[Senate Document 106-4]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress                                                  S. Doc.
                                 SENATE                                
 1st Session                                                     106-4
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     




                          PROCEEDINGS OF THE


                         UNITED STATES SENATE



                                IN THE



                         IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF


                  PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON


 
 VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF 
                  PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON




                            VOLUME IV OF IV

               February 12, 1999.--Ordered to be printed

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57-104                     WASHINGTON : 1999

                 OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE SENATE

                         Gary Sisco, Secretary

                 Sharon A. Zelaska, Assistant Secretary

   Ronald Kavulick and Jerald D. Linnell, Chief Reporters of Debates

                     Bruce E. Kasold, Chief Counsel

                         Keith Simmons, Counsel

                                ------                                


                      UNANIMOUS CONSENT AGREEMENT

                   In the Senate of the United States

                           February 12, 1999

    Mr. LOTT. I ask unanimous consent that the Secretary be 
authorized to include these statements [of Senators explaining 
their votes], along with the full record of the Senate's 
proceedings, the filings by the parties, and the supplemental 
materials admitted into evidence by the Senate, in a Senate 
document printed under the supervision of the Secretary of the 
Senate, that will complete the documentation of the Senate's 
handling of these impeachment proceedings.
    The CHIEF JUSTICE. Without objection, it is so ordered.
                 To the memory of Raymond Scott Bates,

                    Legislative Clerk of the Senate,

who, until his untimely and tragic accidental death on February 
5, 1999, in the midst of these proceedings, brought to the 
conduct of this trial the constant dedication, skill, and 
professionalism that characterized his Senate career. Scott 
represented the best of the Senate staff who work tirelessly to 
support the institution and its members.
                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    This document contains the full record of the United States 
Senate proceedings in the impeachment trial of President 
William Jefferson Clinton. Its purpose is to preserve for the 
future use of the Senate, the American people, and historians 
the formal record of the only Presidential impeachment trial of 
the 20th century. Together with the 24-volume Senate Document 
106-3, which contains all publicly available materials 
submitted to or produced by the Judiciary Committee of the 
House of Representatives, these four volumes represent the 
entire official record of the impeachment actions against 
President Clinton.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The Senate, by a unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 
1999, authorized the Secretary of the Senate to oversee the printing of 
the Senate proceedings in order to complete the documentation of the 
impeachment trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The present four volumes include the Senate proceedings in 
open session; filings by the parties; supplemental materials 
received in evidence that were not part of the House record, 
such as affidavits and depositions; floor statements of 
Senators in open session expressing their views regarding the 
proceedings; and statements delivered in closed deliberations 
that individual Senators elected to make public.
    The document is divided into four sections--
          Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings
          Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings
          Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits
          Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the 
        Impeachment Trial of President William Jefferson 
        Clinton

                   Volume I: Preliminary Proceedings

    This volume contains the portion of the Senate proceedings 
that occurred before the actual trial commenced. On December 
19, 1998, the House of Representatives adopted two articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton (House Resolution 611, 
105th Congress) and a subsequent resolution appointing managers 
on the part of the House (House Resolution 614, 105th 
Congress).
    Because the Senate of the 105th Congress had already 
completed its business and adjourned sine die, the House 
managers, in the late afternoon of December 19, 1998, delivered 
the articles of impeachment to the Secretary of the Senate. The 
Senate of the 106th Congress convened and organized on January 
6, 1999, and the House notified the Senate that it had 
reappointed the managers (House Resolution 10, 106th Congress). 
On January 7, 1999, the House managers exhibited the articles 
of impeachment to the Senate and the Chief Justice of the 
United States, as presiding officer during the impeachment 
trial, took the prescribed oath, as did all Senators.
    On January 8, 1999, the Senate unanimously directed that 
the summons be issued to President Clinton and that his answer 
to the articles be filed, together with the response of the 
House of Representatives (Senate Resolution 16, 106th 
Congress). This resolution admitted into evidence the materials 
submitted by the House Judiciary Committee and authorized their 
publication. It also allowed the parties to file preliminary 
motions (none was filed), established a schedule for the filing 
of trial briefs by the parties, and established further 
procedures for the conduct of the trial. Although all these 
documents were previously printed in Senate Document 106-2--as 
well as the text of the provisions of the United States 
Constitution applicable to impeachment and the Rules of 
Procedure and Practice of the Senate When Sitting in 
Impeachment Trials--they are reprinted here for ease of 
reference.

                   Volume II: Floor Trial Proceedings

    This volume reproduces the full record of the Senate floor 
proceedings in the impeachment trial as provided under Senate 
Resolution 16. The resolution first permitted the parties an 
extended period to make their presentations. The managers 
presented their case on behalf of the House of Representatives 
on January 14, 15, and 16, 1999. Counsel for the President 
presented their case on January 19 and 20, 1999. The Senate 
then devoted January 22 and 23, 1999, to posing questions to 
the House managers and counsel.
    Senate Resolution 16 also provided that, at the end of the 
question-and-answer period, the Senate would consider 
separately a motion to dismiss and a motion to subpoena 
witnesses and to present additional evidence not in the record. 
On January 25, 1999, the Senate heard argument on the motion to 
dismiss and, on January 26, 1999, considered the motion by the 
House managers to call witnesses and admit additional evidence. 
The Senate voted to deny the motion to dismiss and to grant the 
motion to subpoena witnesses.
    On January 28, 1999, the Senate established procedures for 
the taking of depositions (Senate Resolution 30), and three 
witnesses were deposed on February 1, 2, and 3, 1999. On 
February 4, 1999, the Senate heard argument and voted on 
motions to admit the deposition testimony into evidence, to 
call witnesses to testify on the Senate floor, and to proceed 
directly to closing arguments. The portions of the deposition 
transcripts admitted into evidence are reproduced in this 
volume, while the full transcripts of the three depositions 
appear in Volume III. Both parties presented evidence to the 
Senate on February 6, 1999.
    On February 8, 1999, the parties presented final arguments 
to the Senate. The Senate then considered proposals by various 
Senators to suspend the Senate impeachment rules to permit 
deliberation in open session, but all deliberations on motions 
and on the articles of impeachment occurred in closed session. 
(The proceedings in closed session are not published here, but 
statements that Senators elected to make public are printed in 
Volume IV.) Volume II concludes with the record of the February 
12, 1999, vote and judgment of the Senate to acquit President 
Clinton on both articles of impeachment.

                 Volume III: Depositions and Affidavits

    This volume reproduces the complete transcripts of the 
depositions taken by the Senate of witnesses Monica S. 
Lewinsky, Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., and Sidney Blumenthal. It also 
contains the affidavits of Christopher Hitchens, Carol Blue, 
and R. Scott Armstrong, which were admitted into evidence by a 
unanimous-consent agreement of February 12, 1999.

 Volume IV: Statements of Senators Regarding the Impeachment Trial of 
                  President William Jefferson Clinton

    By unanimous consent, the Senate agreed to provide each 
Senator an opportunity to place in the Congressional Record a 
statement describing his or her own views on the impeachment. 
The statement could, if a Senator so chose, be a statement he 
or she had delivered during closed deliberations. Since not all 
Senators chose to publish their remarks, the fact that a 
statement of a particular Senator does not appear in Volume IV 
does not mean that the Senator did not address the Senate 
during its closed deliberations.


    The publication of these four volumes, supplemented with 
Senate Document 106-3, contributes to a fuller understanding of 
the way in which the Senate conducted these important and 
historic proceedings.


                               Gary Sisco,                 
                          Secretary of the Senate.                 


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                                                   Page

Foreword.........................................................     V

                   VOLUME I: PRELIMINARY PROCEEDINGS

Constitutional Provisions on Impeachment.........................     1
Rules of Procedure and Practice in the Senate When Sitting on 
  Impeachment Trials.............................................     3

                            January 6, 1999

Statements of Senators Lott and Reid regarding access to Senate 
  floor, galleries, and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S7 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]........................    15
Unanimous-consent agreement on access to Senate floor, galleries 
  and wing during impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S7-8 
  (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]......................................    16
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives by 
  Secretary of the Senate during sine die adjournment announcing 
  impeachment of President and appointment of Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S14-15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\1\.......................    17
Notice of receipt of message from House of Representatives 
  announcing reappointment of Managers, H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. 
  (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S15 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)]\2\........    19
Unanimous-consent agreement on receiving Managers and requesting 
  attendance of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................    20
Message from House of Representatives announcing reappointment of 
  Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S36 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].........    22
H. Res. 611, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    23
H. Res. 614, 105th Cong. (1998)..................................    29
H. Res. 10, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    31
Sample of Senate Impeachment Trial gallery tickets...............    33

                            January 7, 1999

Exhibition of Articles of Impeachment Against William Jefferson 
  Clinton, President of the United States [145 Cong. Rec. S39-41 
  (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]......................................    35
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize taking 
  photograph in Senate Chamber of swearing-in, S. Res. 11, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].....    38
Appointment of escort committee to receive Chief Justice [145 
  Cong. Rec. S41 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)].......................    38
Administration of oath to Chief Justice and Members of Senate 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S41-42 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 1999)]...............    40
S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    41
Photographs taken pursuant to S. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999).....    42

                            January 8, 1999

Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle providing for issuance of 
  summons to William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United 
  States, and establishing trial procedures, S. Res. 16, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 1999)].....    45
    Rollcall Vote No. 1 [145 Cong. Rec. S50 (daily ed. Jan. 8, 
      1999)].....................................................    47
S. Res. 16, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................    48
Writ of Summons (January 8, 1999)................................    53

                            January 11, 1999

Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999).................................    58
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999)....................................    71

                            January 13, 1999

Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999)......................................................   365
Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
  Clinton (January 20, 1999)\3\..................................   500

                            January 14, 1999

Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment (January 
  14, 1999)......................................................   735
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999)..........................................................   740

                   VOLUME II: FLOOR TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
                            January 14, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott to authorize installation of 
  appropriate equipment and furniture in Senate Chamber, S. Res. 
  17, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S59 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   773
Unanimous-consent agreement on floor privileges during closed 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S59-60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]......   774
Unanimous-consent agreement on authority to print documents filed 
  by the parties and other impeachment documents \4\ [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S60 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................   775
Writ of Summons and Return of Service by Sergeant at Arms 
  (January 8, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S60-61 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 
  1999)].........................................................   776
Answer of President William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of 
  Impeachment (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S61-63 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]............................................   778
Trial Memorandum of United States House of Representatives, with 
  Appendix (January 11, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S63-190 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 14, 1999)]................................................   783
Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 
  13, 1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S191-214 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]..   938
Replication of House of Representatives to Answer of President 
  William Jefferson Clinton to Articles of Impeachment [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S214-15 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)]........................   992
Reply of United States House of Representatives to Trial 
  Memorandum of President William Jefferson Clinton (January 14, 
  1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S215-21 (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].......   994
Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S221-51 
  (daily ed. Jan. 14, 1999)].....................................  1007
S. Res. 17, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1087
Floor plan and seating arrangements in Senate Chamber for 
  impeachment trial proceedings..................................  1089

                            January 15, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S260-79 
  (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1999)].....................................  1091

                            January 16, 1999

Presentation of case by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S281-300 
  (daily ed. Jan. 16, 1999)].....................................  1144

                            January 19, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S483-95 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]............................................  1195
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S720-21 (daily ed. Jan. 19, 1999)]........................  1225

                            January 20, 1999

Statement of Senator Harkin in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S729-32 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1227
Statement of Senator Wellstone in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S732-33 (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]........................  1234
Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S810-30 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 20, 1999)]............................................  1237

                            January 21, 1999

Presentation of case for President [145 Cong. Rec. S832-48 (daily 
  ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]............................................  1292
Statement of Senator Lott regarding procedure for question-and-
  answer period [145 Cong. Rec. S848 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1999)]..  1335
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Harkin and Wellstone [145 Cong. Rec. S848-49 (daily ed. Jan. 
  21, 1999)].....................................................  1336

                            January 22, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S869-92 (daily ed. Jan. 
  22, 1999)].....................................................  1338
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Hutchison, Specter, Lieberman, Hagel, Collins, and Snowe [145 
  Cong. Rec. S892 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1999)].....................  1396
Sample question card used by Senators............................  1398

                            January 23, 1999

Questions submitted by Senators and answers of House Managers and 
  counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S933-56 (daily ed. Jan. 
  23, 1999)].....................................................  1400
Letter from Senator Harkin to Chief Justice (January 23, 1999)...  1461

                            January 25, 1999

Letter from Chief Justice to Senator Harkin (January 25, 1999)...  1462
Unanimous-consent agreement on argument on motion to dismiss and 
  on motion to open debate [145 Cong. Rec. S962-63 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 25, 1999)]................................................  1466
Motion of Senator Byrd to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 
  Cong. Rec. S963 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................  1469
Argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S963-65 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1469
Argument of counsel for President in support of motion to dismiss 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S965-70 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].............  1476
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in opposition to motion to 
  dismiss [145 Cong. Rec. S970-73 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....  1489
Motion to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators Harkin, 
  Wellstone, Feingold, Leahy, Lieberman, Johnson, Inouye, 
  Schumer, Wyden, Kerrey, Bayh, Torricelli, Lautenberg, Robb, 
  Dodd, Murray, Dorgan, Conrad, Kennedy, Kerry, Durbin, Boxer, 
  Graham, Bryan, Landrieu, and Mikulski [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 
  (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)].....................................  1495
    Rollcall Vote No. 2 [145 Cong. Rec. S973-74 (daily ed. Jan. 
      25, 1999)].................................................  1496
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S974 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 
  1999)].........................................................  1497
Statement of Senator Mikulski in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S987 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1999)]...........................  1498

                            January 26, 1999

Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion of United States House 
  of Representatives for Appearance of Witnesses at Deposition 
  and to Admit Evidence Not in Record (January 26, 1999).........  1500
Motion of House of Representatives for appearance of witnesses 
  and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S991-92 (daily ed. 
  Jan. 26, 1999)]................................................  1531
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S992-99 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1532
Unanimous-consent agreement on order of consideration of and 
  deliberation on motions to suspend rules and for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S999-1000 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1552
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence, cont. [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1000-02 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]............................  1552
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to appearance of 
  witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1002-07 
  (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].....................................  1558
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  appearance of witnesses and admission of evidence [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1007-09 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)].......................  1571
Motion of Senator Harkin to Suspend the Rules of the Senate [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1999)]....................  1578
    Rollcall Vote No. 3 [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
      1999)].....................................................  1579
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1010 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 
  1999)].........................................................  1580

                            January 27, 1999

Vote on motion to dismiss impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]............................  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 4 [145 Cong. Rec. S1017-18 (daily ed. Jan. 
      27, 1999)].................................................  1582
Vote on motion for appearance of witnesses and admission of 
  evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)]......  1582
    Rollcall Vote No. 5 [145 Cong. Rec. S1018 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 
      1999)].....................................................  1583
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Affidavit of Barry W. Ward, Law Clerk to Honorable Susan 
      Webber Wright, U.S. District Judge for Eastern District of 
      Arkansas...................................................  1585
    Declaration of T. Wesley Holmes, with attachments............  1586
    Telephone records documenting conversations between President 
      Clinton and Monica S. Lewinsky.............................  1594
Statement of Senator Hollings in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1028-29 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1595
Statements of Senator Abraham in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1029-30, 1031 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)] 

Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
orize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
eachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
sed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
 deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411�0912 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601982
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)] I601984
I74February 11, 1999
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
tograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
] I601986
I21Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (
nators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437�0938 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. S1454�0955 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601987
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)] I601988
I21S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) I601989
I74February 12, 1999
I21Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. Rec. S1457�0958 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601992
I21Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601993
A
I21Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601994
I23Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)] I601995
I21Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458�0959 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)] I601997
I23Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (

Statement of Senator Lieberman in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1030-31 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1999)].......................  1599

                            January 28, 1999

Resolution by Senator Lott and amendments thereto by Senator 
  Daschle relating to procedures for taking depositions, S. Res. 
  30, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1069-73 (daily ed. Jan. 
  28, 1999)].....................................................  1605
    Rollcall Vote No. 6 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1608
    Rollcall Vote No. 7 [145 Cong. Rec. S1071-72 (daily ed. Jan. 
      28, 1999)].................................................  1609
    Rollcall Vote No. 8 [145 Cong. Rec. S1072 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 
      1999)].....................................................  1610
Unanimous-consent agreement on taking of depositions [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1073-74 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1614
S. Res. 30, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1616
Leadership protocol on depositions pursuant to S. Res. 16 and S. 
  Res. 30 (January 28, 1999).....................................  1623
Statement of Senator Cleland in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1105-06 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1624
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1106-07 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1628
Statements of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1107-10 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1999)].......................  1631

                            January 29, 1999

Subpoenas issued for witnesses to appear at depositions:
    Monica S. Lewinsky (January 29, 1999)........................  1639
    Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (January 29, 1999).....................  1642
    Sidney Blumenthal (January 29, 1999).........................  1645

                            February 3, 1999

Statement of Senator Dorgan in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1117-19 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1999)]........................  1648

                            February 4, 1999

Motion of House of Representatives for admission of evidence, 
  appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1199-1200 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]................  1653
Argument of House Managers in support of motion for admission of 
  evidence, appearance of witnesses, and presentation of evidence 
  [145 Cong. Rec. S1200-05 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............  1654
Argument of counsel for President in opposition to motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1205-07 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1667
Rebuttal argument of House Managers in support of motion for 
  admission of evidence, appearance of witnesses, and 
  presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1207-08 (daily ed. 
  Feb. 4, 1999)].................................................  1673
Votes on motions for admission of evidence, appearance of 
  witnesses, and presentation of evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-
  10 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]...................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 9 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1677
    Rollcall Vote No. 10 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1678
    Rollcall Vote No. 11 [145 Cong. Rec. S1209-10 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1680
    Rollcall Vote No. 12 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1681
Motion of Senator Daschle to proceed to closing arguments [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].....................  1681
    Rollcall Vote No. 13 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1682
Motion of counsel for President for provision of written notice 
  by House Managers of designated video excerpts [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)].............................  1683
    Rollcall Vote No. 14 [145 Cong. Rec. S1210-11 (daily ed. Feb. 
      4, 1999)]..................................................  1685
Unanimous-consent agreement on printing partial transcripts of 
  depositions in Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1212 
  (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999)]......................................  1687
Materials admitted into evidence:
    Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1212-29 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1687
    Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1229-46 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1736
    Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (partial 
      transcript) [145 Cong. Rec. S1246-54 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 
      1999)].....................................................  1776

                            February 6, 1999

Presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1290-
  1303 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].................................  1800
Presentation of evidence by counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1303-15 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1836
Rebuttal presentation of evidence by House Managers [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1315-17 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]........................  1866
Unanimous-consent request of Senator Boxer to show additional 
  deposition testimony [145 Cong. Rec. S1317-18 (daily ed. Feb. 
  6, 1999)]......................................................  1873
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Lott, Daschle, Hutchison, Harkin, Collins, Specter, Wellstone, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1318 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)]......  1873
Statements of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1330-32 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999)].............................  1874

