not entirely insignificant that of the 13 House 
Republican managers who have presented their case, 7 were 
unopposed in the last election, and 3 were reelected with such 
significant majorities they were virtually unopposed. I find it 
disquieting that the passion for conviction of 10 of the 13 
House Republican managers may not have been tempered by the 
voices of dissent within their congressional districts.
    I sincerely hope that as we consider the facts of this 
case, the law in this case, and the impact of removing this 
President, we will give equal consideration to the impact on 
the Office of the Presidency.
    It is clear from ``The Federalist Papers'' that the framers 
wanted a strong, independent, ``energetic executive,'' and in 
the words of Alexander Hamilton, one free from ``the propensity 
of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and 
to absorb the powers of the other departments. . . .''
    As our presiding Chief Justice properly noted in his book 
``Grand Inquests'':

    The constitutional convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787 
borrowed many of its ideas from existing governments and from political 
philosophers. But it did make two original contributions to the art of 
government. The first was the idea of a Presidential, as opposed to a 
parliamentary system of government. . . .

    In the introduction to his treatise on impeachment, the 
noted constitutional scholar Charles Black reminds us that 
``the Presidency is a prime symbol of our National unity. The 
election of the President is the only political act that we 
perform together as a Nation: voting in the Presidential 
election is certainly the political choice most significant to 
the American people, and most closely attended to by them. No 
matter, then, can be of higher political importance than our 
considering whether, in any given instance, this act of choice 
is to be undone, and the chosen President dismissed from office 
in disgrace.'' Professor Black adds forebodingly, ``everyone 
must shrink from this most drastic of measures.''
    In all candor, I must say I saw little evidence of the 
House majority shrinking from the drastic measure of 
impeachment.
    I revere the Presidency and I wish all future occupants of 
the Oval Office to inherit a strong, independent and 
``energetic'' office.
    I fear the precedent of this impeachment case will come to 
haunt us.
    Now to the specifics of this case.
    This scandal has seriously bruised every institution that 
has come in contact with it. But none has been battered more 
than the executive branch itself.
    The culpability for this damage lies first and foremost 
with President Clinton. His illicit affair with a young woman, 
a subordinate, in the West Wing of the White House has properly 
been greeted with universal condemnation. President Clinton's 
subsequent misleading and false statements to his staff, his 
Cabinet, the country and others is abhorrent. History will 
judge his actions and significant lapses of judgment harshly, 
as it should.
    If he is acquitted by this Senate, he will not as some have 
suggested ``get off scot-free.'' To stand as the only popularly 
elected President to be impeached will relegate him as the 
Hester Prynne in the pantheon of our chief executives. Do not 
allow your decision to convict this President to be influenced 
by the false and ludicrous notion that he will emerge from this 
national nightmare unscathed if we vote to acquit.
    President Ford is often quoted as having said ``the grounds 
for impeachment are whatever the House of Representatives says 
they are by a majority vote.'' I do not take issue with that 
statement except to say that it strikes me as being somewhat 
cavalier. In the Senate, the grounds for conviction and removal 
of a President must not be so loosely fashioned; the grounds 
for conviction must be restricted to the articles of 
impeachment as passed by the House. I am dismayed by the 
argument of some that conviction can be based on reasons 
totally beyond the scope of the articles before us.
    Whether we like it or not, we have a constitutional duty to 
confine our judgment to the specific accusations.
    The standard of proof we use to arrive at our decision is 
properly up to each Senator. But we do not have a similar 
luxury to decide what grounds we may use to convict. Those 
grounds are set by the House and must be proven by them.
    By very narrow margins, on nearly party-line votes, the 
House Republican managers have presented us with two articles 
of impeachment accusing the President of perjury and 
obstruction of justice.
    The House managers have very specifically charged the 
President with violation of the criminal code, insisting that 
the facts prove each and every element of the criminal charges.
    While it is certainly true that no person, including the 
President, is above the law, it is equally true that no 
President is below the law, either. By insisting that this 
President is in violation of specific crimes in the criminal 
code, have not the House managers deprived somewhat the Members 
of the Senate of the individual judgment when exercising a 
standard of proof? The standard of proof in all criminal cases 
is ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' If those who vote to convict 
on either count use a lesser standard than would be used in the 
case of any other citizen, then a vote to take the ``drastic 
measure'' of conviction and removal of the President from 
office would be based on an unequal standard of justice.
    I found it unsettling that while the House Republican 
managers were passionately asking the Senate to convict this 
President of the criminal charges, two of the most active 
managers were simultaneously expressing their own reservations. 
First, House manager Lindsey Graham candidly told the Senate in 
response to a question that reasonable people could reasonably 
conclude to acquit this President. It appeared to me that 
Manager Graham was less than convinced this President was 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Secondly, House manager Asa Hutchinson, in a moment of 
candor on a National television news program, conceded he would 
not be confident of a conviction in a case such as the one he 
now asks us to reach judgment of conviction beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
    Does it not also strike us as strange that when given the 
opportunity to call any of three or four witnesses, the House 
managers chose not to invite Betty Currie to testify? Other 
than the President and Monica Lewinsky, no other person was as 
involved in the allegations brought by the House managers, and 
yet they made the calculated decision not to take her 
deposition. Why?
    For these reasons and the careful, detailed distinction 
drawn between the inferences made by the House managers and the 
direct testimony of deposed witnesses, as outlined by Senator 
Carl Levin, I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that 
this President is guilty of the criminal charges enumerated in 
either article of impeachment.
    Thus, not only do I ``shrink from this most drastic of 
measures''--I positively affirm we must not remove this 
President from office.
    Some final thoughts.
    The criminalization of our political process must stop 
before irreparable damage is done to the institutions of our 
federal system.
    It is right to condemn in harsh words the behavior of the 
President. It should be equally appropriate to condemn the 
damage done by an independent counsel statute that has spawned 
runaway, brakeless prosecutors who storm the country trampling 
on our system of justice, completely unchecked by any branch of 
government.
    The damage this President has caused his office can and 
will be repaired.
    The damage done by the Office of Independent Counsel and by 
court decisions that allow unlimited discovery in civil 
lawsuits may be far more difficult to repair.
    That fragile balance between our three coequal branches of 
government is being subjected to unprecedented strains as a 
result of events that have occurred over the past several 
years.
    I would urge our leaders to include an examination of these 
issues as part of our agenda in the 106th Congress.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator James M. Jeffords

    Mr. JEFFORDS. Mr. Chief Justice, on January 7, 1999, the 
House of Representatives presented the Senate with two articles 
of impeachment against President William Jefferson Clinton. The 
articles charged the President with lying under oath before a 
Federal grand jury and with obstruction of justice. In the days 
following the House's presentation of the articles, many have 
criticized the Senate for continuing on where the House left 
off. They argue that if there are not enough votes in the 
Senate to remove the President, then the Senate should not have 
bothered proceeding with the trial. While this may seem like a 
reasonable way of disposing of an unpopular process, the Senate 
has a constitutional duty to hold an impeachment trial. 
Although the Constitution provides little guidance, one thing 
was clear: In order to fulfill this duty, we had to come 
together as a body and proceed in a manner that was judicious, 
deliberative and fair. That meant that before the Senate could 
make any decision on the articles of impeachment, each side had 
to be given the opportunity to present its case.
    Now that we have heard from the House managers, the 
President's counsel and viewed the deposition testimony of 
three key witnesses, it is the appropriate time to render 
judgment on the articles of impeachment. I must state at the 
outset that this has been one of the most difficult experiences 
that I have endured in my 23 years in Congress.
    This process has been distressing on a personal level 
because I came into it with a great deal of respect and 
admiration for President Clinton. Over the past 6 years, we 
have enjoyed a good working relationship. While we do not share 
the same party and we often approach issues from different 
points of view, the President and I have worked together on a 
number of important projects. Given my esteem for the 
President, I have been saddened and gravely disappointed by 
much of what I have learned over the last few weeks. Whatever 
the final outcome, I will leave this trial with the knowledge 
that the President has indeed committed shameful acts, misled 
the American people and brought disrepute on the Office of the 
Presidency. By his own actions, he has ensured himself a place 
in history alongside President Andrew Johnson.
    This process has been trying on a professional level 
because I recognize the enormous historical significance of my 
decisions. This trial will establish precedents to examine and 
judge the conduct of all future Presidents. While our Founding 
Fathers clearly intended impeachment for only the gravest 
offenses, confronted with a series of tawdry acts, the facts 
and circumstances do not neatly fit into the definition of 
``other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I am gravely concerned 
that a vote to convict the President on these articles may 
establish a low threshold that would make every President 
subject to removal for the slightest indiscretion or imperil 
every President who faces a Congress controlled by the opposing 
party. Yet, at the same time, I am concerned that a vote of 
acquittal could be mistaken by future generations to mean that 
perjury and obstruction of justice are not impeachable 
offenses.
    The Constitution provides very little guidance to the 
Senate for its trying of the impeachment of the President. 
There is absolutely no reference at all to the standard of 
proof that Senators shall use when evaluating the articles of 
impeachment. I believe the fact that the framers gave this body 
the duty to try an impeachment, but no guidance as to what 
standard of proof to use in the trial, gives each Senator the 
discretion to select the standard he or she deems appropriate.
    In making my decision, I have focused on the nature of the 
proceeding. The impeachment trial is a unique process; it is 
neither criminal nor civil. I also focused on the purpose of 
the proceeding. The Senate holds an impeachment trial to 
determine whether there is proof that the President's 
misconduct rises to the level which demonstrates that he or she 
is no longer fit to hold office.
    Given the nature and purpose of an impeachment trial, I 
have decided that the preponderance of the evidence standard 
would not be appropriate as being too low a standard. On the 
other hand, I believe that proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
would raise too high a standard. The question we must ask 
ourselves is, Do the President's actions demonstrate that he is 
unfit to serve, thus warranting his removal in order to protect 
the public? Since we are concerned with the public's 
protection, I would suggest that the clear and convincing 
standard, which lies somewhere in between, would be more 
appropriate to make the very fateful decision of removing the 
President from office.
    Accordingly, I have used the clear and convincing evidence 
standard to judge the impeachment charges against President 
Clinton. I understand that this standard is little used, 
however, I feel that in impeachment trials it is most 
appropriate to use a standard that is somewhere in between the 
extremes.
    Article I alleges that the President provided perjurious 
false and misleading testimony before the Federal grand jury. 
The House managers applied the Federal perjury statute found at 
18 U.S.C. 1623 to the President's testimony. The elements of 
perjury are met when: (1) while under oath (2) one knowingly 
(3) makes a false statement as to (4) material facts. While I 
agree that some of the President's statements before the 
Federal grand jury were false and misleading, I have concluded 
that some of the allegations simply do not rise to the level of 
perjury and that the House managers have not proven the 
remaining perjury charges by clear and convincing evidence.
    The first allegation is that the President committed 
perjury before the grand jury when he testified about the 
nature of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. In his 
testimony before the grand jury, the President admitted that 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was ongoing and that it 
involved inappropriate intimate contact. Based on the House 
managers' presentation, there is no doubt in my mind that the 
President's prepared statement to the grand jury was inaccurate 
in part. While I disagree with the House managers' conclusion 
that the President's use of the terms ``on certain occasions'' 
and ``occasional'' were intentionally misleading, I agree with 
the House managers that the President lied about when and how 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began. However, given that 
the President admitted to the key issue before the grand jury, 
I am not persuaded that lies about these immaterial details 
justify a charge of perjury. I also reject the related 
allegations pertaining to the President's testimony regarding 
the definition of sexual relations used in the Jones case.
    The second allegation of this article is that the President 
committed perjury in his grand jury testimony by repeating the 
perjurious answers he had given in his civil deposition. The 
House managers have certainly proven that the President lied 
about a number of issues in his civil deposition. However, 
article I concerns the President's grand jury testimony, not 
his deposition testimony, and the House managers seem to rely 
upon the President's reaffirmation of his deposition testimony 
as proof that he committed perjury. Since I do not find that 
the President reaffirmed his deposition testimony before the 
grand jury, I reject this allegation of perjury.
    The third allegation is essentially that the President 
committed perjury when he testified before the grand jury that 
he was not paying attention to Mr. Bennett's misstatement that 
the Lewinsky affidavit meant that ``there was no sex of any 
kind in any manner, shape or form.'' Although the video tape of 
the President's civil deposition does show the President 
staring in Mr. Bennett's direction, we cannot know what the 
President was actually thinking at that time. We have all had 
moments where we appear to be paying attention to a speaker, 
when we are actually lost in our own thoughts. Because the 
House managers could not possibly prove whether or not the 
President was actually paying attention to the exchange, they 
have not met the burden of proving that the President's 
testimony was false.
    The final allegation in article I is that the President 
testified falsely about his attempts to obstruct justice in the 
Jones case. I reject this perjury allegation outright because I 
believe it was improper for the House managers to include a 
restatement of the obstruction of justice allegations within 
article I. I have considered the obstruction of justice 
allegations in article II.
    The second article of impeachment charges the President 
with obstruction of justice. Article II charges that the 
President prevented, obstructed and impeded the administration 
of justice, both personally and through his subordinates and 
agents, in a Federal civil rights action. To prove a case of 
obstruction of justice under the Federal statute found at 18 
U.S.C. 1503, the House managers must prove that the President 
acted with intent and that he ``endeavored to influence, 
obstruct or impede the due administration of justice.'' After 
considering these allegations, I have concluded that the House 
managers failed to prove all but one of the obstruction of 
justice charges. My basis for this conclusion is the following:
    The first allegation in article II is that the President 
obstructed justice by having his friend Vernon Jordan assist 
Ms. Lewinsky in her New York job search in exchange for her 
silence in the Jones case. To prove this allegation, the House 
managers presented compelling circumstantial evidence that Mr. 
Jordan assisted Ms. Lewinsky with both her job search and with 
her affidavit. The House managers also pointed to the fact that 
Ms. Lewinsky received her job offer just 2 days after she 
signed a false affidavit. However, there are also 
circumstantial facts that belie the quid pro quo claim. First, 
there is evidence that the President enlisted Mr. Jordan's help 
well before Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the Jones witness 
list. Second, Mr. Jordan testified in his Senate deposition 
that he had ``stepped up'' the job search before he learned 
that Ms. Lewinsky was involved. On a final note, a conspiracy 
takes two willing actors. I would have a hard time convicting 
the President of this charge when both Mr. Jordan and Ms. 
Lewinsky have denied that there was any connection between the 
job search and the false affidavit.
    Another allegation is that the President obstructed justice 
by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit in the 
Jones case. The House managers have shown that when the 
President informed Ms. Lewinsky that her name had appeared on 
the Jones witness list, he suggested that she might file an 
affidavit to avoid being deposed. To find that the President 
obstructed justice, however, I must infer from the evidence 
that the President was encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to file a false 
affidavit. I cannot make this leap when Ms. Lewinsky herself 
testified that President Clinton made no connection between 
their false cover stories and the contents of the affidavit. 
Indeed, Ms. Lewinsky testified repeatedly that the President 
never discussed the contents of the affidavit with her and 
that, at the time of their conversation, she did not think that 
the affidavit necessarily had to be false.
    Article II also alleges that the President obstructed 
justice by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to hide his gifts. The 
thrust of the House managers' claim is that the President 
instructed Ms. Currie to pick up the gifts from Monica Lewinsky 
on December 28, 1997, so Ms. Lewinsky would not have to turn 
the gifts over to Paula Jones' attorneys. I would agree that 
the circumstances of the President's secretary, Ms. Currie, 
picking up the gifts several hours after Ms. Lewinsky suggested 
to the President that Ms. Currie might hold onto them for 
safekeeping are certainly suspect. If the House managers could 
prove that Ms. Currie initiated the gift pickup, there would be 
clear and convincing evidence that the President was in fact 
encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to hide the gifts. Because there is 
conflicting evidence on this critical issue, the House managers 
did not meet their burden.
    In addition, article II alleges that the President 
obstructed justice by making false and misleading statement to 
his aides about Ms. Lewinsky. Given that the President had an 
ongoing relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, it was spurious, mean 
spirited, defamatory and morally wrong for the President to 
refer to Ms. Lewinsky as a stalker or to in any way impugn her 
reputation. The House managers and all of us have every reason 
to be incensed by the President's actions. That being said, it 
is clear that the President made these remarks in his 
continuing effort to conceal the true nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. There is no evidence that the 
President knew these aides would be called to testify. 
Therefore, I believe that this allegation has no merit.
    While I found the other charges alleged in article II to be 
either legally or factually deficient, there is one allegation 
of obstruction of justice which I believe that the House 
managers have proven by clear and convincing evidence; the 
President's postdeposition statements to Bettie Currie. Ms. 
Currie testified that on two occasions in the days following 
the President's deposition in the Jones case, the President 
called her into his office and made a series of remarks to her: 
``You were always there when she was there, right? We were 
never alone. You could see and hear everything. Monica came on 
to me and I never touched her, right? She wanted to have sex 
with me and I couldn't do that.''
    I simply do not believe the President's explanation that he 
was questioning Ms. Currie in an ``effort to get as much 
information as quickly as I could'' or that he was ``trying to 
ascertain what the facts were'' or ``what Ms. Currie's 
perception was.'' I am also not persuaded by the fact that Ms. 
Currie testified that she did not feel pressured to agree with 
the President. Rather, I agree with the House managers that if 
the President was actually seeking information he would not 
have been asking rhetorical questions. I also believe that the 
President's explanation would be more plausible if his 
statements to Ms. Currie were not false.
    The fact is that the President gave false testimony in the 
Jones deposition, that during his deposition he repeatedly 
referred to Ms. Currie as someone who could back up his 
testimony, and that immediately following the deposition he 
summoned Ms. Currie into work on a Sunday and cleverly spoon-
fed his cover stories to her. Despite the President's counsel's 
protestation, there was still a possibility that Ms. Currie 
could be called to testify in the Jones case. Accordingly, I 
believe that when the President called Ms. Currie to his office 
and repeatedly recounted these false statements he ``endeavored 
to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of 
justice'' in violation of the Federal obstruction statute.
    The House managers have left us with the impression that 
once we conclude that the President has committed either 
perjury or obstruction of justice, we have a constitutional 
duty to vote to remove the President from office. They maintain 
that perjury and obstruction of justice must be considered high 
crimes per se because they carry the same penalties as bribery. 
I reject this premise. In fact, the severity of a bribery 
sentence is dependent on subject matter and the amount of the 
bribe. Similarly, a conclusion that the President committed 
obstruction of justice should not automatically warrant his 
removal. It is incumbent upon each of us to examine the 
underlying facts and circumstances to determine whether or not 
the President has committed a high crime.
    Now, having found that the President is guilty of 
obstructing justice in the Paula Jones case, I had to determine 
whether the violation is a ``high crime'' warranting removal 
from office. This led me to think about what justice was 
actually being obstructed and to consider the underlying 
circumstances that brought us here today.
    In the narrow legal sense, this entire impeachment trial 
rests on the independent counsel statute and the Paula Jones 
case.
    As many of my colleagues remember, Congress enacted the 
independent counsel statute in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal, after President Nixon ordered the dismissal of special 
Watergate prosecutor Archibald Cox over his refusal to drop a 
subpoena for Nixon's incriminating White House tapes. Congress 
designed the independent counsel statute to insulate and 
protect investigations of alleged criminal conduct by the 
President and other high-level Federal officials. 
Unfortunately, the statute has not worked as Congress 
envisioned it would. This well-intended statute has resulted in 
a proliferation of interminable, expensive investigations 
against public officials. It has cost our taxpayers more than 
$130 million, and considering all the time, effort and expense, 
there have been very few successful prosecutions resulting from 
the statute.
    One such investigation under the statute originated in 
August 1994, when Judge Kenneth Starr was appointed as an 
independent counsel to investigate alleged wrongful acts in the 
so-called Whitewater land deal. During the course of the next 4 
years, the Office of independent counsel (``OIC'') expanded its 
investigation of President Clinton a number of times. At the 
same time, the President was defending a civil rights action by 
Paula Jones, a former Arkansas State employee who alleged that 
President Clinton sexually harassed her during the time he 
served as Governor. Last January, the OIC was able to expand 
its investigation and redirect its D.C.-based Whitewater grand 
jury panel to investigate the President's concealment of his 
extramarital affair with White House employee Monica Lewinsky.
    We must not forget the reason that the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was even an issue in the Jones 
suit was because Paula Jones was trying to show that the 
President's treatment of Ms. Jones was part of a pattern and 
practice of sexual harassment. Judge Wright initially ruled 
that Paula Jones was entitled to information on the so-called 
Jane Does, because that evidence might help establish the 
President's pattern of sexually harassing conduct. However, 
Judge Wright ultimately ruled that evidence about the 
President's harassment of other women would not change her 
decision to dismiss the case because Paula Jones failed to 
establish that she herself was harassed. I quote from the 
judge's April 1, 1998, decision:

    One final matter concerns alleged suppression of pattern and 
practice evidence. Whatever relevance such evidence may have to prove 
other elements of plaintiff's case, it does not have anything to do 
with the issues presented by the President's motion for summary 
judgment, i.e., whether plaintiff herself was the victim of alleged 
quid pro quo or hostile work environment sexual harassment. . . . 
Whether other woman may have been subjected to workplace harassment, 
and whether such evidence has allegedly been suppressed, does not 
change the fact that plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she has a 
case worthy of submitting to a jury. [emphasis added]

    Why is this ruling so important in my decision? Well, we 
are essentially here today because the Whitewater investigation 
was expanded to determine whether President Clinton's efforts 
to conceal his consensual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
obstructed Paula Jones' right to justice. The plain fact is 
that the Jones case was thrown out because Judge Wright ruled 
that Paula Jones had no case and that even if the President had 
revealed the true nature of his consensual relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky, it would not have changed the outcome of the 
Paula Jones case. While President's relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky was morally wrong, there is absolutely no evidence 
that the President was sexually harassing Ms. Lewinsky.
    Although I have concluded that the President obstructed 
justice by trying to influence the testimony of Bettie Currie, 
the fact is that the President's actions did not actually 
hinder Paula Jones. Indeed, in the midst of the OIC 
investigation, Paula Jones appealed Judge Wright's ruling and 
the President agreed to pay her $850,000 in an out-of-court 
settlement. Some might even argue that as a perverse result of 
the President's obstruction of justice, Paula Jones ended up 
with greater monetary relief than she would have otherwise 
received. Therefore, while the articles of impeachment came 
about as a direct result of President Clinton's actions in the 
Jones case, it is clear that in the end the President's actions 
did not negatively affect Paula Jones' justice. In other words, 
there was no justice to obstruct in the Jones case.
    Most of us now believe the President lied about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky when he testified under oath and 
that he also lied about the nature of his relationship to his 
staff, his family and the American people. I have concluded the 
President not only lied about the affair but that he took at 
least one illegal action in an attempt to conceal the truth 
from Paula Jones. However, I believe that President Clinton 
took these steps to avoid deep personal embarrassment, not to 
seize, maintain or subvert the power of the state.
    Let us not forget that the ultimate question we must each 
answer is whether on these facts arising out of these 
circumstances this President poses such a danger to the state 
that we can no longer permit him to remain in office. The 
ultimate issue here is a determination of whether the President 
is fit to serve.
    Consider our constitutional guidance: The President of the 
United States ``shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors.'' The framers intentionally set this standard 
at an extremely high level to ensure that only the most serious 
offenses would justify overturning a popular election. The 
concept of ``maladministration'' was considered and rejected.
    I believe that whether the President's misconduct occurred 
in the private sphere or in his public or official capacity is 
also an important distinction to make when deciding his fitness 
to serve. Clearly, there are those private acts which in no way 
reflect on a President's fitness for office. On the other hand, 
there are public or official acts which I think no reasonable 
person would doubt reflect poorly on a President's fitness for 
office and would warrant impeachment and removal. I think we 
can all see the difference in gravity between the offenses of 
which President Clinton stands accused and a hypothetical 
accusation that he took a bribe. While the former reflects 
poorly on his character and discretion, the latter reflects on 
his fitness to serve and describes a classic case of abuse of 
office.
    For the President to do what he did was reprehensible and 
morally wrong. I believe that the President lied to avoid 
embarrassment. However, the framers did not envision such 
behavior as being encompassed by the phrase ``other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.''
    The bottom line is that old maxim that bad facts lead to 
bad law. Such a low threshold for removal of a President from 
office would be dangerous. After careful consideration, I have 
concluded that President Clinton has not committed an offense 
that indicates the President is not fit to serve. Therefore, I 
will not vote to convict President Clinton.
    I do not want the President to come away from this trial 
thinking that he is forgiven, or that what he has done is not 
serious, because I think it was most serious. I do not want the 
people of this Nation to think that a vote of acquittal means 
that the President's conduct is acceptable because it is not 
acceptable. Lying and obstruction are wrong. I also hope that 
my vote does not lend any credence to the notion that sexual 
harassment is not that important, because it is important. A 
determination to let the President serve out his term should 
not be taken as an exoneration of his actions. At the same 
time, I think it is extremely important that we leave this 
chapter behind us and move on to the Nation's business.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Paul Wellstone

    Mr. WELLSTONE. Mr. Chief Justice, I want to explain my 
views publicly on the impeachment articles sent to us by a 
partisan vote of the House of Representatives, and on the 
removal of the President from office which they would prompt.
    First, I am shocked and saddened that our Republican 
colleagues persistently have blocked our efforts to have open 
and public debates and discussion in our deliberations in this 
matter, and most especially in our deliberations on the final 
votes on whether to remove the President. Whatever their 
motives, this is not what a free, representative, accountable 
democracy is all about. Simply publishing partial transcripts 
of our proceedings, which include only some formal statements 
made by Senators and not the deliberations themselves--and 
doing so only at the end of the trial--is, in my view, a great 
leap sideways.
    I also want to describe what I think--and frankly have 
thought for months--is a more appropriate mechanism to express 
our disapproval of the President's behavior: a tough, 
bipartisan censure resolution which makes clear our contempt 
for what he's done in lying to his family, his friends, his 
staff, and the American people about his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky, and the disgrace which those lies have placed 
upon his Presidency for all time.
    In recent months, hundreds of constitutional scholars--
including many respected conservatives--have argued that, in 
their view, the Constitution does allow this censure vote; the 
Senate's precedents allow it; we have done it before. It is 
true that the Constitution is silent on the question of what 
else we can do in addition to removal; it is also true that the 
Constitution in no way prevents us from moving forward on 
censure. The argument that we are somehow blocked 
constitutionally from censuring the President is contrived and 
fraught with partisan pleading.
    Even so, if we are ultimately blocked by a filibuster from 
a vote on censure, the President will not have escaped the 
judgment of Congress or the American people. Any Senator, in 
any venue they choose, can offer their own forceful, public 
censure of the President, repeatedly if they like. I certainly 
have. A corporate expression of the Senate's condemnation of 
the President's actions, while of course preferable, is not 
essential, for all of us already have made known our views.
    We all condemn the President's behavior. It has been said 
so many times, it hardly bears repeating, were it not for the 
willful, partisan attempts to mischaracterize a vote against 
removal as a vote to condone what the President has done. That 
is, of course, preposterous; the President has been impeached 
by the House. That has only happened once before in our 
history. The trial has gone forward, and every Member of this 
body has condemned the President's behavior as unacceptable, 
meriting only scorn and rebuke.
    It is clear that the President already has paid a terrible 
price in the eyes of history, not least in the shame and 
humiliation that this permanent mark on his Presidency has 
caused him, his family, his friends and supporters, and his 
administration. The message is clear, including to our young 
people: When one fails to tell the truth, there are real, 
sometimes even awful, consequences and costs. The President's 
behavior was shameful, despicable, unworthy, a disgrace to his 
office. And in this long, sordid, painful process, I believe he 
has been held accountable for what he has done.
    Pursued overzealously by Kenneth Starr and by House 
Judiciary Committee Republicans, the articles were then 
approved by the full House in a grossly unfair and partisan 
proceeding that was destructive both of our polity and our 
politics. All of us should be deeply troubled by it, and all 
should work together to put it behind us. In my view, these 
allegations should never have reached the Senate. But they 
have, and the trial has now been held. It has changed few, if 
any, minds on the basic facts, on how the law should be applied 
to those facts, or on the high bar for removal set by the 
Constitution.
    Finally we bring to a close this long, sad year of 
investigations, hearings, and speeches. It has been a painful 
year. In many ways, it has been a lost year. Think of what we 
might have done this past year, had we not done this. Think of 
the news we could have made, had not all seen this. Think of 
the good laws that we could have written, had not this stood in 
the way. Think of the opportunities lost, the hopes staved off. 
We must ask with Langston Hughes, ``What happens to a dream 
deferred?''
    Sadly, so many opportunities for better, more prudent and 
proportionate judgment fell by the wayside. First, and most 
important, the President should have avoided this sorry 
relationship. Then, a little over a year ago, the President 
could have been more forthcoming and told the whole truth, 
instead of misleading us all. The American people could have 
handled it. Then the independent counsel could have shown 
greater discretion in judging whether to bring this case 
forward. The leadership of the House of Representatives could 
have allowed a vote on censuring the President, instead of 
pushing the case forward to impeachment. They were wrong to 
thwart the will of what I expect would have been a House 
majority in so doing. And the Senate could have voted to 
dismiss the case and promptly and resolutely censured the 
President.
    Instead, against better judgment, against all indications 
of the people's will, and against any shred of charity, an 
ardent and zealous minority pressed on. They had the right. 
They had the power. But they were wrong, and I believe history 
will so judge them. It is a supreme irony that the most 
conservative forces in our politics today have for months 
wielded the most radical option made available in the 
Constitution against this President: impeachment and removal. 
Aware of its dangers, our founders designed constitutional 
protections against its abuse. This process has shown that 
those protections are not perfect; they require reasoned 
judgment in their application; judgment that has been missing 
in this process from day one.
    Let us resolve to learn the lessons of this long, sad year. 
Let us learn now, having come this far, the wisdom of the 
founders that impeachment is and must be a high barricade, not 
to be mounted lightly. Let us learn that because it requires 
the overwhelming support of the Senate to succeed, it cannot 
and should not proceed on a merely partisan basis. Let us learn 
that the desire to impeach and remove must be shared broadly, 
or it is illegitimate.
    Let us learn that the subject matter of impeachment must be 
a matter of great gravity, calling into question the 
President's very ability to lead, and endangering the Nation's 
liberty, freedom, security. Let us learn that the case against 
the President must be a strong and unambiguous one in fact and 
in law, for even a President deserves the benefit of our 
reasonable doubts.
    The charges brought against President Clinton do not rise 
to those levels. And even if they did, the case against him is 
neither strong nor unambiguous. As the White House defense team 
has made clear, there are ample grounds for doubt about both 
the facts and law surrounding each of the two articles before 
us.
    It is true that the impeachment process has further 
alienated millions of Americans from their government, and that 
is a tragic harm for which the President bears considerable 
responsibility. It is also true, as we were told by Chairman 
Hyde yesterday, that the nobility and fragility of a self-
governing people requires hard work, every day, to get it 
right, to fight the good fight, to discern the common good. But 
I believe, unlike him, that it is the impeachment process 
itself, both here and in the other body--its partisanship, its 
meanness and unfairness, its leadership by those who want to 
win too badly--which has increased people's cynicism; not the 
prospect of the President's ``getting away'' with something.
    Our Nation was founded on the Jeffersonian principle ``that 
government is the strongest of which every man feels himself a 
part.'' What Jefferson and the other founders feared was the 
warning of their counterpart Rousseau: ``As soon as any man 
says of the affairs of state `What does it matter to me?' the 
state may be given up as lost.'' But while the many signs of 
disaffection among our people are growing, I do not think we 
have reached the point of no return; there is time in this 
Congress to recover from this episode, and to move on.
    Despite the claims of pundits that Americans have simply 
tuned out, I think a deeper reality is present in their 
reactions, and in the polls. In fact, most Americans, in their 
wisdom, have reached a subtle, sophisticated judgment in this 
case, and have already moved beyond it. As is so often the 
case, they're way ahead of Washington. It is true that they 
abhor the President's behavior but don't believe it merits his 
removal. In addition, they believe there are larger issues 
facing the Nation than the misdeeds that nearly all now concede 
the President committed: peace in the Middle East; the hunger 
of children; the health of Americans; saving our Social 
Security safety net; debating whether hundreds of billions of 
dollars of surplus should go to bolster Medicare, or to some 
combination of universal savings accounts or tax cuts. These 
are the things the people sent us here to work on. These are 
the things that I hear about when I return to my State.
    So let us now bring to a close, with our votes, this long, 
sad year of investigation and impeachment. And let us resolve 
that there shall be many a year before we have another one like 
it. It is time for our country to pull together to seek an end 
to the fractious partisanship that has defined this period, and 
to re-engage a full-throated, genuine debate about our Nation's 
future that can help us find again that common ground that 
unites us as Americans and that can serve as a firm foundation 
for resolving the many serious problems that still face our 
country--impeachment or not--today and tomorrow.
    We should, as White House attorney Charles Ruff said, 
listen to the voices not merely of the advocates who have been 
before us, but of Madison, Hamilton, and the others who met in 
Philadelphia 212 years ago; of the generations of Americans 
since then; of the American people now, and of future 
generations of Americans. And if we do, we will do the right 
thing.
    Congressman John Lewis observed in his final impeachment 
speech, in the end, we are ``one house, one family, one people; 
the American house, the American family, the American people.'' 
We are called together to come to judgment on this President, 
and then to return promptly to the pressing issues that lay 
before us and that require our urgent attention. That judgment 
is by now clear: Bill Clinton should remain President; the 
censure of this body, and the historic impeachment that will 
ever attach to his name, will leave a permanent mark on his 
Presidency.
    I thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, for the fine work you have 
done, and I thank both the majority leader and the minority 
leader for their leadership. I said to Senator Lott, I think 
yesterday, I am still furious that we are in closed session and 
will say that, but I appreciate the way in which you have kept 
us together. I thank the two of you.
    I was thinking I might do something a little different, 
because even if I were to give a great speech to the best of my 
ability, I don't know that there are any more arguments that 
can be made. I was thinking like, I might agree--actually I 
have a printed statement--I might agree to just have my 
statement included in the Record and not speak any further, if 
I can get some support for some legislation. (Laughter.)
    Just on some children's legislation. Does it look like we 
are at that point? It does? Well, I like that show of support, 
and I think, Mr. Chief Justice, what I will do is give to you 
in a moment a full statement and just simply say to everybody 
here about three things in 2 minutes.
    One, I wish we had done this in open session, and I cover 
that more in my full statement.
    Second of all, I think that a decision to acquit is 
certainly not a decision to condone the President's behavior 
which I think merits scorn and rebuke.
    Third of all, I think that the standard, and I want to say 
this to Senator Domenici, talking about children, to me the 
standard is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. I think the 
evidence has to be unambiguous and strong. I don't think it 
was. Senator Levin said that very well, so I don't need to 
repeat any of those arguments.
    Fourth of all, Tim Hutchinson, Senator Hutchinson, I like 
what you said about the polls. I actually make a different 
argument. I raised the question earlier when we were raising 
questions about popular will and does it matter. I actually 
meant about the last election, it seems to me if it ever does, 
it is on such a decision. I think before you overturn an 
election, you really have to meet a very high threshold. I 
don't think the House managers have done so.
    Finally, I think a lesson that I have learned as a 
political scientist, when I teach class again, is I do not 
think the articles work and this process works when it is 
clearly not bipartisan. I think it becomes illegitimate. It 
just doesn't work.
    You did not have broad support coming from the House, and 
you do not have it here. That is why I think it was doomed from 
the start.
    Finally, it has been a long, sad year, and I wish--I just 
wish--that those who could have really rendered decisions with 
judgment had done so, starting with the President and his sorry 
affair. He could have told the truth to the people in the 
country. The people would have appreciated that. I could also 
talk about Starr, and I could also talk about the House, and I 
could also talk about us. But I do not think I need to do so.
    Let's get on with the work of democracy. We have had some 
strong views here, but I am looking forward to working with 
you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Ted Stevens

    Mr. STEVENS. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank our majority 
leader. Throughout this ordeal, no one has tried to poll me on 
any substantive matter or influence my vote. That, to me, means 
a great deal. I view this process as the most serious task I 
have faced as a Senator over the past 30 years, and I 
appreciate the recognition by the leadership of the solemnity 
of our duties under these circumstances and the fact that we 
each must reach our own conclusions based on the evidence.
    As Senators, each of us joined in this oath:

    I . . . do solemnly swear that I will support and defend the 
constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and 
domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that 
I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or 
purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge my 
duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God.

    And now, we took an additional oath:

    [I] solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial of 
the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
States, now pending, [I] will do impartial justice according to the 
Constitution and laws, so help [me] God.

    As free citizens of the world's most successful democracy, 
we are inexorably tied to the pledges and commitments we make. 
These obligations, and the unlimited benefits they bestow on 
us, depend on our willingness to be truthful with one another. 
The President took the two most serious oaths any American ever 
encounters: the oath to faithfully execute our laws, 
administered by the Chief Justice, our Presiding Officer, on 
the steps of this building, and the oath to tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth to a jury of his peers.
    I am most concerned that the action we take here today not 
denigrate the role of oaths and truth in our society. To be 
fair to the President, I feel he believed that he admitted to 
the grand jury that he had not testified truthfully under oath 
in his deposition. In fact he did not, and he did not tell the 
truth to the grand jury either.
    Both the House managers and the President's lawyers have 
seized on apparent conflicts in the evidence and recorded 
testimony before this Court of Impeachment. Nonetheless, the 
evidentiary record and the presentations of both sides, as 
supplemented by their responses to our questions, leave no 
doubt in my mind that if I were sitting as a juror in a 
criminal case I would find that the accused is guilty of 
perjury as charged in article I. Following the jury's verdict, 
it would then fall to the judge to determine appropriate 
punishment within the bounds of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines provided by Congress.
    But an impeachment trial is no ordinary proceeding. We sit 
as judge and jury--rulers on law and triers of fact. The 
Constitution charges us with a great responsibility. Section 4 
of article II of the Constitution requires that the President 
be removed from office upon conviction of high crimes and 
misdemeanors. No President has ever been removed under these 
circumstances. To me, that history alone should make each of us 
seriously consider whether the facts presented to us require 
that the Senate exercise this awesome power.
    The process by which our Founding Fathers determined that 
this power should be vested in the Congress is adequately 
briefed in the record. I found particularly helpful the 
testimony and scholarly papers from the hearings before the 
House Judiciary Committee on November 9, 1998.
    Remember in the House committee deliberations, the minority 
submitted a joint resolution of censure for consideration in 
lieu of the articles finally voted upon. It restated:

    Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to the censure of 
William Jefferson Clinton. Resolved by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
That it is the sense of Congress that--
    (1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the oath 
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States faithfully to 
execute the office of President; implicit in that oath is the 
obligation that the President set an example of high moral standards 
and conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect for the truth; and 
William Jefferson Clinton, has egregiously failed in this obligation, 
and through his actions violated the trust of the American people, 
lessened their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the 
office which they have entrusted to him;
    (2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements concerning 
this reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
    (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongly took steps to delay discovery 
of the truth; and
    (C) in as much as no person is above the law, William Jefferson 
Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil penalties; and
    (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, by 
his conduct has brought upon himself, and fully deserves, the censure 
and condemnation of the American people and the Congress; and by his 
signature on this Joint Resolution, acknowledges this censure and 
condemnation.

    On December 19, 1998, the House minority in the full House 
offered this resolution on the House floor which stated:

    That it is the sense of the House that--
    (1) on January 20, 1993, William Jefferson Clinton took the oath 
prescribed by the Constitution of the United States faithfully to 
execute the office of President; implicit in that oath is the 
obligation that the President set an example of high moral standards 
and conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect for the truth; and 
William Jefferson Clinton, has egregiously failed in this obligation, 
and through his actions violated the trust of the American people, 
lessened their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the 
office which they have entrusted to him:
    (2)(A) William Jefferson Clinton made false statements concerning 
his reprehensible conduct with a subordinate;
    (B) William Jefferson Clinton wrongfully took steps to delay 
discovery of the truth; and
    (C) in as much as no person is above the law, William Jefferson 
Clinton remains subject to criminal and civil penalties; and
    (3) William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, by 
his conduct has brought upon himself and fully deserves the censure and 
condemnation of the American people and this House.

    As a former U.S. attorney, Solicitor of the Department of 
the Interior, and defense attorney, I believe I understand the 
rule of law. The conduct which the President engaged in was 
clearly wrong, and his actions clearly warrant his impeachment, 
which the House of Representatives has done. But with regard to 
the allegations in article I, I do not believe his criminal 
activity rises to the level of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' 
which require his removal from office by this Senate.
    Article II, charging obstruction of justice, to me, 
involves a very different matter than the perjury charge in 
article I. Article II involves the use of Presidential powers 
to impede or imperil the impartial administration of justice in 
a civil as well as before the grand jury. We have pledged to 
``Support and Defend the Constitution,'' and I suggest that in 
our present roles we must do so by fulfilling and reaffirming 
the freedoms and obligations of all Americans under that 
document. By micromanaging the briefing of witnesses and the 
concealment of evidence and by testifying before the grand jury 
to what he knew was not the whole truth, the President has 
obstructed justice. His oath as President requires him to 
faithfully execute laws, and by his actions he has violated 
this oath.
    In his 1992 book ``Grand Inquests,'' the Presiding Officer 
of this court (and the Chief Justice of the United States) 
wrote:

    The framers [of the United States Constitution] and the authors of 
the Federalist Papers had not envisioned political parties as we now 
know them . . . Would the dominant role played by political parties 
make the Senate a partisan tribunal which would be willing to undermine 
the fundamental principles of the Constitution in order to remove a 
political enemy from office?

    I also wonder whether the framers anticipated that in 85 of 
the 106 Congresses, the minority party has held more than the 
necessary one-third strength to prevent the removal of a 
President?
    The action of the House of Representatives was not 
partisan. But, it is obvious from the final vote that future 
generations could reach such a conclusion. In fact, it is 
obvious that many of our Democratic Senators have done so. In 
this Senate, a final vote strictly on party lines should not 
occur. The fundamental principles referenced by the Chief 
Justice--particularly the balance of power between the 
legislative and executive branches of our Federal Government--
should not be undermined. The most basic principle at issue is 
the obligation of each branch to dedicate itself to protect the 
separation of powers of our three branches of Government.
    In my judgment, the power of the Senate to reach across to 
the executive branch and remove a President of the United 
States may be exercised only when the President's actions 
seriously threaten our Nation's security, when he violates his 
oath to ``faithfully execute the law of the United States,'' or 
does such violence to the rule of law that removal from office 
is clearly the only way to protect our Nation from the 
possibility that he might do great harm to our people.
    While I believe the President violated his oath, it does 
not necessarily follow that he must be removed. For myself, if 
I knew my vote would be the deciding vote here, I would not 
vote to remove this President, despite his unlawful acts. He 
has not brought that level of danger to the Nation which, in my 
judgment, is necessary to justify such an action.
    The President remains answerable, as all Americans should 
be, to the criminal processes of our justice system. We do not 
have the power to convict him of a crime; the Constitution 
forbids it. Instead, the Constitution provides that the Senate, 
by a two-thirds majority of those voting, may remove him from 
office. For me, that makes this more than a factual issue, so I 
do not vote as I would were I a juror in a criminal case.
    As I prepared my decision, it was apparent to me that there 
was no alternative that will dispose of this matter consistent 
with the sanctity of oaths and the importance of truth other 
than to adopt findings of fact. Not to do so and to not remove 
the President undermines the great success of a Nation based 
upon observance and loyalty to our oaths.
    Having no other alternative, I shall vote guilty on article 
II. As I previously pointed out, I would not do so if I knew 
such action would remove the President from office. I do so to 
demonstrate my firm conviction not only that the President has 
obstructed justice, but also that we should have followed the 
procedure which would establish the facts clearly and then 
determine if the President should be removed from office.
    When we had our first meetings on this issue, I told my 
colleagues we had forces in Kuwait on high alert, forces in 
Bosnia, an alarming situation in North Korea, and Asian flu 
plaguing the economies of emerging Nations, and Pakistan and 
India drawing closer and closer to conflict. President Yeltsin, 
when I saw him yesterday, was a very ill leader, a leader of a 
Nation that has the ability to threaten our freedom. NATO could 
well order an assault in Kosovo if negotiations there break 
down.
    The world has one stable superpower--the United States of 
America. Removal of the President by the Senate for the first 
time in history could destabilize our Nation--leaving him in 
office will not.
    The long National ordeal our country has undergone over the 
past year has been agonizing for all of us. Since the Senate 
convened as a Court of Impeachment, I have received thousands 
of e-mails and letters from every reach of my State, from the 
most remote Eskimo village to our largest urban center.
    I have received letters from literally every walk of life: 
from doctors, lawyers, and Indian chiefs. Many are filled with 
advice on how I should cast my vote, the most important vote I 
will ever cast as a Senator. But whether they believe the 
President should be removed from office or not, all express 
deep concerns about the future of our country and the example 
we set for future generations. I have laid awake many nights 
pondering those very questions, and I share the anguish that 
many have felt.
    When I was appointed to the Senate 30 years ago Christmas 
Eve, I had a motto that I have tried to live by. ``To hell with 
the politics. Just do what's right for Alaska.'' Today, as one 
of 100 men and women who have been chosen to exercise this 
mighty power that our Founding Fathers conveyed on us over 200 
years ago, I modify my creed: ``To hell with the politics. Just 
do what's right for the Nation.''
    There are many who will disagree with the votes I cast in 
this historic trial. But I hope all will know that I have done 
my best to live by the oaths that I took, and to do what I 
think is right for the Nation.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Joseph I. Lieberman

    Mr. LIEBERMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, throughout the history of 
this great country, we have endured trials that have strained 
the sinews of our democracy and sometimes even threatened to 
tear apart our unparalleled experiment in self-government. Each 
time the Nation has returned to the Constitution as our common 
lodestar, trusting in its vision, its values and its ultimate 
verity. Each time we have emerged from these tests stronger, 
more resilient, more certain of Daniel Webster's claim of ``one 
country, one constitution, one destiny.'' (Speech to a Whig 
Party rally in New York City, March 15, 1837.) And each time 
our awe of the Founders' genius has been renewed, as has our 
reverence for the brilliantly-calibrated instrument they 
crafted to guide their political progeny in the unending 
challenge of governing as a free people.
    At this moment, we face a test that, although not as grave 
or perilous as some before, is nevertheless unlike anything 
this Nation has ever experienced. As my colleagues well know, 
the impeachment trial of William Jefferson Clinton marks the 
first time in our history that the United States Senate has 
convened as a court of impeachment to consider removing an 
elected President from office. But what also makes this trial 
unprecedented are the underlying charges against President 
Clinton, which stem directly from his private sexual behavior. 
The facts of this case are complicated, embarrassing, 
demoralizing, and infuriating. They raise questions that 
Madison, Hamilton, and their brethren could never have 
anticipated that the Senate would have to address in the solemn 
context of impeachment.
    The public examination of these difficult questions--about 
private and public morality, about the role of the independent 
counsel, and about our expectations of Presidential conduct--
has been a wrenching, dispiriting and at times unseemly process 
for the Nation. It has divided us as parties and as a people, 
reaching its nadir in the partisan bickering and badgering that 
unfortunately defined the impeachment vote in the House of 
Representatives and compromised the legitimacy of this process 
in the eyes of many Americans. It has set off a frenzy in the 
news media that has degraded and devalued our public discourse 
and badly eroded the traditional boundaries between public and 
private life, leaving a pornographer to assume the role of 
arbiter of our political mores. And it has so alienated the 
American people that many of them are hardly paying attention 
to a trial that could result in the most radical disruption of 
the Presidency--excepting assassination--in our Nation's 
history.
    Yet despite the significant pain this trauma has caused for 
the country, I take heart from the fact that we have once again 
reaffirmed our commitment to the Constitution and the 
fundamental principles underpinning it. The conduct of the 
trial here in the Senate has been passionate at times, but 
never uncivil, and while some votes have broken along party 
lines, they have never broken the spirit of common purpose we 
share. Indeed, throughout the past several weeks we as a body 
have grown closer as we have continually measured our actions 
with the same constitutional yardstick, and each of us has 
sought to remain faithful to the founders' vision as we 
understand it in fulfilling our responsibilities as triers of 
the President. This, I believe, is in the end a remarkable 
testament to the foresight of our forefathers, that even in 
this most unusual of crises, we could and would rely on the 
Constitution as our compass to find a peaceable and just 
resolution.
    We are about to achieve that resolution and complete our 
constitutional responsibilities by rendering a judgment, a 
profound judgment, about the conduct of President Clinton and 
the call of the House of Representatives to remove him from 
office. This is the duty we accepted when we swore to do 
``impartial justice,'' and it is a duty that I, as each of you, 
have pondered night and day since this trial began.
    As I have stated previously on this Senate floor, I have 
been deeply disappointed and angered by this President's 
conduct--that which is covered in the articles, and the more 
personal misbehavior that is not--and like all of us here, I 
have struggled uncomfortably for more than a year with how to 
respond to it. President Clinton engaged in an extramarital 
sexual relationship with a young White House employee in the 
Oval Office, which, though consensual, was irresponsible and 
immoral, and thus raised serious questions about his judgment 
and his respect for the high office he holds. He then made 
false or misleading statements about that relationship to the 
American people, to a Federal district court judge in a civil 
deposition, and to a Federal grand jury; in so doing, he 
betrayed not only his family but the public's trust, and 
undermined his moral authority and public credibility.
    But the judgment we must now make is not about the 
rightness or wrongness of the President's relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky and his efforts to conceal it. Nor is that 
judgment about whether the President is guilty of committing a 
specific crime. That may be determined by a criminal court, 
which the Senate clearly is not, after he leaves office.
    No, the question before us now is whether the President's 
conduct--as alleged in the two articles of impeachment--makes 
his continuance in office a threat to our government, our 
people, and the National interest. That, I conclude, is the 
extraordinarily high bar the framers set for removal of a duly-
elected President, and it is that standard we must apply to the 
facts to determine whether the President is guilty of ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
    Each side has had ample opportunity to present its case, 
illuminating the voluminous record from the House, and we 
Senators have been able to ask wide-ranging questions of both 
parties. The House was also authorized to conduct depositions 
of the three witnesses it deemed most important to its case. I 
have listened intently throughout, watched the videotaped 
depositions, and been very impressed by both the House managers 
and the counsel for the President. The House managers, for 
their part, have presented the facts and argued the 
Constitution so effectively that they impelled me more than 
once to seriously consider voting for removal.
    But after much reflection and review of the extensive 
evidence before us, of the meaning of the term ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors,'' and, most importantly, of the best 
interests of the Nation, I have concluded that the facts do not 
meet the high standard the founders established for conviction 
and removal. No matter how deeply disappointed I am that our 
President, who has worked so successfully to lift up the lives 
of so many people, so lowered himself and his office, I 
conclude that his wrongdoing in this sordid saga does not 
justify making him the first President to be ousted from office 
in our history. I will therefore vote against both articles of 
impeachment.
    In reaching the judgment that President Clinton is not 
guilty of high crimes or misdemeanors, I started from the same 
premise that the founders did--the right of the people to 
choose their leaders is paramount in America, derived directly, 
as Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence, 
from the equality of rights endowed to the people by our 
Creator. The supremacy of this first democratic principle was 
well described by Alexis De Tocqueville in ``Democracy in 
America'': ``The people reign in the American political world 
as the Deity does in the universe. They are the cause and the 
aim of all things; everything comes from them, and everything 
is absorbed in them.'' (Heffner ed., 1956, p. 58.)
    In debating the President's fate, we must remember that 
what we are deciding is whether to supersede the people's 
decision about who should lead them--to substitute our judgment 
for theirs. On this point, the framers of the Constitution were 
clear. They had boldly rejected the autocratic rule of a 
monarch and put in his place a President elected by, and 
accountable to, the people. Their deliberations show that they 
did not want even the legislature to exercise too much control 
over the popularly-chosen President. The framers provided 
impeachment to serve as the narrowest of escape valves in the 
most extreme of cases. As a result, they set an extraordinarily 
high bar--both procedurally and substantively--for Congress to 
overcome before we, rather than the voters, could remove a 
President from office.
    Specifically, they required a majority of the House of 
Representatives to impeach and permitted removal only upon the 
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate--which the framers 
surely knew, and the current proceedings have demonstrated, is 
exceedingly difficult to obtain. They also established a very 
strict substantive standard, authorizing the Congress to remove 
a President from office only upon ``Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' (U.S. Constitution, Art. II, sec. 4.)
    The first time I read that clause, ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors,'' I assumed it included any criminal offense--and 
only criminal offenses--and I thought that it gave Congress 
broad latitude to impeach and remove from office a President 
who had committed any violation of the criminal code. But the 
more I studied the history, the less clear that interpretation 
became. The phrase ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' was a term 
of art to the framers, and it meant something very different 
from ordinary crimes, the response to which must be left to the 
criminal justice system. The framers chose the term ``high 
crimes'' to connote a very specific type of offense, like 
treason or bribery, which has a direct impact on the Government 
and undermines the chief executive's ability or will to 
continue serving without corruption and in the National 
interest. As Alexander Hamilton explained in ``The Federalist 
Papers,'' high crimes and misdemeanors are ``those offenses 
which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They 
are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.'' (``The Federalist Papers'' 
No. 65, Rossiter ed. 1961, p. 396 (emphasis in original).)
    It is not necessary here to offer a lengthy dissertation on 
the Constitutional Convention's impeachment debates. But I 
would like to share a statement of James Madison that 
illuminates the reasons why the framers wanted to authorize 
impeachment and removal, as well as the intended scope of that 
power. In response to the suggestion that it was dangerous to 
authorize the legislature to remove the President, Madison 
argued that it was:

    indispensable that some provision should be made by defending the 
Community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy of the chief 
Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service, was not a 
sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. 
He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or 
oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers . . . In the 
case of the Executive Magistracy which was to be administered by a 
single man, loss of capacity or corruption was more within the compass 
of probable events, and either of them might be fatal to the Republic. 
(``Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,'' Vol. II, pp. 65-66 
(Farrand ed. 1888).)

    ``Loss of capacity or corruption''--that is the evil at 
which the Constitution's impeachment clauses were directed, in 
Madison's view.
    Although neither the words of the Constitution nor the 
writings of Hamilton, Madison or any of the other framers of 
the Constitution provide a precise list of those offenses that 
prove ``the abuse or violation of some public trust,'' or the 
``loss of capacity or corruption'' that would constitute ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' their words and our history offer 
some help in supplying a more detailed meaning to those terms.
    First, the framers saw impeachment as an extreme remedy 
meant to respond to only a limited universe of offenses. They 
took great care to ensure that their chosen substantive 
standard did not have the effect of providing Congress so much 
discretion over the President's fate that it could use its 
power to infringe on the President's independence. It was for 
this precise reason that Madison successfully argued against 
allowing for removal for ``maladministration,'' for fear that 
``[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during 
pleasure of the Senate.'' (``Records of the Federal Convention 
of 1787,'' Vol. II, p. 550 (Farrand ed. 1888).)
    Second, pervading the framers' discussions--and the 
constitutional language they ultimately adopted--was the view 
that impeachment was intended to protect the Nation and the 
National interest and not to provide the legislature an 
alternative to the criminal justice system for holding 
accountable the President or any other violator of the Nation's 
criminal laws. In crafting our Constitution's impeachment 
clauses, the framers specifically and consciously departed from 
the English practice, in which Parliament could use its 
impeachment power to impose criminal sanctions. Emphasizing 
that the legislative branch has no constitutional role 
whatsoever in meting out punishment, whether for the chief 
executive or any other citizen, was so important to the framers 
that they declared it not once, but twice in the Constitution--
first when they outlawed bills of attainder (Art. I, sec. 9, 
cl. 3), and again when they emphasized that ``Judgment in Cases 
of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of 
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party 
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law'' 
(Art. I, sec. 3, cl. 7).
    It is this linguistically-driven irony--that the 
Constitution's impeachment clauses employ the language of 
criminal law to authorize a process entirely outside of and 
distinct from the criminal justice system--that has created so 
much confusion over our precise task here. The House managers 
often appear to suggest that if they show that the President 
committed a crime, then they have met their burden, because it 
is our responsibility to hold accountable a President who 
violates the law and to send a message that the President is 
not above the law.
    But as Professor Charles Black so well explained in 
``Impeachment: A Handbook,'' criminality in and of itself is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient basis for concluding that 
a President has committed a high crime or misdemeanor, because 
our goal is to protect the Nation's interests, not to punish a 
President for violating the criminal law. He states: ``I think 
we can say that `high Crimes or Misdemeanors,' in the 
constitutional sense, ought to be held to be those offenses 
which are rather obviously wrong, whether or not `criminal,' 
and which so seriously threaten the order of political society 
as to make pestilent and dangerous the continuance in power of 
their perpetrator. The fact that such an act is also criminal 
helps, even if it is not essential, because a general societal 
view of wrongness, and sometimes of seriousness, is, in such a 
case, publicly and authoritatively recorded.'' (1998 ed., pp. 
39-40.)
    If the purpose of impeachment was to ensure that the 
President is held accountable for violating the law, then the 
framers would have authorized Congress to impeach and remove, 
not just for high crimes but for any crimes. They did not do 
that. They gave us the power of impeachment and removal for one 
reason and one reason only: to protect the Republic from a 
chief executive who, by his acts, has demonstrated that he can 
no longer be trusted to govern in the National interest. 
Responses to all other forms of malfeasance were left to the 
other branches.
    That is why I conclude that the appropriate question for 
each of us to ask is not whether the President committed 
perjury or obstruction of justice, but whether he committed a 
high crime or misdemeanor--a term I understand from the history 
to encompass two categories of offenses. The first includes 
those that are like treason or bribery in that they represent a 
gross misuse of official power to directly injure the State or 
its people. Those guilty of such offenses must be removed from 
office because they have explicitly demonstrated, by their 
conduct, that they will place their personal interests above 
the National interest.
    The President's counsel and others suggest that we should 
stop here, arguing that Congress has no authority to remove a 
President for any offense not committed through the use of 
official power. (Trial Memorandum of President Clinton, pp. 19-
20.) I cannot agree. Instead, Madison's argument that we must 
have an escape valve that allows the legislature to remove a 
President when the need arises to defend ``the Community 
against the incapacity, negligence, or perfidy of the chief 
Magistrate,'' coupled with Hamilton's definition of ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as an ``abuse or violation of some 
public trust,'' convince me that it is more than just misuse of 
official power that can require the Senate to remove an office 
holder. Acts that, although in their immediate nature and 
effect differ from treason or bribery because they do not stem 
from a misuse of official power, may nevertheless undermine the 
offender's ability to discharge his duties in the interests of 
the American people. In other words, the second category of 
offenses that equal ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are non-
official acts that unequivocally demonstrate the same threat 
posed by treason or bribery: that the President can no longer 
be trusted to use his power in the best interests of the 
Nation.
    It is for this reason that I reject the contention that a 
President's giving false or misleading statements under oath or 
his impeding the discovery of evidence in a lawsuit arising out 
of his personal conduct may never constitute a high crime or 
misdemeanor. I have no doubt that under certain circumstances 
such offenses could demonstrate such a level of depravity, 
deceit and disregard for the administration of justice that we 
would have no choice but to conclude that the President could 
no longer be trusted to use the authority of his office and 
make the decisions entrusted to him as chief executive in the 
best interest of the Nation. It is because I hold this position 
that I found reaching a decision in this case such a difficult 
matter.
    Before evaluating the charges against the President, and 
determining whether his misconduct in fact meets the high 
threshold the Constitution establishes for removal, each of us 
had to resolve the important question of what standard of proof 
should be used for judging the evidence against the President. 
It is widely agreed that the House managers have the burden of 
convincing Members of the Senate that the President has 
committed a high crime or misdemeanor, but there are 
differences of opinion on the level of certainty each of us in 
the Senate must reach before we can conclude that the House has 
met its burden.
    During the impeachment trial of Judge Alcee Hastings, I 
gave a great deal of thought to this question, and after 
weighing the competing interests of preserving the integrity of 
the judiciary, maintaining the independence of the judiciary, 
and protecting the personal interests of the office holder, I 
concluded that the House had to prove its case by ``clear and 
convincing evidence.'' (135 Cong. Rec. S14359-61 (Oct. 27, 
1989).) Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that, in one 
formulation, produces in the mind ``a firm belief or conviction 
as to the matter at issue'' (U.S. Fifth Circuit District Judges 
Association, Pattern Jury Instructions Sec. 2.14 (1998 ed.)) 
or, put another way, persuades the finder of fact that the 
claim ``is highly probable'' (Committee on Model Jury 
Instructions, Ninth Circuit Manual of Model Jury Instructions 
Sec. 1.12.2 (1997 ed.)).
    There are valid arguments for adopting the higher standard 
of ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' in this case, most importantly 
that the National trauma caused by the removal of a President 
so far surpasses the damage imposed by the removal of a single 
judge, that the Senate must remove a President only if it has a 
very high degree of certainty in the facts underlying its 
decision. On the other hand, just as the trauma of removing a 
President is greater than that flowing from removing a judge, 
the danger an errant President poses to the Republic far 
exceeds the threat presented by a misbehaving judge. This need 
to protect the integrity of the Republic and the welfare of its 
people argues against setting the standard of proof so high 
that it would result in leaving in power an individual whose 
fitness to continue serving in the national interest is 
seriously in doubt, remembering that no matter what the 
standard, removal still requires two-thirds of the Senators' 
support.
    In 1974, then Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield 
recommended that the standard of ``clear and convincing 
evidence'' was ``a logical middle ground between the burden of 
proof requirement in criminal proceedings (`beyond a reasonable 
doubt') and the burden of proof requirement in civil 
proceedings (`by a preponderance of the evidence').'' He added 
these words of insight and reason:

    An impeachment proceeding is not a criminal proceeding since the 
Court of Impeachment is barred by the Constitution from imposing any of 
the usual criminal law sanctions in the event of conviction, and it is 
not a civil proceeding because the extraordinary formality and 
complexity of the process and the serious consequences of a conviction 
and removal (in at least the case of an impeachment of the President of 
the United States) militate against accepting as adequate the low 
threshold requirement of a civil action. The burden of proof, like the 
terminology and various other requirements, must be unique because 
impeachment itself is unique. It is unique in that it is a hybrid of 
the legislative and the judicial, the political and the legal. (Senate 
Committee on Rules and Administration Executive Session Hearings on 
Senate Rules and Precedents Applicable to Impeachment Trials, Aug. 5-6, 
1974, p. 193.)

For similar reasons, Professor Charles Black in his 
``Impeachment: A Handbook'' (p. 17), offers the standard of 
``overwhelming preponderance of the evidence'' as appropriate 
for impeachment trials.
    Taken together, those arguments persuaded me to adopt as 
the appropriate standard of proof the same one I chose in Judge 
Hastings' impeachment trial: clear and convincing evidence. In 
other words, to vote for either of the articles before us, I 
must conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence that 
President William Jefferson Clinton has committed a high crime 
or misdemeanor.
    This brings me to the crux of this case, where it is 
necessary to apply the standard of proof I have adopted to the 
evidence the managers have presented, in order to reach 
judgment on the articles before us.
    A number of specific allegations contained in the articles 
lack sufficient legal or evidentiary support. For example, it 
strikes me as highly doubtful that an obstruction case can be 
made from the President's statements to aides who later 
testified to the grand jury. The House asserts that these 
statements constituted obstruction because the President knew 
his aides would repeat those statements to the grand jury, 
thereby providing misleading information to the grand jury. But 
the House has not adequately explained how the President saying 
privately to his aides the same thing he was saying to the 
public could constitute obstruction, particularly when we have 
been presented no evidence showing that the President made 
those statements for the purpose of having them repeated to the 
grand jury.
    Similarly, the managers have not offered a convincing legal 
theory showing how the President obstructed justice simply by 
failing to dispute his attorney's statements about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky during the President's 
deposition. And, the managers have failed to substantiate their 
allegation that the President committed perjury by misstating 
the date of his initial sexual encounter with Ms. Lewinsky when 
he told the grand jury ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on 
certain occasions in early 1996 and once in early 1997, I 
engaged in conduct that was wrong'' (Aug. 17, 1998 Grand Jury 
Testimony of President Clinton, pp. 8-9). The managers have not 
offered evidence that the President's error was intentional, 
nor did they provide a convincing explanation how such a 
misstatement was material to the grand jury's investigation.
    Although the managers offered slightly more weighty 
evidence concerning the involvement of the President and his 
friend, Vernon Jordan, in Ms. Lewinsky's job search at the same 
time she was filing a false affidavit in the Jones case, their 
case on this point leaves me suspicious but unconvinced. The 
evidence is highly circumstantial, amounting largely to an 
overlap in the timing between Ms. Lewinsky's appearance on the 
Jones' witness list and Mr. Jordan's efforts to find Ms. 
Lewinsky a job at the President's request. Both Ms. Lewinsky 
and Mr. Jordan testified that there was no connection between 
the two events. Although the fact that Ms. Lewinsky's job 
search and the drafting of her affidavit occurred 
simultaneously and that Mr. Jordan was involved with both 
raises questions, nevertheless the ultimate lack of any direct 
evidentiary connection prevents me from reaching any settled 
conclusion on the matter.
    The House has provided more persuasive evidence to support 
a number of its other allegations. For example, I am troubled 
by the President's grand jury testimony that he did not have 
sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky within the meaning of the 
definition offered him in his Jones deposition. (Aug. 17, 1998 
Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, pp. 9, 109.) Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that they had several such encounters. (Aug. 
26, 1998 Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, pp. 6-40.) 
The President's counsel responded to this allegation by saying: 
``This claim comes down to an oath against an oath about 
immaterial details concerning an acknowledged wrongful 
relationship.'' (Trial Memorandum of President Clinton, p. 44.)
    I disagree. The President's statement almost certainly was 
material to the grand jury's investigation. The grand jury was 
not investigating whether or not Ms. Lewinsky and the President 
had a relationship per se, but rather whether the President 
perjured himself in his Jones deposition and obstructed 
justice. Given that in his Jones deposition, the President 
specifically denied having sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky, 
it seems not only material, but central to the grand jury's 
investigation to determine whether the President told the truth 
when he said he did not have sexual relations with her.
    The fact that Ms. Lewinsky was testifying under an immunity 
agreement and would therefore be subject to prosecution if she 
lied, and that most of her other testimony is uncontroverted, 
so much that the President's counsel relies on it at several 
key points, leads me to view her testimony about the details of 
her sexual relationship with the President as credible. The 
same is true of her consistent testimony that it was Betty 
Currie who called her and told Ms. Lewinsky she understood she 
had something for her--the gifts from the President. (Feb. 1, 
1999 Deposition of Monica Lewinsky, 145 Cong. Rec. S1225 (Feb. 
4, 1999).)
    Although it is a less central matter, I am puzzled by the 
President's including in his prepared grand jury testimony the 
statement that ``I regret that what began as a friendship came 
to include this [inappropriate] conduct.'' (Grand Jury 
Testimony of President Clinton, p. 9.) As the House managers 
pointed out, according to Ms. Lewinsky, she and the President 
engaged in ``this conduct'' on the first day they met.
    The series of questions which Betty Currie, a friendly 
witness to the President, testified that the President asked 
her on the day after his deposition in January 1998 and again a 
few days later are most troubling--both as to the credibility 
of the President's testimony to the grand jury regarding those 
statements and as to whether his intent in making those 
statements was to wrongly influence Ms. Currie's potential 
testimony. The President testified that he asked Ms. Currie 
those questions ``to refresh my memory about what the facts 
were.'' (Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, p. 131.) In 
their trial memorandum (pp. 52-53), the President's counsel 
assert that his statement is consistent with Ms. Currie's 
testimony that the President seemed to be trying to gather 
information. But the President did not testify that he was 
trying to gather information generally. He stated that he was 
trying to refresh his own memory. And this, unfortunately, 
seems to me to be an implausible explanation of what he was 
doing. In his testimony before the grand jury on August 17, 
1998, the President admitted that he had ``inappropriate 
intimate contact'' with Ms. Lewinsky and that the relationship 
occurred ``when I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky.'' (Grand Jury 
Testimony of President Clinton, pp. 8-9.) He therefore must 
have known in January 1998, when he asked Ms. Currie the series 
of questions, that the statements they contained, for example, 
that ``I was never alone with Monica Lewinsky,'' that Ms. 
Currie ``could see and hear everything,'' and that ``Monica 
came on to me, and I never touched her, right?'' either were 
not true or were beyond Ms. Currie's knowledge and that Ms. 
Currie could not possibly help refresh his memory.
    The President called Ms. Currie in on January 18, 1998 to 
ask her those questions after the surprise questions he was 
asked the day before in the Jones deposition about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and after he repeatedly invoked 
Ms. Currie's name in connection with Ms. Lewinsky in response 
to those questions. (Jan. 17, 1998 Deposition of President 
Clinton, reprinted in Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. 
XXII, pp. 17, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.) Certainly, if 
the Jones lawyers wanted to further investigate the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, the President's own statements 
would have led them directly to Ms. Currie.
    In summary, although the House managers have left me 
thoroughly unconvinced of some of their allegations, the 
evidence presented on others does lead me to believe that it is 
likely that there were occasions on which the President made 
false or misleading statements and took actions which could 
have had the effect of impeding the discovery of evidence in 
judicial proceedings. Whether any of his conduct constitutes a 
criminal offense such as perjury or obstruction of justice is 
not for me to decide. That, appropriately, should and must be 
left to the criminal justice system, which will uphold the rule 
of law in President Clinton's case as it would for any other 
American. What I must do is uphold the Constitution and decide 
whether the House managers have presented clear and convincing 
evidence that the President has committed a high crime or 
misdemeanor, which is to say whether they have demonstrated 
that his misconduct has so compromised his capacity to govern 
in the national interest that he must be removed.
    I conclude that the House managers have not met that high 
burden. I am, of course, profoundly unsettled by President 
Clinton's irresponsibility in carrying on a sexual relationship 
with an intern in the Oval Office and by the disregard for the 
truth he showed in trying to conceal it from his family, his 
staff, the courts and the American people. But the managers 
have failed to convince me with the evidence they have 
presented that his misbehavior, as charged in the articles of 
impeachment, makes him a threat to the national interest, and 
that we can no longer expect the President to govern free of 
corruption in the Nation's best interests.
    Indeed, the managers have barely addressed this point of 
consequences at all, providing almost no evidence or argument 
that the republic needs protecting from this President. Rather, 
they have presented their case largely as if the Senate were a 
criminal court, as if our sole responsibility were to determine 
whether the President is guilty of the crimes of perjury and 
obstruction of justice, as if those specific crimes were the 
indisputable equivalent of high crimes or misdemeanors 
automatically warranting the President's removal. And in doing 
do, I believe, they have failed to cross the higher 
constitutional threshold of proving that the President has 
forfeited his right to fill out the term for which the people 
elected him.
    The voice of the American people, in fact, indicates that 
just the opposite is true. According to every public poll we 
have seen, a clear majority of the American people have 
continued to support the President throughout this ordeal. 
Nearly two-thirds of them say repeatedly that they approve of 
the job that President Clinton is doing in running the country, 
and that they oppose his removal. In my State of Connecticut, a 
survey done by The Hartford Courant just last week showed that 
68 percent of my constituents rate the President's job 
performance as excellent or good, and a full three-quarters of 
them believe he deserves to stay in office.
    In noting this, I recognize that it would be a dereliction 
of my duty to substitute public opinion polls for reasoned 
judgment about our national interest in resolving this 
constitutional crisis. But it would also be a serious error to 
ignore the people's voice, because in exercising our authority 
as a court of impeachment we are standing in the place of the 
voters who re-elected the President two years ago. In this 
case, the prevailing public opposition to impeachment has 
particular relevance, for it provides substantial evidence that 
the President's misconduct has not been so harmful as to 
shatter the public's faith in his ability to fulfill his 
Presidential duties and act in their interest.
    It is possible, of course, that a popular President could 
nevertheless be corrupt and pose a threat to the Nation, which 
is to say that public opinion is not the only barometer of 
fitness for office. But in this democracy it is an 
indispensable measure, and in light of the ultimately 
unconvincing evidence the managers have presented to 
demonstrate the President's loss of capacity or corruption, the 
public's opposition to removal carries weight in my 
deliberations. It carries particular weight given the 
overwhelming amount of information the news media has provided 
us about the details of the President's behavior, which 
strongly suggests that the American people have not reached 
their conclusions in ignorance of the President's flaws or 
faults.
    The public opinion polls tell us more than that the 
majority of people support his continuance in office. Those 
two-thirds who consistently give him high ratings for his job 
performance have also strongly expressed their disapproval of 
his sexual behavior and his deliberate lies to the Nation. 
Indeed, surveys have routinely shown that, as a consequence of 
this scandal, less than one-fifth of the American people claim 
that they share the President's moral and ethical values, a 
result I find stunning and which may be unparalleled in our 
history.
    How can so many Americans simultaneously hold the views 
that the President has demeaned his office and yet should not 
be evicted from it? We will be trying to answer that question 
and to weigh the consequences of those seemingly conflicting 
opinions for a long time to come. But I believe the explanation 
must have something to do with the context of the President's 
actions. As the record makes abundantly clear, the President's 
false or misleading statements under oath and his broader 
deception and coverup stemmed directly from his private sexual 
behavior, something that no other sitting American President to 
my knowledge has ever been questioned about in a legal setting. 
The President neither lied about nor was trying to conceal 
Presidential malfeasance or a heinous crime, such as murder or 
rape, but instead sought to hide a sexual relationship with an 
intern that was deeply embarrassing, shameful, even 
indefensible, yet not illegal.
    Indeed, troubled as I am by much of the evidence the 
managers presented and the arguments they made, on each 
occasion I considered voting for removal I invariably came back 
to this question of context, and I asked myself: Are these the 
kinds of offenses the founders envisioned when they entrusted 
us with the awesome power of invoking our democracy's ultimate 
sanction? Does this tawdry, tragic episode justify, for the 
first time in our proud history, ejecting from office the 
individual the American people chose to lead the country? And 
each time I had to answer no.
    To reach this conclusion, that the context matters in 
judging the President's misconduct, is in the eyes of the House 
managers and many of the President's critics an abdication of 
duty and honor. It is, they contend, to wink at any immorality, 
any transgression that is connected to sexual behavior, to 
sacrifice our most precious principles at the altar of moral 
relativism. And worse, by choosing to acquit the President, 
they argue, we are setting an awful precedent for Presidents to 
come.
    I understand and share the frustrations that lead to these 
criticisms. As I stated in the speech I made on this floor on 
September 3 of last year, I was deeply angered by the 
President's recklessness and his purposeful deceit. The conduct 
he had acknowledged at that point in his grand jury testimony 
was not only immoral but harmful. The President is, as eminent 
historian Clinton Rossiter noted, the American people's ``one 
authentic trumpet'' (Rossiter, ``The American Presidency,'' 
1955, p. 23), and when the notes he sounds falter in the 
expression of our common values, it has an effect, one that 
cannot be ignored. That was made clear to me in talking with 
many parents and children about this matter over the last 
several months, hearing the dismay and distrust in their 
voices, which was powerful evidence to me that the President 
had undercut his moral authority and undermined public 
confidence in his word.
    My disappointment and anger with the President's actions 
were reawakened as I listened to the evidence the managers have 
presented. And like many of my colleagues, I am left 
dissatisfied with the all-or-nothing nature of the choice we 
have been asked to make in this proceeding, between removing 
this President from office on the one hand, or not removing him 
on the other, which could imply exoneration or even 
vindication.
    But as unsatisfying as that choice is, it is the only one 
that the founders empowered the Senate to make in this 
impeachment proceeding. Our responsibility is not to pass 
judgment on the morality of the President's behavior, or to 
find whether he committed a specific crime. Impeachment is not 
an instrument of protest, or of prosecution, but one of 
protection, of our country, its people, and our democratic 
ideals. When the roll is called on each article and I answer 
``not guilty,'' I want it understood that I am saying ``not 
guilty of a high crime or misdemeanor,'' and that is all I can 
say.
    With that understood, I do believe the Constitution allows 
for one recourse that would provide a means for us as the 
people's representatives to register our and their disapproval, 
and would, I believe, help us to bring appropriate closure to 
this terrible chapter in our Nation's history. It is well 
within the Senate's constitutional prerogatives to adopt a 
resolution of censure expressing our contempt for the 
President's misconduct, both that which is charged in the 
articles and that which is not. Such a censure would not amount 
to a punishment, nor would it be intended to do so. What it 
would do, particularly if it united Senators across party lines 
and positions on removal, is fulfill our responsibility to our 
children and our posterity to speak to the common values the 
President has violated, and make clear what our expectations 
are for future holders of that highest office.
    And what it could do, I believe, is to help us to begin 
healing the wounds the President's misconduct and the 
impeachment process's partisanship have done to the American 
body politic, and to the soul of the Nation. I have observed 
that roughly two-thirds of the public consistently expresses 
its opposition to the President's removal. But I do not think 
we can leave this proceeding, especially those of us who have 
voted against the articles, without also noting that roughly 
one-third of the American people have consistently expressed 
their belief that this President is unfit to lead this Nation. 
That is a startlingly large percentage of our people who have 
totally lost confidence in our Nation's leader.
    This extraordinary divergence of opinion tells us that 
there is a rift in our public life that extends far beyond the 
specific circumstances of this case, a rift that the 
President's misconduct has only exacerbated. A statement of 
censure is not an antidote that will magically eliminate this 
division, but I believe it will help by demonstrating that we 
can find common moral ground and articulate our common values 
even though we Senators and our constituents have disagreed 
about impeachment. For that reason, I hope that once this trial 
is concluded, we will put aside our partisan loyalties and our 
political hesitations and overcome parliamentary obstacles to 
join together in passing a resolution that affirms our belief 
that the Presidency is and must continue to be, in the words of 
Clinton Rossiter, ``the one-man distillation of the American 
people'' (``The American Presidency,'' p. 11), the steward of 
our freedom and our values.
    In closing, Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to quote from a 
wise and compelling insight that Manager Hyde put forward in 
his final argument. The most formidable obstacle the managers 
faced in making their case, he said, was public cynicism, ``the 
widespread conviction that all politics and all politicians are 
by definition corrupt and venal.'' He went on to say, ``That 
cynicism is an acid eating away at the vital organs of American 
public life. It is a clear and present danger because it blinds 
us to the nobility and the fragility of being a self-governing 
people.''
    While I disagree with Manager Hyde's ultimate conclusion in 
this case, I could not agree more with his eloquent assessment 
of this threat to our democracy. It is a problem I addressed at 
the end of the campaign finance investigation that the 
Governmental Affairs Committee conducted in 1997, when I argued 
that the mad chase for money that dominates and distorts our 
political system gives the American people, already deeply 
skeptical of the motives of politicians, good reason to doubt 
whether they have a true and equal voice in their government. 
And it is a problem that I fear has grown significantly worse 
in the wake of this unseemly saga and the damage it has done to 
the public's esteem for and expectations of their leaders.
    The long and painful process of impeachment is about to 
come to an end, and thankfully so, but the enormous challenge 
we face in restoring the public's faith in our public 
institutions and those who serve in them is just beginning. 
This is the next great test for the President and for each of 
us, the fight against cynicism's corrosive influence and the 
loss of public trust. If we once again seek the help of our 
common creator and the counsel of our shared Constitution, and 
through our actions express their ideals and fulfill their 
expectations, I am confident we can in time renew a sense of 
common purpose and reassure the citizenry we serve that America 
is indeed, as Webster proclaimed, one country with one destiny. 
Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Sam Brownback

    Mr. BROWNBACK. Mr. Chief Justice, I find that William 
Jefferson Clinton did commit perjury and obstruct justice; that 
these offenses rise to the level of ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors;'' that William Jefferson Clinton should be 
convicted under the articles of impeachment; and that he must 
be removed as President of the United States.
    This is a sad chapter in our Nation's long and illustrious 
history. A man of extraordinary talent took a mistake and 
turned it into a tragedy. William Jefferson Clinton is no 
ordinary man. Gifted and charismatic, brilliant and refined, he 
took raw ability and focus and turned it into a Presidency. 
Such is the stuff of story books and heroes. Sadly for this 
tale, the hero had a habit he would not break, and, when it 
called him back to darkness, he sought to hide it at all cost. 
And there the tragedy occurred.
    President Clinton repeatedly chose to lie and obstruct 
justice rather than tell the truth and comply with court orders 
throughout this ordeal. By his words and deeds he chose to 
place himself above the law. By his words and deeds he has 
undermined the rule of law in America to the great harm of this 
Nation. By his own words and deeds, he has undermined the 
truth-finding function of the judiciary, at great harm to that 
branch of our government. By his words and deeds, he had done 
great harm to the notions of honesty and integrity that form 
the underpinnings of this great republic.
    The following represents the specific facts upon which I 
find William Jefferson Clinton is guilty of perjury before a 
Federal grand jury and obstruction of justice, and must be 
removed as the President of the United States.

                               article i

    In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the Office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal 
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
    On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal 
grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury concerning . . . the nature and details of 
his relationship with a subordinate Government employee[.]

    Ms. Lewinsky testified as to the extent of her sexual 
relationship with President Clinton, and her statements were 
corroborated by numerous individuals with whom she 
contemporaneously shared the details of her encounters with the 
President, including two professionals. Her testimony indicated 
direct contact by the President with certain areas of her body. 
The conduct described by Ms. Lewinsky clearly falls within the 
definition of sexual relations as President Clinton understood 
the term to be defined in the Paula Jones case and during his 
grand jury testimony.
    In his prepared statement to the grand jury, President 
Clinton stated that the sexual encounters between he and Ms. 
Lewinsky ``did not constitute sexual relations as I understood 
that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 deposition.'' 
President Clinton acknowledged that the type of activity 
described by Ms. Lewinsky constituted sexual relations as he 
understood the term to be defined during the Paula Jones' 
deposition: ``I understood the definition to be limited to, to 
physical contact with those areas of the bodies with the 
specific intent to arouse or gratify.'' However, during 
questioning under oath, President Clinton repeatedly denied 
engaging in the activities described by Ms. Lewinsky.
    President Clinton was even asked by a grand juror whether 
``if Monica Lewinsky says that while you were in the Oval 
Office area you touched [certain area of her body that falls 
within the definition of sexual relations as understood by the 
President in the Paula Jones case], would she be lying.'' 
President Clinton responded: ``That is not my recollection. My 
recollection is that I did not have sexual relations with Ms. 
Lewinsky and I'm staying on my former statement about that.''
    If Ms. Lewinsky's testimony is true, President Clinton 
committed perjury during his grand jury testimony. I have had 
the opportunity to read the portions of grand jury testimony 
provided by both President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky concerning 
their characterizations of their sexual relations. I also had 
the opportunity to watch Ms. Lewinsky's videotaped deposition 
in which she reaffirmed her previous grand jury testimony 
concerning the extent of their sexual relations. Based upon: 
(1) the corroboration of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony by numerous 
witnesses with whom she had spoken contemporaneously, (2) the 
detailed nature of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, (3) the 
evasiveness of President Clinton's testimony, (4) the apparent 
sincerity of Ms. Lewinsky in her videotaped deposition before 
the Senate, and (5) the President's refusal to be deposed by 
the Senate, I find that the President provided false and 
misleading testimony before a Federal grand jury that 
constitutes perjury.
    On January 18, 1998, President Clinton met with Ms. Currie 
at the White House and told her ``there are several things you 
may want to know'' about the President's relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky. During his grand jury testimony, President 
Clinton stated that ``I was not trying to get Betty Currie to 
say something that was untruthful.'' However, as discussed 
further in the obstruction of justice charges, President 
Clinton said to Ms. Currie ``Monica came on to me, and I never 
touched her, right?'' Based upon both Ms. Lewinsky and 
President Clinton's testimony concerning their intimate 
contact, and upon Ms. Lewinsky's Senate deposition, I must 
conclude that Ms. Lewinsky's account of their intimate activity 
is accurate. As a result, I must further conclude that 
President Clinton was lying when he told Ms. Currie that he had 
not touched Ms. Lewinsky, and that the President committed 
perjury when he testified before the grand jury that he had not 
asked Ms. Currie ``to say something that was untruthful.''
    Mr. Clinton further testified that his only interest in 
speaking to Ms. Currie that day after the President was deposed 
in the Paula Jones case was to ``refresh [his] own 
recollection'' and ``not to impart instructions on how she was 
to recall things in the future.'' As will be discussed further 
below, I conclude that President Clinton made a series of 
statements to Betty Currie in an attempt to improperly persuade 
her to provide false testimony. As a result, based upon the 
evidence presented in the record, I believe that President 
Clinton's interest in talking to Ms. Currie the day after he 
was deposed by Paula Jones' attorneys was to impart 
instructions on how Ms. Currie was to recall events concerning 
the President's illicit affair and not to refresh the 
President's memory. The President's statements before the grand 
jury concerning his interest in talking to Ms. Currie would 
thus constitute perjury.
    In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton asserted in 
his conversations with Mr. Blumenthal and Mr. Podesta, that ``I 
said things that were true. They may have been misleading.'' 
President Clinton further states that ``what I was trying to do 
was give them something they could--that would be true, even if 
misleading in the context of this deposition.'' Mr. Clinton 
told Sidney Blumenthal that ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and 
made a sexual demand on me'' and that the President had 
rebuffed her. Mr. Blumenthal also testified that the President 
claimed that Ms. Lewinsky threatened the President, saying 
``that she would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was 
known as the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and 
if she had an affair or said she had an affair then she 
wouldn't be the stalker any more.'' When Mr. Blumenthal asked 
the President whether Mr. Clinton had been alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky, the President replied ``I was within eyesight or 
earshot of someone.''
    Even President Clinton acknowledges that he was alone with 
Monica Lewinsky, and, therefore not within eyesight or earshot 
of anybody, on numerous occasions. Mr. Clinton also 
acknowledges that he and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in 
``inappropriate intimate contact'' which, if Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony is true, amounted to sexual relations as President 
Clinton understood the term to be defined in the Paula Jones 
case. As a result, the President lied, not simply misled Mr. 
Blumenthal, when Mr. Clinton stated that he had ``rebuffed 
her.''
    John Podesta testified that President Clinton had told Mr. 
Podesta that the President ``had never had sex with her [Ms. 
Lewinsky] in any way whatsoever.'' Mr. Podesta further 
testified that President Clinton elaborated that the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky ``had not engaged in [sexual activity that 
falls within the definition of sexual relations as President 
Clinton understood the term to be defined in the Paula Jones 
case].''
    During Mr. Clinton's grand jury testimony, he refused to 
directly contradict Mr. Podesta's characterization of their 
conversation: ``I'm not saying that anybody who had a contrary 
memory is wrong.'' President Clinton was asked ``[i]f [the 
White House aides] testified that you denied sexual relations 
or relationship with Monica Lewinsky, or if they told us that 
you denied that, do you have any reason to doubt them?'' The 
President responded ``no.''
    Based on the evidence concerning the extent of the sexual 
relationship between President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky, and 
based on the President's own admission concerning the accuracy 
of statements made by his aides, I conclude that President 
Clinton committed perjury when he characterized the manner in 
which he conveyed false statements to Mr. Podesta and Mr. 
Blumenthal. President Clinton did not simply mislead his aides, 
he lied to them about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.