                            February 8, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Lott for admission of 
  affidavits into evidence [145 Cong. Rec. S1337 (daily ed. Feb. 
  8, 1999)]......................................................  1882
Final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1337-44 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 8, 1999)].............................................  1882
Final arguments of counsel for President [145 Cong. Rec. S1344-54 
  (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......................................  1900
Rebuttal final arguments of House Managers [145 Cong. Rec. S1354-
  65 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]...................................  1925
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle, Lott, Hutchison, Harkin, Wellstone, Collins, Specter, 
  and Leahy [145 Cong. Rec. S1365 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1999)]......  1955
Notice of Intent to Suspend the Rules of the Senate by Senators 
  Daschle and Feinstein [145 Cong. Rec. S1380 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 
  1999)].........................................................  1955
Letter from House Managers to Senators Lott and Daschle (Feb. 8, 
  1999)..........................................................  1956

                            February 9, 1999

Unanimous-consent request of Senator Specter to allow parties to 
  take additional discovery [145 Cong. Rec. S1385 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1964
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to Suspend the Rules of the 
  Senate [145 Cong. Rec. S1385-86 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]......  1964
    Rollcall Vote No. 15 [145 Cong. Rec. S1386 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1965
Motion of Senators Lott and Daschle to authorize Senators to 
  insert statements delivered in closed deliberations into 
  Congressional Record [145 Cong. Rec. S1386-87 (daily ed. Feb. 
  9, 1999)]......................................................  1966
Motion of Senator Lott to close doors of Senate for final 
  deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...  1970
    Rollcall Vote No. 16 [145 Cong. Rec. S1387 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1970
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1388 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
  1999)].........................................................  1971
Statement of Senator Leahy in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1406-09 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1971
Statement of Senator Feingold in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1409 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)]...........................  1978
Statement of Senator Dodd in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1409-10 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1999)].............................  1980

                           February 10, 1999

Colloquy on record of closed deliberations [145 Cong. Rec. S1411-
  12 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1999)]..................................  1982
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1412 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 
  1999)].........................................................  1984

                           February 11, 1999

Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1437 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 
  1999)].........................................................  1986
Resolution by Senators Lott, Daschle, McConnell and Dodd to 
  authorize taking photograph in Senate Chamber of impeachment 
  vote, S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1437-38 
  (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)].....................................  1987
Appointment of committee to escort Chief Justice from Senate 
  Chamber upon conclusion of impeachment trial [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1454-55 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]............................  1987
Unanimous-consent agreement on consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1455 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1999)]....  1988
S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  1989

                           February 12, 1999

Unanimous-consent agreement on printing of statements of Senators 
  in Congressional Record and for printing of Senate document 
  containing full record of impeachment proceedings [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1457-58 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  1992
Closed deliberation [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1993
Vote on first article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily 
  ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................................  1994
    Rollcall Vote No. 17 [145 Cong. Rec. S1458 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1995
Vote on second article of impeachment [145 Cong. Rec. S1458-59 
  (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....................................  1997
    Rollcall Vote No. 18 [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 
      1999)].....................................................  1997
Order to Secretary of the Senate to communicate judgment of 
  Senate to Secretary of State and House of Representatives [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  1998
Statement of Chief Justice [145 Cong. Rec. S1459 (daily ed. Feb. 
  12, 1999)].....................................................  1998
Resolution by Senators Lott and Daschle expressing gratitude of 
  Senate to Chief Justice of the United States, S. Res. 37, 106th 
  Cong. (1999) [145 Cong. Rec. S1459-60 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  1999
Unanimous-consent agreement on admitting affidavits into evidence 
  and making full deposition transcripts part of the record [145 
  Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....................  2000
Adjournment sine die [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 
  1999)].........................................................  2000
Statements of Senators Lott, Daschle and Chafee in legislative 
  session [145 Cong. Rec. S1460 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......  2001
Motion of Senator Feinstein in legislative session to suspend the 
  rules in order to permit the consideration of censure 
  resolution [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]....  2002
Motion of Senator Gramm in legislative session to indefinitely 
  postpone consideration of motion to suspend rules [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2002
    Rollcall Vote No. 19 [145 Cong. Rec. S1462 (daily ed. Feb. 
      12, 1999)].................................................  2003
Statement of Senator Feinstein in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1664-66 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2004
Statement of Senator Snowe in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1546-47 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]............................  2010
Statement of Senator Ashcroft in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1461 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2011
Statement of Senator Chafee in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1639 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2013
Statement of Senator Kohl in legislative session [145 Cong. Rec. 
  S1656 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]...............................  2014
Resolution by Senator Hollings in legislative session to censure 
  President [145 Cong. Rec. S1657 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].....  2015
Statement of Senator Daschle in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1637-38 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)].......................  2015
Statement of Senator Warner in legislative session [145 Cong. 
  Rec. S1667 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)]..........................  2017
S. Res. 37, 106th Cong. (1999)...................................  2019
Photograph taken pursuant to S. Res. 36, 106th Cong. (1999)......  2021
Legislative Clerk's tally sheets for Senate votes on articles of 
  impeachment....................................................  2022
Judgment of United States Senate (Feb. 12, 1999).................  2024

                         TABLE OF ROLLCALL VOTES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                 Measure/
 Vote No.        Date           Description           Result        Page
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1........  1/8/99.........  S. Res. 16........  Resolution Agreed     47
                                                 to 100-0.
2........  1/25/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1496
                             suspend the rules.  43-57.
3........  1/26/99........  Harkin motion to    Motion Rejected     1579
                             suspend the rules.  41-58.
4........  1/27/99........  Byrd motion to      Motion Rejected     1582
                             dismiss the         44-56.
                             impeachment
                             proceedings.
5........  1/27/99........  House Managers'     Motion Agreed to    1583
                             motion to           56-44.
                             subpoena
                             witnesses and
                             admit evidence
                             not in record.
6........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1608
                             1 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 44-54.
7........  1/28/99........  Daschle Amdt. No.   Amendment           1609
                             2 to S. Res. 30.    Rejected 43-55.
8........  1/28/99........  S. Res. 30 as       Resolution Agreed   1610
                             amended.            to 54-44.
9........  2/4/99.........  Division I of       Motion Agreed to    1677
                             House Managers'     100-0.
                             motion re:
                             admission of
                             evidence.
10.......  2/4/99.........  Division II of      Motion Rejected     1678
                             House Managers'     30-70.
                             motion re:
                             appearance of
                             witnesses.
11.......  2/4/99.........  Murray motion to    Motion Rejected     1680
                             substitute          27-73.
                             Division III of
                             House Managers'
                             motion.
12.......  2/4/99.........  Division III of     Motion Agreed to    1681
                             House Managers'     62-38.
                             motion re:
                             presentation of
                             evidence.
13.......  2/4/99.........  Daschle motion to   Motion Rejected     1682
                             proceed to          44-56.
                             closing arguments.
14.......  2/4/99.........  White House         Motion Rejected     1685
                             Counsel's motion    46-54.
                             on video
                             deposition
                             excerpts.
15.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Rejected     1965
                             suspend the rules.  59-41.
16.......  2/9/99.........  Lott motion to      Motion Agreed to    1970
                             close the doors.    53-47.
17.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 45-55.   1995
                             Article I.
18.......  2/12/99........  Impeachment         Not Guilty 50-50.   1997
                             Article II.
19.......  2/12/99........  Gramm motion to     Motion Rejected     2003
                             postpone            43-56.
                             consideration of
                             rules suspension
                             motion.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 VOLUME III: DEPOSITIONS AND AFFIDAVITS

Deposition of Monica S. Lewinsky (Feb. 1, 1999) (full transcript)  2027
Deposition of Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 2, 1999) (full 
  transcript)....................................................  2224
Deposition of Sidney Blumenthal (Feb. 3, 1999) (full transcript).  2399
Affidavit of Christopher Hitchens (Feb. 5, 1999).................  2534
Affidavit of Carol Blue (Feb. 7, 1999)...........................  2535
Affidavit of R. Scott Armstrong (Feb. 8, 1999)...................  2536

 VOLUME IV: STATEMENTS OF SENATORS REGARDING THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL OF 
                PRESIDENT WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON \5\
                           February 12, 1999

Sen. Specter \6\.................................................  2537
Sen. Gorton......................................................  2537
Sen. Feingold \7\................................................  2545
Sen. Hutchison...................................................  2548
Sen. Conrad......................................................  2558
Sen. Hutchinson..................................................  2561
Sen. Murray......................................................  2563
Sen. McCain......................................................  2565
Sen. Johnson.....................................................  2567
Sen. Lugar.......................................................  2570
Sen. Biden.......................................................  2573
Sen. Abraham.....................................................  2616
Sen. Mikulski....................................................  2622
Sen. Grams.......................................................  2625
Sen. Breaux......................................................  2627
Sen. Domenici....................................................  2630
Sen. Sarbanes....................................................  2633
Sen. Campbell....................................................  2637
Sen. Kerrey......................................................  2639
Sen. Voinovich...................................................  2641
Sen. Lautenberg..................................................  2643
Sen. Bond \8\....................................................  2646
Sen. Robb........................................................  2652
Sen. Boxer.......................................................  2656
Sen. Mack........................................................  2659
Sen. Fitzgerald..................................................  2672
Sen. Roth........................................................  2681
Sen. Burns.......................................................  2684
Sen. Inhofe \9\..................................................  2685
Sen. Cleland.....................................................  2689
Sen. Frist.......................................................  2694
Sen. Bunning.....................................................  2703
Sen. Durbin......................................................  2706
Sen. Kyl.........................................................  2710
Sen. Specter.....................................................  2715
Sen. Levin.......................................................  2738
Sen. Kohl........................................................  2758
Sen. Thompson....................................................  2761
Sen. Moynihan....................................................  2789
Sen. Graham......................................................  2792
Sen. Allard......................................................  2794
Sen. McConnell...................................................  2799
Sen. Kennedy.....................................................  2807
Sen. Collins.....................................................  2812
Sen. Harkin......................................................  2814
Sen. Reid........................................................  2826
Sen. Edwards.....................................................  2830
Sen. Akaka.......................................................  2833
Sen. Leahy \10\..................................................  2837
Sen. Grassley....................................................  2867
Sen. Craig.......................................................  2870
Sen. Dodd \11\...................................................  2873
Sen. Jeffords....................................................  2877
Sen. Wellstone...................................................  2884
Sen. Stevens.....................................................  2888
Sen. Lieberman...................................................  2892
Sen. Brownback...................................................  2905
Sen. Bryan.......................................................  2913
Sen. Ashcroft....................................................  2917
Sen. Thurmond....................................................  2934
Sen. Crapo.......................................................  2937
Sen. Dorgan......................................................  2939
Sen. Kerry.......................................................  2943
Sen. DeWine......................................................  2948
Sen. Lincoln.....................................................  2956
Sen. Helms.......................................................  2959
Sen. Hollings....................................................  2962
Sen. Wyden.......................................................  2965
Sen. Smith (Ore.)................................................  2967
Sen. Hagel.......................................................  2971
Sen. Rockefeller.................................................  2972
Sen. Murkowski...................................................  2977
Sen. Byrd........................................................  2981
Sen. Inhofe......................................................  2987
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  2996
Sen. Snowe.......................................................  3000

                           February 22, 1999

Sen. Nickles.....................................................  3005
Sen. Landrieu....................................................  3013
Sen. Smith (N.H.)................................................  3016
Sen. Bingaman....................................................  3022
Sen. Bennett.....................................................  3024
Sen. Reed \12\...................................................  3026
Sen. Enzi........................................................  3033
Sen. Feingold....................................................  3042

                           February 23, 1999

Sen. Daschle.....................................................  3053
Sen. Bond........................................................  3058
Sen. Sessions \13\...............................................  3059
Sen. Coverdell...................................................  3063
Sen. Hatch.......................................................  3066
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3090
Sen. Sessions....................................................  3094
Sen. Dodd........................................................  3099
Sen. Leahy.......................................................  3102

                           February 24, 1999

Sen. Reed........................................................  3103

    \1\ On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives agreed to H. 
Res. 611, 105th Cong., the Articles of Impeachment, [144 Cong. Rec. 
H12040-42 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998)] and H. Res. 614, 105th Cong., 
which provided for the appointment of managers and procedures relating 
to impeachment proceedings [id. at H12042-43].
    \2\ The House of Representatives agreed to H. Res. 10, 106th Cong., 
on January 6, 1999 [145 Cong. Rec. H216-17 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1999)].
    \3\ The Appendix to Trial Memorandum of President William Jefferson 
Clinton, consisting of exhibits, was filed separately on January 20, 
1999, but is inserted here for ease of reference.
    \4\ For ease of reference, the documents contained in S. Doc. 106-
2, i.e., the pertinent constitutional provisions, the Senate 
Impeachment Rules, the Articles of Impeachment, the Answer of President 
Clinton, and the Replication of the House of Representatives, are 
reprinted in this publication. Separately, the Senate admitted into 
evidence and authorized the printing, pursuant to S. Res. 16, 106th 
Cong., of the publicly available materials submitted to or produced by 
the House Judiciary Committee, including transcripts of public hearings 
or mark-ups and any materials printed by the House of Representatives 
or the House Judiciary Committee pursuant to H. Res. 525 and H. Res. 
581, 105th Cong. (1998). That evidentiary record, S. Doc. 106-3 (1999) 
[24 vols.], is not reproduced here.
    \5\ The unanimous-consent agreement of February 9, 1999, allowed 
each Senator to place in the Congressional Record his or her statement 
delivered during closed deliberations. Not all Senators chose to 
publish their remarks; the fact that a statement of a particular 
Senator does not appear here does not mean that Senator did not address 
the Senate during the closed sessions. Additionally, the unanimous-
consent agreement of February 12, 1999, allowed Senators to have 
statements and opinions explaining their votes printed in the 
Congressional Record.
    \6\ Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2715 below.
    \7\ Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22, 
see p. 3042 below.
    \8\ Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see 
p. 3058 below.
    \9\ Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12, 
see p. 2987 below.
    \10\ Sen. Leahy submitted additional statements on February 12 and 
February 23, see pp. 2996, 3090, 3102 below.
    \11\ Sen. Dodd submitted additional statements on February 23, see 
pp. 3099 and 3100 below.
    \12\ Sen. Reed submitted an additional statement on February 24, 
see p. 3103 below.
    \13\ Sen. Sessions submitted an additional statement on February 
23, see p. 3094 below.
       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Arlen Specter*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
*Sen. Specter submitted an additional statement on February 12, see p. 
2715, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, between the time I made my 
statement in the closed Senate deliberations on February 11 and 
the time I cast my vote on February 12, I consulted with the 
Parliamentarian and examined the Senate precedents and found 
that if I voted simply ``not proven,'' I would be marked on the 
voting roles as ``present.'' I also found that a response of 
``present,'' and inferentially the equivalent of ``present,'' 
could be challenged and that I could be forced to cast a vote 
of ``yea'' or ``nay.''
    I noted the precedent on June 28, 1951, recorded on pages 
S7403 and S7404 of the Congressional Record, when Senator 
Benton of Connecticut and Senator Lehman of New York voted 
``present'' during a rollcall vote. Senator Hickenlooper of 
Iowa challenged these votes and argued that a Senator must vote 
either ``yea'' or ``nay'' unless the Senate votes to excuse the 
Senator from voting. Senator Hickenlooper's challenge was 
upheld, and the Senate voted against excusing these Senators 
from voting by a vote of 39 to 35 in the case of Senator Lehman 
and a vote of 41 to 34 in the case of Senator Benton.
    I also noted the precedent on August 3, 1954, on page 
S13086 of the Congressional Record, when Senator Mansfield of 
Montana voted ``present'' during a rollcall vote. Senator 
Cordon of Oregon objected and asked that the Senate vote on 
whether Senator Mansfield should be excused from voting. By 
voice vote, the Senate voted against excusing Senator Mansfield 
from voting.
    In order to avoid the possibility that some Senator might 
challenge my vote, I decided to state on the Senate floor, 
``not proven, therefore not guilty,'' when my name was called 
on the rollcall votes on article I and article II of the 
articles of impeachment. That avoided the possibility of a 
challenge and also more accurately recorded my vote as ``not 
guilty'' since I did not wish to be recorded as merely 
``present.''
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Slade Gorton