                               article ii

    In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the Office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, 
and impeded the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged 
personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of 
conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the 
existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.
    The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme 
included:
    (1) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him.

    Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997 she told 
President Clinton that she had been subpoenaed and that the 
subpoena required her to produce gifts given her by the 
President. According to Ms. Lewinsky, she asked the President 
``should I--maybe I should put the gifts away outside my house 
somewhere or give them to someone maybe Betty.'' Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that President Clinton responded ``I don't know'' or 
``Let me think about that.''
    Later that day, December 28, Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
she received a phone call from Ms. Currie, who stated ``I 
understand you have something to give me'' or ``the President 
said you have something to give me.'' Ms. Currie then retrieved 
the gifts that President Clinton had given to Ms. Lewinsky and 
hid them under her bed. Based upon the fact that Ms. Currie was 
clearly acting under instructions from President Clinton, I 
find that President Clinton obstructed justice by attempting to 
hide evidence requested in a subpoena in a Federal civil rights 
case.

    (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through 
and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified 
and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a 
time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
harmful to him.

    At President Clinton's request, Vernon Jordan met with 
Monica Lewinsky in November of 1997 to discuss assistance that 
Mr. Jordan could provide Ms. Lewinsky in securing a job in New 
York. However, Mr. Jordan took no action until December 11, 
1997, five days after President Clinton learned that Monica 
Lewinsky was on the witness list in the Paula Jones case and 
that Mr. Jordan had not yet provided Ms. Lewinsky with any 
assistance in securing a job in New York. On the day that Mr. 
Clinton learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list, the 
President assured her that he would talk to Mr. Jordan to 
ensure that Mr. Jordan stepped up his efforts to secure her a 
job in New York.
    Mr. Jordan stepped up his activities on December 11, 1998, 
because, on that date, Judge Susan Webber Wright ordered that 
Paula Jones was entitled to information concerning any 
government employee with whom the President had sexual 
relations. On January 7, 1998, Ms. Lewinsky signed a false 
affidavit, stating that she had not engaged in a sexual 
relationship with the President. On January 8, 1998, after Ms. 
Lewinsky believed that her interview with MacAndrews and Forbes 
in New York had gone poorly, Mr. Jordan called the company's 
CEO, Ron Perelman, to ask his assistance with securing 
employment for Ms. Lewinsky within Mr. Perelman's company. All 
of this activity was done in order to ensure that Ms. Lewinsky 
did not provide damaging testimony against President Clinton 
and thus constituted an effort to obstruct justice in the Paula 
Jones case.

    (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.

    Ms. Currie was summoned to the White House on Sunday, 
January 18, 1998 for a private meeting with President Clinton. 
The President was under court order not to talk about the case 
to anyone. Nonetheless, after telling Ms. Currie that he had 
been deposed in the Paula Jones case and that Ms. Jones' 
attorneys had asked the President several questions about Ms. 
Lewinsky, President Clinton then made a series of statements to 
Ms. Currie:

    I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    You could see and hear everything, right?

    The testimony of Ms. Currie and President Clinton 
demonstrate that these statements were an attempt to influence 
the future testimony of Ms. Currie regarding the President's 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. President Clinton admitted 
being alone with Ms. Lewinsky. Ms. Currie also testified that 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been alone. Given the fact 
that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky had been alone on a 
number of occasions, a fact that President Clinton would be 
unlikely to forget considering the intimate nature of their 
encounters, the President was not refreshing his memory when he 
stated to Ms. Currie that he and Ms. Lewinsky had never been 
alone. President Clinton was attempting to improperly persuade 
Ms. Currie to testify that he and Ms. Lewinsky were never 
alone.
    Ms. Currie testified that President Clinton and Ms. 
Lewinsky were alone a number of times. Despite the legal 
hairsplitting engaged in by the White House, I interpret the 
statement ``You were always there when Monica was there, 
right?'' to mean that President Clinton was attempting to 
improperly persuade Ms. Currie to testify that Ms. Lewinsky was 
always within Ms. Currie's sight during her visits to the 
President.
    Based upon Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, President Clinton's 
statement that ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, 
right?'' would clearly be false. In addition, because even 
President Clinton admitted to ``inappropriate intimate 
contact,'' I assume that President Clinton is at least 
admitting to having touched Ms. Lewinsky. As a result, I must 
conclude that President Clinton did touch Ms. Lewinsky. I must 
then further conclude that, because Mr. Clinton was making a 
statement to Ms. Currie that the President knew to be false, he 
could only have made such a claim in order to improperly 
persuade Ms. Currie to testify that President Clinton had never 
touched Ms. Lewinsky.
    In his grand jury testimony, President Clinton admitted 
that he did not allow Ms. Currie to ``watch whatever intimate 
activity [the President] did with Ms. Lewinsky.'' In addition, 
when asked whether he would ``not have engaged in those 
physically intimate acts if [the President] knew that Ms. 
Currie could see or hear that,'' President Clinton responded 
``[t]hat's correct.'' However, on the Sunday after he was 
deposed in the Paula Jones case, Mr. Clinton told Ms. Currie 
``You could see and hear everything, right?'' I find these two 
concepts to be inherently contradictory. President Clinton 
could not, on the one hand, shield Ms. Currie from seeing or 
hearing any intimate activity, while, on the other hand, be 
sincerely stating that Ms. Currie could see and hear 
everything. I must then conclude that President Clinton made 
this statement in an attempt to improperly persuade Ms. Currie 
to testify that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in 
no activity that Ms. Currie could neither see nor hear.

    (7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in 
a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.

    On January 21, 1998, President Clinton met with Sidney 
Blumenthal, a senior White House aide. During the course of 
their conversation, Mr. Blumenthal asked President Clinton what 
the President had done wrong. According to Mr. Blumenthal, the 
President responded ``[n]othing'' and ``I haven't done anything 
wrong.''
    Mr. Blumenthal asked the President why, if he had done 
nothing wrong, would the President want to appear on television 
and admit wrongdoing, which is what the President implied he 
wanted to do. At that point, according to Mr. Blumenthal, the 
President stated that ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a 
sexual demand on me'' and that the President had rebuffed her. 
Mr. Blumenthal also testified that the President claimed that 
Ms. Lewinsky threatened the President, telling him ``that she 
would tell people they'd had an affair, that she was known as 
the stalker among her peers, and that she hated it and if she 
had an affair or said she had an affair then she wouldn't be 
the stalker any more.''
    According to Mr. Blumenthal, President Clinton also stated 
that ``I feel like somebody who is surrounded by an oppressive 
force that is creating a lie about me and I can't get the truth 
out.'' When Mr. Blumenthal asked the President whether Mr. 
Clinton had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, the President replied 
``I was within eyesight or earshot of someone.''
    Based upon the grand jury testimony presented by Ms. 
Lewinsky and President Clinton, and upon the deposition 
provided to the Senate by Ms. Lewinsky as well as the 
President's failure to provide the Senate with a deposition, I 
have concluded that the statements made by President Clinton to 
Mr. Blumenthal are false. If the President had agreed to be 
deposed by the Senate, his testimony might have strengthened 
the credibility of the statements that he had made to Mr. 
Blumenthal. However, the credibility of such statements have no 
foundation in the evidence presented to the Senate. As a 
result, I must conclude that President Clinton had a motive 
other than an interest in conveying the truth when he made 
these statements to Mr. Blumenthal.
    President Clinton has tried to argue that the President 
made these statements to Mr. Blumenthal, not to obstruct 
justice, but merely to mislead him. However, when asked whether 
he knew that Sidney Blumenthal and John Podesta might be called 
into a grand jury, President Clinton responded ``That's 
right.'' Therefore, I must conclude that President Clinton lied 
to Sidney Blumenthal in order to plant false testimony on a 
potential grand jury witness, a witness the President himself 
admits he knew might be called.
    John Podesta testified that President Clinton had told Mr. 
Podesta that the President ``had never had sex with her [Ms. 
Lewinsky] in any way whatsoever.'' Mr. Podesta further 
testified that President Clinton elaborated that the President 
and Ms. Lewinsky ``had not engaged in [sexual activity that 
falls within the definition of sexual relations as President 
Clinton understood the term to be defined in the Paula Jones 
case].'' As stated above, Mr. Clinton acknowledges that he knew 
that Mr. Podesta might be called as a witness by the grand 
jury. As also discussed above, it is my opinion, based on the 
evidence, that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky did engage in 
sexual activity that falls within the definition of sexual 
relations as President Clinton understood the term to be 
defined in the Paula Jones case. As a result, Mr. Clinton lied 
to Mr. Podesta. In addition, because President Clinton knew 
that Mr. Podesta might be called as a witness by the grand 
jury, I must conclude that the President lied to Mr. Podesta, 
not simply to mislead him and his White House colleagues, but 
in order to plant false testimony on a potential grand jury 
witness.
    Perjury before a Federal grand jury and obstruction of 
justice do rise to the level of being a ``high crime or 
misdemeanor'' that is the standard set forth in the 
Constitution for impeachment. Indeed in recent years the United 
States Senate has impeached two federal judges for perjury. 
Were we not to remove the President for the same offense we 
would be breaking established precedent.
    Furthermore, would it be right to set a lower standard for 
the President than the judges he appoints? I think not. The 
President must be held to the same standard, if not a higher 
one.
    Perjury and obstruction of justice are crimes against the 
state. Perjury goes directly against the truth-finding function 
of the judicial branch of government. If the President can lie 
under oath, others will plead the same defense, sacrificing the 
truth.
    The President is the chief law enforcement officer in the 
land. He or she should be the ultimate example of a law-abiding 
citizen, not one who willfully and repeatedly violates the law 
when it serves his or her narrow interest. The unlawful actions 
by the President will have the long term effect of reducing 
compliance with the law by others if the President can get away 
with it.
    The Constitution states that impeachment and removal is to 
occur when ``the President, Vice President and all civil 
officers'' commit ``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    I find bribery and perjury to be offenses of the same 
nature. Both seek to thwart well established legal processes. 
Bribery seeks to produce an outcome different from justice by 
obscuring our priorities. Perjury seeks to produce an outcome 
different from justice by obscuring the truth.
    Obstruction of justice committed by the President 
undermines the entire judicial system and is thus a crime 
against the nation falling clearly in the category of a ``high 
crime.''
    Whether or not the vote taken today is considered a victory 
for President Clinton, it will be, in many ways, a loss for 
America. We have lost many things over the past few months: 
trust in public officials, respect for the rule of law, 
confidence in the truth of the White House's public statements. 
But perhaps the most tragic loss has been the steady erosion of 
our societal standards.
    It is hard to imagine that a generation or two ago, a 
majority of Americans would have greeted news of Presidential 
crimes and cover-ups with a shrug. We did not expect our 
leaders to be perfect, but we did expect them to provide moral 
leadership, and to obey the laws they were charged with 
upholding and executing. We expected Presidents to commit sins; 
but we would not allow them to commit crimes. We held the 
Office of the Presidency, and the honor of the Nation, in the 
highest esteem.
    We looked to the leaders of our Nation as examples to 
admire, rather than avoid. Parents would point to the President 
of the United States and tell their son or daughter that if 
they worked hard and did right, they might one day hold that 
office. That is not so today. Perhaps in the future the 
admiration of that office can be restored.
    Our loss is compounded by the manner of our response. In 
many quarters, the news of Presidential perjury and obstruction 
of justice has been greeted with a shrug, if not a wink. We are 
no longer outraged by the outrageous. We have grown comfortable 
with presidential misconduct, even as we prosecute, convict, 
and imprison the less powerful for the same crimes.
    If we are to believe the media, much of our reluctance to 
enforce the laws of our land springs from our material 
concerns. We have heard, from many quarters, the assertion that 
things are good in America, we are at peace, the stock market 
is doing well, so why rock the boat? Why shake things up?
    We seem to have forgotten that all of our prosperity would 
be impossible without the rule of law, and without a cultural 
predisposition to honor and uphold the law. Reducing the 
administration of justice to opinion polls debases our country. 
Putting pocketbook concerns over standards of right and wrong 
impoverishes our culture. If we do not sustain the moral and 
legal foundation on which our system of government and our 
prosperity is based, both will surely and steadily diminish.
    The great southern writer Walker Percy once stated that his 
greatest fear for our future was that of ``seeing America, with 
all of her great strength and beauty and freedom . . . 
gradually subside into decay through default and be defeated . 
. . from within by weariness, boredom, cynicism, greed, and in 
the end, helplessness before its great problems.''
    I am optimistic about our future, but this point is an 
important one. America is at a place in history where our great 
enemies have been defeated. Our economy is strong, our incomes 
up, our expectations high. We are the only remaining world 
superpower.
    Our future looks bright. But our continued success is not a 
historical certainty. It will be determined by the character of 
our Nation--by the condition of our culture, as much as our 
economy. The standards we hold--for ourselves, and for our 
leaders--are a good indicator of what we soon shall be.
    For all of the reasons described above, I have chosen, with 
great sadness but firm resolve to vote for the conviction and 
removal of William Jefferson Clinton as President of the United 
States of America.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Richard H. Bryan

    Mr. BRYAN. Mr. Chief Justice, we are about to embark upon a 
rollcall vote that only one other Senate in the history of our 
Republic has been called upon to cast. It is a weighty 
decision. We have taken an oath that requires us to render 
``impartial justice according to the Constitution and the 
laws.'' By so doing each of us has undertaken a solemn 
obligation to be fair to the President, fair to the American 
people, and faithful to our constitutional responsibility.
    One hundred thirty-one years ago, the 40th Congress faced a 
similar decision. Then, as now, the Nation was divided. Then, 
as now, the passions of the day raged across the land. Then, as 
now, the critics of the President were in the majority in the 
Senate. Confounding the cynics of that day, the Senate rose 
above itself by the slenderest of margins, a single vote, and 
acquitted President Andrew Johnson. More than a century later, 
that decision has stood the test of time.
    The Senate's acquittal reaffirmed a basic constitutional 
doctrine that the executive branch and the legislative branch 
shall be separate and co-equal; and that the executive branch 
should not be subservient to the prevailing views of a 
congressional majority.
    How different the course of our constitutional history 
might have been had President Andrew Johnson been convicted. 
Our system of government today might be more like a 
parliamentary system undermining the independence of the chief 
executive.
    Future Presidents may have been forced to operate within 
the omnipresent shadow of impeachment whenever a legislative 
majority was hostile to their views or policies. I think it is 
fair to conclude the Office of the Presidency would be a 
profoundly different one had Andrew Johnson been convicted. It 
is in that historical context we meet.
    In this century, there have been five judicial impeachments 
that have reached the Senate. In each of those proceedings, the 
actions of the House and Senate were decided by a bipartisan 
vote, and all five judges were convicted, and removed from 
office.
    In the history of the Republic, there have been but two 
Presidential impeachments, that of Andrew Johnson and William 
Jefferson Clinton. Each Presidential impeachment, however, has 
come to the Senate under an ominous cloud of partisanship.
    The Constitution wisely imposes a heavy burden of proof 
upon the House of Representatives to convict and remove a duly 
elected President. And when that constitutional process is 
tainted by partisan actions, the articles of impeachment must 
be subjected to an additional measure of scrutiny.
    The Constitution provides in article II, section 4 that 
``The President . . . shall be removed from office on 
Impeachment for the Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
    What constitutes impeachable conduct, as contemplated by 
the Constitution, is the central issue of this trial.
    The framers of the Constitution labored at some length to 
fashion an impeachment article. As their guide, they looked to 
the English experience in their parliamentary system. They 
followed that history in deciding to involve both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate giving them different roles--the 
former to charge and impeach, and the latter to convict or 
acquit.
    Unlike the British parliamentary system with its monarch, 
the framers decided impeachment would apply against its highest 
officeholders, expressly including the President. Further, the 
framers determined that impeachment would in and of itself be 
limited. Rather than including capital punishment and other 
criminal penalties as a part of impeachment as Britain did, the 
framers limited impeachment to the removal of the individual 
from office upon conviction.
    As the drafting of the Constitution's impeachment clause 
proceeded, the drafters struggled with how to characterize the 
offenses for which a President could be impeached, convicted, 
and removed from office. Initially, offenses such as 
``malpractice'', ``neglect of duty'', and ``corruption'' were 
considered. As the Constitutional Convention drew to a close, 
the Convention's Committee of Eleven proposed ``treason or 
bribery'' as the appropriate standard.
    George Mason suggested the addition of 
``maladministration'' due to his concern that limiting the 
offenses to only treason or bribery would still allow a 
president to commit ``many great and dangerous offences'' which 
would not be subject to impeachment. (``The Records of the 
Federal Convention of 1787.'')
    However, James Madison believed ``maladministration'' was 
``. . . [s]o vague a term [it] will be equivalent to a tenure 
during [the] pleasure of the Senate.'' George Mason then 
proposed the addition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors against 
the State,'' which the Committee on Style modified by deleting 
``against the State'' believing that language unnecessary.
    Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 argues that the 
Senate could convict and remove a President only for ``those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or in 
other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. 
They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated political, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.''
    Nearly two centuries later, Charles Black explained in his 
``Impeachment: A Handbook,'' the purpose of impeachment is to 
protect the Nation, rather than to punish the individual 
holding the Office of President. Thus, the behavior at issue 
must reach a level of endangering the state.
    The House voted to impeach President Clinton on two 
articles; perjury before the grand jury and obstruction of 
justice. Two other articles accusing the President of perjury 
in a deposition in a civil case, and of abusing his power by 
not responding to the 81 requests for admission made on 
November 5, 1998, in a manner the House desired, were not 
approved.
    Article I, charging perjury, is poorly and rather vaguely 
worded. Nevertheless, it appears to contain 11 separate 
allegations. The House managers in their presentation in 
article II allege seven acts of Presidential misconduct 
constituting obstruction of justice.
    The Office of Independent Counsel was authorized by the 
Attorney General of the United States to conduct an 
investigation of the President's relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Mr. Starr has 25 attorneys and 5 non-FBI 
investigators on his personal staff, and access to the 
virtually unlimited resources of the FBI. The investigation 
continued for 8 months, culminating in a record of over 60,000 
pages of materials including sworn testimony from grand jury 
appearances, depositions, and sworn statements.
    That the relationship between the President and the Office 
of Independent Counsel was a contentious one is beyond dispute. 
Mr. Starr has been an aggressive special prosecutor. Many 
believe that his prosecutorial zeal violated any reasonable 
standard of fairness. He has been no shrinking violet in his 
pursuit of the President.
    Yet even Mr. Starr and his staff, after careful analysis, 
concluded that 8 of the 11 allegations of perjury before the 
grand jury, and one of the allegations of obstruction of 
justice lacked sufficient prosecutorial merit to be submitted 
to the House. Certainly, it cannot be contended that these 
allegations can sustain the burden of proof to establish the 
President's guilt, or to rise to the level of impeachable 
conduct necessary to remove a duly elected President.
    The Constitution's impeachment process was not created to 
mete out punishment against the individual serving as 
President. Rather, the impeachment process is to protect the 
Nation from a President who has brought grave harm to the 
office and to the country. These are distinctly different 
goals.
    As is so often the case, the American people have a clear 
understanding of the circumstances that bring us together.
    The President had an improper relationship in the White 
House with a 22-year-old intern.
    The President lied to his family, his staff and the 
American people in denying the existence of the relationship.
    The President pursued a course of conduct to conceal his 
improper relationship with the White House intern.
    The President's conduct was wrong and it was immoral. It 
remains for us to determine the constitutional consequences, if 
any, to be attached to this conduct.
    The House managers rely heavily upon circumstantial 
evidence and draw from that evidence a series of inferences 
which lead them to conclude that the President is guilty of 
perjury and obstruction of justice.
    The President's counsel artfully attack the weaknesses in 
the managers' case and assert that exculpatory direct evidence 
raises sufficient doubt under the law, and therefore, the 
President is entitled to be acquitted.
    On this record, as one of the House prosecutors pointed 
out, reasonable people can differ as to the conclusions they 
reach.
    It is acknowledged that the House managers have the burden 
of proof in establishing the President's guilt under legal 
definitions. Open to question is the standard of proof to be 
applied, a mere preponderance of the evidence as in a civil 
trial, clear and convincing evidence as in alleging fraudulent 
behavior, or beyond a reasonable doubt as in a criminal case.
    The House alleges that specific crimes have been committed, 
to wit perjury and obstruction of justice as defined in law. 
Under these circumstances, I believe the appropriate standard 
is the criminal standard--proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
    But is it impeachable conduct? Does it rise to the 
constitutionally required standard of bribery, treason or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors. I think not.
    The President's conduct is boorish, indefensible, even 
reprehensible. It does not threaten the Republic. It does not 
impact our national security. It does not undermine or 
compromise our position of unchallenged leadership in 
international affairs.
    Although I conclude that the evidence presented in this 
case does not reach the standard commanded by the Constitution 
to convict and remove a President, it does not follow that we 
are precluded from registering our strong disapproval of the 
President's personal conduct.
    There is a way. After our vote on these articles of 
impeachment, and assuming, as most believe, there are not the 
votes to convict the President--the Senate should proceed 
immediately to adopt a bipartisan resolution of censure.
    It is important for us to do this. There are two reasons. 
First, the American people need to hear from us in strong and 
unambiguous language that the President's personal conduct is 
unacceptable and unworthy of the President of the United 
States.
    The record of these proceedings must also reflect that the 
acquittal of the President can in no way be construed as an 
exoneration of his conduct. A censure resolution should not be 
embarked upon lightly or for political reasons, but it should 
be used in this case.
    And finally, a response to the injunction that we have 
frequently heard over the past several weeks: that no man is 
above the law. That is a core value. It goes to the very 
essence of our beliefs as Americans. No violence is done to 
this sacred principle by pursuing the course of action I have 
chosen.
    For those who believe that the President is guilty of 
perjury and obstruction of justice--criminal offenses--there is 
a forum available for that determination. It is our criminal 
justice system and William Jefferson Clinton may be called to 
the bar of justice to respond to these criminal charges--armed 
with no greater legal protection than that accorded the most 
humble among us. And that is how it should be.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator John Ashcroft

    Mr. ASHCROFT. Mr. Chief Justice, when the impeachment trial 
began on January 7, I took an oath to render ``impartial 
justice according to the Constitution and laws: So help me 
God.'' This oath distinguishes impeachment from all my other 
responsibilities in the Senate. Although the Constitution 
requires Senators to take an oath of office and gives the 
Senate numerous powers and responsibilities, only the 
obligation to try impeachments demands the swearing of a 
special, separate oath. While many commentators have sought to 
mark this trial as a political event, the oath leaves room only 
for impartial justice. I interpret this oath as requiring that 
I decide this case based on the evidence in the record, the 
arguments of the parties, and the applicable law--and on no 
other basis.
    If I were to look beyond the evidence in the case, to 
public opinion polls, then a path to a decision would be clear. 
A large majority of Americans, for example, believe that the 
President committed perjury, but do not think that he should be 
removed from office. I am sure that those surveyed considered a 
variety of factors and did not limit themselves to the Senate 
record. More than anything else, these poll results reflect the 
American people's capacity for forgiveness. I share this desire 
to forgive the President for his admitted mistakes. However, 
the forgiveness we grant in our capacity as individuals must be 
distinguished from the Government's responsibility to remedy 
wrongdoing. We routinely ask jurors to sentence defendants in 
accordance with the law, even though they may forgive the 
defendant. That is the same responsibility that the 
Constitution and my oath impose on me in this proceeding.
    On the other hand, if I were simply to vote my conscience 
as to whether I believe the President's continued service is 
good for our country and our culture, that is a clear path as 
well. From the very outset, I have stated consistently that if 
the allegations were true concerning the President's 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, then the President has 
disgraced himself and his office, and should resign. In my 
view, the confessed facts of the President's conduct in the 
Oval Office make his continued presence an obstacle to the 
healing our culture. The honorable course would be for the 
President to resign, to allow the Nation to heal from the 
wounds he has inflicted.
    My oath, however, forecloses either of these paths, and 
instead forces me to undertake the far more difficult task of 
sifting through the record, weighing evidence, determining 
credibility and reaching a final, impartial judgment on the 
articles of impeachment. As a result, I cannot explain my 
judgment by resort to any grand principles or by broad 
statements about my opinion of the President as a leader. I can 
only explain my vote through a detailed examination of the 
articles of impeachment, the evidence presented and the 
relevant law.
    The first article of impeachment charges President Clinton 
with committing perjury before the grand jury when he testified 
on four subjects. Attorneys for the President complain that the 
House managers failed to specify the particular grand jury 
statements of the President that constituted perjury. I agree 
that the President deserves sufficient specificity to provide 
him the basis for a defense. However, during the course of the 
House managers' presentation it became clear that the perjury 
allegations focused on a handful of specific statements the 
President made to the grand jury.
    Perhaps the single most obvious instance of a false 
statement by the President stems from his explanation of his 
conversations with Ms. Betty Currie in the days immediately 
following his deposition testimony in Jones v. Clinton. Ms. 
Currie told the grand jury that on the evening of his 
deposition the President called her and requested that she make 
a rare Sunday appearance at the White House. When she arrived, 
the President called her in and confronted her with an unusual 
series of statements and questions, including: ``Monica came on 
to me, and I never touched her, right?''; ``You were always 
there when Monica was there, right?''; and ``I was never really 
alone with Monica, right?'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, 
Vol. IV, pp. 559-60.) When the President was asked to explain 
this conversation to the grand jury, he stated that he was 
``trying to refresh [his] memory about what the facts were.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 651.) He was 
also asked, ``[Y]ou are saying that your only interest in 
speaking with Ms. Currie in the days after your deposition was 
to refresh your own recollection?'' and answered, ``Yes.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, pp. 593-94.
    These statements are demonstrably false. A person cannot 
refresh his or her memory by repeating lies. The President's 
leading questions were falsehoods. The President knew that he 
had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky, knew that they had been 
together outside of Ms. Currie's presence, and knew that he had 
touched Ms. Lewinsky. Repeating these falsehoods to Ms. Currie 
could not have refreshed the President's memory ``about what 
the facts were.''
    What is more, Ms. Currie testified that the President 
reviewed these same statements and questions with her again 2 
or 3 days later. (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. IV, 
pp. 560-61.) The President does not have specific memory of 
this second conversation, but does not dispute Ms. Currie's 
recollection. If the President were trying to refresh his 
memory, he would not go through the same questions again two or 
three days later. However, if the President were trying to 
coach Ms. Currie's testimony and ensure that her version of 
events was consistent with his false deposition testimony, then 
rehearsing these questions and answers a second time would be 
helpful. Based on all the evidence, I have concluded beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President's testimony concerning 
these conversations with Ms. Currie was false. The evidence 
clearly shows that the President gave false testimony to the 
grand jury in order to cover up his illegal effort to influence 
Ms. Currie's testimony.
    Another clear example of a false statement by the President 
in his grand jury testimony is his claim that he was truthful 
with his aides in discussing his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. The exact nature of what the President said to his 
aides in the immediate aftermath of his deposition was of 
interest to the grand jury as part of its investigation of 
whether the President obstructed justice. When asked about 
these conversations, the President told the grand jury that ``I 
said to them things that were true about this relationship.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 558.)
    The testimony of the President's own aides, however, makes 
it clear that the President was not truthful with his aides. He 
did not mislead them, he lied to them. For example, one 
presidential aide, John Podesta, testified that the President 
told him that he did not have sex with Ms. Lewinsky ``in any 
way whatsoever'' and provided additional, more detailed denials 
concerning the relationship. (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-
3, Vol. IV, p. 3311.) Sidney Blumenthal, another presidential 
aide, testified that the President told him that ``Ms. Lewinsky 
came at me and made a sexual demand on me,'' that he ``rebuffed 
her,'' and that Ms. Lewinsky ``was known as the stalker.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. IV, p. 185.) In his 
Senate deposition Mr. Blumenthal unequivocally stated that he 
now believes the President lied to him. (Deposition testimony 
of Sidney Blumenthal, Feb. 3, 1999, 145 Congressional Record 
S1249.) As the President's closest aides have conceded, the 
President was not truthful with them. In reviewing all the 
evidence, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
President was not truthful with his aides and that his grand 
jury testimony concerning these discussions was false.
    The first example included in the grand jury perjury 
article approved by the House focuses on the President's grand 
jury testimony concerning ``the nature and details of his 
relationship with'' Ms. Lewinsky. His testimony on this matter 
also appears to be false.
    Although some of the detailed testimony underlying this 
example of perjury is nothing short of sordid, the President's 
lack of credibility on this matter is straightforward. For a 
number of months last year, Ms. Lewinsky was on record as 
having told Federal investigators that she and the President 
had engaged in a sexual relationship. The President publicly 
and repeatedly denied the truth of these allegations. It was a 
classic ``he said, she said'' situation. Then physical evidence 
of a sexual relationship between the President and Ms. Lewinsky 
was discovered. After this physical evidence came to light, it 
ceased to be a ``he said, she said'' situation. He changed his 
story and admitted an ``inappropriate intimate relationship'' 
to a federal grand jury, while she was vindicated.
    However, the President declined to follow his oath to tell 
the grand jury the whole truth and admit the true nature of the 
relationship. Instead, the President attempted to walk an 
impossibly fine line, admitting to a relationship which 
involved sufficient contact to explain the physical evidence 
but insufficient contact to make the President's earlier 
deposition statements about the relationship perjurious. The 
President's testimony on this matter, therefore, was at the 
heart of the grand jury's investigation into whether the 
President committed perjury in the Jones case. The physical 
evidence strongly suggested that the President had committed 
perjury in his deposition, and this grand jury testimony was 
the basis for his defense. The President's testimony flatly 
contradicts Ms. Lewinsky's testimony concerning the nature and 
details of their relationship. Ms. Lewinsky's testimony 
provides a much more plausible explanation of the physical 
evidence, and makes clear that the President perjured himself 
in his sworn deposition testimony.
    With respect to the nature and details of their 
relationship we are once again presented with a ``he said, she 
said'' situation. But now there are two differences. First, the 
President's implausibly contorted version of events appears to 
be tailored precisely to avoid admitting a prior perjury. 
Second, we have the benefit of a prior ``he said, she said'' 
dispute between the same two people, in which subsequent 
evidence conclusively proved that she was telling the truth and 
he was lying. Under these circumstances, I am convinced beyond 
a reasonable doubt that the President lied about ``the nature 
and details of his relationship'' with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The House included two other examples of grand jury perjury 
in the first article of impeachment. The article alleges that 
the President lied to the grand jury concerning both his prior, 
perjurious deposition testimony and whether he was paying 
attention to his lawyer's statements during that same 
deposition. While there is considerable evidence that supports 
the notion that the President did lie to the grand jury 
regarding these two matters, I am not convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President's statements on these 
matters constitute perjury.
    The President began his grand jury testimony with the 
assertion that he was truthful in his deposition testimony. 
However, later in his grand jury testimony, the President 
clarified and corrected much of his false and misleading 
deposition testimony. As a result, it is clear that the 
President's claim that his deposition testimony was truthful 
was itself a false statement. However, it is equally clear that 
this false statement cannot form the basis for a perjury 
conviction for two reasons. First, when viewed in its entirety, 
the President's grand jury testimony makes this one statement 
immaterial. It is the equivalent of the statement of a murderer 
who begins his confession with the statement that ``I didn't do 
anything wrong.'' Second, in light of the House's decision to 
reject a separate article focusing on deposition perjury, I am 
uncomfortable allowing this one line to be used as a means to 
``backdoor'' allegations that the President lied in that forum.
    The allegation that the President lied to the grand jury 
when he testified that he was not paying attention to his 
lawyer when he used Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit to deny that there 
was any sexual relationship between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky is a closer matter. During the President's deposition 
in the Jones case, the President's lawyer, Mr. Bennett, argued 
to the court that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit demonstrated ``there 
is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form'' 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky. (Evidentiary Record, S. 
Doc. 106-3, Vol. XIV, p. 23.)
    The President allowed his lawyer to make this 
representation to the court, even though the President knew 
that representation and the underlying affidavit were both 
false. When confronted with these facts before the grand jury, 
the President attempted to excuse his behavior with the claim 
that he was not paying attention and this ``whole argument just 
passed me by.'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, 
p. 481.) The available evidence and common sense suggest that 
the President was paying attention. I have reviewed the 
videotape of the President's deposition, and he appears to be 
paying attention to his lawyer before, during and after his 
lawyer's representation. Common sense suggests the President 
was paying attention because his lawyer made this statement in 
an effort to keep the President from answering a question the 
Jones lawyer had just directed to him. The President would have 
needed to pay attention to the question in order to answer it, 
and it is hard to believe he would have tuned out his lawyer's 
objection to the question.
    What is more, in light of the President's admitted fears 
about the true nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
becoming public, it is implausible that he would have not paid 
attention to his lawyer's efforts to use the Lewinsky affidavit 
to prevent questioning about their relationship. The President 
does not dispute that he suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file an 
affidavit in a December 17, 1997, telephone call. The 
President's stated objective in suggesting the filing of an 
affidavit was to keep Ms. Lewinsky from becoming an issue in 
the Jones litigation. The notion that the President would not 
pay attention to his lawyer's efforts to have that suggestion 
bear fruit strains credulity. Finally, it is worth noting that 
immediately following Mr. Bennett's representation, the 
presiding judge cautioned Mr. Bennett against coaching the 
witness. That caution would not have been necessary had the 
witness, Mr. Clinton, not been paying attention to his lawyer's 
words.
    If I were applying a preponderance of the evidence or a 
clear and convincing evidence standard, I certainly would 
reject the President's claim that the ``whole argument just 
passed me by.'' However, applying a beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard, I have reached a different conclusion. The problem 
for me is that the President's statement concerns his own 
mental state. Although the evidence and common sense suggest 
the President was paying attention to Mr. Bennett, I have not 
been able to remove all doubts from my mind on this score.
    On the other hand, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the President made false statements to the grand jury 
concerning his conversation with Ms. Currie, his statements to 
other aides, and the nature and details of his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky. Moreover, in light of the legal standards 
for grand jury perjury, I am convinced the President's conduct 
satisfies every element of felony perjury under section 1623 of 
the Federal criminal code, title 18. There are five elements to 
the crime of grand jury perjury. To constitute perjury a 
statement must be made under oath, before a grand jury, with 
intent, and the statement must be both false and material.
    I have already discussed why I have concluded that these 
statements were false, and there is no question that they were 
made under oath to a grand jury. The only two remaining 
elements are intent and materiality. Neither of these standards 
is difficult to satisfy in the context of grand jury perjury. 
Congress passed a special statute, section 1623, to make it 
easier to prosecute grand jury perjury out of a recognition 
that grand jury perjury is a more serious threat to the 
administration of justice than other perjuries. As a result, 
the intent requirement is not demanding--the defendant need 
only make the statement with knowledge of its falsity. As the 
well-respected American Criminal Law Review, published by 
Georgetown University, concludes: ``Section 1623, unlike 1621 
[the general perjury statute], does not require proof that the 
allegedly false testimony was submitted willfully. Rather, it 
requires that such testimony was knowingly stated or 
subscribed. This requirement is ordinarily satisfied by proof 
that the defendant knew his testimony was false at the time he 
provided it.''
    The one thing that emerges from the presentations made by 
both the White House and the House managers is that the 
President made his grand jury statements with a great deal of 
forethought and precision. The President's false statements did 
not result from inadvertence or confusion. The President knew 
these statements were false. For example, he knew full well 
that his conversation with Ms. Currie was not designed to 
refresh his memory.
    Likewise, the materiality standard is easily satisfied in 
this case. Courts are generally quick to find grand jury 
perjury to be material in deference to the broad investigatory 
authority of a Federal grand jury. As the Second Circuit 
observed in United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751, 754 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994): ``Because the grand jury's 
function is investigative, materiality in that context is 
broadly construed.'' The grand jury in this case was 
investigating whether the President committed perjury in his 
Jones deposition or obstructed justice in the Jones lawsuit. 
Specifically, the grand jury was concerned that the President 
may have lied in denying a sexual relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky and obstructed justice by coaching Ms. Currie and his 
other aides. Therefore, the President's grand jury testimony 
concerning what he said to his aides and the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was directly relevant to the 
grand jury's investigation. The President's statements were not 
just material--they were at the heart of the grand jury's 
inquiry.
    Lawyers for the President raised a number of legal smoke 
screens in his defense that do not change the ultimate 
conclusion that the President committed perjury. For example, 
they emphasize the so-called Bronston defense, in which a 
misleading statement does not constitute perjury if it is 
technically true. However, the Bronston defense provides no 
defense to a statement that is literally false. As United 
States Supreme Court Justice Breyer, while still on the First 
Circuit, observed: ``The Bronston Court held only that a 
defendant cannot be convicted of perjury for true but 
misleading statements, not that a defendant is immune from 
prosecution for perjury whenever some ambiguity can be found by 
an implausibly strained reading of the questions he is asked.'' 
United States v. Doherty, 867 F.2d 47,69 (1st Cir.), cert. 
denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
    Likewise, the White House has attempted to rely on the two-
witness rule--i.e., the notion that a perjury prosecution 
cannot rest on an oath versus an oath. That rule of law would 
not apply here if it were a correct statement of the law 
because there is ample corroborating evidence. But the truth of 
the matter is that section 1623 expressly rejects the two-
witness rule, stating that: ``it shall not be necessary that 
such proof be made by any particular number of witnesses.'' As 
the American Criminal Law Review puts it: ``the obvious purpose 
of this language [is] to prevent the application of the two-
witness rule in section 1623 prosecutions.'' That view is 
supported by the Supreme Court's analysis of the purpose of 
section 1623 in Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 108 & n.6 
(1979).
    In the end, the White House's legal arguments cannot 
obscure the fact that the President committed perjury in his 
grand jury testimony. The House managers successfully carried 
their burden. They proved the facts underlying the first 
article of impeachment beyond a reasonable doubt, and the 
evidence satisfied every element of proof for grand jury 
perjury.
    The second article of impeachment approved by the House 
alleges that the President obstructed justice and provides 
seven examples of specific conduct that obstructed justice 
either in the Jones litigation or in the Federal grand jury's 
investigation. I have examined each of these examples in detail 
and will share my analysis. As with perjury, perhaps the 
clearest example of obstruction of justice stems from the 
President's conversation with Ms. Currie the day after his 
sworn deposition testimony in the Jones case.
    As noted in the discussion of perjury, the President called 
in Ms. Currie the day after his sworn deposition testimony and 
confronted her with a series of questions and answers, such as 
``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''; 
``You were always there when Monica was there, right?'' and ``I 
was never really alone with Monica, right?'' (Evidentiary 
Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. IV, pp. 559-60.) According to Ms. 
Currie, the President repeated this rehearsal of questions and 
answers 2 or 3 days later. As discussed earlier, the 
President's explanation for this conversation--that he was 
trying to refresh his memory--is simply not credible. The true 
purpose of these conversations becomes clear in light of the 
President's sworn deposition testimony. On several occasions 
during his deposition, the President invoked Ms. Currie's name 
in answering questions concerning his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Indeed, at one point, the President specifically 
directed the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty whether Ms. Lewinsky 
was alone with him or with Ms. Currie between the hours of 
midnight and 6 a.m. (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. 
XIV, p. 35.)
    In other words, during his deposition, the President 
attempted to use Ms. Currie as an alibi witness to deny that he 
had been alone with Ms. Lewinsky. It is telling in this regard 
that in his conversation with Ms. Currie the President sought 
Ms. Currie's agreement that ``he was never alone with her, 
right?'' This was the exact point as to which the President 
directed the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty.'' In short, having 
invoked Ms. Currie as an alibi in his deposition, the President 
wasted no time in contacting Ms. Currie and making sure her 
story would square with the President's sworn testimony. 
Indeed, the President contacted Ms. Currie and explained that 
Ms. Lewinsky's name had come up during the deposition despite 
Judge Wright's admonition not to discuss the deposition with 
anyone other than his lawyers.
    There is simply no innocent explanation for this 
conversation with Ms. Currie. It was a violation of Judge 
Wright's order. It was not an attempt to refresh the 
President's memory. Instead, the evidence shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this was an unlawful attempt to obstruct 
justice by altering Ms. Currie's testimony in the Jones case.
    This coaching of Ms. Currie is not the only example of 
obstruction of justice by the President. For instance, the 
first example cited in the obstruction of justice article 
alleges that the President corruptly encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to 
file a false affidavit in the Jones litigation. The President 
does not dispute that he called Ms. Lewinsky at 2:30 in the 
morning on December 17, 1997, to inform her that she was on the 
witness list in the Jones case. The President likewise does not 
dispute that he hoped Ms. Lewinsky would not have to testify 
and suggested to her that she could file an affidavit to reduce 
her chances of being deposed or called to testify in the Jones 
proceeding. (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, pp. 
567-73.) The President's defense is that although he wanted Ms. 
Lewinsky to file an affidavit to avoid testifying, he did not 
want her to file a false affidavit. As the President put in his 
grand jury testimony, ``Did I hope she'd be able to get out of 
testifying on an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to 
execute a false affidavit? No, I did not.'' (Evidentiary 
Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 571.) This claim that an 
affidavit could be both truthful and result in a reduced chance 
of Ms. Lewinsky testifying is critical to the President's 
defense because it is a crime to corruptly persuade a potential 
witness to delay or prevent their testimony.
    The fundamental problem with the President's defense is 
that a truthful affidavit that disclosed the nature of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would have been inconsistent 
with the President's stated goal of reducing her chances of 
being called to testify. A truthful affidavit would have 
guaranteed that Ms. Lewinsky would have been called as a 
witness. It is folly to suggest that an affidavit that admitted 
the relationship but emphasized its consensual nature could 
have prevented Ms. Lewinsky from being called. Judge Wright had 
already approved discovery of government employees involved in 
relationships with the President without regard to whether they 
were consensual.
    Additional evidence that the President encouraged Ms. 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit comes from the President's 
revival of previously developed cover stories in this same 2:30 
a.m. telephone conversation. Specifically, according to Ms. 
Lewinsky, the President reminded her that ``you can always say 
you were going to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
letters?'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 
843.) To be sure, Ms. Lewinsky has testified that the ideas of 
filing an affidavit and using the cover stories were not 
explicitly linked in her mind. However, there must have been 
some implicit link, in fact, because Ms. Lewinsky's draft 
affidavit featured one of the cover stories. Although it was 
dropped in the editing process to eliminate any suggestion that 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky were alone, the draft affidavit 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky had brought the President papers.
    In addition, the notions that the President wanted Ms. 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and that only a false 
affidavit would have the desired effect of keeping Ms. Lewinsky 
from being called as a witness are supported by the fact that 
the filed affidavit was false. The affidavit Ms. Lewinsky filed 
was false, in the following particulars: (1) it stated that Ms. 
Lewinsky did not ``possess any information that could possibly 
be relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones . . .'', (2) 
it stated that on the occasions on which Ms. Lewinsky saw the 
President after she left employment at the White House in April 
1996 were official receptions and formal functions related to 
her job, and that ``there were other people present on those 
occasions,'' and (3) it stated that--contrary to the 
President's admission before the grand jury that he and Ms. 
Lewinsky had an inappropriate intimate relationship--``the 
President . . . always behaved appropriately in my presence.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 1235.) 
Moreover, any doubt about the falsity of Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit is removed by her decision to enter into an immunity 
agreement to prevent her prosecution for perjury with respect 
to the affidavit.
    Finally, the President's claim that he did not want Ms. 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit is belied by the fact that 
the President allowed his attorney to use the false affidavit 
in an effort to keep the Jones lawyers from questioning him 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's 
attorney, Mr. Bennett, relying on the Lewinsky affidavit, 
represented to the Court that ``there is absolutely no sex of 
any kind in any manner, shape or form, with President 
Clinton.'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. XIV, p. 
23.) Mr. Bennett expressly told the court that the President 
was ``fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit.'' (Id.) It is 
difficult to credit the President's claim that he did not want 
Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit when he allowed his 
lawyer to use a false affidavit--of which he was ``fully 
aware''--to keep him from being questioned about Ms. Lewinsky.
    The House has alleged that the President's decision to 
allow Mr. Bennett to use this affidavit--knowing it to be 
false--was an additional example of obstruction of justice. I 
am not convinced that the President's failure to correct his 
attorney's representation to the Court amounts to an 
obstruction of justice. However, the President's actions in 
allowing his attorney to use a false affidavit to his 
litigation advantage undermines his claim that he never wanted 
Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit. When all the evidence 
is considered, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
President wanted Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit.
    The second example cited by the House in its obstruction of 
justice article was the President's suggestion that Ms. 
Lewinsky could use cover stories to disguise the true nature of 
their relationship from the Jones lawyers. These cover stories, 
of course, were used by the President and Ms. Lewinsky long 
before her name appeared on the witness list in the Jones 
litigation. As a result, the cover stories--that she was 
visiting Ms. Currie or bringing the President papers--were 
instantly familiar to Ms. Lewinsky. But even though these cover 
stories were not criminal--only deceptive--in their origins, 
the President's revival of these cover stories after Ms. 
Lewinsky became a witness in a civil suit against the President 
stands on a very different footing.
    The President's reiteration of the cover stories in the 
same conversation that he told her she was on the witness list 
is evidence of an effort to alter her testimony. As 
demonstrated above, Ms. Lewinsky included one of the cover 
stories in her false draft affidavit. Although the President 
emphasizes that the cover stories had an element of truth to 
them, that claim is not a defense to a witness tampering or 
obstruction of justice charge. For the Federal witness 
tampering statute it is enough that the President attempted to 
influence Ms. Lewinsky's testimony through corrupt or 
misleading conduct--see 18 U.S.C. 1512--and for obstruction of 
justice it is enough that the President endeavored to influence 
the due administration of justice--see 18 U.S.C. 1503. As a 
result, the President's revival of the cover stories 
constituted obstruction of justice. His actions obstructed the 
true course of justice and denied an American citizen a fair 
hearing of her claim.
    The third example of obstruction of justice cited in the 
House article concerns the efforts to conceal the President's 
gifts to Ms. Lewinsky from the Jones lawyers. The House alleges 
that the President orchestrated a scheme by which Ms. Lewinsky 
concealed the gifts from the Jones lawyers by conveying them to 
Ms. Currie. In defending against this charge, the President 
must overcome the undisputed fact that the gifts sought by the 
Jones lawyers ended up beneath the President's personal 
secretary's bed.
    These gifts clearly were relevant evidence in the Jones 
litigation. The subpoena served on Ms. Lewinsky required the 
production of ``each and every gift including but not limited 
to, any and all dresses, accessories, and jewelry, and/or hat 
pins given to you by, or on behalf of, Defendant Clinton.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 2704.) Ms. 
Lewinsky discussed this subpoena with the President on December 
28, 1997, and both expressed their concern that the subpoena 
covered the hat pin. Ms. Lewinsky testified that when the 
subject of what to do with the gifts came up the President 
responded: ``I don't know'' or ``let me think about it.'' 
(Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 872.) The 
President, by contrast, told the grand jury that he instructed 
Ms. Lewinsky that if the Jones lawyers ``asked for the gifts, 
[Ms. Lewinsky would] have to give them whatever she had, that 
that's what the law was.'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, 
Vol. III, p. 495.)
    Ms. Lewinsky left the White House and returned home only to 
receive a call in which Ms. Currie told her, ``I understand 
that you have something to give me'' or ``the President said 
you have something to give me.'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 
106-3, Vol. III, p. 874.) Ms. Currie does not recall making 
this call, and instead suggests that Ms. Lewinsky initiated the 
gift exchange. It is uncontroverted, however, that Ms. Currie 
went to Ms. Lewinsky's apartment to pick up the gifts and that 
those gifts were stored under Ms. Currie's bed. The net result 
of these events is that the gifts that evidenced a relationship 
the President was trying to conceal in litigation against him 
were kept from the Jones lawyers. This net result makes the 
President's sworn testimony that he directed Ms. Lewinsky to 
turn over the gifts difficult to credit. It is difficult to 
believe that Ms. Lewinsky would disregard the President's 
advice on this issue.
    This evidence makes it more likely than not that the 
President obstructed justice by orchestrating the concealment 
of the gifts. However, to prove obstruction of justice, the 
House must show that the President directed Ms. Currie to pick 
up the gifts. That is the missing link in the House's case. 
Although that is the most likely explanation for the 
concealment of the gifts, both parties to that conversation--
Ms. Currie and the President--deny that such a discussion took 
place. As a result, there is a reasonable doubt in my mind as 
to whether the President obstructed justice by concealing the 
gifts, and I find this issue in his favor.
    The next example of obstruction cited by the House is the 
job search. The evidence is clear that the President asked 
Vernon Jordan to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job in New York City. 
Mr. Jordan was unequivocal that he, not Ms. Lewinsky, was 
running the job search, and that he was finding Ms. Lewinsky a 
job at the ``behest'' of the President. (Deposition testimony 
of Vernon Jordan, Feb. 2, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1245.) This 
word choice is telling. The dictionary defines ``behest'' as 
``an authoritative order,'' or secondarily as ``an urgent 
prompting,'' and suggests ``command'' as a synonym. (Merriam-
Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Ed. 1993), p. 103.)
    The only remaining question is whether the President 
directed Mr. Jordan to find Ms. Lewinsky a job in order to get 
Ms. Lewinsky to ``withhold testimony, or withhold a record, 
document or other object, from an official proceeding,'' or for 
some other purpose. In evaluating this issue, the President's 
past failure to provide job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky is 
relevant. Since Ms. Lewinsky left the White House in April 
1996, she was anxious to get back and enlisted the President's 
support. He never helped her return to the White House. 
Eventually, Ms. Lewinsky despaired of ever receiving any job 
assistance from the President to help her return to the White 
House and turned her sights to a job in New York. Once again, 
the President's level of job assistance was underwhelming until 
Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list in the Jones 
case. At that point, Mr. Jordan, at the ``behest'' of the 
President, put the job search into full gear.
    However, Mr. Jordan's involvement with Ms. Lewinsky was not 
limited to finding her a job. He also found her a lawyer, a 
lawyer who oversaw the filing of an affidavit that turned out 
to be false. The same affidavit the President suggested Ms. 
Lewinsky could file in their late night telephone call. The 
same affidavit that the President's lawyer attempted to use to 
keep the Jones lawyers from questioning the President about Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Mr. Jordan also shared a breakfast with Ms. Lewinsky in 
which they discussed draft notes between Ms. Lewinsky and the 
President. Mr. Jordan initially denied that this breakfast 
meeting had taken place. However, when confronted with a 
receipt for breakfast, Mr. Jordan conceded the meeting took 
place and that the subject of the notes came up. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that Mr. Jordan told her to make sure that those 
incriminating notes were destroyed. Mr. Jordan denies that he 
gave her that advice. Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on this subject 
is certainly entitled to great weight because she has 
consistently remembered the breakfast and what transpired, 
while Mr. Jordan previously denied that the breakfast had 
occurred. But this conflict in the testimony need not be 
resolved. Mr. Jordan is not on trial. The President is, and the 
fact that the person he designated to get Ms. Lewinsky a job 
was also discussing incriminating notes relevant to the Jones 
litigation and finding her a lawyer to file an affidavit in 
that case undermine the President's claim that the job search 
and the Jones litigation were unrelated.
    Although Ms. Lewinsky has testified that the President 
never expressly conditioned her job assistance on her continued 
cooperation in the Jones litigation, her conduct shows an 
implicit connection between the job search and the Jones 
litigation. When she received a subpoena from the Jones lawyers 
she went to her job counselor. When she had concerns about what 
to do with incriminating notes, she discussed the matter with 
her job counselor.
    The evidence demonstrates that the motivation for the job 
search was not to enhance Ms. Lewinsky's career or to find her 
a ``dream job.'' The President had the opportunity to give her 
a ``dream job'' at the White House and declined. Instead, the 
evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the job search 
was intimately tied to the Jones litigation and designed to 
ensure Ms. Lewinsky's continuing cooperation.
    The next example of obstruction of justice is the 
President's decision to stand mute while his attorney used an 
affidavit the President knew to be false to make 
representations to a Federal judge that the President knew to 
be false. As I have noted, I do not think the President's act 
of omission constitutes a separate act of obstruction. However, 
I do think the President's failure to object to the use of this 
false affidavit sheds light on many of the President's acts of 
commission that do constitute obstruction of justice and 
witness tampering, such as his suggestion that Ms. Lewinsky 
file an affidavit to avoid testifying in the Jones case.
    The final example of obstruction cited by the House 
involves the President's false statements to aides who were 
potential grand jury witnesses. Most of the evidence on this 
point is not in dispute. The President insisted before the 
grand jury that he was truthful with his aides. However, the 
President's own aides now admit that he lied to them. There is 
no dispute that those lies were repeated to the grand jury. The 
only remaining question is whether the President told these 
lies to his aides with the expectation that they would 
resurface in the grand jury.
    The White House's principal defense on this point is that 
the President's lies to his aides were no different than the 
lies he had told the entire American people. This is a strange 
defense. Essentially, it attempts to make a virtue out of the 
fact that the President lied to every American, without respect 
to whether they were potential witnesses. The legal point 
appears to be that the President's aides could not obstruct the 
due administration of justice because the grand jurors already 
were exposed to the President's false denials.
    There are several problems with this argument, not the 
least of which is that it is based on a false premise. The 
President did not merely repeat the same denials he made to the 
public at large. The President's denials to his aides were 
embellished and substantially more detailed. The President did 
not tell the American people that Ms. Lewinsky was a stalker or 
categorically state that there was no sex ``in any way 
whatsoever,'' though he labored hard to leave that false 
misimpression. He did share these details with his aides, and 
they repeated them to the grand jury. These details, moreover, 
were not immaterial to the grand jury's investigation. These 
details, such as the characterization of Ms. Lewinsky as a 
stalker, directly attack the credibility of the principal 
witness against the President in the grand jury proceeding. As 
a result, I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
President obstructed justice when he lied to his aides.
    The President's conduct clearly violates the Federal 
criminal statutes against obstruction of justice and witness 
tampering. The Federal obstruction of justice statute requires 
the government to prove three elements: ``(1) there was a 
pending Federal judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant knew of 
the proceeding; and (3) the defendant acted corruptly with the 
specific intent to obstruct or interfere with the proceeding or 
due administration of justice.'' (American Criminal Law Review, 
Vol. 35, pp. 989, 992 (1998).) There is no real dispute in this 
case that the President knew that the Jones suit was pending 
when he engaged in the conduct covered by the obstruction of 
justice article. The only relevant legal question is whether he 
intended to obstruct justice in the Jones case.
    There is ample evidence in the record to suggest that 
obstructing justice in the Jones case was the President's 
precise intent. Indeed, the President's own testimony makes 
clear that he viewed the Jones litigation as illegitimate. He 
stated that he ``deplored'' the Jones lawsuit and felt it was 
only going forward ``because of the funding they had from my 
political enemies.'' (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. 
III, p. 532.) As a result, the President concedes that, in his 
words, he was ``not trying to be particularly helpful'' to the 
Jones lawyers. (Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, p. 
480.) Moreover, the discussion of the specific examples of 
obstruction of justice make clear that the President's advice 
that Ms. Lewinsky file a false affidavit, the President's 
coaching of witnesses, and the job search were all done with 
the object of obstructing justice in the Jones litigation.
    The Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 criminalized 
a particular form of obstruction of justice, witness tampering. 
Part of that act, section 1512(b) of the Federal criminal code, 
sets out the four elements of witness tampering. ``Under 
section 1512(b), the government must prove that the defendant: 
(1) knowingly (2) engaged in intimidation, physical force, 
threats, misleading conduct or corrupt persuasion, (3) with 
intent to influence, delay or prevent testimony or cause any 
person to withhold a record, object or document (4) from an 
official proceeding.'' (American Criminal Law Review, Vol. 35, 
pp. 989, 1004 (1998).) Each of these elements is satisfied in 
this case.
    The President's attorneys have emphasized that the 
President never physically threatened any potential witness. In 
particular, they point to Ms. Currie's testimony that she never 
felt threatened or intimidated in her conversations with the 
President. However, that is simply not relevant under the 
Federal witness tampering statute, which criminalizes not just 
physical intimidation, but corrupt persuasion and misleading 
conduct as well. What is more, the statute makes clear that it 
applies to any witness in any official proceeding, and the 
statute specifies in subsection (e) that ``an official 
proceeding need not be pending or about to be instituted at the 
time of the offense.'' As with the perjury counts, the 
President's legal defenses misstate the applicable law. Just as 
Federal law does not require two witnesses to support a 
conviction for grand jury perjury, the assertion that witness 
tampering requires actual intimidation simply misstates the 
law.
    My careful examination of the evidence, legal precedent and 
arguments made by both sides convinces me that the President 
committed perjury, obstructed justice and violated the Federal 
witness tampering statutes. Having reached this conclusion, the 
remaining step in my analysis of the cases to examine whether 
these criminal acts require the President's removal from 
office. In other words, do perjury and obstruction of justice 
constitute high crimes and misdemeanors? The precedents of the 
Senate provide an unequivocal answer: the Senate has repeatedly 
treated perjury as a high crime and misdemeanor that 
justifies--indeed, necessitates--removal.
    Three times in the last 15 years the House has impeached 
and the Senate has removed a Federal judge for perjury or 
related crimes. In two of the three cases, moreover, the judge 
was removed for lies that had nothing to do with his official 
duties. Judge Harry Claiborne was removed for filing false tax 
returns under penalty of perjury. Judge Walter Nixon was 
removed for lying to a Federal grand jury about his efforts to 
influence a state judicial proceeding. The Senate's precedents 
on perjury as an impeachable offense are clear. Moreover, there 
is simply no basis in the Constitution to apply a less 
demanding standard of the President than has been traditionally 
applied to Federal judges. A single provision of the 
Constitution creates a single standard of impeachment for all 
``Officers of the United States,'' judges and the President 
alike. To be sure, the Constitution specifies that Federal 
judges ``shall hold their offices during good behavior.'' (Art. 
III, sec. 1.) However, this clause has always been understood 
as establishing life tenure, as opposed to a relaxed standard 
for impeachment, and no judge has ever been impeached or 
removed for ``bad behavior.'' In sum, the notion that the 
President--with his infinitely greater effect on the culture, 
for good or ill--would be held to a lesser standard than one of 
800 Federal judges has as little basis in common sense as it 
has in the Constitution's text.
    Of course, even if we did not have the benefit of the 
Senate's precedents treating perjury as a high crime, and had 
to consider this issue as an original matter, I would have 
little difficulty concluding that perjury and obstruction of 
justice qualify as high crimes and misdemeanors. The 
Constitution's use of the adjective ``high'' to modify the 
phrase ``crimes and misdemeanors'' suggests that there may be 
some crimes and misdemeanors that do not form the basis for 
impeachment. However, those crimes, such as perjury and 
obstruction of justice, that undermine public confidence in 
government and strike at the integrity of our systems of 
government and justice surely must be covered by the phrase 
``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    In addition, the scope of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
is informed by the two crimes specifically enumerated in the 
Constitution as a basis for impeachment, treason and bribery. 
Both these crimes, in common with perjury and obstruction of 
justice, threaten the proper functioning of government--either 
directly in the case of treason, or indirectly, by undermining 
the government's integrity, in the case of bribery. Perjury is 
bribery's twin. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this point 
is that the President could have accomplished the same result 
in this case--interfering with the Jones litigation--by bribing 
a witness or the Judge. Perjury, like bribery, has been grouped 
among the most serious crimes at least since the founding of 
our Nation.
    John Jay, one of the three authors of ``The Federalist 
Papers'' and our Nation's first Chief Justice, provides a 
glimpse of the framers' views on the seriousness of perjury. 
When riding circuit in Bennington, Vermont in the summer of 
1792, Chief Justice Jay instructed the grand jury in a perjury 
persecution. His instruction is worth quoting at length:

    Independent of the abominable insult which perjury offers to the 
divine Being, there is no crime more extensively pernicious to Society. 
It discolours and poisons the streams of justice, and by substituting 
falsehood for truth, saps the Foundation of personal and public rights. 
Controversies of various kinds exist at all times, and in all 
communities. To decide them, Courts of justice are instituted. Their 
decisions must be regulated by evidence, and the greater part of the 
evidence will always consist of the testimony of witnesses. This 
testimony is given under those solemn obligations which an appeal to 
the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to be held sacred, 
our dearest and most valuable rights would become insecure.

    There is ample evidence to support Chief Justice Jay's view 
that, of all crimes, perjury is among the most pernicious to 
society, and one that has always been thought to rise to the 
level of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' It is not surprising 
then, that the Kentucky Constitution of 1792 directed that: 
``Laws shall be made to exclude from office and from suffrage 
those who thereafter be convicted of bribery, perjury, forgery 
or other high crimes or misdemeanors.'' (Art. VIII, cl. 2.) 
Moreover, the belief that perjury is an impeachable high crime 
is not limited to the framers. Less than a decade ago in a law 
review article, Chief Justice Rehnquist, the presiding officer 
in this impeachment trial, summed up our national experience 
with impeachment by noting that ``impeachment has been confined 
to flagrant abuse of office--perjury, bribery, and the like.'' 
(William Rehnquist, ``The Impeachment Clause: A Wild Card in 
the Constitution,'' Northwestern University Law Review, Vol. 
85, pp. 903, 910 (1991).)
    The point has also been raised that the President's conduct 
does not rise to the same levels as President Nixon's conduct 
in Watergate. That may well be true, but it is also irrelevant. 
Not every high crime and misdemeanor is created equal, but all 
require removal under the express terms of the Constitution. 
However, whatever differences exist between President Clinton's 
conduct and Watergate, the reaction of Watergate Special 
Prosecutor Leon Jaworski to President Nixon's misconduct is 
telling. Of all the misconduct portrayed on the famous Nixon 
tapes, Jaworski found one strip of dialogue ``the most 
repulsive on the tape. In that strip the President--a lawyer--
coached [his aide] to testify untruthfully and yet not commit 
perjury. It amounted to subornation of perjury. For the number-
one law enforcement officer of the country it was, in my 
opinion, as demeaning an act as could be imagined.'' (Leon 
Jaworski, ``The Right and the Power--The Prosecution of 
Watergate,'' p. 47 (1976).)
    That is perjury. The Nation's first Chief Justice stated 
that ``there is no crime more extensively pernicious to 
Society.'' Our current Chief Justice described it as a 
``flagrant abuse of office.'' And the Watergate special 
prosecutor thought subornation of perjury by the President ``as 
demeaning an act as could be imagined.'' There is no doubt in 
my mind that perjury and the closely related crime of 
obstruction of justice are high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Moreover, having concluded that the President committed these 
high crimes, the Constitution leaves me with no further 
discretion--it states that the President ``shall be removed 
from office for impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    Some have argued that the Senate retains some discretion 
not to remove a President even if the evidence shows that he 
committed acts that constitute high crimes or misdemeanors. 
This simply misreads the Constitution. The Constitution is 
unequivocal that the President shall be removed upon conviction 
of a high crime. As Justice Story observed in his Commentaries 
on the Constitution, ``the Senate, on the conviction, [is] 
bound, in all cases, to enter a judgment of removal from 
office.'' The Senate recognized this constitutional imperative 
in the trial of Judge Halsted Ritter in 1936, when it expressly 
rejected the need for a second vote on the question of removal, 
after the Senate had convicted him of high crimes. Conviction 
without removal would be a direct affront to the Constitution. 
It is no less an affront to refuse to convict despite facts 
that support conviction for a high crime because of an 
unwillingness to trigger the consequences demanded by the 
Constitution. Such an action subverts both the Constitution and 
the rule of law. It abrogates to Senators the authority to 
second guess the Constitution and conclude that although the 
President has committed crimes for which others should be 
removed, in this case the President should be permitted to 
remain in office. It is a brazen act of jury nullification.
    The Constitution empowers the Senate to conclude that the 
facts do not support the crimes alleged in the articles of 
impeachment. Likewise, the Senate may conclude that the crimes 
alleged in the articles do not rise to the level of high crimes 
and misdemeanors. But nothing in the Constitution allows the 
Senate to refuse to convict if it finds that the facts support 
the articles, and the articles allege high crimes. There has 
been much talk in this case about the rule of law. A power to 
refuse to convict in the face of evidence of a high crime is 
the antithesis of the rule of law. It is the rule of whim. Such 
an action would go beyond repudiating the value of the Senate 
precedents that perjury is an impeachable offense, it would 
destroy the value of all Senate precedents. As Justice Story 
warned while riding circuit over 160 years ago, if jury 
nullification were permitted, ``it would be almost 
impracticable to ascertain, what the law . . . actually is.'' 
United States v. Battiste, 24 F. Cas. 1042 (Cir. Ct. D. Mass. 
1835).
    Any discretion that exists in the constitutional framework 
to refuse to act in the face of impeachable offenses lies in 
the House of Representatives. The law has long recognized the 
legitimacy of prosecutorial discretion. But the law has also 
long criticized jury nullification. Unlike a normal jury, the 
Senate has the power to determine both law and facts. What it 
lacks is the raw power to refuse to convict in the face of law 
and facts that both support conviction.
    I cannot leave this discussion of perjury and obstruction 
of justice as high crimes and misdemeanors without a comment on 
the consequences of failing to remedy perjury and obstruction 
of justice by the number-one law enforcement officer in the 
nation. Chief Justice Jay warned of the dangers of diluting the 
importance of oaths: ``[I]f oaths should cease to be held 
sacred, our dearest and most valuable rights would become 
insecure.'' If the President of the United States--our Nation's 
leader and the man surveys still identify as the most admired 
in America even after all this--can commit perjury and obstruct 
justice without any immediate consequence, it is difficult to 
see how oaths will continue to be held sacred. We can either 
abandon all perjury prosecutions or acknowledge that the 
President is above the law. Those are the choices: lawlessness 
or hypocrisy. Either option carries grave risks that oaths will 
``cease to be held sacred.''
    Removing the President, by contrast, will not only 
reinforce the importance of oaths; it will demonstrate the 
importance of personal responsibility and accountability. 
Rather than signaling that some in society are too talented or 
important for the normal rules to apply, removing the President 
will teach that actions have consequences, no matter who you 
are. We have an opportunity either to set a good example for 
our children or to enshrine the ``Clinton defense'' and the 
``Clinton exception'' to the importance of telling the truth. 
We need to send a message that the grand words that grace the 
Supreme Court--equal justice under law--mean what they say.
    After sifting through the evidence presented by both sides, 
all relevant legal precedents, and all the arguments by 
counsel, it is plain that the President committed perjury and 
obstructed justice. The prosecutors have done more than show 
that the President lied and tampered with witnesses. They have 
proven the elements of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. 
These Federal crimes are not technical violations of an obscure 
law. They are crimes as old as the Nation. They strike at the 
heart of the integrity of our government. Not surprisingly, 
Congress always has treated them as high crimes and 
misdemeanors that require the removal of a guilty party. In 
light of the President's criminal misconduct, I will vote to 
convict the President on both articles of impeachment.
    This is the only conclusion consistent with my oath to do 
impartial justice. In large measure, this case is all about the 
importance of oaths. The President's failure to honor his oath 
has necessitated this entire proceeding. Although some might 
see a vote to acquit as expedient, I will not further damage 
the sacredness and vitality of oaths by disregarding my own.
    I have not relished the responsibility of serving as a 
finder of fact and determiner of law in an impeachment trial. I 
am eager to return to a legislative agenda to provide Americans 
and Missourians with tax cuts, retirement security, educational 
opportunity and greater safety from drugs and crime. It is 
regrettable that the President's misconduct forced Congress to 
consider this matter. I hope the unprecedented time that 
Senators have spent together in this work will enable us to 
make strong progress on the people's business when we return to 
the Senate.
    Finally, while I have not relished this duty, and sincerely 
wish the President would have spared the Nation this ordeal, 
this responsibility is among the most important assigned to the 
Senate under our Constitution. It has been my goal to do my 
very best to do my duty as prescribed by the Constitution. 
While the Constitution calls upon the Senate to remove an unfit 
President, it does not charge the Senate with punishing the 
President. Indeed, the Constitution specifically limits the 
Senate's remedies and leaves the President ``subject to . . . 
punishment, according to law'' through the courts. The 
Constitution requires a clear choice: acquit the President and 
leave him in office, or convict him and remove him. The framers 
deemed it wise not to allow the Senate to leave a President in 
place, but wound him with punishments short of removal. Thus, 
once we discharge our impeachment responsibilities, the Senate 
should move energetically to its legislative agenda. To 
accomplish legislative goals for the nation, it will be 
necessary for Congress and the President to work together. If 
Senators wish to condemn the President's conduct, they should 
do so on their own, and should not tie up the Senate and divert 
energy from doing the people's work.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Strom Thurmond

    Mr. THURMOND. Mr. Chief Justice, the vote I cast on the 
articles of impeachment was one of the hardest votes that I 
have had to make in all my years in the United States Senate--
not that I do not think I made the correct decision. While I am 
saddened that we had to make the judgment we made in this 
impeachment trial, each of us had a duty to undertake this 
task, and I do not shirk from duties.
    The House managers performed their duty admirably, making a 
comprehensive, coherent, and eloquent presentation. The White 
House attorneys presented a spirited defense. Similarly, due in 
part to the outstanding leadership of the Senate majority 
leader, I am confident that history will record that we in the 
Senate exercised our duty to conduct the trial appropriately 
and fairly. I believe the Founding Fathers would be pleased 
with the process and procedure.
    The purpose of impeachment is not to punish a man. It is 
not a way to express displeasure or disagreement with a 
President or his policies. Impeachment is a mechanism designed 
to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, the country, 
and Office of the Presidency. My primary concern, from the 
first day of this scandal, was the impact it would have on the 
Office of the Presidency.
    This case is not about illicit conduct or even about not 
telling the truth about illicit conduct. Instead, the case is 
about two activities. The first is whether the President 
intentionally made false statements under oath to a Federal 
grand jury, to the judiciary of the United States. The second 
is whether the President obstructed justice before a United 
States district court and a Federal grand jury, again to the 
judiciary of the United States.
    A Senator's role in an impeachment trial is a mix of roles 
from our judicial system, including being part judge and part 
jury. At least in reviewing the evidence, we do act as jurors, 
and we should view evidence the way the courts expect jurors to 
view it. We use our common sense and our knowledge of human 
behavior based on our everyday experiences in life. In this 
case, the defense has attempted to take each act, separate it 
out, and artificially place it in isolation. I cannot view the 
evidence in this fashion. I cannot ignore common sense.
    As to perjury, I have no doubt that the evidence presented 
to the Senate proves that the President did not tell the truth 
to the Federal grand jury. He made numerous false statements to 
make his illicit conduct seem more benign; to make his efforts 
at witness tampering with his secretary seem innocuous; and to 
make his testimony in the Paula Jones case appear truthful.
    As to obstruction of justice, in my mind there can be no 
dispute but that the President intentionally interfered with 
the judiciary. When the President spoke to Monica Lewinsky 
about her being a witness in the Paula Jones case, he did not 
discuss the contents of her affidavit because he did not have 
to. Based on their previous conversations and the pattern of 
their relationship, she knew exactly what he meant; he meant 
for her to file a false and misleading affidavit with the 
Federal court. When the President spoke to his secretary and 
suggested to her an explanation for his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky that he knew was not true, he was engaged in 
classic witness tampering. There can be no other acceptable 
explanation. When the President failed to reveal to the Federal 
judge during his Paula Jones deposition that the Monica 
Lewinsky affidavit was false, he was obstructing the fact-
finding process of the district court. I can accept no other 
explanation.
    The President has violated his sacred oath to faithfully 
execute the laws of the United States. Regardless of the bounds 
of private conduct and of the importance of allowing people to 
keep their private lives private, those bounds are broken when 
someone violates an oath to tell the truth in a court of law. 
Those bounds are also broken when someone interferes with a 
court of law in its efforts to find the facts and find the 
truth.
    The President's conduct in this matter was an egregious 
affront to the judicial system. We have a Chief Executive who 
has intentionally decided not to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed. Indeed, he intentionally interfered with 
the lawful duties of a co-equal branch of Government. This 
should not be tolerated.
    No one is above the law. I cannot accept the argument that 
a different legal standard applies to judges than to the 
President. The Congress has never accepted that argument 
before. There is no support for it in the words of the 
Constitution, which establishes one standard of impeachment for 
``the President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States.'' There is no support for it in the debates at 
the Constitutional Convention or in ``The Federalist Papers.'' 
Is it reasonable to conclude that our standards for removal 
from office for criminal conduct is less for the chief law 
enforcement officer than it is for civil officers who are 
appointed to apply the law?
    Because the President is the Commander in Chief, I must 
think about our men and women in uniform. I do not suggest that 
the President should be strictly subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice during his term in office. However, if we vote 
not guilty on the articles on these facts, what message do we 
send to our soldiers about duty, honor, and country? Given that 
the President is the chief law enforcement officer, if we vote 
not guilty, what message do we send American citizens about 
respect for the rule of law? For that matter, what message do 
we send our children and grandchildren for generations to come 
about the consequences of not telling the truth?
    We have been told that we should not remove the President 
from office because doing so would ``overturn the results of an 
election.'' The Senate does not have this power. Our power 
extends no further than removal of the President, and the law 
provides that his running mate, the Vice President, takes the 
oath of office. If the President is removed, the Administration 
does not change from one party to another. The Constitution 
wisely provides for continuity. The impeachment process only 
provides for the removal of the current occupant.
    Indeed, we are not engaged in a constitutional crisis. The 
Constitution provides the roadmap for what we are doing. We are 
simply following our constitutional duty. We did not ask for 
this burden. It was thrust upon us by the misconduct of the 
current occupant of the Office of the Presidency.
    Before today, perjury and obstruction of justice were 
clearly high crimes and misdemeanors under the Constitution, My 
vote is consistent with this. The President is not above the 
law. The constitutional standard is no different for him than 
for anyone else. It is for these reasons that I voted guilty on 
both articles of impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Mike Crapo

    Mr. CRAPO. Mr. Chief Justice, very soon we will all cast 
what is clearly among the most serious votes any Members of 
Congress could ever be asked to make. I will vote to convict 
President William Jefferson Clinton on both of the two articles 
of impeachment before the U.S. Senate--perjury before a grand 
jury and obstruction of justice. To me, the evidence presented 
over the previous 4 weeks is not reasonably subject to any 
conclusion other than that the President did commit the crimes 
alleged against him.
    From the very beginning of this matter, I have been 
circumspect about commenting on President Clinton's conduct. As 
a newly elected Senator, I was inundated with interview 
requests from national media. I chose not to appear on these 
programs and restricted my comments to a discussion of the 
process. I felt it was incumbent upon me as a member of the 
impeachment court to avoid commenting on the evidence until the 
trial has concluded.
    At the outset, each Senator was administered a separate 
oath by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This special 
oath was separate and distinct from the oath of office that 
each Senator takes when sworn into office. To my knowledge, 
this is the only other occasion in which our Founding Fathers 
required a separate and distinct oath of U.S. Senators to 
perform a constitutional responsibility.
    Once again, the incredible wisdom of our Founding Fathers 
was evident. As each Senator took the oath to provide impartial 
justice, a realization fell over us that we had just embarked 
on a very solemn duty. No longer was the Senate a legislative 
body, it was a court of impeachment. A unique court, to be 
sure, not identical to traditional civil and criminal courts, 
but a court nonetheless.
    This oath to render ``impartial justice'' was a promise to 
God under our Constitution. It also represented a duty to all 
Idahoans to represent them impartially. I committed that I 
would conduct myself in a fashion so that at any time I could 
affirm that I fully honored this commitment. I was present at 
all the Senate proceedings, and fully reviewed the evidence 
presented before the Senate. I was ready to vote either to 
acquit or to convict, depending on the evidence, argument, and 
law presented to the Senate.
    In approaching this decision, several questions must be 
answered. Did the President commit the crimes alleged? And if 
so, are these crimes ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' requiring 
the removal of the President from office under the impeachment 
provisions of the U.S. Constitution? After carefully weighing 
the evidence and the law presented to the Senate, I have 
concluded after many sleepless nights and troubling days that 
the evidence shows that President Clinton committed the crimes 
alleged in the articles of impeachment. These crimes involve 
perjury and obstruction of justice in Federal criminal grand 
jury proceedings and in a Federal civil rights action. Although 
the ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard of traditional 
criminal trials is not applicable in impeachment proceedings, I 
am convinced the evidence presented in this case meets even 
this high standard.
    Notwithstanding the impression created by some of the media 
and talk shows, there seems to be general consensus that the 
President committed the acts alleged against him. The core 
debate is whether these acts rise to the level of high crimes 
and misdemeanors as required to impeach and remove the 
President from office under the Constitution.
    Some argue that this entire matter is just an effort to 
impeach the President for ``private'' conduct and that 
impeachment is proper only for ``public'' conduct that violates 
the public trust. But it is important to clarify that these 
proceedings are not about sex or even lying about sex. Both the 
President's counsel and the House managers correctly made the 
point that private conduct by the President is a matter 
properly left between the President and his wife and family. 
The allegations in this case, however, relate to public acts 
that go to the heart of the rule of law in America--perjury and 
obstruction of justice in a civil rights case and before 
criminal grand jury proceedings. I am deeply concerned that we 
will do great damage to our system of law and the freedom it 
defends if we diminish the seriousness of these crimes and 
thereby suggest to future offenders that they can commit these 
crimes with little to fear.
    It is telling that on three separate occasions the U.S. 
Senate has removed Federal judges from office for perjury. 
Judges are tried under the same Constitutional provision 
requiring proof of treason, bribery or high crimes and 
misdemeanors as are presidents. Judge Claiborne was removed 
from office for lying on his income tax returns. Judge Hastings 
was removed for lying under oath in a trial. Judge Nixon was 
removed for making false statements to a grand jury. Clearly, 
under prior Senate precedent, perjury is a ``high crime and 
misdemeanor.''
    In America, our freedom is assured by the rule of law. Our 
law seeks to provide equal and impartial justice to all. All 
Americans--the poor, the rich, the weak, the powerful--are 
entitled to the same protection under the law. And even, the 
most powerful among us must be subject to those laws. Tampering 
with the truth-seeking functions of the law undermines our 
justice system and the foundations on which our freedoms lie. 
All Americans must abide by the rule of law, including the 
President of the United States, who is the highest official in 
the land and who has the additional duty to ensure that the 
laws are faithfully executed.
    The primacy of the rule of law over the rule of individuals 
is one of the most important safeguards of freedom in our 
Constitution. Our entire legal system is dependent on our 
ability to find the truth. That is why perjury and obstruction 
of justice are crimes. Federal sentencing guidelines place 
perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice in the 
same realm of seriousness as bribery. Commission of these 
crimes is a direct effort to prevent our legal system from 
performing one of its core functions--finding the truth.
    The offenses are even worse when committed against the poor 
or powerless by the wealthy or powerful. Our Constitution 
guarantees, fortunately, that the most ordinary person has the 
right to her day in court even if she is not well liked by the 
public or has become characterized in a bad light by her 
opponents. And even if the person from whom she seeks justice 
is the President.
    In 1792, Chief Justice John Jay gave one of the best 
historical explanations of the reason crimes against the truth-
seeking process in our system of justice are so dangerous to 
our freedom:

    Independent of the abominable Insult which Perjury offers to the 
divine Being, there is no Crime more Pernicious to Society. It 
discolors and poisons the Streams of Justice, and by substituting 
Falsehood for Truth, saps the Foundations of personal and public Right. 
. . . Testimony is given under those solemn obligations which an appeal 
to the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to be held 
sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would become insecure.--
Chief Justice John Jay, Charge to a Grand Jury of the Circuit Court of 
the District of Vermont, June 25, 1792.