    Mr. GORTON. Mr. Chief Justice, the statement that I am 
placing in the Record is the statement I would have given had I 
been permitted to speak longer and in open session. During our 
closed deliberations, I gave a similar but abridged statement.
    For almost 2 years, the President of the United States was 
engaged in what he has come to describe as an ``inappropriate 
intimate'' relationship with a young woman who came to his 
attention as a White House intern. He then lied about their 
relationship, publicly, privately, formally, informally, to the 
press, to the country, and under oath, for a period of about a 
year.
    This course of conduct requires us to face four distinct 
questions.
    First, we must determine if the material facts alleged in 
the articles of impeachment have been established to our 
satisfaction.
    Second, do the established facts constitute either 
obstruction of justice or perjury, or both?
    Third, are obstruction of justice and perjury high crimes 
and misdemeanors under the Constitution?
    Fourth, even if the acts of the President are high crimes 
and misdemeanors, are they of sufficient gravity to warrant his 
conviction if it allows for no alternative other than his 
removal from office?
    The first article of impeachment alleges that the President 
committed perjury while testifying before the Starr grand jury. 
Although the House managers assert that his testimony is 
replete with false statements, it is clear, at the least, that 
his representations about the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky are literally beyond belief.
    From November 1995 until March 1997, the President engaged 
in repeated sexual activities with Monica Lewinsky, who was 
first a volunteer at, and then an employee of the White House 
and eventually the Pentagon. Though he denies directly few of 
her descriptions of those activities, he testified under oath 
that he did not have ``sexual relations'' with her. His 
accommodation of this paradox is based on the incredible claim 
that he did not touch Ms. Lewinsky with any intent to arouse or 
gratify anyone sexually, even though she performed oral sex on 
him.
    It seems to me strange that any rational person would 
conclude that the President's description of his relationship 
with Ms. Lewinsky did not constitute perjury.
    In addition, while we are not required to reach our 
decision on these charges beyond a reasonable doubt, I have no 
reasonable doubt that the President committed perjury on a 
second such charge when he told the grand jury that the purpose 
of the five statements he made to Ms. Currie after his Jones 
deposition was to refresh his own memory.
    The President knew that each statement was a lie. His goal 
was to get Ms. Currie to concur in those lies.
    The other allegations of perjury are either unproven--
particularly those requiring a strict incorporation of the 
President's Jones deposition testimony into his grand jury 
testimony--or are more properly considered solely--with those 
already discussed--as elements of the obstruction of justice 
charges in article II.
    To determine that the President perjured himself at least 
twice, however, is not to decide the ultimate question of guilt 
on article I. That I will discuss later.
    All the material allegations of article II seem to me to be 
well founded. Four of them, however, those regarding the 
President's encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit 
and then to give false testimony, those regarding the 
President's failure to correct his attorney's false statements 
to the Jones court, and those bearing upon the disposal of his 
gifts to her are not, in my mind, proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Again, I do not believe this standard to be required in 
impeachment trials, but because I believe that the other three 
factual allegations of article II do meet that standard, I 
adopt it for the purposes of this discussion.
    From the time she was transferred to the Pentagon in April 
1996, Ms. Lewinsky had pestered the President about returning 
to work at the White House, and, other than some vague 
referrals, until October 1, 1997, the President had done 
nothing to make this happen and little to help her find another 
job.
    On the first of October 1997, the President was served with 
interrogatories in the Jones case asking about his sexual 
relationships with women other than his wife, and during the 
rest of October the President and his agents stepped up their 
efforts to find Ms. Lewinsky a job. Three weeks later, on 
October 21, the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Bill 
Richardson, called Ms. Lewinsky personally to schedule an 
interview in her apartment complex, though apparently he 
interviewed no one else. Shortly after this unusual interview, 
the Ambassador created a new position in New York and offered 
it to Ms. Lewinsky.
    What is perhaps most striking about the U.N. job is not 
even how promptly it materialized, nor that the U.S. Ambassador 
was so personally involved in hiring a young woman with 
precious little job experience, but that Ambassador Richardson 
held the specially crafted sinecure open for 2 months while the 
former intern kept him waiting on her decision.
    When Ms. Lewinsky decided that she preferred the private 
sector, the President enlisted the help of one of his closest 
personal friends, one of the most influential men in the United 
States, Vernon Jordan. Ms. Lewinsky met with Mr. Jordan in 
early November. Mr. Jordan, who was acting at the President's 
behest, apparently did not fully appreciate how important it 
was for him to cater to Ms. Lewinsky and took no action for a 
month.
    The President and Mr. Jordan realized, however, on December 
5, 1997, the importance of satisfying Ms. Lewinsky's fancy when 
her name appeared on the Jones witness list. Before that date, 
the President needed Ms. Lewinsky only to commit a lie of 
omission--simply to refrain from making their relationship 
public. Her appearance on the witness list now meant that she 
would have to lie under oath.
    Fully appreciative of the higher stakes, the President 
redoubled his efforts and those of his agents to find Ms. 
Lewinsky a job and keep her in his camp. In the weeks after Ms. 
Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list, Mr. Jordan kept 
the President apprised of his efforts to find work for her in 
the private sector. He called his contacts at American Express, 
Young and Rubicam, and MacAndrews & Forbes, Revlon's parent 
corporation. When Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed on December 19, 
1997, to be deposed in the Jones case, Mr. Jordan oversaw the 
preparation of the affidavit that the President had suggested 
she file in lieu of testifying. On January 7, 1997, Ms. 
Lewinsky signed the affidavit, which she later admitted was 
false, denying that she had a ``sexual relationship'' with the 
President. On January 8, she interviewed with MacAndrews & 
Forbes. When she told Mr. Jordan that she had done poorly, he 
called the Chairman of the Board, Ronald Perelman, to recommend 
Ms. Lewinsky, whom he commended as ``this bright young girl, 
who I think is terrific.'' As a result of this conversation, 
Ms. Lewinsky was called back for another interview with 
MacAndrews the following day and given an informal offer. On 
January 9, she reported this to Mr. Jordan, who called Ms. 
Currie with the message, ``mission accomplished'' and then 
called the President himself to share his success.
    The President's lawyers arranged for Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit to be filed on January 14, 1998. After this date, 
although Ms. Lewinsky did not end up with a job in the private 
sector, neither the President nor Mr. Jordan, who so resolutely 
pursued their earlier mission, lifted a finger to help the 
``bright . . . terrific'' young woman. Why? Because shortly 
thereafter the fiction of the President's platonic relationship 
with Lewinsky had exploded. Monica Lewinsky was the same Monica 
Lewinsky, but she now could no longer protect the President.
    It is impossible to reconcile the President's course of 
conduct with any purpose other than to preclude Ms. Lewinsky's 
truthful testimony in the Jones case, or, indeed, to prevent 
her testifying at all. The case for obstruction of justice is 
clear. Obstruction was the President's only motive.
    Next we have the Currie conversation--a set of statements 
by the President in the nominal form of questions, addressed by 
the President to Ms. Currie on the Sunday evening following his 
Jones deposition when she was called to the White House at an 
extraordinary time and for apparently a single purpose. We are 
all familiar now with the questions he posed:
    ``I was never really alone with Monica, right?''
    ``You were always there when Monica was there, right?''
    ``Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?''
    ``You could see and hear everything, right?''
    ``She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.''
    Those five statements have a single common thread: the 
President knew each and every one of them to have been totally 
false.
    Had Ms. Currie been willing to confirm the President's 
suggestions, she would have been a devastatingly effective 
witness for him.
    There is no reasonable explanation of this incident other 
than it is the President's clear attempt to obstruct justice, 
both in the Jones case and in the subsequent grand jury 
investigation.
    The false self-serving statements by the President to 
senior members of his staff, to his Cabinet, and to the 
American people just after his affair became public present a 
somewhat different face. It is reasonably clear that, at the 
time at which they were made, the President's goal, at least in 
part, was to save face with his staff and put a less 
humiliating spin on the Lewinsky matter. At the same time, 
coupled with his public statements, the President's assertions 
to his staff were designed to influence their testimony at some 
future time and place and to enlist them in disguising his 
conduct. In fact, they did obstruct the grand jury 
investigation. The President's manipulation of friendly 
witnesses to testify falsely, if unknowingly, extended for 
months until the DNA evidence shattered both his public and 
private positions.
    The President's attempt to derail the independent counsel's 
inquiry--an inquiry the very purpose of which was to discover 
whether the President gave false testimony and tampered with 
witnesses--by lying to his colleagues, his Cabinet, his 
confidantes, the media, the American people, and ultimately, 
the grand jury, is--beyond a reasonable doubt--a wide-ranging 
and highly public obstruction of justice, deeply damaging to 
the judicial fabric of the United States.
    One final note: to the extent that there are unresolved 
questions of fact, almost every one of them could be resolved 
by truthful and complete testimony by the President himself. 
That is a course of action he spectacularly avoided both in his 
Jones deposition and before the Starr grand jury. Now, he 
refuses to answer interrogatories from Senator Lott and refuses 
to appear at this trial to testify on his own behalf.
    Under the circumstances, is it not appropriate to infer 
that to tell the truth would be to confirm all of the 
questionable charges against him? I have not done so for the 
purposes of this argument, and have considered only those 
charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but the President's 
silence allows the inference that every one of the factual 
charges by the House managers is true.
    With sufficient material facts alleged in the two articles 
of impeachment either essentially uncontested or established by 
overwhelming evidence, and with those facts clearly 
constituting both perjury and obstruction, we arrive at the 
third question before the Senate. Are perjury and obstruction 
of justice high crimes and misdemeanors under the impeachment 
clause of the Constitution?
    This is the easiest of the four questions to answer. 
Perjury and crimes less serious than obstruction of justice 
have always and properly been considered high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    In 1986 Judge Claiborne was convicted by the Senate and 
removed from office for filing a false income tax return under 
penalties of perjury. By a vote of 90 to 7, the Senate rejected 
his argument that he should not be convicted because filing a 
false return was irrelevant to his performance as a judge. In 
1989, Judge Nixon was convicted by the Senate and removed from 
office for perjury: in fact, for lying under oath to a grand 
jury. And in that same year, Judge Hastings was convicted of 
lying under oath and removed by the Senate even though he had 
already been acquitted in a criminal trial--it is generally 
recognized that an act need not be criminal in order to be 
impeachable. As these examples illustrate, perjury is and 
historically has been a sufficient cause for conviction and 
removal. Although no person has been convicted and removed for 
obstruction of justice, the nature and gravity of this crime, 
punished more harshly under our laws than bribery, clearly is 
also a sufficient cause for conviction and removal.
    Most of the Senate's precedents, of course, are based on 
the impeachment trials of judges. President Clinton argues that 
those precedents should not apply; that Presidents, who hold 
the highest office in the land, should benefit from a lower 
standard for removal than the judges they appoint and the 
military officers they command. This President would have 
Presidents remain in office for acts that have resulted in the 
dismissal of military officers under his command, in the 
removal of judges, and for acts that would have resulted in the 
removal of Senators like Bob Packwood, who, like the President, 
are popularly elected for a fixed term. As House Manager Canady 
has pointed out, the 1974 report by the staff of the Nixon 
impeachment inquiry concluded that the constitutional provision 
stating that judges would hold office during ``good 
Behaviour,'' does not limit the relevance of judges' 
impeachments with respect to standards for Presidential 
impeachments. The President's argument that he should be held 
to a lower standard than judges, military officers and Senators 
has no basis in the Constitution, in precedent, in equity, or 
in common sense.
    The fourth and ultimate question, nevertheless, is 
considerably more difficult to answer. For me, the proof of 
material facts supporting some of the allegations is 
overwhelming, the proposition that the established facts of the 
President's conduct constitute perjury and obstruction of 
justice almost impossible to deny, and the conclusion that 
perjury and obstruction of justice are high crimes and 
misdemeanors a given.
    The inevitable result of a guilty verdict in this trial is 
the President's removal from office, and I believe that 
reasonable minds can differ on whether or not that consequence 
is appropriate. So does at least one of the House managers. In 
answering the question of whether removal is too drastic a 
remedy for these alleged acts of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, Lindsey Graham, one of the most thoughtful managers, 
stated that great minds may not necessarily agree on the 
question of whether, for the good of the nation, one should or 
should not remove this President for these high crimes. 
Removal, he said, is the equivalent of the political death 
penalty, and the death penalty is not imposed for every felony. 
Considerations such as repentance and the impact of removal on 
society should also be considered. Mr. Graham's view was not , 
incidentally, that reasonable minds could differ on any of the 
first three questions that I have outlined, but only on the 
ultimate question of removal.
    While removal upon conviction has not always been 
considered inevitable, I agree that article II, section 4 of 
the Constitution requires a mandatory sentence of removal upon 
conviction of high crimes and misdemeanors. Nevertheless, a 
number of thoughtful commentators, and at least a few Members 
of this Senate, have already decided that removal is too 
drastic a sanction. These commentators and Members--who are 
convinced, perhaps, that the President committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice, which, as classes of crime, are high 
crimes and misdemeanors--may nevertheless vote not to convict 
because they believe that removal from office is unwarranted 
for this perjury and this obstruction of justice.
    I share that conclusion with respect to article I, but not 
article II.
    On article I, I have decided, with some regret, that the 
instances of perjury I believe were established beyond a 
reasonable doubt are offenses insufficient for removing the 
President from office--based on the gravity of the offenses as 
against the drastic nature of removal. Equally important is the 
fact that these instances of perjury are also elements of the 
obstruction of justice charges in article II. One conviction 
for the same acts of perjury is enough.
    Nevertheless, I am convinced that one other reflection must 
precede a decision based on the belief that removal is 
disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses established 
here, and that is: what are the consequences of a not guilty 
finding by the Senate? The consequences are, of course, no 
sanction whatsoever.
    It is precisely because the absence of any sanction is so 
objectionable to those who choke over removal that there has 
been such a spirited search for a third way. But, fellow 
Senators, there is no third way. There is no third way.
    Article I, section 3 of the Constitution states: ``Judgment 
in Cases of Impeachment shall extend no further than to removal 
from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office 
of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States. . . .''
    The drafters did not intend to allow Congress to choose 
among a range of punishments analogous to those available to 
the judiciary, and for this reason they specified that the 
impeached party was to remain subject to judicial process and 
specifically limited to two--removal and disqualification--the 
sanctions that Congress could apply.
    We must, I believe, by reason of this harsh choice 
consciously forced on us at the Constitutional Convention in 
1787, weigh seriously the effect on the Republic of either of 
our two possible courses of action. Will the Republic be 
strengthened, or will it be weakened, by determining that a 
President shall remain in its most exalted office after 
perjuring himself and obstructing the pursuit of justice both 
of a private citizen and of a federal grand jury, in a case 
occasioned by the President's sexual activities? Will the 
Republic be strengthened or weakened by removing the President 
from office by an impeachment conviction for this perjury and 
this obstruction?
    Early in our history an incident involving one of the 
authors of the Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, shows clearly 
the bright line between, on the one hand, a private sexual 
scandal, and on the other, a public obligation--a line the 
President has intentionally crossed.
    In No. 65 of ``The Federalist Papers,'' Mr. Hamilton 
described impeachable offenses as ``those offences which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated 
POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately 
to the society itself.'' The President's defenders place great 
reliance on this explanation.
    Within 4 years of the composition of this essay, Mr. 
Hamilton had an opportunity to reflect on his own words. In the 
summer of 1791, Hamilton, then the Secretary of the Treasury, 
had an adulterous affair with a Maria Reynolds. Her husband 
discovered the affair and demanded a job in the Treasury 
Department. Though Secretary Hamilton turned him down, he did 
pay blackmail from his personal funds.
    A year later, three Congressmen, all politically opposed to 
Hamilton, learned of the payments, suspected that they might 
involve Treasury funds, and confronted Hamilton. Despite the 
tremendous political advantage the story, which eventually 
leaked, offered them, he immediately and without hesitation 
told them the truth and nothing but the truth.
    The author of Federalist No. 65 knew very well the 
distinction between a private scandal and the profound 
embarrassment arising out of its publication--and the violation 
of a public duty in an attempt to avoid that embarrassment. He 
chose not to use his Treasury position in a way that would 
justify an impeachment. The personal cost was immense and he 
assumed it without blinking.
    President Clinton could hardly have chosen a more different 
course of action. He chose to violate both his oath of office 
and his oath as a witness, using his office, his staff, and his 
position to try to avoid personal embarrassment. In any event 
even the personal consequences for him have been far worse than 
those visited upon Alexander Hamilton. But it is our duty to 
determine whether he merits a drastic public sanction--or none 
at all.
    Some will say that the President can be charged with crimes 
related to this affair after his term of office is over.
    First, such charges lie outside our jurisdiction or duty.
    Second, such charges seem to me to be unlikely if we acquit 
the President, or in any event.
    But third, and most important, let us assume that President 
Clinton is charged, convicted, and sentenced in 2001. What a 
devastating judgment on the Senate of the United States that 
would be! We ourselves would be convicted, by history and 
forever, of having permitted a felon who abused his office in 
committing his felonies to remain in office as President of the 
United States for 2 long years.
    I simply cannot imagine any Senator willing to carry that 
burden of conscience.
    No, we must choose between the sanction of removal and no 
sanction at all. We know how Alexander Hamilton would vote 
today on our question. We know how James Madison, one of 
Hamilton's interrogators and the careful author of the 
impeachment provision, would have voted. And merely to call up 
the name of George Washington is to answer the question of how 
he would vote.
    The Republic will not be weakened if we convict. The 
policies of the Presidency will not change. The administration 
will not change. If we acquit, if we say that some perjuries, 
some obstructions of justice, some clear and conscious 
violations of a formal oath are free from our sanction, the 
Republic and its institutions will be weakened. One exception 
or excuse will lead to another, the right of the most powerful 
of our leaders to act outside the law--or in violation of the 
law--will be established. Our republican institutions will be 
seriously undermined. They have been undermined already, and 
the damage accrues to all equally--Republicans, Democrats, 
liberals, and conservatives.
    If there is one thing this President can be relied on to 
do, it is to put his interests before those of his office and 
of the Republic. President Clinton has debased the Presidency 
now and, if he is allowed to remain in office, the low level to 
which he has brought the presidency will continue, and that is 
not tolerable.
    I cannot will to my children and grandchildren the 
proposition that a President stands above the law and can 
systematically obstruct justice simply because both his polls 
and the Dow Jones index are high.
    Our duty in this case is as unpleasant as it was unsought. 
But our duty is clear. It was imposed on us, by history, 
without equivocation, 212 years ago. It requires us to convict 
the President of article II of these articles of impeachment. 
And that is how I vote, with clear conscience and a saddened 
heart.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Russell D. Feingold*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Feingold submitted an additional statement on February 22, see 
p. 3042, below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. Chief Justice, my colleagues, like many 
others, the day the President wagged his finger at the American 
people and indicated he had not been involved with Ms. 
Lewinsky, I had the sense that he wasn't telling the truth and 
I felt some genuine regret. The President and I began here in 
Washington in the same month, in 1993. I had high hopes and 
actually felt very close to what he was trying to accomplish. 
So all along in this process, I have had to fight an urge to 
personalize that regret in a way that would affect my ability 
to do my job in this impeachment trial. And I will tell you 
that taking that separate oath helped me get into the mindset 
necessary to do that task.
    I do regret that the President's public conduct--not his 
private conduct--has brought us to this day.
    But we are here, and I want to take a minute to praise my 
colleagues on the process. I think it would have been 
unfortunate had we not had any witness testimony--at least in 
the form of deposition testimony. I think it would have been an 
unfortunate historical precedent. I found the video testimony 
helpful. I didn't enjoy it, but I found it helpful in 
clarifying some of the things that I was thinking about. So I 
am glad, on balance, that we did not dismiss the case at the 
time it was first suggested.
    As we get to the final stage and get immersed in the law 
and facts of this case, it is too easy to forget the most 
salient fact about this entire matter, and that is one simple 
fact that many others have mentioned: In November 1996, 47 
million Americans voted to reelect President Clinton. The 
people hired him. They are the hiring authority. An impeachment 
is a radical undoing of that authority. The people hire and 
somehow, under this process, the Congress can fire. So, I 
caution against, with all due respect to the excellent 
arguments made, the attempt to analogize this to an employee-
employer relationship, or a military situation, or even the 
situation of judges--those situations are all clearly 
different. Along with the choice of the Vice President, in no 
other case do the American people choose one person, and in no 
other case can a completely different authority undo that 
choice.
    Having said that, the Presidential conduct in this case, in 
my view, does come perilously close to justifying that extreme 
remedy. There really have been three Presidential impeachments 
in our Nation's history. I see this one as being in the middle. 
The Andrew Johnson case is usually considered by historians to 
have been a relatively weak case. President Johnson had a 
different interpretation of the constitutionality of the 
statute that he believed allowed him to remove the Secretary of 
War, Mr. Stanton. He was not convicted, and subsequently the 
U.S. Supreme Court, I believe, ruled that in fact that was 
constitutional. I see that as having been a relatively weak 
case.
    The case of Richard Nixon, in my view, was a pretty strong 
case, involving a 1972 Presidential election and attempts to 
get involved with the aspects of that election--frankly--an 
attempt to cover up what happened during that 1972 election. I 
think that had more to do with core meaning of ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors.''
    This is a closer case; this is a close case. In that sense, 
it may be the most important of the three Presidential 
impeachments, in terms of the law of impeachment, as we go into 
the future. I agree neither with the House managers who say 
their evidence is ``overwhelming,'' nor with the President's 
counsel who says the evidence against the President is 
``nonexistent.'' The fact is, this is a hard case, and 
sometimes they say that hard cases make bad law. But we cannot 
afford to have this be bad law for the Nation's sake.
    So how do we decide? There have been a lot of helpful 
suggestions, but one thing that has been important to me is the 
way the House presented their case. That doesn't bind us, but 
they did suggest that two Federal statutes had been violated. 
Mr. Manager McCollum said that ``you must first determine if a 
Federal crime has occurred.'' Many others have said that. I 
will reiterate a point. If that is the approach you want to 
take, then it is clear, in my view as one Senator, that you 
must prove that beyond a reasonable doubt. Otherwise, you are 
using the power and the opprobrium of the Federal criminal law 
as a sword but refusing to let the President and the defense 
counsel have the shield of the burden of proof that is required 
in the criminal law.
    I do not have time to discuss the perjury count this 
afternoon, but will do so in a longer presentation for the 
Record. Suffice it to say, I do not believe the managers have 
met their burden of proving perjury beyond a reasonable doubt.
    As to obstruction of justice, the President did come 
perilously close. Three quick observations make me conclude 
that, in fact, he did not commit obstruction of justice beyond 
a reasonable doubt. First, I am very concerned about the 
conversations between the President and Betty Currie concerning 
the specifics of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. But the 
critical question there is intent. Was his intent about 
avoiding discovery by his family and the political problems 
involved? Or was the core issue trying to avoid the Jones 
proceeding and the consequences of that?
    I don't think it has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the Jones proceeding was the President's concern. Perhaps 
Ms. Currie could have shed some light on this. That is why I 
was extremely puzzled when the House managers didn't call Betty 
Currie. Let me be the first to say that I don't think in this 
instance the House managers ``wanted to win too badly.'' I 
don't think they wanted to win badly enough to take the chance 
of calling Betty Currie, a crucial witness.
    I was very concerned about the false affidavit until I saw 
Ms. Lewinsky's Senate deposition testimony. I am persuaded that 
you cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that she was urged by 
the President to make a false statement in that affidavit.
    Finally, I was very concerned about the hiding of the 
gifts. And maybe everyone will disagree with me on this. But 
when I watched her testimony, I thought Ms. Lewinsky was the 
most indefinite about whether or not she had gotten that call 
from Ms. Currie than any other part of her testimony. I happen 
to believe that Ms. Lewinsky was the one who was the most 
concerned about the gifts. And I believe a showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt has not been made that the President 
masterminded the hiding of the gifts.
    So I cannot deny what Representative Graham said: If you 
call somebody up at 2:30 in the morning, you are probably up to 
no good. But if you call somebody up at 2:30 in the morning, 
you have not necessarily accomplished the crime of obstruction 
of justice.
    I realize there is a separate question of whether these 
same acts by the President, apart from the Federal criminal 
law, constitute high crimes and misdemeanors. I do not. I will 
discuss that in more detail in a future statement in the 
Record.
    But I would like to conclude by just talking a little bit 
about this impeachment issue in the modern context. When I say 
that the vote in 1996 is the primary issue, I don't just mean 
that in terms of the rights of people. I mean it in terms of 
the goal of the Founding Fathers, and our goal today; that is, 
political stability in this country. We don't want a 
parliamentary system. And we don't want an overly partisan 
system.
    I see the 4-year term as a unifying force of our Nation. 
Yet this is the second time in my adult lifetime that we have 
had serious impeachment proceedings, and I am only 45 years 
old. This only occurred once in the entire 200 years prior to 
this time. Is this a fluke? Is it that we just happened to have 
had two ``bad men'' as Presidents? I doubt it. How will we feel 
if sometime in the next 10 years a third impeachment proceeding 
occurs in this country so we will have had three within 40 
years?
    I see a danger in this in an increasingly diverse country. 
I see a danger in this in an increasingly divided country. And 
I see a danger in this when the final argument of the House 
manager is that this is a chapter in an ongoing ``culture war'' 
in this Nation. That troubles me. I hope that is not where we 
are and hope that is not where we are heading.
    It is best not to err at all in this case. But if we must 
err, let us err on the side of avoiding these divisions, and 
let us err on the side of respecting the will of the people.
    Let me conclude by quoting James W. Grimes, one of the 
seven Republican Senators who voted not to convict Andrew 
Johnson. I discovered this speech, and found out that the Chief 
Justice had already discovered and quoted him, and said he was 
one of the three of the ablest of the seven. Grimes said this 
in his opinion about why he wouldn't convict President Johnson:

    I cannot agree to destroy the harmonious working of the 
Constitution for the sake of getting rid of an unacceptable President. 
Whatever may be my opinion of the incumbent, I cannot consent to trifle 
with the high office he holds. I can do nothing which, by implication, 
may be construed as an approval of impeachment as a part of future 
political machinery.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison

    Mrs. HUTCHISON. Mr. Chief Justice, if a university 
president, a minister or priest, general or admiral, or a 
corporate chief executive had engaged in a sexual relationship 
with an intern under his charge, he would lose his position, 
with scant attention paid to whether or not such a relationship 
were ``consensual.'' We place in certain individuals so great a 
measure of trust that they are seen as acting essentially in 
loco parentis.
    The question before us today is: Should the President of 
the United States be held to a lower standard?
    The answer is: No. To the contrary; we can bestow no higher 
honor than to select one individual to represent us all as 
President. In one person we endow the character of our Nation, 
as the head of state and the head of government.
    It is with great disappointment, but firm resolve, that I 
have concluded the President has not lived up to this high 
standard and that he should be removed from office. The House 
managers have demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that, in 
addition to indefensible behavior with an intern, which was not 
illegal, the President engaged in the obstruction of justice 
and, as an element of that obstruction, committed perjury 
before a Federal grand jury, which is.
    This case began as an alleged civil rights violation of a 
young woman who came to the bar seeking justice. The Supreme 
Court unanimously decided to permit her case against the 
President to go forward. It was that case which led to the 
revelations regarding the President's relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky, the White House intern.
    Incredibly, an element of the President's defense is that 
we should take the long view. We are told by the President's 
defenders that we should not judge his actions toward one 
individual, in which he schemed to impede her ability to seek 
redress, because his overall actions on civil rights are so 
positive. We are asked not to judge his treatment of one woman, 
or two women, but to evaluate his policies that affect all 
women.
    Would the President's defenders forgive a schoolteacher who 
molests a student, simply because the teacher's classes are 
popular and his students all go on to college? Should we ignore 
the police officer who personally enriches himself by accepting 
graft, so long as his arrest record is high? Would we look away 
from the corporate executive who illegally profits from insider 
information, as long as his shareholders are happy with the 
return on their investment? We would not sustain civil society 
for long with such moral relativism as our guide.
    The President had it solely within his power to keep the 
country from the course on which it has been for the past year. 
First, of course, he could have chosen not to engage in the 
behavior in question. Having behaved as he did, though, and 
having been discovered, the President could have acknowledged 
his own actions and accepted the consequences. This could have 
been an honorable resignation, or an admission, contrition, and 
a firm resolve to take responsibility; with a request for 
resolution in a manner short of impeachment and trial.
    Instead, the President chose to deny the allegations, and 
fight them with a coordinated scheme of manipulation and 
obstruction. He lied outright to the American people, to his 
close associates, and to his Cabinet. An enduring image of this 
whole tale will be his finger-pointing lie to the American 
people, even after admonishing us to listen closely, because he 
didn't want to have to say it again.
    Even in view of these actions, the President missed 
numerous opportunities to right this matter and get it behind 
him and the country. At virtually every opportunity, though, he 
chose an action that further prolonged the matter and led 
directly to his impeachment.
    The President chose to impede the pursuit of justice by the 
independent counsel, who was given the authority to investigate 
this matter by the President's own Attorney General.
    The President chose to construct a cover story with Ms. 
Lewinsky, should their relationship become public.
    The President chose to direct his personal staff to 
retrieve items from Ms. Lewinsky that he knew were under 
subpoena in a Federal investigation.
    The President chose to seek the assistance of friends to 
find a job for Ms. Lewinsky, and to intensify that job search 
when it became clear that Ms. Lewinsky had become a target of 
the civil suit against him.
    The President chose to lie to his staff about the nature of 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky herself, with the 
expectation that these lies would become part of the public 
perception.
    The President chose to lie before a Federal grand jury 
about his actions with regard to some of the elements of 
obstruction of justice, including the concealment of the gifts 
that were likely to become evidence in the civil case against 
him.
    As a result of these choices by the President of the United 
States, the Senate was left with no choice other than to 
confront the charges and hear the case pursuant to the 
President's impeachment in the House of Representatives.
    In so doing, the Senate conducted a fair and expeditious 
trial. We rejected the idea of an early test vote that would 
have truncated the process. We rejected the motion for an early 
dismissal. The Senate is fulfilling its constitutional 
responsibility to hold a trial with a complete evidentiary 
record and a final vote on each article of impeachment sent to 
the Senate by the House of Representatives.
    Through skillful use of the written record compiled by the 
independent counsel, videotaped depositions, and hard evidence, 
the House managers presented a compelling case. The case for 
perjury was difficult. The President's testimony before the 
grand jury was guarded. He was fully aware of the evidence the 
prosecutors had with respect to this case. He chose his words 
carefully. He admitted his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
before the grand jury, but did so only after confronted with 
clinical evidence of its existence.
    He lied to the grand jury to deny other key facts. He 
perjured himself as an element of a broader attempt to obstruct 
justice. There are two false statements that are the most 
persuasive. First, when asked if he directed Betty Currie to 
retrieve gifts from Ms. Lewinsky, he stated unequivocally, ``No 
sir, I did not do that.''
    The facts are contrary to that allegation. Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that Betty Currie called her to suggest that Ms. 
Lewinsky give her the gifts. We have cellular telephone records 
that indicate a call from Ms. Currie to Ms. Lewinsky at about 
the time the gifts were picked up. It was clear that Ms. Currie 
initiated a retrieval of the gifts at the direction of the 
President, for this was the only source of information she had 
that there were gifts. The evidence is overwhelming that the 
President directed Betty Currie to retrieve these gifts. Thus, 
his statement is false. Not only is this perjury, it is 
obstruction of justice.
    The President also lied before the grand jury about his 
conversations with White House aides regarding Ms. Lewinsky. He 
testified that ``I said to them things that were true about 
this relationship.'' We know this to be completely false from 
the testimony of Sidney Blumenthal, who stated directly and 
unequivocally that the President had lied to him about the 
nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    The legal standard for perjury is high. Under 18 U.S.C. 
1623(a), a person is guilty of perjury if he or she knowingly 
makes a false, material statement under oath in a Federal court 
or grand jury. I believe these statements were false, 
intentional and material in that they attempt to put a false 
impression on key events in a series of attempts to obstruct 
justice. In effect, the President knew his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky was shameful, but not necessarily illegal. But he 
knew his obstruction of justice was illegal--so he lied about 
it to a grand jury.
    In many ways, obstruction of justice is even more corrosive 
than perjury to the machinery of our legal system. As the 
target of a grand jury and an independent prosecutor, the 
President has defended himself against charges of perjury by 
claiming he was caught off guard, was misinterpreted, was 
attempting to mislead but not lie.
    Obstruction of justice, though, is a quite different 
matter. It is an affirmative act that occurs at the person's 
own initiative; in this case, the President. It involves 
actions taken that were not instigated by anyone else.
    It has been said in his defense that the President did not 
initiate his perjury in that he was led to it by the 
prosecutor. But there is no similar argument regarding article 
II, the obstruction of justice. Without the affirmative actions 
of the President, there would have been no article II.
    The President sought out Mr. Blumenthal to tell his 
misleading story about the nature of his relationship and the 
character of Ms. Lewinsky.
    Separately, the President enlisted his personal secretary 
to further his obstruction of justice. He asked Ms. Currie to 
retrieve the gifts. He summoned her to coach her testimony 
under the guise of ``trying to figure out what the facts 
were.'' He did so within hours after coming back to the White 
House on January 17 from his deposition in the civil sexual 
harassment lawsuit. He required a face-to-face meeting with her 
the next day, a Sunday. It couldn't be done over the phone, and 
it couldn't wait until Monday. It was clear he needed her to 
reaffirm his false testimony. This is obstruction of justice.
    The edifice of American jurisprudence rests on the 
foundation of the due process of law. The mortar in that 
foundation is the oath. Those who seek to obstruct justice 
weaken that foundation, and those who violate the oath would 
tear the whole structure down.
    Every day, thousands of citizens in thousands of courtrooms 
across America are sworn in as jurors, as grand jurors, as 
witnesses, as defendants. On those oaths rest the due process 
of law upon which all of our other rights are based.
    The oath is how we defend ourselves against those who would 
subvert our system by breaking our laws. There are Americans in 
jail today because they violated that oath. Others have 
prevailed at the bar of justice because of that oath.
    What would we be telling Americans--and those worldwide who 
see in America what they can only hope for in their own 
countries--if the Senate of the United States were to conclude: 
The President lied under oath as an element of a scheme to 
obstruct the due process of law, but we chose to look the other 
way?
    I cannot make that choice. I cannot look away. I vote 
``guilty'' on article I, perjury. I vote ``guilty'' on article 
II, obstruction of justice.
    I ask unanimous consent that an analysis of the articles of 
impeachment be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                Analysis of the Articles of Impeachment