    Perjury and obstruction of justice are public crimes that 
strike at the heart of the rule of law--and therefore our 
freedom--in America. I conclude that these acts do constitute 
high crimes and misdemeanors under the impeachment provisions 
of the U.S. Constitution. Therefore, I will vote to convict 
President Clinton on both of the impeachment articles.
    Fortunately, this trial is over and I now can direct my 
full attention to fulfilling the other oath I took when I was 
sworn in as a United States Senator. Many challenges and 
opportunities face Idahoans and all Americans. I will, as I 
always have, give all my energy to working on a bipartisan 
basis to solve problems, strengthen America and protect our 
future.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Byron L. Dorgan

    Mr. DORGAN. Mr. Chief Justice. Thank you, Senator Lott, 
Senator Daschle, and the Chief Justice for the skill and 
dignity you have given these proceedings.
    I wish every American could see and hear the Senate in 
these deliberations.
    There is a kind of majesty to see the Senate Chamber filled 
with Senators listening to each other in debate and 
deliberation.
    We are different people, coming from different regions with 
different philosophies, and that is what creates the unique 
character of this wonderful institution.
    I want to tell you briefly today about Teddy Roosevelt.
    Over a century ago, Teddy Roosevelt was consumed with grief 
following the death of his wife and mother who died on the same 
day. He decided to change his life and move out west. When he 
stepped off the train in the Badlands of North Dakota, he was 
wearing a cowboy suit hand-tailored from Brooks Brothers, 
rimless glasses, a Bowie knife with ``Tiffanys'' engraved on 
the handle, and Sterling silver spurs with his initials on each 
rowel.
    The local cowboys thought he was a joke. One unlucky cowboy 
picked a fight with Teddy in a Badlands saloon in Medora. In 
minutes, the cowboy was punched senseless by this funny looking 
easterner.
    And then Teddy Roosevelt was accepted. Being different, 
looking different didn't much matter to the folks in the 
Badlands after that.
    Here in the Senate we're very different people, too. No 
saloon fights here, though. We engage in verbal battles. And 
the Senate works because we accept each other, and we share a 
common purpose.
    The discussion we are having today reminds me again of the 
unique skills and passion for our country possessed by each and 
every Member of the Senate.
    How do we apply these skills and that passion here and now?
    Mark Twain once said, with tongue in cheek, that ``the next 
best thing to a lie, is a true story no one will believe.''
    Well, this sorry chapter in our rich history embraces both. 
Lies, yes! And truth that is almost unbelievable.
    We meet here as Senators to consider whether to remove from 
office a President elected by the American people. In the 
entire history of our country, the Senate has never voted to 
remove a President. In fact, it has been tried only once. The 
framers of our Constitution made it very hard to do; and they 
made it, with a two-thirds vote required in the Senate, 
impossible to do on a ``partisan'' basis.
    The matter that calls us to this duty is a sordid one.
    It is truly a scandal and a drama without heroes and 
without winners.
    It is about a President who should be, and I'm sure is, 
ashamed of his behavior. Is there anyone here in the Senate who 
had a sexual relationship with one of their interns? Of course 
not! The President did. He had a sexual relationship with an 
intern, and he lied about it, to the country, to all of us, to 
try to conceal it.
    This President has betrayed our trust and I have expressed 
to him personally how profoundly disappointed I am with his 
actions.
    This matter is also about an independent counsel who you 
and I know has leaked confidential information from secret 
proceedings of a grand jury, and whose actions in detaining 
Monica Lewinsky should be troubling to every Senator. And an 
independent counsel who came to Congress with such 
prosecutorial passion that his ethics advisor resigned in 
protest.
    And it is about many others as well. Major figures and bit 
players, some who conspired in disgraceful ways, and others who 
were innocently swept into the maelstrom of a sensational 
scandal.
    But, for all of the intrigue, the matter here is less 
complicated than some would have us believe.
    Here is a short chronology.
    Several years after the day she claims that then-Governor 
Bill Clinton made unwanted sexual advances toward her, Paula 
Jones appeared at a conservative political gathering to 
announce she was filing suit against the President.
    Some while later, following the Supreme Court ruling that 
the case could go forward, the President was called to a 
deposition in the Jones case.
    In that deposition, which the Judge later determined to be 
immaterial, and in a case that was later dismissed, Bill 
Clinton denied having a sexual relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. That was a lie. Oh, I know about the convoluted 
definition of sex that was used, but I think he lied. But 
that's not a matter before us. The impeachment article about 
that deposition was defeated in the U.S. House.
    Following the President's testimony in the Jones case, the 
independent counsel, appointed 3 years earlier to investigate a 
Whitewater land deal, and controversies called Travelgate and 
Filegate, swung into action to investigate this sex scandal. 
Linda Tripp was wired, Monica Lewinsky was detained by the 
Independent Counsel and the FBI, and they told her she 
shouldn't call her lawyer. A grand jury began hearing witnesses 
and after many months the President appeared before that grand 
jury to answer questions.
    Then, one-and-a-half months before the 1998 general 
election, the U.S. House, with cooperation from the independent 
counsel, released to the American public all of their 
investigative material and the secret proceedings of the grand 
jury.
    Following the election, the U.S. House Judiciary Committee 
began their impeachment hearings. The independent counsel, in a 
virtual footnote to his presentation before the House on the 
sex scandal, admitted he had not been able to implicate the 
President on Whitewater, Travelgate or Filegate--but he got him 
on the sex matter. And so the House managers and the 
independent counsel used the President's bad behavior to weave 
their charges of perjury and obstruction of justice.
    And finally the U.S. House on a partisan vote sent to the 
Senate the two articles of impeachment.
    That's the chronology as I see it.
    And so we gather--conducting a trial of this sordid mess.
    What are we to do? What is our duty? What is, as Lincoln 
said, ``our last full measure of devotion'' to this country.
    I am deeply troubled by this President's behavior. But I am 
also troubled by the constitutional gravity of removing a 
President. Some, with a mere wave of the hand seem to say that 
``it's not such a big deal.'' But they are wrong. This decision 
affects the very roots of our democracy.
    The selection of the head of government by the governed in 
a free election is rare. It is still the case in too many 
countries that power shifts through the barrel of a gun--
through raw, naked power and violence.
    In our country, the American people choose their President 
by the simple, elegant act of voting. It is through voting--not 
fighting--that power shifts. Our governments change without an 
army marching. With no shots being fired. What a remarkable 
thing to behold.
    The Constitution does contain a very special provision 
allowing for the removal of a President ``for treason, bribery, 
and other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' It does that because 
the framers wanted to provide a method to remove a President 
who was acting in a manner that threatens the country.
    But the framers worried that a partisan majority could try 
to remove a President for political gain.
    Hamilton, in Federalist No. 65 said, ``the greatest danger 
. . . that the decision will be regulated more by the 
comparative strength of the parties than by the real 
demonstration of innocence or guilt.''
    Mason said that the President should be removed for ``great 
and dangerous offenses'' that amount to ``attempts to subvert 
the Constitution.'' Hamilton wrote that impeachable offenses 
result from a ``violation of public trust'' and ``relate 
chiefly to injuries done to society itself.''
    It is also clear that the impeachment process was not meant 
to punish a transgressor. In fact, the Constitution provides 
that any such ``crimes'' would still be punishable in the 
criminal justice system.
    In short, impeachment is a device to prevent grave danger 
to the Nation.
    I believe that the framers of the Constitution would be 
startled by this impeachment effort.
    That this impeachment process was passionately partisan in 
its birth in the U.S. House is not in question. In fact, two of 
the House managers who brought these articles of impeachment to 
us called for the impeachment of President Clinton long before 
they had ever heard of Monica Lewinsky. Seventeen Republican 
Congressmen had called for impeachment hearings long ago. 
Theirs was a cause searching for a reason.
    Nearly 2 years ago, before Linda Tripp, before Monica 
Lewinsky, before Betty Currie, before knowledge of sex with an 
intern, before a stained dress, before the deposition in the 
Jones case, before the testimony to the grand jury, two of the 
House managers who argued for these impeachment articles had 
introduced an impeachment inquiry resolution. Representative 
Bob Barr and Representative Lindsey Graham said then that it 
was about ``the rule of law.'' They were asking for the 
nullification of an election before they knew the existence of 
a Monica Lewinsky and before the action that led to the two 
articles of impeachment now before us.
    Isn't there room to wonder then, that maybe this is exactly 
the partisan passion that persuaded our framers to place the 
impeachment bar just above the vertical leap of those Members 
of Congress who would carry ``fill in the blank'' impeachment 
papers for every reason and every season.
    Take the partisan flavor away. I don't think the case has 
been made that the President's behavior, while reprehensible, 
poses a grave danger to the Nation. Therefore I cannot vote to 
nullify the results of the last election. The people chose Bill 
Clinton and I do not believe the case made against the 
President meets the constitutional threshold for removing a 
President.
    I respect those here who differ. I do not allege that your 
guilty vote is partisan. You have reached a different 
conclusion charge than I did, and I respect you for that.
    But I cannot vote for these articles of impeachment. This 
is not a case of high crimes and misdemeanors. It's a case of 
bad behavior by a President who has shamed himself.
    But let us not respond to his bad behavior by hurting our 
country.
    Let us not aim at Bill Clinton and hit the Constitution.
    I do not vote to support our President. I vote against 
these articles of impeachment to support our Constitution.
    In the final analysis, however, the President should take 
no solace in this vote. I and others in the Senate have joined 
in a censure resolution that expresses a harsh judgement about 
the President's actions.
    Now, it is time for the country to move on.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator John F. Kerry

    Mr. KERRY. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, I want to 
thank the Chief Justice for his important stewardship of these 
proceedings. And I thank Senator Lott and Senator Daschle for 
their patient leadership in helping to bridge the divide of 
partisan votes so that these are not partisan deliberations.
    There is a special spirit in this Chamber. No matter all 
the easy criticisms directed our way, this is a great 
institution and in our own way we are witnessing--living out--
the remarkable judgment of the Founding Fathers.
    Let me turn to the question of removing President William 
Jefferson Clinton.
    Many times the House managers have argued to us that if you 
find the facts as you argue them, you must vote to convict and 
thereby remove. But of course, that, like a number of things 
that they said, is really not true. You can, of course, find 
the facts and still acquit, because you don't want to remove on 
a constitutional basis or, frankly, on any other balance that a 
Senator decides to make in the interest of the Nation.
    Now, I agree that perjury and obstruction of justice can be 
grounds for removal or grounds for impeachment. The question 
is: Are they in this case? I will not dissect the facts any 
further because I don't have the time but also because I 
believe there are issues of greater significance than the facts 
of this case.
    Let's assume you take the facts as the House managers want 
you to do. I would like to talk about some of the things in the 
arena outside of the mere recitation of facts--critical 
considerations in this matter.
    I have listened to all of the arguments for removal, and I 
must say that even as I understand what many have said, there 
seems to be a gap between the words and the reality of what is 
happening in this country.
    Some have said it sets a double standard for judges, 
despite the fact that the vast majority of scholars say there 
is a difference between impeachment of judges and the 
President, despite a difference clearly spelled out in the 
Constitution, and despite all of the distinguishing facts of 
each one of those cases involving judges.
    Some have said we will have a negative impact on kids, on 
the military, and on the fabric of our country.
    And while I agree that this is absolutely not about polls 
and popularity, some are making a judgment that clearly the 
country itself does not agree with. The country does not 
believe the fiber of our Nation is unraveling over the 
President's egregious behavior, because most people have a 
sense of proportion about this case that seems totally lacking 
in the House managers' presentation.
    No parent or school in America is teaching kids that lying 
or abusing the justice system is now OK. In fact, the 
President's predicament, I argue, does not make it harder to do 
so. If anything, there may now be a greater appreciation for 
the trouble you can get into for certain behavior. More parents 
are teaching their children about lying, about humiliation, 
about family hurt, about public responsibility, than before we 
ever heard the name of Monica Lewinsky.
    The clear answer to children who write letters about the 
President is that since being discovered he has been in a lot 
of trouble, may even be criminally liable, has suffered public 
humiliation, and all of history will not erase the fact of this 
impeachment, this trial, or the lessons of this case.
    But the bottom line for us is our constitutional duty, our 
responsibility to balance based on common sense and sense of 
honor.
    There is a simple question but a question of enormous 
consequence: Do we really want to remove a President of the 
United States because he tried to avoid discovery in a civil 
case of a private, consensual affair with a woman who was 
subsequently determined to be irrelevant to the case, which 
case itself was thrown out as wholly without merit under the 
law? That is the question.
    Let me be clear about the President's behavior so no one 
misinterprets. I am as deeply disturbed by it as all of us are 
here in the Senate. But I am not sure we need additional 
moralizing about something that the whole Nation has already 
condemned and digested. The President lied to his countrymen, 
to family, friends, to all of us. And if one is not enormously 
concerned by gifts not surrendered, conversations which can't 
refresh recollection, jobs produced with uncommon referral and 
speed, certainly one must be unsettled by the mere lack of easy 
compliance with judicial inquiry by a President. That is of 
grave concern to all. It deserves our censure.
    But let me say as directly as I can that no amount of 
inflated rhetoric, or ideological or moral hyperextension can 
lift the personal, venial aspects of the President's actions to 
the kind of threat to the fabric of the country contemplated by 
the Founding Fathers. I must say that I am truly somewhat 
surprised to see so many strict constructionists of the 
Constitution giving such new and free interpretation to the 
clear intent of the framers.
    And I have, frankly, been stunned by the overreach, the 
moral righteousness, even the zealotry of arguments presented 
by the House managers.
    No matter the words about not hating Bill Clinton, no 
matter the disclaimers about partisanship, I truly sensed at 
times not just a scorn but a snarling, trembling venom that 
told us the President is a criminal and that ``we need to know 
who our President is.''
    Well, the President is certainly a sinner. We all are. And 
he may even have committed a crime. But just plain and simply 
measured against the test of history so eloquently articulated 
by the Senator from New York this morning and by the Senator 
from Delaware yesterday, just plain and simply, this is not in 
any measure on the order of a high crime and misdemeanor so 
clearly contemplated by the Founding Fathers.
    Unlike President Nixon's impeachment case, no government 
power or agency was unleashed or abused for a goal directly 
affecting public policy. No election was interfered with. No 
FBI or IRS power was wrongfully employed. At worst, this 
President lied about his private, consensual affair and tried 
wrongfully, but on a human level--understandable to most 
Americans, at least as to the Paula Jones case--to cover it up. 
I think, in fact, that most Americans in this country 
understood there was in that inquiry a violation of a zone of 
privacy that is as precious to Americans as the Constitution 
itself.
    The fact that the House dropped the Paula Jones deposition 
count underscores the underlying weakness on which all of this 
is based. So I ask my colleagues, are we really incapable of at 
least measuring the real human dimensions of what took place 
here and contrasting it properly with the constitutional 
standards we are presented by precedent and history?
    We have heard some discussion of proportionality. It is an 
important principle within our justice system and in life 
itself. The consequences of a crime should not be out of 
proportion to the crime itself. As the dictionary tells us, it 
should correspond in size, degree or intensity.
    I must say that no one yet who will vote to remove has 
fully addressed that proportionality issue.
    If you want to find perjury because you believe Monica 
about where the President touched her, and you believe that 
adopting the definition given to him by a judge and by Paula 
Jones' own lawyers, and you can reach into the President's mind 
to determine his intent, then that is your right. But having 
done that, if you think a President of the United States should 
be removed, an election reversed, because of such a thin 
evidentiary thread, I think you give new meaning to the concept 
of proportionality. If you do that, you turn away from the 
central fact that the President opened his grand jury testimony 
by acknowledging ``inappropriate, intimate contact'' with 
Monica Lewinsky.
    Enough said, you would think. But no, not enough for this 
independent prosecutor. While not one more question really 
needed to be asked, a torrent of questions followed. Every 
question thereafter calculated to either elicit an admission of 
a lie in a case found to be without merit, or to create a new 
lie which could bring us here.
    With the President's acknowledgment of intimate contact, 
everyone in this Chamber understood what had happened. Everyone 
in America understood what had happened. For what reason did we 
need 80 percent of the questions asked about sexual relations? 
For the simple reason that the Presidential jugular instinct of 
the so-called independent counsel was primed by what all of us 
have come to know--he had colluded with Paula Jones' attorneys 
and Linda Tripp to set the Monica trap in the January 
deposition, and now he was going to set the perjury trap in the 
grand jury. Mr. Bennett's own comments in the deposition 
underscore this:

    ``I mean, this is not what a deposition is for, Your Honor. He can 
ask the President, What did he do? He can ask him specifically in 
certain instances what he did, and isn't that what this deposition is 
for? It is not to sort of lay a trap for him.''

    I wonder if there is no former district attorney, now 
Senator; no former attorney general, now Senator; no former 
U.S. attorney, now Senator; former officer of the court, now 
Senator, who is not deeply disturbed by a so-called independent 
counsel grilling a sitting President of the United States of 
America about his personal sex life, based on information from 
illegal phone recordings?
    Is there no one finding a countervailing proportionality in 
this case when confronted by our own congressionally created 
Javert who is not just pursuing a crime but who is at the 
center of creating the crime which we are deliberating on now?
    Think about it. When Mr. Starr was appointed, when we 
authorized an independent counsel, when the grand jury was 
convened, the crime on trial before us now had not even been 
committed, let alone contemplated.
    I wonder also if there is no one even concerned about Linda 
Tripp--who now gives definition to the meaning of friendship--
working with Paula Jones' attorneys even as she was in the 
guidance and control of Mr. Starr as a Federal witness. Some of 
you may want to turn away from these facts. Secondly, the House 
managers never even acknowledged them in their presentations. I 
raise them, my colleagues, not for ideological or political 
purposes, but fundamental fairness demands that we balance all 
of the forces at play in this case.
    Now, much has also been made in this trial of the rights of 
Paula Jones and her civil rights case--that we must protect 
Paula Jones' rights against the President of the United States.
    My fellow colleagues--please let us have the decency to 
call this case what it was. This was no ordinary civil rights 
case. It was an assault on the Presidency and on the President 
personally, and the average American's understanding of that is 
one of the principal reasons our fellow citizens figured this 
case out long ago.
    But there is more to it than that:
    Mr. Starr became involved in the Paula Jones suit before he 
became independent counsel.
    He had contacts with Paula Jones' attorneys before his 
jurisdiction was expanded.
    He wired Linda Tripp before his jurisdiction was expanded.
    Many sources documented that without any expansion of 
jurisdiction, in 1997, he had FBI agents interrogating Arkansas 
State troopers, asking about Governor Clinton's private life--
especially inquiring into Paula Jones.
    After Paula Jones filed her suit in 1994, announcing it at 
a conservative political convention, and with new counsel 
affiliated with the Rutherford Institute, her spokesperson 
said, ``I will never deny that when I first heard about this 
case, I said, `OK, good. We're gonna get that little slime 
ball.' ''
    She later said, ``Unless Clinton wants to be terribly 
embarrassed, he'd better cough up what Paula needs. Anybody 
that comes out and testifies against Paula better have the past 
of a Mother Teresa, because our investigators will investigate 
their morality.''
    Even Steve Jones, Paula Jones' husband, was part of an 
operation to poison the President's public reputation by 
divulging the secrets of his personal life--threatening even to 
employ subpoena power to depose, under oath, every State 
trooper in Arkansas who may have worked for the Governor. Steve 
Jones pledged that: ``We're going to get names; we're going to 
get dates; we're going to do the job that the press wouldn't 
do. We're going to go after Clinton's medical records, the raw 
documents, not just opinions from doctors . . . we're going to 
find out everything.''
    Into all of this came Ken Starr, and the police power of 
our Nation.
    This was not a civil rights suit in the context most of us 
would recognize. Indeed, there existed an extended and secret 
Jones legal team of outside lawyers--including George Conway 
and Jerome Marcus, experts on sexual harassment and 
Presidential immunity, who ghostwrote almost every substantive 
argument leveled by Paula Jones' lawyers; Ken Starr's friend 
Theodore Olson, and Robert Bork, the former Supreme Court 
nominee, who together advised the Jones team; Richard Porter, a 
law partner of Ken Starr and former Bush-Quayle opposition 
research guru, who also wrote briefs for the Jones team; and 
the conservative pundit and longtime Clinton opponent Ann 
Coulter, who worked on Paula Jones' response to President 
Clinton's motion for a dismissal. The connections between this 
crack--and covert--legal team, and Ken Starr's staff and his 
witnesses--including Paul Rosenzweig, Jackie Bennett, and Linda 
Tripp--as well as familiar figures including Lucianne Goldberg, 
add up to something far more than a twisted and disturbing game 
of six degrees of separation.
    I do not suggest that this was the right wing conspiracy 
bandied about on the talk shows. But I ask you--are we not able 
to acknowledge that this was a legal and political war of 
personal destruction--not just a civil rights case?
    And we cannot simply dismiss the fact that all of this 
turmoil--these entire proceedings--arise out of this deeply 
conflicted, highly partisan, ideologically driven, political 
civil rights case with incredible tentacles into and out of the 
Office of the Independent Counsel.
    Moreover, I remind my colleagues, Mr. Starr is supposed to 
be independent counsel--not independent prosecutor. He was and 
is supposed to represent all of the Congress and nowhere do I 
remember voting for him to make a referral of impeachment--a 
report of facts, yes--a referral of impeachment, no.
    Now there is a rejoinder to all of this. Nothing wipes away 
what the President did or failed to do.
    So, some of you may say, So what? The President lied. The 
President obstructed justice. No one made him behave as he did. 
And yes, you're right. The President behaved without common 
sense, without courage, and without honor, but we are required 
to measure the totality of this case. We must measure how 
political this may have been; whether process was absurd; 
whether the totality of what the President did meets the 
constitutional threshold set by the Founding Fathers.
    We must decide whether the removal of the President is 
proportional to the offense and we must remember that 
proportionality, fairness, rule of law--they must be applied 
not just to convict, but also to defend--to balance the 
equities.
    I was here during Iran-contra and I remember the 
extraordinary care Senator Rudman, Senator Inouye, and Senator 
Sarbanes exerted to avoid partisanship and maintain 
proportionality. I wish I did not conclude that their example 
frankly is in stark contrast to the experience we are now 
living.
    The House managers often spoke to us of principle and duty. 
And equally frequently we were challenged to stand up for the 
rule of law.
    Well, we all believe in rule of law. But we also believe in 
the law being applied fairly, evenly--that the rule of law is 
not something to cite when it serves your purposes, only to be 
shunted aside when it encumbers.
    But where was the managers' duty to their colleagues in the 
House--in the committee--on the floor; where was the same self-
conscious sense of pain for what they were going through, when 
they denied a bipartisan process for impeachment; where was 
their commitment to rule of law in denying the President's 
attorneys access to the exculpatory evidence which due process 
affords any citizen?
    Rule of law is a process in a democratic institution, and 
there is a duty to honor process.
    I believe the Senate has distinguished itself in that 
effort and I want to express my deep respect for the strongly 
held views of all my colleagues. Reasonable people can differ 
and we do, but we can still come together in an affirmation of 
the strength of our Constitution.
    Chairman Hyde says ``let it be done''--I hope it will be. 
Right requires we be proportional as to all aspects of this 
case. I hope what we do here will apply the law in a way that 
gives confidence to all our citizens, that everyone can look at 
the final result of our deliberations and say justice was done. 
And we have called an end to the process by which we savage 
each other, and are beginning to heal our country.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Mike DeWine

    Mr. DeWINE. Mr. Chief Justice, my friends in the Senate, 
each of the articles before us contains numerous examples of 
conduct, any of which as alleged would constitute grounds for 
the President's removal from office. I have determined that 
most of these allegations have not been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.
    Let me now turn to the three, at least for me, remaining 
allegations. First is the allegation that the President 
obstructed justice. When? After his Paula Jones deposition, he 
had his two, by now very famous, conversations with Betty 
Currie. The facts are familiar, but they are telling. On 
January 17, 1998, the President gave his deposition in the 
Paula Jones case. The Jones lawyers zeroed in on the 
relationship between Monica Lewinsky and the President. It was 
clear that the Jones lawyers had specific knowledge of the 
details of this relationship. In the President's answers, he 
referred repeatedly to Betty Currie. Further, counsel for Ms. 
Jones questioned the President in detail about Betty Currie, 
about her job, her hours at work, et cetera.
    I submit that any first year law school student who 
attended that deposition would know that Paula Jones was a 
prospective witness or would know that Betty Currie was a 
prospective witness. In fact, 5 days after the deposition Betty 
Currie was subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers. When the President 
returned to the White House after the deposition, he knew Betty 
Currie was a prospective witness.
    Sure enough, within 3 hours of the conclusion of the 
deposition, the President called Betty Currie at home on a 
Saturday night and asked her to come to the White House the 
next afternoon, Sunday. During the course of that Sunday 
afternoon meeting, the President informed Betty Currie that 
Monica's name came up during the deposition. According to Betty 
Currie's testimony, the President said to her--and we are all, 
of course, familiar with this--``You were always there when 
Monica was there, right?'' ``We were never really alone, 
right?'' ``Monica came on to me and I never touched her, 
right?'' ``You could see and hear everything, right?'' ``She 
wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do that.''
    We are all familiar with that, but I think most 
significantly, and to me the most telling thing, is that 2 or 3 
days later the President again spoke to Betty Currie and again 
made the same statements and used the same demeanor.
    The President does not dispute that he made these 
statements to Betty Currie. He explained he was just trying to 
refresh his memory about what the facts were. The President's 
explanation is simply not credible. It defies logic. Why would 
the President make five declarative statements to Betty Currie 
to ``refresh his memory'' when he knew that Betty Currie could 
not possibly know whether most of these statements were true? 
In fact, we know and the President knew that the statements 
were false.
    Betty Currie was a key potential witness who could 
contradict the President's sworn testimony in the Paula Jones 
deposition. She was also the President's subordinate. On two 
separate occasions the President made blatantly false 
statements to her to try to corrupt the due process of justice 
and with the intent to corruptly persuade her with the 
intention to influence her testimony. This charge of 
obstruction of justice, I believe, has been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence, and I might add it has been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt.
    Let me now turn to the second allegation, the allegation 
that the President committed perjury on August 17, 1998, when 
he testified about these two postdeposition meetings with Betty 
Currie. I know there may be some who are still struggling with 
the perjury charge. I simply say this: If you believe, as I do, 
that the obstruction of justice charge is made based on the 
statements made to Betty Currie, then any fair reading of the 
grand jury testimony will indicate to you that you also have to 
find he committed perjury.
    Here is what he said:

    What I was trying to determine is whether my recollection was right 
and she [Betty Currie] was always in the office complex when Monica was 
there and whether they thought she could hear any conversation we had, 
or did she hear any. I thought what would happen is it would break in 
the press, and I was trying to get the facts down. I was trying to 
understand what the facts were.

    He also says, the President:

    I was not trying to get Betty Currie to say something that was 
untruthful. I was trying to get as much information as quickly as I 
could.

    I submit if the President is guilty of obstruction of 
justice in his statements to Betty Currie, then clearly, 
clearly, he also must be guilty of perjury in his account of 
these events to the grand jury. The two findings are 
inextricably connected. One cannot reach the first conclusion 
without reaching the second. I believe it has been proven by 
clear and convincing evidence that the President committed 
perjury. And I might also add, I believe it has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence clearly shows that the 
President obstructed justice and then lied under oath about 
this obstruction in his grand jury testimony.
    Now, on the third charge, I believe the evidence shows that 
the President further perjured himself in the grand jury to 
avoid a perjury charge in his prior deposition. This perjury 
had to do with the nature and details of his relationship with 
Monica Lewinsky.
    I know many people have come to the well and have expressed 
concern about how we got here, what brings us here today. I 
share some of those concerns. Congresses, beginning with this 
one, will have to deal with the aftermath of this sorry affair: 
court cases that have weakened the Presidency, a discredited 
independent counsel law.
    You will forgive me if I point out that I was one of the 
80-some Members of the House who voted against the independent 
counsel law when it came up--please forgive me for that aside. 
I voted against it because I share some of the same concerns we 
have heard expressed here today and yesterday. We also will 
have to deal with the Secret Service that is now vulnerable to 
subpoenas and Presidents who are vulnerable to civil rights 
suits while in office.
    These are important issues, but I submit they are issues 
not for today but rather for another day. None of us wanted to 
be here, but we are where we are, the facts are what they are, 
and we know what we know. What we know is that the President 
obstructed justice and committed perjury. What must we do with 
this President who has obstructed justice and then committed 
perjury?
    Obstruction of justice and perjury strike at the very heart 
of our system of justice. By obstructing justice and committing 
perjury, the President has directly, illegally, and corruptly 
attacked a coequal branch of Government, the judiciary. It has 
been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the President 
of the United States has committed serious crimes.
    But while I have found specific violations of law, it is 
not insignificant, in my final decision, that these specific 
criminal acts were committed within a larger context, a larger 
context of a documented pattern of indefensible behavior--
behavior that shows a reckless disregard for the law and for 
the rights of others.
    I have concluded that the President is guilty of behaving 
in a manner grossly incompatible with the proper function and 
purpose of his office. In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee 
used those precise words to define an impeachable offense.
    I have also concluded that the President is guilty of the 
abuse or violation of a public trust. Alexander Hamilton, in 
Federalist No. 65, used those precise words to define an 
impeachable offense. What the President did is a serious 
offense against our system of government. It undermines the 
integrity of his office and it undermines the rule of law.
    Here is what Thomas Paine said about the rule of law:

    Let a crown be placed on the law by which the world may know that, 
so far as we approve of monarchy, in America the law is king.

    The law is indeed king in America. There isn't one law for 
the powerful and one for the meek. That is what we mean when we 
say we are a ``nation of laws.'' We elect a President to 
enforce these laws. In fact, the Constitution commands that the 
President ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.''
    How can we allow a man who has obstructed justice and 
committed perjury to remain as the chief law enforcement 
officer of our country? How can we call ourselves a nation of 
laws and leave a man in office who has flouted those laws? We 
define ourselves as a people not just by what we hold up, not 
just by what we revere, but we also define ourselves by what we 
tolerate. I submit that this is something we simply, as a 
people, cannot tolerate.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I will vote to convict the President on 
both counts and to remove him from office.
    I ask unanimous consent that my full statement be included 
in the Record immediately following these remarks.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.

             Supplemental Statement of Senator Mike DeWine

    Mr. Chief Justice, Members of the Senate, the President has been 
impeached on two separate articles by the House of Representatives.
    Article I charges that the President willfully provided perjurious, 
false and misleading testimony to the grand jury.
    Article II charges that the President obstructed justice (1).
    Each article contains numerous examples of conduct, any of which, 
it is alleged, would constitute grounds for the President's removal 
from office.
    I have examined each of these separate grounds or allegations.
    I have determined that most of these allegations have not been 
proven by clear and convincing evidence (2).
    I now turn to the three allegations that I believe have the most 
merit.
    I. I examine first the allegation that the President obstructed 
justice when on January 18 and January 20 or 21, 1998, he related a 
false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him to a potential witness in the 
proceeding--Betty Currie--in order to corruptly influence her 
testimony.
    These are the essential facts: On January 17, 1998, the President 
gave his deposition in the Paula Jones case. Jones' lawyers zeroed in 
on the relationship between Monica Lewinsky and the President. It was 
clear that the Jones lawyers had specific knowledge of the details of 
this relationship. In the President's answers, he referred--
repeatedly--to Betty Currie. For example, when asked whether he walked 
with Ms. Lewinsky down the hallway from the Oval Office to his private 
kitchen in the White House, the President said Ms. Lewinsky was not 
there alone or that Betty was there (3); when asked about the last time 
he spoke with Monica Lewinsky, he falsely testified that he only 
recalled that she was only there to see Betty (4); when asked whether 
he prompted Vernon Jordan to speak to Monica Lewinsky, he stated that 
he thought Betty asked Vernon Jordan to meet with Monica (5); and he 
said that Monica asked Betty to ask someone to talk to Ambassador 
Richardson about a job at the United Nations (6). Further, counsel for 
Ms. Jones questioned the President in detail about Betty Currie, her 
job, and her hours of work (7).
    Anyone reading the transcript would have to expect that Jones was 
the President's subordinate. On two separate occasions, the President 
made blatantly false statements to her to try to corruptly influence 
the due administration of justice and to attempt to corruptly persuade 
her with the intent to influence her testimony (8).
    This charge of obstruction of justice has been proven by clear and 
convincing evidence. (Let me state for the record it has also been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.)
    II. Let me now turn to the second allegation--that the President 
committed perjury on August 17, 1998, when he testified about these two 
postdeposition meetings with Betty Currie.
    Here is what the President said to the grand jury about these 
meetings. He first testified that ``what I was trying to determine was 
whether my recollection was right and that she [Betty Currie] was 
always in the office complex when Monica was there, and whether she 
thought she could hear any conversations we had, or did she hear any. . 
. . I thought what would happen is that it would break in the press, 
and I was trying to get the facts down. I was trying to understand what 
the facts were'' (9).
    The President also testified that ``I was not trying to get Betty 
Currie to say something that was untruthful. I was trying to get as 
much information as quickly as I could'' (10).
    When asked again about these statements, the President said: ``I 
was trying to refresh my memory about what the facts were. . . . And I 
believe that this was part of a series of questions I asked her to try 
to quickly refresh my memory. So, I wasn't trying to get her to say 
something that wasn't so'' (11).
    He was asked this specific question: ``If I understand your current 
line of testimony, you are saying that your only interest in speaking 
with Ms. Currie in the days after you deposition was to refresh your 
own recollection?'' The President responded: ``Yes'' (12).
    If the President is guilty of obstruction of justice in his 
statements to Betty Currie, then clearly, he must also be guilty of 
perjury in his account of these events to the grand jury. The two 
findings are inextricably connected--one cannot reach the first 
conclusion without also reaching the second.
    It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the 
President committed perjury (13). (Let me state for the record that it 
has also been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.)
    III. The last allegation I would like to discuss is the charge that 
the President committed perjury on August 17, 1998, before a Federal 
grand jury when he testified concerning the nature and the details of 
his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Specifically, it is alleged that 
the President committed perjury when he denied kissing or touching 
certain body parts of Ms. Lewinsky. The President's denials were quite 
specific on this point (14).
    Monica Lewinsky's testimony is just as unequivocal. She describes, 
in graphic detail, 10 separate encounters where such intimate 
activities occurred (15). Ms. Lewinsky's story is corroborated by 
numerous consistent contemporaneous statements she made to her friends 
and counselors. Her testimony is further corroborated by phone logs and 
White House exit and entry logs.
    Counsel for the President have failed to show any motive for Monica 
Lewinsky to lie about these details.
    Conversely, the President clearly had a motive to lie. He could 
not, in his grand jury testimony, admit such sexual activity without 
directly contradicting his deposition testimony in the Paula Jones 
case. Such a contradiction would have subjected him to a perjury charge 
in that case. To avoid a perjury charge concerning the Jones 
deposition, the President had to carefully craft an explanation so it 
was clear he did not touch Monica Lewinsky. He had to do this to avoid 
falling within the definition of ``sexual relations'' that had been 
given him in the Jones deposition.
    The President's story defies common sense and human experience. 
This is particularly true if you consider the number of times the 
President and Monica Lewinsky were alone and, in the President's words, 
engaged in ``inappropriate behavior.'' It is also probative that the 
President's DNA was found on Monica Lewinsky's dress.
    The charge of perjury has been proven by clear and convincing 
evidence. (Let me state for the record that it has also been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.)
    That concludes my findings of fact. The evidence clearly shows that 
the President obstructed justice and then lied under oath about this 
obstruction in his grand jury testimony. He further perjured himself in 
the grand jury to avoid a perjury charge in his prior deposition.
    I wish this were not true. When I began my examination of this 
case, I assumed that I would vote not guilty. I assumed that the 
evidence simply would not be sufficient to convict.
    Unfortunately, the facts are otherwise.
    Many people, including myself, are deeply concerned about how we 
got here. Congresses--beginning with this one--will have to deal with 
the aftermath of this sorry affair: court cases that have weakened the 
Presidency; a discredited independent counsel law; a Secret Service 
vulnerable to subpoenas; and Presidents who are subjects to civil suits 
while in office.
    These are important issues. But they are issues for another day.
    None of us wanted to be here. But we are where we are. The facts of 
the President's misconduct are what they are. We know what we know. And 
although each of us may find some of the acts more offensive than 
others, all of them are disturbing, all are very serious, and all lead 
to the same conclusion: The President obstructed justice and committed 
perjury.
    What must we do with this President who has obstructed justice, and 
then committed perjury about that obstruction?
    Obstruction of justice and perjury strike at the very heart of our 
system of justice. By obstructing justice and committing perjury, the 
President has directly, illegally, and corruptly attacked a coequal 
branch of Government, the judiciary.
    The requirement to obey the law applies to us all, in all cases. To 
say a President can obstruct justice is to put the President above the 
law, and above the Constitution.
    Perjury is also a very serious crime. The Constitution gives every 
defendant a choice: Testify truthfully, or remain silent. No one can be 
forced to testify in a manner that involves self-incrimination. But a 
decision to place one's hand on the Bible and invoke God's witness--and 
then lie--threatens the judiciary. The judiciary is designed to be a 
mechanism for finding the truth--so that justice can be done. Perjury 
perverts the judiciary, turning it into a mechanism that accepts lies--
so that injustice may prevail.
    It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the 
President of the United States has committed serious crimes. But 
although I have found specific violations of law, it is not 
insignificant in my final decision that these specific criminal acts 
were committed within a larger context of a documented pattern of 
indefensible behavior--behavior that shows a reckless disregard for the 
law and for the rights of others.
    I have concluded that the President is guilty of ``behaving in a 
manner grossly incompatible with the proper function and purpose of 
(his) office.'' In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee used those 
precise words to define an impeachable offense (16).
    I have also concluded that the President is guilty of ``the abuse 
or violation of (a) public trust.'' Alexander Hamilton, in the 
Federalist No. 65, used those precise words to define an impeachable 
offense.
    What the President did is a serious offense against the system of 
government. It undermines the integrity of his office. And it 
undermines the rule of law.
    Here's what Thomas Paine said about the rule of law: ``Let a crown 
be placed (on the law), by which the world may know, that so far as we 
approve of monarchy, that in America the law is king'' (17).
    The law is indeed king in America. There isn't one law for the 
powerful and one for the meek. That's what we mean when we say we are a 
nation of laws. We elect a President to enforce these laws. The 
Constitution commands that he ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.''
    How can we allow a man who has obstructed justice and committed 
perjury to remain as the chief law enforcement officer of our country?
    How can we call ourselves a nation of laws and tolerate a man in 
office who has flouted those laws?
    We define ourselves as a people not just by what we revere, but by 
what we tolerate. This, in my view, is simply not tolerable. I will 
vote to convict the President on both counts and to remove him from 
office.
    I wish to acknowledge the assistance of many talented individuals 
who have helped me address these difficult questions of fact, law, and 
policy. I have been given able counsel by Karla Carpenter, Helen Rhee, 
Louis DuPart, Robert Hoffman, Laurel Pressler, and Michael Potemra on 
my Senate staff; my good friends William F. Schenck, Curt Hartman, 
Nicholas Wise, and Charles Wise; and my son and valued adviser Patrick 
DeWine. All deserve my sincere thanks; of course, the responsibility 
for the conclusions remains mine alone.
                                 notes
    1. Specifically, the article charges that ``the President has 
prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice and 
has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates and 
agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
coverup, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to 
a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted 
judicial proceeding.''
    2. Each Senator must determine the standard of proof to be applied 
in judging an impeachment case. In weighing the facts of this 
impeachment, I have used the standard of proof of ``clear and 
convincing evidence.'' The Modern Federal Jury Instruction describes 
clear and convincing evidence as ``proof (that) leaves no substantial 
doubt in your kind . . . that establishes in your mind, not only the 
proposition at issue is probable, but also that it is highly probable. 
It is enough if the party with the burden of proof establishes his 
claim beyond any `substantial doubt he does not have to dispel every 
`reasonable doubt'.'' Modern Federal Jury Instructions, section 73.01 
(1998). I have rejected the standard of proof ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt,'' which applies to criminal cases. This standard is not 
applicable to a case in which the defendant is threatened not with loss 
of liberty but with loss of office. I have also rejected the standard 
of ``preponderance of the evidence.'' This standard, which would 
provide for conviction if the scales of evidence were tipped ever so 
slightly against the President, would not treat removal from office 
with the seriousness and gravity it deserves.
    3. Question: Do you recall ever walking with Jane Doe 6 Lewinsky 
down the hallway from the Oval Office to your private kitchen there in 
the White House?
    Answer: . . . Now, to go back to your question, my recollection is 
that, that at some point during the government shutdown, when Ms. 
Lewinsky was still an intern but was working the chief of staff's 
office because all the employees had to go home, that she was back 
there with a pizza that she brought to me and to others. I do not 
believe she was there alone, however. I don't think she was. And my 
recollection is that on a couple of occasions after that she was there 
but my secretary Berry Currie was there with her. She and Betty are 
friends. That's my, that's my recollection. And I have no other 
recollection of that.
    4. Question: When was the last time you spoke with Monica Lewinsky?
    Answer: I'm trying to remember. Probably sometime before Christmas. 
She came by to see Betty sometime before Christmas. And she was there 
talking to her, and I stuck my head out, said hello to her.
    Question: Stuck your head out of the Oval Office?
    Answer: Uh-huh, Betty said she was coming by and talked to her, and 
I said hello to her.
    Question: I believe I was starting to ask you a question a moment 
ago and we got sidetracked. Have you ever talked to Monica Lewinsky 
about the possibility that she might be asked to testify in this 
lawsuit?
    Answer. I'm not sure, and let me tell you why I'm not sure. It 
seems to me the, the--I want to be as accurate as I can here. Seems to 
me the last time she was there to see Betty before Christmas we were 
joking about how you-all, with the help of the Rutherford Institute, 
were going to call every woman I'd ever talked to, and I said, you 
know----
    Mr. Bennett: We can't hear you, Mr. President.
    Answer: and I said that you-all might call every woman I ever 
talked to and ask them that, and so I said you would qualify, or 
something like that . . .
    Question: Was anyone else present when you said something like 
that?
    Answer: Betty, Betty was present, for sure. Somebody else might 
have been there, too, but I said that to a lot of people. I mean that 
was just something I said.
    5. Question: You know a man named Vernon Jordan?
    Answer: I know him well.
    Question: You've known him for a long time.
    Answer: A long time.
    Question: Has it ever been reported to you that he met with Monica 
Lewinsky and talked about this case?
    Answer: I knew that he met with her. I think Betty suggested that 
he meet with her. Anyway, he met with her. I, I thought that he talked 
to her about something else. I didn't know that--I thought he had given 
her some advice about her move to New York. Seems like that's what 
Betty said.
    Question: So Betty, Betty Currie suggested that Vernon Jordan meet 
with Monica Lewinsky?
    Answer: I don't know that.
    Question: I thought you just said that. I'm sorry.
    Answer: No, I think, I think, I think Betty told me that Vernon 
talked to her, but I, but my impression was that Vernon was talking to 
her about her moving to New York. I think that's what Betty said to me.
    Question: Did you do anything, sir, to prompt this conversation to 
take place between Vernon Jordan and Monica Lewinsky?
    Answer: I can tell you what my memory is. My memory is that Vernon 
said something to me about her coming in, Betty had called and asked if 
he would see her and he said he would, he said he would, and then she 
called him and then he said something to me about it . . .
    Question: My question, though, is focused on the time before the 
conversation occurred, and the question is whether you did anything to 
cause the conversation to occur.
    Answer: I think in the mean--I'm not sure how you mean the 
question. I think the way you mean the question, the answer to that is 
no, I've already testified. What my memory of this is, if you're asking 
did I set the meeting up, I do not believe that I did. I believe that 
Betty did that, and she may have mentioned, asked me if I thought it 
was all right if she did it, and if she did ask me I would have said 
yes, and so if that happened, then I did something to cause the 
conversation to occur. If that's what you mean, yes. I didn't think 
there was anything wrong with it. It seemed like a natural thing to do 
to me, But I don't believe that I actually was the precipitating force. 
I think that she and Betty were close, and I think Betty did it. That's 
my memory of it.
    6. Question: Have you ever asked anyone to talk to Bill Richardson 
about Monica Lewinsky?
    Answer: I believe that, I believe that Monica, what I know about 
that is I believe Monica asked Betty Currie to ask someone to talk to 
him, and she, and she talked to him and went to an interview with him. 
That's what I believe happened.
    Question: And the source of that information is who?
    Answer: Betty. I think that's what Betty--I think Betty did that. I 
think Monica talked to Betty about moving to New York, and I, my 
recollection is that that was the chain of events.
    Question: Did you say or do anything whatsoever to create a 
possibility of Monica Lewinsky getting a job at the U.N.?
    Answer: To my knowledge, no, although I must say I wouldn't have 
thought there was anything wrong with it. You know, she was a--she had 
worked in the White House, she had worked in the Defense Department, 
and she was moving to New York. She was a friend of Betty. I certainly 
wouldn't have been opposed to it, based on anything I knew, anyway.
    7. Question: How long has Betty Currie been your secretary?
    Answer: Since I've been president.
    Question: How is her work schedule arranged? Does she have a 
certain shift that she works, or do you ask her to work certain hours 
the following day? Please explain how her schedule is determined.
    Answer: She works, she comes to work early in the morning and 
normally stays there until I leave at night. She works very long hours, 
and then when I come in on the weekend, or on Saturday, if I work on 
Saturday, she's there, and normally if I'm, if I'm working on Sunday 
and I'm having a schedule of meetings, either she or Nancy Hernreich 
will be there. One of them is always there on the weekend. Sometimes if 
I come over just with paperwork and work for a couple of hours, she's 
not there, but otherwise she's always there when I'm there.
    Question: Have you ever met with Monica Lewinsky in the White House 
between the hours of midnight and six a.m.?
    Answer: I certainly don't think so.
    Question: Have you ever met----
    Answer: Now, let me just say, when she was working here, during, 
there may have been a time when we were all--we were up working late. 
There are lots of, on any given night, when the Congress is in session, 
there are always several people around until later in the night, but I 
don't have any memory of that. I just can't say that there could have 
been a time when that occurred, I just--but I don't remember it.
    Question: Certainly if it happened, nothing remarkable would have 
occurred?
    Answer: No, nothing remarkable. I don't remember it.
    Question: It would be extraordinary, wouldn't it, for Betty Currie 
to be in the White House between midnight and six a.m., wouldn't it?
    Answer: I don't know what the facts were. I meant I don't know. 
She's an extraordinary woman.
    Question: Does that happen all the time, sir, or rarely?
    Answer: Well, I don't know, because normally I'm not there between 
midnight and six, so I wouldn't know how many times she's there. Those 
are questions you'd have to ask her. I just can't say.
    8. There are two statutes regarding obstruction of justice that are 
relevant to the facts of this case: 18 U.S.C. 1503 which provides 
``Whoever corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of 
justice . . .'' shall be guilty of the crime of obstruction of justice 
and 18 U.S.C. 1512 which provides ``Whoever knowingly . . . corruptly 
persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in 
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to--(1) 
influence, delay or prevent the testimony of any person in an official 
proceeding . . .'' shall be guilty of the crime of witness tampering.
    9. President's Grand Jury testimony, August 17, 1998, pp. 55-56.
    10. Ibid., p. 56.
    11. Ibid., pp. 131-2.
    12. There are two federal perjury statutes relevant to the facts of 
this case: 18 U.S.C. 1621 which provides that ``Whoever--having taken 
an oath before a competent tribunal, . . . or person, in any case, in 
which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to be administered, 
that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly, . . . 
willfully and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material 
matter which he does not believe to be true . . .'' shall be guilty of 
an offense against the United States; and 18 U.S.C. 1623 which provides 
that ``Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before . . . any . . 
. court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes any false 
material declaration . . .'' shall be guilty of an offense against the 
United States. A statement is material ``if it has a natural tendency 
to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the 
decisionmaking body to whom it is addressed.'' A statement is no less 
material because it did not or could not confuse or distract the 
decision maker. In this case, the President made false statements to a 
grand jury investigating ``whether Monica Lewinsky or others suborned 
perjury, obstructed justice, intimidated witnesses or otherwise 
violated federal law other than a Class B or C misdemeanor or 
infraction in dealing with witnesses, potential witnesses, attorneys, 
or others concerning the civil case Jones v. Clinton.'' [January 16, 
1998 Order of the Special Division of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to expand the jurisdiction 
of independent counsel Kenneth W. Starr.] The President's false 
statements strike at the very heart of what the grand jury was 
investigating--perjury and obstruction of justice--and are material.
    13. Grand Jury Testimony, President Clinton, 8/17/98, pp. 593-94.
    14. Question: So, touching, in your view then and now--the person 
being deposed touching or kissing the breast of another person would 
fall within the definition?
    Answer: That's correct sir.
    Question: And you testified that you didn't have sexual relations 
with Monica Lewinsky in the Jones deposition, under that definition, 
correct?
    Answer: That's correct, sir.
    Question: If the person being deposed touched the genitalia of 
another person, would that be and with the intent to arouse the sexual 
desire, arouse or gratify, as defined in definition (1), would that be, 
under your understanding then and now----
    Answer: Yes, sir.
    Question: --Sexual relations?
    Answer: Yes, sir.
    Question: Yes, it would?
    Answer: Yes, it would. If you had direct contact with any of these 
places in the body, if you had direct contact with intent to arouse or 
gratify, that would fall within the definition.
    Question: So, you didn't do any of those three things----
    Answer: You----
    Question: --With Monica Lewinsky?
    Answer: You are free to infer that my testimony is that I did not 
have sexual relations, as I understood this term to be defined.
    Question: Including touching her breast, kissing her breast, or 
touching her genitalia?
    Answer: That's correct.
    Grand Jury Testimony, President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 94-95.
    15. These incidents occurred on November 15th, 1995 (Deposition 
Testimony, Monica Lewinsky, 8/26/98, p. 6, lines 22-25; p. 7, 11.1-21); 
November 17th, 1995 (Ibid., p. 10, 11.20-25; p. 11, 11.1-25); December 
31st, 1995 (Ibid., p. 16, 11.2-10); January 7th, 1996 (Ibid., p. 18, 
11.15-19); January 21st, 1996 (Ibid., p. 24, 11.11-23); February 4th, 
1996 (Ibid., p. 28, 11.23-25; p. 29, 11.1-20); March 31st, 1996 (Ibid., 
p. 36, 11.2-24); April 7th, 1996 (Ibid., p. 39, 11.19-25; p. 40, 11.1-
6); February 28th, 1997 (Ibid., p. 45, 11.23-25; p. 46, 11.1-15); and 
March 29th, 1997 (Ibid., p. 49, 11.5-14).
    16. See House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., Constitutional 
Grounds for Presidential Impeachment 18 (Comm. Print 1974).
    17. Quoted in Maxwell Taylor Kennedy, ed., Make Gentle the Life of 
This World: The Vision of Robert F. Kennedy. p. 106.

                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Blanche L. Lincoln

    Mrs. LINCOLN. Mr. Chief Justice, I thank you for your 
thoughtfulness and patience in these proceedings. I apologize 
that my back is to you.
    I would also like to thank the majority leader and the 
minority leader. I have been awed by their patience--just as 
Job had the patience--to deal with all of us on our particulars 
that we have wanted to express here and the time constraints we 
have all felt. They have done a wonderful job in accommodating 
all of us and certainly giving these proceedings the dignity 
that I think all Americans have expected. I do appreciate that.
    As the youngest female Senator in the history of our 
country, as a farmer's daughter raised by the salt of the earth 
with basic Christian values, and as a young mother whose first 
priority in life is my family and the well-being of the world 
they live in, I regret that my first opportunity to speak on 
the floor of this historic Chamber is under these 
circumstances. And I am reluctant to speak here today. I had 
intended to wait until I had more experience under my belt 
before I addressed my esteemed colleagues here. You will find 
that I am not quite as eloquent, or as lengthy, as my 
predecessor; but I will work on that. But because of the 
historical aspects of this proceeding, I feel it is important 
that my thoughts and my judgments are expressed here today.
    I, like President Clinton and my colleague, Senator 
Hutchinson, grew up in a small town in Arkansas, the oldest 
city in Arkansas. My colleague expressed regret that the black 
and white of right and wrong is not as easy as it was growing 
up in that small rural community. I am reminded of the wisdom 
that my grandmother shared with me as a younger woman returning 
home from college. I sat on our back porch and I expressed to 
her my agony over what difficult times I was growing up in, and 
that she could not possibly know or understand because right 
and wrong were so much easier in her day. She quickly corrected 
me. Right and wrong becomes more difficult for each of us as we 
grow older, because the older we get the more we know 
personally about our own human frailties.
    I will not discuss the historical or the legal aspects 
about what we are doing here today and what we have been doing 
in these past weeks. I am not a lawyer; neither am I a 
historian. But I do want to thank each of you for your legal 
and your historical aspects, and the heartfelt wisdom and 
guidance that you have shared with me and with all of us as 
colleagues.
    I want desperately to cast the right vote for the people 
that I represent in Arkansas and for all the people of this 
great country. My heart has been heavy and I have deliberated 
within my own conscience, knowing that my decision should not 
come out of my initial emotion of anger toward the President 
for such reckless behavior, but should be based on the facts. I 
have approached this both as a parent and as a public servant, 
with the ultimate goal of doing what is right for our country. 
Since hearing of the President's misconduct, I have in no way 
tried to make excuses for the President or to defend such 
dishonorable behavior. I have tried to determine how we should 
communicate to our children and our Nation that this very 
visible misconduct is unacceptable.
    I have sought to reconcile in my mind what is appropriate 
condemnation of such action and what is the best course of 
action for the future of the Presidency and for this country. 
In my efforts to reach a fair conclusion, I have listened to 
the presentation of evidence from both sides. I have examined 
the historical intent of our Founding Fathers with regard to 
impeachment and my constitutional responsibility as a Senator--
however young I may be. I have sought the counsel of 
colleagues, family, friends and constituents; and, of course, I 
have prayed for guidance for myself and for our country.
    My home State of Arkansas has been under the scrutiny of a 
powerful microscope these past 6 years and, yes, regardless of 
how closely we may be viewed, any of us, character does count 
in each and every one of us. But who of us in this Chamber does 
not have a chapter in our individual books of life that we 
might be ashamed of or might regret--a chapter that might be 
revealed under such a powerful microscope, something we might 
be so ashamed of that we might mislead others to spare our 
families, our very children, the pain and sorrow?
    Many have referenced what they would do if another 
President of their own party were in this situation, and they 
have indicated that they would still vote the same.
    But the true test, I say, is what each of us would want 
done if we were in this President's position. How would we want 
to be treated? And who of us would not go to great lengths to 
protect our children and our families from the pain and 
embarrassment that we have seen over the course of these years?
    I have also heard many people say that the President should 
be removed from office because he set a poor example for our 
children. It is all of our responsibility to set an example for 
our children. It is not just the President's. Ultimately, my 
husband and I have the responsibility to teach our children. 
And we will teach our children that misconduct is unacceptable. 
The President's conduct, however troubling, does not take away 
my responsibility to teach what is right to my children. Future 
generations depend on each of us--not just the President--to 
teach and to lead.
    Many are amazed that the general public, although they 
believe that the President's behavior was wrong, does not want 
him removed from office. I am not so amazed by this as I find 
it reassuring. This expression of humanity and forgiveness from 
the real-life people of this Nation who we represent reassures 
us that in our highly technical, fast-paced and somewhat 
impersonal society, we as a country but, more importantly, we 
as human beings, are still equipped to handle this or any other 
situation.
    It is striking to me that we are at a crossroads in our 
Nation at this entrance into the 21st century. We are being 
tested--not by war or by pestilence--but by conflict that is 
our own trouble from within. This requires us to reflect on not 
only the lessons we have learned but, more importantly, those 
that we want to leave. These lessons should not only 
demonstrate how we as a country prosper, or how our people 
advance, but how we treat and relate to one another as 
individuals.
    So today, after much careful thought and deliberation, I 
have come to the conclusion that the President's actions, while 
dishonorable, do not rise to the level of an impeachable 
offense warranting his removal from office. Impeachment was 
never intended to be a vehicle or a means of punishment. And 
the standard to prove high crimes and misdemeanors has not been 
met by the disjointed facts strung together by a thread of 
inferences and assumptions that were presented here.
    I have and will support a strong bipartisan censure 
resolution that tells the President and this Nation that the 
President's misconduct with a subordinate White House employee 
was deplorable, and that future generations must know that such 
conduct will lead to a profound loss of trust, integrity and 
respect. I believe there has to be consequences here not only 
to demonstrate that something wrong has been done but to 
finally bring closure to this ordeal, not just for us but also 
for the American people.
    Above all else, I believe we have been entrusted not only 
to be judges and jurors in this trial, but we have also been 
entrusted with the last word. Senator Kerrey from Nebraska 
spoke strongly to this--that the last word from this body's 
collective voice should be a chorus, loud and clear, of how 
great this land and our people are.
    The President, actually in his own words from his 1993 
inaugural address, aptly replied. He said, ``There is nothing 
wrong with this country that cannot be fixed by what is right 
with this country.''
    The most important thing we can do in the last days of this 
trial is to present the good in the U.S. Senate, in our 
Government, and in our Nation for the sake of our children and 
future generations. I hope and pray that in the following weeks 
this body will grasp the leadership role and to begin the 
process of healing our Nation, restoring pride in our 
Government, and inspiring faith in our leaders once again.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Jesse Helms

    Mr. HELMS. Mr. Chief Justice, 26 years ago this past 
November, I was first elected to serve as a U.S. Senator from 
North Carolina. I had not believed it possible that I would be 
the first Republican directly elected to the U.S. Senate by the 
people of North Carolina.
    I have often told many of the thousands of young people 
with whom I have visited during the past 26 years that one of 
three commitments I made to myself on that election night in 
November 1972 was that I would never fail to see a young 
person, or a group of young people, who want to see me.
    That was one of the most meaningful decisions I ever made. 
I am told that I have met with something in the neighborhood of 
almost 70,000 young people according to our records for the 
past 26 years.
    These are wonderful young Americans and I am persuaded that 
they are by all odds the most valuable treasure held by our 
country.
    For the better part of the past year, these young people 
have almost without fail asked me about what they described as 
``the problems'' of President Clinton. The vast majority of the 
time, the young people have talked about the moral and 
spiritual principles so deeply etched in the hearts of those 
patriots whom we today call our Founding Fathers--or the 
framers of our Constitution--or both--when America was created.
    So in the first few weeks of this new year, 1999, I have 
begun my remarks to the young visitors with the recitation of 
two statements that I sincerely believe have much to do with 
whether--and how--this blessed Nation can and will survive.
    The first statement: ``A President cannot faithfully 
execute the laws if he himself is breaking them.''
    The second statement: ``The foundations of this country 
were not laid by politicians running for something--but by 
statesmen standing for something.''
    The first statement was voiced by a former distinguished 
Democratic U.S. Attorney General of the United States, the 
Honorable Griffin Bell.
    The second was sent to me at Christmastime by a friend 
whose name and voice I suspect is familiar to most if not all 
Senators, my dear friend, George Beverly Shea, who for so many 
years has thrilled and inspired millions as he stood beside 
Billy Graham and singing, with that remarkably deep voice, 
``How Great Thou Art.''
    Our trouble today is that the American people every day 
must choose between what is popular and what is right. There is 
a constant deluge of public opinion polls telling us which way 
to go, almost without fail showing the popular way.
    But I must put it to you that we will, at our own peril, 
look to opinion polls to decide how we vote, when the real need 
is to look to our hearts, to our consciences and to our soul. 
So many decisions are made in the Senate--be it on the fate of 
treaties, or legislation, or even Presidents--decisions having 
implications, not merely for today, but for generations to 
come, reminding that if we don't stand for something, the very 
foundations of our Republic will crumble.
    Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious charges, as 
nobody knows better than you, Mr. Chief Justice, charges that 
have been proved during the course of this trial. Therefore, 
the outcome of this trial may determine whether America is 
becoming a fundamentally unprincipled nation, bereft of the 
mandates by the Creator who blessed America 210 years ago with 
more abundance, more freedom than any other nation in history 
has ever known.
    There is certainly evidence fearfully suggesting that the 
Senate may this week fail to convict the President of charges 
of which he is obviously guilty. What else can be made of the 
behavior of many in the news media whose eyes are constantly on 
ratings instead of the survival of America?
    This trial has been dramatized as if it were a Hollywood 
movie trivializing what should be respected as our solemn duty.
    The new media technology is creating an explosion of media 
outlets and 24-hour news channels--and a brand new set of 
challenges.
    A friend back home called me after an impressive 
presentation by one of the House managers and said, ``You know, 
Jesse, I found Asa Hutchinson persuasive. But I had to tune 
into CNN to see whether it was effective--because I knew 
without the media's immediate stamp of approval, it wouldn't 
make a damn bit of difference.''
    He had a valid point. Mr. Chief Justice, the awesome power 
of the media with its instant analysis is frightening. A 
political event occurs. The TV commentators immediately offer 
their lofty opinions; overnight surveys are taken and many 
politicians are all too often cowed into submission by poll 
results.
    In these proceedings, the House managers of course provided 
a forest of evidence clearly indicating that the President of 
the United States perjured himself before a Federal grand jury 
and obstructed justice. The imaginative White House attorneys 
of course chopped down a few trees here and there--and then 
proclaimed that the whole forest had burned down. The press 
gallery bought that whole concept.
    Some years ago, there was a western movie starring Jimmy 
Stewart and John Wayne called ``The Man Who Shot Liberty 
Valance.'' Jimmy Stewart portrayed a tender-footed young lawyer 
who ran afoul of the local outlaw, Liberty Valance.
    Through a twist of fate, the character played by Jimmy 
Stewart received credit for ridding the county of the outlaw, 
even though it was John Wayne's gun that brought Liberty 
Valance down. Yet it was Stewart who rode public acclaim into a 
political career in the U.S. Senate, while Wayne's character 
faded into obscurity.
    Late in life, Stewart's character, still a Senator, 
returned from Washington to attend John Wayne's funeral. 
Stewart felt guilty, of course, that the truth of Wayne's 
heroism remained untold. He related the entire story to the 
local newspaper, only to find the editor totally disinterested.
    ``When the legend becomes fact,'' the editor said, ``print 
the legend.''
    With its vote on articles of impeachment, the U.S. Senate 
is preparing to add to the legend of this whole sordid episode, 
Mr. Chief Justice. We have the facts before us and we should 
heed those facts because truth must become the legend.
    We must not permit a lie to become the truth.
    A couple of weeks ago, a Falls Church Episcopal minister, 
the Reverend John Yates, delivered a remarkable sermon to his 
parishioners. The Reverend Dr. Yates had this to say about 
lying--and liars:

    . . . if a person will lie, and develops a pattern of lying as a 
way of life, that person will do anything. Someone who becomes good at 
lying loses his fear of being discovered and will move on to any number 
of evil actions. He becomes arrogant and self-assured. He comes to 
believe he is above the law. You should fear people like this. If such 
a person is caught red-handed in a lie and confronted with the 
evidence, that sort of man or woman will be forced to admit it, but he 
won't like it. It will make him angry and vengeful. He will do all he 
can to move and leave it behind. It's what the Bible calls evidence of 
a seared conscience, not a sensitive conscience, but a seared 
conscience.

    If we allow the lies of the President of the United States 
of America to stand, Mr. Chief Justice, then I genuinely fear 
for America's survival.
    Shortly before his death, Senator Hubert Humphrey visited 
this Chamber for the last time. He knew it was the last time; 
we knew it was the last time. Hubert's frail body was wracked 
with cancer, his steps were halting, his voice feeble. But as 
he walked down the aisle, Hubert saw me standing at my desk 
over there. He walked over to me, arms outstretched. Tears 
welled up in my eyes as Hubert hugged me softly saying, ``I 
love you.''
    I loved Hubert Humphrey too, Mr. Chief Justice, and I told 
him so.
    Hubert and I disagreed on almost all policy matters, large 
and small. Often Hubert got the better of me in debates, a few 
times I did it to him. But I loved Hubert Humphrey because we 
agreed on so much more--duty, honor, patriotism, faith and 
justice, the very essence of America.
    But we are obliged to ponder: What is the essence of 
America now? Public life once was about honest debate on the 
merits, but it is now often a debate on the merits of honesty. 
And it was the President of the United States who brought us 
where we are today.
    In November of 1955, a young editor named William F. 
Buckley undertook an ambitious mission, now completed. Bill had 
decided to start a conservative journal of ideas that would 
fuel an entire political movement.
    In his ``Publisher's Statement,'' printed in the very first 
edition of National Review, he declared that his magazine 
``stands athwart history yelling `Stop!' ''
    Mr. Chief Justice, I plead with Senators to look around and 
see what Bill Clinton's scandal has wrought. National debate is 
now a national joke. Children tell their parents and teachers 
that it's OK to lie, because the President does it. Our 
citizens tune out in droves, preferring the daily distractions 
of everyday life to an honest appraisal of the depths to which 
the Presidency of the United States has sunk.
    If this is progress and if this is the path history is 
taking, the Senate does have an acceptable alternative.
    We simply must summon our courage and yell, ``Stop 
tampering with the soul of America.''
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Ernest F. Hollings

    Mr. HOLLINGS. Mr. Chief Justice, I shall vote with a clear 
conscience not to convict; rather, to acquit. I have no better 
authority, of course, than my own Congressman, the manager, 
Lindsey Graham, when asked--and I will never forget it--by the 
Senators from North Carolina and Wisconsin: ``Under the law and 
the facts as then submitted at the end of the presentation, 
could reasonable people find differently with respect to 
guilt?'' and Congressman Graham said, ``Why, of course,'' that 
reasonable people could differ. And when the manager says there 
is reasonable doubt, that ends the case.
    But let's remember that the impeachment clause is not 
intended to punish the President, but to protect the Republic. 
And the mistake in this entire presentation on both sides, in 
my judgment, has been that they have been trying a criminal 
case rather than a political case. What is really for the good 
of the country? I go to the understanding of the impeachment 
clause with respect to the author himself, George Mason, who 
said, ``must be guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors against 
the State.'' And Justice Story, in the midcentury, said that 
you could only impeach a President for conduct that only the 
President could engage in.''
    I will never forget, when they gave us the booklet, in the 
Nixon impeachment, by the eminent professor of constitutional 
law, Charles Black, he said that ``an impeachable offense must 
constitute a deep wrong to the country, an abuse of 
Presidential power.'' Everybody is talking about the polls and 
I think they are significant. When 80 percent of the people 
believe the President lied, and I believe he did--not on the 
perjury charge, and not on the obstruction of justice, of 
course, but I believe he lied--and 80 percent of the people 
believe he lied, but 70 percent of the people said keep him 
there. Why? Because there wasn't a deep wrong to the country.
    Let's get to it. Fooling around--that was what Monica 
Lewinsky called it--seen as sex or not, is not a crime. In 
fact, actual intercourse constitutes adultery, a crime with 
which the managers, I would say, are very familiar.
    We must remember that the fooling around was between 
consenting adults, both of them sexually experienced. 
Incidentally, in private both of them are admitted liars. The 
President said he lied. Monica said that she grew up lying, was 
taught to lie.
    But the managers said, ``Oh, this isn't about sex, this is 
about crime.'' Really? I have been at the law too long. A sues 
B for the crime of adultery, sexual misconduct. A and B both 
swear under oath and through their pleadings and their 
testimony and not before a halfway grand jury. I always 
wondered, what if prosecutors went under oath before a grand 
jury? We would have to build new courthouses. But be that as it 
may, they swear under oath in testimony before the judge who is 
trying the case on its merits, and A or B loses--whoever the 
loser--are they taken over to criminal court and charged for 
lying under oath and obstruction of justice?
    I called a prosecutor in Congressman Graham's district, an 
18-year experienced prosecutor, a Republican, George Duckworth. 
I said, ``George, have you ever taken lying under oath and 
obstruction of justice for sexual misconduct--have you ever 
taken that to criminal court?'' He said, ``It's never 
happened.''
    I then went to the chief of all the State prosecutors, John 
Justice, who happens to be from my State, and he said he had 
never heard of it.
    So we are beginning to get to really what is going on, and 
that is not to say, whoopee, everybody lies about sex and we 
can go ahead and do that. We are not saying that at all, 
because the President can be charged with it, as anybody can. 
It might be a rare case, but we ought to remember, rather than 
that one witness that they found--and I guess they will find 
another one--but the Republican district attorneys who 
testified on the House side, the deputy attorney general in 
charge of the Criminal Division, William Weld, they said they 
would never bring the case.
    This case never should have been brought. Any respectable 
prosecutor would have been embarrassed actually to so charge.
    I will never forget when this commenced, David Pryor, the 
Senator from Arkansas almost 4 years ago, said: Wait a minute, 
41 TDY FBI agents coming from one side of Arkansas to the 
other, 81 support personnel, asking, Did you ever sleep with 
Bill Clinton? Do you know anybody who slept with him? I heard 
you know. We're going to take you before the grand jury. 
Locking up witnesses who did not testify to what they wanted 
attested to, paying off others and securing them and hiding the 
witnesses, and on and on; and thereafter subpoenaing the mother 
in tears; the Secret Service, the White House steward, the 
bookstore; some 4\1/2\, 5 years and $50 million. And they come 
up with private sexual misconduct, in privacy. I know it is a 
public office. It is a public office, but we operate in private 
in our own offices. To make this thing public after all of that 
expense and effort, I would be embarrassed as a prosecutor to 
bring it.
    But not Kenneth Starr. He wasn't embarrassed. He should 
never have taken it. A member of the Kirkland & Ellis law firm 
that had an interest in the case, the Jones case, was 
participating at the time. Instead of recusing himself, he 
immediately started pursuing that case with the official hand 
of government.
    Three years ago, seven former independent prosecutors 
expressed dismay at Starr's ethics. He was representing private 
clients inimical to the defendant, our President. The New York 
Times and other newspapers editorialized that he ought to step 
aside. But instead of removing himself, he continued to talk to 
political groups, all the time leaking information and, yes, 
holding up his findings after 4\1/2\ years until after the 
election and saying he found nothing with respect to Filegate, 
Travelgate, Whitewater, or any of the other cases for which he 
was commissioned--no embarrassment at all.
    He injected himself so in the House proceedings to where 
finally his ethics advisor, Sam Dash--who, of course, had been 
the principal participant in Watergate--had to resign. Then he 
injected himself over here on the Senate side, and last 
weekend, during a key moment, of course, he said he was going 
to bring a criminal indictment. He leaked that information.
    So now we have the Justice Department investigating the 
independent prosecutor for his misconduct in the way he treated 
the main witness with respect to her access to counsel. And you 
have an 8-1 vote in the American Bar Association, which has 
been inserted; they say let this independent prosecutor thing 
die.
    Yes, we have, like Bryant said, broad overreaching of 
power. Not by Clinton. He got into an elicit affair, and he 
tried like everybody else to cover it up. They sought to 
characterize it as lying, lying, lying, lying under oath. We 
had the chief of the managers; he lied not just from January 
until August, but 30 years--and others over there. The 
hypocrisy of that crowd.
    Yes, we had broad overreaching of powers, mindful, of 
course, of the reason that we declared our independence 223 
years ago--``sending hither swarms of officers to harass our 
people and seek out their substance.'' We have it now, and we 
have a chance to try it. We have an impeachment case, but we 
are trying to impeach the wrong person. That is why the 
American people are as concerned as they are. That is what you 
find in the polls that we keep talking about.
    Let's understand, of course, that President Clinton debased 
the Office of the Presidency, but let's say once and for all 
that we are not going to have the political hijacking of the 
Office of the Presidency. Let's be certain when we vote this 
week that we don't debase the Constitution.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Ron Wyden

    Mr. WYDEN. Mr. Chief Justice, our leaders, Senators Lott 
and Daschle, my colleagues, my friends, I doubt that I will 
ever know what the President of the United States was up to 
when he lied to Betty Currie about the nature of his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Did the President lie to Ms. 
Currie because he didn't want her to know the truth about the 
affair? Did the President lie because he wanted her to defend 
him to the White House staff? Did the President lie because he 
wanted her to repeat those lies under oath? I doubt that I am 
ever going to get the real answer to those questions.
    But I believe I do know why it has been excruciatingly 
difficult for the U.S. Senate to get to the bottom of the 
Currie controversy and several others that we have been 
wrestling with for weeks now. If I might paraphrase a legal 
doctrine, this impeachment has become the fruit of a poisonous 
tree. This impeachment is a deadly plant that has flowered in 
the toxic soil of partisanship.
    Given the highly contentious nature of the charges against 
the President, there is no question in my mind that the 
congressional leadership should have first established a 
bipartisan process for investigating the serious allegations.
    It is my view that had the Founding Fathers decided that 
the first step in the impeachment process would be taken by the 
U.S. Senate, Senator Lott and Senator Daschle would have 
produced a truly bipartisan inquiry, and we would have been 
able to find common ground on several of the key issues. I 
don't think it would have produced a string of 100-0 votes, but 
I believe that we would have had a more bipartisan result than 
what we are going to see at the end of these deliberations. But 
this process began elsewhere. And I only want to make one 
comment about the House.
    In my view, the House didn't even try to locate the common 
ground. And I use that word ``try'' specifically because it is 
one thing to work your head off and not be able to bring people 
together. We have all been there. But that is not what went on 
in the House. They didn't even try to come together. It has 
been well documented, for example, that the Speaker of the 
House and the House minority leader went for months at a time 
without even talking to each other. I am not going to assign 
fault to one or the other, but the fact is that by the end of 
last year, our two major political parties were at war with 
each other over the allegations against the President.
    This toxic partisanship is not, in my view, what public 
service is all about. I am a Democrat, for good reasons; and 
there are sincere, important differences of philosophy on 
issues between Senators on the respective sides. But I have 
always felt doing what is right is more important than adhering 
to party dogma, and that is what I wanted to do in this matter.
    The framers of the Constitution tried to give us a heads-
up, a warning about how the impeachment process could become 
unduly partisan.
    Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 65, said that the 
types of crimes for which impeachment is the appropriate remedy 
are ``political.'' And he added, ``the prosecution of them, for 
this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the 
whole community, and to divide it into parties, more or less 
friendly, or inimical, to the accused.''
    Thomas Jefferson, after almost having been kept from office 
in a partisan maneuver to replace him with Aaron Burr, set a 
deeply moving tone for looking beyond partisan confrontation in 
his first inaugural address.
    My colleagues and friends, it doesn't have to be all 
partisan all the time. There is an alternative to slash-and-
burn government. And it is a topic, I regret to say, about 
which I know a fair amount.
    I won a very, very bitter Senate campaign against a man I 
am proud to call my friend, my colleague, Senator Gordon Smith. 
Our part of the country had never seen a campaign so 
relentlessly negative. The whole country was watching the race 
to succeed Bob Packwood, but our campaign didn't enlighten very 
many people. It brought out the worst in us. I was so disgusted 
with it and what I had become, that with only a few short weeks 
to go in the campaign I got rid of all my ads and basically 
started over.
    Shortly after Senator Smith won his election, we got 
together and talked about how we regretted the bitter nature of 
the campaign and what we had become. We decided from that point 
on we would put the greater good, that of the people of Oregon, 
before any differences we might have. The New York Times has 
started to call us the ``odd couple''--a Jew from the city, a 
Mormon from the country. What kind of odds would you have given 
for that kind of relationship? But it works.
    The votes that we are going to cast now are in little 
doubt. So I wish to express my concern that as the Senate 
completes its work on impeachment that we have the ability to 
come back and tackle our other constitutional responsibilities 
in a bipartisan fashion.
    The public is tired of us being at each other's throats. 
They are tired of beltway politics that places toxic 
partisanship over the public interest. Gordon Smith and I found 
out the hard way, and they are right.
    Perhaps even at this late hour we can find our way to a 
little miracle and wrap up this impeachment debate through a 
bipartisan statement that makes it clear that each of us finds 
the President's conduct repugnant. If we miss that chance, 
let's keep looking for every possible opportunity to come 
together.
    Senator Frist and I have a bipartisan education bill. No 
speeches about that now, but every Governor in the country is 
for it. My point is that this impeachment process has brought 
us to a critical moment in our history. We can either rise to 
the occasion by forging new and healthier ways to deal with our 
differences, or we can sink from the collective weight of a 
partisan mess that we have all helped to create.
    In arriving at my decision in this case, I kept coming back 
to the reality that Congress has not once removed a President, 
not once in 211 years. The Constitution places the burden for 
such a grave step very high. Such a showing is not only to 
protect our Nation from partisan prosecution, but also to 
impose safeguards that are necessary, given the severity of the 
potential punishment--a political death penalty, as House 
Manager Lindsey Graham said.
    When I say ``punishment,'' I am not only referring to the 
punishment imposed on the President, but in particular to the 
destructive impact of such an action to our Nation as a whole. 
The House managers did not, in my view, prove their case beyond 
a reasonable doubt. In my opinion, they didn't get particularly 
close.
    As stated earlier, I do find the President's lying to Betty 
Currie about his relationship with Monica Lewinsky to be very, 
very disturbing. The House managers have a hunch that the 
President's intent was criminal. To borrow from House Manager 
Graham, they think it is likely he was up to no good. My 
friends, hunches are not impeachable, nor should they be. If 
the evidence required to convict a President of the United 
States in an impeachment trial is allowed to be less than that 
required in a shoplifting trial, the constitutional foundation 
for the Presidency will disintegrate before our very eyes. That 
is something that a few future Presidents in this body ought to 
consider for just a moment.
    Today I am going to vote to acquit on both counts. But I 
don't want that to be my final contribution today.
    I had a lot of farfetched dreams as a boy, but never once 
did I dream that I could serve with all of you on the floor of 
the U.S. Senate. My parents fled Nazi Germany, and not all of 
my family got out. We lost family in Hitler's brutal 
Kristallnacht. So you might understand how I grew up revering 
the greatness of America and the institutions of our democracy.
    I will tell you, I never, ever believed that some skinny 
fellow with modest oratorical skills and a face for radio--
[laughter]--could have a chance to serve in the U.S. Senate.
    What I want to be able to tell my grandchildren is that 
this was the point in American history where we drew a line in 
the sand and said ``no more'' to the excessive partisanship. A 
time when we said ``no more'' to a brand of politics that each 
of us knows is bringing out the worst in good people. We have 
good leaders in the U.S. Senate--in Trent Lott, in Tom 
Daschle--who have shown, in the last month, just how hard they 
are willing to work to bring us together.
    My friends, let the toxic partisanship end. Let it end 
here, and let it end now.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Gordon Smith

    Mr. SMITH of Oregon. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, first 
let me thank the Chief Justice for the dignity he has lent to 
this trial. I have so appreciated the keenness of his intellect 
and the fairness of his spirit.
    I also join the Senator from Mississippi in thanking these 
two magnificent men who lead this Chamber. I express to you, my 
colleagues, the genuine affection that I feel for each of you. 
I am often asked the question, who do you like and who do you 
dislike? The ones I especially like are very easy to name; and 
then when it comes to those I dislike, I cannot name one. I 
genuinely thank you for allowing me to participate with you in 
this difficult and historic time.
    I want to also thank my colleague, Ron Wyden, for his 
comments about me yesterday. When Ron and I ran for the 
Packwood seat, I think America--and certainly Oregon--saw one 
of the most difficult and mean elections in the history of our 
State. Yet since that time, when I won the Hatfield seat, Ron 
and I have become friends. It was a remarkable thing to both of 
us that by doing something as simple as having a joint town 
hall meeting, Republican and a Democrat from the same State, it 
led to a full-page story in the New York Times. That is a sad 
commentary.
    The truth is that if Ron Wyden and I can become friends and 
do things to the credit and benefit of our State, so can you 
all. I actually believe this trial will bring us closer 
together over time, and I hope will lay a foundation for some 
very good work in the 106th Congress.
    Today, as Oregon's other Senator, I will cast two votes to 
convict and remove the President of the United States. Reaching 
this verdict has been a very difficult ordeal for me, and I 
would like to tell you why. This Mr. Smith did not come to 
Washington, DC, to oppose President Clinton. Indeed, over the 
last 2 years there have been many issues, ranging from the 
expansion of NATO to the promotion of free trade and the fight 
against big tobacco, in which I have supported him and worked 
closely with him. As I have met with President Clinton in his 
office, traveled with him aboard Air Force One, he has 
consistently treated me with great civility and has often 
inspired me with his eloquence.
    To be in his presence is to experience the magic of his 
enormous personal and political talents. It is the magnitude of 
his talents that makes the magnitude of his misdeeds so 
disappointing. There can be no doubt that President Clinton's 
conduct has made a mockery of most of his words, or that his 
example has been corrosive beyond calculation to our culture 
and to our children. These personal conclusions, however, do 
not provide a constitutional basis for his removal. Only his 
high crimes could justify such a vote.
    As you know, the House of Representatives argued two 
articles of impeachment to us. Article I alleged four instances 
of perjury before a grand jury; article II alleged seven 
instances of obstruction of justice.
    The House managers presented us with volumes of direct and 
circumstantial evidence, and the White House lawyers worked 
skillfully to plant the seeds of reasonable doubt. But as the 
trial progressed, I found that these seeds of doubt could only 
grow in proportion to my ability to suspend common sense. I 
struggled throughout the trial to find a way to acquit the 
President, if possible, on both or at least one of the 
articles. But in the end, the facts kept getting in my way: the 
stained blue dress; the Dick Morris poll asking whether the 
President could get away with perjury; Monica in tears in the 
Oval Office being told she could not come back to the White 
House; and then being threatened that it is a crime to pressure 
the President in that way.
    These facts and so many, many more led me to the logical, 
inescapable conclusion that what began as private indiscretions 
became public felonies. It is even more ironic to me that I had 
not made up my mind on article I until Mr. Ruff was in his 
closing arguments. We had just seen a videotape of Mr. 
Blumenthal saying that what he had been told was a lie, and we 
saw Mr. Ruff play the videotape of Mr. Clinton's grand jury 
testimony in which he said, ``What I told him was truthful but 
misleading.'' That was a lie. And it was to a grand jury. It 
revealed the calculations of his mind to obstruct justice. So 
common sense caught up with this juror.
    Having concluded that the President did, indeed, commit 
perjury and attempt to obstruct justice, I had to ask if these 
offenses were high crimes and misdemeanors as contemplated by 
the founders of this Nation. Like many of you, I found answers 
and comfort in the Federalist No. 65 written by Alexander 
Hamilton speaking directly to the ultimate power of 
impeachment. You remember his words; I won't repeat them. They 
will be in the Record many times.
    When Senator Moynihan speaks, he is kind of like E.F. 
Hutton to me--I listen. He had a wonderful statement yesterday 
about the kinds of impeachable offenses. He cited the example 
of Justice Chase and President Johnson.
    Senator Moynihan said that they were nearly impeached for 
their opinions, and to have done so would have been wrong. But 
it is not Bill Clinton's opinions that affect my vote, it is 
his conduct.
    Now, what is his conduct here? Last night, I think we all 
saw a brilliant statement by Senator Edwards. I think we saw 
firsthand why he has made so much money talking to jurors. We 
are seeing right now why I had to make my money selling frozen 
peas. I went through the same calculations as Senator Edwards, 
but I want to point out to you some very different reasoning 
that led me to come down on the other side. See, Senator 
Edwards is talking about what you do when you talk to a jury 
about taking someone's life or their liberty. That is not what 
we are doing here. We are talking about protecting the public 
trust, protecting the Constitution. So the arguments that he 
made ultimately aren't the ones that we ought to be using to 
decide whether to remove President Clinton from office.
    Now, what was so bad about President Clinton's conduct? The 
scales that Senator Edwards spoke to us about, the fulcrum of 
justice, won't work if President Clinton's conduct is 
sanctioned by this body or by any court. What President Clinton 
did was an attack on the Government, and specifically on the 
judicial branch of Government. You see, the courts aren't 
supposed to write law, though, Mr. Chief Justice; they do too 
much of that. The courts don't have any power to raise taxes or 
appropriate money, and they can't raise an army or send a navy. 
They can find the truth and act upon the truth. And if what 
Bill Clinton did is OK, then we have weakened the weakest of 
the branches of our Government, and that is a high crime under 
the Constitution.
    I mentioned Mr. Hamilton. I think it is worth noting again 
that after the publication of Federalist No. 65, he became the 
Secretary of the Treasury for President George Washington. He 
also became involved in an adulterous relationship with a woman 
named Maria Reynolds. Her husband, upon learning of the affair, 
demanded of Mr. Hamilton a job at the Treasury Department in 
exchange for keeping his silence and keeping Mr. Hamilton from 
personal humiliation and political scandal. Hamilton refused 
Mr. Reynolds a position on the public payroll, but he agreed to 
pay him blackmail from his personal funds. News of this 
arrangement soon found its way to Mr. Hamilton's opponents. 
When confronted, without being under oath, Hamilton confessed 
the truth and the whole truth. He knew and respected the 
boundaries between the public and the private. He wrote them 
down for our country, and he lived his life within those 
boundaries, never veering recklessly over the line of 
impeachability.
    Consider the painful contrast this creates when measured 
against the public life of President Clinton. When his 
scandalous conduct with a subordinate female became entwined 
with another woman's civil rights action against him, which a 
unanimous Supreme Court ruled that she had the right to bring, 
President Clinton set about to cover himself by lying to his 
staff, to his Cabinet, to the Congress, and to the country. And 
then, as the evidence so clearly shows, it demonstrates that 
when brought to court--the weakest of our branches of 
Government--and placed under oath, he lied again and again and 
again.
    In the end I suspect this place is going to divide pretty 
much down the middle. I simply sound a warning note to raise 
your awareness to the fact that, ultimately, history and 
biographies and accounts yet to be revealed, facts yet to be 
uncovered, shoes yet to drop, will determine which of us voted 
right. But we have to decide on the evidence today, and the 
evidence to me is clear. Soldiers and sailors are discharged 
and punished for far less than what the President did. And 
judges are impeached by the House and removed by the Senate for 
far less than this. Indeed, we have to ask, is the President to 
be held to a lower standard than those he sends to war or those 
he appoints to dispense justice? I cannot and I never will 
agree to such a low standard for the Presidency of the United 
States.
    Pollsters tell me how strongly Americans and Oregonians 
feel about this case and how conflicted their feelings. Large 
majorities have concluded that the President is guilty of the 
felonies charged. Yet large majorities have also concluded that 
they do not want him to be removed from office. These numbers 
remind me that the demands of justice are sometimes hard. I 
hope, however, that we remember obedience to the law will 
protect our liberties as nothing else can.
    You see, political prisoners around the world look to the 
United States for hope, not because we have a popular 
President, but because we have laws to protect us from a 
popular President. If the President of the United States is 
allowed to break our laws when they prove embarrassing to him 
or conflict with his political interests, then truly some 
public trust has been violated, a trust which, as Hamilton 
says, ``relates chiefly to injuries done immediately to society 
itself.''
    These felonies are impeachable offenses, and the 
Constitution makes our duty clear, even though it appears harsh 
and difficult. When the Chief Justice calls my name, ``Senator, 
how say ye?'' I will say ``guilty'' twice because I refuse to 
say that high political polls and soaring Wall Street indexes 
give license to those in high places to act in low and illegal 
ways. Perjury and obstruction of justice are high crimes, and 
they are utterly inconsistent with any Federal office--ours as 
well, but especially with the office of the President of the 
United States.
    I harbor no illusions that two-thirds of the Senate will 
vote as I will. Therefore, I hope the President will spend the 
balance of his office repairing the damage done to his family, 
our democratic institutions, and our country. I will continue 
to support his proposals when I believe they are right, and I 
will oppose them when I believe them to be wrong.
    The other man in this Chamber that I deeply regard--and 
because I am so junior I do it from a distance--is Senator 
Robert Byrd. I have appreciated his public struggle with this 
issue because it has validated my own struggle. When he said 
this last week on ``This Week with Sam Donaldson and Cokie 
Roberts,'' he could have been speaking my words: ``We have to 
live with the Constitution. We have to live with our 
consciences.'' And so do I.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Chuck Hagel

    Mr. HAGEL. Mr. Chief Justice, I write this statement at my 
desk on the floor of the U.S. Senate. After weeks of listening, 
reading, reviewing, reflection, analysis and contemplation, I 
have come to the conclusion that I will vote to convict the 
President on both articles of impeachment.
    The Constitution is very clear. It requires Members of the 
U.S. Senate to vote for or against each article of impeachment. 
No improvising. No substitutions. No censures. No findings of 
fact. The completeness of the charges against the President is 
powerful. The issue is abuse of power. Did the President abuse 
his power and therefore violate the Nation's trust in him? We 
must remember that trust is the only true currency elected 
officials have.
    Perjury and obstruction of justice are not just Federal 
crimes. When committed by an elected official they are abuses 
of power. When committed by a President, they constitute an 
abuse of the highest power. The standards and expectations for 
America's elected officials cannot be calibrated. When elected 
officials bring down those standards and expectations and 
violate the people's trust . . . they rip the very fabric of 
our Nation. There is then a dishonoring of the spirit that is 
the guardian of American justice.
    There can be no shading of right and wrong. The complicated 
currents that have coursed through this impeachment process are 
many. But after stripping away the underbrush of legal 
technicalities and nuance, I find that the President abused his 
sacred power by lying and obstructing justice. How can parents 
instill values and morality in their children? How can 
educators teach our children? How can the rule of law for every 
American be applied equally if we have two standards of justice 
in America--one for the powerful and the other for the rest of 
us?
    What holds this Nation, this society, this culture, 
together? Yes, laws are part of it. But it is really the strong 
moral foundation anchored by values and standards--the 
individual sense of right and wrong, personal responsibility, 
accountability for one's actions. This is what holds a free 
people together. Respect for each other--not because a law 
dictates that action--but rather because it's the right thing 
to do.
    The President violated his constitutional oath and he broke 
the law. His crimes do rise to the level of high crimes and 
misdemeanors prescribed in the Constitution. The President's 
actions cannot be defended by dancing on the pinhead of legal 
technicality. Every American must know actions have 
consequences. Even for Presidents. All Americans must have 
faith in our laws and know that there is equal justice for all. 
The core of our judicial process is the rule of law.
    Americans deserve to always expect the highest standard of 
conduct from their elected officials. If that expectation is 
defined down over time, it will erode the very base of our 
democracy and put our Republic in peril. That is the point of 
the impeachment clause of our Constitution . . . to protect the 
Republic. The impeachment clause of our Constitution is there 
to ensure the fitness of an individual to hold high office. 
President Clinton's conduct has debased his office and violated 
the soul of justice--truth. He has thereby debased and violated 
the American people. I have no other course to follow than to 
vote to convict President William Jefferson Clinton on both 
articles of impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