                   (By Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison)
    ``Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the 
trial of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to 
the Constitution and laws: So help you God?''
    When the Chief Justice of the United States administered this oath 
and I signed my name to it on January 7, 1999, as one of one hundred 
triers of fact and law in the Court of Impeachment of the President of 
the United States, I did so with a heavy heart, but with a clear mind.
    That solemn occasion in the well of this Senate, and the weight of 
the burden imposed on us as ``jurors'' in only the second such 
proceeding in the history of our Nation, reminded me with vivid clarity 
that our Constitution belongs to all of us.
    I was reminded as well, however, that the laws of our Country are 
applicable to us all, including the President, and they must be obeyed. 
The concept of equal justice under law and the importance of absolute 
truth in legal proceedings is the foundation of our justice system in 
the courts.
    In this proceeding, I have drawn conclusions about the facts as I 
see them, and I have applied the law to those facts as I understand 
that law to be.
              underlying facts leading to this proceeding
    The details of an intimate personal relationship that occurred 
during the years 1995, 1996, and 1997 between the President of the 
United States and a 22-year-old female White House Intern who was 
directly under his command and control have been chronicled throughout 
the world and are described in thousands of pages of evidence and 
materials filed with both the House and the Senate in this case and in 
bookstores across America. They involved intimate sexual relations 
within the White House, personal gifts, jobs within and outside of 
government, and ``missions accomplished.'' The underlying details will 
not be repeated by me here.
    While some facts about that relationship and the timing of some 
events were disputed at the trial in the Senate, their essence has been 
publicly admitted by the President, by his Counsel, and by the Intern 
in written or verbal form, including sworn testimony in various forms.
    However inappropriate the behavior of the President was, the legal 
issues in the impeachment trial do not deal with this relationship. All 
accusations against the President here relate instead to alleged 
attempts to prevent the disclosure of this relationship in a pending 
civil rights lawsuit against the President in an Arkansas Federal court 
and to the public. That is the critical factor that has brought us to 
this extraordinary moment in our Nation's history when we are 
considering whether or not to remove from office the President of the 
United States.
           core facts leading to the articles of impeachment
    In May, 1994, a female citizen and employee of the State of 
Arkansas filed a lawsuit in an Arkansas Federal District Court, 
alleging, in summary, that, in 1991 while President Clinton was 
Governor of Arkansas, the Governor committed the civil offense of 
sexual harassment against her by insisting that she perform sexual acts 
identical or similar to those later performed by the Intern.
    In the course of preparing for the trial of the Arkansas case, the 
plaintiff, with the consent of the presiding Federal Judge, attempted 
to develop evidence that defendant Clinton had, before and afterward, 
engaged in patterns of conduct that were similar to the allegations of 
the plaintiff in the case.
    In December, 1997, the Arkansas Judge ordered defendant Clinton to 
answer a written interrogatory naming every state and federal employee 
with whom he had had sexual relations since 1986. President Clinton 
answered: ``none.''
    In an alleged attempt to avoid giving a personal deposition in the 
case pursuant to a December, 1997, subpoena, the White House Intern, 
who had since become employed at the Pentagon, on January 7, 1998, 
signed an affidavit denying any sexual relationship with President 
Clinton. Six days later, on January 13, the Intern accepted a job offer 
at a major corporation in New York City. A friend called the President 
shortly thereafter with the message: ``Mission accomplished.''
    While the President was giving his own deposition in the Arkansas 
case, his counsel tendered this affidavit to the Arkansas Federal 
Court, referred to it, and vouched for its accuracy in the presence of 
the President. The President, knowing the affidavit to be false, sat by 
and said nothing. The President's counsel subsequently advised the 
Court that this affidavit was not reliable and should be ignored.
    Defendant Clinton was subpoenaed to give the above-mentioned 
deposition in the case and did so on January 17, 1998. In a rare event, 
the Arkansas Judge attended for the purpose of supervising the 
deposition of the President in a Washington lawyer's offices. While 
there, the Judge and participating counsel for the parties, either 
knowingly or unknowingly, formulated a definition of the meaning of the 
words ``sexual relations'' to exclude certain forms of human contact 
that in their commonly accepted meaning would be included. But, 
allegedly upon the basis of this definition, President Clinton denied, 
under oath, among other things, that he had sexual relations with the 
Intern.
    On January 21, 1998, the existence of an alleged inappropriate 
relationship between the President and the White House Intern blazed 
across the Nation from a story first published in the Washington Post 
carrying the headline: ``Clinton Accused of Urging Aid to Lie; Starr 
Probes Whether President Told Woman to Deny Alleged Affair to 
(plaintiff's) Lawyers.''
    Evidence introduced and debated by the House Managers and the 
President's Counsel in the Senate painted a picture of frantic 
activities within and without the White House throughout the month 
before and during the week following this public disclosure, by the 
President, by his friends, by White House staff and employees, and 
others. It was alleged, among other things, that the President coached, 
manipulated, and influenced false testimony of witnesses, including the 
Intern, engineered the hiding of gifts and evidence that was subject to 
subpoena, lied to his staff and friends about the facts in order to 
assure that they would give false testimony in public and legal 
proceedings, manipulated the Intern into signing the false affidavit in 
the Arkansas Federal Court, and, after failures to obtain employment 
for her elsewhere, rewarded the Intern by obtaining for her an out-of-
town job in return for her cooperative falsehoods or silence. The 
sequence and importance of such activities, much of which is not 
disputed in the evidence, were debated aggressively by the House 
Managers and the President's Counsel in the Senate, but the essence of 
those activities was not seriously denied.
    After numerous public denials immediately after the public 
disclosure, and after several days of alleged ``damage control'' 
designed to synchronize false stories to be provided by various parties 
in response to all inquiries, and event of major, historic, and future 
national importance occurred.
    On January 26, 1998, the President addressed the Nation about this 
issue at a press conference in Washington, since replayed in television 
broadcasts thousands of times. On that occasion, the President looked 
sternly into the camera and pointed his finger directly at the American 
people and stated:
    ``I want to say one thing to the American people. I want you to 
listen to me. I'm going to say this again: I did not have sexual 
relations with that woman (naming the Intern). I never told anybody to 
lie, not a single time. Never. These allegations are false.''
    During the following months, the gist of this representation filled 
the news media around the World and in every conceivable form, provided 
by every conceivable spokesman for the President, including government 
employees, Cabinet officials, lawyers, public relations specialists, 
political advisors, friends, Members of Congress, and others.
    After an immunity agreement was reached between the Independent 
Counsel (discussed below) and the Intern on July 28, 1998, the Intern 
delivered a dress to the Independent Counsel that, according to her 
testimony, had been worn by her on February 28, 1997, during a sexual 
encounter with the President in the White House. The dress was tested 
for the President's DNA. The test was positive.
    The President of the United States had lied directly to the 
American people.
            the president's appearance before the grand jury
    After months of negotiation for an appearance by the President, on 
July 17, 1998, the President was subpoenaed to appear before a Federal 
grand jury in Washington by the Independent Counsel assigned to 
investigate multiple issues concerning the President, including issues 
involving potential perjury by both the President and the Intern in the 
Arkansas sexual harassment case, issues relating to the President's 
relationship with the Intern, and issues relating to alleged actions 
taken to influence the testimony of witnesses in the Arkansas case and 
before the grand jury, attempts to discredit the Intern by describing 
her as a ``stalker,'' as ``ignorant,'' and as ``stupid,'' all done in 
an alleged effort to cover up and conceal the underlying relationship 
between the President and the Intern, to obstruct the right of the 
Arkansas plaintiff to pursue her sexual harassment claims in the 
Arkansas Federal Court, and to obstruct the proceedings of the grand 
jury itself.
    After various losing motions and court proceedings asserting 
various executive privileges against a Presidential appearance before 
the grand jury, the President, on August 17, 1998, gave testimony 
voluntarily to the grand jury by deposition given in the White House 
and piped live to the grand jury. The prior subpoena was withdrawn by 
the Independent Counsel.
    During and since this appearance, the President has repeatedly 
acknowledged publicly that he had an inappropriate relationship with 
the White House Intern but has insisted that he was misleading but 
truthful in his depositions in the Arkansas case and before the Federal 
grand jury and did not commit any act that would constitute an 
obstruction of any legal proceeding or the rights of any party 
associated with any portion of this historic tale.
                      impeachment of the president
    The Ethics in Government Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c), directs any 
Independent Counsel appointed under that law to advise the House of 
Representatives of any substantial and credible information received 
during the course of an investigation that may constitute grounds for 
the impeachment of the President of the United States.
    On September 9, 1998, the Office of Independent Counsel submitted 
its referral to the House of Representatives consisting of thousands of 
pages of sworn testimony from many parties, recorded telephone 
conversations, video tapes, interviews, reports, legal briefs, and 
arguments, including the following partial introduction:
    ``This Referral presents substantial and credible information that 
President Clinton criminally obstructed the judicial process, first in 
a sexual harassment lawsuit in which he was a defendant and then in a 
grand jury investigation.''
    The Judiciary Committee of the House, in its report to the full 
House of Representatives, recommended four Articles of Impeachment of 
the President. On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives 
declined to approve two of the proposed Articles, but did approve the 
following two Articles, and delivered H. Res. 611 to the Senate for 
trial in accordance with the provisions of Section 3 of Article I of 
the Constitution of the United States:
    Impeachment Article I, the ``perjury'' article, accuses the 
President of violating his constitutional duty to take care that the 
laws are faithfully executed, of willfully corrupting and manipulating 
the judicial process, and of impeding the administration of justice for 
personal gain and exoneration, in that:
    While under oath before the Federal grand jury, the President gave 
perjurious testimony before the grand jury concerning one or more of 
the following: (i) the nature and details of his relationship with the 
Intern; (ii) prior perjurious, false, and misleading testimony he gave 
in the Arkansas case; (iii) prior false and misleading statements he 
allowed his attorney to make about the Intern's affidavit in the 
Arkansas case; and (iv) his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony 
of witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Arkansas 
case.
    Impeachment Article II, the ``obstruction of justice'' and 
``witness tampering'' article, accuses the President of violating his 
constitutional duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, 
of preventing, obstructing, and impeding the administration of justice, 
and, to that end, of engaging personally and through his subordinates 
and agents in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to the Arkansas Federal sexual harassment case.
    In support of the accusation, Article II accuses the President of 
seven specific acts of obstruction: (i) corruptly encouraging the 
Intern to execute false affidavit in the Arkansas case, (ii) corruptly 
encouraging the Intern to give false testimony in the Arkansas case if 
and when she was called to testify personally in that case, (iii) 
corruptly engaging in, encouraging, or supporting a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in the Arkansas case, (iv) obtaining 
a job for the Intern in order to corruptly prevent her truthful 
testimony in the Arkansas case, (v) corruptly allowing his attorney in 
the Arkansas case to make false statements to the Federal Judge 
characterizing the Intern's affidavit in order to prevent questioning 
deemed relevant by the Judge, (vi) corruptly influencing his personal 
secretary to give false testimony in the Arkansas case, and (vii) 
making false and misleading statements to witnesses in the Federal 
grand jury proceeding, confirmed by the witnesses, in order to 
corruptly influence the testimony of those witnesses.
                        the trial in the senate
    H. Res. 611 was received in the Senate on December 19, 1998. The 
trial commenced on January 7, 1999. During the trial, we have listened 
to hours of arguments from the House Managers and Counsel for the 
President, and have engaged in hours of internal Senate debate, both 
public and private. We have been provided with access to thousands of 
pages and other forms of evidence relating to the accusations contained 
in the two Articles of Impeachment.
    Under the Constitution, the power to impeach (or ``accuse'') a 
President of an impeachable offense is vested solely in the House of 
Representatives. As Senators and triers of both the facts and the law, 
we cannot ``accuse,'' ``venture outside the record,'' or ``create and 
assert new allegations.'' We are bound to cast our votes of ``guilty'' 
or ``not guilty'' solely on the two Article of Impeachment as presented 
by the House.
    I do not hold to the view of our Constitution that there must be an 
actual, indictable crime in order for an act of a public officer to be 
impeachable. It is clear to this Senator that there are, indeed, 
circumstances, short of a felony criminal offense that would justify 
the removal of a public officer from office, including the President of 
the United States. Manifest injury to the Office of the President, to 
our Nation, and to the American people, and gross abuses of trust and 
of public office clearly can reach the level of intensity that would 
justify the impeachment and removal of a leader. One of the Articles of 
Impeachment presented by the House Judiciary Committee to the full 
House of Representatives in this case charged the President with 
precisely such an offense. The House of Representatives did not approve 
that Article, and such a charge is, therefore, not before us in this 
proceeding.
    The two Articles of Impeachment before the Senate in this 
proceeding do in fact accuse the President of committing three actual 
crimes, ``perjury before the grand jury,'' `'obstruction of justice,'' 
and ``witness tampering,'' that meet the requirements for conviction of 
an indicted defendant in a criminal case brought under Federal law. The 
House Managers and Counsel for the President reviewed those laws 
extensively. Thus, in order to find the President ``guilty'' under 
either Article, this Senator must conclude that all of the statutory 
prerequisites to conviction are present that would be required to 
convict the President of one or more of those crimes, if this 
proceeding were, instead, the prosecution of felony criminal 
indictments in a United States District Court under Federal law.
    The President's Counsel did not significantly challenge the 
underlying facts in the case, but insisted throughout (i) that no 
crimes have been committed, and (ii) that, even if crimes have been 
committed, they ``do not rise to the level of the high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' contemplated by the Constitution that would permit a 
conviction in this proceeding, since a finding of ``guilty'' by 67 
Senators under either Article would, under the Constitution, 
automatically result in the removal of the President from office and 
prohibit him forever from holding another office of profit or trust 
under the United States.
 perjury, obstruction of justice, and witness tampering as impeachable 
                                offenses
    Section 4 of Article II of our Constitution provides:
    ``The President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    Because of the uniqueness of this Constitutional process in which 
``guilt'' and ``punishment'' are combined, each Senator, as a trier of 
both fact and law, before voting as to the guilt or innocence of the 
President under either of the Articles must answer the basic question: 
Do the crimes of perjury, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice 
as alleged in this proceeding rise to the level of the ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors'' included in our Constitution that would justify the 
automatic removal from office of the President of the United States?
    The Supreme Court of the United States has observed that there is 
an occasional misunderstanding to the effect that the crime of 
``perjury'' is somehow distinct from ``obstruction of justice.'' United 
States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937). They are not. While 
different elements make up each crime, each is calculated to prevent a 
court and the public from discovering the truth and achieving justice 
in our judicial system. Moreover, it is obvious that ``witness 
tampering'' is simply another means employed to obstruct justice.
    This Senate on numerous occasions has convicted impeached Federal 
Judges on allegations of perjury. Moreover, the historical fact is that 
``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' as used and applied in English law on 
which portions of our Constitution were founded, included the crimes of 
``obstructing the execution of the lawful process'' and of ``willful 
and corrupt perjury.'' Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
a treatise described by James Madison as ``a book which is in every 
man's hand.'' See article entitled ``The True History of High crimes 
and misdemeanors,'' by Gary L. McDowell, Director of the Institute of 
United States Studies at the University of London, appearing in the 
Wall Street Journal, January 25, 1999.
    Some argue that the precedents of the Senate in cases involving 
Federal Judges are not applicable because Federal Judges are not 
elected by the people and the President is. This is a shocking analysis 
to this Senator. That the President is elected should call for a 
``higher'' standard of conduct, not a lower one. The fact is that the 
standards are set by the Constitution for all officers of the Federal 
government. They are precisely the same, and we are obligated to apply 
them evenly.
    It is argued by others that this test leaves Presidents at risk of 
being impeached and convicted for trivial offenses. The two-thirds vote 
requirement for conviction imposed by the Constitution, itself, is 
designed to protect public officers from precisely such a result.
    The President's Counsel and a number of Senators advance a 
``felony-plus'' interpretation of the Constitutional terms ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors.'' They seem to agree that the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice are ``high crimes'' under the 
Constitution, but they argue that, even if guilt is admitted, 
nevertheless, a Senator should vote ``not guilty,'' on any article of 
impeachment of a President, if the ``economy is good,'' if the 
underlying facts in the case are ``just about sex,'' or if the Senator 
simply feels for whatever personal reason that the President ought to 
stay in office despite having committed felonies while holding it.
    To this Senator, this astounding application of the plain language 
of our Constitution strikes at the very heart of the rule of law in 
America. It replaces the stability guaranteed by the Constitution with 
the chaos of uncertainty. Not only does it obliterate the noble ideal 
that our highest public officer should set high moral standards for our 
Nation, it says that the officer is free to commit felonies while doing 
it if the economy is good, if the crime is just about sex, or if, 
except for the crime, ``things are going pretty well right now,'' or 
simply that ``they can indict and try the President for the crime after 
leaving office in a couple of years.''
    I will not demean our Constitution or the office of the Presidency 
of the United States by endorsing the felony-plus standard.
              elements required for conviction of perjury
    Lying is a moral wrong. Perjury is a lie told under oath that is 
legally wrong. To be illegal, the lie must be willfully told, must be 
believed to be untrue, and must relate to a material matter. Title 18, 
Section 1621 and 1623, U.S. Code.
    If President Washington, as a child, had cut down a cherry tree and 
lied about it, he would be guilty of ``lying,'' but would not be guilty 
of ``perjury.''
    If, on the other hand, President Washington, as an adult, had been 
warned not to cut down a cherry tree, but he cut it down anyway, with 
the tree falling on a man and severely injuring or killing him, with 
President Washington stating later under oath that it was not he who 
cut down the tree, that would be ``perjury.'' Because it was a material 
fact in determining the circumstances of the man's injury or death.
    Some would argue that the President in the second example should 
not be impeached because the whole thing is about a cherry tree, and 
lies about cherry trees, even under oath, though despicable, do not 
rise to the level of impeachable offenses under the Constitution. I 
disagree.
    The perjury committed in the second example was an attempt to 
impede, frustrate, and obstruct the judicial system in determining how 
the man was injured or killed, when, and by whose hand, in order to 
escape personal responsibility under the law, either civil or criminal. 
Such would be an impeachable offense. To say otherwise would be to 
severely lower the moral and legal standards of accountability that are 
imposed on ordinary citizens every day. The same standard should be 
imposed on our leaders.
    Nearly every child in America believes that President Washington, 
as a child himself, did in fact cut down the cherry tree and admitted 
to his father that he did it, saying simply: ``I cannot tell a lie.''
    I will not compromise this simple but high moral principle in order 
to avoid serious consequences to a successor President who may choose 
to ignore it.
 elements required for conviction of witness tampering and obstruction 
                               of justice
    Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, 
or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engage 
in misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to--
          (i) influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of any person 
        in an official proceeding;
          (ii) cause or induce any person to (A) withhold testimony or 
        evidence from an official proceeding, (B) alter or destroy 
        evidence in an official proceeding; (C) evade legal process 
        summoning that person as a witness or produce evidence in an 
        official proceeding to which the person has been summoned;
          (iii) harass another person and thereby hinder, delay, 
        prevent, or dissuade any person from attending or testifying in 
        an official proceeding; or
          (iv) corruptly influence, obstruct, or impede, or endeavor to 
        influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of 
        justice;
is guilty of witness tampering and/or obstruction of justice. Title 18, 
Sections 1512 and 1503, U.S. Code.
    The elements of these crimes are evident from the laws themselves 
and do not need amplification here.
                my votes on the articles of impeachment
    Based upon my analysis of the facts of this case and my own 
conclusions of law, I have concluded:
    (i) The President of the United States willfully, and with intent 
to deceive, gave false and misleading testimony under oath with respect 
to material matters that were pending before the Federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998, as alleged in Article I presented to the Senate. I, 
therefore, vote ``Guilty'' on Article I of the Articles of Impeachment 
of the President in this Proceeding.
    (ii) The President of the United States engaged in a pattern of 
conduct, performed acts of willful deception, and told and disseminated 
massive falsehoods, including lies told directly to the American 
people, that were designed and corruptly calculated to impede, 
obstruct, and prevent the plaintiff in the Arkansas Federal sexual 
harassment case from seeking and obtaining justice in the Federal court 
system of the United States, and to further prevent the Federal grand 
jury from performing its functions and responsibilities under law, I, 
therefore, vote ``Guilty'' on Article II of the Articles of Impeachment 
of the President in this proceeding.
                article i, perjury--explanation of vote
    This Article accuses the President, while giving sworn testimony on 
August 17, 1998, before the Federal grand jury in Washington, D.C., of 
willfully corrupting and impeding the judicial process and the 
administration of justice by giving false and perjurious testimony 
about his relationship with the White House Intern, about his January 
17, 1998, deposition testimony in the Arkansas sexual harassment case, 
about his role in developing and tendering to the Federal Judge in the 
Arkansas case an affidavit that was knowingly false while giving his 
deposition in the Arkansas case, and about his attempts to influence 
the testimony of White House employees and other witnesses in the 
Arkansas case who were at the time also subject to the jurisdiction of 
the grand jury.
    In reaching my decision with respect to this Article, I have 
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the President gave false and 
misleading testimony in the Arkansas sexual harassment case and in his 
appearance before the Federal grand jury.
    At the trial in the Senate, the President's Counsel argued that, 
even if it were to be admitted that the testimony in both instances 
were false and misleading, the testimony would, nevertheless, not 
amount to perjury because it does not reach the level of 
``materiality'' that is required for a lie to rise to the level of a 
crime under Federal law.
    They attempt to trivialize the issues raised by Article I by 
reference to such questions as ``Who touched whom, and where,'' and to 
answers to questions by the President such as ``It depends on what the 
meaning of `is' is.''
    The false testimony complained of in Article I of the Articles of 
Impeachment relates to testimony before the grand jury, and only 
indirectly to the testimony in the Arkansas case. The Federal grand 
jury was investigating broad issues and many persons at the time the 
President gave false and misleading testimony before it.
    Willful, corrupt, and false sworn testimony before a Federal grand 
jury is a separate and distinct crime under applicable law and is 
material and perjurious if it is ``capable'' of influencing the grand 
jury in any matter before it, including any collateral matters that it 
may consider. See, Title 18, Section 1623, U.S. Code, and Federal court 
cases interpreting that Section.
    The President's testimony before the Federal grand jury was fully 
capable of influencing the grand jury's investigation and was clearly 
perjurious.
        article ii, obstruction of justice--explanation of vote
    When, on January 26, 1998, the President of the United States 
pointed his finger at the American people and represented to them that 
he was the victim of lies and not their perpetrator, he lied to 
America. The evidence is overwhelming that he did so because all of his 
``ducks were in a row.''
    The White House Intern had executed a false affidavit; subpoenaed 
gifts had been hidden; his own false deposition had been given; other 
witnesses had testified falsely based upon his own false 
representations to them; retribution against the White House Intern had 
been programmed should she abandon loyalty; and loyalty had been 
confirmed by the Intern's acceptance of a special new job in New York, 
that represented, according to a friend of the President, ``Mission 
accomplished.''
    Then came the dress, the tapes, and the Federal grand jury. The 
attempt to obstruct and cover-up grew, expanded, and developed a life 
of its own. It overpowered the underlying offense itself. A new 
strategy was required, fast: The President was advised: ``Admit the 
sex, but never the lies.'' Shift the blame; change the subject. Blame 
it on the plaintiff in the Arkansas case. Blame it on her lawyers. 
Blame it on the Independent Counsel. Blame it on partisanship. Blame it 
on the majority members of the House Judiciary Committee. Blame it on 
the process.
    The blame belongs to the President of the United States. This juror 
has concluded that the President is guilty of obstructing justice 
beyond a reasonable doubt, as alleged in Article II of the Articles of 
Impeachment in this proceeding.
                          concluding statement
    This has been a case about civil rights. It has been about the 
right of the weakest and the strongest among us to have equal access to 
our system of justice in order to pursue legal and Constitutional 
rights and to fix responsibility for alleged legal wrongs.
    During the last half of this passing century, we have managed to 
maintain the proposition established over 200 years ago that every 
American is entitled to equal justice under the law.
    In the middle of the century, our Country and our courts began to 
recognize the inherent evil of discrimination based on race and 
national origin. In the last two decades, we have begun to address 
issues of gender. We have enacted sexual harassment laws that have 
become the symbols of the high moral standards of our Country. They 
permit half of our citizens to work freely among us without fear of 
harm and sexual abuse.
    It has been said by many, in attempts to demean this proceeding, 
that this case is, simply, ``all about sex.'' In some ways, it is. It 
is about the right of an employed female American living in the State 
of Arkansas to hold a job without being forced to engage in it by the 
Governor of that State. That is not the question before us, and I 
express no opinion on that subject. But I do know that the President of 
the United States willfully and unlawfully obstructed her efforts in 
the Federal courts of our Land to pursue her cause. We are forced to 
leave it to history to determine whether her cause was factually just, 
and to define the message that the conduct of our Country's highest 
public officer sends into the next century.
    If only the President had followed the simple, high moral principle 
handed to us by our Nation's first leader as a child and had said early 
in this episode ``I cannot tell a lie,'' we would not be here today. We 
would not be sitting in judgment of a President. We would not be 
invoking those provisions of the Constitution that have only been 
applied once before in our Nation's history.
    But we should all be thankful that our Constitution is there, and 
we should take pride in our right and duty to enforce it. A hundred 
years from now, when history looks back to this moment, we can hope for 
a conclusion that our Constitution has been applied fairly and 
survives, that we have come to principled judgments about matters of 
national importance, and that the rule of law in American has been 
sustained.
                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Kent Conrad