              Statement of Senator John D. Rockefeller IV

    Mr. ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise today to 
announce, or simply declare, that I will vote not guilty on 
both articles of impeachment and to urge my colleagues to spare 
the country the injustice of removing a President who has been 
twice elected to his office by the American people, and whom 
they continue to trust to lead them.
    As a Senator, I have taken my trial oath very, very 
seriously. For my part, I have listened intently to the 
presentations, carefully considered the evidence, read 
everything that I could get my hands on, and thought about 
those matters carefully. I have read, and reread, the key 
language of our Constitution, and thought long and hard about 
the words of our Founding Fathers. In fact, the Constitution, 
in many ways, came alive for me for the first time.
    I am humbled by the wisdom and foresight of our founders as 
I struggle through some of the most profound questions that our 
democracy can present to us. What is the balance of power 
between the three branches of Government? How do we measure 
public trust, and under what circumstances may the Senate 
exercise its most devastating power--the power to overturn a 
popular election, and a power, therefore, to remove a President 
from office?
    As I confront these questions, I am acutely conscious of 
the terrible disappointment of our Nation in the personal and 
public behavior of our President. No one of us would defend his 
actions. No one of us would say that he is free of serious 
fault.
    I have condemned in the strongest possible terms that I 
know how to do--and I have done it to him directly--the conduct 
of the President in the Lewinsky matter. And I share the sense 
of outrage that so many of my constituents from West Virginia 
have shared with me.
    When first confronted with this shameful affair, the 
President deliberately misled his family, his friends, and his 
staff. He went on national television, and, as far as I am 
concerned, lied to the American people, and he walked a 
troubling line between truth and deception in his sworn 
testimony, all in an effort to keep this scandal out of the 
humiliating glare of public scrutiny.
    It is without question a very serious moral matter. But the 
ultimate power of the U.S. Senate--the power to convict and 
remove the President for high crimes and misdemeanors--is not a 
power to pass moral judgment or render moral punishment. It is 
not even a power to render a judicial conviction or judicial 
punishment. The power of the Senate is drawn carefully and 
narrowly by the Constitution of the United States, and it is a 
power to sit in judgment of a President only as a means of 
protecting our Nation from great harm. It is a power to remove 
a President only if he has committed treason, bribery or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors against the state.
    As U.S. Senators, the Constitution must be our predominant 
guidepost. It must be the compass we come back to at every 
point of hesitation or ambiguity or doubt. ``Treason, bribery, 
or other high crimes and misdemeanors''--these words are 
powerful, extraordinary, and carefully crafted. We know how 
very grave treason and bribery are, and we know that they 
involve a fundamental corruption of public office. But what 
about high crimes and misdemeanors? The words ``or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' on its face means high crimes and 
high misdemeanors.
    Borrowing from my good friend, Senator Biden, the word 
``treason'' was defined in the Constitution itself. The word 
``bribery'' was not. It was a definition fixed at common law. 
These are both relatively definite terms. But ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' are indefinite.
    In this setting, two rules of construction led us to add 
the words--Madison and Mason to add the words--``or other'' in 
their famous colloquy. The word ``other'' is, to me, 
fascinating, because what it does is essentially return us to 
the previous clause, which is ``treason and bribery.'' It says 
that ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' must necessarily be 
interpreted at the same level of, even though less definite 
than, ``bribery and treason.''
    I think that is clear. I think that is uncontested.
    As U.S. Senators, the Constitution must be, as I said, our 
guidepost. We know from the statements of our founders that the 
phrase was intended in a very careful way--``high crimes and 
misdemeanors''--to cover only very grave and threatening abuses 
of Presidential duty and public office.
    The House managers contend, as did Independent Counsel Ken 
Starr before them, that in the course of hiding his illicit 
affair from the world, the President committed perjury, 
obstruction of justice, and those crimes are so serious that 
they constitute, by definition, high crimes and misdemeanors, 
demanding conviction and immediate removal from office, 
something that has never happened before in the history of our 
Nation.
    Most of this body are lawyers. And I think that most would 
agree--all of us would agree--the questions that must be 
answered by all of us in this Senate are:
    First, did the President commit perjury or obstruction of 
justice as charged by the articles of impeachment?
    Second, did the President's conduct rise to the level of 
high crimes and misdemeanors requiring removal?
    The answer to both of these questions must be yes in order 
for the President to be removed from office. If either one of 
these questions fails, then by definition the Constitution 
demands that the President be acquitted.
    On the basis of the case presented over the last several 
weeks, on the basis of the evidence and the deposition 
testimony, which I reviewed carefully and in full, and on the 
basis of the constitutional arguments made by each side, I have 
concluded unequivocally that the answer to both questions is 
no, and that the articles of impeachment are not well founded 
and must be rejected.
    First and foremost, the House managers have utterly failed 
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the President committed 
perjury or obstructed justice. Their case is speculative, 
circumstantial, and contradicted by facts.
    Admittedly, the burden of proof on the House managers is a 
very heavy one.
    We have a presumption in this country of innocence until 
proven guilty. And we have a presumption that national 
elections should be upheld.
    With the fate of a twice-elected President before us in 
this Senate, I believe that the evidence must be the 
universally accepted standard of proof that is applied to other 
criminal cases. It must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
    What does that mean, to prove a case beyond reasonable 
doubt? It means that it is proven to a moral certainty, that 
the case is clear, that the case is concise. It means if there 
are doubts about the evidence, about the case, then he must be 
acquitted.
    In the case presented by the House managers in the 
managers' version of the Clinton-Lewinsky story, there are 
many, many reasonable doubts.
    There are the doubts about the articles themselves, which 
are ambiguous, and what conduct actually purported to be 
criminal. There are serious doubts about the perjury charge in 
which the President openly acknowledges his inappropriate 
behavior--and his effort to keep it secret from the Nation. 
There are doubts about the obstruction charges in which the 
President is accused of a vast conspiratorial scheme to 
influence witnesses and testimony, even though everyone 
involved has denied that any such effort occurred. No person, 
regardless of the stature or position, could, or should be, 
convicted on evidence that is so ambiguous and so questionable, 
and to my way of thinking ultimately, weak.
    Second, and equally important, no matter how deplorable the 
President's conduct, the charges clearly do not meet the 
constitutional test for conviction. They simply do not rise to 
the level of treason, bribery or other high crimes and high 
misdemeanors, as I would put it. Any other conduct, any other 
charges, are left to the judgment of the people in the casting 
of their votes, and to the judgment of the courts once the 
President has left office.
    Despite the anger that we feel at the President, despite 
misgivings that we have about his honesty, despite his lies to 
the American people, we cannot allow emotions--or, I might say, 
homilies--or partisanship to interfere with our judgment. The 
Constitution alone puts us in the box from which we dare not 
venture.
    On impeachment, our constitutional history is well 
established. And we in the Senate and across the Nation must 
abide by it, and abide by it strictly. We may remove a 
President only for using his great office to commit high crimes 
against the Nation, against the state, and against the people. 
There is no question in my mind that the President has not done 
this. We would be derelict in our duties as Senators if we 
removed him for anything less.
    So given the weakness of the evidence supporting the 
charges made by the House, given the serious doubt in the 
Senate that the charges rise to the level of demanding removal 
from office, how do we find ourselves so far down this 
dangerous constitutional path?
    How do we in the Senate find ourselves so close to the 
brink of removing a President from office without clear and 
compelling evidence that crimes against the state were 
committed?
    How was an independent counsel investigation allowed to 
turn into a 5-year, $50 million crusade against the President?
    And why have we not been able to debate the real issues for 
the future of our Nation--strengthening Medicare, reforming 
Social Security, ending the steel import crisis so West 
Virginia steelworkers can get their jobs back?
    It is clear, in the end, justice will be done, and the 
Constitution will have protected the Nation. I have been 
dismayed by growing partisanship, but the bottom line is that 
the President should not be removed from office, and he will 
not be removed from office.
    With the greatest respect for each of my colleagues, I must 
say there is something very wrong with the fact that we have 
been forced to take this so far, and that the Senate has been 
rendered impotent for so long. Even in the face of unceasing 
calls to end this investigation--from people in every State, 
from every background and political party--it has marched on 
relentlessly.
    I do not believe that it was ever the will of the House of 
Representatives or the Senate to pursue these charges against 
the President to such great and absurd lengths. Yet we have--
and in the process, a growing crack in the civil and moral 
foundation of our government has been revealed.
    It has become clear to me that a destructive momentum has 
taken hold, and supplanted the better judgement of some in this 
Congress and in this country.
    From the start, there has been a core of political 
interests that has sought every opportunity and pursued every 
tactic to attack this Presidency. Every President faces critics 
who will go to great lengths to fight his policies. But this 
President has faced unprecedented and unyielding attempts by a 
small group of determined activists to destroy him, his family, 
and his work.
    Unfortunately, these efforts at destruction have been aided 
by a media inside the beltway that has accepted nearly every 
rumor--proven or unproven--and splashed it across the front 
page or put it at the top of the evening newscast. Ratings and 
revenues too often have taken priority over sound and judicious 
coverage of the news. Far from serving the public interest, 
this has only fueled the efforts of those who have sought to 
undermine the reasoned pursuit of truth and justice.
    As I made clear earlier, none of this diminishes my belief 
that the President's actions were wrong and indefensible. His 
personal failures in this matter deserve our condemnation.
    But his failures do not deserve--and have never deserved--
the relentless attempts at political and personal destruction 
to which he has been subjected. His failures do not deserve--
and have never deserved--the triggering of a constitutional 
process that our Founding Fathers reserved for the most serious 
crimes against the Nation.
    I do not say this to fan the flames of partisan division. 
After all, each of us--Republican or Democrat--has and will 
make mistakes, and each of us must be held accountable for our 
mistakes. But no Member of the Senate, no Member of the House, 
no elected official who serves this country to his or her best 
ability deserves the sort of insidious venom that has become 
such a common part of our political discourse.
    Let me also be clear that I say this not solely in defense 
of President Clinton--but principally in defense of civility 
and fairness in our political society. I say this with sincere 
hope that we can bring to an end the destructive momentum that 
has gripped this Nation and this city. Because, as disturbing 
as the President's actions are, I am far more concerned by the 
fanaticism of those who have driven our great Nation so close 
to the precipice.
    For our system of democracy to be successful for another 
two centuries, it must be driven by people's best instincts--
not their worst. It must be founded in moral strength and 
guided by civil discourse. We must, as Minority Leader Gephardt 
has so eloquently stated, end the politics of personal 
destruction.
    I have great hope that we can do this, because as I look 
around, I see a vast majority of Americans who are tired of 
good leaders being destroyed by a vindictive minority. I see a 
majority of Americans who understand clearly that President 
Clinton should not be removed from office for his deep personal 
failings. I see a majority of Americans who know better than to 
believe everything and anything they hear in the media.
    The American people want us to seek the truth--they, in 
fact, demand it. But with equal vigor, they demand that we cast 
fair judgement; and they demand that in seeking the truth, we 
do not seek to destroy lives and careers.
    I believe that this Senate is prepared to cast a fair 
judgment on the President. We have been through a trying time 
in our Nation's history--a time from which not one of us has 
relished or gained the least bit of satisfaction. We have all 
done our best to seek impartial justice, and I am certain that 
history will judge us well in this pursuit.
    But history will cast a very severe judgement if we do not 
go forward with the purpose of healing the wounds that this 
episode has caused, and restoring the moral and civil 
foundation of our political society.
    I leave my colleagues with the wisdom of James Madison in 
Federalist No. 62 when he addressed the important role of the 
Senate in tempering the actions of the House. ``. . . [A] 
senate,'' he wrote, ``as a second branch of the legislative 
assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, 
must be in all cases a salutary check on the government.''
    By dismissing these charges against the President, we will 
have done our duty to provide that salutary check, and we will 
have taken the first step in restoring the trust and faith of 
the people of this Nation. It is time to do as the American 
people have asked: end this sad episode and get back to work.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Frank H. Murkowski

    Mr. MURKOWSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, it seems to be a 
prerequisite to speak today for Senators to indicate the number 
of grandchildren each has. I am proud to say Nancy and I have 
11, but I won't indulge you with naming each of them.
    I, along with all of you, will soon cast our votes on the 
articles of impeachment that have been presented against 
President Clinton. With the exception of voting on a 
declaration of war, I can think of no more serious vote that a 
Senator will cast in his or her lifetime than on removing a 
President from office. History may or may not tell which vote 
is correct.
    We have deliberated more than 67 hours. Five weeks ago, we 
met in the Old Senate Chamber and on a 100-0 vote departed on a 
course of action to resolve this matter. The House managers 
presented the case against the President. White House counsel 
presented their defense and then Senators spent 2 days 
submitting questions to both sides. We then resolved the 
question of witnesses by allowing the use of videotapes, and 
heard final arguments from both sides on Monday. For the past 2 
days, Senators have offered their statements on this matter and 
we are on target to reach a final vote on the two articles in 
less than 48 hours. That's our constitutional duty. I am proud 
and honored to have participated in this historical 
deliberation and respect each of you and your words.
    There are several recollections about the facts in this 
case that trouble me. Perhaps it is because I am not a lawyer.
    In Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, she indicated that on the 
first day she met the President, she was wearing a pink 
identification tag which provides limited access to the White 
House. The President reached out and held it and said: ``Well, 
this could be a problem,'' or words to that effect. That tells 
us something about the President's character.
    Furthermore, after the Lewinsky story broke in the press, 
the President had Dick Morris conduct a poll and when Morris 
told the President that the public would forgive him for 
adultery but not for perjury or obstruction of justice, the 
President responded: ``We will just have to win then.'' That 
tells me something else about the President.
    It should also be noted that we would not be here if Ms. 
Lewinsky had not kept the blue dress which contained the DNA 
evidence implicating the President beyond a doubt. Without that 
dress, it would be an old story of ``He said/She said.'' Think 
about that.
    Finally, we are all held accountable for our actions. But 
the President refuses to be held accountable. And I have a 
problem with the repeated reference from the First Lady that 
the President ministers to troubled people, suggesting that 
Monica Lewinsky was such a person.
    What has been happening, not just here in Washington, but 
all around the country, is something far more disturbing than 
the trial of a President. What we have been witnessing is a 
contest for the very moral soul of the United States of 
America--and that the great casualty so far of the national 
scandal is the notion of truth.
    Truth has been shown to us as an elastic commodity.
    It has been said that this trial is not about the partisan 
political gamesmanship between the President's Democratic 
supporters and the Republican forces on the other side, as the 
media would have you think.
    Indeed, one pundit said that more Americans get their ideas 
and reactions of the impeachment process from Jay Leno than 
they do from CNN.
    The polls show Americans favoring leaving the President in 
office while they say Republicans appear bent on political 
suicide.
    It has been said that Republicans see accountability, 
discipline and punishment as fundamental to the very structure 
of American society and that the President ought to be the 
``stern father'' image and a figure of moral authority.
    Clinton's liberal supporters model American society on the 
``nurturing parent'' concept. To them, the Presidency is less a 
figure of moral authority than a helpful and powerful friend 
capable of doing good.
    Where were you when former President Nixon resigned? I 
wondered at the time whether the Republic would survive 
Watergate. We did survive and many believe we are a stronger 
Nation because of that process.
    In reaching a judgment in this case, I have reviewed the 
evidence presented by the House managers and the able defense 
offered by the President's counsel. I have concluded that the 
President is guilty on both articles and that the two articles 
more than satisfy the constitutional standard of high crimes 
and misdemeanors.
    I believe the President should be removed from office not 
because he engaged in irresponsible, reckless, and 
reprehensible conduct in the Oval Office with a White House 
intern. He should be removed from office because he engaged in 
conduct designed to undermine the foundation, the very bedrock, 
of the concept of due process of law and, by extension, the 
very notion of the rule of law.
    There is no question in my mind that President Clinton 
intentionally provided false and misleading testimony and 
committed perjury before the grand jury when he told the grand 
jury he was ``trying to figure out what the facts were'' when 
he made the following statements to his secretary, Betty 
Currie, the day after his civil deposition testimony:
    ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
    ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
    ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
    ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.''
    Mr. Chief Justice, it is just not credible to believe that 
these statements were designed to help the President elicit 
facts since he, and not Betty Currie, knew precisely the type 
of indiscreet activities he and Monica Lewinsky had engaged in. 
To believe his testimony, one would have to assume the 
unbelievable--that the President engaged in these acts with Ms. 
Lewinsky in the full expectation that Ms. Currie witnessed 
them.
    It is only reasonable to assume that the President's 
statements to Ms. Currie, made on more than one occasion--
twice--were designed for one, and only one, simple purpose: to 
coach and influence her future testimony. He was clearly 
seeking to undermine judicial proceedings by encouraging her to 
lie under oath for the single purpose of protecting him. His 
conduct not only amounts to false testimony, but provides a 
clear basis to conclude that the President sought to obstruct 
justice.
    Moreover, it is undisputed that gifts the President gave to 
Monica Lewinsky, gifts that were subpoenaed in the civil suit 
against the President, were removed from Ms. Lewinsky's 
possession and hidden under Betty Currie's bed. There is no 
rational reason that Ms. Currie, on her own, decided to seek 
the return of the gifts. The only inference that a reasonable 
person could conclude is that the President asked Ms. Currie to 
retrieve the gifts in an effort to conceal evidence from the 
court; evidence that was clearly relevant in the civil case.
    The House managers have presented a credible case showing 
that the President increased the pressure on his friend, Vernon 
Jordan, to obtain a private sector job for Ms. Lewinsky when 
she was named as a potential witness in the civil case brought 
against the President. It was not a coincidence of events, but 
rather a concerted effort by the President to secure employment 
for Ms. Lewinsky to ensure an affidavit that did not harm his 
interests. Mr. Jordan is not at fault; he was merely a pawn in 
the President's strategy to obstruct justice by encouraging the 
submission of a false affidavit from Ms. Lewinsky.
    The charges against the President concern perjury, witness 
tampering, and concealing of evidence. These offenses clearly 
rise to the level of obstructing justice in the same sense that 
bribing a witness to testify falsely or destroying evidence 
amount to obstruction of justice.
    Today, there are 115 people incarcerated in Federal prisons 
because they were convicted of perjury. On Saturday, we heard 
the videotape testimony of Dr. Barbara Battalino who had been 
an attorney and a VA doctor. Her crime? She lied about sex 
under oath in a civil proceeding. Her penalty? She lost her 
medical license. She lost her right to practice law. She was 
fired from her job. The Clinton Justice Department prosecuted 
her for perjury and she was sentenced to 6 months of 
imprisonment under electronic monitoring and paid a $3,500 
fine.
    Should not the standard applied to Dr. Battalino apply to 
the President of the United States who swore an oath to 
``preserve, protect and defend the Constitution,'' when he 
entered office and who swore an oath to tell the truth when he 
testified before the grand jury? Or should we condone the 
standard the President suggested in his grand jury testimony, 
when he testified that he ``said things that were true, that 
may have been misleading?'' Think about that statement.
    The foundation of our Republic is that we are a nation 
governed by laws, not by men. For the rule of law to be 
maintained, there must be a credible system of justice. Any 
effort to undermine the integrity of the judicial system 
subverts the principle of a nation of laws. And that system of 
justice depends for its very survival on maintaining the 
integrity of the oath that a person swears to tell the truth. 
Otherwise, if we turn a blind eye and allow people to lie under 
oath, destroy or hide evidence, or conspire to present false 
and misleading testimony, the entire notion of justice and 
truth become meaningless.
    The President's counsel on Monday asked the question: 
``Would it put at risk the liberty of the people to retain the 
President in office?'' Unfortunately, I believe the answer is 
yes. The right of an individual to a fair trial is endangered 
when the President of the United States remains in office 
having undermined the rule of law by obstructing justice and 
committing perjury.
    Why should a citizen tell the truth in a courtroom when it 
does not serve his interest if the President is allowed to 
perjure himself because it does not serve his interest?
    Why should an individual not try to influence the testimony 
of a witness when the President suffers no adverse consequences 
when he seeks to influence the testimony of a witness?
    Does anyone in this Chamber believe that obstruction of 
justice is not a high crime and misdemeanor? Does anyone in 
this Chamber believe that President Clinton did not attempt to 
obstruct justice? If your answer to those questions is in the 
affirmative, I believe you must, I repeat, you must vote to 
convict and remove the President. That is the mandate of the 
Constitution.
    Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides that 
``the President . . . shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
    There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a 
President with a high popularity rating shall not be removed if 
convicted. The framers believed that it was so important to rid 
the Government of officials convicted for such offenses that 
the framers gave us no latitude on the question of removal from 
office.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the Nation has endured more than a year 
of what started as a scandal and turned into an obstruction of 
justice and an impeachment. Again, had there been no DNA 
evidence, Ms. Lewinsky would have been smeared in the press as 
a stalker and this case would be closed.
    I hope my colleagues in good conscience can put party aside 
and uphold the oath we took a month ago to be impartial in our 
judgment of President Clinton. This is a sad day for our 
contemporary country but a magnificent day for the founders who 
recognized that no man is above the law and gave us the tools 
to remove those who violate the public trust.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd

    Mr. BYRD. Mr. Chief Justice:

I think my country sinks beneath the yoke,
It weeps, it bleeds,
And each new day,
A gash is added to her wounds.

    I am the only remaining Member of Congress who was here in 
1954 when we added the words ``under God'' to the Pledge of 
Allegiance. That was on June 7, 1954. One year from that day we 
added the words ``In God We Trust'' to the currency and coin of 
this country. Those words were already on some of the coins. 
But I shall always be proud to have voted to add those words, 
``under God'' and ``In God We Trust.'' They mean much to us 
today as we meet here.
    This is my 47th year in Congress. I never dreamed that this 
day would ever come. And, until 6 months ago I couldn't place 
myself in this position. I couldn't imagine that, really, an 
American President was about to be impeached.
    A few years ago, when my youngest grandson, who now is a 
Ph.D. in physics, was just a little tot, he came up to my den 
and looked around and said, ``Papa, who made this mess?''
    Now, Senators, who made this mess? The mess was created at 
the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. The House of 
Representatives didn't make it. The U.S. Senate didn't make it. 
But, nevertheless, we sit here today in judgment of a 
President.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I thank you for presiding over this 
gathering with such grace and dignity. But the Chief Justice is 
not here because he wanted to be. He is not here because we 
asked him to come. He is here because the Constitution 
commanded that he be here. Senators are not here because you 
wanted to be here today. We are here because the Constitution 
said that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all 
impeachments.
    Soon we will vote and, hopefully, end this nightmarish time 
for the Nation. Like so many Americans, I have been deeply torn 
on the matter of impeachment. I have been angry at the 
President, sickened that his behavior has hurt us all and led 
to this spectacle. I am sad for all of the actors in this 
national tragedy. His family and even the loyal people around 
him whom he betrayed--all have been hurt. All of the 
institutions of government--the Presidency, the House of 
Representatives, the Senate, the system of justice and law, 
yes, even the media--all have been damaged by this unhappy and 
sorry chapter in our Nation's history.
    The events of this last year have engendered so much 
disillusionment, distrust, bitter division and discord among 
the people of the United States. There can be, I fear, no happy 
ending, no final act that leads to a curtain call in which all 
the actors link hands and bow together amid great applause from 
the audience. No matter what happens here, many, many people 
will be left tasting only the bitter dregs of discontent.
    I was proud of this Senate when, early last month, we 
gathered in the Old Senate Chamber to choose a path on which to 
proceed. We agreed on a constitutional roadmap to follow during 
the early days of this trial. We followed that roadmap to the 
letter, considering a motion to dismiss the proceedings as well 
as one to provide for the deposition of witnesses. When there 
was a question or conflict, we decided the answer together. I 
commend Senator Daschle and Senator Lott for their untiring 
efforts to maintain bipartisanship.
    Hamilton observed that impeachable offenses ``are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, 
in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public 
trust . . . to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' Hamilton also observed that the impeachment court 
could not be ``tied down'' by strict rules, ``either in the 
delineation of the offense by the prosecutors [the House of 
Representatives] or in the construction of it by the judges 
[the Senate].''
    Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story said: ``The jurisdiction 
is to be exercised over offenses, which are committed by public 
men in violation of their public trust and duties . . . 
injuries to the society in its political character,'' . . . 
``such kind of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the 
commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust.''
    Story observed that ``no previous statute is necessary to 
authorize an impeachment for any official misconduct,'' . . . 
because ``political offenses are so various and complex . . . 
so utterly incapable of being defined, or classified, that the 
task of positive legislation would be impracticable, if it were 
not almost absurd to attempt it.''
    There are those--without my repeating the sordid details of 
what we have all heard over and over and over again--there are 
those who say that the President lied to protect his family. We 
all understand that. I have a feeling for that. But I can never 
forget his standing before the television cameras and saying to 
the American people, what he said: ``Now I want you to listen 
to me. . . .'' Don't you Senators think that that was a bit 
overdone if the purpose was to protect his family?
    ``O, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to 
deceive.''
    Impeachment is a sword of Damocles that hangs over the 
heads of Presidents, Vice Presidents, and all civil officers, 
always ready to drop should it become necessary. But, the 
impeachment of a President is uniquely and especially grave. We 
must recognize the gravity and awesomeness of it, and act in 
accordance with the oath we took to do ``impartial justice.'' 
We are the wielders of this weapon, responsible for using it 
sparingly and with prudence and wisdom.
    This is only the second time that this Nation has ever 
impeached a President. President Nixon resigned when it was 
made clear to him that, if impeached and tried, he would be 
convicted and removed from office. In that instance, both the 
country and the Congress were of the same mind that the 
President's offenses merited his removal. It was not a partisan 
political impeachment; it was a bipartisan act. But where 
political partisanship becomes such an overwhelming factor as 
to put the country and the Congress at odds, as it has with 
this impeachment, something draws us back. We must be careful 
of the precedent we set. One political party, alone, should not 
be enough to bring Goliath's great sword out of the Temple.
    Regrettably, this process has become so partisan on both 
sides of the aisle and particularly in the House and was so 
tainted from the outset, that the American people have rebelled 
against it. The President lied to the American people, and, 
while a great majority of the people believe, as I do, that the 
President made false and misleading statements under oath, 
still, some two-thirds of the American people do not want the 
President removed from office. I do not think that this is just 
a reflection of the American people's traditional bias for the 
underdog, but rather, of the much more basic American dislike 
of unfairness. Many people, perhaps even most people, do not 
believe that this process has been a fair process. They are 
further supported in their viewpoint by the polarization and 
partisanship so regrettably displayed in Congress.
    Indeed, the atmosphere in Washington has become poisoned by 
politics and even by personal vendettas. As a result, 
perspective and a clear sense of proportion and balance have 
been lost by all too many people. As a byproduct of the venom, 
a process intended to be serious and sober has, instead, 
devolved into a virulent, off-color soap opera event, watched 
by an incredulous people grown weary of its content.
    We have known for weeks that the votes were not here to 
convict this President. And yet some wanted to press on, in a 
desperate attempt to bring witnesses onto the Senate floor. 
What a dreadful national spectacle that would have been. That 
is one reason why I offered a motion to dismiss the 
proceedings. Both the House managers and the White House 
defense team had presented their case and had presented it 
well. We had gotten into the 16 hours of questioning by 
Senators, while all went along swimmingly for a while, the 
proceedings began to degenerate into a dueling press conference 
on both sides of the aisle. Moreover, the House managers had 
already taken steps to begin the deposition of Monica Lewinsky, 
and the fact that they were doing this before the Senate had 
even voted to depose witnesses, led me to believe that it was 
time to call the whole thing off before the Senate slipped into 
the snake pit of bitter partisanship like the House of 
Representatives had done. Always with a weather eye open 
concerning the image of the Senate and its place in history, I 
made the motion to dismiss which had been provided for in the 
original agreement by 100 Senators on January 8, following the 
great bipartisan meeting we had all attended in the Old Senate 
Chamber. Many people all around the country, as well as here 
within the beltway, misunderstood my reasons for moving to 
dismiss. I didn't do that to protect Mr. Clinton, as some 
people have so mistakenly surmised. I knew that the votes were 
not here then to convict him, and we all know they are not here 
now. I just didn't want the Senate to sink further into the 
mire. I did not want this body to damage its own quotient of 
public trust the way the House and the White House have 
diminished theirs.
    I called for these proceedings to be dismissed, out of 
genuine concern for the divisive effect that an ultimately 
futile trial would have on the Senate and on the Nation.
    The House articles charged the President with having 
committed perjury. This word ``perjury''--lawyers can dance all 
around the head of a pin on that word. I won't attempt to dance 
all around on the head of the pin on the word ``perjury.'' The 
President plainly lied to the American people. Of course, that 
is not impeachable, but he also lied under oath in judicial 
proceedings.
    Mr. Clinton's offenses do, in my judgment, constitute an 
``abuse or violation of some public trust.'' Reasonable men and 
women can, of course, differ with my viewpoint. Even though the 
House of Representatives rejected the second article that came 
out of the Judiciary Committee, the evidence against Mr. 
Clinton shows that he willfully and knowingly and repeatedly 
gave false testimony under oath in judicial proceedings.
    When the President of the United States, who has sworn to 
protect and defend the Constitution of the United States, and 
to see to it that the laws be faithfully executed, breaks the 
law himself by lying under oath, he undermines the system of 
justice and law on which this Republic--not this 
``democracy''--this Republic has its foundation.
    In so doing, has the President not committed an offense in 
violation of the public trust? Does not this misconduct 
constitute an injury to the society and its political 
character? Does not such injury to the institutions of 
government constitute an impeachable offense, a political high 
crime or high misdemeanor against the state? How would 
Washington vote? How would Hamilton vote? How would Madison or 
Mason or Gerry vote? My head and my heart tell me that their 
answer to these questions would be, ``Yes.''
    The matter does not end there. The Constitution states, 
without equivocation, that the President, Vice President or any 
civil officer, when impeached and convicted, shall be removed 
from office. Hence, one cannot convict the President without 
removing him from office.
    Should Mr. Clinton be removed from office for these 
impeachable offenses? This question gives me great pause. The 
answer is, as it was intended to be by the framers, a difficult 
calculus. This is without question the most difficult, 
wrenching and soul-searching vote that I have ever, ever cast 
in my 46 years in Congress. A vote to convict carries with it 
an automatic removal of the President from office. It is not a 
two-step process. Senators can't vote maybe. The only vote that 
the Senator can cast, under the rules, as written, is a vote 
either to convict and remove or a vote to acquit.
    So should I vote ``Guilty'' when my name is called, 
believing that President Clinton's offenses constitute high 
misdemeanors? Should I vote guilty and vote to remove him from 
office? Some critics may say--some of my colleagues may say--
they may ask, if you believe he is guilty, how can you not vote 
to remove him from office?
    There is some logic to the question, but simple logic can 
point one way while wisdom may be in quite a different 
direction. It is not a popularity contest, of course. But 
remember our English forbears, who, on June 20, 1604, submitted 
to King James I the Apology of the Commons, in which they 
declared that their rights were not derived from kings, and 
that, ``The voice of the people in things of their knowledge is 
[as] the voice of God.'' ``Vox populi, vox Dei.''
    The American people deeply believe in fairness, and they 
have come to view the President as having ``been put upon'' for 
politically partisan reasons. They think that the House 
proceedings were unfair. History, too, will see it that way. 
The people believe that the independent counsel, Mr. Starr, had 
motivations which went beyond the duties strictly assigned to 
him.
    In the end, the people's perception of this entire matter 
as being driven by political agendas all around, and the 
resulting lack of support for the President's removal, tip the 
scales for allowing this President to serve out the remaining 
22 months of his term, as he was elected to do. When the people 
believe that we who have been entrusted with their proxies, 
have been motivated mostly or solely by political partisanship 
on a matter of such momentous import as the removal from office 
of a twice-elected President, wisdom dictates that we turn away 
from that dramatic step. To drop the sword of Damocles now, 
given the bitter political partisanship surrounding this entire 
matter, would only serve to further undermine a public trust 
that is too much damaged already. Therefore, I will reluctantly 
vote to acquit.
    In 399 B.C., Socrates was convicted and sentenced by the 
Athenian jury to die. If only 30 votes on that Athenian jury 
had switched, Socrates would not have been convicted. If only 
20 Senators--or less--on my side of the aisle who are expected 
to acquit, were to switch their votes, President Clinton would 
be convicted, and before this coming Sabbath day, he would be 
removed from the Oval Office. President Clinton will be 
acquitted by the Senate; yet he will not be vindicated.
    The crowds will still cheer the President of the United 
States, but the American people have been deeply hurt and, 
while they may forgive, they will not forget. The pages of 
history will not be expunged--ever.
    Be assured that there will be no winners on this vote. The 
vote cast by every Senator will be criticized harshly by 
various individuals and sundry interest groups. Yet it is well 
for the critics to remember that each Senator has not only 
taken a solemn oath to support and defend the Constitution, but 
also to do ``impartial justice'' to Mr. Clinton and to the 
Nation, ``So help me, God.'' The critics and the cynics have 
not taken that oath; only Senators have done so. Carrying out 
that oath has not been easy. That oath does not say anything 
about political party; politics should have nothing to do with 
it.
    The frenzy of pro-and-con opinions on every aspect of this 
case emanating from every conceivable source in the land has 
made coming to any sort of ``impartial'' conclusion akin to 
performing brain surgery in a noisy, rowdy football stadium. It 
will be easy for the cynics and the critics who do not have to 
vote, to stand on the sidelines and berate us. But only those 
of us who have to cast the votes will bear the judgment of 
history.
    None of us knows whether the attitudes of the American 
people will take a different turn after this trial is over and 
this drab chapter is closed. ``Fame is a vapor; popularity an 
accident; riches take wings; those who cheer today may curse 
tomorrow; only one thing endures--character!'' It is the 
character of the Senate that will count. And while the politics 
of destruction may be satisfying to some, the rubble of 
political ruin provides a dangerous and unstable foundation for 
the Nation.
    And yet we must move ahead. The Nation is faced with 
potential dangers abroad. No one can foresee what will happen 
in Russia or in North Korea or in Kosovo or in Iraq. To remove 
Mr. Clinton at this time could create an unstable condition for 
our Nation in the face of unforeseen and potentially dangerous 
happenings overseas.
    Preceding Senators have sounded the clarion note of 
separation of powers. I have sounded that same trumpet many 
times when the line item veto was before the Senate, but to no 
avail. Some of the voices that have rung throughout this 
Chamber in these deliberations, were curiously still on that 
occasion. The Supreme Court of the United States saved the 
Constitution and struck that law down. But the Supreme Court 
has no voice in the decision that confronts the Senate at this 
hour. It is for the Senate alone to make. When these Senate 
doors are flung open, we must hope that the vote that follows 
will strengthen, not weaken, our Nation.
    Let there be no preening and posturing and gloating on the 
White House lawn this time when the voting is over and done. 
The House of Representatives has already inflicted upon the 
President the greatest censure, the greatest condemnation, that 
the House can inflict upon any President. And it is called 
impeachment. That was an indelible judgment which can never be 
withdrawn. It will run throughout the pages of history and its 
deep stain can never be eradicated from the eyes and memories 
of man. God can forgive us all, but history may not.
    Within a few hours, the mechanics of this matter will 
finally be concluded. But it will not yet be over. For the 
Nation must still digest the unpleasant residue of these 
events. Mr. Chief Justice, hatred is an ugly thing. It can 
seize the psyche and twist sound reasoning. I have seen it 
unleashed in all its mindless fury too many times in my own 
life. In a charged political atmosphere, it can destroy all in 
its path with the blind fury of a whirlwind. I hear its ominous 
rumble and see its destructive funnel on the horizon in our 
land today. I fear for our Nation if its turbulent winds are 
not calmed and its storm clouds somehow dispersed. In the days 
to come, we must do all that we can to stop the feeding of its 
vengeful fires. Let us heap no more coals to fan the flames. 
Public passion has been aroused to a fever pitch, and we as 
leaders must come together to heal the open wounds, bind up the 
damaged trust, and, by our example, again unite our people. We 
would all be wise to cool the rhetoric.
    For the common good, we must now put aside the bitterness 
that has infected our Nation, and take up a new mantle. We have 
to work with this President and with each other, and with the 
Members of the House of Representatives in dealing with the 
many pressing issues which face the Nation. We must, each of 
us, resolve through our efforts to rebuild the lost confidence 
in our government institutions. We can begin by putting behind 
us the distrust and bitterness caused by this sorry episode, 
and search for common ground instead of shoring up the 
divisions that have eroded decency and good will and dimmed our 
collective vision. We must seek out our better natures and 
aspire to higher things. I hope that with the end of these 
proceedings, we can, together, crush the seeds of ugliness and 
enmity which have taken root in the sacred soil of our 
Republic, and, instead, sow new respect for honestly differing 
views, bipartisanship, and simple kindness towards each other. 
We have much important work to do. And, in truth, it is long 
past time for us to move on.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe

    Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chief Justice, now that the vote to impeach 
William Jefferson Clinton has been taken, and before I discuss 
my vote, let me say first that this whole thing could have been 
avoided had President Clinton resigned months ago. I say this 
because I called for his resignation last September. Rather 
than explain my reasoning for calling for President Clinton's 
resignation, I believe it is better explained by an eighth 
grade school teacher from Tulsa, OK, Mr. Terrence Hogan. I ask 
unanimous consent that Mr. Hogan's letter to the President 
dated September 26, 1998, be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the letter was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:
                                                September 26, 1998.
The President,
The White House,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. President: It is in the early morning hours. The infamous 
Starr report has been made public for less than twenty-four hours and I 
am unable to sleep. I don't imagine you've had much of a restful night 
either. As you no doubt are troubled, so am I.
    As the forty-eight year old father of five and a teacher of eighth 
grade Civics these past twenty-two years I am greatly concerned about 
the moral direction of our nation. It is as if we have lost our compass 
and know not what we as a nation wish to be. I am fearful, for I do not 
wish us to become a nation that is only concerned about the economy and 
has lost the will to be a nation of admirable principles. I do not want 
us to dissolve into a people who are more influenced by the spin of the 
facts than the facts themselves. I am concerned about the effects the 
next six months of a legal nit picking debate over whether or not you 
committed an impeachable offense will have on our nation. I am also 
concerned that the debate will not ask what I believe to be the two 
paramount questions. First, are you capable of leading this nation for 
the next 30 months in the directions that we want and need to go? And 
secondly, do you deserve to be allowed to lead this country?
    There is no question in my mind that you have the will to lead. The 
sad conclusion I have drawn is that you no longer have the moral 
authority to lead for you have violated the main foundation upon which 
all relationships are built, that being the existence of mutual trust. 
In the elections of 1992 and 1996 the American voters forgave you for 
your one admitted transgression with Ms. Flowers. Then, however, you 
chose to repeat that transgression in the confines of the Oval office. 
After which, when confronted with your choices you chose to repeatedly 
lie to your wife, daughter, supporters and the American people. You 
chose to continually lie about your choices rather than to frame the 
debate around the issue that this was a private matter between you and 
your wife and therefore no business of the American public. It is my 
heartfelt belief that your choice to lie was designed not so much to 
save your wife and daughter certain pain but to save yourself and your 
presidency, an understandable choice but not an acceptable one. Your 
willful and repeated lying has given the people of this country an 
insight into the character and integrity of their leader.
    With this in mind I am asking you to resign your position as 
President of these United States for if we are even to pretend to be a 
nation of principles we cannot tolerate from our president actions and 
choices that we would not tolerate from the principal of our 
neighborhood school.
    In the last few days you have begun to ask the forgiveness of the 
American people. If your contrition is heartfelt you deserve the 
forgiveness of all those individuals whose trust you have violated. I 
for one forgive you. But as a member of the body politic I must also 
hold you accountable for your public choices and demand that certain 
natural consequences be allowed to occur. You no longer possess the 
trust of the majority of the American people and can therefore no 
longer lead that people and must therefore give up your position of 
leadership.
    No doubt you share my belief that God our creator calls each of us 
to be all we can be and that we are also called to sacrifice ourselves 
for what is in the ultimate best interest of our neighbors, I am asking 
you now, Mr. President, to do both of those things. Please set aside 
your personal pride and ambitions, take full responsibility for the 
choices you have made, accept the natural consequences of those choices 
and step down as our president and save this nation from the turmoil 
that the debate over your choices will undoubtedly cause. Let this 
nation heal and get on with those issues you believe need to be dealt 
with. Please remember that in making this personal sacrifice that your 
true legacy will not be determined by what kind of president you were 
but by what kind of man you became.
    Please know that my prayers are with you and your family in this 
time of trial for you, your family and this country.
            With sincerity,
                                                    Terrence Hogan.

    Mr. INHOFE. Today I voted to convict William Jefferson 
Clinton on each of the two articles of impeachment presented by 
the House of Representatives.
    I find the President guilty, as charged, of high crimes and 
misdemeanors: lying under oath and obstructing justice. The 
President engaged in a deliberate and selfish pattern of 
conduct designed to thwart the civil rights of a fellow 
citizen. This conduct represents a serious breach of faith and 
trust. This conduct is incompatible with the solemn duties and 
moral responsibilities of the high office of President of the 
United States.
    Similar conduct by others results in consequences: 
perjurers, witness tamperers and obstructors of justice go to 
jail; supervisors lose their jobs; military officers are court-
martialed, imprisoned or forced out of the Armed Forces; judges 
are impeached and removed from office. Shall we embrace a lower 
standard for this President under these circumstances? I think 
not. I believe that the President of the United States should 
be held to the very highest of standards.
    I believe that conviction and removal from office is 
justified in order: (1) to preserve the integrity, honor and 
trust of the Presidency; (2) to protect the sanctity of the 
witness oath in judicial proceedings; and (3) to uphold the 
fundamental principle of ``equal justice under law.''
    In accord with my sworn oath to do ``impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and the laws,'' I have approached 
the trial of William Jefferson Clinton as a solemn 
constitutional duty. Voting on the articles of impeachment may 
be the most historically significant thing I will do in my 
entire career in public service. I have taken this obligation 
seriously, without concern for public opinion polls or for any 
partisan political advantage of consequence. This is a moment 
when one must put the longer-term interests of the country 
first.
    As a political opponent of this President, I have made an 
extra effort to weigh the evidence and the arguments on both 
sides with a sense of detachment and fairness. Having served on 
a jury in a criminal trial some 24 years ago, I learned how 
important it is to listen and to exercise impartial judgment. 
During jury selection in a local murder trial, I found myself 
assigned to a murder case about which I had expressed a 
definite opinion. From press reports, I was already convinced 
the defendant was guilty. With that and since I was the author 
of the capital punishment bill in the legislature, I thought 
for sure they would never qualify me for the jury, but somehow 
they did. Five days later, I surprised even myself when I 
became the foreman of the jury that acquitted that very 
defendant.
    I have approached the trial of the President with that 
experience in mind. I have also considered whether in good 
conscience, I would apply the same judgment I made here equally 
to a similar set of facts and circumstances if they applied to 
a Republican--and not a Democratic--President.
    In 1990, I did not hesitate to publicly condemn a 
Republican President, George Bush, when he violated his ``read 
my lips'' campaign pledge. Politicians who deliberately violate 
public trust undermine good government and increase the level 
of cynicism in society.
    Today, I have a clear conscience in rendering the judgment 
I believe is just and in the best interests of the future of 
the country.
    I have concluded that the President engaged in a deliberate 
and premeditated pattern of conduct which was corruptly 
designed to undermine the rights of a fellow citizen. That 
citizen was entitled under the law to obtain truth and justice 
in a duly constituted legal proceeding.
    The President had a legal obligation, as a citizen, to 
comply with ordinary and proper legal procedure and to 
faithfully abide by the standard oath to ``tell the truth, the 
whole truth, and nothing but the truth.''
    I believe the President also had a moral obligation, as 
President, to refrain from engaging in any conduct which would, 
by example, undermine respect for the rule of law, the witness 
oath, or the dignity, honor, or public trust embodied in the 
Presidency.
    The President failed to fulfill these obligations. He lied 
under oath, obstructed justice and tampered with witnesses. He 
sought to undermine the judicial system for his own personal 
gain. In so doing, he set a perverse example for every 
schoolchild, parent, teacher, employer, supervisor and citizen 
in America. He brought dishonor upon himself and his office.
    White House lawyers went to great lengths to try to deny 
the specific charges, but common sense and the weight of the 
evidence leave no reasonable doubt in my mind that the charges 
are true. I believe there are few, if any, Members of the 
Senate who do not believe the President lied under oath and 
obstructed justice. Even many of the President's most ardent 
supporters in and out of the Senate have openly stated their 
belief that the essential facts of the case are not in dispute.
    Senator Robert Byrd pretty well summed it up in a recent TV 
appearance. He said of the President: ``I have no doubt that he 
has given false testimony under oath and . . . there are 
indications that he did indeed obstruct justice. . . . It 
undermined the system of justice when he gave false testimony 
under oath. He lied under oath.''
    I have often said that one of the qualifications I have for 
the U.S. Senate is that I am not an attorney. So, when I read 
the Constitution, I know what it says. When I read the law, I 
know what it says. When I look at the evidence and apply common 
sense from a nonlawyer perspective, I know what it says. In 
this case, it says--without question--the President is guilty 
as charged.
    The President's attorneys kept arguing that the President's 
conduct does not amount to the technical crimes of perjury or 
obstruction of justice, but that even if it does, it should not 
warrant his removal from office.
    I have concluded the President's conduct does amount to the 
crimes of perjury and obstruction, but that even if it does 
not, it still warrants his removal from office because it is 
unacceptable behavior, incompatible with his duties and 
responsibilities as President.
    I was not persuaded by the hairsplitting argument that the 
President did not lie under oath. The President's lawyers claim 
he did not lie or commit perjury before the grand jury and they 
imply that his conduct there should be deemed acceptable. As a 
nonlawyer, I find their arguments preposterous and an insult to 
the intelligence and moral sensibilities of the Members of the 
Senate of both parties, not to mention the American people.
    The President was afforded every opportunity to treat the 
grand jury with the respect it deserved. He was not blindsided, 
tricked or trapped. He could anticipate all the key questions 
in advance. He had plenty of time to prepare. He was warned on 
numerous occasion by Members of both parties in the Congress of 
the serious consequences of untruthful testimony. Yet he 
deliberately sought to continue weaving a self-serving and 
misleading web of deception and falsehood.
    Similarly, I reject the argument that the President did not 
commit obstruction of justice in an improper and illegal effort 
to undermine the legitimate search for truth in the Paula Jones 
civil suit. To believe the President's defense is to stand 
common sense on its head.
    Does anyone seriously believe the Lewinsky job search would 
have proceeded to a successful conclusion in early January 
1998--a critical moment in the Jones case--had her name not 
appeared on the Jones case witness list?
    Does anyone seriously believe the President was suggesting 
to Ms. Lewinsky that she file a truthful affidavit?
    Does anyone seriously believe that the decision to conceal 
the gifts--evidence--was not blessed and ordered by the 
President?
    Does anyone seriously believe the President was seeking to 
``refresh his memory'' while planting false stories with Ms. 
Currie when his conversations took place after he had testified 
that the Jones lawyers should talk to Ms. Currie?
    Does anyone seriously believe the President did not want 
and expect Mr. Blumenthal and other aides to repeat false 
stories to the grand jury?
    I do not believe any of these things. I believe--and I 
suspect most Senators believe--the President is guilty as 
charged of obstruction of justice.
    The President's efforts to cover up his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky, however understandable in a nonlegal context, 
became textbook examples of obstruction of justice once her 
name appeared on a witness list and in a duly constituted legal 
proceeding.
    The President, after all, is himself a lawyer. He was well 
aware that--orchestrating a job search to silence a potential 
hostile witness, suggesting the filing of a false affidavit, 
concealing relevant evidence, and coaching potential witnesses 
to give false testimony--all are improper and illegal.
    Yet he chose to take these actions, not in some contorted 
belief that they were proper, but in the calculation that if 
successful, he could thwart the legal search for truth and 
justice in the Jones case.
    To accept this behavior by the President without 
constitutional consequence is to permit the setting of a 
precedent which will reverberate negatively for years 
throughout our legal justice system and beyond.
    I am amazed that there is any debate whatsoever over 
whether lying under oath before a grand jury is an impeachable 
offense. The precedent is clear: Judge Walter Nixon and others 
have been rightly convicted and removed from office for lying 
under oath. Is there to be a different standard for a 
President, or for this particular President, or for this 
particular set of circumstances? Are we to make exceptions for 
lying under oath so long as it is lying about some things but 
not others? If so, what precedent will that set?
    Our legal system depends of the sanctity of the witness 
oath. There can be no exceptions to the obligation every 
citizen incurs when he solemnly swears ``to tell the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth.'' Setting any other 
precedent would totally disrupt our system of jurisprudence by 
breeding disrespect for the rule of law.
    The White House lawyers argued that since the President is 
elected and judges are appointed a different standard should 
apply. The only conceivable way they might be right is if the 
President is held to a higher--not a lower--standard.
    Important as each of a thousand judges is to our legal 
system, it is the President alone who stands at the pinnacle of 
our system of law and justice. He alone is constitutionally 
charged to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' 
He appointed the judges. He embodies the public trust to a 
degree far and above anyone else. He sets the example for the 
entire Nation. His public conduct in abiding by the oath must 
be above reproach.
    In speaking about President Richard Nixon in 1974, a young 
Arkansas congressional candidate spoke to the need for high 
standards:

    Yes, the President should resign. He has lied to the American 
people, time and time again, and betrayed their trust. Since he has 
admitted guilt, there is no reason to put the American people through 
an impeachment. He will serve absolutely no purpose in finishing out 
his term; the only possible solution is for the president to save some 
dignity and resign.

    The candidate, Bill Clinton, set his own perfectly 
understandable standard: ``If a President of the United States 
ever lied to the American people, he should resign.'' (Arkansas 
Democrat Gazette, Aug. 6, 1974.)
    Recently, one of my Democrat colleagues, in a television 
interview, explained his standard for perjury as an impeachable 
offense: ``Perjury could be an impeachable offense,'' he said. 
``If he lied about the national security interest of the United 
States, or if he did something else that had serious 
consequence for the country, or performing improperly in his 
official capacity, that's impeachable.'' But if he's ``not 
acting in his official capacity'' and only ``as an 
individual,'' that's different. That's not impeachable, he 
says.
    I believe this kind of making exceptions for lies about 
certain subjects, and not others, is a dangerous and slippery 
slope. I believe any lying before a grand jury by a sitting 
President will have ``serious consequences for the country'' if 
it is deemed to be in some way acceptable.
    Indeed, part of the reason this is so important is that if 
the President is capable of lying under oath about one thing, 
it reveals a predisposition and capability to lie about other 
more important things, while not under oath. For example, we 
already know this President has lied about the national 
security interest of the United States on numerous occasions. 
He lied to Congress in 1995 in pledging U.S. troops would not 
remain in Bosnia beyond 1 year. He lied or misled audiences 
over 130 times in 1995 and 1996 in asserting that no nuclear 
missiles were aimed at American children. People know he has 
lied on numerous other public occasions. Such behavior eats 
away the public trust and the moral authority of the 
Presidency, which are so vital to the national security.
    In addition, it should not go unremarked that the 
President's underlying conduct in this matter showed 
astonishingly bad judgment and disregard for the national 
security implications of his own behavior. In the modern world, 
the President is always a potential target of foreign intrigue, 
blackmail and salacious propaganda.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand jury that the 
President himself speculated that his phone calls to her may 
have been monitored by a foreign embassy. In essence, he was 
admitting that he had exposed himself to potential blackmail. 
Such behavior by any President is not merely inappropriate. It 
is clearly dangerous and unacceptable.
    Economic-driven ``popularity'' polls are masking an 
unprecedented erosion of public trust in this President which 
has already caused serious damage to his ability to rally the 
country in time of national threat or crisis. His consistent 
and long-term pattern of untruthful and deceptive behavior, as 
exemplified in the articles of impeachment, has undermined his 
credibility to such an extent that he can no longer be afforded 
the benefit of any public doubt about virtually any topic.
    When the President took military action against overseas 
terrorist targets in August and when he ordered airstrikes 
against Iraq in December, popular majorities--in the polls--
questioned his timing and motives--and rightly so. Suspicions 
about both of these actions linger to this day, draining the 
small reserves of trust the President may have left.
    What happens if and when there is a much more serious 
international or domestic crisis, requiring timely public 
sacrifice mobilized through Presidential leadership? Will the 
President be believed--even if he is telling the truth? In a 
world of many lurking dangers of which much of the public is 
only vaguely aware--from information warfare to weapons of mass 
destruction--such questions raise very serious concerns.
    If we do not hold the President accountable in this case, 
what do we say to the over 100 people who are serving time in 
Federal prison for committing perjury in legal proceedings? 
What do we say to Ms. Barbara Battalino, who was convicted of 
perjury, sentenced, and lost her right to practice her 
profession because she lied under oath about sex in a civil 
case that was eventually dismissed by the judge? What do we say 
to others in similar situations? I was waiting for the 
President's lawyers to address these issues. But they never did 
in any remotely satisfactory way.
    What do we say to the military officers whose careers and 
lives have been ruined over misconduct similar to the 
President's, including sexual misconduct, lying and obstructing 
justice?
    Capt. Derrick Robinson, an Army officer caught up in the 
Aberdeen sex misconduct case, is serving time in Leavenworth 
prison for admitting to consensual sex with an enlisted person 
who was not his wife.
    Drill Sgt. Delmar Simpson is serving 25 years in a military 
prison because a court-martial found that, even though his 
relationship with a female recruit was consensual, the power 
granted him by his rank made such consensual sex with a 
subordinate unacceptable and--in the military--illegal.
    Lt. Kelly Flinn was forced out of the Air Force for lying 
about an adulterous affair.
    Sgt. Maj. Gene McKinney, the Army's top enlisted man, was 
tried for perjury, adultery and obstruction of justice 
concerning sexual misconduct. He was convicted of obstruction 
of justice, but not before his attorney asserted at trial how 
people in uniform rightly ask: How can you hold an enlisted man 
to a higher standard than the President of the United States, 
the Commander in Chief?
    When we establish a glaring double standard in the law, we 
diminish respect for all law. This is why we must uphold the 
highest of standards for officials in public office.
    I will oppose any censure resolution that may be offered 
after the trial, as I opposed any so-called finding of fact 
during the trial because it is little more than a thinly veiled 
effort to give people political cover. I believe some who might 
otherwise vote to convict look to censure as a way to justify 
or politically cover a vote to acquit. There is no precedent 
for censure in the Constitution or in an impeachment context. 
It would be dangerous and wrong to set such a precedent now. I 
believe it could threaten the separation of powers between the 
branches of Government as Congresses start censuring Supreme 
Courts and Presidents for all manner of perceived misconduct.
    Senators should vote on the articles of impeachment, 
explain their reasons, and live with the consequences.
    I am struck that some of my colleagues who agree that the 
President did commit the serious offenses charged in the 
articles of impeachment still believe Congress can render some 
effective consequence short of removal such as censure, which 
will uphold the Presidency, the rule of law, and the sanctity 
of the oath. I believe they are wrong.
    I fear that they are not properly considering the precedent 
they would establish. Never mind what we think of this 
particular President. A thoroughly corrupt President in the 
future will not be inhibited by the empty words of a nonbinding 
sense-of-the-Senate resolution. However, such a corrupt 
President will think twice about certain conduct, if he knows 
without doubt, by precedent, that such conduct is removable.
    If perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering 
are deemed--as a result of this trial--to be nonremoval 
offenses in certain circumstances, then a corrupt future 
President may calculate them to be acceptable. We should not 
set that precedent.
    From the beginning, I strongly supported efforts to allow 
both the House managers and the White House lawyers to call 
whatever live witnesses they deemed necessary to make their 
case. I favored a full and complete trial, believing that it 
was more important to ensure fairness to both sides than it was 
to get the trial over by some arbitrary date. This was in 
keeping with normal procedures in all previous impeachment 
trials. It also seemed to me to be essential to fundamental 
fairness and a full airing of the facts and issues in dispute. 
A hundred years from now no one will care whether the trial 
lasted 2 weeks or 6 months. They will care, we must hope, about 
the extent to which justice was done. Overall, I was 
disappointed in the unnecessarily tight procedural restrictions 
imposed on this trial, including the limits on witnesses. I 
fear that a bad precedent has been unnecessarily set for the 
future.
    Throughout the trial, I opposed efforts to waive the time-
honored rules of procedure which require that deliberations 
among Senators be closed to the public. I am convinced this was 
the right decision. The closed meetings allowed for a more 
colleagial atmosphere among Senators, limiting much of the 
posturing and grandstanding that often goes on before the 
cameras. The closed sessions also helped enhance a greater 
spirit of duty and cooperation concerning the tasks at hand. As 
with all jury trials going back for more than 2,000 years in 
history, closed deliberations constitute proper procedure, and 
I believe this tradition should be maintained.
    This need not, and does not, diminish the accountability of 
Senators to their constituents and the public at large. All 
rollcall votes remain open and I believe every Member maintains 
an obligation to inform his constituents of the reason for his 
votes.
    I received a letter from Mr. Terrence Hogan of Owasso, OK, 
an eighth-grade civics teacher at the Cascia Hall Middle School 
in Tulsa for the past 22 years. He wrote last September saying 
he ``was greatly concerned about the moral direction of our 
Nation'' in light of the President's ``willful and repeated 
lying.'' He said the Nation ``cannot tolerate from our 
President actions and choices that we would not tolerate from 
the principal of our neighborhood school.''
    And this is exactly the point that people across America 
are asking: Is the President subject to the same moral 
accountability as every other responsible citizen in the 
workplace, or in any other position of public trust? And what 
do we say to the kids about truth and justice, about honesty 
and integrity, about the political and governmental heritage 
they should admire and emulate?
    These acts, which were committed willfully and 
premeditatedly by the President, are serious offenses which I 
believe clearly rise to the level of impeachable offenses.
    I reject the White House lawyers' argument that the 
President's conduct does not amount to the technical ``crimes'' 
of perjury and obstruction, but I'm content to allow a regular 
court of law to settle the issue. I also reject their argument 
that the President's conduct does not rise to the level of 
impeachable offenses.
    I believe the President's conduct, however it is ultimately 
labeled, constitutes absolutely unacceptable behavior on the 
part of the President of the United States, the Nation's chief 
law enforcement officer who is constitutionally charged to 
``faithfully execute the laws,'' and who, by word and deed, 
sets an example for every citizen.
    In finding the President guilty on both articles of 
impeachment, I believe the constitutional consequence of 
removal from office is warranted in order to uphold for future 
generations:
    The integrity, honor, and trust which are indispensable to 
the moral authority of the Presidency;
    The sanctity of the oath which every citizen must take in 
any legal proceeding to tell ``the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth;'' and
    The viability of our judicial system, the rule of law, and 
the principle of ``equal justice under law.''
    Holding public office is a special privilege and I am 
continually grateful to the people of Oklahoma for the 
opportunity to serve in the U.S. Senate.
    During the past weeks and months, I have received thousands 
of letters, e-mails, faxes, phone calls and other 
communications relative to the impeachment trial and all of the 
subject matters surrounding it. Many have expressed strongly 
held views on one side or the other, often urging me to vote in 
accord with their wishes and thinking. My overworked staff and 
I have done our best to digest and respond to these inquiries 
and comments as best we could. To those who may have not yet 
received a personal response, I wish to express my appreciation 
for sharing your thoughts, your ideas, and your concerns.
    Whether you agree or disagree, I want you to know that my 
votes for conviction on the two articles of impeachment 
represent my best judgment, based on my analysis of the facts, 
the law, the Constitution and what I believe is best for our 
country. They do not represent the results of any poll or 
political calculation about what may be popular, either in 
Oklahoma or elsewhere.
    I have viewed the trial as a serious constitutional duty 
and have listened and deliberated with profound sense of 
history and patriotism. I have sought to respect the process 
and preserve for future generations those wise procedural 
precedents, including the rule of law, that have served this 
Nation so well for over 200 years.
    I have stated my views and I accept the result of the 
trial. I harbor no personal bitterness or hatred toward the 
President. It is time to look to the future. I hope all of us 
on all sides of these issues can unite in a prayer for the 
future of our country and for the ideals of freedom and justice 
it stands for in the world. God Bless America.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy

    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, no matter how each of us 
viewed the evidence in this case and no matter how each of us 
voted, we all share common relief that the impeachment trial of 
William Jefferson Clinton is concluding. In many respects, this 
was uncharted territory for us. We all felt the weight of 
history and precedent as we made our decisions on how to 
proceed.
    With this in mind, the procedures developed and followed 
for the three depositions taken during the course of this trial 
should be made a part of the record of this impeachment trial. 
Unfortunately, the complete depositions were not introduced 
into evidence and made a part of the Senate trial record until 
after the vote on the articles themselves. Instead, at the 
request of the House managers, the only parts introduced into 
evidence before then were those ``from the point that each 
witness is sworn to testify under oath to the end of any direct 
response to the last question posed by a party.'' 
(Congressional Record S1209, Jan. 4, 1999.)
    I served as one of the six presiding officers at the 
depositions and attended all of them. In particular, I wish to 
thank Senators Dodd and Edwards for serving with me, and 
Senator DeWine with whom I jointly presided.
    The decisions made during those depositions may provide 
guidance in the future should any other Senate be confronted 
with challenges similar to those that we have confronted. For 
that reason, I have described below the manner in which we 
reached our decisions and summarize the issues we resolved both 
before and during the depositions of Monica S. Lewinsky, Vernon 
Jordan, and Sidney Blumenthal.
    I thank Thomas Griffith, Morgan Frankel and Chris Bryant in 
the Senate legal counsel's office for their assistance during 
the depositions and in preparing this summary of the rules and 
procedures.
    I ask unanimous consent that this summary be printed in the 
Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

  Summary of Rulings and Procedures of the Presiding Officers During 
                Depositions in Senate Impeachment Trial

                           a. the procedures
    Selection. An equal number of Presiding Officers from each party 
were selected by the Minority and Majority Leaders.
    Presiding. One Presiding Officer from each party presided jointly 
over each deposition at all times. The Presiding Officers rotated from 
deposition to deposition and the Democratic Presiding Officers chose to 
rotate during the deposition of Ms. Lewinsky, with Senator Leahy 
presiding over the first part and Senator Edwards presiding over the 
latter part of that deposition.
    Attendance. All Presiding Officers were permitted to attend each 
deposition in order to provide continuity in the proceedings and ensure 
familiarity with both substantive and procedural decisions made in each 
deposition.
    Consultation. All Presiding Officers present, whether or not 
actually presiding over a specific deposition, were invited to and did 
participate in discussions among Presiding Officers about certain 
rulings.
    Opening Script. The first Presiding Officer to speak was from the 
majority party. He used an opening script that summarized Senate 
Resolution 30 authorizing the depositions and set forth the ground 
rules for the timing of lunch and other breaks, the overall time 
allotted for the deposition, the scope of the examination, basic 
guidelines for objections, an explanation of the confidentiality 
requirements, and the oath required to be administered to the witness. 
(Lewinsky Depo. Tr., pp. 5-8). Senator DeWine reiterated the 
confidentiality requirement at the close of the Lewinsky deposition. 
(Id., p. 174, ln. 10--p. 175, ln. 7).
    Senator Leahy made an opening statement at the Lewinsky deposition 
to advise the witness of her rights, including that she could correct 
the transcript, was free to consult with her attorneys, and notified 
her of the criminal liability she risked if she failed to tell the 
truth. (Lewinsky Depo. Tr., pp. 9-11).
    Senator Dodd stressed the confidentiality requirement before the 
Jordan deposition (Jordan Depo. Tr., p. 9, lns. 6-13).
    Senator Edwards stressed the confidentiality requirement again 
before the Blumenthal deposition (Blumenthal Depo. Tr., p. 8, lns. 8-
10).
    Oath. The Presiding Officer from the majority party administered 
the oath to the witness.
    Advise of Rights. Senator Leahy in his opening remarks at the 
Lewinsky deposition informed the witness that should she fail to tell 
the truth, she would risk violating a federal law (18 U.S.C. Section 
1001), prohibiting a person from making any materially false statement 
in any investigation or review by Congress (Lewinsky Depo. Tr., p. 9, 
Ins. 4-13).
    Breaks. Senator DeWine called for 5-minute breaks on the hour, and 
Senator Leahy made clear that the witness should just ask should she 
want a break. At the conclusion of each break, Senator DeWine informed 
counsel of the time remaining for questioning. (See, e.g., 145 Cong. 
Rec. S1218, S1222 (Lewinsky)). Senator Thompson did likewise. (Id. at 
S1233, S1238 (Jordan)). Senator Specter also called for 5-minute breaks 
on the hour. (Id. at S1249, S1253; Blumenthal Depo. Tr., p. 86, Ins. 6-
7, 15). Senators Thompson and Dodd called for a lunch break, even 
though Mr. Jordan asked to proceed through lunch. (145 Cong. Rec. 
S1243). Brief breaks were also taken when required to change the tapes, 
see, e.g., id. at S1227, and during a power outage in the Jordan 
deposition. (Id. at S1234).
    Reserving Time for Re-direct and Re-Cross Examinations. The parties 
were allowed to reserve time out of their four hours for re-direct and 
re-cross examination, with the understanding, however, that should the 
President's counsel fail to cross-examine, the Managers would have no 
opportunity to re-direct. Likewise, should the Managers fail to re-
direct following cross-examination, the President's counsel would have 
no opportunity to re-cross.
    During the Lewinsky deposition, the President's counsel chose to 
ask no questions, which meant that the Managers could ask no further 
questions. (Lewinsky Depo. Tr., p. 173, Ins. 16-17). The President's 
counsel made a short apology to the witness on behalf of the President, 
to which no objection was made. (Id., p. 173, Ins. 18-20).
    During the Jordan deposition, the President's counsel asked very 
few questions on cross-examination, and the Managers asked no questions 
on re-direct examination. (145 Cong. Rec. S1245).
    During the Blumethal deposition, the President's counsel asked no 
questions on cross-examination, but the House Managers were allowed to 
ask questions on a limited scope of inquiry that had been the subject 
of an earlier objection raised by the President's counsel. (Id. at 
S1253). Senators Specter and Edwards had ruled that the Managers could 
develop this line of inquiry at the conclusion of the deposition so 
that should the objection be sustained, that portion of the deposition 
could be easily excised (145 Cong. Rec. S1253). Following the Managers' 
last line of inquiry, the President's counsel was given the opportunity 
to ask, but had no questions for Mr. Blumenthal. (Blumenthal Depo. Tr., 
p. 86, Ins. 15-18).
    Recalling the Witness. At the completion of the Managers' direct 
examination of Ms. Lewinsky, Senator Edwards asked Manager Bryant 
whether he had concluded his direct examination. Manager Bryant said he 
had. When the President's counsel determined not to ask any questions, 
Senators DeWine and Edwards ruled that the deposition was completed, 
meaning that the deponent could not be compelled to testify again 
unless the Senate voted to issue another subpoena. (Lewinsky Depo. Tr., 
p. 173, In. 24). In so doing, they expressly rejected a request from 
Managers Bryant and Rogan to retain jurisdiction over the witness 
should she be called as a witness before the Senate. (Id., p. 176, lns. 
4-8).
    Off the Record. The Presiding Officers determined when to go off 
the record. For example, Senator DeWine asked to go off the record when 
conferring on a ruling with Senator Leahy. (145 Cong. Rec. S1219 
(Lewinsky)). Senator Edwards also asked to go off the record to confer 
with Senator Specter on a ruling. (Id. at S1250 (Blumenthal)). The 
parties were also permitted to request that discussion take place off 
the record. For example, upon Manager Bryant's request, Senators DeWine 
and Leahy allowed discussion to take place off the record. (Id. at 
S1229 (Lewinsky)). Similarly, upon President's Counsel's request, 
Senators Specter and Edwards allowed discussion to take place off the 
record. (Id. at S1253 (Blumenthal)).
    Videotape. Senator Leahy advised Ms. Lewinsky at the outset for her 
deposition of how the videotape of the deposition might be used, 
including admitted into evidence in the impeachment trial and used in a 
way that it becomes public. (Lewinsky Depo. Tr., p. 10, lns. 10-12). 
Her attorney noted for the record that the witness objected to the 
videotaping of the deposition, and to any subsequent public release of 
the videotape of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony (Id. p. 12; lns. 19-22).
                             b. the witness
    Counsel May Not Coach the Witness. Senator DeWine instructed Ms. 
Lewinsky's counsel not to coach or prompt the witness in her answers. 
He stated that she was free to ask for a break to confer with her 
counsel, but they should not whisper responses to her while a question 
was pending. (145 Cong. Rec. S1215).
    Relying on Prior Grand Jury Testimony. Ms. Lewinsky objected to 
certain questions, answers to which were already in the record. After 
conferring, Senators DeWine and Leahy instructed Ms. Lewinsky to answer 
a Manager's question even though the question might have been covered 
in her grand jury testimony, though she ``certainly can reference 
previous testimony if she wishes to do that.'' Senator Leahy 
particularly noted that there may be ``some nuances different,'' and 
that she could ``correct her testimony.'' (145 Cong. Rec. S1213).
    Transcript Corrections. Senator Leahy made clear when he presided 
at the Lewinsky deposition that the witness would be given an 
opportunity to examine the transcript to make any necessary 
corrections. By letter dated February 2, 1999, her attorney provided a 
list of corrections to the deposition (145 Cong. Res. S1229).
               c. objections to questions and statements
    Procedures for Resolving Scope Objections. Section 204 of S. Res. 
30 limited the examination of the witness to ``the subject matters 
reflected in the Senate record.'' Prior to the Lewinsky deposition, 
Senators DeWine and Leahy determined that if objection was made to a 
question on the ground that it exceeded the scope of the Senate record, 
the proponent of the question would be allowed to identify where in the 
Senate record the subject matter of the question was reflected. If the 
proponent could satisfy the Presiding Officers that the subject matter 
of the question was reflected in the Senate record, the witness would 
be instructed to answer the question.
    In the Blumenthal deposition, a scope objection arose about 
questions regarding White House strategy discussions of Kathleen 
Willey. (145 Cong. Rec. S1249). Senators Specter and Edwards decided to 
reserve that line of questioning until the end of the deposition. When 
the issue arose again, after consultation off the record, Senators 
Specter and Edwards decided that questions regarding Kathleen Willey 
were within the scope, but not questions regarding strategy sessions on 
any other women. (Id. at S1253). Senators Specter and Edwards also 
overruled Mr. Blumenthal's attorney's scope objection to another area 
of questions after Manager Graham had offered proof to support the 
scope of the question, and the attorney had withdrawn his objection. 
(Id. at S1251).
    Limitation on Scope. While S. Res. 30 broadly defined the 
permissible scope of the deposition to cover subject matter reflected 
in the Senate record, the Managers were reminded of their 
representations to the Senate limiting the areas about which they would 
examine the witnesses. For example, Senator Leahy reminded Manager 
Bryant of his promise to the Senate that he would not ask Ms. Lewinsky 
about her explicit sexual relationship with the President. (145 Cong. 
Rec. 1213).
    Objections by Counsel for the Witness. Senators DeWine and Leahy 
ruled that counsel for the witness were allowed to interpose objections 
to a question. (Id. at S1219 (Lewinsky)).
    Answering the Question Subject to an Objection. Section 203 of S. 
Res. 30 required that ``the witness shall answer'' all questions unless 
asserting a ``legally-recognized privilege, or constitutional right.'' 
Senators DeWine and Leahy noted all non-privilege objections and 
instructed the witness to answer questions subject to the objection. 
(See, e.g., 145 Cong. Rec. S1221 (Lewinsky)). The attorney-client 
privilege was asserted by Ms. Lewinsky's counsel in response to one 
line of questioning. Senators DeWine and Leahy instructed Manager 
Bryant to postpone that line of questioning until after Ms. Lewinsky's 
counsel could determine whether prior grand jury testimony had waived 
the privilege for that subject matter. (Id. at S1223). Her counsel 
later withdrew the objection, and Manager Bryant resumed his line of 
questioning. (Id. at S1224).
    When Manager Graham asked about Mr. Blumenthal's prior use of 
executive privilege, his attorney, Mr. McDaniel, objected that the 
question was misleading because Mr. Blumenthal had not raised the 
privilege, but the White House had. Senators Specter and Edwards 
overruled the objection, and asked Mr. Blumenthal to answer the 
question, which was rephrased. (Id. at S1249).
    Compound or Ambiguous Questions. During the depositions, there were 
numerous objections that the questions were compound and/or ambiguous. 
In each instance, the Presiding Officers invited the manager to 
rephrase the question and allowed the questioning to proceed. (See, 
e.g., id. at S1214-15 (Lewinsky), S1228 (Lewinsky), S1252 
(Blumenthal)). At one point in the Blumenthal deposition, Senators 
Specter and Edwards ruled that Mr. Blumenthal could answer a question 
to which Mr. McDaniel objected as confusing, if the witness understood 
it. (Id. at S1250).
    Open-ended Question. On cross-examination, Mr. Kendall asked Mr. 
Jordan if he had anything to add to the testimony he had given during 
his direct examination. That question drew an objection from Manager 
Hutchinson that it was too broad. Senator Thompson asked Mr. Kendall to 
rephrase the question, which he did. (Id. at S1245).
    Witness Statement. At the conclusion of his examination, Mr. Jordan 
asked the Presiding Officers if he could make a statement. (Jordan 
Depo. Tr., p. 157, lnc. 6-7). Manager Hutchinson reserved the right to 
object if the statement exceeded the scope of the inquiry. (Id. at ln. 
18). Mr. Jordan then offered a statement defending his integrity, which 
the Presiding Officers allowed. (Id. at ln. 24--p. 158, ln. 23). 
Manager Hutchinson did not assert an objection following the statement.
    Leading Questions. Senator Thompson allowed Manager Hutchinson to 
ask a leading question of Mr. Jordan, since according to S. Res. 30 
these witnesses were to be treated as adverse to the Managers. (145 
Cong. Rec. S1238).
    Questions Assuming Facts Not in Evidence. Senator Edwards, with 
Senator Specter's concurrence, sustained an objection to a Manager's 
question that contained premises and characterized events not in the 
record, and Manager Graham rephrased the question. (Id. S1252).
    Speculation. Senators DeWine and Leahy asked Manager Bryant to 
rephrase questions after objection was made that the questions called 
for speculation about another person's state of mind. (Id. at S1219, 
S1221 (Lewinsky)). Senators Specter and Edwards asked Manager Graham to 
rephrase questions calling for Mr. Blumenthal's speculation about 
other's thoughts. (Id. at S1250, S1254).
                           d. use of exhibits
    Prior Production of Exhibits. Section 204 of S. Res. 30 requires 
``[t]he party taking a deposition . . . [to] present to the other 
party, at least 18 hours in advance of the deposition, copies of all 
exhibits which the deposing party intends to enter into the 
deposition.'' Following objection from the President's counsel that the 
Managers had failed to comply with this requirement and had largely 
supplied only general descriptions of exhibits without copies of 
specific documents, Senators DeWine and Leahy ruled that this provision 
required production to the witness, the other party, and the Presiding 
Officers of a copy of any document that would be used during the 
deposition. A general description of the exhibit document did not 
comply with the resolution. (Lewinsky Depo. Tr., p. 14, ln. 16--p. 19, 
ln. 5). The President's counsel lodged an objection to the tardy 
production of deposition exhibits by the Managers prior to the Lewinsky 
deposition and again prior to the Jordan deposition, but agreed to 
proceed after the Presiding Officers assured them they would have an 
adequate opportunity to review any documents used in the deposition. 
(Jordan Depo. Tr., p. 13, lns. 22-25). Senators Thompson and Dodd put 
the Managers on notice that failure to comply with the Presiding 
Officers' ruling would preclude the use of documents not provided in a 
timely fashion at the Blumenthal deposition scheduled for the next day. 
(Id. at p. 13, ln. 22-p. 14, lns. 6, 16-23).
    Referring to Exhibits. Senators DeWine and Leahy ruled that 
exhibits should be referred to according to their location in the 
Senate record. (145 Cong. Rec. S1214, S1226 (Lewinsky)). Senator 
Thompson reiterated that ruling in the Jordan deposition. (Id. at 
S1236). Senator Thompson also ruled that grand jury exhibits in the 
Senate record used as deposition exhibits should not be referred to by 
their grand jury exhibit number, but rather by an exhibit number for 
this impeachment trial deposition. (Id.) Senators Thompson and Dodd 
numbered the exhibits as they were presented, rather than as they were 
admitted into evidence. (Id. at S1245).
    Admitting Exhibits into Evidence. S. Res. 16, the agreement which 
emerged from the Senate's January 8, 1999 bipartisan caucus in the Old 
Senate Chamber, provides that the material the House filed with the 
Senate on January 13, 1999 ``will be admitted into evidence.'' Those 
materials were printed, bound, and distributed to Senators. (See S. 
Doc. No. 106-3, vols. I-XXIV (1999)). Thus, any documents in that 
Senate record were already admitted into evidence by the time the 
depositions were taken. S. Res. 30, which governs the conduct of these 
depositions, provides that ``[n]o exhibits outside of the Senate record 
shall be employed, except for articles and materials in the press, 
including electronic media.'' When a party used a document during a 
deposition that was in the Senate record, there was no need to seek 
admission of that document into evidence. The only non-record documents 
that could be used in these depositions were ``articles and materials 
in the press, including electronic media.'' A party needed to seek the 
admission of those documents into evidence before they could become 
part of the record.
    During the Jordan deposition, Manager Hutchinson attempted to use 
as an exhibit a summary of telephone records, a redacted form of which 
was in the Senate record. Mr. Kendall objected to the use of the 
exhibit because it had not been properly authenticated. Senators 
Thompson and Dodd sustained the objection. (145 Cong. Rec. S1241).
    After the Manager's examination of Mr. Blumenthal, the President's 
counsel, Lanny Breuer, presented various news articles that were 
admitted into evidence. (Blumenthal Depo. Tr., p. 81, ln. 8-p. 82, ln. 
2). Manager Graham also submitted articles into evidence, including 
those not referred to by Mr. Blumenthal, and they were admitted after 
Mr. Breuer withdrew his objection that no reference had been made to 
the articles during the examination. (Id. at p. 82, lns. 16-25, p. 83, 
ln. 15-p. 85, ln. 25).
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Olympia J. Snowe

    Ms. SNOWE. Mr. Chief Justice, distinguished colleagues, let 
me begin by expressing my appreciation to the Chief Justice for 
his wisdom, for his infinite patience, and for conferring upon 
this body the judicial temperament envisioned by the framers.
    I would also like to commend both the Senate majority and 
minority leaders for upholding the dignity of this body, by 
preserving judiciousness and fairness, and maintaining 
bipartisanship and civility.
    Colleagues, we have arrived at a juncture in our public 
lives that will largely define our place before the judgment of 
history, and I think it will be said that justice and the 
Constitution were well served.
    Indeed, the consequences of our decision are manifest in 
the words of Alexander Hamilton, who wrote of ``the awful 
discretion which a court of impeachment must necessarily have, 
to doom to honor or to infamy the most confidential and the 
most distinguished characters of the community.''
    Those words should weigh heavily upon us. But while the 
gravity of our task is humbling, the genius of our Constitution 
is ennobling; for we deliberate not under the imposing shadow 
cast by the exceptional men who framed this Nation, but in the 
illuminating light of their wisdom.
    Impeachment was designed by the framers to be a circuit 
breaker to protect the Republic when ``checks and balances'' 
would not contain the darker vagaries of human nature. 
Impeachment empowers the Senate--under the most extraordinary 
of circumstances--to step outside its legislative role, reach 
into the executive branch, and remove a popularly elected 
President.
    Impeachment was not, however, devised as an adjunct or 
independent arm of prosecution. It is not for the U.S. Senate 
to find solely whether the President committed statutory 
violations. Rather, we have a larger question--whether there is 
evidence that persuades us, in my view beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that the President's offenses constitute high crimes and 
misdemeanors that require his removal.
    Here is the precise point of our challenge--to give 
particular meaning to the elusive phrase, ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' This task is critical, because impeachment is 
not so much a definition, as it is a judgment in a particular 
case--a judgment based not upon an exact or universal moral 
standard--but upon a contemporary and historical assessment of 
interest and need.
    ``High crimes and misdemeanors'' speak to offenses that go 
to the heart of matters of governance, social authority, and 
institutional power--offenses that, in Hamilton's words, 
``relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.''
    These crimes must be of such magnitude that the American 
people need protection, not by the traditional means of civil 
or criminal law--but by the extraordinary act of removing their 
duly elected President.
    For removal is not intended simply to be a remedy; it is 
intended to be the remedy. The only remedy by which the 
people--whose core interests are meaningfully threatened by the 
President's conduct--can be effectively protected.
    This, to me, is what President Woodrow Wilson meant when he 
referred to ``nothing short of the grossest offenses against 
the plain law of the land.'' This, to me, is what framer George 
Mason meant when he emphasized ``great and dangerous 
offenses.''
    So in determining whether this President has committed a 
``great and dangerous offense'' requiring removal, we must 
first weigh all of the credible evidence to identify which acts 
were actually committed. Then, we must assess the gravity or 
degree of the misconduct. This process requires that we review 
the acts from their origin and the circumstances in their 
totality.
    The allegations in article I do not paint a pretty picture. 
Indeed, we are all struggling with having to reconcile the 
President's lowly conduct with the Constitution's high 
standards. We should all be concerned with the minimal 
threshold that he has set and the poor example he has created 
for leadership in this country.
    The President himself admits he gave evasive and incomplete 
testimony. He admits he worked hard to evade the truth. He 
admits he misled advisers, Congress, and the Nation. And he 
looked all of America in the eye--wagging his finger in mock 
moral indignation when he did it.
    The fact is, the truth is not our servant. The truth does 
not exist to be summoned only when expedient. I find his 
attempts to contort the truth profoundly disturbing. A 
President should inspire our most noble aspirations. 
Unfortunately, he has fueled our darkest cynicisms.
    I resent the ordeal he has put this country through--and we 
should make no mistake about it--whatever else may be said, we 
are here today because of the President's actions. I resent the 
shadow he has cast on what should be--and I feel still is--an 
honorable profession: public service. And I think all of us who 
take our oaths to heart should resent it.
    Finally, as a woman who has fought long and hard for sexual 
harassment laws, I resent that the President has undermined our 
progress. No matter how consensual this relationship was, it 
involved a man in a position of tremendous power, with 
authority over a 21-year-old female subordinate, in the 
workplace--and not just any workplace. He has shaken the 
principles of these laws to their core and it saddens me 
deeply.
    But as I work my way through my distaste, my dismay, and my 
disappointment, I return to the discipline that the 
Constitution imposes upon us as triers of fact. My job here is 
to review the evidence, and to measure that evidence against my 
standard of proof, and the constitutional standard of high 
crimes and misdemeanors.
    So let's look at the evidence. Article I does not go to 
perjury about the underlying relationship--that charge was 
dismissed by the House. Instead, the article before us alleges 
perjury based on statements about statements about conduct. 
Unfortunately, what this comes down to is a case of ``perjury 
once removed''--an inherently tenuous charge.
    As triers of fact, we are asked under article I not to find 
whether the President lied, but whether he committed the 
specifically defined act of perjury. Here, the law is clear 
that there must be proof that an untruth was told; that it was 
told willfully; and that it was told about a subject matter 
material to the case. These are the hard rules of the statute.
    In this instance, article I alleges perjury in statements 
the President made explaining the nature and details of the 
relationship. Significantly, the underlying subject matter of 
most of these statements was ruled irrelevant and inadmissable 
in the underlying civil case that was itself dismissed and 
settled. To me, these facts undermine the materiality of these 
statements.
    Article I also alleges perjury in the President's 
statements explaining his concealment of that relationship. 
Here, I find insufficient evidence of the requisite untruth and 
the requisite intent. Given, again, that we are talking here 
about ``perjury once removed,'' I cannot conclude that the 
President is guilty on article I.
    As I look at article II, I have similar concerns and 
conflicts. Are there any among us who can look at the 
disturbing pattern that has been laid out for us and not be 
deeply troubled?
    Just look at the allegations. The President may have 
influenced the filing of an affidavit. The President may have 
initiated the concealment of potential evidence. And the 
President may have accelerated a job search, in hopes of 
influencing a witness. But for all of this, there is only 
circumstantial evidence. Despite a 64,000-page record and 
countless hours of argument and testimony, there is no direct 
evidence supporting any of these allegations.
    To the contrary, where there is direct evidence, the 
testimony is against the allegations. Indeed, not one witness 
with firsthand knowledge has come forward since the beginning 
of this matter to corroborate the charges. So while I can draw 
inferences from the evidence, I cannot draw conclusions beyond 
a reasonable doubt.
    The framers clearly prescribed caution when measuring high 
crimes, and such caution is all the more important when a case 
rests on purely circumstantial evidence. Mindful of this 
caution, I still find that one allegation stands out from the 
rest; the President's attempt to influence the potential 
testimony of his personal assistant.
    Let's look at the facts. In the President's civil 
deposition, the President suggested, at least three times, that 
the attorneys should ask questions of his personal assistant. 
At the end of the deposition, the judge reminded him of the 
confidentiality order not to discuss the testimony with others.
    Within 2\1/2\ hours, the President called his personal 
assistant to arrange a rare Sunday meeting. At that meeting, 
the President disclosed to her the contents of his deposition. 
In a manner that all but reveals the President's motives, he 
included in his discussion with her false statements about the 
circumstances of his relationship. Indeed, she would later 
testify that she believed the President sought her agreement 
with those statements he was posing.
    Consider this critical exchange in the testimony of the 
President's assistant:
    She was asked, ``Would it be fair to say then--based on the 
way he stated it and the demeanor he was using at the time he 
stated it to you--that he wished you to agree to that 
statement?'' The President's assistant nodded. She was then 
asked, ``And you're nodding your head yes, is that correct?'' 
And she answered, ``That's correct.''
    And he again violated the gag order when he revisited these 
statements with her several days later.
    As an experienced lawyer, the President knew that, by the 
force of his own testimony, he made his assistant a potential 
witness.
    As a former State attorney general, the President knew he 
was violating the confidentiality order when he spoke with her.
    As a defendant who repeatedly named his assistant, the 
President knew that his assistant would be subpoenaed.
    And she was subpoenaed just 3 days later. But even if she 
hadn't, the President did not need absolute or direct knowledge 
that his assistant would testify. Under the law of obstruction, 
which, unlike perjury, does not expressly require materiality, 
he only had to know that she could offer relevant facts.
    Make no mistake about it, I find the President's behavior 
deplorable and indefensible.
    If I were a supporter, I would abandon him. If I were a 
newspaper editor, I would denounce him. If I were a historian, 
I would condemn him. If I were a criminal prosecutor, I would 
charge him. If I were a grand juror, I would indict him. And if 
I were a juror in a standard criminal case, I would convict him 
of attempting to unlawfully influence a potential witness under 
title 18 of the United States Code.
    However, I stand here today as a U.S. Senator, in an 
impeachment trial, with but one decision--does the President's 
misconduct, even if deplorable, represent such an egregious and 
immediate threat to the very structure of our government that 
the Constitution requires his removal?
    To answer this broad question, we need to ask several finer 
questions:
    Do the people believe their liberties are so threatened 
that he should not serve his remaining 23 months? Is the 
President's violation on par with treason and bribery? What are 
the inescapable and unprecedented effects of removing a duly 
elected President? And can the President's wrongdoing be more 
effectively remedied by criminal prosecution, in a standard 
court of law, after he leaves office?
    These are the questions which drive our consideration of 
the ``gravity'' and ``degree'' of the President's conduct. To 
this end, I return to the words of another Maine Senator, 
William Pitt Fessenden, who during the Andrew Johnson trial 
said that removal must ``be exercised with extreme caution'' 
and in ``extreme cases.'' It must, he said, ``address itself to 
the country and the civilized world as a measure justly called 
for by the gravity of the crime. . . .''
    In this case, I understand how reasonable minds could 
differ, for I have struggled long and hard with my own 
decision.
    But the Constitution tempers our passion and measures our 
judgment. The Constitution requires each of us to determine not 
just whether the President violated a statute. For had the 
framers intended the offenses charged in this case to require 
removal in any and all circumstances, they would have 
specifically included them in the impeachment provisions of the 
Constitution.
    Because they did not, we are compelled to ask ourselves 
whether the nature and circumstances of his conduct are such 
that we have no choice but to inflict upon him what one of the 
House managers called ``the political equivalent of the death 
penalty.''
    If I could conclude that this President's conduct is of 
that nature, I would vote to remove him. Because if there is 
one thing I've learned throughout my 25 years in elective 
office, it is that the really tough decisions leave us with but 
one choice--doing what we know to be right and true.
    In this instance, among the seven allegations charged in 
article II, I have only been persuaded beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President committed one of them. After due 
consideration of all the factual circumstances relating to this 
one finding, and the constitutional dictates and implications 
of this matter as a whole, I am persuaded that the President's 
wrongdoing can and should be effectively addressed by the 
additional remedy expressly provided by the framers in the 
Constitution--namely, trial before a standard criminal court. 
And I am further persuaded that future Presidents, and future 
generations can be effectively deterred from such wrongdoing by 
this impeachment and a potential prosecution.
    The President's behavior has damaged the Office of the 
Presidency, the Nation, and everyone involved in this matter. 
There are only two potential victims left--the Senate and the 
Constitution--and I am firmly resolved to allow neither to join 
the ranks of the aggrieved.
    From the day I swore my oath of impartiality, I determined 
that the only way I could approach this case was to ask myself 
one question, ``If I were the deciding vote in this case, could 
I remove this President under these circumstances?'' The 
answer, I have concluded, is no--and therefore, I will vote 
against both articles of impeachment.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I came to this process with an open 
notebook and an open mind, determined to honor my oath to do 
impartial justice and serve the best interests of the 
Presidency, the American people, and the Nation. I stand 
confident that in doing so, my manner has been impartial and my 
judgment has been measured. Therefore, in my mind and in my 
heart, I believe to a moral certainty that my verdict is just.
    As men and women of honor, that is the highest expectation 
to which we can aspire. For we are writing history with 
indelible ink, but imperfect pens.
    In the end, when future generations dust off the record of 
what we have done here, may they say we validated the framers' 
faith in the Senate. May they say we reached within ourselves 
to discover our most noble intentions. And may they say we 
achieved a conclusion worthy not just of our time, but of all 
time.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Don Nickles

    Mr. NICKLES. Mr. Chief Justice, the U.S. Senate has nearly 
concluded only the second impeachment trial of a President in 
history. We fulfilled our promise to conclude the process in an 
expeditious and responsible manner in accordance to the 
Constitution.
    Americans understand there is really only one person to 
blame for this ordeal: Bill Clinton. He could have prevented 
the entire impeachment process if he had chosen the truth 
instead of lies and obstruction and the well-being of the 
Nation instead of his own personal and political needs. He 
squandered his opportunity to provide trustworthy leadership on 
the important issues facing America.
    The President's actions left the Attorney General with no 
choice but to ask the independent counsel to investigate. They 
left the independent counsel with no choice but to refer 
charges to the House of Representatives. They left the House 
with no choice but to impeach him.
    The day Senators took that impeachment oath was one of the 
most serious, solemn times that I have experienced during my 18 
years in the Senate. Our oath was to do impartial justice, and 
that oath was in my mind as I weighed the facts, the law, and 
the Constitution.
    The President took an oath, too. He took an oath to tell 
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
    I believe that clear and convincing evidence presented to 
the Senate demonstrates that President Clinton did indeed 
commit multiple acts of perjury, as alleged in article I, and 
multiple acts of obstruction of justice, as alleged in article 
II, and deserves to be found guilty on both articles of 
impeachment.
    The President made a serious, serious mistake when he went 
to his Paula Jones deposition, raised his right hand and swore 
to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, 
and then lied repeatedly. Following that, he committed more 
acts of obstruction and more lies, culminating in his testimony 
before the grand jury where he lied time and time again. He had 
obstructed justice and he had perjured himself in the Jones 
case, and he wanted to be consistent, so he perjured himself 
again.
    One of many specifics, concerning his ``conversations'' 
with Betty Currie: ``I was trying to get the facts down. I was 
trying to understand what the facts were.'' He wasn't trying to 
understand the facts. He knew what the facts were. He was 
trying to mislead a witness, and then he lied under oath after 
being begged, ``Don't do it again, Mr. President.''
    I believe the public deserves, and the Constitution 
permits, that the Senate demand a high standard of conduct in 
its President. Rather than find a loophole to excuse the 
President's behavior, the Senate ought to find him guilty.
    The President's counsel have attempted to frame the 
question before the Senate as ``[a]re we at that horrific 
moment in our history when our Union could be preserved only by 
taking the step that the framers saw as the last resort?'' \1\ 
His lawyers are asking the wrong question. In fact, as Manager 
Canady pointed out, under this standard even the deeds of 
Richard Nixon may not have been worthy of impeachment.\2\ The 
proper question is not whether America would survive President 
Clinton remaining in office: that answer is yes. The proper 
question before the Senate is whether, knowing what we now know 
about his conduct, America should have to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\1\ 145 Cong. Rec. S495 (January 19, 1999) (statement of counsel Ruff).
                                   * * * * *                              
\2\ 145 Cong. Rec. S963 (January 20, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Canady).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another of the President's lawyers argued that ``[i]f you 
convict and remove President Clinton on the basis of these 
allegations, no President will ever be safe from impeachment 
again[.]'' \3\ I, for one, have a little more confidence that 
our future leaders will not commit felonies, but if a future 
President commits the same crimes as President Clinton, I hope 
that President will face the same constitutional response.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\3\ 145 Cong. Rec. S823 (January 20, 1999) (statement of counsel 
Craig).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In fact, one familiar lawyer recognized that there is ``no 
question that an admission of making false statements to 
government officials and interfering with the FBI is an 
impeachable offense.'' \4\ That lawyer was William Clinton, 
speaking in 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\4\ Arkansas Democrat, August 6, 1974.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's defenders have argued that his errors were 
``private acts'' which are irrelevant to the constitutional 
standards of public behavior. But this was not about adultery. 
These charges would be just as valid even if he were never 
married. Let's also consider a few other facts.
    The President utilized his secretary to conceal evidence;
    The President went out of his way to lie to his most senior 
aides, knowing they would repeat those lies to the grand jury;
    The President supervised a massive and coordinated effort 
to have his staff, on government time, repeatedly lie to the 
public on his behalf;
    The President asserted one of his most precious powers, 
that of executive privilege, to keep government employees from 
cooperating with a Federal grand jury; and
    There is evidence that official White House personnel 
attempted to smear Ms. Lewinsky and other witnesses to bolster 
his bogus defense.
    If this conduct is so private, why has the President 
dragged so many public servants into his web of deceit and 
lies?
    If the Senate were going to pass a censure resolution, 
perhaps it should include language rebuking his private 
behavior which even his staunchest defenders have recognized as 
reprehensible, reckless, and indefensible. However, we are 
sitting not as a court of morality, but as a Court of 
Impeachment which must decide whether the rule of law, as 
Manager Hyde so eloquently explained, is a value so worthy of 
protection that it requires removal of a twice-elected 
President.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\5\ See Cong. Rec. S299 (January 16, 1999) (statement of Manager Hyde).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even more importantly, the President's conduct was not 
simply a personal matter, but rather an attack on our system of 
government. Our system of justice, both civil and criminal, 
would collapse if lying under oath was tolerated, tampering 
with witness' testimony was permitted or hiding of evidence was 
customary. Think of all of the plaintiffs, defendants, and 
witnesses who are involved in difficult or embarrassing 
situations involving bad investments, physical altercations, 
substance abuse, or adultery. How can we expect all of them to 
tell the truth, produce the evidence, and abide by society's 
legal standards about these matters when our President refused 
to do so?
    Recognizing that the President still may face the criminal 
justice system, I believe it is entirely appropriate for the 
Senate to consider how our judicial system reacts to perjury. 
Remember the 1998 quote from a Federal judge which Manager 
Buyer recounted:

[Congress does not] want people lying to grand juries. They 
particularly don't want people lying to grand juries about criminal 
offenses. They particularly don't want people lying to grand juries 
about criminal offenses that are being investigated. They don't like 
that. And Congress has said we as a people are going to tell you if you 
do that, you're going to jail and you're going to jail for a long time. 
And if you don't get the message, we'll send you to jail again. Maybe 
others will. But we're not going to have people coming to grand juries 
and telling lies because of their children or their mothers or fathers 
or themselves. It's just not acceptable. The system can't work that 
way.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\6\ 145 Cong. Rec. S283 (January 16, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Buyer).

    Of all of the powers trusted to the President, possibly the 
most important is his role as Commander in Chief. His ability 
to lead the military in times of war, and during every day of 
preparation, training, and planning which precedes violent 
conflict, depends in large part in the trust and confidence he 
can inspire in the approximately 1.2 million men and women he 
commands. These men and women are subject to the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice: the President should be grateful he is 
not, for he likely would be facing court-martial for his 
actions. At a minimum, he likely would be found guilty of the 
following offenses:
    False official statements--article 107;
    Perjury--article 131;
    Conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman--article 133;
    False swearing--article 134;
    Obstruction of justice--article 134; and
    Subornation of perjury--article 134.

    As Manager Buyer reminded us:

    In every warship, every squadbay, and every headquarters building 
throughout the U.S. military, those of you who have traveled to 
military bases have seen the picture of the Commander in Chief that 
hangs in the apex of the pyramid that is the military chain of command. 
You should also know that all over the world military personnel look at 
the current picture and know that, if accused of the same offenses as 
their Commander in Chief, they would no longer be deserving of the 
privilege of serving in the military.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\7\ 145 Cong. Rec. S286 (January 16, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Buyer).

    We all remember the publicity surrounding the case of Kelly 
Flynn, forced to resign from the Air Force for adultery and 
false statements. But there are many others, including the 
pending case of Air Force Captain Joseph Belli. Captain Belli 
is currently awaiting trial, and faces up to 27 years in 
military prison, for having an adulterous affair with a female 
airman on the base at Diego Garcia, then asking both his wife 
and his lover to lie about it. Although Captain Belli asked to 
resign and although his wife asked that the charges, which she 
first raised, be dropped, the prosecution goes on. What do you 
think Captain Belli would think of an acquittal of President 
Clinton?
    One of the bedrock principles of our system of justice is 
stare decisis, that is following precedent. One question before 
us is whether making false statements under oath merits 
conviction and removal. The Senate has clear and recent 
precedent that answers this exact question. In 1986, Judge 
Harry Claiborne was convicted by votes of 90-7 and 89-8 for 
making false statements under oath on his tax returns. In 1989, 
Judge Walter Nixon was convicted by votes of 89-8 and 78-19 for 
making false statements to a Federal grand jury. Also in 1989, 
Judge Alcee Hastings was convicted by a votes of 68-27, 69-26, 
67-28, 67-28, 69-26, 68-27, and 70-25 for making false 
statements under oath. The Senate has spoken decisively, 
repeatedly, and recently on this question: making false 
statements under oath is an offense worthy of impeachment and 
conviction.
    As Manager Hyde noted, ``This country can survive with a 
few bad judges, a few corrupt judges; we can make it; but a 
corrupt President, survival is a little tougher there.'' \8\ 
Legal commentator Stuart Taylor phrased it well: ``While 
removing him would be uniquely traumatic, his alleged crimes . 
. . are uniquely visible, and thus uniquely menacing to the 
rule of law, to trust in government, and to the national 
culture.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\8\ 145 Cong. Rec. S887 (January 22, 1999) (statement of Manager Hyde).
                                   * * * * *                              
\9\ Legal Times, January 18, 1999, at 26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, we know what the founders thought of perjury: the 
very first Congress enacted ``An Act for the Punishment of 
Certain Crimes Against the United States'' which made perjury a 
Federal crime. Rather than creating a lower standard of conduct 
for the President, I believe the Senate should hold the 
President to the same or even a higher standard.
    We should ask the President, if he discovered that a person 
he was considering for a judicial nomination had committed the 
acts which have been proven in this case, would he still 
nominate that individual? I think we know the answer.
    I believe the evidence shows a pattern of perjury which 
deserves conviction. In describing how the lies were not few in 
number or in importance, Manager McCollum captured the essence 
of the President's grand jury testimony: ``This is about a 
pattern. This is about a lot of lies.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\10\ 145 Cong. Rec. S266 (January 15, 1999) (statement of Manager 
McCollum).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the weeks leading up to the President's grand jury 
testimony, Americans of all political persuasions offered 
unsolicited advice to the President to ``come clean'' before 
the grand jury, to admit any embarrassing conduct, and, above 
all, to tell the truth. They advised him that testimony which 
was ``evasive, incomplete, misleading--even maddening,'' as the 
President's own lawyer described his deposition testimony, 
would not suffice before the grand jury.\11\ Rather than heed 
this advice, however, the President decided to ignore his oath 
``to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the 
truth,'' and instead, to paraphrase Manager Rogan, decided to 
tell the evasive truth, the incomplete truth, and nothing but 
the misleading truth.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\11\ House Serial 68, at 11.
                                   * * * * *                              
\12\ See 145 Cong. Rec. S879 (January 22, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Rogan).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is true, as counsel for the President argued, that the 
President did make many admissions during his appearance which 
no doubt were painful: that he had had an affair with a 
subordinate employee not even half his age, and that he had 
misled the American people, his family, and aides. Sprinkled 
amidst these admissions, however, were numerous lies and half-
truths. These statements were obviously under oath, they were 
material to the grand jury's investigation, and they were 
intentional. Thus, they constitute perjury. The claim by the 
President's counsel that ``he told the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth for 4 long hours'' is complete 
nonsense.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\13\ 145 Cong. Rec. S812 (January 20, 1999) (statement of counsel 
Craig).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Simply put, the President decided that his personal and 
political needs were more important than the rights of the 
grand jury to receive truthful testimony or his obligation to 
comply with Federal law. For these statements, which deceived a 
legitimately constituted Federal grand jury investigating 
criminal conduct not only of the President, but of others, the 
President deserves to be convicted on article I.
    For instance, I believe the President lied when he claimed 
his goal during the deposition ``was to be truthful'' and again 
when he said ``I was determined to work through the minefield 
of this deposition without violating the law, and I believe I 
did.'' \14\ No person who has read or seen the President's 
deposition can really believe that he was trying to be 
truthful.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\14\ House Doc. 105-311, at 532.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For example, when asked during the deposition, ``At any 
time have you and Monica Lewinsky ever been alone together in 
any room in the White House?'' the President replied ``. . . it 
seems to me that she was on duty on a couple of occasions 
working for the legislative affairs office and brought me some 
things to sign, something on the weekend.'' \15\ No reasonable 
person could believe that his goal in responding this question 
was to be truthful. The President, a lawyer, a former law 
professor, and a former attorney general of his State, could 
not have believed that he had not violated the law when he 
answered questions in this manner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\15\ Clinton Jones deposition at 58.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I need to address briefly the defense argument that the 
Senate is forbidden from considering the Jones deposition 
because the specific article alleging perjury was defeated on 
the House floor--remember Ms. Seligman's claim that the 
deposition ``answers are not before you and the managers' 
sleight of hand cannot now put them back into article I.'' \16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\16\ 145 Cong. Rec. S969 (January 25, 1999) (statement of counsel 
Seligman).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On December 11, 1998, when the House Judiciary Committee 
considered the articles of impeachment against the President, 
subsection (2) of article I read exactly as it does today 
alleging perjury in the grand jury about the ``prior 
perjurious, false and misleading testimony he gave in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him.'' No member of the 
committee offered a motion to strike or amend this provision. 
The subarticle remained unchanged when it was debated on the 
House floor. All 435 Members of the House were on notice that 
this section of article I clearly charged the President with 
lying before the grand jury about his Jones deposition 
testimony. The fact that a separate article of impeachment 
dealing solely with the deposition was defeated on the House 
floor has absolutely no impact on the contents of article I.
    Moving to the remainder of article I, I believe the 
evidence tends to show that the President was lying when he 
stated to the grand jury that ``I was not paying a great deal 
of attention to this exchange'' when his attorney, Robert 
Bennett, argued for a lengthy period of time that the President 
should not have to answer questions about Monica Lewinsky 
because of her affidavit, known by the President to be 
false.\17\ The videotape of the deposition clearly shows 
President Clinton staring directly at his attorney when these 
misrepresentations were made, and then closely following the 
back-and-forth between Bennett, Judge Wright, and Jones' 
counsel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\17\ House Doc. 105-311, at 511.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I also believe the evidence demonstrates clearly that the 
President perjured himself during his testimony concerning his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Subsection (4) of article I concerns the President's grand 
jury testimony concerning the various allegations of 
obstruction of justice contained in article II. I discuss my 
views on the substantive obstruction counts below, but I also 
conclude that the President committed multiple acts of perjury 
in discussing and denying his role in these events. For those 
who argue that the allegations of perjury only deal with sex, I 
invite you to read the President's answers to the questions 
about the alleged obstruction: some defy common sense, most 
conflict with more credible accounts provided by other 
witnesses, and many are perjurious, false, and misleading.
    The evidence concerning certain of the allegations of 
obstruction is strong and would meet the legal requirements of 
title 18 were this a criminal trial. While the White House 
defense would urge us to consider the President's ``record on 
civil rights, on women's rights[,]'' \18\ I would urge all 
Senators to remember that it is easy to talk a good game, but 
when another American citizen sought to exercise her rights, 
the President played a different one. To use a phrase, the 
President wanted to win too badly.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\18\ 145 Cong. Rec. S830 (January 20, 1999) (statement of counsel 
Mills).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For instance, the evidence that the President tampered with 
a potential witness, Betty Currie, is convincing. As Manager 
McCollum pointed out, Ms. Currie's testimony in this matter is 
undisputed.\19\ Just hours after he fed the Jones lawyers 
numerous lies, the President called Currie and demanded that 
she come to the Oval Office on a Sunday. He then accosted her 
with a list of falsehoods, such as: ``You were always there 
when she was there, right?'' \20\ The President clearly knew 
Currie was a potential witness in the Jones case, not only 
because he had mentioned her repeatedly during the deposition, 
but also because he knew that the Jones lawyers obviously knew 
there was some relationship between he and Lewinsky and that 
they would continue to follow that lead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\19\ See 145 Cong. Rec. S994 (January 26, 1999) (statement of Manager 
McCollum).
                                   * * * * *                              
\20\ House Doc. 105-316, at 559.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even worse, according to Currie's testimony and evidence in 
the record, when it was known that the Office of Independent 
Counsel was investigating, the President saw Currie again and 
repeated his coaching. By this time, Currie was clearly a 
witness to a grand jury investigating Federal crimes. Both of 
these conversations constituted witness tampering under title 
18 and warrant conviction.
    Moreover, in attempting to explain away his crime during 
his appearance before the grand jury, the President clearly 
perjured himself. His answers, which included the hilarious 
claims that he was trying to ``refresh my memory'' and ``I was 
trying to get the facts down. I was trying to understand what 
the facts were'' are perjury.\21\ The fact that Ms. Currie was 
willing to recount these encounters to the grand jury does not 
diminish in the slightest the fact that the President illegally 
tried to coach her.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\21\ House Doc. 105-310 at 507-508, 583.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    But this episode of obstruction was only part of a 
continuing pattern. Clear circumstantial evidence proves that 
the President participated in a scheme to hide evidence under 
subpoena by Paula Jones. The evidence shows that Lewinsky 
suggested that she make sure that the many gifts the President 
had given her were not at her residence, specifically 
suggesting to the President that Betty Currie could hide them 
from the Jones attorneys. Lo and behold, hours later, Currie, 
having no idea that Lewinsky was under subpoena to turn over 
gifts, called Lewinsky after having seen the President at the 
White House and said something to the effect of ``I know you 
have something for me or the President said you have something 
for me.'' \22\ The two arranged to meet, Lewinsky sealed the 
gifts in a taped box, handed the box over to Currie, who hid it 
under her bed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\22\ 145 Cong. Doc. S1225 (February 4, 1999) (deposition of Monica 
Lewinsky).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are two explanations for how this obstruction 
happened. One, Betty Currie suddenly had a vision that she 
should call Lewinsky to see if she needed help in her plans to 
obstruct justice. Or two, the President communicated, 
explicitly or obliquely, that Currie should call Lewinsky to 
execute her scheme. Deciding which of these scenarios is more 
plausible is not difficult. Moreover, the idea, advanced by the 
President's defense, that he did not care if Lewinsky produced 
to the Jones attorneys all 24 gifts he had given her, is 
ridiculous. Can anybody really think that the Jones attorneys 
would have taken a look at the pile of gifts and said, Well, 
there are only 24 gifts--I guess there was nothing going on 
there?
    I also believe Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that the President 
suggested to her that she could supply the Jones attorneys 
their long-standing ``cover stories''--that she was delivering 
papers or visiting Currie when in fact she was coming to visit 
the President. The President's counsel have done their best to 
confuse this issue by linking it with the events surrounding 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. But her deposition testimony is clear 
that the President reminded her during a 2 a.m. phone call, 
after she was on the Jones witness list, that if she ended up 
testifying--that is, if the affidavit was unsuccessful--that 
she should use the cover stories they had developed:

    Q: . . . did you talk about cover story that night (December 17, 
1997)?
    A: Yes, sir.
    Q: And what was said?
    A: Uh, I believe that, uh, the President said something--you can 
always say you were coming to see Betty (Currie) or bringing me papers.
    Q: . . . You are sure he said that that night?
    A: Yes.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\23\ 145 Cong. Rec. S1219 (February 4, 1999) (deposition of Monica 
Lewinsky).

    As the managers pointed out, this scheme, which was ``not 
illegal in its inception--simply trying to keep the 
relationship private--did in fact deteriorate into illegality 
once it left the realm of private life and entered that of 
public obstruction.'' \24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\24\ 145 Cong. Rec. S275 (January 15, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Barr).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the issue of making false statements to top aides, 
knowing these lies would be repeated to the grand jury, the 
President is guilty both of obstruction and perjury. The fact 
that the President was also lying to the American people is 
irrelevant to this charge. The facts are that the President was 
denying this workplace relationship, that he knew the 
independent counsel was attempting to prove it was true, and he 
knew his top aides working in his close proximity would be 
called before the grand jury to find out whether they had seen 
or heard of the relationship. The false information he passed 
to them, including much more than just false denials, clearly 
obstructed the grand jury's investigation.
    I also believe the evidence concerning unusual job 
assistance provided to Monica Lewinsky through the President's 
close friend, Vernon Jordan, and the President's blatant 
failure to interrupt his attorney's unknowing attempt to 
utilize Ms. Lewinsky's false affidavit bolsters the managers' 
charges of obstruction.
    The Senate has never faced the question whether obstruction 
of justice is an offense worthy of conviction and removal from 
office. Luckily, this is not a difficult question. No less than 
perjury, obstruction of justice and witness tampering interfere 
with the gathering of truthful evidence and testimony that is 
the lifeblood of our civil and criminal courts. Our Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines recognize the detrimental effects of 
these acts, providing for tougher sentences for obstruction 
than for general acts of bribery.
    In conclusion, consider whether instead of lying and 
obstructing in the Jones case, the President had paid bribes to 
Lewinsky and Judge Wright. Would the President's defenders 
still claim that this was private conduct? No, they could not, 
and the effect of the perjury and obstruction is the same.
    Throughout these proceedings, the President's counsel and 
defenders have cited his popularity as a new type of legal 
defense to the charges. Senator Bumpers said, ``The people are 
saying `Please don't protect us from this man.' '' \25\ In 
fact, I believe his popularity, largely a result of economic 
factors not of his making means the Senate should give even 
closer scrutiny to the charges. I would argue, as did Manager 
Canady, that a President able to get away with crimes because 
of his popularity is the greatest danger to our system of 
government, exactly the type of danger that the framers 
envisioned when trusting the Senate with the power of 
removal.\26\ Remember how Alexander Hamilton spoke of the 
Senate's role:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\25\ 145 Cong. Rec. S846 (January 21, 1999) (statement of counsel 
Bumpers).
                                   * * * * *                              
\26\ See 145 Cong. Rec. S295 (January 16, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Canady).

    Where else, than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal 
sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other body 
would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own situation, to 
preserve unawed and uninfluenced the necessary impartiality between an 
individual accused, and the representatives of the people, his 
accusers? \27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\27\ 145 Cong. Rec. S296 (January 16, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Canady) (quoting The Federalist No. 65).

    As Manager Graham pointed out, a Senator voting to convict 
the President for his actions is placing a ``burden on every 
future occupant'' of the Office of the President to avoid this 
type of conduct.\28\ Asking our Presidents to obey the law and 
to respect the judicial process are burdens that I am willing 
to place on future Presidents.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\28\ 145 Cong. Rec. S289 (January 16, 1999) (statement of Manager 
Graham).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    President Clinton is guilty of perjury. He is guilty of 
obstruction of justice. He must be removed from office.
    The House and its managers admirably fulfilled their 
constitutional and moral responsibilities. I can say 
confidently that Senate Republicans kept their promises to 
conduct a fair and expeditious trial and to protect the 
Constitution. The just cause of impeachment is nearly over.
    Congress will then be able to focus on its full-time job: 
securing a better quality of life for all Americans. During the 
coming months, Congress will move forward with an aggressive 
agenda to provide an across-the-board tax cut, improve 
educational opportunities for our children, strengthen our 
national security, and ensure a sound Social Security and 
retirement system that provides Americans with the best 
possible return on their investments.
    I am anxious to roll up my sleeves, get to work, and make 
the most of the opportunities ahead in the 106th Congress.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu

    Ms. LANDRIEU. Mr. Chief Justice, as I begin, as so many of 
my colleagues have, I would like to thank our leaders for their 
tremendous patience--Tom Daschle, for your steady hand, and 
Trent Lott, for your good sense of humor.
    Before I get into the core of my remarks, I would like to 
say that this ordeal has been, indeed, trying for all of us, 
but I believe it has strengthened us individually and as a 
body. We have come to know each other far better. We have 
gained a deeper appreciation of our individual strengths and 
gifts. I am more than satisfied, particularly in listening to 
my colleague, Olympia Snowe, that this country is in good hands 
with the men and women here in this Chamber.
    Besides gaining a deeper appreciation for each other and 
for the Senate itself, we have also shared a great history 
lesson. For some of us, it has been our first in-depth study of 
these portions of our history; for others, it has been a timely 
refresher course; and to one among us, Senator Robert C. Byrd, 
I trust a rewarding experience as your words and writings on 
this important constitutional question have brought calm and 
clarity to our deliberations.
    So many excellent points have been made in these last days. 
I don't want you all to repeat this outside--and I know you 
can't--because people would say I am crazy, but I have enjoyed 
every single moment of these last 3 days. There has been a lot 
of talk about our Constitution and the framers' intent 
regarding the impeachment clause. Many have been mentioned. I 
will only venture to offer one that has to my knowledge not 
been mentioned yet because it strikes me as particularly 
timely, important and ironic. That is the argument of the anti-
Federalist faction who fought vigorously for an impeachment 
provision because they believed according to Madison ``. . . 
that the limitations of the period of service''--and they were 
speaking about an Executive--``was not sufficient security.''
    They believed that in creating a Federal Government it 
would quickly get out of control and out of step with the 
sentiments of the American people. Their fears were palpable. 
According to some scholars, as outlined in Senator Biden's 
brief, this charge of possible ``corruption, intrigue, tyranny 
and arrogance'' between elections by the Chief Executive was so 
strong that it was almost fatal to the ratification of the 
Constitution by the States.
    It is, indeed, ironic that we are in the process of 
conducting an impeachment against a President that seems by all 
impartial and objective analysis--despite his personal 
failings--to be in step with the American people, in step with 
their wishes and their hopes for this country, in step with 
their ideas for a domestic and an international agenda.
    The latest independent analysis by the New York Times and 
CNN published today shows that 70 percent of the American 
people--a clear majority--believe the President should not be 
removed from office. I know that people have rejected talk of 
analysis and polling. When I was writing this, I felt some 
hesitation of even bringing it up because I come from a family 
that wears as a badge of honor the ability to stand alone 
against great odds. In the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, as one of 
nine siblings born to parents who were civil rights leaders, it 
is the only way I knew. I grew up listening to my father tell 
stories about his lone vote against the Jim Crow laws in the 
Louisiana Legislature. I grew up thinking that was the right 
thing to do. I believe at this time it still is.
    But as the Bible would imply, there is a time to lead and 
there is a time to listen. For those who are still struggling 
at this last hour with your decision, regardless of how 
strongly you might feel about what the President did, I 
respectfully suggest that you can find comfort in the wisdom of 
the people.
    Should we make all of our decisions based on polls and 
public opinion surveys? Absolutely not. However, this 
particular situation is different. Let me point out two 
important distinctions.
    One, this is not a regular issue. The people know a lot 
about this case. They have a clear high-tech, 20th century view 
of the currents and events shaping it. All of them: the good, 
the bad, and the ugly. It has been the most publicized and 
analyzed political/legal case of this century and perhaps all 
of history.
    Two, this is the greatest and most admired democracy on the 
face of the Earth. As Patrick Moynihan so eloquently pointed 
out: One so rare and precious, it is truly a treasure. In such 
a democracy, the people's voices should count.
    Thomas Jefferson said, ``Democracy is cumbersome, slow and 
inefficient.'' Over the last 12 months, we can certainly attest 
to that. ``But,'' he said, ``in due time, the voice of the 
people will be heard and their latent wisdom will prevail.''
    As for me, I voted to dismiss both articles at the first 
appropriate opportunity. I did so after careful review of the 
facts, the evidence and a reading of the relevant parts of the 
Constitution and the other appropriate historical 
documentation. My colleague, Olympia Snowe, and others have 
eloquently gone through many of the details of the case, and I 
will not take time to repeat them now.
    I concluded that the charges of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, while serious indeed, overlaid an immoral but not a 
criminal act against the state, one that is essentially private 
and not a public act. Therefore, in my judgment the charges did 
not rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors, a high 
constitutional bar which has served us exceedingly well over 
the last 223 years.
    So today for those same reasons, and in respect for the 
people of this democracy, I will vote to acquit the President 
on both charges.
    As I said in an earlier statement, which at this time I ask 
unanimous consent to have printed in the Record, this vote 
should not be interpreted as approval of the President's 
actions which were reckless, irresponsible and showed a serious 
lack of judgment. A sexual dalliance with a White House intern 
and the subsequent breach of the public trust will cast a deep 
shadow over his other notable accomplishments and will forever 
tarnish his Presidential legacy.
    I cast this vote and find my comfort in a clear conscience, 
in the Constitution, and in the will of the people.
    In closing, let me make one last appeal. Let us put forth a 
strong censure resolution. One that doesn't attempt to provide 
cover for either political party or to make us feel better or 
worse about our votes. We can all defend our votes, and 
certainly we will be called on to do so. Let us, rather, craft 
a resolution which could receive a majority support of both 
parties. The wording should condemn the President's actions in 
the strongest terms and call for a national reconciliation.
    There being no objection, the statement was ordered printed 
in the Record, as follows:

        Upholding the Constitution, by Senator Mary L. Landrieu

    Several weeks ago the Senate took up the somber constitutional task 
of sitting in judgment of a President in an impeachment trial. 
Throughout the trial, I have limited public comment to underscore the 
impartiality I have brought to this process. Both sides have now spoken 
and I have reviewed all of the evidence as required by the 
Constitution. My decision has been made: the actions of President 
Clinton, while wrong, indefensible and reckless, do not meet the 
constitutional standards for removal from office. Therefore I have 
voted to dismiss the articles of impeachment against the President.
    From the start, I have tried to focus on what the framers of the 
Constitution had in mind when they carefully crafted the impeachment 
clause. It is important to remember that for more than 100 years the 
colonies suffered under the thumb of the tyrannical kings of the 
English monarchy. A principal goal of the framers was to have a 
mechanism to protect the populace from corrupt and oppressive leaders.
    In the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison 
argued that impeachment be used only for ``distinctly political 
offenses against the state.'' Our founders were trying to guard against 
tyranny and oppression, and not personal actions no matter how 
reprehensible. More than 700 noted legal and historical scholars, both 
conservative and liberal, agree with this constitutional interpretation 
of the impeachment clause.
    The founders were also rightly concerned that impeachment might be 
employed as a partisan tool to undermine, even destroy, high ranking 
government officials--especially the President. They worried a 
``powerful partisan majority'' might misuse it for public gain. The 
House impeachment vote, which essentially fell along party lines, is 
troubling. Such partisanship was absent during the Watergate 
proceedings. At that time Republicans and Democrats on the House 
Judiciary Committee joined together to vote for impeachment because the 
evidence showed crimes were committed against the government.
    I also voted against calling witnesses because it is clear that a 
complete and fair trial can and should be conducted on this voluminous 
and well-publicized record. Our Nation deserves to be spared this 
protracted spectacle, particularly at a time when public 
disillusionment of government is at an all-time high and issues like 
Social Security, education and international crises demand our 
immediate attention.
    Critics of this position will somehow believe that President 
Clinton has avoided punishment. On that issue, let me make two points. 
First, the power of impeachment was never meant to punish the 
President, but to protect the Nation. Second, the President has already 
suffered by his reckless behavior and, unfortunately, so has his 
family. In addition, criminal charges could be brought against him once 
he leaves office, and he is still subject to civil charges. Worst of 
all, his inappropriate and reckless behavior and the subsequent breach 
of public trust will cast a permanent shadow over his other notable 
accomplishments and will forever tarnish his Presidential legacy.
    In 1868, James G. Blaine voted to convict and remove Andrew 
Johnson, the only other President to be impeached. Twenty years later 
he said he had made a ``bad mistake'' and recanted. Upon further 
reflection he realized that the charges did not warrant the ``chaos and 
confusion'' of removing President Johnson from office. Likewise, these 
charges do not warrant the ``chaos and confusion'' that could occur 
should our last Presidential election be overturned.
    At the conclusion of this trial, I plan to cosponsor a strong 
censure resolution of President Clinton concluding that his conduct in 
this matter has brought shame and dishonor to himself and the Office of 
the President. In my opinion, it would bring a sensible end to this 
regrettable chapter in American political history. Finally, the 
ultimate political judgments will be made by the people in future 
elections. And the lasting judgment will be made by the only One who 
can.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Bob Smith

    Mr. SMITH of New Hampshire. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you 
very much. I would certainly give more than a penny for your 
thoughts on this matter. But I am afraid we will probably never 
know.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I have been proud to be a U.S. Senator 
ever since that day over 8 years ago when I took the oath of 
office and my colleague, Senator Byrd, told me that I was the 
1,794th person to serve in the U.S. Senate.
    During my tenure in the Senate, I have learned to respect 
my colleagues even when I strongly disagree with them on the 
issues of the day. I have challenged colleagues on issues and 
maybe at times even criticized their votes. But I have never 
challenged a colleague's motives and I never will. I respect 
each and every one of you and the high office you hold.
    I consider it a great honor to serve in this body, and 
serve with some giants here--Senator Helms, Senator Thurmond, 
Senator Byrd, to name a few.
    I remember when I came to the floor of the Senate and 
signed that book as No. 1,794. Senator Byrd reminded me of the 
significance of that. I have never forgotten it.
    I also sit at the desk of Daniel Webster. It is a constant 
reminder that I am just a temporary steward occupying this seat 
in the U.S. Senate. It is also a reminder that we will move on. 
But the Constitution will not move on. The Constitution will 
endure forever. Our role here in this proceeding is to preserve 
the Constitution and the Presidency. Yes--even if it means we 
have to remove the President.
    Mr. Chief Justice, when the rollcall is called tomorrow, I 
will be voting guilty on both of the articles that are now 
before the Senate. It is clear that the Senate will not be 
finding President Clinton guilty on either article. But I just 
want to say regarding censure that my vote is my censure. I 
think anyone who votes to find him guilty does not need to be 
concerned about censure.
    As I contemplate my vote, I am reminded of a prayer offered 
in 1947 by a former Chaplain of the Senate, Rev. Peter 
Marshall. Reverend Marshall prayed: ``Our Father in Heaven . . 
. help us to see that it is better to fail in the cause that 
will ultimately succeed than to succeed in a cause that will 
ultimately fail.''
    I have faith that the cause in which I believe will 
ultimately prevail, because I believe that history will judge 
that President Clinton is, in fact, guilty of high crimes and 
misdemeanors that warrant his removal from office. I know 
others respectfully disagree. And believe me, I respect that 
disagreement.
    Many of my colleagues have spoken on the instability a 
guilty verdict would cause for the Nation. We should never 
remove a President unless there is clear and present danger to 
the Nation, they say. With respect, colleagues, I submit to you 
that the double standard that we have set for our leader will 
ignite a cynicism directed against all of us. A cynicism is a 
clear and present danger to society.
    With a not guilty verdict, you will tell the American 
people that perjury and obstruction of justice for the 
President are acceptable; that those who put their lives on the 
line for our Nation every day in our Armed Forces have a higher 
standard than the Commander in Chief; and that for everyone 
else in America who lose their jobs because of perjury and 
obstruction, that is not acceptable.
    We reap what we sow. In my view, respectfully, history will 
judge us harshly for this. And I say that in great humbleness. 
It is my view. A not guilty verdict is a short-term victory for 
the President. It is a long-term defeat for truth, for honor, 
for integrity, for the Presidency, and, in my view, for the 
Constitution.
    As Peter Marshall intimated in his prayer, with a not 
guilty verdict we have succeeded in a cause which I believe 
will ultimately fail.
    My colleagues, we are all elected officials. I want to 
comment about this partisanship. I say it in the spirit of 
bipartisanship. We have all been through the same ordeal 
together here. The nasty fundraising, the ad wars, dirty 
campaign tactics, thousands of miles of travel, neglecting our 
families, hours and hours away from home, much to the detriment 
of our own health and financial well-being. We do it all the 
time. And for anyone inside or outside this institution to 
suggest that my vote, or your vote, or anyone's vote in here is 
based on partisanship not only makes me sick, it makes me 
bristle with anger.
    What are my colleagues really saying when they invoke the 
word ``partisanship''? Do you really believe that the 
impeachment of the President of the United States by a majority 
of the Members of the House of Representatives, the body that 
is elected every 2 years, gives closure to the people, and the 
body elected by the same voters who elect one-third of us every 
2 years would impeach the President of the United States 
because he is a Democrat? Even to imply that is unworthy, it is 
arrogant, and it is below the dignity of this very seat that 
you now hold. Have you forgotten the ``war'' that James 
Carville declared on Ken Starr a year or so ago, and on the 
Republicans, to protect the innocent Bill Clinton?
    Was that partisan? Was the President totally innocent? 
Partisanship has no place in this Senate, especially when it 
sits as a Court of Impeachment. We are here to do impartial 
justice, to be unbiased triers of fact. Yet we have allowed 
that runaway partisan train of White House apologists, I might 
say, to rumble into the Senate with no brakes.
    One of my colleagues mentioned the courage of Republicans 
who voted against impeachment in the House. How about the 
Democrats who voted to impeach? Are they, by implication, 
cowards?
    Alexander Hamilton would be appalled at the notion of 
partisanship in an impeachment trial. Indeed, writing in the 
Federalist Papers, Hamilton said that the impeachment of the 
President ``will seldom fail to agitate the passion of the 
whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less 
friendly to the accused.''
    ``There will always be the greatest danger,'' Hamilton 
warned, ``that the decision will be regulated more by the 
comparative strength of the parties, than by the real 
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.''
    Mr. Chief Justice, there was a hero of the Revolutionary 
War era, Dr. Joseph Warren. He was a doctor. He didn't have to 
serve; he was 34 years old. His colleagues begged him not to 
go. But he picked up arms at Bunker Hill at 34 years old and he 
said, ``Our country is in danger. On you depend the fortunes of 
America. You are to decide the important questions upon which 
rest the happiness and the liberty of millions yet unborn. Act 
worthy of yourselves.'' He was killed at the Battle of Bunker 
Hill.
    We don't act worthy of ourselves when we let partisanship 
enter into this trial, or even accuse one another of it. Why is 
it, when Democrats march in lockstep on a vote, that we 
Republicans are the only ones being accused of partisanship?
    Why are the House Republicans partisan because they vote 
out the articles, yet the Democrats who vote to block them are 
not partisan?
    I have served with Henry Hyde in the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and so have many of you. There is not even a 
remote chance--and every single one of you knows it--not even a 
remote chance that Henry Hyde would bring articles of 
impeachment against the President of the United States of any 
party if he didn't believe they were justified.
    Honorable men and women can disagree on these articles, but 
leave your politics at the door. Act worthy of yourselves.
    If the articles were so outrageous, so political, so 
partisan, so vindictive, and it is nothing more than a private 
sexual matter, then why do those of you who say those things 
want to censure this President using such terms to describe his 
actions as ``shameful,'' ``disgraceful,'' ``reprehensible,'' 
``false'' and ``misleading,'' and so forth?
    Before I leave the matter of partisanship, let me say a few 
words about the case of our former colleague, Senator Packwood. 
My colleagues know I was a member of the Ethics Committee, and 
I supported the expulsion of Senator Packwood. I lost a 
colleague, and I lost a friend over that.
    That case, too, was ``about sex.'' My colleagues and I 
didn't shrink from doing our duty in the Packwood case because 
this outrageous behavior was about sex.
    In addition, those organizations advocating that the Senate 
take strong action against Senator Packwood were, by and large, 
liberal feminist groups, which I disagree with on nearly every 
issue.
    That, however, did not matter. Instead of being partisan or 
being deterred because the case was about sex, those of us on 
the Ethics Committee painstakingly investigated that case in 
all of its sordid and unpleasant detail. We considered the 
shameful behavior in which Packwood engaged. We considered how 
his behavior reflected on his fitness to serve. We considered 
his obstruction of the investigation with respect to his 
diaries.
    In the end, the committee, Republicans and Democrats alike, 
voted to recommend to the full Senate that he be expelled. In 
doing our duty as we saw fit, we were not deterred by the 
argument that we were ``overturning an election,'' nor were the 
Republican Members of the Ethics Committee--at the time, 
Senators McConnell, Craig and myself--deterred by the fact that 
Senator Packwood was a Member of our own party, nor were we 
deterred because liberal feminist groups were aggressively 
supporting many of the women accusers of Senator Packwood. The 
heart of the issue is not who Paula Jones' lawyers are, my 
colleagues, but, rather, did Bill Clinton expose himself in the 
presence of Paula Jones against her wishes? That is at best 
sexual misconduct, and at worst it is sexual harassment. Right 
wing groups did not find Paula Jones. Bill Clinton did. He says 
he didn't do it. Do you really believe him? The women accusers 
of Senator Packwood received justice in spite of those who 
promoted their cause. Paula Jones deserves the same treatment. 
The Supreme Court agreed 9 to 0. It is outrageous to say, as 
some have on this floor, that it is acceptable to expel Senator 
Packwood and acquit the President. That kind of debate should 
not take place on the floor of the Senate. How can you say that 
Senator Packwood is equal under the law, and yet the President 
is above the law?
    Today, I ask my colleagues in the Senate to do in the 
impeachment case of President Clinton what we did in the ethics 
case of Senator Packwood. Put aside your political affiliation. 
Put aside your friendship or your personal disdain for 
President Clinton. Put all of that aside and do the right 
thing.
    The House managers have established, I believe, beyond a 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton perjured himself and 
obstructed justice. As such, I don't believe we have any option 
other than to remove him from office and replace him with the 
Vice President--a fine, decent man, as many of his predecessors 
who have assumed the Office of the Presidency during difficult 
times, and the Nation has persevered.
    As I have listened to my colleagues in these final 
deliberations, I have heard time and again that the House 
managers did not prove their obstruction of justice charge 
because of conflicts in testimony. We heard about all these 
conflicts--conflicts in testimony about the hiding of the 
gifts, conflicts in testimony about the job search, conflicts 
in testimony about the President's coaching of Betty Currie.
    Well, let me ask you, colleagues, if you believed that 
these conflicts needed to be resolved, then why didn't you join 
some of us who signed a letter to call for the President of the 
United States to come here to the Senate and tell the truth? 
What were you afraid of?
    We could have called President Clinton here to a closed 
session of the Senate. It need not have been a media spectacle. 
It can and should have been a closed session--just the Senate 
and the President.
    Time and again, I have heard my colleagues say that there 
should be a higher standard for removing a President of the 
United States than for removing a Federal judge or expelling a 
Senator Packwood. If there is such a higher standard for the 
law, then why not insist on a higher standard for the man?
    One of my colleagues mentioned the Iran-contra matter. At 
an earlier time, not too many years ago, when impeachment talk 
was in the air, President Ronald Reagan walked to the 
microphone, and he said, ``I take full responsibility for my 
own actions and for those of my administration. As angry as I 
may be about activities undertaken without my knowledge, I am 
still accountable for those activities. As disappointed as I 
may be in some who served me, I'm still the one who must answer 
to the American people for this behavior. And as personally 
distasteful as I find secret bank accounts and diverted funds--
well, well, as the Navy would say, this happened on my watch.''
    Oh, what a little honesty and candor can do for the soul of 
the Nation. Why didn't we call the President? Why didn't every 
Member of this Senate sign that letter? What would be wrong 
with having him come, either in deposition or in person? I will 
always regret that we failed to do so. We will never know 
whether the President's own testimony here before us could have 
better enabled us to do our constitutional duty. We will never 
know. The President testified before the grand jury. He 
testified before the Paula Jones case. He should have testified 
at his own impeachment trial so we could get the truth, so 
those of you who want to know whether or not he obstructed 
justice or committed perjury could have heard from him, not his 
lawyers. It is a permanent black mark on this trial, and I 
believe historians will ask for a long, long time: Why didn't 
the President testify? It could have changed the outcome of the 
trial.
    Speaking of constitutional duty, I am reminded of the 
President's oath. Article II, section 1, clause 7, of the 
Constitution provides that:

    Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation: ``I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I 
will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, 
and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the 
Constitution of the United States.''

    The Constitution considers the oath so important that it 
requires the man or woman who is elected President to take it. 
So given the importance of an oath--it is so important that no 
one elected can serve unless they take it--how can we say that 
willful violation of that oath, being perjury and obstruction, 
doesn't rise to the level of impeachment?
    President Clinton has discredited the oath that the chief 
law enforcement officer of the Nation must take. We have 
compounded that discredit by not holding him accountable.
    Manager Lindsey Graham said that ``we could leap boldly 
into the 21st century by ignoring the rule of law.'' 
Unfortunately, the Senate opted to crawl.
    My colleagues, we all in politics know what a user is. With 
all due respect, Bill Clinton is a user. He used Monica 
Lewinsky; he used his friends; he used his Cabinet; he used the 
American people; and now he is using the Senate.
    The President has never been held accountable. He wasn't 
held accountable for not telling the truth about the draft; he 
was not held accountable for not telling the truth about 
marijuana; he was not held accountable for lying about his 
relationship with Gennifer Flowers; he was not held accountable 
for his actions towards Paula Jones; he was not held 
accountable for lying about Monica Lewinsky. He will walk away 
from this trial with an acquittal, and yet again he will avoid 
accountability for his actions. He will avoid being held 
accountable for the actions that every American citizen, every 
teacher, every CEO, every military man and woman, would have 
lost his or her job over, and we let it happen. We did. With 
the greatest respect, that is not a profile in courage.
    After the acquittal, I hope we will not be a party to the 
party. The champagne corks will pop; cigars will be lit; maybe 
even the bongo drums will be played. I implore you, colleagues, 
don't go to the party. There is nothing to celebrate. Act 
worthy of yourselves.
    In 1880, when Dostoevsky, the great Russian author, wrote 
``The Brothers Karamazov,'' he could not even have dreamed that 
there would ever be a Bill Clinton, but here is what he says, 
and it goes right to the heart of this entire case:

    The important thing is to stop lying to yourself. A man who lies to 
himself and believes his own lies becomes unable to recognize the 
truth, either in himself or anyone else, and he ends up losing respect 
for himself as well as for others.
    When he has no respect for anyone, he can no longer love. And in 
order to divert himself, having no love in him, he yields to his 
impulses, indulges in the lowest form of pleasure, and behaves in the 
end like an animal in satisfying his vices. And it all comes from 
lying, lying to others and to yourself.

    The rule of law and the President's constitutional oath 
must pass the test of truth. President Clinton, regrettably, 
failed that test.
    Mr. Chief Justice, I am satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt 
that William Jefferson Clinton is guilty of perjury, is guilty 
of obstruction of justice, and must be removed from office. I 
have only to answer to my conscience, to the Constitution, and 
the judgment of history, and I stand ready for that judgment.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Jeff Bingaman

    Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, I will vote to 
acquit the President on the two articles of impeachment. I will 
vote no for two reasons. First, the House has failed to allege 
acts by this President which in the context of this case 
constitute high crimes and misdemeanors. And, second, the House 
managers allege that the President committed crimes, but they 
have failed to establish the elements of those crimes.
    The illicit sexual affair which the President engaged in, 
and the President's efforts to conceal that affair, are 
permanent black marks on his Presidency. His actions were 
deplorable, indefensible, and immoral.
    But however reprehensible these acts were, they are not 
impeachable offenses. They did not endanger the government. 
They were not the ``stuff'' which the writers of the 
Constitution had in mind when they used the phrase ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors.''
    I think we should act accordingly. Our duty, as I see it, 
is to look at the record, look at the arguments, judge our own 
authority as it has been given to us in the Constitution, and 
then vote either to remove the President or to acquit the 
President.
    I want to spend just a minute on this issue of our own 
authority. As I hear some of the discussion, it seems to me we 
have lost sight of our own authority. Some have argued that if 
a university president were to have engaged in these acts, 
clearly the board of regents of the university would fire that 
president. Some have said if a chief executive officer of a 
corporation were to engage in a course of conduct such as this, 
the board of directors of the corporation would fire the chief 
executive officer.
    I was visiting the United Parcel Service facility in 
Albuquerque right before Christmas, and I was talking to 
various people there. One of the men said, ``I hope you throw 
the President out of office because if I did what he has done 
my boss would sure fire me.'' That is the way a lot of us tend 
to think about this issue. And the discussion here this 
afternoon has been consistent with that. So I think it is worth 
focusing on what is wrong with that argument.
    What is wrong with that argument is that we are not the 
President's boss. We did not hire the President. The American 
people hired the President, just like the American people hired 
each one of us. We have very limited authority under the 
Constitution to step in and interfere with the decision of the 
American people in that regard. I do not believe the 
Constitution intended that we would set ourselves up as the 
judge of the President's character, or to determine whether we 
believe this President is trustworthy enough to remain in 
office. That issue is not for us to decide. That was decided by 
the American people. They have not delegated that decision to 
us.
    I am reminded of a story from New Mexico politics. We had a 
mayor in Albuquerque many years ago named Clyde Tingley. He was 
very proud of the city zoo, which he had built with city funds. 
He was showing the zoo to a high official in the Catholic 
Church one day. The official at one point said, ``Well, Mr. 
Mayor, this is an amazing project here. The people of 
Albuquerque ought to canonize you for this.'' The mayor shot 
back, ``A bunch of them tried during the last election. But 
they didn't get away with it.''
    I think a bunch of people tried to throw this President out 
of the White House in the last election because of questions 
about his character, but they didn't get away with it. These 
are not new questions about this President. These are questions 
which have been raised and raised and raised about whether this 
President is trustworthy, whether this President has 
demonstrated the character necessary to serve as President. And 
we really did already have a vote. Every one of us has already 
voted on whether to remove this President from the White House. 
Each one of us voted on that issue in November of 1996. I would 
assume a majority of us in this Chamber voted to remove him 
from the White House. But the American people chose to keep him 
there. The American people judged him to be worthy of the job 
and chose him to be their President for another 4 years. And 
they did not authorize us to second-guess that decision.
    So we need to look at our own job here, and say to 
ourselves, ``Are we here to pass judgment on the President's 
character, are we here to pass judgment on the President's 
trustworthiness, are we here to determine whether he is a 
proper example for young people, or instead are we here to 
decide whether he has committed high crimes and misdemeanors 
that would justify removing him from office?''
    Senator Joe Biden put it very well by saying that this 
branch of Government--the House and Senate--should be very 
reluctant to reach across and remove the head of another branch 
of Government. That is an extraordinary act. It has never 
occurred in the history of this country. For good reason it has 
never occurred. It would be a major mistake for us to take that 
action at this time.
    The framers of the Constitution did not intend Congress to 
remove a duly elected President on the basis of facts such as 
these, and they were right to deny the Senate that authority. 
The stability of the executive branch must not be put at risk 
by Congress, contrary to the ``electoral will,'' absent a clear 
showing of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' by the President. 
There is no such clear showing here. The proper remedy for this 
kind of improper conduct is in the voting booth, not here on 
the floor of the United States Senate.
    In my view, the House misused the power of impeachment when 
it voted these articles of impeachment against the President. 
It would compound the misuse of power if the Senate were to 
vote to convict and remove. My vote will be to acquit.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett

    Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chief Justice, as I have sat through this 
trial, I have not spent much time on questions of reasonable 
doubt or where the preponderance of evidence lies. Whatever the 
importance of those concepts in a typical court, the 
constitutional implications of what we are considering are much 
more serious than the issues decided in a normal trial. I will 
not vote to remove a sitting President on the turning of a 
legal issue.
    Accordingly, early in the trial I decided that I would not 
vote to convict under the first article of impeachment. It 
struck me as overly legalistic. I listened to the lawyers argue 
about the proper form of the article, and I heard about 
questions of materiality--not a term I use in everyday 
conversation--and I decided that while the case was there, it 
was shaky. In order to be sure I would render impartial 
justice, I asked myself if I would remove Ronald Reagan in a 
similar circumstance. When I realized I would not, I decided 
that I could not vote to remove Bill Clinton.
    Once I had made that decision, I more or less tuned out 
further discussions on article I, from either side, and 
concentrated on article II.
    Here the issues seemed more disturbing. The Constitution 
guarantees that the most ordinary of citizens has the right to 
her day in court, regardless of her hair or her nose or her 
choice of attorneys. The man she sues, even if he is the most 
powerful man in the country, does not have the right to lie 
while testifying under oath in her case, to deny her truthful 
discovery just because it would embarrass him. He does not have 
the right to encourage others who are beholden to him, either 
for their jobs or for favors he has done for them, to do the 
same, even by interference. He does not have the right to coach 
and mislead potential witnesses. He does not have the right to 
use the awesome power of the White House public relations 
apparatus to spread false and malicious rumors about people--
calling them ``stalkers,'' ``trailer park trash'' and 
``liars''--just because he thinks they might embarrass him if 
they tell the truth.
    It has been said that it was understandable for President 
Clinton to do all these things because he was just trying to 
cover up a sexual affair, and, after all, everyone lies about 
sex. Well, not everyone. We have had other Presidents whose 
sexual improprieties have been made public at awkward times--
Grover Cleveland, while a candidate for President, was exposed 
as having fathered a child out of wedlock. Asked by his 
panicked political allies what to do he said, ``Tell the truth, 
of course,'' and won the election. Bill Clinton should take 
such notes.
    What finally convinced me to vote for article II was the 
statement of my good friend, Dale Bumpers. I thought he was 
magnificent. He told us that the fundamental purpose of the 
Constitution was to ``keep bullies from running over weak 
people.''
    I was struck by that. I wrote it down. Then I asked myself, 
``In this case, who is the bully, and who are the weak 
people?''
    While publicly posing as a helpless victim of a relentless 
prosecutor, it was President Clinton and the people in his 
famous ``war room'' who were the bullies, using Presidential 
powers and Presidential lies to run over the rights of Paula 
Jones and, if necessary, Monica Lewinsky.
    Any President who is willing to lie and smear and 
stonewall, whether under oath in a courtroom or before a TV 
camera, speaking confidentially to his aides or privately to 
his family--any President who is so ruthless, disdainful of the 
truth and callous of the rights of others that he is willing to 
do anything to ``just win, then''; any President who readily 
uses the power of his office for his personal ends regardless 
of who is hurt--that President is a bully and, as such, a 
threat to the constitutional liberties of us all.
    Dale Bumpers said that the Constitution was written to keep 
bullies from running over weak people. That's called justice. 
William Jefferson Clinton tried to obstruct that justice. And I 
decided to vote to remove him from office.
    So there I was--ready to vote not guilty on article I, 
guilty on article II. I sat down and wrote a fancy speech 
outlining these conclusions, showed it to a few friends, 
notified my staff and sat back to let things play out.
    As the trial proceeded, however, something was gnawing at 
me. The perjury charge kept creeping back into my mind. That 
something, as I confronted it, was my experience with the 
Clinton political apparatus and its modus operandi. At the 
heart of everything that apparatus and its operatives do, 
whatever the situation, is the process of lying.
    Some of their lies have been whoppers, some trivial. Most 
have been dismissed as mere ``spin,'' relatively few have been 
under oath, but the continuing pattern of distorting, avoiding 
and, when necessary, simply denying the truth goes back to the 
1992 campaign. It has carried through the three Senate 
investigations in which I have participated. On a parochial 
note, it defined the process of creating a stealth national 
monument in my State. It has permeated the entire PR campaign 
connected with the Lewinsky affair. The New York Times calls it 
``habitual mendacity.''
    If this were a standard trial, as juror I would not know 
any of that. I would have to make up my mind solely on the 
basis of the evidence presented here. Some would say I still 
should.
    I believe that the framers of the Constitution dictated 
otherwise. They chose the Senate as the trial Court of 
Impeachment deliberately, giving us extensive powers as both 
judge and jury, and they were not naive enough to think that we 
would check our understanding of the history of the accused 
President at the door as we took up this burden. They intended 
for this to be different than a typical trial court.
    When I realized that, I began to rethink my earlier 
decision. With such a pattern of ``habitual mendacity'' running 
through his entire public career, could I really say that Bill 
Clinton's perjurious testimony before the grand jury didn't 
warrant removal?
    I made my decision to change my vote to guilty on article I 
during the closing arguments when Charles Ruff, the President's 
attorney, asked us a question with respect to an alleged high 
crime or misdemeanor. He asked, ``Would it put at risk the 
liberties of the people?''
    As I watched a replay of the President's testimony 
repeating obvious lies while under oath, I realized that the 
answer is yes. A President who has demonstrated a capacity to 
lie about anything, great or small, whether or not under oath, 
does threaten our liberties. We cannot be sure of anything he 
says; we cannot trust his word, whatever the issue. We will 
always be fearful of where that trait of his could take us, and 
we should be.
    So now I will vote guilty on both articles, with a clear 
conscience that I have done my duty. And I would vote the same 
if the President's name were Ronald Wilson Reagan.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Jack Reed*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
*Sen. Reed submitted an additional statement on February 24, see p. 
3103, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. REED. Mr. Chief Justice, for the past 6 weeks, the 
Senate has been engaged as a Court of Impeachment to try 
President William Jefferson Clinton--the first trial of an 
elected President in the history of the United States. Our 
deliberations will bring to a close more than a year of 
controversy which has left the American people both frustrated 
and dismayed. Hopefully, our decision will serve as a means of 
rededicating the energies of our Government to the service of 
the American people.
    In this endeavor, our solemn duty to the Constitution is 
paramount.
    Conscious of these responsibilities and based on the 
evidence in the record, the arguments of the House managers and 
the counsels for the President, I conclude as follows. The 
President has disgraced himself and dishonored his office. He 
has offended the justified expectations of the American people 
that the Presidency be above the sordid episodes revealed in 
the record before us. However, the House managers failed to 
establish that the President's conduct amounts to ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors'' requiring his removal from office in 
accordance with the Constitution. Moreover, the House managers 
also failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
allegations in the articles would constitute the crimes of 
perjury or obstruction of justice.
    The constitutional grounds for impeachment, ``Treason, 
Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' indicate both 
the severity of the offenses necessary for removal and the 
essential political character of these offenses. The clarity of 
``Treason'' and ``Bribery'' is without doubt. No more heinous 
example of an offense against the constitutional order exists 
than betrayal of the Nation to an enemy or betrayal of duty for 
personal enrichment. With these offenses as predicate, it 
follows that ``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' must 
likewise be restricted to serious offenses that strike at the 
heart of the constitutional order.
    Certainly, this is the view of Alexander Hamilton; one of 
the trio of authors of ``The Federalist Papers,'' which is the 
most respected and authoritative interpretation of the 
Constitution. In Federalist No. 65, Hamilton describes 
impeachable offenses as ``those offenses which proceed from the 
misconduct of public men, or, in other words from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may 
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they 
relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\1\ The Federalist Papers, No. 65 (Hamilton) at 396 (Clinton Rossiter, 
ed., 1961) (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This view is sustained with remarkable consistency by other 
contemporaries of Hamilton. George Mason, a delegate to the 
Federal Constitutional Convention, declared that ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors'' refer to ``great and dangerous offenses'' or 
``attempts to subvert the Constitution.'' \2\ James Iredell, a 
delegate to the North Carolina Convention which ratified the 
Constitution and later a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
stated during the Convention debates:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\2\ Max Farrand, ed., The Record of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 
550 (1966).

    The power of impeachment is given by this Constitution, to bring 
great offenders to punishment. . . . This power is lodged in those who 
represent the great body of the people, because the occasion for its 
exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and the 
objects of it may be such as cannot be easily reached by an ordinary 
tribunal.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\3\ Jonathan Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution, at 113 (emphasis added).

    Iredell sustains the view that an impeachable offense must 
cause ``great injury to the community.'' These interpretations 
strongly indicate that private wrongdoing, without a 
significant, adverse effect upon the nation, does not 
constitute an impeachable offense.
    Later commentators expressed similar views. In 1833, 
Justice Story quoted favorably from the scholarship of William 
Rawle in which Rawle concluded that the ``legitimate causes of 
impeachment . . . can have reference only to public character, 
and official duty. . . . In general, those offenses, which may 
be committed equally by a private person, as a public officer, 
are not the subject of impeachment.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\4\ Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution Sec. 799 at 269-270 
quoting William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States 
at 213 (2d ed. 1829).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This line of reasoning was manifest in the careful and 
thoughtful work of the House of Representatives during the 
Watergate proceedings in 1974. The Democratic staff of the 
House Judiciary Committee concluded that:

[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation, it 
is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with 
either the constitutional form and principles of our government or the 
proper performance of constitutional duties of [the President's] 
office.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\5\ Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by the 
Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. On Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 
2d Sess. at 26 (1974).

    This view was echoed by many of the Republican Members of 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the Judiciary Committee when they declared:

. . . the Framers . . . were concerned with preserving the government 
from being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man . . . 
[I]t is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that the 
Framers of the United States Constitution intended that the President 
should be removable by the legislative branch only for serious 
misconduct dangerous to the system of government.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\6\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United States, 
Report of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., H. 
Rep. 93-1305 at 364-365 (Aug. 20, 1974) (Minority Views of Messrs. 
Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, Moorhead, 
Maraziti, and Latta).

    This authoritative commentary on the meaning of ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' is supported by the structure of the 
Constitution which makes impeachment independent from the 
operation of the criminal justice system. Regardless of the 
outcome of an impeachment trial, the accused ``shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.'' \7\ The 
independence of the impeachment process from the prosecution of 
crimes underscores the function of impeachment as a means to 
remove a President from office, not because of criminal 
behavior, but because the President poses a threat to the 
constitutional order. Criminal behavior is not irrelevant to an 
Impeachment, but it only becomes decisive if that behavior 
imperils the balance of power established in the Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\7\ U.S. Const. Art. I Sec. 3. Cl. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House managers argue that we should apply the same 
reasoning to the removal of the President that we have applied 
to the trial of Federal judges. They make their argument with 
particular urgency in regard to article I and its allegations 
of perjury since several judges have been removed for 
perjury.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\8\ For example, both Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. and Judge Alcee L. 
Hastings were convicted based on charges of perjury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This reasoning disregards the unique position of the 
President. The President is elected and popular elections are a 
compelling check on Presidential conduct. No such ``popular 
check'' was imposed on the judiciary. They are deliberately 
insulated from the public pressures of the moment to ensure 
their independence to follow the law and not a changeable 
public mood. As such, impeachment is the only means of removing 
a judge. And, the removal of one of the 839 Federal judges can 
never have the traumatic effect of the removal of the 
President. To suggest that a Presidential impeachment and a 
judicial impeachment should be treated identically strains 
credibility.
    Moreover, the Constitution requires that judicial service 
be conditioned on ``good Behavior.'' This adds a further 
dimension to the consideration of the removal of a judge from 
office. Although ``good Behavior'' is not a separate grounds 
for impeachment, this constitutional standard thoroughly 
permeates any evaluation of judicial conduct. Judges are 
subject to the most exacting code of conduct in both their 
public life and their private life.\9\ Without diminishing the 
expectations of Presidential conduct, it is fair to say that we 
expect and demand a more scrupulous standard of conduct, 
particularly personal conduct, from judges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\9\ The Judicial Conference of the United States publishes a Code of 
Conduct for United States Judges, as prepared by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts. Cannon 2 of the Code requires 
federal judges to ``avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety 
in all activities.'' (March, 1997.) This Cannon requires a Judge to at 
all times act in ``a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.'' Perceived violations of 
the Code could result in a complaint to the Judicial Conference, which 
can make referrals to the House Judiciary Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House managers' argument is ultimately unpersuasive. 
Rather than reflexively importing prior decisions dealing with 
judicial impeachments, we are obliged to consider the 
President's behavior in the context of his unique 
constitutional duties and without the condition to his tenure 
of ``good Behavior.''
    Authoritative commentary on the Constitution, together with 
the structure of the Constitution allowing independent 
consideration of criminal charges, makes it clear that the term 
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' encompasses conduct which 
involves the President in the impermissible exercise of the 
powers of his office to upset the constitutional order. 
Moreover, since the essence of impeachment is removal from 
office rather than punishment for offenses, there is a strong 
inference that the improper conduct must represent a continuing 
threat to the people and the Constitution, and not simply an 
episode that either can be dealt with in the courts or raises 
no generalized concerns about the continued service of the 
President.
    Measured against this constitutional standard, the 
allegations against the President do not constitute ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The uncontradicted facts of the case 
paint a sordid picture of the President's involvement in a 
clandestine, consensual affair with a young woman. His attempts 
to disguise this affair collided with the Jones lawsuit; a 
lawsuit filed against him in his capacity as a private citizen, 
and not in anyway directed at his conduct as President. Over 
many months, he misled and he dissembled about his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky. He lied to his family, he lied to his 
colleagues, and, on January 26, 1998, he lied to the American 
people. All of these lies were designed to disguise his illicit 
but consensual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Only after being 
compelled to testify before a Federal grand jury in August of 
1998, did the President finally admit his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    The House managers take this tale of deception and 
betrayal, more soap opera than high drama of state, and urge 
that it rises to behavior evidencing an impermissible exercise 
of his powers as President or an impermissible failure to 
discharge his duties as President which threatens the 
constitutional balance of government and can only be remedied 
by the removal of the President. They urge too much. The 
allegations, even construed in the most favorable light to the 
House managers, do not constitute ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' as that term has been consistently interpreted 
over the course of American history.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\10\ These allegations are a far cry from the most relevant historical 
precedent, the Watergate affair of President Richard M. Nixon. For 
example, President Nixon attempted to cover up a burglary of the 
Democratic National Committee by enlisting the authority and the 
assistance of the Central Intelligence Agency. The precipitating event 
of this crisis was a direct attack on a fundamental Constitutional 
tenet, the right to free and fair elections unimpeded by the criminal 
attempts to steal information and wiretap telephones. Moreover, 
President Nixon liberally exercised the formal powers of his office to 
impede the investigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One could confidently stop at this point and reach a 
judgment to acquit the President. Such a judgment does not 
forgive the disreputable behavior of the President. Rather, it 
does, as it must, keep faith with the Constitution.
    However, to stop at this juncture and ignore the 
allegations of criminal conduct could leave several 
misperceptions. First, such an approach could be criticized as 
failing to afford the House of Representatives appropriate 
recognition as the proponent of articles of impeachment. The 
House of Representatives acted in the discharge of its 
exclusive constitutional prerogative to impeach the President. 
They cast these articles as criminal violations, and due 
deference must be given to the decision of the House. Second, 
failing to examine the allegations of criminal conduct may 
leave the erroneous impression that criminal activity by the 
President can never rise to the level of ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.'' And, finally, failing to examine these 
allegations leaves in doubt charges of criminal misconduct 
against the President. Although the Senate does not sit as a 
criminal court, a condemnation or exoneration ``by silence'' 
would be unfair to both the President and to the American 
people.
    The House managers argue in article I that the President 
committed the crime of perjury while testifying before the 
Federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. They argue in article II 
that the President committed the crime of obstruction of 
justice in the Jones case. After considering the evidence and 
the arguments of the House managers and the White House 
counsels, I believe that the House managers have not shown, 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of the 
alleged crimes.
    It is without dispute that the House managers have the 
burden of proof. It is also without dispute that each Senator 
has the right individually to determine what constitutes the 
appropriate burden of proof. Because of the gravity of this 
impeachment process, but, more significantly, because of the 
urging of the House managers,\11\ I believe that a standard of 
beyond a reasonable doubt should be used.\12\ This is the 
standard used in the prosecution of criminal cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\11\ Mr. Manager McCollum stated, ``none of us, would argue . . . that 
the President should be removed from the office unless you conclude he 
committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed.'' 145 Cong. 
Rec. S260 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1999) (Statement of Mr. Manager McCollum). 
The House managers invited the Senate to arrive at a conclusion beyond 
a reasonable doubt before voting to convict the President. I take them 
at their word.
                                   * * * * *                              
\12\ The adoption of a standard of ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' in 
this matter should not be construed as implying that the same standard 
must be utilized in each and every Impeachment proceeding. Conduct of 
``civil officers'' in the performance of their official duties might 
pose such an immediate threat to the Constitution that a less exacting 
standard could properly be used. Any choice of a standard of proof 
must, at a minimum, consider the nature of the allegations and the 
impact of the alleged behavior on the operation of the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Article I alleges that the President committed perjury 
before the grand jury by knowingly making false, material 
statements. The first great hurdle that the House managers must 
overcome is the fact that the House refused to adopt an article 
of impeachment regarding the President's testimony at the Jones 
deposition. However one characterizes these two statements 
under oath, no one can argue that the President was more 
truthful at the Jones deposition. Most, if not all, would argue 
that he was considerably less truthful at the Jones deposition. 
This discrepancy fatally undercuts the contention that this 
article constitutes ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' and it 
seriously erodes the claim that the President committed the 
crime of perjury before the grand jury. Unlike the Jones 
deposition, the President admitted up front in his grand jury 
testimony that he had engaged in ``inappropriate intimate 
behavior'' with Ms. Lewinsky while they were ``alone.''
    Confronted with this preemptive statement by the President, 
the article generally alleges perjury without citing specific 
statements from the grand jury testimony and leaves the House 
managers with the task of sifting through the record to suggest 
examples of the President's alleged perjury. They suggest four 
general areas.
    First, they point to discrepancies between the testimony of 
the President and Monica Lewinsky about intimate details of 
their relationship. This is a difficult proposition to prove 
without corroborating evidence, and the House managers offer 
none. Moreover, some of these details, such as the number of 
times they engaged in sexual banter on the phone, are just not 
material.
    Second, the House managers attempt to ignore the 
President's preliminary statement and argue that he adopted the 
``perjurious'' testimony of his Jones deposition. This is 
simply not true. To make this assertion, the House managers use 
the President's grand jury testimony that ``I was determined to 
walk through the mine field of this deposition without 
violating the law, and I believe I did.'' \13\ But, the 
President's peremptory statement clearly indicated that he was 
not vouching for the facts of his Jones deposition. The 
President's statement expresses his state of mind. It is not an 
affirmation of the Jones testimony. Not even Independent 
Counsel Starr alleged that the President committed perjury in 
this way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\13\ Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton on 8/17/98 as cited in 
the House Managers' Trial Brief, p. 60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, the House managers allege that the President's 
silence, while his counsel made representations about the 
Lewinsky affidavit, constitutes perjury. This novel theory of 
``unspoken perjury'' fails from the lack of any conclusive 
evidence concerning the President's state of mind at this time. 
Such evidence is necessary to prove the specific intent to 
establish the crime.
    Fourth, the House managers alleged that the President 
committed perjury when he denied his involvement in the 
obstruction of justice, particularly his alleged involvement in 
the exchange of gifts between Monica Lewinsky and Betty Currie. 
This topic will be discussed in more detail with respect to 
article II. At this juncture, it is sufficient to note that the 
House managers have not presented evidence to indicate beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President committed perjury.
    Fifth, the House managers allege that the President 
committed perjury when he denied ``coaching'' Betty Currie. 
Again, this issue will be addressed in more detail with respect 
to article II. But, this allegation also fails from the absence 
of persuasive evidence establishing the President's specific 
intent in conducting this conversation with Ms. Currie.
    Finally, the House managers allege that the President 
committed perjury when he gave false information to his aides 
about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. This too raises the 
issue of the President's state of mind. His grand jury 
testimony expressed his belief that he tried to say things that 
were true. He acknowledged that he misled, but he asserted that 
he tried not to lie. To prove that these statements are 
perjurious, the House managers had to prove that the President 
had the necessary specific intent. They have not done so.
    Article II alleges that the President obstructed justice. 
The article sets forth seven ``acts'' which the House managers 
argue the President used to implement this ``scheme.''
    Three of these alleged ``acts,'' encouraging Monica 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit, urging her to give false 
testimony, and finding her a job to obtain her silence, crash 
on an immovable evidentiary rock: Monica Lewinsky's 
uncontradicted and often repeated statement, ``no one ever 
asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for my 
silence.'' \14\ The House managers offered other circumstantial 
evidence, but this too failed to be persuasive.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
\14\ Part I, Appendices to the Referral to the U.S. House of Reps., 
Communication from the Office of the Independent Counsel, Kenneth W. 
Starr, 105th Cong. 2d Sess., H. Doc. 105-311 (September 18, 1998) at 
1161. (Ms. Lewinsky responding to a question from a juror.) See also 
Counsel to the President's Trial Brief, p. 57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The fourth ``act'' involves the transfer of gifts between 
Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie. Although Ms. Lewinsky's testimony 
strongly suggests that the President directed Ms. Currie to 
retrieve gifts, the two parties to this suggested transaction, 
the President and Ms. Currie, flatly deny any such 
conversation. Certainly, there is more than a reasonable doubt 
based on this conflicting testimony; particularly, since no one 
has ever impeached Ms. Currie's credibility.
    The fifth ``act'' recharacterizes the President's silence, 
while his attorney made representations about Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit, as obstruction of justice. This allegation fails 
based on the lack of any conclusive evidence of the President's 
state of mind.
    The sixth ``act'' involved the purported coaching of Betty 
Currie by the President after his Jones deposition. This 
allegation too turns on the President's state of mind. The 
House managers argue that the President's intent was to 
influence the testimony of Ms. Currie as a potential witness. 
White House counsels argue that the President had no reasonable 
anticipation that she would be a witness. But, more decisively, 
they argue that his intent was to confirm his story in 
anticipation of a media onslaught. The lack of persuasive 
evidence about his state of mind also undercuts this 
allegation.
    Finally, the last allegation involves the President's 
purported attempt to influence the testimony of his aides. 
Again, the House managers have not shown beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President intended to make his statement to 
influence their testimony. There is an equally plausible 
inference that the President was simply continuing his public 
campaign to deny his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. This 
campaign led him to lie to the American public and no one 
suggests he was then tampering with witnesses. Indeed, as a 
result of these public statements, it seems unlikely that he 
would tell his aides anything else.
    The House managers have not sustained their burden of proof 
in regard to article II.
    It is clearly evident that the facts of the case require 
acquittal. As such, serious questions can and should be raised 
about the unwarranted extension of the trial. Given the 
significant doubts surrounding the case of the House managers, 
a motion to dismiss, followed by a debate on censure should 
have been utilized to properly put an end to these proceedings. 
Instead, a majority of the Senate accommodated the desire of 
the House managers to excessively pursue allegations that were 
politically damaging to the President. Indeed, had Members of 
the House of Representatives been allowed to consider censure 
this matter may never have reached the Senate.
    We, as a Nation and as the Senate, have come to the end of 
a long and wearisome road. It has wandered through scandal and 
deception. Many of those who have trod this road, both 
individuals and institutions, have seen their reputations 
besmirched. The journey emanated from the reckless conduct of 
William Jefferson Clinton. But, the passage has also exposed 
vicious political partisanship and the reckless and relentless 
exploitation of the powers of the independent counsel. In the 
midst of this dishonor, deception, and rancor, we could have 
easily lost our way. But we reached this moment because we have 
been guided by the Constitution and inspired by the common 
sense and common decency of the American people, and with such 
a guide and such inspiration, we will do justice with our 
votes, whether they be to convict or acquit.
    For my part, the Constitution and the evidence compels me 
to vote to acquit the President on both articles of 
impeachment.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Mike Enzi