    Mr. CONRAD. Mr. Chief Justice, I have served 12 years in 
the U.S. Senate.
    I respect this institution and all of you as colleagues. I 
especially respect the job our leaders have done in this trial. 
They have performed in the highest tradition of the U.S. 
Senate. Most of all, I respect our oath of office: to 
``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.'' I know all of us take that oath seriously.
    At the end of this proceeding, however, we may reach 
different conclusions about what the Constitution compels us to 
do. The simple truth is that this case is not black and white. 
As Mr. Manager Graham said, reasonable people may come to 
different conclusions.
    There is one thing on which we all agree: The President's 
conduct was wrong. In fact, it was very wrong. But the question 
before us is not whether the President's conduct was wrong. The 
question is whether that conduct meets the constitutional 
standard for removing a President from office.
    That requires us to make a profound judgment on whether we 
should overturn the results of a national election. Sixty-seven 
Members in this Chamber can nullify the votes of the 47 million 
Americans who voted for President Clinton. That is an awesome 
power. It must be used with great restraint.
    There are three questions we must answer in the affirmative 
to remove a President: First, did the President commit the 
crimes he is charged with? Second, are these crimes properly 
addressed by impeachment, or would they be better left to the 
criminal justice system? Third, do the charges rise to the 
level of high crimes and misdemeanors and justify the removal 
of the President of the United States?
    Let me start with the first question. The charges against 
the President are perjury and obstruction of justice.
    Five experienced Federal prosecutors representing both 
Republican and Democratic administrations concluded that no 
responsible Federal prosecutor would bring perjury charges 
based on the facts in this case.
    The President in his grand jury testimony acknowledged an 
intimate and inappropriate relationship with Monica Lewinsky. 
The details of that relationship are in conflict. But I do not 
believe relatively minor differences in the details of that 
relationship would result in a perjury conviction.
    On the obstruction charges, again the Federal prosecutors 
told us they would not bring charges based on the facts in this 
case.
    Ms. Lewinsky has testified that no one ever asked her to 
lie or promised her a job for her silence. Ms. Lewinsky further 
testified she never discussed the contents of her testimony 
with the President, ever. Finally, she also testified that she 
believed she could file a truthful affidavit.
    There are two elements of the obstruction of justice 
charges that do trouble me. One is the transfer of gifts from 
Ms. Lewinsky to Betty Currie. That could constitute concealment 
of evidence. But Betty Currie has testified five times that Ms. 
Lewinsky called her to arrange for the transfer of gifts. And 
both the President and Betty Currie have denied that the 
President initiated the transfer.
    The second troubling charge is the questioning of Betty 
Currie by the President after his deposition in the Jones case. 
I find it hard to believe the President was just refreshing his 
memory when on two occasions he put the same set of questions 
to Ms. Currie. That could constitute witness tampering, but at 
the time of these conversations, Betty Currie was not a witness 
in any judicial proceeding. And she has testified that she did 
not feel pressured to agree with the President.
    Although I am not certain that there was no wrongdoing, I 
do conclude that the charges have not been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.
    That leads me to the second question: even if these charges 
were proven, is this a matter for impeachment, or should it be 
left to the ordinary course of judicial proceeding?
    For me, it is a question best answered by the rule of law 
that governs us all: the Constitution of the United States.
    James Madison kept a journal of the Constitutional 
Convention. In it, he said many of the Founders opposed 
impeachment altogether. Others believed impeachment was needed 
to protect against treason, bribery, or other ``attempts to 
subvert the Constitution.'' So a carefully crafted, very narrow 
compromise was adopted.
    Article II, section 4 originally read: ``The President . . 
. shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and 
conviction of, Treason, Bribery or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors against the United States.''
    James Wilson, a 19th century constitutional scholar has 
written that impeachment was designed for ``great and publick 
[sic] offences by which the Commonwealth was brought into 
danger.''
    These charges against the President just do not measure up 
to that standard. Hiding presents under a bed, asking a 
secretary leading questions, these can hardly be the great and 
public offenses that our Founding Fathers had in mind. These 
charges, and the facts behind them, simply do not bring our 
Commonwealth into danger.
    So is the President above the law? Most emphatically, no.
    William Rawle, a contemporary of the Founders and a 
distinguished commentator on the Constitution wrote: ``In 
general, those offenses which may be committed equally by a 
private person as a public officer, are not the subject of 
impeachment . . . [A]ll offenses not immediately connected with 
office, except the two expressly mentioned, are left to the 
ordinary course of judicial proceeding.''
    I do not argue that no private wrongs can rise to the level 
of impeachable offense, but they must be heinous crimes.
    Article I, section 3, of the Constitution says: ``Judgment 
in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to 
removal from Office . . . but the party convicted shall 
nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, trial, 
judgment and punishment according to law.''
    The President is not above the law. He can be prosecuted, 
indicted, convicted, and sentenced for alleged wrongful acts, 
just like any other American.
    We have our Founding Fathers' own words, distinguishing 
between public crimes and those that involve the President's 
conduct as a private individual. We have their deeds to guide 
us as well. When Vice President Aaron Burr killed Alexander 
Hamilton in a duel and was indicted for murder, impeachment was 
not even considered.
    Almost 200 years later, the House Judiciary Committee 
dismissed a tax evasion charge against President Nixon when an 
overwhelming majority of the committee concluded, in the words 
of Congressman Ray Thornton, ``These charges may be reached in 
due course in the regular process of law.''
    In the case before us today, the underlying offense is that 
the President had an extramarital affair. He is alleged to have 
lied about that under oath, and to have obstructed justice. 
These are serious allegations, and we have considered them 
seriously.
    Offensive as they were, the President's actions have 
nothing to do with his official duties, nor do they constitute 
the most serious of private crimes. In my judgment, these are 
matters best left to the criminal justice system.
    That brings me to the third and final question: do the 
charges so fundamentally threaten our democratic system of 
government that they constitute high crimes and misdemeanors 
and justify removal of the President from office?
    Our Founding Fathers told us two things about impeachment. 
First, the matter at hand had better be a very significant 
crime--a ``high crime'' that threatens our fundamental 
freedoms. These alleged crimes do not meet that standard. 
Second, they told us that it better not be partisan. That is 
why they required a two-thirds vote in the Senate to remove a 
President.
    They feared the passions of what they called a ``faction.'' 
This is a classic case of just that. This proceeding was 
partisan in the House. It has become partisan here. I am not 
casting aspersions here. I am stating a fact.
    Impeachment will fail. And it should. It lacks the 
fundamental legitimacy only a bipartisan consensus can provide.
    My colleagues, the Republic still stands. Our safety as a 
Nation is not in jeopardy. Our Constitution has not been 
shaken.
    Voting to impeach the President under these circumstances 
would undermine the core principle that lies at the heart of 
our system of government: the separation of powers. Our 
Founding Fathers made it difficult to remove a sitting 
President by design. They were convinced of the wisdom of 
having three coequal branches of government. They did not want 
the President serving at the pleasure--or being removed at the 
displeasure--of the legislative branch.
    Our Founding Fathers were right. Removing a popularly 
elected President from office would have implications not only 
for this President, but for every President to follow, and 
ultimately for the very system of government we hold so dear. 
Thomas Jefferson once said, ``I know of no safe depository of 
the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves.''
    My colleagues, we are a democracy. In a government ``of the 
people, by the people, and for the people,'' we cannot ignore 
the will of the people. Removing the President under these 
circumstances would be the most fundamental violation of the 
rule of law. It would overturn the rule of the people as 
expressed in a free election. It would adopt minority rule, 
overturning the clear wishes of a majority of the American 
people.
    Our freedom and liberty are not threatened by the wrongful 
acts of this President. But our freedom and liberty might be 
threatened if a minority can overturn the will of the majority.
    There may yet come a time when we have no choice but to 
substitute our judgment for the will of the people. I pray I 
never see that time. I know it has not come in this case.
    My colleagues, I will vote against the articles of 
impeachment in the case of William Jefferson Clinton.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Tim Hutchinson

    Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chief Justice, we are nearing one of 
the most important votes most of us will ever cast.
    As an Arkansan, the impeachment process has been long and 
difficult. President Clinton is a dominating political 
influence in Arkansas and still immensely popular in my home 
State, so I am acutely aware of the political implications of 
this vote for me.
    As an Arkansan, I share pride in one of our own having 
achieved so much and having attained the highest elective 
office in the land. Arkansas has produced more than its share 
of political leaders--the Joe T. Robinsons, the Hattie 
Caraways, the John McClellans, and the J.W. Fulbrights. But 
never before has an Arkansan reached the Presidency. I, with 
all of Arkansas, was proud. We knew William Jefferson Clinton's 
intellect, his grasp of policy issues. We knew his personality, 
his charisma. We had seen for years his remarkable political 
skills, his uncanny ability to connect with people. I believe I 
am like most Arkansans--deeply conflicted--pride mixed with 
embarrassment, and most of all pain.
    This trial is not about private conduct. It is not about 
the President's personal behavior. We are all sinners. We are 
all flawed human beings. The President's personal life is his 
personal life. It is his business, not mine. The facts that are 
relevant are those relating to law.
    This trial is not about process. It seems to me that 
throughout this long drama, many have sought to put Ken Starr 
on trial or the House managers on trial. Was Ken Starr on a 
vendetta or was he just doing an unpleasant job? Whichever, we 
have to deal with the facts and the evidence. Did the House 
managers, as we have heard from the President's counsel so 
often, ``want to win too much?'' Frankly, both sides wanted to 
win, both sides were fervent in their presentations, and I am 
glad we didn't hear half-hearted arguments. A vigorous 
prosecution and defense is the basis of a successful 
adversarial system. What we are doing is important. I am glad 
they believe in what they are doing, but in the end it is the 
facts, the evidence, with which we must grapple. The process 
with all its flaws is secondary. The reality is, we are faced 
with a body of evidence.
    This trial is not about punishment. It is not about getting 
our pound of flesh from the Democrats. It is not about getting 
our retribution on the President. It is not political 
vengeance. It is not about polls. If polls had prevailed, 
Andrew Johnson would have been removed, and that would have 
been wrong. To argue that a popular President should not be 
removed regardless of his actions, merely because he is 
popular, is to lower our constitutional Republic to a 
meaningless level.
    To say popularity should be a factor in our decision is to 
say that bad poll numbers and unpopularity is an argument for 
removal of a President. How contrary to our constitutional 
system. The popularity of this President should never have been 
mentioned, in my opinion. Nor should political consequences of 
our votes be the basis for our decision of whether to remove 
this President.
    What I had to weigh was the evidence. Voting to remove a 
President--the very thought sobers and humbles me. But the 
facts are so inescapable, the evidence so powerful.
    I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that when the 
President testified before the Federal grand jury and said that 
he had been truthful to his aides in what he had said about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--that he committed perjury and 
obstructed justice. When he told Sidney Blumenthal that Ms. 
Lewinsky was a stalker and he was a victim, he was not being 
truthful. He was trying to destroy her reputation and he would 
have, had it not been for the dress. He lied, and he lied about 
his lie to the grand jury.
    I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that when the 
President led Betty Currie through a false rendition of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky that he was tampering with a 
witness and obstructing justice. He did this not once, but 
twice. His explanation that he was refreshing his memory 
offends all common sense. When he denied this coaching before 
the grand jury, he obstructed justice and committed perjury. Of 
course, there is much more to this case, but how much do we 
need?
    If this trial was only about one man's actions, it might be 
easier. But this trial is about so much more--the office of the 
Presidency, the precedent of lowering the bar on the importance 
of our Nation's rule of law. It is about the oath Bill Clinton 
took when he was sworn in as our President, to uphold our 
Nation's laws. And it is about the oath the President took when 
he swore to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth before the grand jury. The sanctity of the oath is the 
basis of our judicial system. To lessen the significance of 
violating the oath is in fact an attack on our legal system and 
the rule of law.
    There are men and women across America who languish behind 
bars today because they committed the crime of perjury, lying 
under oath. How can we tell America that our President, the 
highest government official in the land, is treated 
differently?
    While I was growing up in Gravette, AR, life seemed much 
more simple than it is today. It was a simpler time. But then 
and now, the bedrock of our society is still truth and justice. 
This hasn't changed. On August 25, 1825, Daniel Webster said, 
``Whatever government is not a government of laws, is a 
despotism, let it be called what it may.''
    Today is a somber day for our country. This trial has been 
a sad chapter of American history, and I have a heavy heart. As 
difficult as these votes will be, I know that I could not serve 
the people of Arkansas with a clear conscience unless I do what 
I believe is right and uphold the law. I will vote guilty on 
both articles of impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Patty Murray

    Mrs. MURRAY. Mr. Chief Justice, this past year certainly 
has been a difficult time for America. I have to say, as a 
citizen, as a woman, and as a parent, I cannot begin to 
describe how deeply disappointed and angry I am with the 
President.
    I came to Washington, DC, in 1992. Over the last 6 years I 
have worked with Bill Clinton. I trusted him. I thought I knew 
him. I refused to believe he would demean the Presidency in the 
way that he has. His behavior was appalling and has hurt us 
all.
    As a Senator, I have an obligation under the Constitution 
that transcends any sense of personal betrayal I might have. I 
am sworn to render my judgment based on the evidence presented 
and the larger question of what the framers of the Constitution 
meant when they wrote the impeachment clause.
    I have listened carefully throughout this debate. I have 
read and listened to every available article and argument. Like 
all of you, I have spent more hours on this case than I ever 
wanted to and have felt the tremendous weight of this decision.
    I believe that perjury and obstruction of justice can be 
considered high crimes. The question is whether the facts in 
this case support the allegations that the President committed 
these crimes.
    The Republican House managers presented a theory. But after 
listening carefully to both sides and, most importantly, 
reviewing the words of the witnesses themselves, they did not 
prove their theory of perjury and obstruction of justice beyond 
a reasonable doubt to me. If we are to remove a President for 
the first time in our Nation's history, none of us should have 
any doubts.
    We must also ask ourselves how it would affect the country 
to remove this President after such a partisan process. A 
conversation I had with a constituent not long ago really 
struck a chord with me. He said to me:

    I am old enough to remember President Nixon's resignation. I know 
how deeply it affected the psyche of an entire generation. I know it 
made many of us cynical of politics for a long, long time. Please don't 
put us all through that turmoil again. This country would be punished 
and hurt by a Presidential removal. This country doesn't deserve to be 
punished for this President's behavior.

    So despite my personal disgust with the President's 
actions, I intend to vote ``not guilty'' on both articles of 
impeachment.
    Our founders were wise. They knew the President would be 
imperfect. They knew he would stumble and fall. While it would 
be wrong to suggest they approved of such behavior, they were 
not interested in the individual and his flaws. They sought to 
protect the Nation.
    They set a very high standard for the legislative body to 
meet before overturning the results of an election--the very 
basis of our democracy. They declared it would only be for the 
crimes most threatening to our Nation. They did not establish 
the impeachment process to punish a wrongdoer; they established 
it to protect America.
    This President's behavior was reprehensible, but it does 
not threaten our Nation. In the past year, despite the scandal 
that ran on the front page nearly every day, our country has 
prospered. Our economy is growing. Our waters and air are 
cleaner. Our communities are safer. Our education system is 
stronger. America is not poised on the brink of disaster. Our 
democracy is safe.
    But what of our legacy in this process? What will I tell my 
daughter, or tell a classroom of young students? Well, it 
doesn't take a lawyer or a constitutional scholar to tell them 
that no matter how difficult it is, tell the truth. The lie 
will hurt you much, much more. It can consume you, your 
friends, your family, your nation. It can destroy those you 
love and diminish you forever in their eyes.
    This President now knows that. His legacy will be tainted 
with the anguish he inflicted on the people and country he 
loves because of his selfish and disgraceful behavior. It is a 
weight that he alone will bear for the rest of his life.
    We have heard a lot of emotions and strong feelings on this 
floor from both sides. I respect the deep convictions of 
everyone in this room. I am saddened it has appeared partisan. 
But it is my hope that we can now turn the page on this sad 
part of America's history and put an end to the recriminations.
    Mr. Chief Justice, a point of personal privilege.
    It is hard to stand before you without Scott Bates behind 
me. I knew him as all of you did as a loyal, excellent Senate 
employee. But I also knew him as a dad. We stood together as 
parents on a soccer field cheering on our daughters in victory 
and hugging them in defeat. He will be missed, but his absence 
should serve as a reminder that although we have been totally 
engrossed in this issue for far too long, there is life outside 
of these doors. There are friends to be hugged, kids to be 
educated, parents to take care of.
    I hope when this day is over, we will set aside our 
differences and remember there are a lot more important things 
each of us needs to be concentrating on, both professionally 
and personally. It is time to move on.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator John McCain

    Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chief Justice, I intend to vote to convict 
the President of the United States on both articles of 
impeachment. To say I do so with regret will sound trite to 
some, but I mean it sincerely. I deeply regret that this day 
has come to pass.
    I bear no animosity for the President. I take no partisan 
satisfaction from this matter. I don't lightly dismiss the 
public's clear opposition to conviction. And I am genuinely 
concerned that the institution of the Presidency not be harmed, 
either by the President's conduct, or by Congress' reaction to 
his conduct.
    Indeed, I take no satisfaction at all from this vote, with 
one exception--and an important exception it is--that by voting 
to convict I have been spared reproach by my conscience for 
shirking my duty.
    The Senate faces an awful choice, to be sure. But, to my 
mind, it is a clear choice. I am persuaded that the President 
has violated his oath of office by committing perjury and by 
obstructing justice, and that by so doing he has forfeited his 
office.
    As my colleagues across the aisle have so often reminded 
me, the country does not want the President removed. And, they 
ask, are we not, first and foremost, servants of the public 
will? Even if we believe the President to be guilty of the 
offenses charged, and even if we believe those offenses rise to 
the level of impeachment, should we risk the national trauma of 
forcing his removal against the clearly expressed desire of the 
vast majority of Americans that he should not be removed even 
if he is guilty of perjury and obstruction of justice?
    I considered that question very carefully, and I arrived at 
an answer by reversing the proposition. If a clear majority of 
the American people were to demand the conviction of the 
President, should I vote for his conviction even if I believed 
the President to be innocent of the offenses he is charged 
with? Of course not. Neither, then, should I let public opinion 
restrain me from voting to convict if I determine the President 
is guilty.
    But are these articles of impeachment of sufficient gravity 
to warrant removal, or can we seek their redress by some other 
means short of removing the President from office? Some of 
those who argue for a lesser sanction, including the 
President's able counsel, contend that irrespective of the 
President's guilt or innocence, neither of the articles charge 
him with high crimes and misdemeanors. Nothing less than an 
assault on the integrity of our constitutional government rises 
to that level. The President's offenses were committed to cover 
up private not public misconduct. Therefore, if he thwarted 
justice he did so for the perfectly understandable and 
forgivable purpose of keeping hidden an embarrassing personal 
shortcoming that, were it discovered, would harm only his 
family and his reputation, but would not impair our system of 
government.
    This, too, is an appealing rationalization for acquittal. 
But it is just that, a rationalization. Nowhere in the 
Constitution or in the expressed views of our founders are 
crimes intended to conceal the President's character flaws 
distinguished from crimes intended to subvert democracy. The 
President thwarted justice. No matter how unfair he or we may 
view a process that forces a President to disclose his own 
failings, we should not excuse or fail to punish in the 
constitutionally prescribed manner evidence that the President 
has deliberately thwarted the course of justice.
    I do not desire to sit in judgment of the President's 
private misconduct. It is truly a matter for him and his family 
to resolve. I sincerely wish circumstances had allowed the 
President to keep his personal life private. I have done things 
in my private life that I am not proud of. I suspect many of us 
have. But we are not asked to judge the President's character 
flaws. We are asked to judge whether the President, who swore 
an oath to faithfully execute his office, deliberately 
subverted--for whatever purpose--the rule of law.
    All of my life, I have been instructed never to swear an 
oath to my country in vain. In my former profession, those who 
violated their sworn oath were punished severely and considered 
outcasts from our society. I do not hold the President to the 
same standard that I hold military officers. I hold him to a 
higher standard. Although I may admit to failures in my private 
life, I have at all times, and to the best of my ability, kept 
faith with every oath I have ever sworn to this country. I have 
known some men who kept that faith at the cost of their lives.
    I cannot--not in deference to public opinion, or for 
political considerations, or for the sake of comity and 
friendship--I cannot agree to expect less from the President.
    Most officers of my acquaintance would have resigned their 
commission had they been discovered violating their oath. The 
President did not choose that course of action. He has left it 
to the Senate to determine his fate. And the Senate, as we all 
know, is going to acquit the President. As much as I would like 
to, I cannot join in his acquittal.
    The House managers have made, and I believe some of my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle would agree, a 
persuasive case that the President is guilty of perjury and 
obstruction. The circumstances that led to these offenses may 
be tawdry, trivial to some, and usually of a very private 
nature. But the President broke the law. Not a tawdry law, not 
a trivial law, not a private law.
    The tortured explanations with which the President's 
attorneys have tried to defend him against both articles fail 
to raise reasonable doubts about his guilt. It seems clear to 
me, and to most Americans, that the President deliberately lied 
under oath, and that he tried to encourage others to lie under 
oath on his behalf. Presidents may not be excused from such an 
abuse no matter how intrusive, how unfair, how distasteful are 
the judicial proceedings they attempt to subvert.
    The President's defenders want to know how can I be certain 
that the offenses, even if true, warrant removal from office. 
They are not expressly mentioned in the Constitution as 
impeachable offenses. Nor did the founders identify perjury or 
obstruction as high crimes or high misdemeanors. Were an 
ordinary citizen accused of perjury in a civil proceeding, he 
or she would in all likelihood not be prosecuted or forced out 
of political necessity into a perjury trap.
    No, an ordinary citizen would not be treated as the 
President has been treated. But ordinary citizens don't enforce 
the laws for the rest of us. Ordinary citizens don't have the 
world's mightiest armed forces at their command. Ordinary 
citizens do not usually have the opportunity to be figures of 
historical importance.
    Presidents are not ordinary citizens. They are 
extraordinary, in that they are vested with so much more 
authority and power than the rest of us. We have a right; 
indeed, we have an obligation, to hold them strictly 
accountable to the rule of law.
    Are perjury and obstruction of justice expressly listed as 
high crimes and misdemeanors? No. Why? Because they are self-
evidently so just as the President is self-evidently the 
Nation's chief law enforcement officer, despite his attorneys' 
quibbling to the contrary. It is self-evident to us all, I 
hope, that we cannot overlook, dismiss or diminish the 
obstruction of justice by the very person we charge with taking 
care that the laws are faithfully executed. It is self-evident 
to me. And accordingly, regretfully, I must vote to convict the 
President, and urge my colleagues to do the same.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Tim Johnson

    Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chief Justice, the great question now 
before the Senate is not whether the rule of law will prevail--
it surely will--both by the actions of this body and by 
possible proceedings within the judicial system.
    The question before the Senate is whether we should take 
action against the President beyond that allowed for in our 
Nation's courts. We are, I believe, confronted by two threshold 
questions which must first be resolved before consideration can 
or need be given to weighing the evidence presented by the 
House managers. First, is whether the articles of impeachment 
have been adequately drawn to allow the accused to know with 
precision the wrongdoing to which he is accused, and to require 
that a two-thirds majority vote of the Senate be secured upon a 
single act of wrongdoing in order to convict. As a second 
threshold matter, if the articles are at least adequately 
drawn, do they, if true, allege wrongdoing of sufficient import 
to justify for the very first time in our Nation's long 
history, the overturning of the people's will as expressed in a 
free, fair, and democratic national election? I am troubled by 
the adequacy of the articles, but even accepting them, the 
second threshold question of impeachability is simply not met.
    Only if these threshold questions are adequately met in the 
mind of an individual Senator, can that Senator proceed to 
determine whether the weight of the evidence is sufficient to 
convict. And even if both threshold questions are ignored, it 
is impossible for me to say that the circumstantial evidence 
presented reaches a ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' standard on 
either article. Reasonable doubt means that if there are 
multiple reasonable theories as to what occurred--if one of the 
reasonable theories is consistent with innocence, then an 
acquittal must follow. Especially relative to article two--I 
can understand the belief of some that a plausible scenario of 
obstruction was established. Some may even believe that the 
President was more likely than not obstructing justice. But the 
evidence is clearly not so powerful as to lead anyone to 
believe that no reasonable and innocent scenario remains.
    I am both profoundly honored and humbled to have this 
historic responsibility to participate with my Senate 
colleagues, Republican and Democrat, in perhaps the most grave 
proceeding envisioned by the authors of our national 
Constitution. I have listened carefully to both sides of this 
dispute, and I have also carefully reviewed the thoughts of 
many of our Nation's leading scholars of history and 
constitutional law. It is clear to me that the results of this 
trial have ramifications which go far beyond the fortunes of 
William Jefferson Clinton.
    The decision made by the Senate this week will have an 
utterly profound impact on the relationship between the 
executive and legislative branches of our government for the 
rest of time. Accordingly, it is essential that the decisions 
made in this proceeding not be driven by transitory passions of 
partisan politics but rather with an eye toward the long-term 
stability and integrity of our democracy.
    My humble reading of history leads me to believe that the 
never-failing bipartisan honoring of national Presidential 
elections over these past two centuries has been one of the 
greatest sources of our national success. While holding a 
President accountable to all the same civil and criminal laws 
that apply to the general citizenry is absolutely essential, 
the writers of our Constitution properly intended for the 
reversal of fair elections at the hands of Congress to be 
exceedingly rare and difficult.
    The learned opinions of our Nation's leading scholars 
overwhelmingly support the understanding that Presidents should 
not be removed from office by Congress short of some horrific 
personal misconduct or misconduct which arises from executive 
authority and threatens the Nation--such as treason or bribery. 
By requiring a two-thirds vote for the overturning of 
Presidential elections, the founders of our Nation also made it 
crystal clear that such an extraordinary step should not and 
cannot be taken unless there is an overwhelming bipartisan 
outcry against the President's actions.
    The American public and most Members of Congress, including 
myself, have criticized President Clinton's personal conduct in 
harsh terms. But the American public also seems to understand 
that at stake is not simply Bill Clinton's future, but the 
integrity of our election system and the long-term freedom of 
the executive branch from partisan congressional attack--this 
understanding about the need for stability, for 
proportionality, for continuity, is a natural and a deeply 
conservative inclination on the part of our citizenry.
    The writers of our Constitution wanted some degree of 
proportionality between a President's conduct and the penalties 
applied--otherwise they would have made impeachment applicable 
to all crimes and misdemeanors. It is certainly conceivable 
that the will of the people expressed in an election may 
someday be rightly overturned by Congress. But it is also 
certain to me that while this President's personal conduct, 
involving immaterial testimony to a lawsuit dismissed by a 
Federal court as having no merit, is deserving of public 
condemnation, and even possible prosecution within the judicial 
system, it simply does not rise to the level of extraordinary 
danger to the Nation that justifies removal from office.
    Some will no doubt say that I have set a high standard for 
overturning Presidential elections. I would very much agree. 
Particularly as a recently former member of the House of 
Representatives, I have witnessed firsthand the depth and the 
intensity of partisan anger that can occur from time to time in 
Congress and among portions of the national public. It is a 
reaction to that open partisanship demonstrated by the House 
and the independent counsel that surely is at the foundation of 
the American public's overwhelming contempt for this proceeding 
and the view that this process is politics as usual, an 
exercise in raw political power and beneath what should be the 
dignity of Congress.
    I have no certain solutions for that sad and angry state of 
affairs, other than to attempt to conduct my own political life 
in as thoughtful and moderate a manner as I am capable, but I 
believe the Constitution provided our Nation with a strong 
bulwark against negative and hateful partisanship by creating 
an executive branch which is largely shielded from 
congressional partisanship and which is instead disciplined by 
law and by the electoral will of the people.
    I greatly fear that any lesser standard would result, even 
without an independent counsel law, in a situation whereby 
civil actions against standing Presidents will be routinely 
brought as yet another destructive partisan political tactic. 
These multiple and nefarious actions will then be followed by 
never-ending legal discovery proceedings, and they in turn 
followed by impeachment articles or the threat of impeachment 
each time the House is controlled by a different political 
party than the Presidency. I fear the wrong decision here will 
lead our Nation into an ever downward spiral where impeachment 
proceedings will be routine.
    It is critically important, in my view, for this U.S. 
Senate to say, ``Stop! Enough!'' We must send an unmistakable 
message to the House, the Nation and the world, that we will 
not permit the stability and independence of the executive 
branch of our government to be jeopardized by anything less 
than heinous crimes or gross threats to the Nation.
    This leaves, of course, other avenues for Congress and the 
public to express great displeasure with the President's 
dishonorable conduct. If illegal activity did in fact take 
place, that activity would be subject to discipline in the 
courts. While there are divided opinions on its wisdom, it is 
possible that some sort of collective censure may be agreed 
upon by the Senate, and certainly individual Senators are free 
to place their condemnations of the President's personal 
behavior in the Congressional Record. The House impeachment of 
the President, the public humiliation of Bill Clinton and his 
family, as well as the great private fortune this dispute will 
have consumed will also serve as punishment enough. But I think 
it is also important for this Senate to understand that the 
writers of our Constitution did not create an impeachment 
process as one more form of punishment, but exclusively to 
protect the viability of our Nation.
    Given my sacred oaths as a U.S. Senator and as a 
participant in this impeachment trial, and given my abiding 
commitment to the Constitution and the well-being of our 
Nation, I have no choice but to vote against both articles of 
impeachment. I do not know nor do I care what the political 
consequences might be of the decision I make here--I am a 
Democrat elected six consecutive times State-wide from my 
largely Republican State, and I have long been proud of the 
bipartisan support extended to me by the good people of South 
Dakota. In turn, I have long recognized that neither political 
party has a monopoly on good ideas or bad, good people or bad. 
But I know this--the issue before me is too grave for politics. 
At the end of the day, when my service in this body is done, I 
want my children, my family and myself to view my decisions 
here as honorable, as an exercise in responsible judgment, and 
in a small way, as efforts that strengthened the bulwark of 
democracy that our Constitution represents.
    The President dishonorably lied to the American people, 
however, the two articles before the Senate fail, first because 
they do not allege offenses that give rise to removal from 
office, and secondly, because it cannot be said that the 
evidence proves guilt of perjury or obstruction of justice 
beyond all reasonable doubt, to such a degree that no innocent 
and reasonable explanation exists.
    I will vote not guilty on both article I and article II.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar

    Mr. LUGAR. Mr. Chief Justice, for the first time in 120 
years, and only for the second time in U.S. history, the Senate 
is about to conclude a Presidential impeachment trial. Our 
Founding Fathers viewed the power to remove a President as a 
necessary constitutional safeguard, but they wanted to make 
certain that the process was sufficiently difficult that the 
will of the voters would be overturned only for the gravest of 
reasons. They wrote the words ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
as a threshold, but left it to us to determine what 
transgressions met this standard. All of us have endeavored to 
fulfill this enormous responsibility.
    From the beginning of the consideration of impeachment last 
year, many Members of Congress in both parties have made public 
statements expressing their opinions that the President lied to 
a Federal grand jury and that he obstructed justice on numerous 
occasions. These judgments are apparently shared by large 
majorities of the American people as illustrated in frequent 
public opinion polls. The same polls have consistently found 
that a large majority of Americans do not want the President to 
suffer the constitutional consequence of these breaches of law, 
namely, removal from office.
    Since the House voted for impeachment, almost all 45 
Democrats and some Republicans in the Senate have voiced their 
skepticism about voting to remove President Clinton from 
office. Early in the trial, 44 Democrats voted to dismiss the 
impeachment proceedings outright. Thus, a two-thirds majority 
vote needed for a guilty verdict has never been a likely 
outcome of the trial.
    In the background, most Senate Democrats and several 
Republicans have worked on a motion to censure President 
Clinton. Our distinguished colleague, Senator Feinstein, 
drafted a censure resolution that attracted substantial 
bipartisan support and was published in the New York Times of 
February 6, 1999. It stated:

    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
engaged in an inappropriate relationship with a subordinate employee in 
the White House, which was shameless, reckless and indefensible;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
deliberately misled and deceived the American people and officials in 
all branches of the United States Government;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, 
gave false or misleading testimony and impeded discovery of evidence in 
judicial proceedings;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter is 
unacceptable for a President of the United States, does demean the 
Office of the President as well as the President himself, and creates 
disrespect for the laws of the land;
    Whereas President Clinton fully deserves censure for engaging in 
such behavior;
    Whereas future generations of Americans must know that such 
behavior is not only unacceptable but also bears grave consequences, 
including loss of integrity, trust and respect;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton remains subject to criminal and 
civil actions;
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton's conduct in this matter has 
brought shame and dishonor to himself and to the Office of the 
President; and
    Whereas William Jefferson Clinton, through his conduct in this 
matter, has violated the trust of the American people: Now, therefore, 
be it
    Resolved, That the United States Senate does hereby censure William 
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, and condemns his 
conduct in the strongest terms.

    Citizens might ask how a Senator could vote for a 
resolution stating that President Clinton ``deliberately misled 
and deceived the American people and officials in all branches 
of the United States Government'' and ``gave false or 
misleading testimony and impeded discovery of evidence in 
judicial proceedings'' and yet fail to vote ``guilty'' on 
articles of impeachment that specifically mention perjury and 
obstruction of justice. The answer to that question is at the 
heart of understanding the Senate trial.
    With few exceptions, Senators recognize that the 
Constitution gives only one outcome to a verdict of ``guilty,'' 
namely, removal from office. At the same time, many Senators 
are shocked by conduct which they call ``shameless, reckless, 
and indefensible,'' and they want their constituents to know 
that they have not been fooled or overwhelmed by Presidential 
charm. They have taken the initiative to explicitly denounce 
the bizarre conduct and the extraordinary corruption of this 
President. Members of both parties have deplored the fact that 
the President conducted an illicit sustained physical sexual 
relationship in spaces close to the Oval Office and publicly 
denied this to his family, his staff, and in televised 
statements to the world only to see all of the elaborate cover-
up collapse after DNA tests on the dress of a young woman, but 
the impeachment trial of President Clinton is not about 
adultery. The impeachment trial involves the President's 
illegal efforts to deny a fair result in the suit brought by 
Ms. Paula Jones. I have no doubt that the President worked 
deliberately to deny justice in this suit. In doing so, he lied 
to a Federal grand jury and worked to induce others to give 
false testimony, thus obstructing justice.
    Ms. Jones has often been described as a small person in our 
judicial system. In contrast, the President, who at the time of 
his inaugural takes a solemn oath to preserve and protect equal 
justice under the law for even the most humble of Americans, is 
a giant figure. As Senators who also take a solemn oath, we 
must ask ourselves the fundamental question: ``Is any man or 
woman above the law?''
    The legal defense team for the President does not admit 
that there is adequate proof of either perjury or obstruction 
of justice. They contend that Senators must embrace a theory of 
``immaculate obstruction'' in which jobs are found, gifts are 
concealed, false affidavits are filed, and the character of a 
witness is publicly impugned, all without the knowledge or 
direction of the President, who is the sole beneficiary of 
these actions. The President's lawyers further contend that 
such crimes are, in any event, insufficient to remove the 
President. The drafters of the Constitution would have rejected 
these rationalizations for the indefensible Presidential 
misconduct at issue. They were political men with a profound 
reverence for the sanctity of the oath and our entire system of 
justice. They did not suggest that Senators park their common 
sense and their stewardship for the security of our country at 
the Senate door as they entered into an impeachment trial.
    In fact, we have discovered in this trial that the Founding 
Fathers wanted the Senate to act as ``triers'' of fact and in 
the roles of both trial court and jury. Most importantly, they 
wanted us to act as guardians of the Constitution and thus the 
liberty and the rights under law of each individual American. 
Liberty itself is directly threatened when a President subverts 
the very judicial system that secures those rights.
    During this trial, I have concluded that the prosecutors 
made their case. I will vote to remove President Clinton from 
office not only because he is guilty of both articles of 
impeachment, but also because I believe the crimes committed 
here demonstrate that he is capable of lying routinely whenever 
it is convenient. He is not trustworthy. Simply to be near him 
in the White House has meant not only tragic heartache for his 
wife and his daughter but enormous legal bills for staff 
members and friends who admired him and yearned for his success 
but who have been caught up in his incessant ``war room'' 
strategies to maintain him in office. Senator Feinstein begins 
her censure resolution with the appropriate word ``shameless.'' 
The President should have simply resigned and spared his 
country the ordeal of this impeachment trial and its aftermath.
    We have been fortunate that this damaged Presidency has 
occurred during a time of relative peace and prosperity. In 
times of war or national emergency, it is often necessary for 
the President to call upon the Nation to make great economic 
and personal sacrifices. In these occasions, our President had 
best be trustworthy--a truth teller whose life of principled 
leadership and integrity we can count upon. Some commentators 
have suggested that with the President having less than 2 years 
left in his term of office, the easiest approach is to let the 
clock expire while hoping that he is sufficiently careful, if 
not contrite, to avoid reckless and indefensible conduct. But 
as Senators, we know that the dangers of the world constantly 
threaten us. Rarely do 2 years pass without the need for strong 
Presidential leadership and the exercise of substantial moral 
authority from the White House.
    Of particular concern are the implications of the 
President's behavior for our national security. As Commander in 
Chief, President Clinton fully understood the risks that he was 
imposing on the country's security with his secret affair in 
the White House. Even in this post-cold war era, foreign 
intelligence agents constantly look for opportunities for 
deception, propaganda, and blackmail. No higher targets exist 
than the President and the White House. The President even 
acknowledged in a phone call with Ms. Lewinsky that foreign 
agents could be monitoring their conversations. Yet this 
knowledge did not dissuade the President from continuing his 
affair. With premeditation, he chose his own gratification 
above the security of his country and the success of his 
Presidency. Then he chose to compound the damage by 
systematically lying about it over the span of many months.
    I believe that our country will be stronger and better 
prepared to meet our challenges with a cleansing of the 
Presidency. The President of the United States is the most 
powerful person in the world because we are the strongest 
country economically and militarily, and in the appeal of our 
idealism for liberty and freedom of conscience. Our President 
must be strong because a President personifies the rule of law 
that he is sworn to uphold and protect. We must believe him and 
trust him if we are to follow him. His influence on domestic 
and foreign policies comes from that trust, which a lifetime of 
words, deeds, and achievements has built.
    President Clinton has betrayed that trust. His leadership 
has been diminished because most Americans have come to the 
cynical conclusion that they must read between the lines of his 
statements and try to catch a glimmer of truth amidst the spin. 
His subordinates have demeaned public life by contending that 
``everybody does it'' as a defense of why the President has 
erred so grievously. But every President does not lie to a 
Federal grand jury. Every President does not obstruct justice. 
The last President to do so was President Nixon, and he had 
sufficient reverence for the office to resign before the House 
even voted articles of impeachment.
    The impeachment trial must come to an end. The Presidency 
will be strengthened and our ability as Americans to meet 
important challenges will be strengthened if we begin to 
restore our faith in the truth and justice that our government 
must exemplify and preserve. It will not be enough simply to 
condemn the tragic misdeeds of President Clinton. He must be 
removed from office as the Constitution prescribes, and we must 
celebrate the strength of that same Constitution which also 
provides a path for a new beginning.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.