    Mr. ENZI. Mr. Chief Justice and colleagues of the Senate, 
this has been a month-long ethics and Constitution class--with 
mandatory attendance. That should have value for each of us.
    I'm getting more mail each day than I normally get in a 
month--and most of it is from your constituents. That's right. 
Out of every 1,000 letters I get, only 30 are from Wyoming. I 
have some ideas what your constituents are saying. I'm not a 
lawyer. I'm not going to present any legal arguments. Most of 
my constituents aren't lawyers. I notice that most of your 
constituents aren't either.
    I've only served on one jury before and we didn't even get 
to render a verdict. A boy was being tried for poaching deer 
out of season--shot with a .22. He was caught redhanded in the 
barn with the .22 and two of the six deer hanging to be 
butchered. The boy's argument began claiming he hadn't been 
properly read his rights. His dad, supporting from the 
audience, stopped the trial by asking the judge if he could 
speak with his son. They went into the hall a couple minutes. A 
boy freshly chastised said, ``I want to plead guilty. In our 
family we don't believe in getting off on technicalities.'' A 
successful trial. I watched a boy become a man.
    I thought about propounding a unanimous consent that 
anything already said couldn't be repeated as testimony even 
though it could be submitted. I thought that would speed up the 
proceedings. I will not propound it but will attempt to follow 
it. Instead of the smooth transitions and brilliant arguments, 
you will only hear what is left. I trust you will rush to get a 
copy of my whole statement. Here goes.
    The President was so thorough in denying any relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky that Janet Reno believed him. Janet Reno 
is the person who expanded the investigation into the Monica 
Lewinsky matter. The President told all of us he had done 
nothing wrong. His own Attorney General believed him. Janet 
Reno was helping to clear the air on these ludicrous charges 
when she gave Ken Starr the approval, direction and budget.
    When our country was founded oaths meant everything. A 
man's word was his bond. Their oath was honor and duels were 
fought to defend honor. When this trial started, you and I had 
to take an oath. It struck me that I might be taking an oath to 
determine if oaths still mean anything.
    The White House argues that the President's actions will 
not have an effect on anyone. I am hearing from judges who say 
people before their court are asking for the same treatment 
given the President. They do not feel their situation is as 
blatant as the President and they are more repentant and 
remorseful. Some have even taken action to correct their wrong. 
All feel they should get a suspended sentence.
    I was disappointed with the White House failure to explain 
all of the charges. Their rebuttal was focused on those charges 
for which they felt they could answer or, more accurately, use 
to create the most confusion. Skipping the tough issues is not 
an answer. This is not an issue of spin or even polls.
    Impeachment is the most serious indictment a President or 
judge can get. The President was impeached by the House of 
Representatives. His reaction was to celebrate in the Rose 
Garden of the White House--spin again--more spin than a kid's 
top. Truth was needed. Dizzy deception is what we've gotten.
    The President's counsel admit he lied, was evasive, 
misleading. The words and adjectives used by the White House 
counsel during the trial should be enough to condemn the 
President. But they still expect us to trust the President with 
the country? Do you think he will only lie about sex? This man 
sends our children into war. He has to be held to the highest 
standard. I would feel more comfortable if even one person 
would have said, ``He didn't do this.'' Only the President said 
that, and we all know he wasn't truthful.
    Last year an Air Force pilot, an officer, was forced to 
resign. She was having a consensual sexual affair. It was 
adultery. She didn't lie about it. She was forced to resign--
removed from office--because we couldn't trust her with deadly 
weapons. The President pushes the button on the whole world--
not just on one plane. Oh, that's right, this isn't about 
personal sex. No one would ever be removed from office for 
that.
    But the President is doing a great job. Job performance 
cannot be the defense for perjury or obstruction of justice or 
sexual harassment or any other crime. If a bank president 
embezzled even a little money from his bank would we leave him 
alone? Would we say, ``That's OK because the bank was doing 
well''?
    We had a hypothetical situation posed to us--an employee 
who controlled the whole computer system and he did what the 
President did. If there is any parallel, you'd fire him. You'd 
fire him because you have been cross-training a vice president 
of computer systems. I've listened to the arguments about world 
peace and I've got to say that's a terrible indictment of the 
capabilities of the vice president.
    When the video evidence was countered, White House counsel 
had one presentation on Ms. Lewinsky's testimony. A second 
presentation was made on Vernon Jordan's testimony. Why didn't 
White House counsel counter Sidney Blumenthal's testimony at 
all? Charges made, charges unanswered. If you have enough 
votes, I guess you only need to look credible.
    Presidents have power. Power draws loyalty. Are we a 
country with one set of standards for the rich, famous, or 
powerful? Is that the way we want our country to be? This isn't 
even a popularity contest. Popularity cannot be a defense in an 
impeachment trial.
    House Manager Rogan said he would risk his political future 
for the Constitution. He said, ``Dreams come and dreams go, but 
conscience is forever.'' We are supposed to be the collective 
conscience of our Nation. Are we trying instead to salve our 
conscience?
    We talk of censure? Isn't that just another way to salve 
our conscience? When this trial is over we better come together 
as a nation--undivided and behind whoever is the President--not 
debating again to what degree he is bad.
    Some have been wrestling with whether the offenses ``rise 
to the level of impeachment.'' The founders may have been a lot 
tougher than we are. We've talked about a guilty vote by a two-
thirds majority removing from office. The founders provided for 
a second vote--a vote that takes away more rights and honor--
the right to hold public office ever again. Should we suggest 
the offenses, especially in the cumulative, rise to the level 
of impeachment and then wrestle with the question and vote on 
``forever''? Judges are appointed for life. Presidents have the 
title for life.
    I heard a suggestion that we can't remove the President for 
sexual harassment because we are not his boss or because he has 
such a critical position. The founders recognized both those 
circumstances. We are not the President's boss--but we have 
been given that responsibility through impeachment. He holds a 
critical position, that's why the founders established the 
succession. Remember, that was when impeachment could put 
another party into the Presidency. And that was when the Senate 
was appointed, not elected.
    ``The Rise and Fall of the Roman Empire'' was a book we 
were introduced to in high school. Rome went through this phase 
too. Free lunches for the masses, an emphasis on entertainment, 
and no accountability for the powerful. We have seen the rise 
of America. Will we be listed in history as the start of the 
fall? Our society is eroding. Our values are disappearing. If 
you watch the news, many nights the main lead even during this 
trial is about the multiple murders right around us.
    We've been talking about ``an impeachable standard.'' We've 
talked about the ``Reagan Test.'' I'm going to suggest two more 
tests. The ``Mom Test'' and the ``Spouse Test.'' When you were 
growing up, did your mom need proof ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' before punishment? Did she ever say, ``Don't put 
yourself in a position where it even looks like you did 
something wrong?'' Circumstantial evidence was enough. Did your 
mom ever say,``Watch out who you hang out with; it reflects on 
you?'' Did your mom say, ``Watch your actions--they reflect on 
you and your family?'' Did your mom ever say, ``Act so I won't 
be embarrassed tomorrow reading the front page of the paper 
about what you did today?'' The President has complained that 
others are out to get him. That he is the most investigated 
President in history. Perhaps he ought to apply the ``Mom 
Test.''
    What about the ``Spouse Test''? My wife has applied that 
test. She said, ``If this were a Republican President, I would 
have already chained myself to the White House fence until he 
resigned.'' She is absolutely stymied that women's groups 
haven't done that. For years she and I fought the accusations 
that women's groups were only about allowing abortion--but 
their silence on the President has changed my mind. I will not 
defend them as they have not defended any woman defamed by the 
actions and the words of the President. And a final ``Spouse 
Test''--when you are playing games with sex definitions ask, 
``What would my spouse think I was doing?''
    While we may have a country doing well economically, we are 
headed toward moral bankruptcy if the trend is not reversed. We 
are becoming ``de-moralized.''
    With this case we are all in a ``no-win'' situation. We 
have heard the media and the Democrats note that the 
Republicans are committing political suicide. But just as many 
mention the Democrats are filing moral bankruptcy. History will 
be the judge of us all. Our constituents just expect us to do 
what is right. They will expect us to do what is right based 
even on what comes out in the future. Yes, what is right based 
on the books and future disclosures of the participants. They 
will judge us even based on the future actions of this 
President. Our words will be forgotten; our verdict won't.
    This isn't about politics. It's about our country. It's not 
about Bill Clinton. It's about the future of the Presidency. 
The process is on trial. The Senate is on trial. No, 
truthfully, truth is on trial.
    As we enter into our final deliberations on whether or not 
to convict President Clinton on the two articles of impeachment 
presented to us by the House of Representatives, I think it is 
imperative that we remember the oath each of us took at the 
outset of this historic process. Each one of us took an oath 
before God to do ``impartial justice according to the 
Constitution and the laws.'' That oath should guide our 
thoughts and actions for it reminds us of the gravity of this 
process and the weighty responsibility we assumed by our own 
free will. We must finally remember that we answer not only to 
future generations who will judge whether we did right by the 
Constitution we swore to uphold, but also to that eternal 
witness of our most solemn oath.
    I will be the first to admit that striving to be impartial 
has been very difficult. To be a good juror is a heavy burden. 
That duty is heightened when one is also called to wear a 
judge's robe when sitting as a silent juror weighing the 
evidence, probing the credibility and motives of the various 
witnesses, and ascertaining the appropriate law which applies 
to the facts before you. There are few duties we will face in 
our life as grave as this one: to decide the political fate of 
the President of the United States.
    Before the trial started I read everything I could find 
that dealt with impeachment history. As the trial progressed, I 
read volumes of published evidence, including the prior 
testimony of the witnesses in this proceeding. I have attended 
all of the proceedings in the Senate from start to finish. I 
have carefully watched all of the videotaped depositions. I 
have read all of the transcripts of these depositions. I 
watched many parts of the depositions several times to be sure 
I understood exactly what each witness was saying and how that 
testimony fit with that witnesses' prior testimony and with the 
testimony of other witnesses who testified under oath. These 
depositions were very helpful in focusing the key points of 
this trial and deciding who was testifying truthfully and who 
was lying in instances where the testimony is in conflict. In 
short, I believe I have taken into account nearly all of the 
pertinent information in this case in coming to my final 
decision.
    This case challenges us to consider whether, in light of 
all the evidence, President Clinton's actions indicate that he 
has, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, ``abused or violated 
some public trust.'' In making this determination, we must 
first decide whether allegations presented by the House 
managers do in fact constitute ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' 
as contemplated in article II, section 4 of the Constitution. I 
have come to the conclusion that they do.
    I believe that perjury and obstruction of justice 
demonstrate intentional, premeditated violations of an 
indispensable public trust. In taking the oath of office, 
President Clinton twice raised his right hand and placed his 
hand on the Bible swearing to uphold and defend the 
Constitution and to faithfully execute the laws of the United 
States. By this oath, he took upon himself the duty to be the 
chief law enforcement officer of the United States. Actions 
which undermine this high duty, whether they involved 
committing perjury in a judicial proceeding or obstructing 
justice, strike at the very heart of the rule of law.
    There is no contradiction that perjury and obstruction of 
justice are serious crimes for the average citizen in the 
United States. Both of these offenses presented by the House 
managers are felonies under the Federal criminal code, and both 
carry equivalent or even higher minimum sentences than bribery 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Nor is the seriousness 
of these crimes simply a matter of abstract speculation. We 
heard video testimony of a real, live citizen who has paid a 
very heavy price indeed for the crime of perjury. In July of 
1995, Dr. Barbara Battalino, a physician who worked for the 
Veterans' Administration, lied under oath about an encounter 
she had had with one of her patients. As a result of this 
perjury, Dr. Battalino was fired from the Veterans' 
Administration, she lost her license to practice medicine, she 
was prohibited from ever practicing law--she also had a law 
degree--and she was required to wear an electronic ankle 
bracelet for 3 years. Those who argue that perjury about sexual 
matters is not serious owe Dr. Battalino a heartfelt apology. 
Dr. Battalino lied one time about one consensual act of oral 
sex.
    Moreover, both perjury and obstruction of justice were 
counted among the list of ``public wrongs'' as opposed to 
private wrongs under common law at the time of the American 
founding. These are the very kind of crimes the founders 
contemplated when they included the impeachment and removal 
mechanism in the Constitution. These crimes were not considered 
to be private offenses by the common law, nor by the Founding 
Fathers. The preeminent commentator on the English common law 
at the time of the American founding, William Blackstone, 
described perjury, or false swearing in a judicial proceeding, 
as an ``offense against public justice.'' As with perjury, 
obstruction of justice was considered a ``high misprision'' or 
``high misdemeanor'' at the time of the drafting of our own 
Constitution.
    It should be remembered that this Senate has convicted and 
removed Federal judges for perjury. In the 1980s alone, this 
body removed three Federal judges for lying under oath. Many in 
this Chamber had occasion to vote in those cases and voted to 
remove these judges because they saw that the act of perjury, 
even if it involved lying about one's taxes, was incompatible 
with a judge's duty to uphold the Constitution and laws of the 
United States.
    When confronted with these very recent precedents, the 
White House lawyers have argued that this Senate should apply a 
lesser standard to the President than to Federal judges. They 
argue that Federal judges should be held to a higher standard 
because they are given life tenure under article III of the 
Constitution. I must admit, that this is an argument that I 
cannot square either with the plain language of the 
Constitution or with common sense. Do we really want to hold 
our President to a lower standard than the Federal judges he 
appoints? It is our President, after all, who appoints all the 
U.S. attorneys and the Federal marshals, who names all the 
Cabinet officials, who has the authority to send American 
troops into battle, and who can sign treaties with foreign 
nations. A corrupt Federal district court judge can work 
injustice on the litigants who enter his courtroom. A corrupt 
President, by contrast, has the power to wreak havoc on the 
entire political order.
    The President's oath forbids him to selectively decide 
whether to follow the laws of the land based on a calculation 
of political expediency or determination of personal gain or 
loss. He is bound to follow the Constitution and the laws of 
our country in and out of season. By intentionally violating 
this duty, the President's actions display the tendencies of an 
unbridled monarch rather than a constitutional executive who 
must bow before the law he swore to faithfully execute.
    On the specific article of perjury, there is abundant 
evidence that President Clinton violated his oath to ``tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth'' on several 
occasions. As the chief law enforcement officer of the United 
States, the President was bound to ``tell the whole truth'' and 
act in a manner becoming of the dignity of his office. 
President Clinton did not do this. When asked before the 
Federal grand jury on August 17, 1998, whether he understood 
that he had an obligation to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth in his prior deposition of January 
17, 1999, in a Federal civil rights suit, the President 
testified that ``his goal was to be truthful, but not 
particularly helpful.'' He later admitted that his testimony 
had been ``misleading.'' For any plain-speaking American, to be 
misleading is the same as lying. In short, the President 
violated his oath to ``tell the whole truth'' when he misled 
the court.
    The facts indicate that the President was not attempting to 
be truthful and was not truthful in his deposition in the Jones 
Federal civil rights case. Moreover, he lied about the nature 
of his relationship with a subordinate employee before the 
Federal grand jury. The President also allowed his attorney, 
Robert Bennett, to file a false affidavit on his behalf denying 
his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. The President continued 
this pattern of deception by lying to his top aides with the 
knowledge that they were likely to be called as witnesses 
before the Federal grand jury. He then attempted to cover up 
these lies by claiming he had possibly ``misled'' his aides, 
but he did not lie to them since he knew they were likely to be 
called as witnesses before the Federal grand jury. These were 
lies. They were lies under oath. They were lies that adversely 
impacted the rights of a U.S. citizen to obtain relief in a 
civil rights case in Federal court. They were lies under oath 
in a Federal grand jury after he had been begged by his aides, 
his friends, and some in this Chamber to finally tell the 
truth. They were lies of a public character and they were 
unbefitting the chief law enforcement officer of our country.
    What is perhaps most disturbing about these lies is that 
the President's actions indicate he had no intention of ever 
telling the truth of his relationship. He had already lied 
under oath in a Federal civil rights action. He lied to his top 
aides and Cabinet officers, he lied to his friends and 
political allies, and he lied with perfect calculation to the 
American public, including myself. I remain convinced that the 
only reason the President admitted his relationship at all was 
the discovery of the now famous ``blue dress.'' Only when it 
became clear that he could no longer continue his pattern of 
judicial and public deception did the President admit that he 
had in fact had an ``improper relationship'' with Monica 
Lewinsky. Unfortunately, the President's deception did not end 
with the revelation of the DNA. Rather, it graduated to legal 
hairsplitting, attempts to torture plain English language, and 
statements which degraded the judicial process and insulted the 
intelligence of the American public. The President has not 
carried out the public trust the American public entrusted to 
him when he was twice elected President.
    When the President's actions became public, the President 
even turned his sword of deception against his partner in 
perjury. Once the Washington Post broke the story on the 
President's extramarital affair and his possible perjury and 
obstruction of justice, the President called in his top aides 
to deny the story and destroy the character of Monica Lewinsky. 
We have seen and heard the video testimony of one of President 
Clinton's top aides, Sidney Blumenthal. Immediately after the 
story broke, President Clinton called Sidney Blumenthal into 
the Oval Office and denied the entire story. He went on to say 
that Monica Lewinsky was a troubled young woman who was called 
the ``stalker'' by her peers. He said that she came on to him 
and made a sexual demand of him, but he rebuffed her. The 
President went so far as to claim that Ms. Lewinsky had 
threatened to tell people that she had had an affair with him, 
even though it was not true. In the words of Mr. Blumenthal, 
the President ``lied to him.'' As expected, Mr. Sidney 
Blumenthal repeated these lies before the Federal grand jury. 
There is also growing evidence that Mr. Blumenthal, or other 
key White House aides, circulated these lies to the popular 
media. Such conduct further establishes that the President was 
willing to go to all lengths to prevent anyone from discovering 
the truth about his illegal conduct in a Federal civil rights 
case.
    The President's lawyers argued that the President could not 
have intended to corruptly influence the grand jury proceeding 
since the lies the President told his top aides were no 
different than the lie the President told the American people 
when he adamantly denied having ``sexual affairs, with that 
woman, Miss Lewinsky.'' If this is the best defense the White 
House lawyers can wage for their client, it speaks volumes 
about the President's character. Unfortunately, it is also 
false. The President never told the American people that Monica 
Lewinsky was a stalker, or that she wore her skirts too tight, 
or that she came on to him and made sexual demands on him. This 
is exactly what the President told his aide, Sidney Blumenthal. 
The President never enumerated the sexual acts he ``did not 
commit'' with Monica Lewinsky. He did deny with great 
specificity these acts when questioned by his assistant chief 
of staff, John Podesta. The President did lie to the American 
public. However, he also told other lies to his top aides, 
knowing that they were likely to be called as witnesses before 
the criminal grand jury.
    There is also substantial evidence that the President 
attempted to obstruct justice in both the civil rights case 
brought against him and the Federal criminal investigation 
conducted by Judge Starr. It should be noted that Judge Kenneth 
Starr's investigation was not the creature of President 
Clinton's political enemies, as some have asserted. President 
Clinton's own Attorney General, Janet Reno, directed Judge 
Starr to expand his investigation to include the allegations in 
this case. If Janet Reno is a member of the vast right wing 
conspiracy, then that operation is very vast indeed.
    We now know that Monica Lewinsky filed a false affidavit in 
the Jones civil action. We also know that the President called 
Ms. Lewinsky at home at 2:30 in the morning to inform her that 
she had been named on the witness list in the Jones civil 
rights case. We also know that in this conversation the 
President also suggested Ms. Lewinsky could file an affidavit 
to avoid testifying. Finally, we know that the President 
reminded Ms. Lewinsky of their agreed-upon ``cover stories'' to 
conceal their relationship. While the President's lawyers have 
made much over Ms. Lewinsky's statement that ``the President 
never asked me to lie,'' they are unable to put a positive spin 
on the cover stories and the President's attempts to encourage 
Monica Lewinsky to file an affidavit in the first place.
    It stretches the bounds of credulity beyond recognition to 
believe that the President intended Ms. Lewinsky to tell the 
truth when: (1) he himself lied under oath about their 
relationship, (2) he reminded Ms. Lewinsky of their cover 
stories in the same conversation in which he suggested that she 
file an affidavit, and (3) he relied on Ms. Lewinsky's false 
affidavit in his own testimony denying their relationship. 
Finally, when Ms. Lewinsky asked President Clinton if he wanted 
to see her signed affidavit, he said he didn't need to see it 
because he had ``seen 15 others like it.'' This response 
remains one of the more puzzling in this case and leaves open 
the possibility that the President tampered with other 
witnesses in the Jones civil rights case.
    We also now know that the President's personal secretary, 
Betty Currie, hid presents under her bed that had been 
subpoenaed in the Jones case. These are the gifts the President 
had given to Monica Lewinsky during their relationship. Ms. 
Lewinsky has testified that Betty Currie definitely called her 
about the gifts, and the only way Ms. Currie could have known 
about the gifts is if the President instructed her to pick them 
up. While the President's lawyers deny this explanation, the 
only phone record we know about is a phone call made from Betty 
Currie to Ms. Lewinsky on the day she picked up the gifts. The 
President's lawyers have failed to produce any concrete 
evidence to contradict this explanation. Concealing gifts that 
are under subpoena in a legal proceeding is illegal and it 
obstructs the administration of justice.
    Moreover, the conclusion that it was in fact President 
Clinton who directed Betty Currie to conceal the presents is 
bolstered by the fact that the President corruptly attempted to 
influence Ms. Currie's testimony in a Federal civil rights 
suit. President Clinton made several false statements to Betty 
Currie on Sunday, January 18, 1997, the day after he testified 
in the Jones lawsuit. Ms. Currie, who explained that it was 
very unusual for the President to ask her to come in to work on 
a Sunday, testified that President Clinton made a series of 
false statements to her as if asking for her consent. 
Specifically, the President stated to Ms. Currie: (1) You were 
always there when she [Monica Lewinsky] was there, right? We 
were never really alone. (2) You could see and hear everything. 
(3) Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? (4) 
She wanted to have sex with me and I couldn't do that. All of 
these statements were false, and all of them occurred the day 
after Judge Wright had expressly forbidden any of the parties 
deposed or their attorneys from discussing the deposition with 
anyone.
    The President's lawyers have argued that the President made 
these statements to refresh his recollection or to find out 
what Ms. Currie knew in the event of a press avalanche. Neither 
of these explanations is plausible. It is impossible to refresh 
one's recollection with false, leading questions. It is also 
impossible to find out what someone else knew if you tell them 
what they are supposed to believe. The plausibility of either 
of these explanations is entirely discounted when you consider 
that the President called Betty Currie in a second time, on 
January 20 to ``remind'' her of these statements. The most 
likely explanation for these statements is far more sinister; 
that the President was intending to influence the testimony of 
a likely witness in a Federal civil rights proceeding. 
President Clinton was, in fact, trying to get Betty Currie to 
join him in his web of deception and obstruction of justice.
    The inescapable conclusion I have come to is that the 
President of the United States set upon a deliberate, 
premeditated plan to deceive the court in two separate legal 
proceedings and to encourage others to deceive the court as 
well. The President first defended himself by claiming to be 
the unfortunate victim of a vast right wing conspiracy. Only 
after the physical evidence uncovered the truth about his 
affair did the President claim he was only trying to protect 
his family from these embarrassing revelations. Neither of 
these excuses justifies the President's actions. A defendant in 
a legal proceeding does not have the right to perjure himself 
because he questions the motives of the plaintiff. There are 
proper legal procedures and remedies available to any defendant 
who believes he has been the victim of a lawsuit predicated on 
frivolous legal theories or springing from personal malice. It 
is, however, never legitimate to respond to even a frivolous 
lawsuit by lying under oath.
    There has been a great debate on how the President's 
actions will impact our Nation, especially if those actions go 
unpunished. Last year I read of a town in Midwestern America 
that had experienced a number of killings in the first 2 months 
of the year. A consultant was hired to find the cause of these 
brutal acts. I believe the findings in his report should cause 
all of us to take pause. He explained that first a window is 
broken and nobody fixes it. That leads to a lawn that isn't 
mowed. Through a series of similar instances, the kids think 
nobody cares about them. If we let the President off for 
intentionally violating the rule of law, what do we tell our 
children when they are caught breaking the law? That we have 
one law for the rulers and another for the ruled? Do we tell 
them they have to follow the law until they become powerful 
enough, or clever enough, or rich enough to violate the law 
with impunity? What do we tell the Federal judges who have lost 
their robes and gavels for committing perjury? What do we tell 
military officers who have lost their livelihood for violating 
their oaths and rules of their office? What do we tell average 
citizens who have lost their jobs, their freedom, and their 
fortunes for violating their oaths to tell the truth in a court 
of law? If the legacy we leave to our children is one of 
cynical duplicity, I fear that even an ever-increasing Dow 
Jones average will be incapable of salvaging our next 
generation, or even, I fear, our civilization.
    I must conclude that while the power of impeachment and 
removal is a strong measure and one that should never be taken 
gently, it is an indispensable remedy in our government for 
those public officers who have so violated their public trust 
as to be unworthy to continue holding offices of public trust. 
The great Supreme Court Justice and constitutional scholar 
Joseph Story perhaps best summarized the impeachment mechanism 
as one which ``holds out a deep and immediate responsibility, 
as a check upon arbitrary power; and compels the chief 
magistrate, as well as the humblest citizen, to bend to the 
majesty of the laws.'' Those who would disregard this rule of 
law for their own personal or political ends must not be 
allowed to remain in offices of public trust. For this reason, 
I will vote to convict President Clinton on both articles of 
impeachment.
    I thank the Chief Justice and yield the floor.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 22, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold

    Mr. Feingold. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent 
that my opinion in the recently concluded impeachment trial of 
President William Jefferson Clinton be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the opinion was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                 Opinion of Senator Russell D. Feingold

I. Introduction
II. Analysis of Alleged Federal Crimes
    A. Standard of Proof
    B. Perjury
    C. Obstruction of Justice
III. High Crimes and Misdemeanors
IV. Conclusion

    Only 154 Senators have ever been sworn to sit in a Court of 
Impeachment for the trial of an American president. For this senator, 
to sit in judgment of this President was a sorrowful experience. The 
President and I began our careers in Washington together in January 
1993. On the crisp, winter day of his first inauguration, I was moved 
by the poetry of Maya Angelou, which celebrated the ``pulse of . . . 
[a] new day'' in American politics and culture. All along in this 
process, I have regretted that his presidency has come to this, but 
have sought not to personalize that regret in a way that would affect 
my judgment. Taking the oath of impartiality on January 7 helped me to 
do that, but let me say, I very much regret that the President's 
conduct brought us to this day.
    This somber experience requires a senator to blend three different 
considerations: (1) the historical purposes of impeachment and the 
record of past impeachments; (2) the current legal and political merits 
and implications of these impeachment proceedings; and (3) the 
potential impact of the current impeachment proceedings on future 
impeachments and the stability of the American constitutional system.
    In attempting to reconcile these considerations, a senator has only 
the Andrew Johnson impeachment trial to look to for precise precedents 
for a presidential impeachment trial. Each senator is expected to 
render independently his or her judgment about the applicable law and 
then to apply that law to his or her own individual understanding of 
the facts of the case. This Opinion is an explanation of my attempt to 
meet that challenge.
                            i. introduction
    Strive as they may to minimize its import, the House Managers and 
those advocating removal of the President must recognize that the 
single most salient fact in this entire case is that on November 5, 
1996, 47,402,357 Americans voted to reelect William Jefferson Clinton. 
That decision was the right and the responsibility of the American 
people.
    By contrast, impeachment and removal from office prior to the 
expiration of a president's four-year term of office must be viewed as 
an extreme and radical remedy, given that it overrides the solemn, 
quadrennial decision of the American people. For us to remove a duly 
elected president could well be the most momentous constitutional event 
in the history of our country, save the Civil War. The people choose 
their leaders in America, and we must not lightly reverse their will. 
To overrule the voters, the offense must be grave and the case must be 
very strong.
    Too much of the rhetoric in this impeachment debate has focused on 
whether the President should be permitted to keep ``his'' job, in light 
of his unacceptable behavior. The question is better phrased as whether 
the President's conduct is sufficiently egregious to require the 
Congress to undo the decision of more than 47 million Americans to give 
him that job in the first place. Nor is it a valid argument or 
palliative to suggest that the same number of Americans also voted for 
Vice President Albert Gore Jr., and that he would become president upon 
President Clinton's removal. This argument is far too dependent on the 
particular nature of the unusual positive connection between this 
President, this Vice President, and the American people. It flies in 
the face of the few actual examples of past presidents who faced the 
prospect of impeachment.
    In 1868, President Johnson, an unpopular president who had been 
President Lincoln's vice-president, himself had no vice president. A 
member of the Senate would have succeeded him had he been convicted. In 
the case of President Nixon, whose resignation merely substituted for a 
nearly certain removal from office in an impeachment trial, Gerald R. 
Ford was elevated to the presidency. He had never been elected 
popularly to an office higher than the House of Representatives. In any 
event, the political similarity of a vice-president to a president 
cannot be taken seriously as an argument that conviction will be less 
wrenching for the country or damaging to the institution of the 
presidency. The crucial fact in this case remains that on November 5, 
1996, the American people hired one man and one man alone to be their 
president, and they have a right to expect that their decision will be 
honored and preserved, except in the most dire circumstances.
    This principle does not apply in the same way to the impeachment of 
judges. Elected presidents and appointed judges are chosen differently 
and their removal must be considered differently. They are starkly 
different in the nature and scope of their duties and in the sources of 
their constitutional legitimacy.
    In the American constitutional system, it cannot soundly be argued 
that every precedent from past impeachments of judges must control in 
the impeachment of an elected president. I do not suggest here a lower 
standard of behavior for presidents. Rather, I believe that our system 
requires a higher standard for removal of an elected president than for 
an appointed judge. Judges serve for life ``during good behavior.'' 
That is a long time, with no means of removing a judge except 
impeachment. Presidents are chosen by the people in a sacred democratic 
process. If the people become displeased with the president they have 
chosen, they need only wait for the next election or the end of his 
term.
    Thus, the analogy of an elected president to an appointed judge is 
weak. Weaker still are the arguments that the President must be removed 
because a corporate manager or military officer would be removed under 
similar circumstances. Corporate life is an arena of private behavior 
and corporate positions do not proceed from popular elections. 
Personnel decisions in the boardroom are of no broad constitutional 
consequence. Military officers likewise are not chosen by the voters. 
The corporate and military analogies cannot justify overturning a 
presidential election.
    Yet, while overturning an election is the most severe 
constitutional sanction in our democracy, this President has chosen to 
conduct himself in such a manner as to run the risk that the U.S. 
Senate reasonably could conclude that he has committed ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors.'' That is not the conclusion I ultimately reach. But 
at least with regard to one of the charges in Article II, the President 
came perilously close to committing an impeachable offense. Even 
without his removal, this is a tragic occurrence in our nation's 
history and a personal disappointment to me as one who holds the 
abilities and many of the accomplishments of this President in high 
esteem.
    This impeachment process has led members of the Senate to consult 
the relatively scant history of American impeachments. Much of the 
history relates to the impeachment of federal judges, and this was of 
some limited relevance to these proceedings. Of the greatest relevance, 
however, are the histories of the impeachment and acquittal of Andrew 
Johnson in 1868, and the virtual impeachment and conviction of 
President Nixon, who resigned in the face of near certain removal in 
1974.
    Based on my reading and study, the actions of President Clinton lie 
somewhere between the conduct of the presidents in the Johnson and 
Nixon episodes. The general historical view appears to be that the case 
against President Johnson lacked a credible basis for removal, the 
primary accusation being that President Johnson removed a cabinet 
secretary from office in circumvention of the law. President Johnson 
disputed the constitutionality of the statute he was alleged to have 
violated, and apparently had a good basis for that view. The United 
States Supreme Court ultimately struck down a similar statute as 
unconstitutional. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). Johnson 
argued that he was the victim of a partisan Congress, determined to 
punish him for his policies. History has adopted that view. The 
President's defenders point to the Johnson case and they argue that the 
impeachment of President Clinton is the same sort of partisan exercise, 
unfounded in fact or law.
    The President's accusers point to the case of President Nixon. In 
contrast to the relatively weak case against President Johnson, most 
regard President Nixon's actions in covering up his and others' efforts 
to interfere with the 1972 presidential election to be a classic 
example of the type of conduct that the framers sought to discourage 
with the ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' provision. President Nixon's 
misdeeds almost certainly would have led to his impeachment and 
conviction if he had not resigned. His alleged crimes were clearly 
committed in the course of his public duties, subverting the 
Constitution, compromising the integrity of the processes of 
government, and using agents of the government for illegal political 
purposes. The President's accusers argue that the same is true of 
President Clinton.
    With all due respect to historians and constitutional scholars who 
may know more or feel differently, it is my sense that the case against 
President Clinton is the first close or ``hard'' case of presidential 
impeachment in our nation's long history. This case lies in the middle. 
It is a hard case and senators may see it either way.
    In the ordinary practice of law, there is a saying that ``hard 
cases make bad law.'' Some people may invoke that phrase when they 
complain that the President has ``gotten away with it.'' Others may 
invoke it with concern that we have somehow made it easier to impeach, 
if not convict, a president. I have tried to remember that adage as we 
have made our procedural and evidentiary decisions along the way. Our 
actions in this trial and our decision today may hold even greater 
significance for our nation's constitutional structure than the past 
two presidential impeachments, as wrenching and important as each of 
those was in our nation's history and in its time. I hope, in the end, 
that this hard case has made good law.
                 ii. analysis of alleged federal crimes
A. Standard of proof
    In drafting the two Articles of Impeachment against President 
Clinton, the House of Representatives sought to portray certain conduct 
by the President as meeting the constitutional standard of ``High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' In the specific language employed by the 
House in the Articles, and in the forceful arguments advanced by the 
House Managers on the Senate floor, a strategic choice was made. A 
particular approach was adopted that the House Managers clearly believe 
puts their case in its strongest light. They could simply have recited 
and attempted to prove certain conduct by the President and then 
argued, independent of the strictures of modern criminal law, that the 
President had committed ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as that term 
has been understood throughout this nation's constitutional history.
    Perhaps to make the facts of the case more easily understandable, 
or perhaps because the conduct alone may lack the gravity to justify 
the removal from office of the President of the United States, the 
House Managers chose another course, laden with the opprobrium of the 
modern statutory federal criminal law. Rather than simply alleging a 
course of general presidential misconduct, they placed enormous 
reliance on their assertion that the President committed the serious 
federal crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice. Indeed, in his 
opening statement on January 15, House Manager McCollum stated quite 
directly:
    ``The first thing you have to determine is whether or not the 
President committed crimes. It is only if you determine he committed 
the crimes of perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering 
that you will move to the question of whether he is removed from 
office. In fact, no one, none of us, would argue to you that the 
President should be removed from office unless you conclude that he 
committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed.''
    The very names of these crimes connote in modern America the type 
of conduct that is hard to reconcile with the continuation in office of 
the chief law enforcement officer of this nation. The House Managers' 
strategy was clever. It had an emotional power deeply rooted in the 
nation's abhorrence of disrespect for the law. It also placed the 
triers of fact and law in the position of potentially having to justify 
a decision that the President committed these federal crimes, but that 
these particular instances of alleged perjury and obstruction of 
justice did not constitute ``High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as intended 
by the Framers.
    I see nothing inappropriate in this approach and, in some ways, it 
assisted me in organizing my thoughts about this case. An obligation, 
however, does attend the House Managers' decision to rely on proving 
that the President committed actual federal statutory crimes. That 
obligation relates to the standard of proof.
    I cannot justify concluding that the President should be removed 
from office for committing these federal crimes unless the case is 
proved by the same standard of proof that any federal prosecutor would 
be required to meet in a federal criminal case. This standard requires 
that the President be shown to have committed one of the two crimes 
alleged ``beyond a reasonable doubt,'' as that standard of proof is 
understood in our criminal justice system. The ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' standard is guaranteed to defendants in criminal cases by the 
due process clause of the Constitution. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 
(1994). To apply any lesser standard in this trial would be unfair not 
only to the President, but also to the tens of millions of Americans 
whose right to have the President finish his term could be overridden 
by a mere likelihood or possibility that he actually committed such 
serious crimes.
    In other words, the House Managers are free to use the ``sword'' of 
the language of the federal criminal law but cannot simultaneously 
deprive the president of the ``shield'' that same criminal law provides 
any defendant by requiring the prosecution to prove its case by the 
highest standard of proof in our legal system.
B. Perjury
    Article I charges the President with committing numerous acts of 
perjury in his Grand Jury testimony of August 17, 1998. To convict an 
individual of perjury under 18 U.S.C. Sec.  1621 or Sec.  1623, the 
prosecution in a criminal case must prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant: (1) knowingly or willfully made a (2) false, (3) 
material declaration (4) under oath (5) in a proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States. To be 
perjurious, the false statements must be knowingly or willfully false 
and material to the proceeding in which they are given. Literally true 
statements, even if misleading, are not perjurious. And if a witness 
honestly believes that his or her testimony is true at the time the 
testimony is given, it is not perjurious, even if it is later shown to 
have been false.
    Before turning to the allegations of perjury in Article I, I must 
comment on the failure of the House to specify the perjurious 
statements on which it based its charge. The President's counsel made a 
convincing argument that if Article I were offered as an indictment in 
a criminal case, it would be dismissed out of hand for this failure. 
And despite being alerted to this deficiency in the President's answer 
and his opening trial memorandum, the House Managers steadfastly 
refused to be specific and complete in their discussion of the perjury 
charges, constantly referring to alleged acts of perjury as mere 
examples.
    As a Senator who has tried to apply a thorough and impartial legal 
analysis to these charges, I have found this refusal to specify the 
alleged perjurious statements somewhat frustrating. Unfortunately, even 
at the conclusion of this trial, it is still very difficult to be sure 
of what the full list of alleged perjuries includes. Indeed, it is even 
difficult to be sure if the House Managers continue to rely on all of 
the charges they raised in their trial memorandum and opening 
presentation.
    The House listed four ``categories'' of perjury before the Grand 
Jury. With respect to the first category, ``the nature and details of 
his relationship with a subordinate Government employee,'' I find that 
some of the examples that the House Managers raised in their trial 
memorandum and in presenting their case in the trial are truly 
frivolous. The Grand Jury was investigating perjury and obstruction of 
justice in the civil case pursued by Paula Jones. Once the President 
admitted that his relationship with Monica Lewinsky included 
inappropriate sexual conduct, of what possible materiality to the Grand 
Jury's inquiry was the question of how many times such conduct 
occurred?
    The testimony of the President concerning whether he engaged in 
conduct with Ms. Lewinsky that would have been considered ``sexual 
relations'' as that term was defined in the Jones case is the one 
instance of testimony in this category cited by the House Managers that 
was clearly material to the Grand Jury's investigation of possible 
perjury in the deposition. As to the specific facts at issue, we still 
have only the conflicting testimony of the two witnesses, Ms. Lewinsky 
and the President. While there are good common sense reasons to doubt 
the President's version of a wholly non-reciprocal sexual relationship, 
perjury has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if we 
accept Ms. Lewinsky's version of what kind of touching occurred, the 
ultimate question of whether President Clinton's statements on this 
issue in the Grand Jury were actually false, turns on the question of 
what his intent was in engaging in those particular acts with Ms. 
Lewinsky. I simply cannot say that there is no reasonable doubt on this 
point. Even Ms. Lewinsky stated in her deposition that the President's 
intent was something on which she did not feel comfortable commenting.
    A second category of alleged perjury consists of statements by the 
President before the Grand Jury concerning his earlier testimony in the 
deposition in the Jones case. This is ``bootstrapping.'' It is 
particularly troubling because the House of Representatives, and even 
one of the House Managers, rejected an Article of Impeachment that 
alleged that the President committed perjury in the Jones deposition. I 
reject the House Managers' argument that the President reaffirmed his 
entire Jones deposition before the Grand Jury and therefore should be 
found guilty of perjury in the Grand Jury if any of his deposition 
testimony was false. The basis for this breathtaking position, as laid 
out by House Manager Rogan in response to Senator Nickles' question, is 
the statement made by the President in response to a question from the 
Independent Counsel concerning what the oath he swore to tell the truth 
in the Jones deposition meant to him. He said, ``I believed then that I 
had to answer the questions truthfully, that's correct.'' In my mind, 
that was not a reaffirmation of his entire Jones deposition testimony 
sufficient to make any perjury in that deposition perjury ``by 
reference'' before the Grand Jury.
    The President did state a few times in the Grand Jury that he 
intended to answer the Jones' lawyers questions in the deposition in a 
misleading but technically true manner, and House Manager McCollum 
highlighted a few of those statements in his closing argument 
concerning this category of perjury. For purposes of the charge of 
perjury before the Grand Jury in these statements, the key issue is not 
whether the President succeeded in negotiating the line between perjury 
and misleading but true testimony, but whether he intended to negotiate 
that line. Frankly, my reading of his testimony in the Jones deposition 
is that it was, in fact, his intent to tell the truth. In the Jones 
deposition, he was cagey and evasive, but he appeared to be trying 
mightily not to tell an out and out lie. Even though he may very well 
have crossed the line on a number of occasions, I have to find that 
there is reasonable doubt that the President was committing perjury in 
the Grand Jury when he said that his intent was to testify truthfully 
in the Jones deposition.
    The third part of Article I deserves only brief mention. It boils 
down to the charge that the President lied when he said he wasn't 
paying attention when his lawyer offered Monica Lewinsky's affidavit in 
the Jones deposition and argued that it meant that ``there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape, or form, with 
President Clinton.'' The only evidence that the House Managers offered 
to support their charge of perjury is the videotape of the deposition 
in which President Clinton is seen looking, we are told, in the 
direction of his lawyer when this conversation occurred. The House 
Managers tried to bolster this shockingly thin reed on which to base a 
perjury charge with a similarly inconclusive affidavit from a law clerk 
to Judge Susan Webber Wright. This is perhaps the weakest of the many 
inferences about the President's state of mind that the House Managers 
urge us to accept in order to convict. I am virtually certain that a 
perjury charge based on this kind of evidence would not be pursued by a 
federal prosecutor, and absolutely certain that a jury would not find 
guilt on such a charge beyond a reasonable doubt. I certainly cannot.
    The fourth and final part of Article I alleges that the President 
committed perjury when he testified in the Grand Jury concerning ``his 
corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede 
the discovery of evidence'' in the Jones case. This presumably refers 
to the President's statements to the Grand Jury concerning the gift 
exchange and his conversations with Betty Currie and other aides after 
his Jones deposition. With respect to the President's testimony about 
the gifts, I find it significant that Monica Lewinsky revealed for the 
first time in her Senate deposition that she had told the FBI shortly 
after the President's deposition that one of his statements about the 
gifts ``sounded familiar.'' Her Senate deposition was the first time 
that anyone learned about that FBI interview. Surely this was 
``exculpatory information'' that the Independent Counsel and the House 
Managers had the responsibility to disclose to the President's counsel 
and bring to our attention.
    The President denied that he instructed Betty Currie to pick up the 
gifts from Monica Lewinsky. By charging the President with perjury for 
that statement, the House Managers have essentially tried to convert 
their obstruction charge into a perjury charge. But there is an 
unresolved conflict of testimony on the issue of who initiated the 
hiding of the gifts. As I will explain later, that conflict raises 
reasonable doubt in my mind about that portion of the obstruction 
charge. It is similarly dispositive of the perjury charge, which 
essentially amounts to a claim that the President lied when he said he 
did not obstruct justice by urging Betty Currie to pick up the gifts.
    The President stated in the Grand Jury that in his conversations 
with aides after his deposition in the Jones case he attempted to be 
literally truthful, but misleading, in order to conceal his affair with 
Ms. Lewinsky. The questioning here by the Independent Counsel was far 
too general to support a perjury conviction for his statement in the 
Grand Jury that he ``said things that were true'' to his aides. He 
certainly said many things that were true to his aides, and he told 
some lies. The clear import of his testimony was that he was trying to 
conceal his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky from his aides while being 
generally truthful to them. I do not believe that the President 
willfully or knowingly lied when he said this to the Grand Jury, nor do 
I believe that these statements were material to the Grand Jury's 
inquiry, since he was never asked about and he never denied making 
specific statements to his aides that were not true.
    As I will discuss later with respect to Article II, the President's 
conversations with Betty Currie give me the most pause and cause me the 
most concern in this whole matter. While it may be hard to believe the 
President's explanation in the Grand Jury that he was ``trying to 
figure out what the facts were,'' his intent in having the oblique and 
tortured conversation with Ms. Currie is not clear enough to find 
beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed perjury in the Grand Jury 
when he discussed that conversation.
    In sum, I do not believe that the House Managers have proved the 
elements of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt. But I also must say that 
even if one or two of these charges did meet that test, I would have 
some skepticism about Article I. It was a highly unusual situation that 
led to the President's appearance before the Grand Jury. Targets of 
criminal investigations are almost never subpoenaed to testify in the 
Grand Jury, and when they are subpoenaed, they invariably invoke their 
Fifth Amendment rights. Here, of course, the President did not invoke 
his right against self-incrimination but instead answered questions 
about the charges against him. And now he faces charges that he 
committed perjury when he denied committing the crimes of perjury in 
the deposition and obstruction of justice that the Grand Jury was 
investigating. I am uncomfortable with these prosecutorial tactics, 
which come very close, it seems to me, to using the Grand Jury not only 
to investigate potential crimes but to trap the President into 
committing them.
C. Obstruction of justice
    In Article II, the House charged President Clinton with obstruction 
of justice and witness tampering. Once again, to successfully convict 
defendants in criminal cases of these charges, prosecutors must prove 
each of the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. And that 
is the standard I believe is most appropriate here.
    In the case of obstruction, the elements of a violation of 18 
U.S.C. Sec.  1503 are that: (1) a judicial proceeding was pending; (2) 
the defendant knew it was pending; and (3) the defendant corruptly 
endeavored to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of 
justice in the proceeding. The courts have indicated that the 
requirement that the defendant ``corruptly endeavored to influence'' 
provides the element of intent in this crime. To ``corruptly endeavor 
to influence'' is to act voluntarily and deliberately with the purpose 
of improperly influencing or obstructing the administration of justice.
    Witness tampering under 18 U.S.C. Sec.  1512 requires proof that 
the defendant (1) corruptly persuaded or attempted to do so or engaged 
in misleading conduct toward another person (2) with intent (a) to 
influence or prevent that person's testimony in an official proceeding; 
or (b) to cause or induce any person to withhold testimony or physical 
evidence from an official proceeding.
    The charges against the President in Article II have been referred 
to by the House Managers as the ``seven pillars of obstruction.'' Some 
of these charges are more easily interpreted as allegations that the 
federal witness tampering statute has been violated. In any event, the 
crucial disputed element in all the charges against the President is 
intent to influence or obstruct the proceeding. The House Managers made 
little effort to distinguish between the two criminal statutes, which 
both include that element. Indeed, if the intent element of these 
crimes were proven, some of the alleged improper conduct of the 
President could fall under both statutes, which is one reason I have 
referred to the case against the President as a close one, with regard 
to Article II.
    The House Managers have regularly urged the Senate to look at the 
entirety of the charges against the President and not to pick apart the 
individual allegations. I think the more appropriate analysis, however, 
is to look at each allegation and determine if the elements of 
obstruction are proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In many cases, the 
House Managers seem to take the position that the intent to obstruct or 
influence can be inferred from a pattern of behavior. But each 
allegation cannot be considered part of a ``pattern of obstruction'' 
unless it meets the elements of obstruction (or witness tampering) on 
its own. Otherwise, Article II become a series of ``bootstraps,'' which 
are alleged to add up to obstruction of justice without any specific 
action actually constituting a violation of federal law.
    Nonetheless, there is no question in my mind that Article II is the 
more serious of the two articles of impeachment, because the factual 
allegations are more troubling and because it charges conduct that 
involved a number of individuals, in and out of government, other than 
the President. If the allegations are true, this conduct would 
undermine respect for the rule of law and injure our system of justice 
even more deeply than perjury, which, of course, is a serious violation 
as well. Because I took these charges very seriously, I wanted to give 
the House Managers every reasonable opportunity to prove them. I 
supported the issuance of subpoenas to witnesses for depositions and 
the presentation of the witnesses' testimony to the Senate because I 
wanted to be very clear in my own mind about what had taken place 
before deciding whether to acquit or convict on this particular 
article.
    The first two obstruction charges against the President arise out 
of his late night telephone conversation with Monica Lewinsky on 
December 17, 1997. The House Managers charge that during that call the 
President encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and to lie 
if called upon to testify in the Jones case. While I may agree with 
House Manager Graham that a telephone call at the hour of 2:30 a.m. is 
not likely to be a casual call, the burden on the House Managers is to 
prove that the President committed a crime during the call, not merely 
to invite an inference that he was ``up to no good.'' And the direct 
evidence--testimony from Ms. Lewinsky--does not support the Managers' 
theory. She testified repeatedly that she never, ``ever'' discussed the 
contents of her affidavit with the President. In addition, according to 
Ms. Lewinsky, the discussion of ``cover stories'' in the December 17 
phone call was not in connection with her possible affidavit or 
testimony in the Jones case.
    There simply is not enough evidence that the President intended to 
influence Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit or testimony to find that the law 
was broken. According to Ms. Lewinsky, they discussed the possibility 
of her filing an affidavit in order to avoid testifying, but did not 
discuss the details of that affidavit. She testified that she thought 
the contents of affidavit could include a ``range of things,'' running 
from the innocuous to the deceitful. Indeed, the main evidence offered 
by the House Managers seems to be that the President and Ms. Lewinksy 
over the period of the relationship developed ``cover stories'' and 
planned to conceal their affair. The House Managers suggest that we 
must infer from the mention of these cover stories during the December 
17 conversation a signal to Ms. Lewinsky that they should be employed 
in the affidavit or in Ms. Lewinsky's testimony if she were called.
    The ``cover stories'' had been developed over a year earlier. The 
House Managers argue that they were transformed into obstruction of 
justice and witness tampering when Ms. Lewinsky became a witness in the 
Jones case by their mere mention in the telephone conversation of 
December 17. That is an interesting theory, but evidence of the 
President's intent to obstruct justice in that conversation is simply 
lacking. I do not believe a federal criminal prosecution would ever be 
brought with such a slim factual foundation, notwithstanding the 
earnest statements to the contrary by a number of the House Managers 
who are former prosecutors.
    Another allegation refuted by the depositions taken by the House 
Managers was the charge based on the efforts of Vernon Jordan to secure 
Monica Lewinsky a job. Jordan admitted that he sought a job for Ms. 
Lewinsky at the request of the President. However disturbing the 
conduct and whatever innuendo it invites, it was not against the law 
for the President to seek to aid a woman with whom he had carried on an 
illicit relationship. It only amounts to obstruction of justice or 
witness tampering if it is proven that the job assistance was offered 
with the intent of preventing her from testifying or influencing her 
testimony in the Jones case. Numerous facts cut against this 
allegation: (1) the President's efforts to help Ms. Lewinsky find a job 
started long before she was a witness in the Jones case; (2) Vernon 
Jordan's intensified efforts predated by at least a week his knowledge 
that she had been subpoenaed; (3) both Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan 
testified that they thought that the job search and the submission of 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit were not connected.
    Vernon Jordan's role in this whole story is nonetheless troubling. 
It is clear he made extraordinary efforts to help Ms. Lewinsky obtain 
employment, and he kept the President informed of his progress. But I 
cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his efforts must be 
attributed to a plan on the part of the President to prevent Ms. 
Lewinsky from testifying truthfully in the Jones case. Just as 
plausible is that the President's motive to help Ms. Lewinsky was 
loyalty or guilt, or to make it less likely that she would reveal the 
relationship, which had long since ceased to be sexual, to one of her 
friends or the press.
    Another charge in Article II deals with the President's failure to 
prevent his lawyer from relying on Ms. Lewinsky's misleading affidavit 
during the Jones deposition. But evidence of the President's intent to 
obstruct justice is completely lacking here. As a witness in a 
deposition, the President did not have a duty to monitor his lawyer's 
statements. One can only imagine what the President was thinking about 
as he listened to the lawyers and Judge Wright debate whether he was 
going to have to answer questions about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    Before turning to the most serious allegations of obstruction and 
witness tampering, let me comment on the final charge in Article II, 
which concerns the President's statements to aides who later were 
called before the Grand Jury to testify. This charge has been a 
sideshow and a distraction from the beginning. While the charge is 
listed in Article II as one of the ``means used to implement'' the 
``course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and 
conceal the existence of evidence and testimony'' in the Jones case, it 
actually alleges an effort to obstruct the Grand Jury investigation. 
Furthermore, it assumes that in the days when the Lewinsky story was 
breaking, the President's conversations with his aides were aimed at 
influencing their eventual testimony in the Grand Jury, rather than 
dealing with the public firestorm that was enveloping the White House 
and the enormous personal embarrassment and humiliation that the 
President faced as his affair became public.
    There is much for the Congress and the nation to criticize about 
the President's behavior in this matter. Concealing the truth and the 
intimate details of this relationship from his close aides ranks well 
down on the list for me. I am much more outraged by his very public, 
very forceful denial of the affair to the American people on national 
television. Yet that denial does not appear to be part of a scheme to 
obstruct the Grand Jury. And the fact that the President's more 
elaborate lie about the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky in 
his conversation with Sidney Blumenthal found its way into press 
accounts is essentially irrelevant to the question of whether the 
President committed a crime. Yet the House Managers spent hours and 
hours trying to substantiate their claim that there was a White House 
effort, masterminded by the President, to discredit and attack Ms. 
Lewinsky. They even called Sidney Blumenthal as a witness and explored 
this issue in depth with him. Then, on the day our deliberations 
started, they sought to introduce new evidence and take new depositions 
because they believe that Mr. Blumenthal was untruthful in his 
deposition.
    After all this, the House Managers still have not explained what 
crime is lurking in the conspiracy they think they have found. The 
President cannot be impeached and removed from office for being a 
``bully,'' or being ``mean,'' or because his Administration has a 
muscular spin operation. On this charge, not only is there a reasonable 
doubt that the President intended to obstruct justice when he misled 
his aides about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, there is no 
evidence at all that he did.
    Let me turn to the two charges of Article II that I view as the 
most serious and substantial--the concealment of gifts given by the 
President to Ms. Lewinsky and the President's two conversations with 
his personal secretary, Betty Currie, after he was deposed in the Jones 
case.
    It is significant that both of these allegations involve Ms. 
Currie. And the gift concealment allegation raises what is probably the 
most serious factual dispute in this case--the question of whether it 
was Ms. Lewinsky or Ms. Currie who suggested hiding the gifts. Yet even 
when given the opportunity to call a limited number of witnesses for 
depositions, the House Managers chose not to call Betty Currie. I was 
troubled by this at the time, particularly since the testimony of 
Sidney Blumenthal seemed so tangential to the case. Other than Monica 
Lewinsky, Betty Currie was the most important witness in this case, and 
the House Managers chose not to depose her.
    While I was inclined to give the House Managers the benefit of the 
doubt on their witness selection, I am prohibited from giving them the 
benefit of the doubt on whose testimony to believe on key disputes of 
fact. Without seeing Ms. Currie testify, I have no basis on which to 
compare her credibility to that of Ms. Lewinsky on the issue of who 
initiated the hiding of the gifts. Furthermore, Ms. Lewinsky testified 
that she was concerned about the Jones lawyers' request for the gifts 
long before her December 28 meeting with the President and her delivery 
of the gifts to Ms. Currie later that day.
    I was struck by Ms. Lewinsky's testimony on this point in her 
Senate deposition. She seemed indefinite when she reaffirmed her 
earlier testimony that Betty Currie had called her about the gifts, 
rather than vice versa. In this instance, I appreciated the opportunity 
to view Ms. Lewinsky's demeanor when she testified. She seemed 
significantly less certain about who raised the idea of hiding the 
gifts. I certainly do not conclude that she was lying, but her memory 
of the sequence of events did not seem as clear on this point as it was 
on many of the issues discussed in the deposition. The fact that the 
President gave Ms. Lewinsky even more gifts on December 28 lends 
additional weight to the theory that it was Ms. Lewinsky who wanted to 
hide the gifts, not the President.
    With an unresolved direct conflict between the testimony of the two 
primary witnesses on this allegation, I simply cannot find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President masterminded the gift exchange to 
obstruct the Jones case.
    Finally, we come to what for me has been the most difficult charge 
of Article II--the President's alleged ``coaching'' of Betty Currie. 
Neither the President's testimony in the Grand Jury concerning these 
conversations nor his lawyers' valiant efforts to explain them were 
wholly convincing. For the President to call his secretary into the 
Oval Office on a Sunday--the day after his deposition in the Jones 
case--and feed her a number of falsehoods about his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky is very alarming.
    The central issue, however, is the President's intent. Knowing that 
the secret of his relationship with Lewinsky was out, but not yet 
knowing who had told the Jones lawyers about it, the President could 
very well have been concerned mostly about public exposure and what his 
wife would soon learn. He knew that Betty Currie was aware of his 
friendship with Ms. Lewinsky, but he did not know how much she knew or 
had surmised about what went on behind closed doors. Since all of that 
activity had ended quite a long time before, it is not inconceivable 
that the President was trying to find out what Ms. Currie knew or even 
influence what Ms. Currie would say to other White House staff, without 
being specifically concerned with her being a witness in the Jones 
case.
    It is worth noting here that I am unconvinced by the argument 
frequently made by the House Managers that Monica Lewinsky was a 
crucial witness in the Jones case whose testimony might have changed 
the course of that litigation. Despite the fact that Monica Lewinsky 
was at one time a White House intern and later a White House employee, 
there is no allegation of sexual harassment in the relationship, and 
Ms. Lewinsky consistently characterized her interaction with the 
President as affectionate and consensual.
    The Jones case later was dismissed on legal grounds that were 
wholly unrelated to any issue on which Ms. Lewinsky could have shed 
light. Thus, it is my view that the President hoped that Ms. Lewinsky 
would not have to testify in the Jones case because he did not want 
their affair to become public, not because he was concerned about the 
impact of her testimony on Paula Jones' claims. When he called Ms. 
Currie into his office on January 18, he knew that someone had told the 
Jones lawyers about Monica Lewinsky. In that context, it is at least 
plausible that he was concerned about the imminent explosion of press 
attention and the political damage that would result from it, rather 
than his legal situation.
    Whatever our suspicions about the President's intentions in his 
conversations with Ms. Currie, the available evidence does not entitle 
us to a convincing inference about his state of mind that would support 
a finding of guilt. Therefore, although I still have concerns about 
this allegation of witness tampering, and I believe it was a serious 
charge to which the President's defense was weak, I do not believe that 
the House Managers have carried their burden to show beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President's intent was to obstruct justice in 
the Jones case. I cannot reach this conclusion, however, without 
expressing my deepest concern and sadness that I am able to say only 
that the President apparently just barely avoided committing the crime 
of obstruction of justice in his conversations with Betty Currie.
                   iii. high crimes and misdemeanors
    Many Senators chose to reach the issue of the ``impeachability'' of 
the offenses charged against the President as a threshold question of 
law prior to hearing the House Managers' full case. Many voted for 
Senator Byrd's motion to dismiss on this basis. For two reasons, I 
believed it was appropriate to allow the facts of the case to be more 
fully presented and put into evidence before making a legal judgment.
    First, I believed that as a matter of deference and respect for the 
constitutional role of the House of Representatives, the case, 
including evidence, should be presented before the Senate reached a 
judgment. The Constitution gives the House the sole power of 
impeachment, and a determination of whether certain offenses constitute 
``Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' is 
necessarily a part of the House's decision to impeach a president. 
While the Senate's exclusive power to try, convict, and remove a 
president makes it the final arbiter of whether the conduct alleged is 
``impeachable,'' I believe it is incumbent on the Senate to permit the 
House Managers a reasonable opportunity to set out their case against 
the President before making a decision on that question. Whatever 
misgivings I may have about the way the House exercised its 
constitutional power to impeach in this instance, I felt compelled to 
permit the House Managers a reasonable opportunity to make their case 
before I would exercise my role as both a trier of fact and a judge of 
law.
    Second, the historical and legal authorities on the question of 
what constitutes ``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' are varied and 
not wholly consistent. I believed that I could apply those authorities 
with more certainty to a clear and complete set of facts, after hearing 
the evidence, than to a set of allegations that might never be proved. 
I recognize that when courts entertain motions to dismiss in civil 
cases, they assume that all facts alleged in a complaint are true and 
determine the scope and impact of the particular statute or legal 
doctrine on which the claim for relief is based. But in this case, I 
felt more comfortable reaching the legal question of ``impeachability'' 
after hearing the evidence. I was comfortable allowing this limited 
deference to the prerogatives of the House Managers in the interest of 
a thorough and constitutional process.
    Having decided that the House Managers failed to prove that the 
President committed the federal crimes they alleged, the question 
remains whether the underlying acts themselves, whether criminal or 
not, constitute conduct that under the Constitution constitute ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' that should result in the President's removal 
from office. On the issue of what constitutes ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors,'' as in many other issues in this impeachment and trial, 
there has been heated and polarizing rhetoric. The House Managers and 
their supporters argued vigorously that the criminal acts they charged 
were, on their face, high crimes. White House counsel and many 
historians and legal scholars argued the contrary, that these acts 
could in no way be considered high crimes.
    Other than bribery and treason, the Constitution itself gives no 
exhaustive or exclusive list of those offenses for which presidents 
should be removed from office. We are given only the phrase ``other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' for guidance. The key to understanding 
the meaning of this phrase in my view are the words ``other'' and 
``high.''
    As University of Chicago Law School Professor Joseph Isenbergh has 
written:
    ``. . . without the word `high' attached to it, the expression 
`crimes and misdemeanors' is nothing more than a description of public 
wrongs, offenses that are cognizable in some court of criminal 
jurisdiction.''
    Isenbergh notes that in the 18th Century, the word ``high'' when 
attached to the word ``crime'' or ``misdemeanor,'' described a crime 
aiming at the state or the sovereign rather than a private person, and 
thus a ``high Crime or Misdemeanor'' was not simply a serious crime, 
but one aimed at the highest powers of the state. This concept had been 
asserted by William Blackstone and others, and was well understood by 
the Framers of the Constitution.
    Indeed, Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 65 that the 
crimes to be considered in a court of impeachment are:
    ``[T]hose offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, 
or in other words from the abuse or violation of some public trust. 
They are of a nature which may with particular propriety be denominated 
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the 
society itself.''
    Writing at the time of the Nixon impeachment, Yale University Law 
Professor Charles Black commented that the crimes enumerated in the 
Constitution, treason and bribery, are crimes that ``so seriously 
threaten the order of political society as to make pestilent and 
dangerous the continuance in power of their perpetrator.'' In my view, 
``other high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' must be interpreted as crimes or 
acts of a similar gravity and impact on society as those enumerated 
crimes.
    To determine whether the conduct that led to impeachment for these 
crimes meets the definition of a high crime, the underlying 
circumstances must govern and a determination must be made if the 
offense, in Black's words, ``threatens the order of political 
society.'' While it is certainly true that an act need not be criminal 
in a technical sense to constitute a threat to the well-being of the 
State, the acts in this case were not assaults on the State or the 
liberties of the people that threaten the order of political society, 
as contemplated by the Framers. This conduct does not justify 
overturning the will of the people as expressed in the 1996 election.
                             iv. conclusion
    As I listened carefully to the trial proceedings over the past 
month, I was impressed with the efforts of counsel for both sides in 
making their cases. Even understanding the role of counsel as 
advocates, however, I was troubled by the exaggerated claims with 
regard to the strength of each side of the case.
    The House Managers referred to the evidence in support of removal 
as ``overwhelming,'' while the President's counsel described the House 
Managers' evidence as ``nonexistent.'' I find neither statement to be 
true and maybe a little reminiscent of the heated words of the Senator 
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts in his Opinion following the 
impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson:
    ``In the judgment which I now deliver I cannot hesitate. To my 
vision the path is clear as day. Never in history was there a great 
case more free from all just doubt. If Andrew Johnson is not guilty, 
then never was a political offender guilty before; and, if his 
acquittal is taken as a precedent, never can a political offender be 
found guilty again. The proofs are mountainous. Therefore, you are now 
determining whether impeachment shall continue a beneficent remedy in 
the Constitution, or be blotted out forever, and the country handed 
over to the terrible process of revolution as its sole protection.''
    I cannot view the Clinton impeachment case from either extreme. 
This, unfortunately, was a close case that raised the very real specter 
of the nullification of an American presidential election. It is, 
however, at such a moment, when the high standard for impeachment and 
conviction becomes especially important.
    The reason I describe the decision of the American people to elect 
a president as the most salient fact in this case is not simply because 
it is the right of the American people to choose their president. It is 
also because of the constitutional goal of our Founding Fathers to 
create a system of political stability. Just as the Framers wished to 
avoid the uncertainty of a parliamentary system, we today in this last 
year of the twentieth century should be concerned about political 
instability and the threat that excessive partisanship poses to our 
constitutional order.
    I see the four year elected term of our president as a unifying 
force in our country. Yet this is the second time in my adult life that 
a President of the United States has undergone a serious impeachment 
process. And I am only 45 years old. In the nearly two hundred years 
prior to the case of President Nixon, this happened only once.
    Are these two recent impeachments a fluke? Is it coincidence that 
two of our recent presidents were thought by some to be sufficiently 
unfit to be president to warrant this procedure? I wonder how we will 
feel about the stability of our system if another presidential 
impeachment occurs sometime in the next ten or twenty years.
    I see a danger in this. I see a danger in this in an increasingly 
diverse country. I see a danger in this in an increasingly divided 
country. I see a danger when national elections seem never to be over. 
I see a danger when the lead House Manager in his concluding remarks in 
this trial asserts that we are engaged in a ``culture war'' in this 
country. I hope that is not where we are, and I hope that is not where 
we are heading.
    In making a decision of this magnitude, it is best not to err at 
all. If we must err, however, we should err on the side of avoiding 
such divisions, and of respecting the will of the people. Senator James 
W. Grimes of Iowa, one of the seven Republicans who voted to acquit 
President Andrew Johnson in 1868, said in his Opinion at the conclusion 
of the trial:
    ``I cannot agree to destroy the harmonious working of the 
Constitution for the sake of getting rid of an unacceptable President. 
Whatever may be my opinion of the incumbent, I cannot consent to trifle 
with the high office he holds. I can do nothing which, by implication, 
may be construed into an approval of impeachment as a part of future 
political machinery.''
    Spoken almost 131 years ago, these words express nearly perfectly 
my sentiments on the grave constitutional questions I was required to 
address in this case.

                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Thomas A. Daschle

    Mr. DASCHLE. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, in just a 
few moments each of us will be called upon to do something that 
no one has done in American history. We will be voting on two 
articles of impeachment against an elected President of the 
United States.
    Having listened carefully to nearly 50 of our colleagues 
who share my point of view, it is both difficult and 
unnecessary to attempt to reiterate the powerful logic and the 
extraordinary eloquence of many of their presentations.
    I share the view expressed by so many that this body must 
be guided by two fundamental principles. I recognize that we 
are not all guided by these principles, but I and others have 
been guided, first, by this question: Has the prosecution 
provided evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and, second, if 
so, do the President's offenses rise to the level of gravity 
laid out by our founders in the Constitution?
    After listening to both sides of these arguments now for 
the past 5 weeks, I believe--I believe strongly--that the 
record shows that on both principles the answer is no--no, the 
case has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and, no, 
even if it had been it would not reach the impeachable level.
    I also share the view expressed by many of my colleagues on 
the process which brought us here: an investigation by an 
independent counsel which exceeded the bounds of propriety; a 
decision by the Supreme Court subjecting sitting Presidents to 
civil suits--it is my prediction that every future President 
will be faced with legal trauma as a result--a deeply flawed 
proceeding in the House Judiciary Committee, which in an 
unprecedented fashion effectively relinquished its obligation 
to independently weigh the case for impeachment; the 
disappointing decision to deny Members of the Senate and the 
House the opportunity to vote on a censure resolution, even 
though I believe it would be supported by a majority in both 
Houses; and finally, the bitterly partisan nature of all the 
actions taken by the House of Representatives in handling this 
case.
    But as deeply disappointed as I am with the process, it 
pales in comparison to the disappointment I feel toward this 
President. Maybe it is because I had such high expectations. 
Maybe it is because he holds so many dreams and aspirations 
that I hold about our country. Maybe it is because he is my 
friend. I have never been, nor ever expect to be, so bitterly 
disappointed again.
    Abraham Lincoln may have been right when he said, ``I would 
rather have a full term in the Senate, a place in which I would 
feel more consciously able to discharge the duties required, 
and where there is more chance to make a reputation and less 
danger of losing it, than 4 years of the Presidency.''
    Maybe it is because of my disappointment that I was all the 
more determined to help give the Senate its chance to make a 
reputation, as Lincoln put it, at this time in our Nation's 
history.
    The Senate has served our country well these past 2 months. 
And I now have no doubt that history will so record. There are 
clear reasons why the Senate has succeeded in this historic 
challenge.
    First is the manner in which the Chief Justice has presided 
over these hearings. We owe him a big, big debt of gratitude. 
He has presented his rulings with clarity and logic. He has 
tempered the long hours and temporary confusion with a fine 
wit. In an exemplary fashion, he has done his constitutional 
duty and has made it possible for us to do ours.
    The second reason is our majority leader. Perhaps more than 
anyone in the Chamber, I can attest to his steadfast commitment 
to a trial conducted with dignity and in the national interest. 
He has demonstrated that differences--honest differences--on 
difficult issues need not result in dissent, and in the end the 
Senate can transcend those differences and conclude a 
constitutional process that the country will respect, and I do.
    Third is our extraordinary staff--the Chaplain, my staff in 
particular, Senator Lott's staff, the floor staff, the 
Parliamentarians, the Sergeant at Arms, the Secretary of the 
Senate. They have served us proudly. Their professionalism and 
the quality that they have demonstrated each and every hour 
ought to make us all proud.
    Finally, if we have been successful, it has been because of 
each of you--your diligence, your deportment, your thoughtful 
arguments on either side of these complex, vexing questions. 
This experience and each of you--each of you--have made me 
deeply proud to be a Member of the U.S. Senate.
    Growing up in South Dakota, I learned so much, as many of 
us have, from relatives and from the people in my hometown, and 
my parents especially. Something my father admonished me to do 
so many, many times in growing up is something I still remember 
so vividly today. He said, ``Never do anything that you 
wouldn't put your signature on.'' I thought of that twice 
during these proceedings--once when we signed the oath right 
here, and again last night when I signed the resolution for 
Scott Bates.
    I will hear Scott Bates' voice when I hear my name called 
this morning. My father passed away 2 years ago. He and Scott 
are watching now. And I believe they will say that we have a 
right to put our signature on this work, on what we have done 
in these past 5 weeks, for with our votes today we can now turn 
our attention to the challenges confronting our country 
tomorrow. And, as we do, I hope for one thing: That we will 
soon see a new day in politics and political life, one filled 
with the same comity and spirit that I feel in the room today, 
one where good governance is truly good politics, one which 
encourages renewed participation in our political system. It is 
a hope based upon a fundamental belief which is now 210 years 
old, a belief that here in this country with this Republic we 
have created something very, very special, a belief so ably 
articulated by Thomas Paine as he wrote ``Common Sense.''

    The sun will never shine on a cause of greater worth. This is not 
the affair of a city, a county, a province, or a kingdom, but of a 
continent. This is not the concern of the day, a year, or an age.
    Posterity is are virtually involved in the contest, and will be 
more or less affected even to the end of time by the proceedings now.

    So it is as we cast our votes today and begin a new 
tomorrow.
    Each of us understands that the decision we must make is 
the most demanding assigned to us, as Senators, by the 
Constitution. The framers did not believe it a simple matter to 
remove a President. They did not intend that it occur easily.
    Only a certain class of offenses--treason, bribery and 
other high crimes and misdemeanors--could justify the 
President's removal. Only a supermajority--two-thirds of the 
Senate--could authorize it.
    The framers made as plain as they could that each Senator 
must judge, on all the circumstances of the case, whether the 
facts support this extraordinary remedy.
    As I look at this case, I am compelled to consider it from 
beginning to end--from the circumstances under which the House 
fashioned and approved the articles, to the trial here in the 
Senate when the House pressed its arguments for conviction. And 
I find a case troubled from beginning to end--one marked by 
constitutional defects, inconsistencies in presentation, 
surprising concessions by the managers against their own 
position, and even damage done to that position by their own 
witnesses.
    In short, the case I have seen is one that I do not believe 
can bear the weight of the profound constitutional consequences 
it is meant to carry.
    Its constitutional defects began in the House.
    Rather than initiating its own investigation, and making 
its own findings, the House rested on the referral from 
Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr.
    Never before has the House effectively relinquished its 
obligation to independently weigh the case for impeachment.
    But this time it did, relinquishing that obligation to Mr. 
Starr.
    Mr. Starr's 454-page referral became the factual record in 
the House. The arguments he made in that referral served almost 
exclusively as the basis for the articles prepared and voted by 
the House.
    The House called no independent fact witness. The only 
witness was Mr. Starr. And it is telling that Mr. Starr's own 
ethics adviser, Professor Sam Dash, resigned his position with 
the Office of Independent Counsel to protest the improper role 
played by Mr. Starr in the impeachment process.
    The House proceedings set a dangerous constitutional 
precedent, and the decision to follow this course has 
reverberated throughout the trial here in the Senate.
    Because Mr. Starr carried the case in the House, the House 
did not develop or explain its own case until the time came to 
prepare for trial in the Senate. Those explanations, when they 
came, were replete with inconsistencies--not technical or minor 
inconsistencies, but rather inconsistencies that struck at the 
heart of their position.
    On the one hand, the managers charged the President with 
serious crimes. Yet they also argued that they should not be 
required to prove ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' that the 
President committed those crimes--that they need not meet the 
standard that applies throughout our criminal justice system.
    On the one hand, the managers acknowledged that the House 
rejected an article based on President Clinton's deposition in 
the Jones case. Yet throughout their presentations, including 
their videotaped presentation on February 6, they repeatedly 
relied on the President's statements in that civil deposition.
    On the one hand, the managers insisted that the record 
received from the House provided clear and irrefutable evidence 
of the President's guilt. Yet one manager declared that 
reasonable people could differ on the strength of the case, and 
another stated that he could not win a conviction in court 
based on that record.
    On the one hand, the managers originally claimed a record 
so clear that the House was not required to call a single fact 
witness--other than Mr. Starr. Yet in the Senate they insisted 
that their case depended vitally on witnesses.
    In the end, the Senate authorized the deposition of 
witnesses, two of whom--Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan--were 
central to the core allegations of perjury and obstruction of 
justice. These were witnesses identified by the House--
witnesses the managers expected to help support their case.
    This is not, however, how it turned out.
    In the final blow to the case for removal brought by the 
managers, those very witnesses provided the Senate with clear 
and compelling testimony--in the President's defense.
    It cannot have escaped many of us that the defense showed 
more and longer segments of this testimony than the managers 
who sought these witnesses in the first place.
    What did Ms. Lewinsky say about the false affidavit she 
filed in the Jones case? That she never discussed the contents 
with the President. That she thought she might be able to file 
a truthful, but limited affidavit and still avoid testifying. 
That she had reasons completely independent from the 
President's for wanting to avoid testimony. That the President 
did not ask her to lie or promise her a job for her silence.
    What did Ms. Lewinsky say about the return of the gifts 
given to her by the President? That she raised with the 
President whether she should turn the gifts over to Ms. Currie. 
That she recalls that the President may have advised her to 
turn them all over to the Jones lawyers. That she told an FBI 
agent of this advice, but it somehow was omitted from the 
independent counsel's investigative report. That 6 days before 
her White House meeting with the President, she had already 
made an independent decision to withhold gifts from her own 
lawyer.
    What did Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan say about the job 
search for Ms. Lewinsky? That it was never connected to the 
preparation of her affidavit, much less conditioned on her 
making any false statements to a court.
    What did Mr. Jordan say about any pressure placed on the 
companies he contacted to hire Ms. Lewinsky? That he only 
recommended her. That two companies he contacted would not hire 
her. That the third company, which did hire her, did so on the 
strength of an interview in which she made a strong personal 
impression--much like the one she made to the managers in their 
first meeting with her.
    These witnesses--the House's witnesses--made it impossible, 
I believe, for the managers to sustain a case already weakened 
by a defective House process, serious inconsistencies in their 
arguments, and doubts about its merits that even some of the 
managers themselves candidly expressed.
    Surely a case for removal of the President must be 
stronger.
    Surely a case for conviction must be strong enough to unite 
the Senate and the public behind the most momentous of 
constitutional decisions.
    Surely a case to remove the President from office must be 
strong enough to meet the high standards established with such 
care by the Constitution's framers.
    In requiring that the Senate remove only for ``high'' 
crimes and misdemeanors, the framers acted with care. As the 
House Judiciary Committee stated in its Watergate report 25 
years ago, ``[I]mpeachment is a constitutional remedy addressed 
to serious offenses against the system of government.'' Its 
purpose is to protect our constitutional form of government, 
not to punish a President.
    It is for this reason that the framers made clear that not 
all offenses by a Chief Executive are ``high'' crimes--and that 
even a President who may have violated the law, but not the 
Constitution, remains subject to criminal and civil legal 
process after he or she leaves office.
    Whatever legal consequences may follow from this 
President's actions, the case made by the House managers does 
not satisfy the exacting standard for removal.
    For all of these reasons, I will vote to acquit on both 
articles. This is my constitutional judgment about whether the 
Senate should remove the President from office. My personal 
judgment of the President's actions is something altogether 
different, reflecting my values and those of South Dakotans and 
millions of Americans.
    Like them, I am extraordinarily disappointed, and angered, 
by the President's behavior. Since I have long considered the 
President a friend, my own sense of betrayal could not run more 
deeply.
    There is no question that the President's deplorable 
actions should be condemned by the Senate.
    I fervently hope that the Senate will do what the House 
would not--permit the people's elected representatives to 
express themselves and reflect their constituents' views on the 
President's conduct, for the benefit of our generation and 
those still to come.
    So let us proceed now to a vote and resolve this 
constitutional task after these long and arduous months. Then 
the time will have come to return to the urgent work of the 
country.
    When we do, I believe that all of us--members of the 
majority and members of the minority, however we choose to cast 
our votes--will be able to agree on this:
    That in 1999, 100 Senators acted as the Constitution 
required, honoring their oath to do impartial justice and 
acting in the best interests of this country they so dearly 
love.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Christopher S. Bond

    Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, I do not intend 
to give a comprehensive statement, nor do I intend to use all 
of the time allotted. But I feel it is very important to answer 
some of the points that have been raised. Let me deal with just 
a few of those.
    When I spoke to you in a previous session, I mentioned the 
cover story and said that while the cover story was not 
impeachable--the cover story which was admitted by counsel for 
the White House--it is a framework and a context in which we 
judge other actions.
    Objection has been made by my friends primarily on this 
side of the aisle that on occasion we have cited evidence where 
the President may not have been truthful, and we may have 
raised other arguments that go beyond the boundaries of the 
articles of impeachment as grounds for impeachment. Let me 
hasten to add I hope that no one would vote for a conviction on 
anything other than the items set forth in article I and the 
items set forth in article II. If there are other activities 
that may bear upon or indicate a pattern of conduct, that is 
one thing. But we must make our decision on the basis of that 
which has been presented to us by the House.
    On the other side, we have heard some very spirited and 
enthusiastic attacks on the independent counsel and on the 
House managers and even on the Paula Jones case itself. Let me 
make just a few points.
    No. 1, we threw Judge Alcee Hastings out of office as a 
judge for lying in a grand jury proceeding where he was not 
convicted. The objective is not to say that you can only commit 
perjury when a case is won or someone is convicted.
    No. 2, the independent counsel got into this because the 
attorney general felt that there were grounds to pursue the 
potential violations of law by the President in the Monica 
Lewinsky case. A three-judge court agreed, and the independent 
counsel was assigned to pursue this.
    Whatever you may think about what the House did, or what 
the Paula Jones attorneys did, or what the independent counsel 
did, that is not the question before us. That can be addressed, 
as some of my colleagues said, if there are investigations by 
the Department of Justice on improper activities by the OIC. 
Let that proceed in its own realm. We are here to judge on the 
evidence before us.
    As I said, we have a cover story. We have a cover story 
that was utilized regularly throughout by this President and by 
Monica Lewinsky.
    Objection has been made that, while we have the clear 
testimony that William Jefferson Clinton never said you should 
lie, he never said expressly you should file a false affidavit. 
Well, of course, he didn't. Of course, he didn't. He is a very 
sophisticated, very able lawyer. If you are concocting a scheme 
to obstruct justice, you don't tell somebody who is to be part 
of that scheme with you that you should lie under oath, that 
you should file a false affidavit because those people might 
just get called to testify under oath at some point, as they 
were in this case. But Mr. Clinton didn't have to do that 
because Monica Lewinsky understood very clearly that she was to 
stay with the cover story until she was told not to. She filed 
the false affidavit that he sought. He and his counsel used it 
in the deposition.
    Why was it filed? To keep him from having to testify 
truthfully in the deposition. Was he surprised by it? I do not 
believe it has one iota of credibility to say that after he 
went out and procured that false affidavit, he didn't know that 
his attorney was going to use it, and he was not going to rely 
on it. He got her to do the felonious deed of filing a false 
affidavit so he could avoid the danger of having to lie himself 
in a deposition.
    Mr. Clinton didn't engage in a conspiracy with his lawyer, 
Mr. Bennett. We hear about the one-man conspiracy. No. He 
foisted that on his attorney, Mr. Bennett, when he found out 
about the falsity of that affidavit, had to do what no attorney 
ever wants to do--he had to write a letter to the judge, and 
say, ``Disregard it. Disregard it. I was part, inadvertently, 
of a scheme to defraud the court.'' You notice he is not in the 
case any longer. He could not be part of that.
    We know that Mr. Clinton enlisted his loyal secretary to 
violate the law to go pick up gifts, and she and Monica 
Lewinsky, once again, committed felonies to continue the story 
to protect the President. And the gifts wound up under Betty 
Currie's bed.
    Mr. Clinton went to Betty Currie on a Sunday and 2 days 
later and told her things that he hoped she would say before 
the grand jury. He told his other subordinates things that he 
hoped they would say. He even trashed her when it appeared that 
she might be a hostile witness.
    Ladies and gentlemen of the Senate, I suggest to you that 
when you have this clear-cut evidence of a scheme carried out 
with direct evidence, testimony of Monica Lewinsky and others, 
Betty Currie and his subordinates, an Audrain County jury would 
not have any trouble finding him guilty of tampering with a 
witness or obstructing justice.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Jeff Sessions*

    Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chief Justice and fellow Senators, I 
appreciate this proceeding. I appreciate the process we have 
gone through. I hope my remarks will be in the spirit of 
deliberation, and that some of what I say will be of value to 
you.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Sessions submitted an additional statement on February 23, see 
p. 3094, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If there was a mistake made in this case, it is that we 
have treated this more like a piece of legislation than a 
trial. It probably would have been better to have just allowed 
the House to have a week or 8 days to present evidence and the 
other side present their evidence and then vote and we would 
have been out of here. As it is, we have been involved in the 
managing of it. I have been impressed that together we have 
somehow gotten through it in a way that I think I can defend. 
It is marginal, but I think we have conducted a trial that I 
feel we can defend.
    The impeachment came from the House so we have to have a 
trial and a vote, in my opinion. Judging on matters like this 
is not easy, but we all have had to do it. Juries make 
decisions like this every day. The President has to grant 
pardons and make appointments and remove appointments. Senators 
have to vote on nominations and so forth. I have had the 
adventure of appearing before Senators judging me on a previous 
occasion. Now I am in this body and the other day the Chief 
Justice declared that we were all a court, and I thought, ``My 
goodness, I am a Federal judge and a Senator, how much better 
can life get than that?''
    Someone suggested that this is a political trial. But the 
more we make it like a real trial, the better off we are going 
to be and the better the people are going to like it and the 
more they will respect it. Our responsibility is to find the 
facts, apply the Constitution, the law, and the Senate 
precedent to those facts. Precedent is important. We should 
follow it unless we clearly articulate a reason to change. 
Unless we do so we are failing in our duty. If we want to 
change our precedent, we obviously have that power. But we 
don't come at this with a blank slate since the 1700s and 
Federalist No. 65. We have had a lot of impeachments since 
then, and this Senate has established some precedent during 
that time. I think the dialog between Madison and Mason 
suggests a somewhat different view of things than Federalist 
No. 65 in the minds of many. But I would just say to you we 
have had impeachment trials of Judges Claiborne, Nixon and 
Hastings since then. That is our precedent, in recent years, 
about what we believe are our laws and how they should be 
interpreted.
    I would say this about the case. Others may see it 
differently. But with regard to the obstruction article, I 
might have a bit of a quibble with the way the case was 
presented. I think there was a lot of time and effort spent on 
trees and not enough on the plain forest. Let me just say to 
you why I believe the proof of obstruction of justice is so 
compelling, beyond a reasonable doubt, to a moral certainty. 
That is because the President received interrogatories, he got 
a subpoena to a deposition, and he knew his day was coming. He 
knew he was going to have to tell the truth or he was going to 
have to tell a lie, and it wasn't going away.
    He tried to avoid the day. He went all the way to the 
Supreme Court to try to stop that case from going forward, and 
the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously ruled ``No, you don't get 
special privileges. You have to go forward with the case.'' So 
here he is having to do something. If he states he did not have 
a sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky, if he files an 
answer to an interrogatory, which he did in December, in which 
he flatout stated that he had never had sex with a State or 
Federal employee in the last decade, that would be false. He 
filed such a false answer to a lawful interrogatory.
    Then he is at a deposition, and what happens at the 
deposition? His attorney tries to keep him from being asked 
about Monica Lewinsky. They produce her affidavit and the 
attorney says that the President has seen that affidavit and 
had the opportunity to study it. The President testifies later 
in that deposition: It is ``absolutely true.'' That is when it 
all occurred, right there, and talking with Monica beforehand 
was critical because if she didn't confirm the lie he was going 
to tell he couldn't tell it. She wanted a job and the President 
got it for her. If they didn't submit the Lewinsky affidavit, 
the President was going to be asked those questions. If they 
talked about the gifts, the cat was going to be out of the bag. 
It is just that simple. The wrong occurred right there.
    Then, when he left that deposition, he was worried. He 
called Betty Currie that night, right after that deposition, 
the same day, because he knew he had used her name and she was 
either going to have to back him up or he was in big trouble. 
So he coached her. That is what it is all about. You can talk 
about the facts being anything you want to, but that is the 
core of this case and it is plain and it is simple for anybody 
to see who has eyes to see with, in my view. So I think that is 
a strong case. The question is whether or not, if you believe 
that happened, you want to remove him from office, and I would 
like to share a few thoughts on that.
    Having been a professional prosecutor for 12 years as a 
U.S. attorney, and I tried a lot of cases myself, I really have 
felt pain for Ken Starr. I had occasion to briefly get to know 
him. I knew that his reputation within the Department of 
Justice as Solicitor General was unsurpassed. He was given a 
responsibility by the Attorney General of the United States and 
a court panel to find out what the truth was. The President 
lied, resisted, attacked him, attacked anybody Mr. Starr dealt 
with, virtually, in seeking the truth. And Ken Starr gets 
blamed for that, and then 7 months later we find out that the 
President was lying all the time. He was lying all the time. 
And somehow this is Ken Starr's fault that he pursued the 
matter? I am sure he suspicioned the President was lying but it 
couldn't be proven until the dress appeared and then we finally 
got something like the truth.
    One of the most thunderous statements made by counsel--I am 
surprised it didn't make more news than it did--was the 
representation by White House counsel that judges hold office 
on good behavior.
    Those of you who fight tenaciously for the independence of 
the judiciary, know that this is not the standard for removal 
of judges. The courts have gone through it in some detail. Law 
reviews have been written about it. Judge Harry T. Edwards, 
Court of Appeals for D.C. Circuit, wrote in a Michigan law 
review that:

    Under article II, a judge is subject to impeachment and removal 
only upon conviction by the Senate of treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.

    This is because he is a civil officer. The President, Vice 
President and judges are civil officers of the United States. 
There is only one standard for impeachment.
    The Constitution is a marvelous document. We respect it. To 
do so, we must enforce it as it is written. It says that civil 
officers, judges are removed for only those offenses. There are 
no distinctions between the President and judges. Just because 
one official is elected and one is not elected, one's term is 
shorter, or there are more judges than Presidents--makes no 
difference--that is not what the Constitution says. They face 
the same standard for impeachment.
    I really believe we are making a serious legal mistake if 
we suggest otherwise. If the standard is the same, then we have 
a problem because we removed a bunch of judges for perjury.
    Of course a President gets elected, but the President holds 
office subject to the Constitution. One of the limitations on 
your office as an elected official is don't commit a high crime 
or misdemeanor and if you commit a high crime or misdemeanor, 
you are to be removed. I don't think there is a lot of give in 
this, frankly.
    With regard to precedent, precedent is important because it 
helps us be objective, less political, less personal and do 
justice fairer. That is what the Anglo-American common law is 
all about. Judges have established precedent, and judges tend 
to follow that precedent unless there is a strong reason not 
to. This is important for the rule of law.
    Perjury and its twin, obstruction of justice, do amount to 
impeachable crimes, and our precedent in the Judge Nixon case 
proves that. I believe we set a good standard in that case, 
finding that perjury is a high crime, clearly, and we ought to 
stay with this standard.
    Some have argued that the House Judiciary Committee on the 
President Nixon matter declared that tax evasion was not an 
impeachable offense because it was not directly related to one 
of the President's duties. I don't think that is clear at all. 
In fact, as I recall, a few House Members and minority Members 
signed a statement to that effect. But let me ask you this, and 
think about this: If a minority on the House Judiciary 
Committee voted on something, or Gerald Ford said something 
when he was in the House about impeachment, such is not 
precedent for the U.S. Senate. It is our precedent that counts. 
It is the precedent established by Judge Hastings, Judge Nixon, 
and Judge Claiborne about which we ought to be concerned.
    I do not believe the Constitution says that the standard 
for removal is whether somebody is a danger to the Republic's 
future. The Constitution says if you commit bribery, treason, 
or other high crimes or misdemeanors, you are out, unless there 
are some mitigating circumstance somebody can find, but the 
test is not whether or not the official is going to continue to 
do the crime in the future. What if it is a one-time bribery 
that is never again going to happen. Mr. Ruff advocated the 
``danger'' standard, and it really disturbed me because it is 
not in the Constitution.
    If we were to reject the standard we use for judges for 
impeachment, I do believe that would mean a lowering of our 
standards. We will not be holding the President to the same 
standards we are holding the judges in this country, and I 
don't think the Constitution justifies a dual standard.
    As a prosecutor who has been in the courtroom a lot, I am 
not as cynical as some have suggested today about the law. I 
have been in grand juries hundreds of times--thousands really. 
I have tried hundreds of cases. I have seen witnesses 
personally. I have been with them before they testified and 
have seen them agonize over their testimony. I know people who 
file their tax returns and pay more taxes than they want to, 
voluntarily, because they are men and women of integrity. I 
have seen it in grand juries. I have seen people cry because 
they did not want to tell the truth, but they told it. They 
filed motions to object to testifying, but when it came right 
down to it, they told the truth.
    I believe truth is a serious thing. Truth is real and 
falsehood is real. This is, in my view, a created universe and 
we have a moral order and when we deny the truth we violate the 
moral order and bad things happen. Truth is one of the highest 
ideals of Western civilization commitment to it defines us as a 
people. As Senator Kyl said, you will never have justice in a 
court of law if people don't tell the truth.
    So this is a big deal with me. I have had that lecture with 
a lot of people who were about to testify. I believe we ought 
not to dismiss this lightly.
    There was a poignant story about Dr. Battalino and her 
conviction for lying about a one-time sex act and the losses 
she suffered. Let me tell you this personal story, and I will 
finish.
    I was U.S. attorney. The new police chief had come to 
Mobile. He was a strong and aggressive leader from Detroit. He 
was an African American. He shook up the department, 
established community-based policing, and caused a lot of 
controversy. A group of police officers sued him. His driver, a 
young police officer, testified in a deposition that the chief 
had asked him to bug other police officers illegally. Not only 
that, he said, ``I've got a tape of the chief telling me to 
bug.''
    It leaked to the newspapers, all in the newspapers. They 
wanted to fire the chief. The FBI was called because it is 
illegal to bug somebody if there is not a consenting person in 
the room.
    It is different with Linda Tripp. Let me just explain the 
law. If you can remember and testify to what you hear in 
conversation, you can record that conversation and play it 
later under law of virtually every State in America. Maryland 
apparently is different.
    Here, the driver's action would be illegal. Anyway, the 
young officer finally, under pressure of the FBI, confessed. 
The lawsuit hadn't ended. The civil suit was still going on. He 
went back and changed his deposition and recanted. His lawyer 
came to me and said, ``Don't prosecute him, Jeff. He's sorry. 
He finally told the truth. He went back. The case wasn't 
over.''
    We prosecuted him. I felt like he had disrupted the city, 
caused great turmoil and violated his oath as a police officer, 
and that we could not just ignore that. The case was 
prosecuted. He was convicted, and it was affirmed on appeal.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Paul Coverdell

    Mr. COVERDELL. Mr. Chief Justice and fellow colleagues, in 
the Capitol's Mansfield Room where our Conference has met over 
the last few weeks, there is a picture of our first President, 
George Washington, who celebrates a birthday this Monday. I was 
reminded that, from childhood through adulthood, George 
Washington carried around with him a copy of the ``Rules of 
Civility.'' The rules could be seen as a roadmap of how one 
should appropriately conduct himself or herself in society. As 
the Senate began its course through uncharted waters, civility 
has been our goal, if not our duty. We have done our best to 
work together, to be respectful of each other's views and to do 
justice according to the Constitution. Had we not started with 
this goal in mind, I fear the debate would have quickly 
descended into rancor, doing a disservice to our Nation.
    In the next few minutes, I want to explain how this trial 
unfolded for me, as well as the rationale behind some of the 
votes I've cast, including on the articles of impeachment.
    When the historians write their accounts of the impeachment 
trial of William Jefferson Clinton, I trust that, regardless of 
where one comes down on the facts of the case, they will agree 
that the Senate did it right. We conducted a trial that was 
fair to all sides, correct according to the Constitution and 
expeditious in accordance with the wishes of the American 
people. We also did our best to conduct our deliberations on a 
bipartisan basis.
    We began this process by taking a second and most solemn 
oath of office: to do impartial justice. For me, as a Senator, 
I can think of no more somber and important a constitutional 
duty than the one that was given us. Our first task was to 
draft a blueprint of how we would proceed in the trial. We met 
in closed session in the Old Senate Chamber where the 
discussions were civil, respectful, and frank on both sides. In 
the end, it was Senator Gramm of Texas, joined by Senator 
Kennedy of Massachusetts, two opposite sides of the political 
spectrum, who led us to a unanimous bipartisan agreement on how 
to proceed. The support of all 100 Senators was important 
because it opened the door to a trial that was conducted in a 
professional and judicious manner and without the discord that 
so many of the Washington wise men had predicted.
    After hearing the opening arguments made by both sides, 
Senator Robert Byrd offered a motion to dismiss the case 
against the President. If successful, this would have been the 
first dismissal of an impeachment trial in our Nation's 
history.
    My vote against this dismissal motion was premised on my 
sworn constitutional obligation to hear the facts and evidence 
and consider the law before I rendered a decision on whether 
the articles warranted the President's conviction and removal 
from office. Indeed, this was part of the oath we took--to do 
impartial justice. The Senate would not have been able to 
render a fair and correct judgment on the articles without 
receiving and objectively assessing the wealth of evidence 
presented by the House of Representatives and the White House. 
In short, dismissal was premature and inappropriate.
    Consistent with our duty to consider all the evidence 
fully, I supported an effort to allow both the House managers 
and the White House the opportunity to depose a limited number 
of key witnesses to resolve inconsistencies in testimony. After 
reviewing the depositions, I supported a bipartisan motion to 
make all of this information--both the videotapes and written 
transcripts--part of the permanent record so that each and 
every American could examine the evidence and draw their own 
conclusions. I also voted to allow both the House managers and 
the White House to use the videotaped deposition testimony on 
the floor of the Senate.
    Although I did support deposing a limited number of 
witnesses, I did not support an attempt to allow Ms. Lewinsky 
to testify as a live witness on the floor of the Senate. In my 
judgment, we provided the House managers a more than adequate 
opportunity to present their case: allowing for witnesses to be 
deposed, for the House managers to ask any questions necessary 
to resolve inconsistencies in testimony and to allow any 
portion of these tapes to be used on the floor to argue the 
case against the President. Consequently, I thought it 
inappropriate and unnecessary for Ms. Lewinsky to testify on 
the Senate floor. Seventy Senators felt similarly on this 
issue.
    The presentation with videotaped excerpts, rather than live 
witnesses, allowed both sides to make their arguments cogently. 
In my opinion, witnesses questioned on the floor, under a time 
agreement, would have made for a more fragmented process--
objections by counsel would have disrupted the flow of 
presentations considerably. I believe that our decision to 
exclude live witness testimony was appropriate, fair, and 
improved the nature of closing arguments.
    It is the same sense of obligation and a desire to maintain 
decorum that guided me in my vote to uphold the Senate's time-
tested tradition of deliberating impeachment trials in private. 
Opening the doors of the Senate during these final 
deliberations would have been a tragic mistake, ignoring years 
of precedent on this issue. For 2,600 years, since the ancient 
Athenian lawgiver Solon, trials have been open and jury 
deliberations have been private. Throughout our own history in 
every courthouse in America, we have had open trials, we have 
had public evidence, we have had public witnesses. But when the 
jury deliberates, it meets in private. Jury deliberations are 
held in private for the protection of all parties and to ensure 
a frank and open discussion of the evidence.
    Private jury deliberations have also been part of the 
Senate rules for 130 years. Some argue that these rules are 
outdated and need to be revised. However, in 1974 and 1986, 
when the Senate had an opportunity to vote on changes to these 
rules, it chose to leave intact the precedent that the 
deliberations should remain closed.
    Our private deliberations have promoted civil discussion on 
this grave matter of impeachment. Some of the most profound and 
thoughtful statements I've heard have come during these private 
meetings--where the absence of cameras has had the effect of 
turning politicians into statesmen. These private deliberations 
set a tone of civility and allowed the healing process to 
begin.
    After hearing all evidence and deliberations, at the end, I 
voted for both impeachment articles. Setting all the legal 
contortions aside, a vote against the articles, or to acquit, 
would be to ratify that there are two sets of law in our 
country--one set for our citizens and another for the President 
of the United States. This is a conclusion I could not reach or 
support. Therefore, my vote on both articles says in the 
simplest terms that no American is above the law and there must 
be one law that applies to us all.
    Today's outcome should be a surprise to no one. From the 
beginning, our two parties approached this issue in 
fundamentally different ways. While Democrats and Republicans 
agree that President Clinton committed very serious offenses, 
the disagreement is over whether or not these issues rise to 
the level that he should be removed from office. To some 
extent, the die had been cast when the Democrat Party decided 
to rally around the President. Like President Nixon's fate was 
sealed when his party fell against him, President Clinton's 
Presidency was secured by his party's allegiance.
    My hope is that no future Senate will ever be required to 
consider articles of impeachment against the President of the 
United States. But, if they do, I have every confidence that we 
have left behind an appropriate roadmap for them to fulfill 
their constitutional responsibilities. I am proud of the Senate 
and its Members. The Senate should be proud of the way it has 
conducted itself; we have done our jobs right by being fair to 
all parties, correct according to the Constitution and 
expeditious in accordance with the wishes of the American 
people.
    In conclusion, I thank the leaders on both sides. In 
particular, I single out Senator Lott for his leadership. This 
has clearly been one of his finest hours as our majority 
leader.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Orrin G. Hatch

    Mr. HATCH. Mr. Chief Justice and distinguished Senators, 
Daniel Webster once observed that a ``sense of duty pursues us 
ever. It is omnipresent like the Deity. If we take to ourselves 
the wings of morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the 
sea, duty performed or duty violated is still with us. . . .'' 
The duty which has faced each United States Senator is the 
obligation to do impartial justice in a matter of significant 
historical import with lasting consequences for our 
constitutional order--the consideration of the impeachment 
articles against President William Jefferson Clinton.
    Our duty calls on us to answer a serious question--whether 
the President's actions warrant his removal from office. 
Fundamentally, in arriving at our individual decisions, we must 
consider what is in the best interests of the American people. 
The President engaged in conduct that even his defenders 
recognize was reprehensible and wrong. A bipartisan majority of 
the House also found that he committed serious, impeachable 
crimes.
    So the test for the Senate must be to do what's in the best 
interest of our Nation. It is not a matter of what is easiest 
or cleanest. It is a matter of what is in the immediate and 
long term national interest. This has been, and it will 
continue to be, a subjective and difficult standard and one 
which I will discuss in greater detail later in my remarks.
    First, however, I wish to speak on the Senate's procedural 
responsibility when sitting as a Court of Impeachment, the 
constitutional law concerning impeachable offenses, and the 
articles of impeachment at issue in the present case. Finally, 
I will conclude with a discussion of whether--assuming the 
facts alleged have been proven--the best interests of the 
country would be served by removing President Clinton from 
office.
    Let me begin by explaining what the role of the Senate is 
in the impeachment process.
    Simply put, the Senate's role in the impeachment process is 
to try all impeachments. As Joseph Story wrote:

    The power [to try impeachments] has been wisely deposited with the 
Senate. . . . That of all the departments of the government, `none will 
be found more suitable to exercise this peculiar jurisdiction than the 
Senate.' . . . Precluded from ever becoming accusers themselves, it is 
their duty not to lend themselves to the animosities of party, or the 
prejudices against individuals, which may sometimes unconsciously 
induce'' the other body. In serving as the tribunal for impeachments, 
we must strive to attain and demonstrate impartiality, integrity, 
intelligence and independence. If we fail to do so, the trial and our 
judgment will be flawed.--Joseph Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, Section 386.

    In short, impeachment trials require Senators to act, 
wherever possible, with principled political neutrality. One 
question I have repeatedly asked myself during this scandal--
when faced with questions concerning the interpretation of the 
relevant law, the process, the calls for resignation, or 
forgiveness--has been whether I would have taken the same 
position were this a Republican President. I have done this 
throughout the past year and I expect many of my colleagues 
have done the same.
    In 1993, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of United 
States versus Nixon that the process by which the Senate tries 
impeachments was nonjusticiable. As a result of the Nixon 
decision, the Senate has a heightened constitutional obligation 
in impeachment cases.
    As constitutional scholar Michael Gerhardt notes in his 
1996 book, ``The Federal Impeachment Process'':

    Congress may make constitutional law--that is, make judgments about 
the scope and meaning of its constitutionally authorized impeachment 
function--subject to change only if Congress later changes its mind or 
by constitutional amendment. Thus, Nixon raised an issue about 
Congress's ability, in the absence of judicial review, to make 
reasonably principled constitutional decisions.

    I believe the Senate has conducted this trial in a fair 
manner and that we have made principled constitutional 
decisions. I commend my colleagues on both sides of the aisle--
in particular the majority leader, Trent Lott--for the 
impartial and proficient manner in which we have conducted our 
constitutional obligation.
    At the core of our deliberations was the tension between, 
on the one hand, our shared interest in putting this matter 
behind us and getting on with the Nation's business, and, on 
the other hand, our interest in affording the President, and 
the weighty matter of impeachment, that process which is due 
and fair. While there are decisions the Senate reached with 
which I differed, I want to make clear my view that the Senate 
has ably balanced these competing interests. A fair and full 
trial that we were once told would take 1 year has been 
completed in less than 6 weeks. The credit for this process 
rests with every Member of the Senate, with the House managers, 
counsel for the President, and the Chief Justice.
    Of great concern to me is what the standard should be for 
impeachment in this and future trials. The President's counsel 
argued that the President can only be removed for constituting, 
what Oliver Wendell Holmes termed in free speech cases a 
``clear and present danger.'' It was contended that a President 
can only be removed if he is a danger to the Constitution. As 
such, according to the President's counsel, removable conduct 
must relate to egregious conduct related to performance in 
office. Even if the House's allegation that President Clinton 
committed acts of perjury and obstruction of justice is proven 
true, it was argued then such behavior does not rise to 
impeachable offenses because it was private, not public, 
conduct. In this case an inappropriate sexual relation with a 
subordinate employee was the predicate of the charged offenses. 
But such a standard establishes an impossibly high bar as to 
render impotent the impeachment clauses of the Constitution. I 
hope that no matter the outcome of this trial, President 
Clinton's view of what constitutes an impeachable offense does 
not become precedent. If it does, I fear the moral framework of 
our Republic will be frayed. If it does, the legitimacy of our 
institutions may very well become tattered. It would create the 
paradox of being able to convict and jail an official for 
committing, let's say, homicide but not to be able to remove 
that official from holding positions of public trust. 
Committing crimes of moral turpitude, such as perjury and 
obstruction of justice, go to the very heart of qualification 
for public office.
    The overwhelming consensus of both legal and historical 
scholars is that the Constitution mandates the removal of the 
``President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the 
United States''--which includes federal judges--``upon 
impeachment by the House and conviction by the Senate of 
`Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.' '' 
(U.S. Const., art. II., sec. 4.) The precise meaning of this 
latter clause is critical to the outcome of the impeachment 
trial.
    The President's advocates agree with their critics that 
this standard is the sole standard for Presidential impeachment 
but contend that the ``or other'' phrase indicates that grounds 
for impeachment must be criminal in nature because treason and 
bribery are crimes or acts committed against the state.
    Such crimes or acts must be heinous, they contend, because 
the term ``crimes and misdemeanors'' is preceded by the 
descriptive adjective ``high'' in the impeachment clause. These 
advocates also claim that there exists no proof of criminal 
wrongdoing, that we have evidence of only a private affair 
unrelated to performance in public office, and that abuse of 
power related to official conduct--not present here--is a 
prerequisite for impeachment.
    Many learned scholars oppose this view. Looking at the 
debates in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 
1787, they note that the Convention originally chose treason 
and bribery as the sole standard for impeachment. George Mason 
argued that this standard was too stringent and advocated that 
``maladministration'' be added to the list. James Madison 
objected, believing that no coherent definition of 
``maladministration'' existed and that such a lenient standard 
would make the President a pawn of the Senate. The Convention, 
as a result, settled on the phrase ``Treason, Bribery or other 
high Crimes or Misdemeanors.'' It is clear that the phrase 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' was considered by the framers 
to have a more narrow and specific meaning and, indeed, it is a 
term taken from English precedent.
    Accordingly, many scholars, including Raoul Berger, the 
dean of impeachment scholars, in ``Impeachment: The 
Constitutional Problems'' (1973), contend that the phrase 
``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' is a common law term of art 
that reaches both private and public behavior. Treason and 
bribery are acts that harm society in that they constitute a 
corruption on the body politic. Consequently, ``other high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' encompasses similar acts of 
corruption or betrayals of trust and need not constitute formal 
crimes. Indeed, Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 makes 
clear that impeachment is political, not criminal, in nature 
and reaches conduct that goes to reputation and character. In 
the 17th and 18th centuries the term ``misdemeanor'' refers not 
to a petty crime but to bad demeanor.
    History thus demonstrates that acts or conduct that demeans 
the integrity of the office or harms an individual's reputation 
in such a way as to engender a lack of public confidence in the 
office holder or the political system is an impeachable 
offense. Justice Joseph Story, in his celebrated ``Commentaries 
on the Constitution of the United States,'' section 762 (1835), 
made this abundantly clear when he wrote that impeachment lies 
for private behavior that harms the society or demeans its 
institutions:

    In the first place, the nature of the functions to be performed: 
The offences, to which the power of impeachment has been, and is 
ordinarily applied, as a remedy, are of a political character. Not but 
that crimes of a strictly legal character fall within the scope of the 
power, (for, as we shall presently see, treason, bribery, and other 
high crimes and misdemeanors are expressly within it;) but that it has 
a more enlarged operation, and reaches, what are aptly termed, 
political offenses, growing out of personal misconduct, or gross 
neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of the public interests, 
in the discharge of the duties of political office.

    Even though the framers rejected the English model of 
impeachment as a form of punishment and promulgated removal as 
the remedy for conviction, most scholars contend that the 
framers looked to English precedent to define ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' There is a wealth of evidence that a betrayal 
of public trust or reckless conduct that places a high office 
in disrepute constitutes ``high misdemeanors.'' The modifier 
``high'' refers to acts against the state or commonwealth. In 
the 18th century, the term ``political'' also encompassed our 
modern term of ``social.'' So conduct that harmed society as a 
whole or denigrated the public respect and confidence in 
governmental institutions constituted ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    As such, both English and American officials have been 
impeached for drunkenness, for frequenting prostitutes, even 
for insanity, in other words private conduct that is unrelated 
to official acts. Such behavior is seen as defaming the office 
that the accused held and diminishing the people's faith in 
government. Impeachment is thus seen by many scholars as a 
means of removing unqualified office holders.
    Thus, impeachment and removal does not have to be 
predicated upon commission of a crime. Consequently, 
impeachment and removal is not in essentially a criminal 
punishment, a conclusion that is also textually demonstrated by 
the fact that the framers expressly provided for later 
indictment and criminal conviction of an impeached and removed 
President.
    A high crime and misdemeanor, according to this view, does 
not have to amount to a crime or be related to official 
conduct. Even if President Clinton's acts of perjury were 
predicated upon lying about a private sexual relation, they 
still must be considered high crimes and misdemeanors. The fact 
that the underlying behavior was private in its genesis is 
irrelevant. Such private acts demean the Office of the 
President and betray public trust. Those acts, therefore, are 
impeachable.
    I must emphasize that even if the President's counsel is 
correct in that private acts unrelated to performance in office 
are not impeachable offenses, I believe the gravamen of what 
President Clinton committed are public, not private, acts that 
are unambiguous breaches of public trust. Perjury and 
particularly obstruction of justice are conduct that attack the 
very veracity of our justice system. Furthermore, I vehemently 
disagree that the underlying conduct was a purely private 
concern because the conduct involved a Federal employee in a 
work environment.
    Lying under oath, hiding evidence, and tampering with 
witnesses destroy the truth-finding function of our 
investigatory and trial system. Perjury and obstruction of 
justice are particularly pernicious if committed by a President 
of the United States who has sworn pursuant to the oath of 
office to protect the Constitution and laws of the United 
States. Whether perjury and obstruction of justice can be 
considered private or public acts is of no moment. They are 
twin ``high crimes,'' harming the political order and requiring 
impeachment and removal from office.
    A related argument made by the President's counsel is that 
a President should be held to a less stringent standard than 
Federal judges in impeachment trials. Because many judges have 
been removed for conduct unrelated to performance in office, 
such as Judges Claiborne and Nixon, who were convicted and 
removed for perjurious statements unrelated to their 
performance in office, the President is almost compelled to 
make this argument.
    In essence, the President's counsel contend that article 
III's requirement that judges hold office for ``good behavior'' 
is not simply a description of the term of office, but a 
grounds for impeachment if violated. Presidents--and other 
civil officers--are subject to the more stringent high crimes 
and misdemeanors standard.
    Most scholars reject this view. For instance, Michael J. 
Gerhardt, author of ``The Federal Impeachment Process'' (1996), 
testified in the House Constitutional Subcommittee of the 
Judiciary Committee in November that the impeachment standard 
of high crimes and misdemeanors applies to all civil officers, 
including judges as well as the President. This is the sole 
constitutional ground for impeachment. Article III's good 
behavior provision for judges simply sets the duration for 
judicial office--lifetime unless impeached. There are simply no 
differing standard for judges and the President.
    Let me now turn to the facts of this case. The House 
alleges in article I that the President should be removed 
because he committed acts of perjury. The House alleges in 
article II that the President should be removed because he 
obstructed and interfered with the mechanisms and duly 
constituted processes of the justice system.
    To demonstrate why I believe it is so, it is necessary to 
discuss both the legal standards and how the facts meet the 
requirements of those standards. I will first discuss perjury, 
and, next, turn to obstruction of justice.

                               article i

    In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his constitutional oath faithfully 
to execute the office of President of the United States and, to the 
best of his ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of 
the United States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, has willfully corrupted and 
manipulated the judicial process of the United States for his personal 
gain and exoneration, impeding the administration of justice, in that:
    On August 17, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton swore to tell the 
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth before a Federal 
grand jury of the United States. Contrary to that oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton willfully provided perjurious, false and misleading 
testimony to the grand jury.

    ``Whoever under oath . . . in any proceeding before or 
ancillary to any court or grand jury knowingly makes any false 
material declaration . . . shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than five years, or both.'' See 18 U.S.C. 
1623(a). In a prosecution for perjury under 18 U.S.C. 1623(a), 
the prosecution must prove the following elements: (i) the 
declarant was under oath, (ii) the testimony was given in a 
proceeding before a court of the United States, (iii) the 
witness knowingly made, (iv) a false statement, and (v) the 
testimony was material. United States v. Whimpy, 531 F.2d 768 
(1976). The first two elements are not at issue here because it 
is undisputed that President Clinton testified under oath 
before a grand jury of the United States. As the discussion 
below reveals, the House managers proved the remaining elements 
of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt for key aspects of 
President Clinton's grand jury testimony.
    President Clinton committed perjury before the grand jury 
when he testified falsely concerning his motivation for making 
five statements to Betty Currie. Hours after his deposition in 
the Jones case, President Clinton called his secretary Betty 
Currie and asked her to come to the White House the next day, 
January 18. (Currie Grand Jury Testimony, Jan. 27, 1998, pp. 
65-66.) On that Sunday afternoon, the President made the 
following five statements to Ms. Currie about Monica Lewinsky: 
(1) ``You were always there when she was there, right?''; (2) 
``We were never really alone.''; (3) ``Monica came on to me, 
and I never touched her, right?''; (4) ``You can see and hear 
everything, right?''; and (5) ``She wanted to have sex with me, 
and I cannot do that.'' (Currie Grand Jury Testimony, Jan. 27, 
1998, pp. 71-74.) President Clinton repeated these same 
questions and statements to Betty Currie a few days later. 
(Currie Grand Jury Testimony, Jan. 27, 1998, pp. 80-81.) When 
he discussed his deposition testimony regarding Ms. Lewinsky 
with Betty Currie on these two occasions, President Clinton 
violated Judge Wright's strict order prohibiting any discussion 
of the Jones deposition.
    President Clinton lied to the grand jury when he testified 
about his motivation for making these statements. When asked 
before the grand jury about these statements to Betty Currie, 
the President testified that he asked these ``series of 
questions'' in order to ``refresh [his] memory about what the 
facts were.'' (Clinton Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, p. 
131.) He further testified that he wanted to ``know what 
Betty's memory was about what she heard, what she could hear'' 
and that he was ``trying to get as much information as quickly 
as I could . . . [a]nd I was trying to figure [it] out . . . in 
a hurry because I knew something was up.'' (Clinton Grand Jury 
Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, p. 56.) Immediately following 
extensive questioning on this issue, a different prosecutor 
from the Office of Independent Counsel asked the President that 
``[i]f I understand your current line of testimony, you are 
saying that your only interest in speaking with Ms. Currie in 
the days after your deposition was to refresh your own 
recollection.'' (Clinton Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, 
pp. 141-42; emphasis added.) President Clinton answered: 
``Yes.'' (Id.)
    President Clinton's testimony that he was ``only'' trying 
to ``refresh [his] memory about what the facts were'' is 
perjury because a person cannot ``refresh'' his memory with 
statements and questions that he knows are false. Each of 
President Clinton's five statements to Currie is either an 
outright lie or extremely misleading. President Clinton knew 
the facts of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and he knew 
his statements to Betty Currie were false. By definition, these 
false questions and statements could not have helped President 
Clinton accurately refresh his memory.
    In addition, Betty Currie could not possibly have known the 
answers to some of these questions. For example, how could 
Betty Currie have known whether the President ever ``touched'' 
Ms. Lewinsky or whether Ms. Currie was ``always there when [Ms. 
Lewinsky] was there?'' Common sense defies the President's 
explanation: if one is trying to refresh his memory or gather 
information quickly, he does not ask questions of a person to 
which the person could not know the answers. The fact that 
Betty Currie could not have known the answers to these 
questions further undermines President Clinton's testimony that 
he was trying to refresh his memory or gather information 
quickly.
    If the President was merely trying to refresh his 
recollection or gather information quickly why did he repeat 
these questions and statements to Currie a few days later? As 
the House managers noted during the trial, instead of asking a 
series of specific leading questions, why didn't President 
Clinton ask Currie a general question about what she recalled 
about Ms. Lewinsky's activity at the White House? Moreover, 
President Clinton's blatant violation of Judge Wright's order 
prohibiting any discussion of the Jones deposition casts 
further doubt on his testimony on this issue. The President's 
testimony regarding his motivation for these statements is 
false. He did not make these statements to refresh his 
recollection. Rather, as the following section explains, the 
President made these statements to Ms. Currie in order to 
influence her potential testimony in the Jones suit and to 
influence her possible responses to the media.
    In a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. 1623, the prosecution 
must prove that the defendant ``knowingly'' made the false 
statement. Under this statute, ``knowingly'' means merely that 
the defendant made the false statement ``voluntarily and 
intentionally, and not because of mistake or accident or other 
innocent reason.'' United States v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 
(7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th 
Cir. 1980).
    The President knowingly made these false statements about 
his motivation for speaking to Betty Currie after his 
deposition. He did not make these statements by ``mistake or 
accident or other innocent reason.'' Rather, President Clinton 
lied about his motivation to conceal his true purpose in making 
these statements to Currie. In reality, President Clinton was 
attempting to corroborate his deceitful testimony in the Jones 
deposition with a prospective witness. When he made these 
statements to Currie, the President knew that she was a likely 
witness in the Jones case because he repeatedly referred to 
Currie when asked about Ms. Lewinsky by the Jones lawyers. 
(Clinton Deposition Testimony, Jan. 17, 1998, p. 58.) President 
Clinton actually told the Jones lawyers to ``ask Betty'' in 
response to one question in the deposition. (Clinton Deposition 
Testimony, Jan. 17, 1998, pp. 64-66.) In fact, Betty Currie was 
subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers only days after the President's 
deposition.
    Moreover, in addition to influencing a prospective witness 
in the Jones suit, the President had another motivation for 
coaching Ms. Currie: She was a probable target of press 
inquiries about this controversy. In fact, a prominent reporter 
from Newsweek had already called Currie on January 15, 1998 and 
asked her about Ms. Lewinsky. (Currie Grand Jury Testimony, May 
6, 1998, pp. 120-21.) The President had a motive to influence 
information Currie might give to the media--in addition to 
testimony she might give as a witness in Jones v. Clinton. The 
President knowingly made these statements to Ms. Currie in 
order to influence both her potential testimony and her 
possible responses to the media.
    ``Because the Grand Jury's function is investigative, 
materiality in that context is broadly construed.'' United 
States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1993). Courts have 
consistently held that in a grand jury, ``a false declaration 
is `material' within the meaning of [18 U.S.C.] 1623 when it 
has a natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or 
dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation.'' 
United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 1994).
    President Clinton's false statements to the grand jury 
regarding his January conversations with Betty Currie are 
material to the grand jury's investigation of obstruction of 
justice. To determine whether the President obstructed justice 
in the Jones case, it was critical for the grand jury to 
ascertain whether President Clinton attempted to influence the 
testimony of Currie, a potential witness in that case. 
President Clinton's statements to Currie the day after his 
deposition strongly indicate that he was seeking to influence 
her testimony. The President's false statements about his 
motivation for making these statements to Currie had the 
``natural effect or tendency'' to ``impede or dissuade the 
Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation'' of obstruction of 
justice in the Jones case.
    In his trial brief, the President offers only a brief 
defense to this perjury allegation. First, the President argues 
that ``Ms. Currie's testimony supports the President's 
assertion that he was looking for information as a result of 
his deposition'' when he made these statements to Currie. 
(President's Trial Brief, p. 53.) As discussed earlier, 
however, this is implausible. A person cannot accurately gather 
information by making false or misleading statements to another 
person.
    Second, in his brief, the President refers to Currie's 
grand jury testimony in which she testified that she felt no 
pressure to agree with the President when he made these 
questions and statements. (President's Trial Brief, pp. 51-53.) 
However, the fact that Ms. Currie testified that she did not 
feel pressured is completely irrelevant to whether the 
President committed perjury concerning these statements. 
President Clinton's state of mind--not Ms. Currie's--is at 
issue here because he is the one accused of perjury.
    In sum, the House managers proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that President Clinton: (1) knowingly (2) lied about his 
motivation for making these deceitful statements to Betty 
Currie (3) concerning a material matter under investigation by 
the grand jury (4) while under oath before a Federal grand 
jury.
    Another example of perjury before the grand jury concerns 
President Clinton's testimony that he did not engage in 
``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky even under his alleged 
understanding of the definition used in the Jones case. Even 
under his purported interpretation of the term, however, 
Clinton admitted to the grand jury that if the person being 
deposed touched certain enumerated body parts of another 
person, then that would constitute ``sexual relations.'' 
(Clinton Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, pp. 95-96.) When 
asked if he denied engaging in such specific conduct, Clinton 
answered ``[t]hat's correct.'' (Id.)
    President Clinton lied to the grand jury when he testified 
concerning the nature and extent of the sexual relationship. 
First, human nature and common sense strongly undermine 
President Clinton's testimony. It is undisputed that President 
Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in sexual activity on at least 
10 occasions over the course of 16 months. President Clinton's 
testimony to the grand jury that he never touched Ms. Lewinsky 
in certain areas with the intent to arouse is simply not 
believable given the nature and extent of their contact.
    In addition, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony directly contradicts 
the President. She testified in detail repeatedly before the 
grand jury about each of their sexual encounters. According to 
Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, she and President Clinton engaged in 
conduct that constituted ``sexual relations'' even under the 
President's purported understanding of the term during 10 
encounters. It is important to note that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony about the extent of their sexual conduct occurred 
before the President's grand jury testimony made these precise 
sexual details important. Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky's friends, 
family members, and medical therapists corroborated her account 
by testifying to the grand jury that Lewinsky made near-
contemporaneous statements to them that President Clinton 
fondled her in a variety of ways during their encounters. 
Finally, the fact that President Clinton lied to the American 
people about this tawdry affair badly undermines his 
implausible testimony on this issue.
    As mentioned earlier, in a perjury case under 18 U.S.C. 
1623, the prosecution must prove that the defendant 
``knowingly'' made the false statement. Under this statute, 
``knowingly'' means merely that the defendant made the false 
statement ``voluntarily and intentionally, and not because of 
mistake or accident or other innocent reason.'' United States 
v. Fawley, 137 F.3d 458, 469 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Watson, 623 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980).
    President Clinton knowingly made these false statements 
about the nature and extent of his sexual relationship. He did 
not make these statements by ``mistake or accident or other 
innocent reason.'' Instead, the President had a strong motive 
to lie about the extent of the sexual contact in order to avoid 
being accused of perjury in the Jones deposition. After Ms. 
Lewinsky's dress was discovered, President Clinton could no 
longer deny a sexual affair. However, because he repeatedly 
denied having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the 
Jones deposition, the President was trapped. As mentioned 
earlier, the President was forced to admit that fondling Ms. 
Lewinsky in certain ways would constitute ``sexual relations'' 
even under his purported interpretation of the term. 
Consequently, President Clinton had to deny such fondling 
before the grand jury to prevent an admission that he committed 
perjury in his civil deposition, despite how implausible this 
denial is. In summary, President Clinton committed perjury 
before the grand jury by insisting that his testimony in the 
Jones deposition on this key matter was true. Perhaps due to 
fear of being charged with perjury in the Jones deposition, 
President Clinton committed the more serious offense of perjury 
before a grand jury.
    As mentioned earlier, ``because the Grand Jury's function 
is investigative, materiality in that context is broadly 
construed.'' United States v. Gribbon, 984 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 
1993). Courts have consistently held that in a grand jury, ``a 
false declaration is `material' within the meaning of [18 
U.S.C.] 1623 when it has a natural effect or tendency to 
influence, impede or dissuade the Grand Jury from pursuing its 
investigation.'' United States v. Kross, 14 F.3d 751 (2d Cir. 
1994).
    The President's false statements about the extent of his 
sexual conduct with Ms. Lewinsky are material to the grand 
jury's investigation of whether the President committed perjury 
in the Jones deposition. In an effort to determine whether 
President Clinton testified truthfully in his deposition, the 
Office of Independent Counsel questioned the President at 
length before the grand jury about the nature and extent of his 
sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's tortured 
definition of sexual relations makes these details material to 
whether he committed perjury in the Jones deposition. Simply 
put, if the President touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain ways, he 
is guilty of perjury in the Jones deposition. Obviously, 
President Clinton's false statements on this matter had the 
``natural effect or tendency to influence, impede or dissuade 
the Grand Jury from pursuing its investigation'' of perjury in 
the Jones deposition.
    In President Clinton's trial brief, the only rebuttal to 
his allegation of perjury is that ``[t]his claim comes down to 
an oath against an oath about immaterial details concerning an 
acknowledged wrongful relationship.'' (President's Trial Brief, 
p. 44.) Even this one pithy sentence, however, is inaccurate. 
First, as the earlier discussion reveals, there is more 
evidence than an oath against an oath. Human nature and common 
sense badly undermine the President's testimony. In addition, 
Ms. Lewinsky testified in detail repeatedly before the grand 
jury about the extent of the sexual relationship, while the 
President reverted to his prepared statement 19 times to avoid 
answering specific sexual questions. Moreover, the testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky's family, friends, and medical therapists provide 
additional evidence of the President's perjury. Finally, the 
fact that President Clinton lied to the entire Nation about 
this sordid affair--and only acknowledged the affair when 
confronted with evidence of Ms. Lewinsky's dress--devastates 
his credibility on this issue.
    In sum, the House managers provide beyond a reasonable 
doubt that President Clinton: (1) knowingly (2) lied about the 
extent of his sexual activity with Ms. Lewinsky (3) concerning 
a material matter under investigation by the grand jury (4) 
while under oath before a Federal grand jury.
    In addition, I have concluded that President Clinton lied 
in other instances before the grand jury. While these lies 
might not sustain a conviction for perjury in a court of law, 
they are profoundly troubling nonetheless. For instance, it 
strongly appears that President Clinton lied to the grand jury 
when he testified that he did not believe certain acts that he 
and Ms. Lewinsky engaged in were covered by any of the terms 
and definitions used in the Jones suite. The following 
definition of ``Sexual Relations'' was used at the Jones 
deposition:

    For the purposes of this deposition, a person engages in `sexual 
relations' when the person knowingly engages in or causes contact with 
. . . [certain enumerated body parts] of any person with the intent to 
arouse . . .'' (Emphasis added.)

Amazingly, President Clinton testified to the grand jury that 
he does not believe and did not believe at the Jones deposition 
that this definition includes certain acts which I will not 
specify. Without addressing these lurid details, Clinton 
interprets ``any person'' to mean ``any other person'' under 
the definition. There is no legal basis for him to interpret 
the definition in this manner.
    I do not believe that President Clinton can reasonably 
claim this interpretation. First, under the President's 
interpretation, one person can engage in sexual relations, 
while his or her partner in the same activity is not engaged in 
sexual relations. Obviously, this is an implausible and absurd 
conclusion. Second, no reasonable person would have understood 
the definition in the Jones suit not to encompass the 
particular activity that President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky 
engaged in. It is important to remember that the underlying 
allegation in the Jones suit concerned the same particular acts 
involved in the Lewinsky affair. Why would the Jones lawyers 
use a definition that did not include the very conduct alleged 
by their client? Given this context, the President's testimony 
that he did not believe the definition included certain conduct 
is not believable.
    Finally, the President had a clear motive to lie about his 
understanding of the definition of sexual relations. After Ms. 
Lewinsky's dress was discovered, the President could no longer 
deny his sexual affair. However, the President repeatedly 
denied having ``sexual relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky in the 
Jones deposition. President Clinton's absurd interpretation of 
the definition of sexual relations allowed him to admit to a 
sexual relationship--which he had to do given the dress--
without simultaneously admitting to perjury in the Jones 
deposition. Because perjury is such a difficult crime to prove, 
I have concluded that the President might not be convicted in a 
court of law for perjury concerning his testimony on this 
issue. I am convinced, however, that President Clinton lied to 
the grand jury about this matter. While this testimony might 
not generate a conviction in a court of law, it was clearly 
contrived and is profoundly troubling.
    Let me now turn to the facts of the second article of 
impeachment alleging obstruction of justice. Article II alleges 
that:

    In his conduct while President of the United States, William 
Jefferson Clinton, in violation of his oath faithfully to execute the 
office of President of the United States and, to the best of his 
ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States, and in violation of his constitutional duty to take care that 
the laws be faithfully executed, has prevented, obstructed, and impeded 
the administration of justice, and has to that end engaged personally, 
and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or 
scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up, and conceal the existence 
of evidence and testimony related to a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him in a duly instituted judicial proceeding.

    In order to determine whether the President has engaged in 
the type of acts charged, it is important that the law be first 
addressed in order to guide us in understanding how the facts 
relate to the violations alleged.
    The Federal obstruction of justice statute punishes 
``[w]hoever 
. . . corruptly . . . influences, obstructs, or impedes, or 
endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due 
administration of justice.'' (18 U.S.C. 1503(a).) Known as the 
``omnibus clause,'' section 1503(a) ``clearly forbids all 
corrupt endeavors to obstruct or impede the due administration 
of justice,'' United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976 (5th 
Cir. 1989), which is defined as ``the performance of acts 
required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as 
a witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.'' 
United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621, 641 (5th Cir. 1977). The 
statute has alternatively been interpreted as forbidding 
``interferences with . . . judicial procedure'' and aiming ``to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice.'' United States v. Silverman, 
745 F.2d 1386, 1398 (11th Cir. 1984).
    ``There are three core elements that the government must 
establish to prove a violation of the omnibus clause of section 
1503: (1) there must be a pending judicial proceeding; (2) the 
defendant must have knowledge or notice of the pending 
proceeding; and (3) the defendant must have acted corruptly 
with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the proceeding 
in its due administration of justice.'' United States v. 
Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 976 (5th Cir. 1989). Accord United 
States v. Grubb, 11 F.3d 426, 437 (4th Cir. 1993) (adding the 
word ``influence'' to the terms ``obstruct or impede'' in the 
intent element).
    The purpose of the statute, according to the Supreme Court 
is not directed at the success of the corruptive effort, ``but 
at the `endeavor' to do so.'' United States v. Russell, 255 
U.S. 138, 143 (1921) (opining that the word ``endeavor'' was 
used instead of ``attempt'' in order to avoid the technical 
distinctions between attempts, which are punishable, and 
preparation for attempts, which are not). See also United 
States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995) (holding that while 
the endeavor must have the `natural and probable effect' of 
interfering with the due administration of justice, the 
defendant's actions need not be successful, citing Russell).
    The statute criminalizing witness tampering prohibits, 
inter alia, the use or attempted use of corrupt persuasion or 
misleading conduct with the intent of influencing, delaying, or 
preventing testimony in an official proceeding, causing a 
person to withhold testimony or documentary evidence, alter or 
destroy physical evidence, evade legal process, or be absent 
from an official proceeding to which such person has been 
legally summoned. (18 U.S.C. 1512(b).) ``To sustain its burden 
of proof for the crime of tampering with a witness . . . the 
Government must prove . . . that the [d]efendant knowingly, 
corruptly persuaded or attempted to corruptly persuade . . . a 
witness; and second, that the [d]efendant . . . did so 
intending to influence the testimony of [that witness] at the 
[g]rand [j]ury proceeding.'' United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 
442, 452-453 (2d Cir. 1996).
    The witness tampering statute's prohibition of corruptly 
persuading someone with intent to ``influence, delay, or 
prevent the testimony of any person in an official 
proceeding,'' has been interpreted to mean exhorting a person 
to violate his legal duty to testify truthfully in court. 
United States v. Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(rejecting defendant's argument that a simple request to 
testify falsely was outside the scope of section 1512(b)), 
cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1279 (1997). As the Second Circuit 
explained: ``Section 1512(b) does not prohibit all persuasion 
but only that which is `corrupt.' The inclusion of the 
qualifying term `corrupt' means that the government must prove 
that the defendant's attempts to persuade were motivated by an 
improper purpose to . . . . A prohibition against corrupt acts 
`is clearly limited to . . . constitutionally unprotected and 
purportedly illicit activity.'' United States v. Thompson 76 
F.3d 442, 452 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Jeter, 
775 F.2d 670, 679 (6th Cir. 1985)).
    Apart from corrupt persuasion with intent to influence a 
person's testimony, section 1512(b) proscribes engaging in 
misleading conduct with intent to influence such testimony. (18 
U.S.C. 1512(b)(1).) As one court described it, ``[t]he most 
obvious example of a section 1512 violation may be the 
situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a false 
story as if the story were true, intending that the witness 
believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury.'' 
United States v. Rodolitz, 786 F.2d 77, 81-82 (2d Cir. 1986).
    Some courts have interpreted conduct that was not 
misleading to the person at whom it was directed, even if it 
was intended to mislead the government, as outside the scope of 
section 1512. E.g., United States v. King, 762 F.2d 232, 237-
238 (2d Cir. 1985). However, the Rodolitz court distinguished 
the facts in King, where there was insufficient evidence that 
the witness was actually mislead, from the situation where the 
declarant makes false statements to a witness who is ignorant 
of their falsity. See Rodolitz, 786 F.2d at 81-82 (``In giving 
the statutory language its fair meaning, the court must find 
that making false statements to convince another to lie falls 
squarely within the definition of `engaging in misleading 
conduct toward another person' under section 1512.'').
    The witness tampering statute explicitly states that ``an 
official proceeding need not be pending or about to be 
instituted at the time of the offense.'' (18 U.S.C. 
1512(e)(1).) However, courts have implied some state of mind 
element. E.g., United States v. Kelly, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 
(D.C.Cir. 1994) (``It therefore follows that section 1512 does 
not require explicit proof of [defendant's] knowledge . . . 
that such proceedings were pending or were about to be 
instituted. . . . The statute only requires that the jury be 
able reasonably to infer from the circumstances that 
[defendant], fearing that a grand jury proceeding had been or 
might be instituted, corruptly persuaded persons with the 
intent to influence their possible testimony in such a 
proceeding.'')
    In subpart (1) of article II, it is averred that:

    On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
encouraged a witness in a Federal civil action brought against him to 
execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he knew to be 
perjurious, false and misleading.

    Subpart (2) alleges that:

    On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought against 
him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and when 
called to testify personally in that proceeding.

    Subparts (1) and (2) are flip sides of the same coin. In 
essence, the two subparts charge that the President's 2:30 a.m. 
phone call to Ms. Lewinsky on December 17, 1997, informing her 
of her presence on a witness list in the Jones case was 
designed to encourage her to provide a false affidavit in the 
case to avoid testifying, or failing that, that she give false 
testimony hiding the true nature of their relationship. What 
does the evidence show?
    It should be recalled that the presence of Ms. Lewinsky's 
name on the Jones witness list first came to the attention of 
the President no later than December 17, 1997. (Clinton Grand 
Jury Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, pp. 83-84.) He was certainly 
aware of the true nature of their relationship, and it can be 
inferred that he knew that knowledge of the existence of that 
relationship would be detrimental to his case. It is also known 
that a cover story had been developed earlier to hide the 
relationship from others that included the false representation 
that Ms. Lewinsky's visits to the oval office were for the 
purpose of bringing the President papers or to visit Ms. 
Currie. (Clinton Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, pp. 83-
84.)
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that in the same 2:30 a.m. 
conversation in which he informed her of the presence of her 
name on the witness list, the President told her that she could 
always say she was bringing him papers or visiting Ms. Currie, 
consistent with their previous cover series. (Lewinsky 
Deposition Testimony, Feb. 1, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1219.) Ms. 
Lewinsky and the attorneys for the President have argued that 
since Ms. Lewinsky did in fact ``see'' Ms. Currie on those 
visits to the President and since she was ``carrying'' papers, 
that story was not untruthful and therefore could not have been 
designed to obstruct justice. However, that rationale defies 
logic and common sense.
    In the first place, the purpose of the visits was not to 
see Ms. Currie. Secondly, the papers she carried were just 
props, not to be handed over to the President, but to be 
falsely characterized as papers for the President if 
questioned. Therefore, were she to testify in a deposition that 
the purpose of her trips to the Oval Office to visit the 
President were actually to deliver papers or visit Ms. Currie, 
those would be false representations. The creation of a cover 
story followed by actions consistent with that cover story do 
not make the story any more truthful. Therefore, the 
President's instruction to her to rely on the cover story is in 
fact an instruction to her to lie.
    Other evidence supports this conclusion, not the least of 
which is the affidavit filed by Ms. Lewinsky in the case after 
those discussions with the President took place, an affidavit 
she herself later testified as being false. How else could she 
have characterized it? In that affidavit, Ms. Lewinsky stated 
that she ``never had a sexual relationship with the 
President.'' This was false. She swore that ``[t]he occasions I 
saw the President after I left my employment at the White House 
in April, 1996, were official receptions, formal functions or 
events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was 
working at the time. There were other people present on those 
occasions.'' This statement too was false. She also averred 
that ``I do not possess any information that could possibly be 
relevant to the allegations made by Paula Jones or lead to 
admissible evidence in this case.'' Once again, this statement 
was false, as the President was aware, since he knew of the 
gifts he had given to Ms. Lewinsky. (Clinton Grand Jury 
Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, pp. 32-35.)
    The President repeatedly said that he thought that Ms. 
Lewinsky ``could,'' and he emphasizes the word ``could,'' have 
been able to draft a narrow truthful affidavit. (Clinton Grand 
Jury Testimony, Aug. 17, 1998, pp. 69, 116-17.) The problem is 
that although she ``could'' have been able to draft such an 
affidavit, the end product was not a truthful affidavit. Thus 
the President's intentional failure to prevent his attorney 
from using that false affidavit at his deposition provides 
further evidence of his corrupt intention during the December 
17, 1997, phone call to Ms. Lewinsky.
    Given these facts, the House has proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President endeavored to corruptly influence the 
affidavit and potential testimony of Ms. Lewinsky in his 
December 17, 1997, 2:30 a.m. call to her.
    In subpart (3), it is alleged that:

    On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that 
had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action brought against 
him.

    This allegation relates to the obstruction of justice by 
Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie in hiding gifts provided to Ms. 
Lewinsky by the President under the bed of Ms. Currie. The only 
question that needs to be answered here in whether the 
President participated in that effort.
    What does the evidence show? By December 28, 1997, Ms. 
Lewinsky had been subpoenaed to appear as a witness in the 
Jones case. In addition to demanding her appearance to testify, 
the subpoena also required that Ms. Lewinsky turn over any 
gifts given to her by the President. (Lewinsky Deposition 
Testimony, Feb. 1, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1221.) Under the 
pretense of meeting with Ms. Currie, Ms. Lewinsky went to the 
White House on Sunday, December 28, 1997, to discuss her 
subpoena with the President. Now, at the time of that visit, 
there is no indication that the President was aware that 
particular items had been subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers from 
Ms. Lewinsky. Without the benefit of that information, the 
President freely gave Ms. Lewinsky a number of additional 
gifts. (Lewinsky Deposition Testimony, Feb. 1, 1999, 145 Cong. 
Rec. S1224.) So when Ms. Lewinsky informed the President of 
that fact, one can infer that he must have been at the very 
least, surprised, and probably, somewhat troubled. When asked 
by Ms. Lewinsky at that meeting whether she should hide the 
gifts or give them to someone else like Ms. Currie for 
safekeeping, the President either failed to respond or said he 
needed to think about it. (Id.)
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that she left the White House and 
later received a phone call from Ms. Currie stating that she 
understood Ms. Lewinsky had something for her, or, the 
President said you have something for me. Ms. Lewinsky 
immediately understood that statement by Ms. Currie to refer to 
the gifts from the President she had discussed with him earlier 
in the day. (Lewinsky Deposition Testimony, Feb. 1, 1999, 145 
Cong. Rec. S1225.) She then proceeded to gather up all those 
gifts. However, according to Ms. Lewinsky, she unilaterally 
withheld some of those gifts from Ms. Currie which were of 
sentimental value to her.
    The President's first defense to this allegation is based 
upon a minor discrepancy in Ms. Lewinsky's testimony concerning 
the time that the gifts were retrieved by Ms. Currie. The 
argument is that if Ms. Lewinsky was mistaken by 1\1/2\ hours 
in her recollection of when the gifts were retrieved by Ms. 
Currie, then her recollection of who initiated the retrieval is 
also suspect. (Statement of Cheryl Mills, Jan. 20, 1999, 145 
Cong. Rec. S826-27.)
    This is a red herring. The timing itself is unimportant. 
What is important is the fact that the call came from Ms. 
Currie. (Lewinsky Deposition Testimony, Feb. 1, 1999, 145 Cong. 
Rec. S1225.) Ms. Currie's cell phone records tend to support 
the notion that Ms. Lewinsky's memory is accurate as to who 
called whom about the gifts. After all, the only way that Ms. 
Currie would have known about the gifts and made the call is if 
the other party to those discussions, the President, apprised 
her of that conversation and asked her to pick up the gifts.
    The fall-back defense of the President is based upon the 
fact that he had given her more gifts that same day, the idea 
being that his giving other gifts to Ms. Lewinsky is 
inconsistent with a plan to hide those gifts. (Statement of 
Cheryl Mills, Jan. 20, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S827.) This, 
however, is belied by the fact that the President provided her 
with those gifts before the issue of the gifts being subpoenaed 
came up in their conversation that day. (Lewinsky Deposition 
Testimony, Feb. 1, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1224.) It is 
reasonable to infer that the President's understanding of the 
gift pickup was unrestricted. He expected Ms. Lewinsky to give 
all the gifts to Ms. Currie for safekeeping, even the ones she 
had received that day. The fact that Ms. Lewinsky kept some of 
the gifts does not change the nature of the intended scheme.
    The evidence adduced as to subpart (3) shows beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President corruptly engaged in, 
encouraged or supported a scheme to conceal evidence in the 
Jones case.
    Subpart (4) makes the accusation that:

    Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through and 
including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified and 
succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a 
time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
harmful to him.

    It is uncontroverted that Vernon Jordan did not actively 
seek to find a job for Ms. Lewinsky until she was on the 
witness list in the Jones case. Once she was on the witness 
list, he engaged in a high-level job search under the guidance 
of the President and reported his progress in that regard 
directly to the President. (Jordan Deposition Testimony, Feb. 
2, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1231-36.) Moreover, he knew at the 
time of his job search that Ms. Lewinsky was a potential 
witness in the Jones case and, according to Ms. Lewinsky, was 
apprised by her of the sexual nature of her relationship with 
the President. (Lewinsky Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 6, 1998, 
pp. 138-39.) And of course, in that very same time frame, he 
procured for her an attorney to help her file a false affidavit 
freeing her from testifying in the case and to prepare that 
false affidavit in time for it to be used in the President's 
deposition in the Jones case. (Jordan Deposition Testimony, 
Feb. 2, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1240-41.)
    One could speculate that the President's use of one of the 
most powerful attorneys in Washington, and a close friend of 
the President, to find a lowly Defense Department employee and 
former intern a lucrative and prestigious job by contacting 
some of the most powerful executives in the country was just an 
act of kindness unrelated to her pending testimony in the Jones 
case. One could conclude that the numerous calls made by Mr. 
Jordan to the President and Ms. Currie, the calls made by the 
President to Mr. Jordan, and the calls made by Mr. Carter to 
Mr. Jordan, calls which coincided with the effort to get Ms. 
Lewinsky to file a false affidavit and secure her a job, were 
simply coincidental.
    One could surmise that Mr. Jordan's call to Ronald Perelman 
after Ms. Lewinsky felt she had a bad interview, which call led 
to a second successful interview, was unrelated to her 
cooperation in signing the affidavit only a day earlier. One 
could believe that Mr. Jordan had a great interest in assisting 
Ms. Lewinsky to find a job prior to her name showing up on the 
witness list in the Jones case and only failed to do so because 
he had no time, but was somehow able to find and devote 
substantial time to that effort, coincidentally, after her name 
showed up on the witness list. One could undertake such 
speculation. But that would defy common sense and reason.
    The President became personally engaged in the effort to 
find Ms. Lewinsky a job only after her name appeared on the 
Jones witness list. He then used his powerful friend to find 
Ms. Lewinsky a job because he believed out of gratitude for his 
help in obtaining a job, she would continue to hide their 
relationship. He kept in constant direct contact with Mr. 
Jordan up until the time that the affidavit was completed and 
she had received and accepted a job offer from Revlon. Indeed, 
the President actually spoke to Mr. Jordan during a meeting 
between her and Mr. Jordan on December 19, 1997. (Lewinsky 
Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 6, 1998, p. 131.) Mr. Jordan 
immediately called the President to report his fears the moment 
he thought Ms. Lewinsky may have turned Government witness when 
he learned Mr. Carter had been relieved of his representation 
by her. (Jordan Grand Jury Testimony, June 9, 1998, pp. 45-46.)
    One need only look at the contrary actions by the President 
once he believed Ms. Lewinsky may have decided to cooperate 
with the independent counsel investigation. Once he believed 
that she may have been cooperating with the Office of the 
Independent Counsel, he began to disparage her to aides like 
Sidney Blumenthal. (Blumenthal Deposition Testimony, Feb. 3, 
1999, 145 Cong. Rec. S1248). After that date, the President 
discussed the wisdom of destroying her credibility and 
reputation with Dick Morris. (Morris Grand Jury Testimony, Aug. 
18, 1998, p. 35.) Can anyone doubt that her favorable testimony 
was tied into the President's efforts to conceal his 
relationship with her and that the intensified job search was 
the President's endeavor to keep her from telling the truth? 
Put another way, does anyone believe that the President would 
have used Vernon Jordan to help get her a job after she agreed 
to tell the truth to the Jones attorneys or to the independent 
counsel? Of course not. It was not in the President's interest 
to reward her for the truth--she was only rewarded for her 
failure to tell the truth. Her reward for telling the truth was 
to be smeared by the President and his spin machine.
    The President's attorneys repeat the mantra that Ms. 
Lewinsky believes that she was not promised a job for her false 
testimony in the Jones case. But that really isn't the issue. 
The law requires an endeavor to corruptly influence her 
testimony. Regardless of how Ms. Lewinsky perceived or 
misperceived the reasons for the high-level assistance she 
received, there was no such misconception on the part of the 
President and Mr. Jordan. The corrupt endeavor by the President 
was confirmed by two powerful and compelling words that cannot 
be parsed or stripped of meaning. Those two words summed up the 
month long effort to protect the President: ``Mission 
accomplished.'' There can be no other meaning of those words in 
the context used by Mr. Jordan other than the completion of a 
crucial and time sensitive task by him on behalf of the 
President.
    The proof as to subpart (4) is sustained beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President intensified and succeeded 
in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that 
proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that 
witness would have been harmful to him.
    Subpart (5) alleges that:

    On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil rights 
action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly allowed 
his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge 
characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed 
relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a communication to that 
judge.

    There is no question that during the deposition of the 
President by the Jones attorneys, the President's attorney, Mr. 
Bennett, made the following statement:

. . . Counsel is fully aware that Ms. Lewinsky has filed, has an 
affidavit which they are in possession of saying that there is 
absolutely no sex of any kind, in any manner, shape or form, with 
President Clinton . . . 

    Mr. Bennett made this statement in an effort to cut off any 
questioning of the President about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. That statement was false, as was later admitted by 
Mr. Bennett, even given the contorted reading of the definition 
of sexual relations as purportedly understood by the President. 
It is equally clear that the President did not correct this 
assertion by his attorney.
    The President's primary defense to this allegation is that 
he wasn't paying attention to what was said by his attorney. 
This statement cannot be believed. The videotape of that 
deposition clearly shows the eyes of the President shifting 
from person to person as each spoke or argued their perspective 
on the issue. As each spoke, the President focused on the 
speaker. It is ludicrous to assert that when the name Monica 
Lewinsky was brought up, the President was not keenly aware of 
the significance of that line of questioning.
    He knew the work that had been done to get her affidavit 
completed before the deposition. He understood the disclosure 
of that relationship could do irreparable damage to his case 
and to his Presidency. There is nothing to indicate he was 
anything less than completely aware of what was said and of his 
failure to correct that record to his detriment. I choose to 
believe my own eyes and common sense, not the implausible 
explanation put forward by the attorneys for the President.
    The secondary defense offered by the President, that Mr. 
Bennett's use of the word ``is'' precluded the necessity to 
reveal any sexual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky not occurring, 
essentially, in that room during the deposition, is not worthy 
of a detailed refutation or response.
    The evidence demonstrates that the President allowed his 
attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal 
judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent 
questioning deemed relevant by the judge, thus obstructing the 
administration of justice.
    In subpart (6), the House makes the contention that:

    On or about January 18, 1998, and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.

    This allegation relates to the statements made to Ms. 
Currie by the President in his unusual Sunday meeting with her 
after the Jones deposition, and in his repetition of those 
statements the following Tuesday or Wednesday after the Starr 
investigation had become public. The President has not 
contested the fact that the statements made to Ms. Currie were 
false and misleading. Nor has he provided any answer as to why 
the statements, if designed to help refresh his recollection, 
were false and had to be repeated to her again several days 
later. After being confronted with the subpoena issued to Ms. 
Currie by the Jones attorneys in the days after his deposition, 
and the revised witness list containing her name, the 
President's attorneys have now backed off the notion that no 
one could have thought Ms. Currie would be a witness at the 
time of these statements. Despite this, the President still 
asserts that those false and misleading statements were 
designed to refresh his recollection and that he personally did 
not believe that she would become a witness. Once again, this 
defense defies credulity.
    When these statements were made, the President was defying 
a court order not to discuss his testimony. (Clinton Deposition 
Testimony, Jan. 17, 1998, pp. 212-13.) He knew it was essential 
to do so regardless of that order because he had blatantly 
inserted Ms. Currie into the case as a fact witness. He 
mentioned her name during his deposition no less than six 
times, on one occasion even stating that the Jones attorneys 
would have to ``ask Betty.'' Clearly, the Jones attorneys got 
the message; they added Ms. Currie to the witness list and 
subpoenaed her the following week. So did the President. Having 
``brought'' her into the case, the President realized the 
absolute need to make sure her testimony would dovetail with 
his assertions that he had no improper relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky.
    It is apparent that the Sunday meeting was designed to 
corruptly mislead Ms. Currie when she would be called as a 
witness in the Jones case. What was left unanswered by the 
President, but for which there can be but one answer, was why 
the President repeated the false statements to Ms. Currie on 
Tuesday or Wednesday.
    The answer lies in the record. By Tuesday, the President 
had learned that Judge Starr was investigating the case. 
(Jordan Grand Jury Testimony, June 9, 1998, pp. 55-74.) He knew 
that the evidence in the Jones case would lead Judge Starr to 
Ms. Currie, just as surely as he knew it would lead the Jones 
attorneys to her. So he had to reinforce the false statements 
he had told Ms. Currie the previous Sunday because the stakes 
had just risen substantially. The President needed to be sure 
he was covered by Ms. Currie for both the Jones case and for 
the independent counsel investigation to come.
    Once again the evidence shows that the President related a 
false and misleading account of events relevant to a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him to a potential witness 
in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of that witness.
    The House asserts in subpart (7) that:

    On or about January 21, 23 and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a 
Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.

    This subpart relates to the President's discussions with 
Erskine Bowles, John Podesta and Sidney Blumenthal concerning 
the nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. The President 
does not deny the testimony of Mr. Podesta where he related 
that the President said that he had no sexual relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky, including oral sex. Nor does he deny the 
testimony of Sidney Blumenthal that he characterized Ms. 
Lewinsky as a stalker who had threatened him, and whose 
seduction he had declined. The President also admits that he 
knew it was likely they would be grand jury witnesses when he 
made those statements to them.
    Their client having conceded the basic facts of this 
allegation, the President's attorneys first try to make the 
argument that the President could not have been intending to 
influence the grand jury since he did not tell his aides 
anything different than he had told any other person publicly. 
However, the evidence is unrefuted that his denials to his 
aides were fundamentally different from his public 
pronunciations in that they departed from even his tortured 
definition of sexual relations. Moreover, he created a false 
impression of Ms. Lewinsky in order to besmirch her character 
and credibility in a blatant attempt to both misguide the grand 
jurors, and it can be inferred by the fact such information was 
provided to his communications aide, to publicly disparage her 
character.
    The second defense offered is that the President's attempts 
to keep his aides out of the grand jury show he was not trying 
to corruptly influence that body. However, this argument loses 
force in light of the fact that only specious arguments were 
made to prevent their testimony. Knowing they would fail, they 
were arguably designed to serve his private interest in 
delaying the investigation and creating an impression of Judge 
Starr as overreaching and out of control. Moreover, the 
President had months to correct his misstatements to Mr. 
Blumenthal prior to his grand jury testimony, but failed to do 
so even when he knew he would be called before the grand jury 
to repeat the earlier lies told to him by the President. 
(Blumenthal Deposition Testimony, Feb. 3, 1999, 145 Cong. Rec. 
S1249.)
    In effect, the President killed two birds with one stone. 
His chimeric fight to prevent his aides from testifying was 
used effectively in a public relations campaign to impugn the 
independent counsel investigation. And when he lost the 
``battle'' that he knew would inevitably fail, he was aware the 
false and slanderous testimony preordained to be given by his 
aides would be of assistance to him in misleading the grand 
jury.
    There is substantial proof as to subpart (7) that the 
President made false and misleading statements to potential 
witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses.
    For the reasons I have just outlined, the evidence proves 
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the President is guilty of 
article II.
    This impeachment trial is of momentous constitutional 
consequence. A removal of the President--a coequal branch of 
government--must not be taken lightly. But that--now that we 
have decided to end the trial by a final vote--does not negate 
the duty that each Senator has, as individual conscience 
dictates, to vote to acquit or convict based upon the evidence. 
Posterity demands that each of us justify the votes Senators 
render in the impeachment trial of the President.
    Future generations of Americans will look to what we do as 
precedents for impeachments. This is particularly true since 
our Nation has faced only one impeachment trial of a 
President--that of Andrew Johnson in 1868. But it is also true 
for judges and other Federal officials as well. Let me thus 
explain in some detail why I shall vote for conviction.
    The Constitution vests great discretion in the Senate in 
determining whether to remove an impeached official. The 
framers intentionally followed the English model where the 
House of Commons possessed the power to impeach or indict 
officials and the House of Lords the authority to try the 
impeached official. As such, the House of Representatives was 
delegated the authority to impeach and the Senate the power to 
try, convict, and remove. The Senate was chosen as the 
repository of this awesome power because it was considered the 
more mature Chamber of Congress. Serving 6-year terms instead 
of the 2 years for the House, the Senate was seen as a bulwark 
against the shifting tides of public opinion.
    The age qualification differences--30 for the Senate and 25 
for the House--demonstrates that maturity in the Senate would 
dominate over youthful passion. And most important, while the 
House was prone to passionate factional rifts, because 
Representatives are elected from small sometimes single-issue 
districts, Senators are elected statewide where, it was hoped, 
factions would counteract factions. Thus, the Senate was 
designed to be more attuned to the public interest than to the 
special interest.
    Consequently, when the Senate sits as a court of 
impeachment, it does not have to rubber-stamp the House's view 
as to what is an impeachable offense. As recognized by the 
Supreme Court in the Nixon case, the Senate was vested by the 
framers with the sole power to try impeachments. The Senate is 
thus vested with independent judgment as to what process to 
employ in the trial.
    It also follows that the Senate was granted the discretion 
to determine whether the factual allegations made by the House 
are true and whether such findings by the Senate rise to the 
level of high crimes and misdemeanors. Furthermore, the Senate, 
as the upper Chamber insulated against popular passions and the 
factions of special interests, could make a subjective 
determination of the public good in defining high crimes and 
misdemeanors and in removing an official.
    In the words of my esteemed colleague, Robert Byrd, the 
answer of whether a person is fit to remain in office requires 
both detached objectivity and subjective judgment rising above 
temporary popular passions of whether continuation in office 
``brings the political--or judicial--system into disrepute and 
undermines the people's trust and confidence in government.''
    Supportive of this discretionary authority to remove 
officials--an authority that must be divorced from the fleeting 
and flaming emotions of the times--is the constitutional 
supermajority safeguard of a two-thirds vote of the Senate 
needed to remove officials. This requirement is a further 
guarantee against the tide of popular passion and tilts the 
impeachment process towards acquittal.
    Accordingly, a Senator in impeachment trials must consider 
two factors: (1) whether the allegations are true; and (2) 
whether the facts proven rise to the level of high crimes and 
misdemeanors--impeachable offenses. In determining the second 
prong--whether the facts proven rise to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors--the subjective intent of Senators of 
what is in the public interest is a factor to consider. I have 
already discussed the facts and the standard for impeachable 
offenses. Now I will discuss whether the public interest--in 
other words what is best for the country--requires that the 
acts committed by President Clinton rise to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors requiring his removal.
    I believe that it has. Some of my colleagues, particularly 
those on the other side of the aisle, contend that it is not in 
the public interest to remove President Clinton, because the 
economy is doing well, or because of his foreign policy 
successes, or because he is extremely popular in the polls. But 
these factors--no matter how important--do not justify ignoring 
the constitutional mandate of removal upon proving that 
impeachable acts were committed.
    Polls should not be a factor in this trial. Our system of 
government is not a pollocracy. It is a representative republic 
where the people, as a constitutional matter, speak only 
through elections of their representatives. America is thus a 
constitutional republic, and will remain so ``if''--in the 
words of Benjamin Franklin--``you can keep it.'' The only way 
to ``keep it'' is to respect the processes established by the 
Constitution itself.
    Simply put, the Constitution mandates the conviction and 
removal of civil officers, including the President, upon 
proving ``treason, bribery, and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' I believe that the House managers have proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt that President Clinton has committed 
acts of perjury and obstruction of justice. I believe that 
Senators should come to the same subjective determination, as I 
have, that these acts of perjury and obstruction of justice so 
erodes our civil and criminal justice system as to conclude 
that the public good is served by removal.
    A President of the United States is not simply a political 
leader. A President is a head of state and a role model for 
Americans, particularly our children. What kind of message will 
we send to our posterity if President Clinton's conduct is not 
considered worthy of removal? What amount of cynicism and 
disrespect for our governmental institutions will we engender 
if we impose one set of rules for the common man--imprisonment 
for acts of perjury and obstruction of justice--and another for 
the President of the United States--who receives a pass from 
removal because he is powerful or has done a ``good job'' in 
some eyes?
    Our children are extremely vulnerable to the growing 
cynicism surrounding this trial. We have all heard stories that 
some children justify their deceits by claiming that the 
President of the United States lied as well. Many wise 
philosophers have exclaimed that a republic can survive only if 
its citizens are moral. I am afraid that our children may not 
learn that lesson.
    Not to remove here is to diminish the rule of law. As 
Manager Rogan warned in his closing argument, ``[u]p until now, 
the idea that no person is above the law has been unquestioned. 
And yet this standard is not our inheritance automatically. 
Each generation of Americans ultimately has to make the choice 
for themselves. Once again, it is time for choosing. How will 
we respond?'' We should respond by safeguarding the rule of law 
by voting to remove the President.
    Whether President Clinton has done a ``good job'' is a 
matter of partisan debate. In fact, adopting a ``good job'' 
exception--a term that is so flexible and vague as to be 
meaningless as a constitutional standard--merely exasperates 
the partisan tensions ever present in impeachment trials.
    The same analysis applies for the ``good economy means no 
removal'' theory. It is intuitive that economic growth can 
never justify crime or acts rising to the level of high crimes 
and misdemeanors warranting removal. If President Clinton is 
removed, our economy will not suffer. The world will still spin 
on its axis. Our Constitution provides for orderly succession 
and stable government. Removal will not overturn an election, 
as some have argued. The constitutional impeachment procedures 
were designed simply to remove unqualified or corrupt 
officials. Vice President Gore, pursuant to the Constitution, 
will become President and life will go on.
    Let me emphasize that by requiring removal upon proving the 
commission of impeachable offenses, the framers believed that 
it is in the public good to remove the official.
    President Clinton is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors 
and his poll numbers, no matter how lofty, cannot insulate him 
from the dictates of the Constitution. The President believes 
that a rule of polls should govern the Senate's decision. But 
as Manager Rogan correctly observed, ``the personal popularity 
of any President pales when weighed against the fundamental 
concept that forever distinguishes us from every nation on the 
planet. No person is above the law.'' There is no escaping the 
Senate's duty enshrined in the impeachment oath that we do 
``impartial justice'' and remove the President if we believe 
that his actions amounted to high crimes and misdemeanors.
    I do not take pleasure or gain any sense of gratification 
for the decision I must make today. For literally months, night 
and day, I have anguished over the serious accusations against 
President Clinton and what they mean for our country, our 
society, and our children.
    I know none of us enjoys sitting in judgment of the 
President, our fellow human being, but that is our job and we 
cannot ignore our responsibility. I believe most of us will do 
a sincere job of trying to fulfill our oath to do impartial 
justice.
    I have diligently strived to extend my deepest respect to 
the President--indeed, to the Presidency--throughout this 
process. I wanted to be able to support President Clinton. I 
believe that I have been more than fair. I have tried not to 
rush to judgment.
    All of my life I have been taught to forgive and forget. I 
have always tried to live up to that belief. As a leader in my 
church, I have dealt with a great number of human frailties, 
people with a wide variety of problems, and I have always 
believed that good people can repent of their sins and be 
forgiven.
    Indeed, to the dismay of some, I had expressed a hope and a 
desire early on in this constitutional drama that the President 
would acknowledge his untruthful statements. He chose to do 
otherwise and perpetuated his untruthfulness. Although some 
believe this is solely a private matter, I feel this is really 
about the President's fidelity to the oath of office and the 
rule of law.
    I have always been prepared to vote my conscience. Indeed, 
my concerns regarding the bad precedent a likely acquittal 
would set have been somewhat calmed by something the great 
constitutional scholar, Joseph Story, once wrote about 
acquittal in impeachment cases. Mr. Story noted that in cases 
in which two-thirds of the Senate is not satisfied that a 
conviction is warranted, ``it would be far more consonant to 
the notions of justice in a republic, that a guilty person 
should escape than that an innocent person should become the 
victim of injustice from popular odium . . . ''
    Nonetheless, I am reminded of a quote by President Theodore 
Roosevelt, a statement that applies to the matter before the 
Senate:

    Honesty is not so much a credit as an absolute prerequisite to 
efficient service to the public. Unless a man is honest, we have no 
right to keep him in public life; it matters not how brilliant his 
capacity. . . .
    ``Liar'' is just as ugly a word as ``thief,'' because it implies 
the presence of just as ugly a sin in one case as in the other. If a 
man lies under oath or procures the lie of another under oath, if he 
perjures himself or suborns perjury, he is guilty under the statute 
law. Under the higher law, under the great law of morality and 
righteousness, he is precisely as guilty if, instead of lying in a 
court, he lies in a newspaper or on the stump; and in all probability 
the evil effects of his conduct are infinitely more widespread and more 
pernicious.

    President Theodore Roosevelt's words cannot be ignored--nor 
can the Constitution. After weighing all of the evidence, 
listening to witnesses, and asking questions, I have concluded 
that President Clinton's actions warrant removal from office.
    Committing crimes of moral turpitude such as perjury and 
obstruction of justice go to the heart of qualification for 
public office. These offenses were committed by the Chief 
Executive of our country, the individual who swore to 
faithfully execute the laws of the United States.
    This great Nation can tolerate a President who makes 
mistakes. But it cannot tolerate one who makes a mistake and 
then breaks the law to cover it up. Any other citizen would be 
prosecuted for these crimes.
    President Clinton did more than just break the law. He 
broke his oath of office and broke faith with the American 
people. Americans should be able to rely on him to honor those 
values that have built and sustained our country, the values we 
try to teach our children--honesty, integrity, being 
forthright.
    For 13 miserable months, we have struggled with the 
question of what to do about President Clinton's actions. The 
struggle has divided the Nation.
    To those of us who have ourselves taken an oath to uphold 
the Constitution--which represents the rule of law and not of 
men--it should not matter how brilliant or popular we feel the 
President is. The Constitution is why we govern based on the 
principle of equality and not emotion. The Constitution is what 
guides us as a nation of laws and not personalities. The 
Constitution is what enables us to live in freedom.
    I will vote for conviction on both articles of impeachment 
not because I want to but because I must. Upholding our 
Constitution--a sacred document that Americans have fought and 
died for--is more important than any one person, including the 
President of the United States.
    When all is said and done, I must fulfill my oath and do my 
duty. I will vote guilty on both article I and article II.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy

    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I would like to submit a 
statement delivered by our colleague Senator Dodd on January 8 
at the commencement of the impeachment trial of President 
Clinton.
    This statement, like the others delivered that day, is 
remarkable in several respects.
    First, it captures the rich history that has transpired 
over the years in the Old Senate Chamber--a history marked 
often by greatness, but occasionally by shame.
    Second, it wonderfully expresses Senator Dodd's own 
personal sense of the history of the Senate. His reflections on 
past Senators--from Roger Sherman, the Founding Father whose 
seat Senator Dodd occupies, to his own father, former Senator 
Thomas Dodd--remind us that the Senate is an institution made 
up of individuals, and that the totality of their actions 
shapes the destiny not just of the Senate itself but indeed of 
the entire country.
    Third, and most importantly, Senator Dodd's statement 
stands as a powerful plea for cooperation and bipartisanship in 
the discharge of the Senate's profound responsibility in this 
trial. Senator Dodd's statement played a critical role in 
setting the stage for the historic bipartisan agreement reached 
at the outset of the trial, and for the spirit of civility that 
prevailed throughout this ordeal. I commend Senator Dodd's 
statement to all citizens who in the future may wish to learn 
something of how the Senate was inspired to conduct the 
impeachment trial of President Clinton in a noble and dignified 
manner.
    I am beginning my 25th year in the Senate. After Senator 
Dodd spoke I told him his speech was one of the finest I had 
heard in those years.
    No Senator ever spoke more directly--or more persuasively--
to other Senators about the duty we all have to the 
Constitution and the Senate. I am proud to serve with him.
    I ask unanimous consent that the text of Senator Dodd's 
statement be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be 
printed in the Record as follows:

Remarks by Senator Christopher J. Dodd, Old Senate Chamber, January 8, 
                                  1999

    Mr. DODD. Let me begin by thanking our two leaders. While none of 
us can say with any certainty how this matter will be concluded, if we, 
like every other institution that has brushed up against this lurid 
tale, end up in a raucous partisan brawl, it will not be because of the 
example set by Tom Daschle and Trent Lott. The graces have once again 
blessed this extraordinary body by delivering two noble and decent men 
to lead us.
    I want to express a special thanks to you, Tom, for asking me to 
share my thoughts this morning on the issue before us.
    On a light note, it was in this very room 4 years ago that I lost 
the Democratic leader's post to Tom Daschle. Of the 47 members of the 
Democratic Caucus, 46 were here that morning to vote. When the ballots 
were counted, Tom and I had each received 23 votes--a dead heat. The 
absent Democratic colleague who voted for Tom with a proxy ballot was 
Ben Nighthorse Campbell. Several weeks later I received a very late 
night call from Ben in which he shared with me his decision to change 
political parties. Ben and I have been good friends for some time, and 
I told him he ought to do what he felt was right. The next morning I 
decided to have some fun with our Democratic leader, Tom Daschle, by 
sending him a note asking that in light of Ben's decision to become a 
Republican, did Tom think a recount of the leader's race might be in 
order?
    Considering the wonderful job our leader Tom has done, particularly 
over these last several weeks, I'm glad he did not even consider the 
offer.
    Allow me further to note a point of personal privilege. I am deeply 
proud to share the representation of my State in the Senate with Joe 
Lieberman. Over these past couple of weeks, Joe and Slade Gorton have 
once again demonstrated the value of their presence in the Senate. 
While many of us, from time to time, have claimed to speak for the 
Senate--few rarely do. On that day in September, Joe, your remarks 
delivered on the Senate floor about the President's behavior were, I 
believe, the sentiments of the entire Senate. We thank you.
    Joe and I represent the Constitution State. Joe sits in the seat 
once held by Oliver Ellsworth, the second Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. I sit in the seat of Roger Sherman, the only Founding Father to 
sign all four of our cornerstone documents: the Declaration of 
Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution and The 
Bill of Rights. Roger Sherman was also the author of the Connecticut 
Compromise which created this Senate in which we now serve.
    So by institutional lineage, I feel a special connection with the 
Senate. On a personal level, I am also very much a product of the 
Senate. Forty years ago this week, I was a very proud 14-year-old 
watching from the family gallery as my father took the same oath I took 
on Wednesday. I also remember that day meeting another new Senator, 
Robert C. Byrd of West Virginia.
    I only mention these facts because I am overwhelmed by a profound 
sense of history as we embark on this perilous journey over the coming 
weeks. I want my institutional forebear, Roger Sherman, and my father 
to judge that on my watch, as a temporary custodian of this Senate 
seat, I did my best.
    I want to express a special thanks to Trent Lott for having the 
wisdom of choosing this most historical room for our joint caucus. 
Trent could have chosen any number of other venues, larger, more 
accommodating rooms around the Capitol for this meeting. But either by 
divine inspiration or simple choice he decided to bring us--Democrats 
and Republicans--together here.
    It was 140 years ago this week--January 4, 1859--that our Senate 
predecessors moved from this room to the Chamber we now occupy. While 
in use, this room was the stage of some of the Senate's most worthy and 
memorable moments.
    The Missouri Compromise was brokered here. So was the Compromise of 
1850. And the famous Webster-Hayne debate took place here in 1830. The 
spirits of Henry Clay, John Calhoun and Daniel Webster--great 
statesmen, great compromisers, giants of our Senate--are here with us 
today. Maybe one day those who come after us will add this joint 
meeting to the list of those other great moments in the history of the 
U.S. Senate.
    But this Chamber also witnessed one of the Senate's most 
regrettable moments--the caning in 1856 of Senator Charles Sumner by 
Representative Preston Brooks.
    Congressman Brooks walked right through this center door and 
proceeded to beat Senator Sumner.
    That tragic incident was precipitated by a strong antislavery 
speech from Senator Sumner in which Representative Brooks felt Sumner 
had accused his colleague and Brook's cousin, Senator Andrew Butler of 
South Carolina, of having an illicit sexual relationship with a young 
woman who was a slave.
    Far from being a momentary bitter, personal dispute, the Sumner 
caning, according to many historians, effectively ended the thin shred 
of comity and compromise that existed in the Senate. Forty-eight months 
later our great Civil War began.
    We are now gathered in this revered room in the face of a great 
constitutional question. Which of the spirits that inhabit this Chamber 
will prevail as we begin this process? Can we find the common ground of 
Clay, Calhoun and Webster? Or will we assault each other by resorting 
to a rhetorical caning?
    I would urge our two leaders to try once more before the scheduled 
vote of 1 p.m. to find a solution to the issue of witness testimony.
    It has been argued that there is little or no difference between 
the two proposals, and, while they may seem slight, I believe our 
failure to make the right choice puts the conduct of this process and 
the public confidence in the Senate at grave risk.
    The President's conduct was deplorable; the conduct of the Office 
of Independent Counsel has raised grave concerns on all sides; and the 
highly partisan spectacle in the House has provoked public revulsion. 
We are the court of last resort--the only hope of restoring public 
confidence rests with us.
    The issue of whether to exclude witnesses altogether or leave open 
the possibility of their testimony rests on how we weigh the relative 
risk of prohibiting witnesses against the risk of severely damaging or 
destroying the shared goals and desires of all Senators.
    Over the past several weeks, in telephone conversations, meetings 
and joint appearances on news programs, I have concluded there are six 
points of common agreement:
          (1) There is the sincere desire for this profound burden we 
        did not ask for to be devoid of partisanship;
          (2) We must act with total fairness, and we must be perceived 
        by the public as having acted fairly;
          (3) We must act with deliberate speed and not flounder;
          (4) We must assure that the Senate retains sole custody of 
        how this matter is conducted and concluded;
          (5) We must demonstrate appropriate respect for the judicial 
        branch, the executive branch and the House of Representatives; 
        and
          (6) We must jealously protect the dignity of the Senate as we 
        consider what most Americans believe to be, at the very least, 
        the most undignified personal behavior of an American 
        President.
    If we permit the House managers and the White House to call 
witnesses, do we not risk the partisan brawling through party-line 
voting that will surely ensue? And does not that risk outweigh the risk 
that some of us may not benefit from body language or voice inflection 
that some witnesses may provide? I think not.
    A process as proposed by Senators Gorton and Lieberman that allows 
a full explanation of the House managers case over several days and an 
equal amount of time allocated for the President's defense, in addition 
to 2 days of questions from Senators, would meet any reasonable 
person's standard of fairness. The added fact that we will have at our 
disposal more than 60,000 pages of grand jury testimony, hearings and 
evidence should satisfy any objective analysis that we can conduct this 
process fairly.
    There is no more important business before the Senate than the 
conduct and conclusion of this impeachment trial. I am of the view that 
no other business ought to intervene while this matter is pending. As I 
have said, we must act fairly--but we must also act expeditiously--not 
rush--but act with deliberate speed and purpose.
    Any first semester law student knows that once witnesses are 
subpoenaed, fundamental fairness allows for depositions and discovery. 
Depending on the number of witnesses, the delays will undoubtedly be 
lengthy.
    I readily acknowledge that there are some risks in excluding the 
testimony of live witnesses--but does that risk exceed the almost 
certain risk of causing the Senate to be unnecessarily tied up with 
this matter for weeks if not months?
    As I have stated, this unsolicited task of disposing of this 
impeachment is paramount, but we would all agree it is not our only 
responsibility.
    There are urgent matters, both foreign and domestic, that we must 
attend to in the 106th Congress. Pete Domenici's concern about the 
budget and not repeating the budget debacle of last year, Social 
Security reform, Ted Stevens' concern about the accuracy of our weapons 
in Iraq, and the Brazilian economic crisis are just a small sample of 
the agenda this Senate must address. The risk of not dealing with these 
matters must be weighed against the wisdom of calling live witnesses in 
this proceeding.
    The Constitution is clear--only the Senate has the power to try 
impeachments. We and we alone must be the custodians of our own 
procedures. While the calling of live witnesses does not necessarily 
mean the Senate would lose control of the proceedings, there is the 
undeniable risk that once the witness parade begins, the ability of the 
Senate, and the Senate alone, to manage these proceedings fairly, 
expeditiously, and in a nonpartisan fashion could be lost.
    We Senators have a serious responsibility to be respectful of the 
judicial branch in the presence of Chief Justice Rehnquist, the 
executive branch in the presence of counsel for the President, and the 
House of Representatives in the presence of the House managers. Being 
respectful and deferential to these institutions should not be confused 
with deferring to these institutions. Chief Justice Rehnquist has 
indicated to our leaders that he intends to be a passive presiding 
officer, except in some narrow instances. The White House, through 
their counsel, indicated that it would prefer to avoid calling 
witnesses. Only the House managers are insisting on the use of 
witnesses. Furthermore, the House managers agree that the exclusion of 
witnesses by the Senate would deprive them of the ability to make their 
case and be taken as an act of disrespect by the Senate.
    I find it stunningly ironic that the House Judiciary Committee saw 
no similar disrespect to their fellow House members when they presented 
their articles of impeachment before the full House without the benefit 
of a single witness appearing before their panel. When asked why no 
witnesses had been called before the House Judiciary Committee, some 
Members argued that the calling of witnesses would have unduly delayed 
their proceedings and the presence of some witnesses could have 
reflected poorly on the dignity of the House.
    The obvious question occurs that if the House managers were 
unwilling to risk an expeditious handling of their procedures and 
unwilling to risk the potential for a lewd and lurid spectacle in their 
Chamber, why then should we in the Senate submit our Chamber to similar 
risks when there is no compelling benefit to be gained?
    A process that would allow either side in this matter to call 
witnesses--with the approval of a bare majority--risks setting in 
motion a Senate proceeding where we Senators would sit in muted 
silence, as my friend Mitch McConnell has pointed out, while our 
Chamber becomes the stage for the most lurid and salacious testimony of 
which we and the American people are all too painfully aware and of 
which the public wants to hear no more.
    Would whatever marginal benefit this testimony could provide 
outweigh the cost to the reputation of the Senate or the dignity of 
this institution?
    I submit that we should not run the risk of allowing this 
institution to be used by anyone as a forum to appeal to the most base 
instincts of a few.
    For these reasons, I would strongly urge you, my colleagues, not to 
run all the substantial risks to the conduct of this process and the 
reputation of our Senate by permitting the unnecessary procession of 
witnesses in the well of our Chamber.

                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Jeff Sessions

    Mr. SESSIONS. Mr. Chief Justice, the Constitution of the 
United States requires the Senate to convict and remove the 
President of the United States if it is proven that he has 
committed high crimes while in office. It has been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that 
President William Jefferson Clinton has persisted in a 
continuous pattern to lie and obstruct justice. The chief law 
officer of the land, whose oath of office calls on him to 
preserve, protect and defend the Constitution, crossed the line 
and failed to protect the law, and, in fact, attacked the law 
and the rights of a fellow citizen. Under our Constitution, 
such acts are high crimes and equal justice requires that he 
forfeit his office. For these reasons, I felt compelled to vote 
to convict and remove the President from office.
    Facing a lawsuit the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld against 
him, President Clinton had to make a decision. He could tell 
the truth or lie and obstruct justice. He took the course of 
illegality. This case is not about an isolated false statement, 
it is about the President of the United States using his 
office, his power, his staff, and his popularity to avoid 
providing truthful answers and evidence that was relevant to a 
civil lawsuit. President Clinton's actions demonstrated a 
pattern of untruth and disdain for the legal system he had 
sworn to uphold.
    President Clinton resisted the lawsuit from the time it was 
filed. Among other defenses, he argued that he, as the 
President, was not subject to the civil legal system while in 
office. The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this 
proposition. His legal arguments having failed, the President 
began to use illegal means to defeat the action. Since the 
truth would be damaging, he took steps to see that the truth 
concerning his relationship with Monica Lewinsky would never 
come out.
    President Clinton began his obstruction of justice by 
denying to the court material truths. He first filed with the 
court false answers to written questions, interrogatories, 
under oath. He then bolstered his lies to the court by 
procuring from Monica Lewinsky a supporting false affidavit 
which he filed with the court. When questioned at his 
deposition about the truthfulness of the Lewinsky affidavit, 
President Clinton, without any hesitation, told the court that 
it was ``absolutely true.'' The President then proceeded, 
confident in his obstruction of the truth, to lie repeatedly 
under oath about their relationship in the deposition.
    Indeed, the President orchestrated a scheme to deceive the 
court, the public and the grand jury. The facts are disturbing 
and compelling on the President's intent to obstruct justice. 
When Monica Lewinsky received a subpoena for the gifts, the 
President knew that if they were produced, his relationship 
would be revealed. I believe Monica Lewinsky's testimony that 
she discussed with the President what to do with the gifts. I 
also believe that Betty Currie got the gifts from Monica 
Lewinsky and hid them under her bed only after approval from 
the President. Secreting evidence under subpoena is a crime. 
The President secured a job for Ms. Lewinsky in large part 
because he wanted her to file a false affidavit and to continue 
to cover up their true relationship. The President coached his 
personal secretary twice to ensure that if she were called as a 
witness in the civil case she would not contradict his 
testimony given the day before. The President intentionally 
lied to aides in an effort to have them mislead the public and 
the grand jury. This is to me a clear pattern of obstruction of 
justice.
    The most conclusive proof of obstruction of justice, 
however, is the most obvious. Clearly, the President succeeded 
at defeating the right of the Paula Jones attorneys to get 
discovery as they were entitled. He got away with it. But for 
the indisputable DNA evidence that was only produced when Ms. 
Lewinsky confessed 7 months later, the obstruction would have 
continued to be successful. Even when confronted with this 
evidence at the grand jury in August, the President chose to 
confuse the definition of words that have plain meanings 
instead of telling the truth.
    From a strictly legal point of view the perjury count was 
not as clear as it might first appear. In fact, standing alone 
these perjury charges may have failed to be impeachable. 
However, the President made his false statements as part of a 
continuous pattern to obstruct justice and deceive. This 
pattern establishes the necessary criminal intent. The 
President before the grand jury continued to deny facts and 
details that are by their very nature important in a sexual 
harassment suit. The President also intentionally deceived the 
grand jury regarding his participation in the concealing of the 
gifts and lied regarding his effort to obstruct justice by 
coaching Betty Currie. His admissions, though significant, 
steadfastly failed to cover any issues that would establish 
that his previous actions were in violation of the law. The 
President denies that these statements are false. However, he 
has no reservoir of credibility left after he so persistently 
lied to the public for 7 months. In my judgment these 
statements, which were aggravated by continuous lying to the 
American people, are sufficient under the circumstances of this 
case to warrant conviction on this article. The President was 
not obligated to appear before the grand jury, but if he chose 
to do so, he was obligated to tell the complete truth.
    Each statement must be individually evaluated in a perjury 
case. The President's statements that he did not believe he had 
violated the law and that he was not paying ``a great deal of 
attention'' to his lawyers when they gave false information to 
the court are not credible. Even so, I believe they are too 
subjective in nature to be defined as clear acts of perjury 
under the law. The President's response to clearly worded 
questions were intentionally designed to be misleading and 
deceptive; however, the Supreme Court has held in Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), that it is not perjurious 
for a witness to give an unresponsive answer even if the 
witness intends to mislead his questioner. With this in mind, I 
conclude that the other charged statements, not delineated 
above, are misleading and false but not perjurious. I wish it 
were not so, but the President is a practiced liar. In summary, 
this President has deliberately, premeditatedly, and with 
calculation set about to defeat the justice system by criminal 
acts which include perjury and obstruction of justice.
    Contrary to the stunning argument by the President's 
attorneys, there is just one impeachment standard for 
Presidents and judges. It is found in article II, section 4 of 
the Constitution, which states,

    The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction 
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

    Advocates on both sides of this case agree that Federal 
judges are civil officers of the United States. As civil 
officers, they ``shall be removed'' on impeachment and 
conviction of high crimes and misdemeanors. The President's 
attorneys in this case have argued that there is a different 
standard for impeachment and removal of Federal judges.
    The President's attorneys made a clever argument that the 
``good behavior'' clause, which refers to a judge's tenure, 
sets a separate standard of impeachable conduct for Federal 
judges. They cite in support of this proposition article III, 
section 1 of the Constitution, which states:

    The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold 
their offices during good Behavior, and shall, at stated Times, receive 
for their Services a Compensation which shall not be diminished during 
their Continuance in Office.

    Historical research clearly shows that when the 
Constitution was drafted and ratified, the phrase ``good 
behavior'' had nothing to do with impeachment. The clause 
simply referred to the term of office and compensation for a 
Federal judge. It is generally accepted that the legislative 
branch's power to actually remove a Federal judge, a member of 
a separate and coequal branch of government, is limited to 
impeachment.
    Before the American Revolution, American colonial judges 
were not independent. They served at the pleasure of the 
British king and could be dismissed at his command. The British 
monarch also controlled the salaries of colonial judges. 
Americans recognized that an independent judiciary was a 
fundamental component of a free society. In fact, they included 
the lack of an independent judiciary as part of the ``long 
train of abuses'' in the Declaration of Independence: ``[King 
George III] has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for 
the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of 
their salaries.'' In response, the framers of the Constitution 
delineated through article III, section 1, that Federal judges 
would not serve at the whims of Congress or the President.
    Moreover, Alexander Hamilton, a drafter of the 
Constitution, addressed the impeachment standard for judges in 
Federalist No. 79, one of a series of essays explaining the 
Constitution. In that essay he writes:

    The precautions for [federal judges'] responsibility are comprised 
in the article respecting impeachments. . . . This is the only 
provision on the point, which is consistent with the necessary 
independence of the judicial character, and it is the only one which we 
find in our own constitution in respect to our own judges.

    Thus, the Constitution provided but one standard of removal 
of judges and it is the same one applied to the President.
    In our history there has been only one effort to impeach a 
judge on the ``good behavior'' standard, and that effort 
failed. In 1805, the Jefferson administration encouraged an 
impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase, an outspoken Justice of 
the Supreme Court and member of the opposition Federalist 
Party. Chase was impeached for his conduct while sitting as a 
circuit judge. The Senate acquitted Justice Chase and thus 
redeemed the drafters' original intent that judges can only be 
impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors.
    So let any notion that judges may be impeached under a 
different standard be put to rest. That conclusion is 
inconsistent with the Constitution and not supported by 
history.
    It is easy to understand why the President's attorneys 
found it necessary to argue that Federal judges may be removed 
under a different impeachment standard. The reason is that if 
the President is guilty of the same conduct that has led to the 
impeachment, conviction, and removal of three Federal judges in 
the last 13 years, and if the constitutional standard is the 
same, and if the substance of the allegations are the same, 
then he too must be removed.
    In 1986, the Senate convicted Federal Judge Harry E. 
Claiborne of three articles of impeachment that involved 
fundamental dishonesty: Judge Claiborne was convicted for 
knowingly filing false tax returns. Like every American who 
pays income tax, Judge Claiborne certified under penalty of 
perjury that his tax returns were true. For 2 years, he 
submitted such returns when he knew them to be false. He was 
subsequently impeached, convicted and removed. The President's 
lies in this case were, in my opinion, worse because they 
constituted a frontal assault on the integrity of the justice 
system. The President did not lie on a form to hide income from 
the Government; he lied under oath before a Federal judge in an 
official proceeding to defeat a civil rights lawsuit filed by 
an American citizen. Under Senate precedent, that is 
impeachable conduct.
    Another example of recent senatorial precedent is the 
Hastings case. In 1989, the Senate convicted Judge Alcee 
Hastings of Florida on 7 of 12 articles of impeachment that 
were presented by the House. Judge Hastings was alleged to have 
taken a bribe to alter the outcome in a case before his court. 
Judge Hastings was convicted in the Senate on seven articles of 
impeachment. Judge Hastings was convicted for knowingly making 
false statements to the jury in his own bribery trial at which 
he was acquitted. In the same year, Judge Walter Nixon was 
convicted by the Senate for lying under oath before a grand 
jury. Judge Nixon corruptly attempted to obstruct justice by 
denying his efforts to intervene in a State court prosecution 
for a friend--a case unrelated to his duties as a Federal 
judge.
    In the present impeachment case, we are not dealing with a 
blank slate. The Senate's actions in earlier cases are our 
clearest guide on how to proceed in the trial of President 
Clinton. The Senate has demonstrated three times in the last 13 
years that perjury by civil officers of the United States 
requires removal. It is inconceivable that equally 
reprehensible conduct by the President in this case should not 
also lead to his conviction and removal. By not so acting, the 
result will be an immediate lowering of our standards for 
impeachment and that standard will apply to judges as well. 
This argument defines us down, reducing the dignity of the 
Presidency and the Congress.
    As one who loves the law and who has spent the better part 
of his professional career trying cases, I understand in a 
profound way just how important it is for justice that citizens 
tell the truth in court. As a Federal prosecutor, I presented 
thousands of cases to a grand jury and tried hundreds. On many 
occasions I have seen witnesses tell the truth, even when it 
was very painful for them. Many have been driven to tears but 
still they honored their oath. Millions of Americans honestly 
fill out their tax returns and pay large sums of money simply 
because they are honest and believe in the rule of law. Such 
integrity is a source of great strength for our country.
    The rule of law and the need for integrity in our justice 
system is why perjury cases are prosecuted in America. About 7 
years ago, when I was still the U.S. Attorney for the Southern 
District of Alabama, a case came before me. My own city of 
Mobile had as its chief of police a strong African American who 
aggressively worked to reform the office, establish community-
based policing, and worked to create a new level of discipline. 
Opposition grew and lawsuits were filed against him. A young 
police officer, who had been the chief's driver, testified in a 
deposition in a Federal lawsuit against the chief. He stated 
that the chief of police had ordered him to ``bug'' the patrol 
cars of other police officers and that he had a secret tape 
recording giving him this illegal order to commit a crime. The 
deposition was released quickly to the newspapers. The city 
council, police department, and the people were in an uproar. 
Under careful questioning by an experienced FBI agent, the 
young officer admitted that he had lied in the deposition 
regarding the tape recording.
    As U.S. attorney, it was my decision whether the officer 
would be prosecuted for his perjury. His counsel argued that he 
was young, that he did lie but had corrected his false 
testimony at a later time. He argued that we should decline to 
prosecute. After reflection and review, I concluded that a 
sworn police officer who had told a plain lie under oath, even 
a young officer, should be prosecuted in order to preserve the 
rule of law and the integrity of the system. Our office 
prosecuted that case. The officer was convicted, and that 
conviction was later affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit. For me personally, I have concluded that 
I cannot hold a young police officer to a different and higher 
standard than the President of the United States.
    In sum, it is crucial to our system of justice that we 
demand the truth. I fear that an acquittal of this President 
will weaken the legal system by suggesting that being less than 
truthful is an option for those who testify under oath in 
official proceedings. Whereas the handling of the case against 
President Nixon clearly strengthened the Nation's respect for 
law, justice and truth by sending a crystal-clear message about 
the requirement for honesty, the Clinton impeachment may 
unfortunately have the opposite result.
    Finally, it is important to pause a moment to reflect on 
truth itself. I believe we live in a created and ordered 
universe and that truth and falsehood are real. They are 
capable of being ascertained. I reject the doctrine of 
relativism that suggests everything is OK. We must always 
strive to hold the banner of truth high. Indeed, the pursuit of 
truth wherever it leads has been a hallmark of our civilization 
and is the single quality that has made us such a vibrant and 
productive nation. Of course, none of us are perfect and we 
often fail in our personal affairs, but when it comes to going 
to court, and its comes to our justice system, a great nation 
must insist on honesty and lawfulness. Our country must insist 
upon that for every citizen. The chief law officer of the land, 
whose oath of office calls on him to preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution, crossed the line and failed to defend 
the law, and, in fact, attacked the law and the rights of a 
fellow citizen. Under our Constitution, equal justice requires 
that he forfeit his office. For these reasons, I felt compelled 
to vote to convict and remove the President from office.
    Some will not agree with my conclusion. In that case, or if 
I have otherwise offended you in any way during this process, I 
ask for your forgiveness. I have sincerely tried to bring to 
bear the training and experience that I have had, along with 
the values with which we were raised in Alabama, to decide this 
important matter.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd

    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to extend a word of 
thanks to Chief Justice Rehnquist for his distinguished service 
in presiding over this trial.
    The Supreme Court sits just a few short yards from this 
Chamber. Yet its Justices and its working remain largely 
unknown to those of us who serve here. Perhaps that conceptual 
distance successfully reflects the framers' construct of 
legislative and judicial branches that act for the most part 
independently of one another.
    Suffice it to say that our knowledge of the Chief Justice 
was rather limited prior to the commencement of the impeachment 
trial. We knew of his reputation as a formidable intellect, as 
a scholar--including on the topic of impeachment--and as an 
efficient manager of the courtroom. We did not as a group know 
much more about him.
    What we learned during that course of that trial is that 
the Chief Justice brought his many estimable qualities to bear 
on this unique legal challenge. He brought a deep historical 
understanding of the impeachment process. He instilled 
confidence in each Senator that he would conduct himself in a 
manner faithful to the role prescribed for the Chief Justice by 
the framers. At all times, he guided the trial with a firm and 
fair hand--not hesitating to use his judgment and common sense 
when appropriate, but never pressing a point of view on matters 
better left to the collective judgment of the Senate. He 
demonstrated a continuing respect and appreciation for the 
workings of this body. Last but not least, he brought a 
refreshing sense of humor to his task, which made our task as 
triers of fact somewhat more bearable.
    Although this was a historic occasion, no one who took part 
in it relished doing so. There is collective relief, I think, 
that this constitutional ordeal is now behind us. But as we 
look back at these past remarkable weeks, we can all take 
comfort and pride in knowing that this second impeachment trial 
in our Nation's history was presided over by an individual of 
great intelligence, historical knowledge, and wit.
    These qualities made him uniquely suited to his task. The 
Senate and the entire Nation owe a debt of thanks to Chief 
Justice Rehnquist for rendering such valued and distinguished 
service.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Christopher J. Dodd

    Mr. DODD. Mr. Chief Justice, the Senate has just discharged 
its duty under the Constitution to try the impeachment of 
President Clinton. We have rendered our judgment.
    We have been asked to consider another, albeit lesser, form 
of punishment of the President--a resolution of censure. That 
resolution is authored by the Senator from California, Mrs. 
Feinstein, and the Senator from Utah, Mr. Bennett. Senator 
Feinstein attempted to bring it before the Senate by way of a 
motion to suspend the rules in order to permit her motion to 
proceed. The Senator from Texas, Mr. Gramm, objected, and then 
moved to indefinitely postpone consideration of Mrs. 
Feinstein's motion. Since two-thirds of the Senate failed to 
vote in the negative, his point of order was sustained, and the 
motion to proceed failed.
    I did not support Senator Gramm's motion for the simple 
reason that I did not believe it appropriate to deny to Senator 
Feinstein and others the opportunity to bring before the Senate 
a resolution of censure following the conclusion of the 
impeachment trial of the President. Had this resolution or 
something similar to it--say, a proposal to make ``findings of 
fact'' about the President's conduct--been offered during the 
impeachment trial, I would have strenuously opposed its 
consideration.
    In my view, such a proposal is not permitted by the 
Constitution when raised as part of an impeachment trial. The 
Constitution is clear on this point. Article I, section 3 
states that ``Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from office, and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the 
United States. . . .'' Our sole choice when trying an 
impeachment case is whether or not to convict and remove--and 
then disqualify from holding any further office--the individual 
in question. The framers decided not to give Senators leeway to 
create additional judgment options--no matter how creative, 
convenient, or compelling they may be.
    Because Senator Feinstein's motion was made after the 
conclusion of the trial, during legislative session, I believed 
it was appropriate and timely for the Senate's consideration.
    That is not to say, however, that I would have supported 
the resolution had the motion to proceed carried. On the 
contrary, I would have opposed it--as I would have opposed each 
of the several proposed censure resolutions that have 
circulated in recent days. The President has acted in a manner 
worthy of censure. No one denies that.
    However, I have serious misgivings about a censure 
resolution emanating from this body and this body alone. I am 
concerned about what it may mean--not for this President, but 
for the institution of the Presidency. I understand the passion 
to voice--loudly and unmistakably--disapproval of the 
President's conduct. But it must be tempered by an even greater 
passion for the office he holds, and for the constitutional 
balance of power between the executive and legislative branches 
of government.
    Federalist No. 73 speaks of ``the propensity of the 
legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to 
absorb the powers, of the other department.'' It warns of a 
presidency ``stripped of [its] authorities by successive 
resolutions, or annihilated by a single vote.''
    My colleagues, we must qualify our understandable disdain 
for this President's conduct with the admonition to protect the 
office that he will occupy for a mere 23 months longer.
    Nowhere does the Constitution expressly permit us to take 
up such a resolution. Nor does it expressly prohibit such a 
step. Yet the Senate, and the Congress as a whole, has been 
remarkably restrained in even considering censure resolutions. 
It has been even more reluctant to adopt them. Only once, in 
1834, was a President formally censured by resolution. Three 
years later, that resolution was expunged.
    The President at that time was Andrew Jackson. The driving 
force behind his censure was Henry Clay. Jackson had defeated 
Clay in the presidential election of 1832. In 1834, they 
remained bitter political adversaries.
    Jackson argued that the resolution was repugnant to the 
constitutional principle of checks and balances between the 
branches of government. If the Senate wanted to punish him, he 
said, it has only one avenue acceptable under the Constitution: 
It would have to wait for the House to send an impeachment.
    I am not convinced that a resolution censuring a President 
is unconstitutional. But I certainly agree that it is, at least 
in the context of the present case, unwise. There have been 
numerous instances where Presidents behaved in a manner deemed 
outrageous and even dangerous to the country. Franklin 
Roosevelt was roundly criticized for his efforts to ``pack'' 
the Supreme Court. President Truman seized the steel mills. 
President Reagan and then-Vice President Bush presided over the 
Executive Branch while an illegal scheme, run out of the White 
House, was conducted to sell arms to Iran and use proceeds from 
those sales to support armed rebellion in Nicaragua. The 
behavior of these individuals arguably was at least as 
egregious as President Clinton's. But the Senate did not pursue 
a censure resolution against any of them.
    Ours is not a parliamentary system. In the United States, 
we do not entertain votes of ``no confidence'' against our 
chief executive. We elect presidents, not prime ministers.
    A censure resolution in the present instance will seem 
modest, perhaps even insignificant, in relation to the 
impeachment conducted by the House. However, future generations 
may well come to view censure as an American-made vote of ``no 
confidence'' against future occupants of the Oval Office. We 
may pave the way to a new form of executive punishment. And it 
may be used not only in cases of personal misconduct. It could 
be used against a President who simply makes an unpopular or 
unwise, but nevertheless lawful and well-intended, decision.
    Ultimately, we could subject future Presidents, who have 
not been impeached, to this form of punishment. In doing so, we 
risk eroding the independence and authority of the Presidency. 
I do not want to see the Senate take such a risk.

                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 23, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Patrick J. Leahy

    Mr. LEAHY. Mr. Chief Justice, I regret to have to return to 
an unfinished aspect of the Senate impeachment trial of 
President Clinton.
    On February 2, I attended the deposition of Vernon Jordan 
as one of the Senators designated to serve as presiding 
officers. On February 4, the Senate approved the House 
managers' motion to include a portion of that deposition in the 
trial record. Unfortunately, the House managers moved to 
include only a portion of the videotaped deposition in the 
trial record and left the rest hidden from the public and 
subject to the confidentiality rules that governed those 
proceedings.
    On Saturday, February 6, at the conclusion of his 
presentation, Mr. Kendall asked for permission to display the 
last segment of the videotaped deposition of Vernon Jordan, in 
which, as Mr. Kendall described it, ``Mr. Jordan made a 
statement defending his own integrity.'' The House managers 
objected to the playing of the approximately 2-minute segment 
of the deposition that represented Mr. Jordan's ``own statement 
about his integrity.''
    I then rose to request unanimous consent from the Senate 
that the segment of the videotaped deposition be allowed to be 
shown on the Senate floor to the Senate and the American 
people. There was objection from the Republican side.
    I noted my disappointment at the time and in my February 12 
remarks about the depositions. After the conclusion of the 
voting on the articles of impeachment and before the 
adjournment of the Court of Impeachment, unanimous consent was 
finally granted to include the ``full written transcripts'' of 
the depositions in the public record of the trial. As far as I 
can tell, however, the statement of integrity by Mr. Jordan has 
yet to be published in the Congressional Record.
    I regret that the Senate chose to prohibit the viewing of 
the videotape of this powerful personal statement during the 
trial. I regret that it continues to be restricted from public 
viewing.
    In order to be sure the transcript that is being made a 
part of the public trial record is readily available to the 
public, I ask unanimous consent that the following portion of 
the written transcript of the deposition of Vernon Jordan, that 
containing his statement of integrity heretofore suppressed, be 
printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

    The Witness. Mr. Chairman, may I be just permitted a moment of 
personal privilege? I don't know about the rules here, but uh, I'd like 
to say something if you would permit.
    Mr. Hutchinson. Mr. Chairman----
    Senator Thompson. Well, Mr. Jordan, quite frankly, it depends on 
what the subject matter is and what you'd like----
    The Witness. Well, it won't be a declaration of war. [Laughter.]
    Senator Thompson. Counsel, did you have----
    Mr. Hutchinson. I would reserve the objection. I think that's 
permissible under the rules. So I would state my objection, let him 
answer it, and if--we can debate that if it becomes an issue in the 
Senate. I'd like to reserve the objection.
    Senator Thompson. All right.
    The Witness. It's just something I want you, Mr. Hutchinson, and 
the House Managers to understand about Vernon Jordan. And that is, you 
know, it's a very long way from the first public housing project in 
this country for black people, where I grew up. It's a long way from 
there to a corner office at Akin Gump. It's a long way from University 
Homes to the corporate board rooms of America. It's a long way from 
University Homes to the Oval Office. And I have made that journey 
understanding one thing, and that is that the only thing I have in this 
world that belongs to me is fee simple absolute, completely and 
totally, is my integrity.
    My corner office at Akin Gump is at best tenuous. My house, my 
home, is at best tenuous. My bank account, my stocks and my bonds, they 
are ultimately of no moment.
    But what matters most to me, and what was taught to me by my 
mother, is that the only thing that I own totally and completely is my 
integrity. And my integrity has been on trial here, and I want to tell 
you that nothing is more important to me than that.
    The President is my friend. He was before this happened, he is now, 
and he will be when this is over. But he is not a friend in that I have 
no friends for whom I would sacrifice my integrity. And I want you to 
understand that.
    Senator Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Jordan.
    If there is no further question, then this deposition is completed, 
and we stand adjourned.
    The  Witness. Thank you.

                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 24, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Jack Reed

    Mr. REED. Mr. Chief Justice, I ask unanimous consent that 
my opinion memorandum relating to the impeachment of President 
Clinton be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the opinion memorandum was 
ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
 [In the Senate of the United States sitting as a Court of Impeachment]

Opinion Memorandum of United States Senator John F. Reed, February 12, 
                                  1999

                             i. conclusion
    Based on the evidence in the record, the arguments of the House 
managers and the arguments of counsel for the President, I conclude as 
follows: The President has disgraced himself and dishonored his office. 
He has offended the justified expectations of the American people that 
the Presidency be above the sordid episodes revealed in the record 
before us. However, the House managers have failed to prove that the 
President's conduct amounts to the Constitutional standard of ``other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' subjecting him to removal from office.
                       ii. statement of the case
    On December 19, 1998, the United States House of Representatives 
passed H. Res. 611,\1\ ``Impeaching William Jefferson Clinton, 
President of the United States, for high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The 
House Resolution contains two Articles of Impeachment declaring that, 
first, the President committed perjury before a Federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998, and, second, the President obstructed justice in 
connection with the civil litigation of Paula Jones.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ H. Res. 611, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., (1998) (enacted).
    \2\ In the course of deliberations in the House, no witnesses to 
the underlying events were called. The House Judiciary Committee held 
four hearings and called only one material witness, the Independent 
Counsel, Kenneth Starr. Mr. Starr testified that he was not present 
when any of the witnesses testified before the Grand Jury. The 
President's attorneys were allowed two days to present their defense, 
and they called a series of expert witnesses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pursuant to article I, section 3 of the United States Constitution, 
the United States Senate convened a Court of Impeachment on January 9, 
1999, and each Senator took an oath to render ``fair and impartial 
justice.'' \3\ As Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist No. 65, 
``what other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in its own 
situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary 
impartiality between an individual accused and the representatives of 
the people, his accusers?'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Rule XXV, Procedure and Guidelines for Impeachment Trials in 
the United States Senate, Prepared by Floyd Riddick and Robert Dove, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 99-33 (August 15, 1986) at 6.
    \4\ The Federalist No. 65, at 398 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961) (Emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The obligation of the Senate is to accord the President, as the 
accused, the right to conduct his defense fairly and, while respecting 
the House's exclusive Constitutional prerogative to bring Articles of 
Impeachment, to put the House to the proof of its case. At the core of 
our task is the fundamental understanding that our system of government 
recognizes the rights of defendants and the responsibilities of the 
prosecution to prove its case. Such a basic tenet of our law and our 
experience as a free people does not evaporate in the rarified 
atmosphere of a Court of Impeachment simply because the accused is the 
President and the accusers are the House of Representatives.
    The House of Representatives submitted a certified, written record 
of over 6,000 pages. By unanimously adopting S. Res. 16, on January 8, 
1999, the Senate agreed to proceed with the Court of Impeachment based 
on ``the record which will consist of those publicly available 
materials that have been submitted.'' The Senate Resolution also 
provided that, following the presentations of the House managers, the 
response of the President's attorneys, and a period of questions by 
Senators, it would be in order to consider a motion to dismiss and a 
motion to depose witnesses.
    On January 27, 1999, the Senate voted 56 to 44, against dismissing 
the Articles of Impeachment. On the same day, by the same margin, the 
Senate passed a resolution, S. Res. 30, allowing the Managers to depose 
three witnesses: Ms. Monica S. Lewinsky, Mr. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and 
Mr. Sidney Blumenthal. These depositions were taken on February 1, 2, 
and 3, 1999, respectively.
    After Senators were provided an opportunity to view the videotaped 
depositions, the Senate reconvened as a trial of impeachment on 
February 4, 1999. At that time a motion by the House Managers to call 
Ms. Lewinsky to the floor of the Senate as a witness was rejected by a 
vote of 30 to 70. Voting 62 to 38, the Senate agreed to permit portions 
of the video to be used on the floor of the Senate during both a 6-hour 
``evidentiary'' session and for closing arguments. The White House 
declined to offer a motion to call witnesses. The Senate then rejected 
a motion by Democratic Leader Daschle to proceed directly to a vote on 
the Articles of Impeachment.
    On Saturday, February 6, 1999, the Senate heard 6 hours of 
presentation, evenly divided, concerning the evidence obtained in the 
three depositions. On Monday, February 8, 1999, the Senate heard 
closing arguments from the House Managers and Counsel for the 
President. The following day, the Senate voted on a motion to open 
deliberations to the public. That motion received 59 votes, several 
short of the supermajority required to change Senate impeachment rules. 
The Senate then voted to adjourn to closed deliberations. A final vote 
was taken on the articles on Friday, February 12, 1999.
                    iii. the constitutional standard
    ``The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.'' 
\5\ With these few words, the Framers of the Constitution entrusted the 
Senate with the most awesome power within a democratic society. We are 
the final arbiters of whether the conscious and free choice of the 
American people in selecting their President will stand.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ U.S. Const., art. I, Sec. 3, cl. 7.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1. ``Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors''
    The Constitutional grounds for impeachment indicate both the 
severity of the offenses necessary for removal and the essential 
political character of these offenses. ``The President, Vice President 
and all civil Officers of the United States shall be removed from 
Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or 
other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' \6\ The clarity of ``Treason'' 
and ``Bribery'' is without doubt. No more heinous example of an offense 
against the Constitutional order exists than betrayal of the nation to 
an enemy or betrayal of duty for personal enrichment. With these 
offenses as predicate, it follows that ``other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' must likewise be restricted to serious offenses that 
strike at the heart of the Constitutional order.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ U.S. Const., art. II, Sec. 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Certainly, this is the view of Alexander Hamilton, one of the trio 
of authors of the Federalist Papers, the most respected and 
authoritative interpretation of the Constitution. In Federalist No. 65, 
Hamilton describes impeachable offenses as ``those offenses which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the 
abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may 
with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate 
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ The Federalist No. 65, at 396 (emphasis in original).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This view is sustained with remarkable consistency by other 
contemporaries of Hamilton. George Mason, a delegate to the Federal 
Constitutional Convention, declared that ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' refer to ``great and dangerous offenses'' or ``attempts 
to subvert the Constitution.'' \8\ James Iredell served as a delegate 
to the North Carolina Convention that ratified the Constitution, and he 
later served as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court. During 
the Convention debates, Iredell stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787, at 550 (1966).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The power of impeachment is given by this Constitution, to bring 
great offenders to punishment. . . . This power is lodged in those who 
represent the great body of the people, because the occasion for its 
exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the community, and the 
objects of it may be such as cannot be easily reached by an ordinary 
tribunal.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Jonathon Elliot, Debates on the Adoption of the Federal 
Constitution at 113 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Iredell's understanding sustains the view that an impeachable 
offense must cause ``great injury to the community.'' Private 
wrongdoing, without a significant, adverse effect upon the nation, 
cannot constitute an impeachable offense. James Wilson, a delegate to 
the Federal Constitutional Convention and, like Iredell, later a 
Supreme Court Justice, wrote that impeachments are ``proceedings of a 
political nature . . . confined to political characters, to political 
crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Michael J. Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A 
Constitutional and Historical Analysis at 21 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Later commentators expressed similar views. In 1833, Justice Story 
quoted favorably from the scholarship of William Rawle in which Rawle 
concluded that the ``legitimate causes of impeachment . . . can have 
reference only to public character, and official duty. . . . In 
general, those offenses, which may be committed equally by a private 
person, as a public officer, are not the subject of impeachment.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution Sec. 799 at 
269-70 quoting William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United 
States at 213 (2d ed. 1829).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This line of reasoning is buttressed by the careful and thoughtful 
work of the House of Representatives during the Watergate proceedings. 
The Democratic staff of the House Judiciary Committee concluded that: 
``[b]ecause impeachment of a President is a grave step for the nation, 
it is to be predicated only upon conduct seriously incompatible with 
either the constitutional form and principles of our government or the 
proper performance of constitutional duties of president office.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, Report by 
the Staff of the Impeachment Inquiry, House Comm. on Judiciary, 93rd 
Cong., 2d Sess. at 26 (1974).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This view was echoed by many on the Republican side. Minority 
members of the Judiciary Committee declared:
    The Framers . . . were concerned with preserving the government 
from being overthrown by the treachery or corruption of one man. . . . 
[I]t is our judgment, based upon this constitutional history, that the 
Framers of the United States Constitution intended that the President 
should be removable by the legislative branch only for serious 
misconduct dangerous to the system of government.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Impeachment of Richard M. Nixon, President of the United 
States, Report of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d 
Sess., H. Rep 93-1305 at 364-65 (Aug. 20, 1974) (Minority Views of 
Messrs. Hutchinson, Smith, Sandman, Wiggins, Dennis, Mayne, Lott, 
Moorhead, Maraziti and Latta).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Constitutional Debates
    Adding impressive support to these consistent views of the meaning 
of the term, ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors,'' is the history of the 
deliberations of the Constitutional Convention. This history 
demonstrates a conscious movement to narrow the terminology as a means 
of raising the threshold for the impeachment process.
    Early in the debate on the issue of Presidential impeachment in 
July of 1787, it was suggested that impeachment and removal could be 
founded on a showing of ``malpractice,'' ``neglect of duty'' or 
``corruption.'' \14\ By September of 1787, the issue of Presidential 
impeachment had been referred to the Committee of Eleven, which was 
created to resolve the most contentious issues. The Committee of Eleven 
proposed that the grounds for impeachment be ``treason or bribery.'' 
\15\ This was significantly more restricted than the amorphous standard 
of ``malpractice,'' too restricted, in fact, for some delegates. George 
Mason objected and suggested that ``maladministration'' be added to 
``treason and bribery.'' \16\ This suggestion was opposed by Madison as 
returning to the vague, initial standard. Mason responded by further 
refining his suggestion and offered the term ``other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors against the State.'' \17\ The Mason language was a clear 
reference to the English legal history of impeachment. And, it is 
instructive to note that Mason explicitly narrowed these offenses to 
those ``against the State.'' The Convention itself further clarified 
the standard by replacing ``State'' with the ``United States.'' \18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 
64-69.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id.
    \17\ Id. (emphasis added).
    \18\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At the conclusion of the substantive deliberations on the 
Constitutional standard of impeachment, it was obvious that only 
serious offenses against the governmental system would justify 
impeachment and subsequent removal from office. However, the final 
stylistic touches to the Constitution were applied by the Committee of 
Style. This Committee has no authority to alter the meaning of the 
carefully debated language, but could only impose a stylistic 
consistency through, among other things, the elimination of redundancy. 
In their zeal to streamline the text, the words ``against the United 
States'' were eliminated as unnecessary to the meaning of the 
passage.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The weight of both authoritative commentary and the history of the 
Constitutional Convention combines to provide convincing proof that the 
impeachment process was reserved for serious breaches of the 
Constitutional order which threaten the country in a direct and 
immediate manner.
3. The Independence of Impeachment and Criminal Liability
    Article I, section 3 of the United States Constitution provides 
that ``[j]udgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than 
to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any 
Office or honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party 
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, 
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.'' \20\ As James 
Wilson wrote:
    [i]mpeachments, and offenses and offenders impeachable, [do not] 
come . . . within the sphere of ordinary jurisprudence. They are 
founded on different principles; are governed by different maxims; and 
are directed to different objects; for this reason, the trial and 
punishment of an offense on an impeachment, is no bar to a trial and 
punishment of the same offence at common law. \21\ The independence of 
the impeachment process from the prosecution of crimes underscores the 
function of impeachment as a means to remove a President from office, 
not because of criminal behavior, but because the President poses a 
threat to the Constitutional order. Criminal behavior is not irrelevant 
to an impeachment, but it only becomes decisive if that behavior 
imperils the balance of power established in the Constitution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ U.S. Const., art. I Sec. 3, cl. 7 (emphasis added).
    \21\ James D. Andrews, ed., The Works of James Wilson at 408 
(1896).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Conclusion
    Authoritative commentary on the Constitution, together with the 
structure of the Constitution allowing independent consideration of 
criminal charges, makes it clear that the term, ``other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors,'' encompasses conduct that involves the President in the 
impermissible exercise of the powers of his office to upset the 
Constitutional order. Moreover, since the essence of Impeachment is 
removal from office rather than punishment for offenses, there is a 
strong inference that the improper conduct must represent a continuing 
threat to the people and the Constitution. It cannot be an episode that 
either can be dealt with in the Courts or raises no generalized 
concerns about the continued service of the President.
                       iv. judicial impeachments
    The House managers urge that the standards applied to judges must 
also be applied identically to the President. Their argument finds 
particular urgency with respect to Article I and its allegations of 
perjury. Several judges have been removed for perjury, and the House 
managers suggest that this experience transforms perjury into a per se 
impeachable offense.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ For example, both Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr. and Judge Alcee 
L. Hastings were convicted on charges based on perjury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This reasoning disregards the unique position of the President. 
Unlike Federal judges, the President is elected by popular vote for a 
fixed term. Popular elections are the most obvious and compelling 
checks on Presidential conduct. No such ``popular check'' is imposed on 
the judiciary. Federal judges are deliberately insulated from the 
public pressures of the moment to ensure their independence to follow 
the law rather than a changeable public mood. As such, impeachment is 
the only means of removing a judge. Moreover, the removal of one of the 
839 Federal judges can never have the traumatic effect of the removal 
of the President. To suggest that a Presidential impeachment and a 
judicial impeachment should be treated identically strains credulity.
    There is an additional Constitutional factor to consider. The 
Constitution requires that judicial service be conditioned on ``good 
Behavior.'' \23\ This adds a further dimension to the consideration of 
the removal of a judge from office. Although ``good Behavior'' is not a 
separate grounds for impeachment, this Constitutional standard 
thoroughly permeates any evaluation of judicial conduct.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ ``The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall 
hold their Offices during good Behavior . . .'' U.S. Const., art. III, 
Sec. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We expect judges to be above politics. We expect them to be 
inherently fair. We expect their judgment to be unimpeded by personal 
considerations. And, we demand that their conduct, both public and 
private, reflect these lofty expectations. Judges are subject to the 
most exacting code of conduct in both their public life and their 
private life.\24\ Without diminishing the expectations of Presidential 
conduct, it is fair to say that we expect and demand a more scrupulous 
standard of conduct, particularly personal conduct, from judges. A 
large part of these heightened expectations for judges emerges directly 
from their particular role in our government. They immediately and 
critically determine the rights of individual citizens. The fates and 
lives of individual Americans are literally in their hands. They 
personify more dramatically than anyone, including the President, the 
fairness and reasonableness of the law. Should they falter, the 
foundation of ``equal justice under law'' is more seriously strained 
than the failings of any other citizen.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ The Judicial Conference of the United States publishes a Code 
of Conduct for United States Judges, as prepared by the Administrative 
Office of the United States Courts. Cannon 2 of the Code requires 
federal judges to ``avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety 
in all activities.'' (March, 1997). This Cannon requires a Judge to act 
at all times in ``a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.'' Perceived violations of 
the Code could result in a complaint to the Judicial Conference, which 
can make referrals to the House Judiciary Committee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The differences between a Presidential impeachment and a judicial 
impeachment are not merely theoretical. The Senate treats a 
Presidential impeachment differently from a judicial impeachment in 
both procedure and substance. The Senate routinely allows a select 
committee to receive testimony in the trial of a judge.\25\ Such a 
delegation of responsibility would be unthinkable in the trial of a 
President. But of even more telling effect are the substantive 
differences between Presidential and judicial impeachments. For 
example, Judge Harry Claiborne was impeached and removed subsequent to 
his criminal conviction for filing a false income tax return.\26\ In 
contrast, the inquiry into the Watergate break-in disclosed similar 
violations of the Federal Tax Code by President Nixon. Yet, the 
Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives declined to approve 
an article of impeachment with respect to President Nixon's apparent 
violation of the Internal Revenue Code. A major factor in declining to 
press this article was the widespread feeling that such private 
misconduct was not relevant to a Presidential impeachment. According to 
Representative Ray Thornton (D-AR), ``there [had] been a breach of 
faith with the American people with regard to incorrect income tax 
returns . . . But . . . these charges may be reached in due course in 
the regular process of law. This committee is not a tax court nor 
should it endeavor to become one.'' \27\ Republican Representative Tom 
Railsback (R-IL) pointed out that there was ``a serious question as to 
whether something involving [the President's] personal tax liability 
has anything to do with his conduct of the office of the President.'' 
\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Rule XI, Procedure and Guidelines for impeachment Trials in 
the United States Senate, Prepared by Floyd Riddick and Robert Dove, 
99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. 99-33 (August 15, 1986) at 4.
    \26\ Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Impeachment 
Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, A Judge of the United States District 
Court for the District of Nevada, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., S. Doc. No. 99-
48 (1986) at 291-98.
    \27\ The Evidentiary Record of the Impeachment of President William 
Jefferson Clinton, [hereinafter The Record] S. Doc. 106-3, 106th Cong., 
1st Sess., Vol. XVII, at 10 (January 8, 1999) (quoting Hearings Before 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary Pursuant to H. Res. 803, 93d Cong., 2d 
Sess. 549 (1974) (Statement of Congressman Ray Thornton)).
    \28\ Id. (Statement of Congressman Railsback).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The reconciliation of this disparate treatment is found by once 
again recalling the Constitution and not by simply adopting the facile 
notion that if impeachment applies to judges then it must apply 
identically to the President. The function of impeachment is to remove 
a ``civil officer'' who so abuses the particular duties and 
responsibilities of his office that he poses a threat to the 
Constitutional order. Furthermore, the Constitution provides an 
additional condition on the performance of judges with the ``good 
Behavior'' standard. The particular duties of the Judiciary together 
with their obligation to demonstrate ``good Behavior,'' renders 
comparison with the President inexact at best.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Various legal scholars and authoritative commentary make this 
point. In support of the ``Judicial Integrity and Independence Act,'' 
which would have established a non-Impeachment procedure for removing 
judges, Senator Lott submitted an article by conservative legal 
scholars Bruce Fein and William Bradford Reynolds. Messrs. Fein and 
Reynolds concluded ``federal judges are also subject to Article III 
Sec. 4, which stipulates that judges shall serve only during `good 
Behavior.' This is a stricter standard of conduct than the Impeachment 
standard. . . .'' 135 Cong. Rec. S15269 (daily ed. July 19, 1989) 
(quoting Fein and Reynolds, Judges on Trial: Improving Impeachment, 
Legal Times, October 30, 1989.) Senator Lott also submitted a 
statement, by then Assistant Attorney General William Rehnquist, 
supporting similar legislation in 1970, which stated that ``the terms 
`treason, bribery and other high Crimes and Misdemeanors' are narrower 
than the malfeasance in office and failure to perform the duties of the 
office, which may be grounds for forfeiture of office held during good 
behavior.'' 135 Cong. Rec. S 15270 (daily ed. July 19, 1989) (quoting 
The Judicial Reform Act: Hearings on S. 1506 Before the Subcomm. on 
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Congress, 2d Sess. (April 9, 1970) (Statement of Asst. Attorney General 
William H. Rehnquist, Office of Legal Counsel)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Managers' argument is ultimately unpersuasive. Rather than 
reflexively importing prior decisions dealing with judicial 
impeachments, we are obliged to consider the President's behavior in 
the context of his unique Constitutional duties and without the 
condition to his tenure of ``good Behavior.''
                        v. the standard of proof
    Judicial proceedings, by definition, resolve an issue in dispute. A 
party seeks an outcome, provided for by the rule of law, and petitions 
for that result. The petitioning party has the burden of producing 
evidence. After hearing the evidence, the trier of fact, to some degree 
of certainty, reaches a conclusion. The critical factor is often the 
degree of certainty necessary.
    American jurisprudence utilizes three standards of certainty: 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing evidence, and 
a preponderance of the evidence. The standard is determined by the 
gravity of the issue in dispute and the degree of harm resulting from 
an incorrect decision.
    Generally, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or to a moral 
certainty, is required to convict an individual of a criminal offense. 
Black's Law Dictionary defines reasonable doubt as ``a doubt as would 
cause prudent men to hesitate before acting in matters of importance to 
themselves.'' \30\ Sample Federal jury instructions provide that ``[a] 
reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense--the 
kind of doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, must, therefore, be proof of such a 
convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to 
rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs.'' 
\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Black's Law Dictionary at 1265 (6th ed. 1990) (citing U.S. v. 
Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 367 F.Supp. 91, 101(S.D. N.Y. 1973)).
    \31\ Edward J. Devitt, Charles B. Blackmar, Michael A. Wolff, Kevin 
F. O'Maley, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, Sec. 12.10 
Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, and Reasonable Doubt (West 
1992).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Clear and convincing evidence is utilized in cases involving a 
deprivation of individual rights not rising to criminal offenses, such 
as the termination of parental rights. Finally, general civil cases, 
which pit private parties against each other, are adjudicated on the 
preponderance of the evidence, i.e., more likely than not. Frequently 
the burden of proof is determinative of the outcome.
    In an impeachment trial, each Senator has the obligation to 
establish the burden of proof he or she deems proper. The Founding 
Fathers believed maximum discretion was critical for Senators 
confronting the gravest of constitutional choices. Differentiating 
impeachment from criminal trials, Alexander Hamilton argued, in 
Federalist No. 65, that impeachments ``can never be tied down by such 
strict rules . . . as in common cases serve to limit the discretion of 
courts in favor of personal security.'' \32\ In this regard, Hamilton 
also recognized that an impeached official would be subject to the 
comprehensive rules of criminal prosecution after impeachment.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ The Federalist No. 65, at 398.
    \33\ Id. at 399.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Senate precedent maintains this discretion. In the 1986 impeachment 
trial of Judge Claiborne, the Senate overwhelmingly rejected a motion 
by the judge to adopt ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' as the standard of 
proof necessary to convict and remove.\34\ That vote has been 
interpreted by subsequent courts of impeachment as ``a precedent 
confirming each Senator's freedom to adopt whatever standard of proof 
he or she preferred.'' \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \34\ 132 Cong. Rec. S15507 (daily ed. October 7, 1986).
    \35\ Gerhardt, The Federal Impeachment Process: A Constitutional 
and Historical Analysis, at 42 (1996).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The constitutional gravity of an impeachment trial suggests that 
the evidentiary bar be high. As I have discussed previously, the 
Founders viewed impeachment as a remedy to be utilized only in the 
gravest of circumstances by a supermajority of Senators. The 
Constitution gives to the people the right to remove a President 
through the electoral process every four years. Only in the most 
extreme of examples, when the constitutional order is threatened, is 
Congress to intervene and remove our only nationally elected 
representative. Nullification of a popularly elected President is a 
grave action only to be taken with high certainty.
    Constitutional analysis strongly suggests that in a Presidential 
impeachment trial a burden of proof at least equivalent to ``clear and 
convincing evidence'' and more likely equal to ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt'' must be employed.\36\ Had the charges of this case involved 
threats to our constitutional order not readily characterized by 
criminal charges, I would have been forced to further parse an exact 
standard. However, for all practical purposes, the managers have 
themselves established the burden of proof in this case.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ See Charles L. Black, Jr., Impeachment: A Handbook, at 14-19 
(1974)
    \37\ The adoption of a standard of ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' in 
this matter should not be construed as implying that the same standard 
must be utilized in each and every Impeachment proceeding. Conduct of 
``civil officers'' in the performance of their official duties might 
pose such an immediate threat to the Constitution that a less exacting 
standard could properly be used. Any choice of a standard of proof 
must, at a minimum, consider the nature of the allegations and the 
impact of the alleged behavior on the operation of the government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The articles, embodied in H. Res. 611, accuse the President of 
perjury and obstruction of justice. This allegation of specific 
criminal wrongdoing is repeated in their trial brief.\38\ Indeed, in 
their presentation, the managers have stated, ``none of us, would argue 
. . . that the President should be removed from the office unless you 
conclude he committed the crimes that he is alleged to have committed. 
. . .'' \39\ The House Managers invited the Senate to arrive at a 
conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt before voting to convict the 
President. I take them at their word.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \38\ Trial Memorandum of the United States House of 
Representatives, In Re Impeachment of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, [hereinafter HMTB] (Submitted pursuant to S. Res. 16) at 1.
    \39\ 145 Cong. Rec. S260 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999) (Statement of 
Mr. Manager McCollum).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After reading their trial brief, listening to their presentation of 
the evidence, viewing depositions, and considering their closing 
argument, I conclude that the President is not guilty of any of the 
allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. I reach this conclusion mindful 
of the admonishment of the Founders that impeachment is not a punitive, 
but rather a constitutional remedy. Having concluded that the charges, 
even if proven, do not rise to the level of ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' an analysis of the specific charges is unnecessary. 
However, given the gravity of the charges alleged, an explanation is 
appropriate.
                  vi. perjury allegations of article i
    Article I alleges that the President committed perjury before a 
Federal grand jury on August 17, 1998. The charge must be measured 
against the fact that the full House of Representatives rejected an 
article of impeachment charging the President with perjury in a civil 
deposition. House Judiciary Committee Republicans, citing case law, 
have asserted that ``perjury in a civil proceeding is just as 
pernicious as perjury in criminal proceedings.'' \40\ The article 
before the Senate is further undercut by the fact that the article 
fails to cite, with specificity, testimony alleged to be false.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \40\ Impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, Report of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 2d 
Sess., H. Rep. 105-830 (December 15, 1998) at 118 [hereafter Clinton 
Report].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Perjury is a statutory crime, set forth in the U.S. Code at 18 
U.S.C. Sec. 1621, Sec. 1623. It requires proof that an individual has, 
while under the oath of an official proceeding, knowingly made a false 
statement about facts material to the proceeding. As seasoned Federal 
prosecutors testified before the House Judiciary Committee, perjury is 
a specific intent crime requiring proof of the defendant's state of 
mind, i.e., the charge cannot be based solely upon unresponsive, 
misleading, or evasive answers.\41\ Both the House managers and counsel 
for the President have referred to the statutes referenced above and 
agree on the elements necessary to convict on a charge of perjury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \41\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume X at 284 (Statement of 
Thomas P. Sullivan, Former U.S. Attorney, Northern District of 
Illinois).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I find it hard to accept the proposition by the President's counsel 
that Mr. Clinton ``testified truthfully before the grand jury.'' \42\ 
Rather than truthful, his testimony appears to be motivated by a desire 
not to commit perjury, i.e., making intentionally false statements 
about material facts. This dance with the law is not what one expects 
of a President. However, it is important to realize that in beginning 
his grand jury testimony, the President read a statement in which he 
admitted being ``alone'' with Ms. Lewinsky and engaging in 
``inappropriate intimate'' \43\ contact with her. Thus, unlike the 
testimony he provided in the Jones civil deposition, the President 
admitted an improper, consensual relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. It is 
against this backdrop that the House managers allege perjury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \42\ Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton, In Re 
Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton, [hereinafter PCTB] 
(Submitted January 13, 1999, pursuant to S. Res. 16) at 38.
    \43\ The full text of the President's statement before the Grand 
Jury can be found in The Record, supra note 27, Volume III, Part 1 of 
2, at 460-62; See also PCTB, supra note 42, at 39; See also HMTB, supra 
note 38, at 52-60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The managers allege in H. Res. 611, which reported the articles of 
impeachment to the Senate, that the President ``willfully provided 
perjurious . . . testimony . . . concerning one or more of the 
following: (1) the nature and details of his relationship with'' Ms. 
Lewinsky; (2) ``prior perjurious . . . testimony'' given in the Jones 
deposition; (3) ``prior false and misleading statements he allowed his 
attorney to make'' in the Jones deposition; and (4) ``his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the 
discovery of evidence'' in Jones. The facts refute some of these 
charges, while legal analysis, precedent and common sense preclude 
pursuit of the others.
1. The Nature and Details of the Clinton/Lewinsky Relationship
    With regard to the first charge of perjury, the managers fail to 
cite specific perjurious language in the article; however, their trial 
brief provides several allegations. It asserts that the President's 
denial that he touched Ms. Lewinsky in certain areas with a specific 
intent is ``patently false.'' \44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \44\ HMTB, supra note 38, at 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most troubling evidence that the President lied in this 
instance is Ms. Lewinsky's testimony to the contrary. While Ms. 
Lewinsky has more credibility than the President concerning the 
intimacies of their relationship, experienced prosecutors, appointed by 
both Democrats and Republicans, have testified that conflicting 
testimony of this type would not be prosecuted for two reasons. First, 
``he said, she said'' discrepancies regarding perjury are difficult to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt without third party corroboration.\45\ 
This is particularly true in this case, where first Independent Counsel 
Starr and now the House managers choose to believe Ms. Lewinsky when 
she helps their case, but impugn her testimony when she refutes their 
accusations. Second, testimony concerning sex in a civil proceeding 
would not normally warrant criminal prosecution.\46\ Indeed, in her 
Senate deposition, Ms. Lewinsky was unwilling to portray the 
President's testimony as untruthful.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \45\ The Trial Brief of the House Managers states that the 
President's testimony is ``directly contradicted by the corroborated 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky.'' Id. By ``corroborated'' the Managers 
refer to the fact that the Office of Independent Counsel (OIC) was 
extremely thorough in questioning all of Ms. Lewinsky's friends and 
associates to whom she described the intimate details of her contact 
with the President. Legally, the fact that Ms. Lewinsky relayed her 
recollection of the facts to various third parties does not provide 
additional, independent evidence of the nature of her contact with the 
President.
    \46\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume X at 284 (Statement of 
Thomas P. Sullivan, Former U.S. Attorney, Northern District of 
Illinois); see also Id. at 325, 332, 333 (testimony of Ronald K. Noble 
and William F. Weld).
    \47\ During her Senate deposition, Manager Bryant asked Ms. 
Lewinsky if, contrary to his defense, the President's contact with her 
fit into that described in the Jones deposition. In response Ms. 
Lewinsky said, ``I'm not trying to be difficult, but there is a portion 
of . . . [the] definition [used in the Jones deposition] that says, you 
know, with intent, and I don't feel comfortable characterizing what 
someone else's intent was. I can tell you that I--my memory of this 
relationship and what I remember happened fell within that definition . 
. . but I'm just not comfortable commenting on someone else's intent or 
state of mind or what they thought.'' 145 Cong. Rec. S1221 (daily ed. 
Feb. 4, 1999) (Senate deposition of Ms. Lewinsky).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In further support of the perjury allegation regarding the ``nature 
and details'' of the Clinton-Lewinsky relationship, the managers also 
alleged that the President's grand jury testimony concerning his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was perjurious because (1) his 
recollection of when the approximately two-year affair began differs 
from Ms. Lewinsky's by a few months; (2) he admitted to occasionally 
having inappropriate banter on the phone with Ms. Lewinsky when it 
occurred as many as seventeen times; and (3) he described his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky as beginning as a ``friendship.'' \48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ See HMTB, supra note 38, at 57; see also Clinton Report, supra 
note 40 at 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Disregarding the futility of attempting to judge the veracity of 
these statements, they appear to be totally immaterial to the grand 
jury given that the President admitted an affair with Ms. Lewinsky. 
Indeed, the triviality of these charges are indicative of the inability 
of the House managers to utilize any sense of proportionality in 
adjudicating the unacceptable behavior of the President. This weakness 
is magnified by the fact that the House managers have asserted that 
conviction on any one of their allegations of perjury warrant 
conviction.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ H. Res. 611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It is difficult to believe that anyone would charge an individual 
with perjury, never mind advocate the removal of a popularly-elected 
President, based upon an interpretation of the words ``occasionally'' 
or ``friendship.'' It is staggering that the managers, after forcing 
Ms. Lewinsky to testify under oath during this trial, would press her 
on the details and timing of her first intimate contacts with the 
President in order to ``prove'' the relationship did not begin as a 
``friendship.'' \50\ As demonstrated by the frustration of the American 
people with this line of inquiry, the resources, both human and 
financial, expended by the managers were not warranted by the substance 
of the charge.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ 145 Cong. Rec. S1213 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999) (Transcript of 
Lewinsky Deposition in which Mr. Manager Bryant is questioning Ms. 
Lewinsky about the timing and intimate details of her relationship).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Perjury Concerning the President's Deposition Testimony in Jones
    The managers' second charge of perjury is that before the grand 
jury the President repeated false testimony he gave in the Jones 
deposition. This argument appears to be an attempt to convict the 
President for lies he told in his Jones deposition, an article which 
the full House of Representatives rejected. Ultimately, this subsection 
of article I collapses on itself.
    In their trial brief the managers also assert that the President 
reaffirmed or adopted his entire deposition testimony before the grand 
jury. This is simply not true. To make this assertion the managers use 
the President's grand jury testimony that ``I was determined to walk 
through the mine field of this deposition without violating the law, 
and I believe I did.'' \51\ Before the grand jury the President refuted 
his deposition testimony that he was never alone with Ms. Lewinsky.\52\ 
In addition to being inaccurate, these charges were rejected by the 
full House. Not even Independent Prosecutor Starr alleged that the 
President committed perjury concerning this issue.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ HMTB, supra note 38, at 60.
    \52\ In his opening statement before the Grand Jury the President 
began, ``When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky. . . .'' The Independent 
Counsel followed-up and asked if he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky. The 
President answered, ``yes.'' The Record, supra note 43 at 460-62, 481.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. Perjury With Respect to Mr. Bennett's Offer of the Lewinsky 
        Affidavit
    The third charge asserted by the managers to substantiate article I 
is that the President lied before the Grand Jury when he testified that 
``I'm not even sure I paid attention to what he [Mr. Bennett] was 
saying.'' \53\ The President made this statement to the grand jury 
after being asked about Mr. Bennett's representation to the Jones court 
that Ms. Lewinsky's deposition verified that there was ``no sex of any 
kind in any manner'' between her and the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ HMTB, supra note 38, at 62.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On page 62 of their trial brief the managers assert that this 
testimony is perjurious because ``it defied common sense'' and the fact 
that the video of the deposition ``shows the President looking directly 
at Mr. Bennett.'' This evidence fails to provide any insight on the 
President's state of mind and thus cannot meet the standard of proof 
that the President knowingly made a false statement.
4. Perjury in Denying the Obstruction of Justice Charges
    Finally, in subpart four of article I, the managers allege that the 
President lied when he denied both tampering with witnesses and 
impeding discovery in the Jones case. This allegation bootstraps every 
allegation made in article II into an additional charge of perjury.
    First, the managers charge that the President lied when he told the 
grand jury that he instructed Ms. Lewinsky that if gifts were 
subpoenaed they would have to be turned over. I will address article 
II's charge of obstruction later. With regard to the charge that he 
committed perjury, Ms. Lewinsky provided testimony in her Senate 
deposition which requires rejection of the allegation. Ms. Lewinsky has 
testified that when she asked the President if she should give the 
subpoenaed gifts to someone, ``maybe Betty,'' the President either 
failed to reply or said ``I don't know,'' or ``let me think about 
that.'' \54\ However, after the President's grand jury testimony, Ms. 
Lewinsky was pressed on the issue. When a FBI agent asked if she 
recalled the President telling her that she must turn over gifts in her 
possession should they be subpoenaed by the Jones attorneys, Ms. 
Lewinsky said, ``You know, that sounds a little bit familiar to me.'' 
\55\ On its face, Ms. Lewinsky's testimony would seem to make it more 
likely than not that the President told her to turn over whatever gifts 
she had.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ HMTB, supra note 38, at 64 (quoting Grand Jury testimony of 
Ms. Lewinsky).
    \55\ 145 Cong. Rec. S1228 (daily ed. February 6, 1999)(Senate 
Deposition Testimony of Ms. Lewinsky).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are two remaining allegations in the final subpart of article 
I. First, it is alleged that the President committed perjury when he 
told the grand jury that on January 18, 1998, he made statements to Ms. 
Currie to ``refresh his memory.'' Second, the managers allege that he 
lied when he testified to the grand jury that facts he relayed to his 
aides in denying an affair were ``true'' but ``misleading.''
    I am troubled by the inability of the President to be completely 
forthright concerning both his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky and 
subsequent attempts to conceal this affair from his family, friends, 
staff, constituents, and Ms. Jones. In no way do I condone this 
behavior. However, seasoned Federal prosecutors have made it known that 
the statements of this type, made by the President or an average 
citizen, would not, indeed should not, be prosecuted as perjury. The 
power and prestige of the Federal Government should not be brought to 
bear on a citizen regarding testimony in a civil case pertaining to an 
improper sexual affair. The impeachment trial has borne this out. 
Discrepancies in testimony between two individuals, and only those two, 
seldom satisfy the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt (or by 
preponderance of the evidence, for that matter.) Moreover, citizens are 
uncomfortable with such a role for government.
    The managers have alleged that a failure to convict the President 
on perjury grounds will destroy civil rights jurisprudence and allow 
any future President to lie with impunity. Both the managers and our 
Government weathered untruths during both the Iran-Contra investigation 
and the ethics investigation of former Speaker Gingrich. Citizens may 
well lack confidence in the ability of President Clinton to be honest 
about his personal life, this is not, however, a threat to our 
Government. The President, as a citizen, remains subject to both 
criminal and civil sanctions. The managers have failed to meet the 
burden of proof they set regarding the perjury charges brought against 
President William Jefferson Clinton.
               vii. obstruction allegations of article ii
    Article II alleges that the President obstructed justice by 
engaging ``personally, and through his subordinates and agents, in a 
course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, cover up and 
conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related to a Federal 
civil rights action brought against him in a duly instituted judicial 
proceeding.'' \56\ The focal point of these allegations is the Jones 
litigation. Article II outlines seven specific ``acts'' that the 
President used to implement this ``course of conduct or scheme.'' These 
``acts'' will be analyzed to determine if they established a foundation 
for a finding of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ H. Res. 611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As an initial point, it is necessary to set out the elements of the 
crime of obstruction of justice, as set forth at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. 
The components of the offense include: (1) there existed a pending 
judicial proceeding; (2) the accused knew of the proceeding; and (3) 
the defendant acted ``corruptly'' with the specific intent to obstruct 
and interfere with the proceeding or due administration of justice.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \57\ 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503. The House Managers periodically urge that 
the President is guilty of witness tampering. The crime of witness 
tampering is set forth at 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512. This statute requires 
proof that a defendant knowingly engaged in intimidation, physical 
force, threats, misleading conduct, or corrupt persuasion with the 
specific intent to influence, delay, or prevent testimony or cause any 
person to withhold objects or documents from an official proceeding. 
Like the obstruction of justice charge, witness tampering requires 
proof of a specific intent to interfere with a witness.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The critical question in regard to the allegations is whether the 
President acted with the specific intent to interfere with the 
administration of justice. Absent a demonstrable ``act'' coupled with a 
demonstrable ``specific intent,'' no crime occurs. The House managers 
point to the seven following acts as the basis of their claim.
1. The Lewinsky Affidavit
    The article alleges that ``[o]n or about December 17, 1997, William 
Jefferson Clinton corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that 
proceeding that he knew to be perjurious, false and misleading.'' \58\ 
The allegations go to the Affidavit prepared by Monica Lewinsky in 
conjunction with the Jones litigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ H. Res. 611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The best evidence of the President's involvement in this affidavit 
is the testimony of Monica Lewinsky. Ms. Lewinsky has repeatedly and 
consistently stated that no one asked her or instructed her to lie.
    ``[N]o one ever asked me to lie and I was never promised a job for 
my silence.'' \59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume III, Part 1 at 1161 
(Lewinsky Grand Jury testimony 8/20/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Neither the Pres[ident] nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their 
behalf) asked or encouraged Ms. L[ewinsky] to lie.'' \60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Id. at 718 (handwritten proffer of Lewinsky, given to OIC 2/1/
98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Neither the President or JORDAN ever told LEWINSKY that she had 
to lie.'' \61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \61\ Id. at 1398 (FBI Interview with Lewinsky 7/27/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Neither the President nor anyone ever directed LEWINSKY to say 
anything or to lie . . .'' \62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Id. at 1400.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite these repeated denials, the House managers persist in 
arguing that the President influenced Ms. Lewinsky to file a false 
affidavit in a early morning phone call on December 17, 1997. They hang 
their case on a portion of the conversation that involved a discussion 
of the filing of an affidavit in response to a subpoena from the Jones 
lawyers and another portion of the conversation that dealt with the 
``cover story'' that both the President and Ms. Lewinsky had been using 
to disguise their affair. Ms. Lewinsky has testified that, in a call on 
December 17, 1997, the President said ``Well, maybe you can sign an 
affidavit.'' \63\ The House managers argue that this statement alone 
must convict because both the President and Ms. Lewinsky knew that a 
truthful affidavit could never be filed given the clandestine nature of 
their relationship.\64\ This theory disregards the testimony of both 
the President and Ms. Lewinsky.\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ Id. (Grand Jury Testimony of Ms. Lewinsky on 8/6/98) (quoted 
in HMTB, supra note 38, at 22.)
    \64\ ``Both parties knew that the Affidavit would need to be false 
and misleading to accomplish the desired result.'' HMTB, supra note 38, 
at 22.
    \65\ The President testified that ``I've already told you that I 
felt strongly that she could issue, that she could execute an affidavit 
that would be factually truthful, that might get her out of having to 
testify. . . . And did I hope she'd be able to get out of testifying on 
an affidavit? Absolutely. Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? 
No, I did not.'' The Record, supra note 27, Volume X at 571.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified to the Grand Jury on 8/6/98, that ``I 
thought that signing an affidavit could range from anywhere--the point 
of it would be to deter or to prevent me from being deposed and so that 
that could range from anywhere between maybe just somehow mentioning, 
you know, innocuous things or going as far as maybe having to deny any 
kind of relationship.'' Id. at 844. In her Senate Deposition Mr. 
Manager Bryant asked Ms. Lewinsky, ``The night of the phone call, he's 
[the President is] suggesting you could file an affidavit. Did you 
appreciate the implications of filing a false affidavit with the 
court?'' Ms. Lewinsky replied, ``I don't think I necessarily thought at 
that point it would have to be false, so, no, probably not.'' 145 Cong. 
Rec. at S1218 (daily ed. February 4, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Any lingering doubt about the nature of the telephone conversation 
on December 17, 1997, was erased by the videotaped testimony of Ms. 
Lewinsky before the Senate. The House managers repeatedly argued that 
the President not only influenced the content of her affidavit, but 
that the President was knowledgeable of those contents. In a response 
to Mr. Manager Bryant's question, however, Ms. Lewinsky unequivocally 
stated that ``[h]e didn't discuss the content of my affidavit with me 
at all, ever.'' \66\ The House managers argued that the telephone call 
on December 17, 1997, was a deliberate attempt by the President to 
compel Ms. Lewinsky to submit an affidavit that would explicitly 
encompass their pre-existing cover story. Again, in response to Mr. 
Manager Bryant's questions, Ms. Lewinsky stated:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ 145 Cong. Rec. at S1307 (daily ed. February 6, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ``Q: Now, you have testified in the Grand Jury. I think your 
closing comments was that no one ever asked you to lie, but yet in that 
very conversation of December 17th, 1997, when the President told you 
that you were on the witness list, he also suggested that you could 
sign an affidavit and use misleading cover stories. Isn't that correct?
    ``A: Uh--well, I--I guess in my mind, I separated necessarily 
signing affidavit and using misleading cover stories. So, does----
    ``Q: Well, those two----
    ``A: Those three events occurred, but they don't--they weren't 
linked for me.'' \67\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \67\ Id. at. S1306.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House managers argued that Ms. Lewinsky could have only filed 
the affidavit as a result of pressure from the President. They reasoned 
that only the President could benefit from Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. 
Ms. Lewinsky totally refuted their view. Again, in another exchange 
with Mr. Manager Bryant, Ms. Lewinsky stated:
    ``Q: But you didn't file the affidavit for your best interest, did 
you?
    ``A: Uh, actually, I did.
    ``Q: To avoid testifying.
    ``A: Yes.
    ``Q: Why--why didn't you want to testify? Why would not you--why 
would you have wanted to avoid testifying?
    ``A: First of all, I thought it was nobody's business. Second of 
all, I didn't want to have anything to do with Paula Jones or her case. 
And--I guess those two reasons.'' \68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \68\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After Ms. Lewinsky's videotaped testimony, it is clear that she 
filed the affidavit of her own volition to satisfy her own needs. The 
President did not influence the content of the affidavit. His remark in 
the December 17, 1997, conversation was, at the most, a terse response 
to her request rather than a elaborate directive to Ms. Lewinsky. There 
is no credible evidence that the President orchestrated an attempt to 
file a false affidavit.
2. The Lewinsky Testimony
    The House managers assert that during that same early morning 
telephone conversation on December 17, 1997, the President 
``corruptly'' encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to give ``perjurious, false and 
misleading testimony if and when called to testify personally in that 
proceeding.'' \69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \69\ H. Res. 611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Once again, this allegation completely fails to consider the sworn 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky that ``no one ever asked me to lie and I was 
never promised a job for my silence.'' \70\ Moreover, Ms. Lewinsky's 
videotaped testimony before the Senate provides even more detail to her 
previous statements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume X at 1161 (quoting Ms. 
Lewinsky's Grand Jury testimony on 8/20/98). See also PCTB, supra note 
42, at 56-57.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House managers suggest that the ``cover story'' developed by 
Ms. Lewinsky and the President to disguise their relationship was 
explicitly urged upon Ms. Lewinsky by the President in response to the 
subpoena. There is little evidence to support this view. Indeed, the 
available evidence undermines the position of the House managers. The 
following grand jury testimony of Ms. Lewinsky indicates that there was 
no explicit linkage between their ongoing denials of a relationship and 
the Jones litigation.
    ``Q [JUROR]: It is possible that you also had these discussions 
[about denying the relationship] after you learned that you were a 
witness in the Paula Jones case?
    ``A: I don't believe so. No.
    ``Q: Can you exclude that possibility?
    ``A: I pretty much can. I really don't remember it. I mean, it 
would be very surprising for me to be confronted with something that 
would show me different but I--it was 2:30 in the--I mean, the 
conversation I'm thinking of mainly would have been December 17th, 
which was----
    ``Q: The telephone call.
    ``A: Right. And it was--you know, 2:00, 2:30 in the morning. I 
remember the gist of it and I--I really don't think so.
    ``Q: Thank you.'' \71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \71\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume X at 1119-90 (quoting Ms. 
Lewinsky's Grand Jury testimony on 8/20/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House managers have presented no credible evidence to overcome 
the sworn testimony of the parties.
3. Concealment of Gifts
    The article alleges that ``[o]n or about December 28, 1997, William 
Jefferson Clinton corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a 
scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him.'' The allegation refers to the 
transfer of gifts from Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie on December 28, 
1997.
    The House managers argue that the President directed Ms. Currie to 
contact Ms. Lewinsky and arrange for the collection of personal gifts 
that he gave Ms. Lewinsky and for their subsequent concealment in Ms. 
Currie's home. There is conflicting evidence whether Ms. Currie or Ms. 
Lewinsky arranged for the pickup of gifts. Regardless of who initiated 
the gift transfer, however, there is insufficient evidence that the 
President was involved in the transfer.
    The chain of events leading to the transfer of gifts began with a 
meeting between the President and Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, 1997. 
Ms. Lewinsky indicated in one of her grand jury appearances that in the 
course of the meeting she raised the topic of the numerous personal 
gifts that the President had given her in light of the Jones subpoena. 
According to her grand jury testimony, Ms. Lewinsky recalled: ``[A]t 
some point I said to him, `Well, you know, should I--maybe I should put 
the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to someone, 
maybe Betty.' And he sort of said--I think he responded, `I don't know' 
or `Let me think about that.' And left that topic.'' \72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \72\ Id. Volume III, Part 1 at 872 (Lewinsky Grand Jury testimony 
8/6/98). Ms. Lewinsky discussed this exchange with the President at 
least ten different times during her multiple interviews and 
appearances as a witness. In a subsequent appearance before the Grand 
Jury on August 20, 1998, she again recalled this discussion and stated 
``And he--I don't remember his response. I think it was something like, 
``I don't know, or `Hmm,' or--there really was no response.'' Id. at 
1122 (emphasis added). It is clear from her testimony that there was no 
discussion of the concealment of gifts with the President.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The next link in the chain is the most confusing. There is no 
question that Betty Currie picked up a box of gifts from Monica 
Lewinsky on the afternoon of December 28, 1997. However, there is still 
an unresolved dispute concerning who initiated this activity. Both Ms. 
Currie and the President denied ever having any conversation in which 
the President instructed Ms. Currie to retrieve the gifts from Ms. 
Lewinsky. Ms. Currie has repeatedly testified that it was Ms. Lewinsky 
who contacted her about the gifts. On the other hand, Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that Ms. Currie called her to initiate the transfer.
    The managers and the committee report cited the following passage 
from Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony.
    ``Q: What did [Betty Currie] say?
    ``A: She said, ``I understand you have something to give me.'' Or, 
``The President said you have something to give me.'' Along those 
lines. . . .
    ``Q: When she said something along the lines of ``I understand you 
have something to give me,'' or, ``The President says you have 
something for me,'' what did you understand her to mean?
    ``A: The gifts.'' \73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \73\ Clinton Report, supra note 40 at 67-68 (quoting The Record, 
supra note 27, Volume III at 874-75 (Lewinsky Grand Jury testimony 8/6/
98); see also HMTB, supra note 38, at 32-33. However, Ms. Lewinsky's 
recollection of references to the President in this conversation were 
later cast in doubt by her subsequent testimony. In her Grand Jury 
testimony, Ms. Lewinsky was quoted as:
    Q: [Juror]: Do you remember Betty Currie saying that the President 
had told her to call?
    A: Right now, I don't. I don't remember. . . .
    The Record, supra note 27, Volume III at 1141 (Lewinsky Grand Jury 
testimony 8/20/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The uncontradicted evidence is that the President and Ms. Currie 
did not discuss the gifts. The uncontradicted evidence is that the 
President did not initiate the discussion of gifts with Ms. Lewinsky 
and made no substantive response to her discussion of the gifts. The 
unresolved issue is whether Ms. Lewinsky or Ms. Currie initiated the 
transfer of gifts. Ms. Lewinsky's videotaped testimony before the 
Senate does not resolve the issue of who initiated the gift transfer. 
It does, however, add critical details that suggest that Ms. Lewinsky, 
of her own volition, decided to surrender certain ``innocuous'' items 
to the Jones lawyers, while concealing other gifts. First, Ms. Lewinsky 
had already decided before the meeting with the President, on December 
28, 1997, to conceal items from the Jones lawyers. As she told House 
Manager Bryant in Senate deposition testimony: on December 22, 1997, 6 
days before her meeting with the President, she brought the gifts that 
she was willing to surrender to a meeting with Vernon Jordan.
    ``Q: Did, uh, you bring with you to the meeting with Mr. Jordan, 
and for the purpose of carrying it, I guess, to Mr. Carter, items in 
response to this request for production?
    ``A: Yes.
    ``Q: Did you discuss these items with Mr. Jordan?
    ``A: I think I showed them to him. . . .
    ``Q: Okay. How did you select those items?
    ``A: Uh, actually, kind of in an obnoxious way, I guess . . . they 
were innocuous. . . .
    ``Q: In other words, it wouldn't give away any kind of special 
relationship?
    ``A: Exactly.
    ``Q: And was that your intent?
    ``A: Yes.
    ``Q: Did you discuss how you selected those items with anybody?
    ``A: No.'' \74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \74\ 145 Cong. Rec. S1222 (daily ed. February 4, 1999) (deposition 
of Ms. Lewinsky).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Not only did Ms. Lewinsky decide unilaterally to withhold certain 
gifts, she also decided unilaterally to conceal these gifts, not at the 
behest of the President, but out of her own concern for privacy. In 
response to a question posed by Mr. Manager Bryant, Ms. Lewinsky 
stated, ``I was worried someone might break into my house or concerned 
that they actually existed, but I wasn't concerned about turning them 
over because I knew I wasn't going to, for the reason you stated.'' 
\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \75\ 145 Cong. Rec. S1309 (daily ed. February 6, 1999) (deposition 
of Ms. Lewinsky as replayed during the trial). Manager Bryant's 
question is compound and slightly confusing, Ms. Lewinsky's response, 
combined with her testimony that she avoided testifying for reasons in 
her own best interest, makes clear that she had come to an independent 
conclusion not to provide gifts to the Jones attorneys.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The final detail added by Ms. Lewinsky's videotaped testimony may 
be the most significant. The President testified to the grand jury that 
when Ms. Lewinsky raised the issue of gifts he responded: ``You have to 
give them whatever you have.'' \76\ When questioned by an FBI agent 
after the President's testimony, Ms. Lewinsky said that the words in 
the President's testimony, ``sounds [sic] a little bit familiar to 
me.'' \77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \76\ This statement has been dismissed by the House managers as 
self-serving at best. However, Ms. Lewinsky's Senate Deposition 
testimony lends significant collaboration to the President's claim. See 
supra, note 55, p. 23.
    \77\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. The Lewinsky Job Search
    The article alleges that ``[b]eginning on or about December 7, 
1997, and continuing through and including January 14, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action against him in 
order to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in 
that proceeding at a time when the truthful testimony of that witness 
would have been harmful to him.'' \78\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \78\ H. Res. 611.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This allegation focuses on the efforts to find employment for Ms. 
Lewinsky. Of critical importance is the undisputed fact that these 
efforts began long before Ms. Lewinsky was identified as a potential 
witness in the Jones case. Ms. Lewinsky herself initiated the search 
for employment based on her dissatisfaction with her job at the 
Pentagon and her perception that she would not be able to return to 
work in the White House. Ms. Lewinsky suggested that Vernon Jordan be 
enlisted to aid her, and his involvement was obtained at Ms. Lewinsky's 
request by Mr. Jordan's long-time friend Betty Currie.\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \79\ In one of the more unusual aspects of this case, it appears 
that the idea to enlist Mr. Jordan's assistance came from Linda Tripp's 
``advice'' to Ms. Lewinsky. See PCTB, supra note 42, note 103, at 78.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The allegation of the House managers crashes on the same unshakable 
and uncontradicted statement that has bedeviled them from the start. 
Monica Lewinsky's unchallenged statement is that ``no one ever asked me 
to lie and I was never promised a job for my silence.'' \80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \80\ Supra, note 70 at 29.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unable to refute her statement, the House managers attempted to 
weave a pattern of circumstantial evidence. Each attempt of the House 
managers rapidly unraveled.
    Mr. Manager Hutchinson argued with great force and skill in his 
opening presentation that December 11, 1997, was the critical date in 
the case against the President. It was on that date that Judge Wright 
ordered the President to answer certain questions about ``other 
women.'' As Mr. Manager Hutchinson argued on the floor: ``And so, what 
triggered--let's look at the chain of events. The judge--the witness 
list came in, the judge's order came in, that triggered the President 
into action and the President triggered Vernon Jordan into action. That 
chain reaction here is what moved the job search along . . . . Remember 
what else happened on the day [December 11] again. That was the same 
day that Judge Wright ruled that the questions about other 
relationships could be asked by the Jones attorneys.'' \81\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \81\ 145 Cong. Rec. S234 (daily ed Jan. 14, 1999) (presentation of 
Manager Hutchinson).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The thrust of the House managers' argument is that the President 
learned that Ms. Lewinsky was on the witness list on December 6, 1997. 
He met with Mr. Jordan on December 7, 1997, to enlist Mr. Jordan in the 
Lewinsky job search, and, with the judge's order on December 11, 1997, 
making Ms. Lewinsky's testimony more likely, Mr. Jordan ``intensified'' 
what had been a dormant record of assistance. This scenario is 
demonstrably false.
    The House Judiciary Committee report acknowledges that the meeting 
between the President and Mr. Jordan on December 7, 1997, had nothing 
to do with Ms. Lewinsky.\82\ Because of this lack of interest by the 
President and Mr. Jordan in Ms. Lewinsky's job search, the House 
managers had to seize an event that could plausibly trigger the 
``intensification'' of the job search which allegedly occurred on 
December 11, 1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \82\ Clinton Report, supra note 40, at 11. This fact alone casts 
serious doubt on the theory of the House Managers. If Ms. Lewinsky's 
appearance on the witness list was disturbing to the President, and he 
was participating in the job search to silence Ms. Lewinsky, why would 
he avoid discussing this matter with Mr. Jordan?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although December 11, 1997, was the date of a meeting between Mr. 
Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky, the record shows that this meeting was 
arranged prior to that date without the participation of the President. 
As early as Thanksgiving, Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky had a 
conversation in which Mr. Jordan told her that ``he was working on her 
job search'' and asked her to ``contact him again around the first week 
of December.'' \83\ In response to a request from Ms. Lewinsky, Betty 
Currie called Vernon Jordan on December 5, 1997, to request a meeting. 
This was one day before the President became aware of the appearance of 
Ms. Lewinsky's name on the witness list. Mr. Jordan told Ms. Currie to 
have Ms. Lewinsky call him to arrange a meeting. Ms. Lewinsky did so on 
December 8, 1997, confirming a meeting with Mr. Jordan on December 11, 
1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \83\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume III at 1465 (Lewinsky OIC 
interview 7/31/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since the appearance of Ms. Lewinsky on the witness list did not 
prompt any accelerated action on the job search and since the meeting 
of Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan was contemplated and initiated before 
the release of the witness list, the House managers were forced to 
grasp for some other triggering event. Unwisely, as clearly stated in 
Mr. Manager Hutchinson's remarks, they chose the issuance of Judge 
Wright's order.
    Judge Wright initiated a conference call with lawyers in the Jones 
case at 6:33 p.m. (EST) on December 11, 1997. At 7:50 p.m. (EST), she 
concluded the conference by informing the parties that she would issue 
an ``order to compel'' testimony about ``other women.'' At that moment, 
Vernon Jordan was somewhere over the Atlantic Ocean on United flight 
946 bound for Amsterdam. His meeting with Ms. Lewinsky had concluded 
hours before. Obviously, the meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, the calls on 
her behalf, the ``intensification'' of the job search, had nothing to 
do with Judge Wright's order.
    Nothing so illustrates the fragility of the House managers' case as 
this dubious and discredited attempt to characterize Judge Wright's 
order as a catalyst for an illegal job search. Forced to beat a hasty 
retreat by the revelation of this attempted legal slight of hand, the 
House managers reversed course and argued, unconvincingly, that they 
always saw the triggering event as the release of the witness list on 
December 5, 1997, or the President's receipt of the list on December 6, 
1997.\84\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \84\ It is interesting to note that the Article alleges that the 
incriminating events began on December 7, 1997, and continued 
thereafter until January 14, 1998. Once again, these constantly 
shifting dates illustrate the ad hoc nature of this argument.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This assertion, however, contradicts the evidence that there was no 
discussion about Ms. Lewinsky during the meeting between the President 
and Mr. Jordan on December 7, 1997, and the evidence that the December 
11, 1997, meeting was arranged by Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan without 
knowledge of the witness list or Judge Wright's order and without the 
assistance of the President.
    Ms. Lewinsky received the active assistance of Mr. Jordan to obtain 
interviews and favorable recommendations with three prominent New York 
firms. She succeeded in obtaining a job at one of these firms, Revlon. 
According to representatives of these firms, they felt no pressure to 
hire Ms. Lewinsky \85\--behavior that undercuts the suggestions of the 
House managers that Mr. Jordan was engaged in a high stakes effort to 
find Ms. Lewinsky a job at all costs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \85\ The FBI investigators working for Mr. Starr recorded the 
following testimony of representatives of Revlon, American Express and 
Young and Rubicam: ``On December 11, 1997, HALPERIN received a 
telephone call from VERNON JORDAN [who recommended Ms. Lewinsky]. . . . 
There was no implied time constraint for fast action. HALPERIN did not 
think there was anything unusual about Jordan's request.'' The Record, 
supra note 27, Volume IV, Part 1 at 1286 (FBI Interview with Richard 
Halperin, Executive VP and Special Counsel, Mac Andrews & Forbes 
(holding company for Revlon) 3/27/98); ``Fairbairn said . . . there was 
no perceived pressure exerted by JORDAN.'' Id. at 1087 (FBI Interview 
with Ursula Fairbairn, Executive Vice President, Human Resources and 
Quality, American Express, 2/4/98). ``JORDAN did not engage in a `sales 
pitch' about LEWINSKY.'' Id. at 1222 (FBI Interview with Peter 
Georgescu, CEO of Young and Rubicam, 3/25/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Jordan emphatically denied that he acted to silence Ms. 
Lewinsky. ``Unequivocally, indubitably, no.'' \86\ The President denied 
that he attempted to buy her silence. ``I was not trying to buy her 
silence or get Vernon Jordan to buy her silence.'' \87\ But, Ms. 
Lewinsky said it best: ``I was never promised a job for my silence.'' 
\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \86\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume IV, Part 2 at 1827 (Jordan 
Grand Jury testimony on 5/5/98).
    \87\ Id., Volume III, part 1 at 576 (Clinton Grand Jury testimony 
on 8/17/98).
    \88\ Id. at 1161 (Lewinsky Grand Jury testimony 8/20/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
5. Allowing False Statements by his Attorneys
    The article alleges that the President ``corruptly allowed his 
attorney to make false and misleading statements to a Federal judge 
characterizing an affidavit . . .'' \89\ This allegation rests on the 
President's silence during the Jones deposition while his attorney, Mr. 
Robert Bennett, cited the Lewinsky affidavit to Judge Wright as a 
representation that ``there is no sex of any kind in any manner, shape 
or form.'' \90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \89\ H. Res. 611.
    \90\ Clinton Report, supra note 40, at 72.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is no doubt about the President's silence. There is, however, 
doubt about the President's state of mind; whether he was aware of the 
interchange between his counsel and Judge Wright; and whether he formed 
the specific intent to use his silence to allow a falsehood to be 
advanced.
    The President consistently denied his awareness of this exchange 
and testified that he was concentrating on his testimony:
    ``I'm not even sure I paid much attention to what he was saying. I 
was thinking, I was ready to get on with my testimony here and they 
were having these constant discussions all through the deposition. . . 
.''
          * * * * * * *
    ``I was not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I 
was focusing on my own testimony. . . .''
          * * * * * * *
    ``I'm quite sure that I didn't follow all the interchanges between 
the lawyers all that carefully. . . .''
          * * * * * * *
    ``I am not even sure that when Mr. Bennett made that statement that 
I was concentrating on the exact words he used. . . .''
          * * * * * * *
    ``When I was there, I didn't think about my lawyers. I was, 
frankly, thinking about myself and my testimony and trying to answer 
the questions. . . .''
          * * * * * * *
    ``I didn't pay any attention to this colloquy that went on. I was 
waiting for my instructions as a witness to go forward. I was worried 
about my own testimony.'' \91\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \91\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume III, Part 1 at 476-513 
(Clinton Grand Jury testimony on 8/17/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's statements are clearly self-serving. The only 
evidence introduced by the House managers to refute the President's 
assertions is an invitation to the Senate to look at the videotape of 
the President's deposition in the Jones case and ``read his mind,'' and 
an affidavit from Barry W. Ward, Judge Wright's clerk. Mr. Ward 
confirms what may be inferred from the tape. ``From my position at the 
conference table, I observed President Clinton looking directly at Mr. 
Bennett while this statement was being made.'' \92\ But, Mr. Ward's 
``mind reading'' abilities are probably on a par with the Senate's. As 
he indicated in an article in the Legal Times after the date of his 
affidavit, Mr. Ward concluded, ``I have no idea if he was paying 
attention. He could have been thinking about policy initiatives, for 
all I know.'' \93\ The House managers have not presented sufficient 
evidence to sustain the burden of proof with respect to this 
allegation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \92\ Ward Affidavit.
    \93\ Legal Times, February 1, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
6. The Conversations with Betty Currie
    The article alleges that ``[o]n or about January 18 and January 20-
21, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading 
account of events relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to a potential witness in that proceeding. . . .'' \94\ 
This allegation embraces two conversations between the President and 
Betty Currie, his executive secretary. On January 18, 1998, the day 
after his deposition in the Jones case, the President met with Ms. 
Currie and asked her a series of leading questions that he promptly 
answered himself by declaring ``Right?'' \95\ He had a similar 
conversation on January 20, 1998.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \94\ H. Res. 611.
    \95\ HMTB, supra note 38, at 65.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The House managers argue that the President knew these rhetorical 
questions were false and the only purpose for raising these questions 
was to influence the testimony of Ms. Currie.\96\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \96\ Ms. Currie was not a witness in the Jones proceeding at the 
time of these conversations. House Managers argue that the President 
knew she would be called as a witness because of his constant 
references to Ms. Currie in his Jones deposition. Moreover, Ms. Currie 
became a witness on January 23, 1998, when the Jones lawyers added her 
to their witness list. White House counsels argue that Ms. Currie's 
addition to the witness list was not prompted by the President's 
testimony, but by information secretly provided to the Jones lawyers by 
Linda Tripp. They further add that it cannot be reasonably assumed that 
the President was aware that Ms. Currie was likely to be called as a 
witness. Obstruction and witness tampering statutes require knowledge 
that the individual is or will be a witness. This argument remains 
unresolved, but a lack of resolution injects further uncertainty as to 
the allegations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What is clear from the evidence is the fact that Ms. Currie was not 
influenced by the President's statements. Ms. Currie testified to that 
effect to the Grand Jury on July 22, 1998.
    ``Q: Now, back again to the four statements that you testified the 
President made to you that were presented as statements, did you feel 
pressured when he told you those statements?
    ``A: None whatsoever.
    ``Q: What did you think, or what was going through your mind about 
what he was doing?
    ``A: At the time I felt that he was--I want to use the word shocked 
or surprised that this was an issue, and he was just talking.'' \97\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \97\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume III, Part 1 at 668 (Currie 
Grand Jury testimony on 7/22/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Ms. Currie added in her testimony:
    ``Q: That was your impression, that he wanted you to say--because 
he would end each of the statements with ``Right?'', with a question.
    ``A: I do not remember that he wanted me to say ``Right.'' He would 
say, ``Right?'' and I could have said, ``Wrong.''
    ``Q: But he would end each of those questions with a ``Right?'' and 
you could either say whether it was true or not true.
    ``A: Correct.
    ``Q: Did you feel any pressure to agree with your boss?
    ``A: None.'' \98\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \98\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    What is unclear from the evidence is the President's intent in 
making these statements. The President has testified: ``I do not 
remember how many times I talked to Betty Currie or when. I don't. I 
can't possibly remember that. I do remember, when I first heard about 
this story breaking, trying to ascertain what the facts were, trying to 
ascertain what Betty's perception was. I remember that I was highly 
agitated, understandably, I think.\99\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \99\ The Record, supra note 27, Volume III, Part 1 at 593 (Clinton 
Grand Jury testimony on 8/17/98).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The President's assertion is not without plausibility. He initiated 
the conversation after the Jones deposition where he learned that all 
of the details of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky were known by 
the Jones lawyers and shortly would be public knowledge. He faced an 
immediate public and political disaster. Although he knew what went on, 
he had to know what Betty Currie knew, not to influence her testimony 
but to determine the potential gaps in this story. Ms. Currie was the 
key ``go-between'' with Ms. Lewinsky and her recollection had to be 
confirmed. More precisely, the President had to know if his story would 
be contradicted by Ms. Currie.
    Given the facts, the President's explanation is as plausible as 
that advanced by the House managers. They have not established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the President had the specific intent to 
transform these events into the crimes of obstruction of justice or 
witness tampering.
7. The Corruption of Potential Grand Jury Witnesses
    The final subpart of the second article of impeachment states that 
``[o]n or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton 
made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in a 
Federal Grand Jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witness.'' The managers have alleged that this 
caused the grand jury to receive ``false and misleading information.''
    In his referral, Independent Counsel Starr outlines denials about 
an affair with Ms. Lewinsky that the President made to members of his 
senior staff: John Podesta, Erskine Bowles, Sidney Blumenthal, and 
Harold Ickes.\100\ The lies that the President told ranged from 
immaterial \101\ to despicable.\102\ These lies call into question the 
President's character and judgment regarding this personal affair, but 
they most certainly do not rise to the level of criminal behavior.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \100\ Referral from Independent Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to the 
House of Representatives, House Doc. 105-310, at 198-203 (September 11, 
1998).
    \101\ Mr. Podesta testified that the President told him that after 
Ms. Lewinsky left the White House (to work at the Department of 
Defense), she returned to visit Ms. Currie and that Ms. Currie was with 
them at all times. Id. at 88 (quoting Podesta Grand Jury Testimony of 
6/16/98).
    \102\ In his Senate Deposition Testimony Mr. Blumenthal testified 
that he related to the Grand Jury that on 1/21/98 the President told 
him that Ms. Lewinsky had ``come on to'' him, he [the President] had 
``rebuffed'' her, and that Ms. Lewinsky then ``threatened'' him with 
telling people that the two had an affair. See 145 Cong. Rec. S1248 
(daily ed. February 4, 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In order to constitute obstruction of justice, the President would 
have had to specifically intended these individuals to go before the 
grand jury and lie. It is just as plausible, if not more plausible, 
that the President was simply trying to conceal and deny the affair 
from the public at large. The President spoke to his staff because of 
the appearance of press articles; their conversations had nothing 
whatsoever to do with the grand jury. As the Democratic minority of the 
House Judiciary Committee pointed out: ``does anyone really think the 
President would have admitted to this relationship . . .  if no grand 
jury had been sitting?'' \103\ Independent Counsel Starr called senior 
aides to the President before the grand jury because his prosecutors 
knew that the President, in furtherance of the public denials he was 
making, would have lied to his aides. Under the OIC and House managers' 
theory, by publically denying the affair, the President tampered with 
all the grand jurors, who must have known of his denials. This simply 
cannot be the case. The President is dishonorable for lying to his 
aides and putting them in legal jeopardy in this way, but he is not a 
criminal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \103\ Clinton Report, supra note 40, at 385 (Minority Views).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  