    Mr. BIDEN. Mr. Chief Justice, let me begin by stating what 
I believe the American people view as the obvious. There are no 
good guys in this sordid affair. Rightly or wrongly, the public 
has concluded that the President is an adulterer and liar; that 
Ken Starr has abused his authority by unfair tactics born out 
of vindictiveness; that the House managers have acted in a 
narrowly partisan way and are now desperately attempting to 
justify their actions for their own political reputation. 
Finally, they have concluded that Monica Lewinsky was both used 
and a user, while Linda Tripp, Lucianne Goldberg, Paula Jones 
and her official and unofficial legal team are part of a larger 
political plot to ``get the President.''
    All of that is beyond our ability to effect. Our job is not 
to dissect the motives or even the tactics of Ken Starr, the 
trial lawyers, Linda Tripp, and others. Our only job is to 
determine whether the President of the United States by his 
conduct committed the specific acts alleged in the two articles 
of impeachment. Not generally, but specifically: Did he do what 
is alleged? And if he did, do these actions rise to the level 
of high crimes and misdemeanors necessary to justify the most 
obviously antidemocratic act the Senate can engage in--
overturning an election by convicting the President?
    It is very important--both for history's sake and for 
fairness' sake--that we keep our eye on the ball. When I tried 
cases, I learned from a man named Sid Balick--he used to say at 
the outset to the jury:

    Keep your eye on the ball. The issue is not whether my client is a 
man you would want your daughter to date--a man you would invite home 
to dinner. The issue is did my client kill Cock Robbin--period.

    If we listen to the oft-times confusing presentation of the 
House managers, they would have us think that it is sufficient 
for us to conclude that we would not trust him with our 
daughters and not invite him home for dinner in order to 
convict.
    Much more is required. The House set the standard we must 
repair to in the articles--did he commit a criminal offense? 
That is what they allege; that is what they must prove.
    The managers keep saying that this case is about what 
standards we want our President to meet. We hear Flanders 
Fields intoned--the honor of our most decorated heroes. How 
incredibly self-serving and autocratic such a plea is.
    The American people are fully capable--without our guidance 
or advice--to determine what standards they want our President 
to meet. That is an appropriate question to ask ourselves when 
we enter the voting booth to vote--it is not when we rise on 
this floor to vote.
    Spare me from those who would tell the American people what 
standard they must apply when voting for President. Ours is an 
impeachment standard and our oath to do justice under that 
standard.
    Impeachment is about what standard to use in deciding 
whether or not to remove a President duly elected by the 
people.
    These are two very different questions and we must not, we 
cannot, get them confused. You and I and the American people 
can apply any standard we want our President to meet when we go 
to the polls on election day.
    Only the Constitution can supply the standards to use in 
deciding whether or not to remove the President--and--in my 
view, this case does not meet that standard, for two reasons.
    First, the facts do not sustain the House managers' case. 
According to the House's own theory, we must find that the 
President has violated Federal criminal statutes--not just that 
he did bad things. In all good conscience, I just cannot 
believe that any jury would convict the President of any of the 
criminal charges on these facts. I also believe that it is our 
constitutional duty to give the President the benefit of the 
doubt on the facts. To me, the allegations that the President 
violated title 18 were left in a shambles on this floor.
    I do not have time to dwell on the facts. So let me turn to 
the second reason: the President's actions do not rise to the 
level required by the Constitution for the removal of a sitting 
President.
    We have heard it argued repeatedly that the Constitution 
does not create different standards for judges and the 
President. But that argument fails to comprehend the organizing 
principle of our constitutional system--the separation of 
powers. The framers divided the power of the Federal Government 
into three branches in order to safeguard liberty. This 
innovation--the envy of every Nation on earth--can only serve 
its fundamental purpose if each branch remains strong and 
independent of the others.
    We needed a President who was independent enough to 
spearhead and sign the Civil Rights Act. We needed a President 
who was independent enough to lead the Nation and the world in 
the Persian gulf war. We still need an independent President.
    The constitutional scholarship overwhelmingly recognizes 
that the fundamental structural commitment to separation of 
powers requires us to view the President as different than a 
Federal judge. Consider our power to discipline and even expel 
an individual Senator. In such a case, we do not remove the 
head of a separate branch and so do not threaten the 
constitutional balance of powers. To remove a President is to 
decapitate another branch and to undermine the independence 
necessary for it to fulfill its constitutional role.
    Only a President is chosen by the people in a national 
election. No Senator, no Representative can make this claim. To 
remove a duly elected President clashes with democratic 
principles in a way that simply has no constitutional parallel. 
By contrast, there is nothing antidemocratic in the Senate 
removing a judge who was appointed and not elected by the 
people.
    Another contention we continue to hear is that the framers 
clearly thought that obstruction of justice of any kind by a 
President was a high crime and misdemeanor. For this they cite 
the colloquy between Colonel George Mason and James Madison, 
who argued that a President who abused his pardon power could 
be impeached. That colloquy illustrates that it is not any 
obstruction that would satisfy the Constitution--rather, that 
the framers were immediately concerned about abuses of official 
power, such as the pardon power.
    The House managers have relied repeatedly on Alexander 
Hamilton's explanation of impeachment found in Federalist No. 
65. But careful reading demonstrates that these articles of 
impeachment are a constitutionally insufficient ground for 
removing the President from office. Federalist No. 65 states:

    The subjects of [the impeachment court's] jurisdiction are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as 
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.

    Hamilton had the word ``political'' typed in all capital 
letters to emphasize that this is the central, defining element 
of any impeachable offense. Having emphasized its meaning, he 
did not leave its definition to chance. While all crimes by 
definition harm society, impeachable offenses involve a 
specific category of offenses. Using Hamilton's terms, these 
are offenses committed when ``public men'' who ``violat[e] some 
public trust'' cause ``injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' The public trust that resides in, to use Hamilton's 
hoary phrase, ``public men'' is what we would call today 
official power.
    What other construction can be given these words? Hamilton 
did not define an impeachable offense to be any offense 
committed by public men. He did not define an impeachable 
offense to be any reprehensible act committed by a bad man. 
Only those acts that abuse public office and so harm the public 
directly and politically are impeachable.
    While I would like to take credit for this insight into 
Hamilton's meaning, I actually stand in a line of 
interpretation that stretches back to the founding era. William 
Rawle wrote the first distinguished commentary on the 
Constitution, ``A View of the Constitution of the United States 
of America.'' In this treatise, he came to precisely the same 
interpretation I have described. He said, ``The causes of 
impeachment can only have reference to public character and 
official duty. . . . In general those which may be committed 
equally by a private person as a public officer are not the 
subject of impeachment.''
    Joseph Story was not only a long-serving and important 
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, he was a 
preeminent constitutional scholar and author of a treatise that 
remains an important source for understanding the 
Constitution's meaning. He, too, emphasized that ``it is not 
every offense that by the constitution is . . . impeachable.'' 
Which offenses did he regard to be impeachable? ``Such kinds of 
misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure the commonwealth by the 
abuse of high offices of trust.'' Justice Story tied the 
definition of impeachable offenses to the purpose that 
underlies the separation of powers--safeguarding the liberty of 
the people against abusive exercise of governmental power. He 
observed that impeachment ``is not so much designed to punish 
an offender as to secure the state against gross official 
misdemeanors.''
    There is no question that the Constitution sets the bar for 
impeachment very high--especially where the President is 
involved. Federalist 65 bears this out, as do numerous other 
commentaries.
    But Federalist 65 also sounds a warning--again, it is a 
warning that has been invoked over and over again--that 
impeachments inevitably risk being hijacked by partisan 
political forces.
    Federalist 65 worried that the ``animosities, partialities, 
influence, and interest on one side or the other'' would enable 
partisans to find a way to interpret words such as high crimes 
and misdemeanors to match the outcome they otherwise wished to 
reach--not necessarily out of any malevolence, but simply 
because of the great capacity that we all have to rationalize.
    Here the rationalization is pretty easy--the President is a 
disgrace to the office, I honor and revere the office of the 
Presidency, so there must be some way to get this man out of 
that office. Therefore, his actions must rise to the level of 
high crimes and misdemeanors.
    It is tempting to go down that road--but this is precisely 
the temptation that the framers urged us to avoid.
    In Federalist 65, Hamilton defended the U.S. Senate as the 
only body that could possibly hear a Presidential impeachment. 
``Where else than in the Senate could have been found a 
tribunal sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? 
What other body would be likely to feel confidence enough in 
its own situation to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced the 
necessary impartiality between an individual accused and . . . 
his accusers?''
    Hamilton was placing the responsibility to be impartial 
squarely upon us--a responsibility that has become embodied in 
the oath we took when the trial began.
    Charles Black, the renowned constitutional law professor 
from Yale, boiled down the attitude that we as Senators must 
adopt in order to achieve an impartiality and independence 
sufficient to the responsibilities of impeachment. He said we 
must act with a ``principled political neutrality.''
    That is a tough standard to meet. In the Johnson 
impeachment, for example, James Blaine originally voted for the 
impeachment of the President in the House. Years later he 
admitted his mistake, saying that `the sober reflection of 
after years has persuaded many who favored Impeachment that it 
was not justifiable on the charges made, and that its success 
would have resulted in greater injury to free institutions than 
Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict.''
    And in our contemporary situation, former President Ford 
and our distinguished colleague and former majority leader, 
Robert Dole, have both urged us not to go down the road to 
impeachment, but to seek other means to express our 
displeasure.
    Charles Black knew that principled political neutrality was 
hard to achieve, so he suggested one approach. He suggested 
that prior to voting, a Senator should ask:

    Would I have answered the same question the same way if it came up 
with respect to a President towards whom I felt oppositely from the way 
I feel toward the President threatened with removal?

    In reaching a final decision, the question I wish to pose 
to my colleagues is this: Can you legitimately conclude that 
you would vote to remove a sitting President if he were a 
person towards whom you felt oppositely than you do toward Bill 
Clinton?
    Given the essentially antidemocratic nature of impeachment 
and the great dangers inherent in the too ready exercise of 
that power, impeachment has no place in our system of 
constitutional democracy except as an extreme measure--reserved 
for breaches of the public trust by a President who so violates 
his official duties, misuses his official powers or places our 
system of government at such risk that our constitutional 
government is put in immediate danger by his continuing to 
serve out the term to which the people of the United States 
elected him.
    In my judgment, trying to assume a perspective of 
principled political neutrality, the case before us falls far, 
far short on the facts and on the law.
    I ask unanimous consent that the text of a more 
comprehensive statement be printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the material was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

   Senator Joseph R. Biden's Comprehensive Statement On Impeachment 
                             Deliberations

    There are no good guys in this sordid affair. Rightly or 
wrongly, the public has concluded that the President is an 
adulterer and liar. Ken Starr has abused his authority by 
unfair tactics born out of vindictiveness. The House Managers 
have acted in a narrowly partisan way and are now desperately 
attempting to justify their actions for their own political 
reputation and that Monica Lewinsky was both used and a user, 
while Linda Tripp, Lucianne Goldberg, Paula Jones and her 
official and unofficial legal team are part of a larger 
political plot to ``get the President''.
    At this point, all that occurred before this is beyond my 
ability to affect. My job as a United States Senator hearing an 
impeachment trial is not to dissect the motives or even the 
tactics of Ken Starr, the trial lawyers, Linda Tripp and 
others. My only job is to determine whether the President of 
the United States, by his conduct committed the acts alleged in 
the two Articles of Impeachment before us. Not generally, but 
specifically, did he do what is alleged--and if he did, do 
these actions rise to the level of high crimes and misdemeanors 
necessary to justify the most obviously antidemocratic act the 
Senate can engage in--overturning an election.

                      the articles of impeachment

    When the framers designed our elected branches of 
Government, they established a system of separate but equal 
branches. The independence of the President from the Congress, 
and vice versa, is constitutionally anchored in the fact that 
each answers directly to the people through the ballot box. The 
people determine who will serve in either branch.
    As I said in a speech last September at Syracuse Law School 
and in another on the floor of the United State Senate, the 
independence of the President from the Congress was no minor 
detail in the constitutional design. The single major goal and 
idea that best explains how the framers constructed the office 
of the Presidency was to make the Presidency as politically 
independent of the Congress as they could. They believed his 
independence vital to the protection of our liberties.
    It takes a strong and independent President to sign the 
Emancipation Proclamation in the face of congressional 
opposition, as Abraham Lincoln did. It takes a strong and 
independent President to sign the executive order integrating 
the Armed Services in the face of congressional resistance, as 
Harry Truman did. It takes a strong and independent President 
to veto legislation in the face of strong majorities, as Ronald 
Reagan, George Bush and all of our Presidents have done.
    We can, and we do, disagree about the wisdom of any 
particular Presidential decision, but none of us can doubt that 
the institution of a strong and independent Presidency has 
enhanced our freedoms and made us a stronger Nation.
    For us to remove a duly elected President will unavoidably 
harm our constitutional structure.
    Accordingly, for this Senator, the starting point in my 
thinking about the articles of impeachment must begin with 
giving the President the benefit of the doubt, and to err on 
the side of sustaining the independence of that office so vital 
to the framers and to the constitutional system they designed. 
Impeachment must be used against a President only as an extreme 
measure, when the President has so breached the public trust 
that our system of government is put in danger by his 
continuing to serve out the term to which the people of the 
United States elected him.
    Have the House managers presented a case of sufficient 
severity, and have they proved it with sufficient clarity, to 
justify the drastic and awesome, step of convicting a duly 
elected President?
    On January 12, when the House managers walked across the 
rotunda to the Senate and presented their case against the 
President, the country moved from the realm of sound bites and 
political attacks to a serious and sober consideration of the 
precise nature of the House's allegations against the 
President, and of the full extent of the record evidence 
against him.
    The House managers have told us that in their judgment two 
dangers to our system of government justify taking this 
unprecedented and awesome step.
    First, they said that failing to remove the President will 
undermine the rule of law and the administration of justice. 
Permitting a serial perjurer and obstructor of justice to 
escape punishment will bring disgrace on the oath ``to tell the 
truth.'' It will mean that we can no longer with good 
conscience punish other people who have committed perjury or 
obstructed justice. The ultimate effects would be felt 
throughout the judicial system. Like a pebble dropped into a 
pond, they said, it will send out ripples to all corners of our 
judicial system.
    Second, they said that failing to remove the President will 
also condone his plot or scheme to deny a specific civil rights 
plaintiff--Paula Jones--of a full opportunity to litigate her 
civil rights claims against the President. Regardless of the 
ripple effects of his actions, the acts themselves were 
violations of law that amounted to a failure of the President 
to ``take care that the laws be faithfully executed,'' in 
violation of his oath of office.

           multiple violations of the criminal law necessary

    As I have said in earlier speeches on the impeachment 
power, not all crimes are impeachable, and an impeachable 
offense does not have to be a crime.
    In this case, however, the House managers have made it 
quite clear that their case against the President depends 
entirely on proving that he has committed crimes, and not just 
a few crimes, but an elaborate scheme that included ``lots and 
lots of perjury'' and ``many obstructions of justice,'' to 
quote Mr. McCollum. The dangers the President supposedly poses 
flow not from the President's reprehensible conduct, or from 
the fact that he misled his family, his aides, his cabinet and 
the Nation about that conduct. This impeachment is not about 
sex, they have insisted.
    I asked Mr. Barr about this during the trial, and he said 
``What brings us here . . . is the belief by the House of 
Representatives in lawful public vote that this President 
violated, in numerous respects, his oath of office and the 
Criminal Code of the United States of America--in particular, 
that he committed perjury and obstruction of justice.'' Mr. 
McCollum made the same point in his opening presentation, when 
he said, ``The first thing you have to determine is whether or 
not the President committed crimes. It's only if you determine 
he committed the crimes of perjury, obstruction of justice and 
witness tampering, that you ever move on to the question of 
whether he is removed from office. . . . None of us would argue 
to you that the President should be removed from office unless 
you conclude he committed the crimes that he is alleged to have 
committed.''

           the burden of proof in assessing the house's case

    So the question before the Senate is whether the President 
is a serial perjurer and a massive obstructor of justice.
    What standard of proof should a Senator apply in deciding 
whether the record supports the accusations contained in the 
articles of impeachment--the accusations that the President 
violated the Federal criminal law? The House managers quite 
correctly pointed out that the Senate has never sought to 
determine for the entire body what the burden of proof should 
be in an impeachment. In effect, we have left it to the good 
judgment of each Senator to decide whether or not they are 
convinced by the evidence presented to us.
    For this Senator, fundamental fairness as well as the 
nature of the House's case dictate that I ought to be convinced 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President violated the laws 
that the House alleges. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the 
same standard applied in criminal cases--it is the standard 
that would apply if the President were tried in a criminal 
court for perjury or obstruction of justice.
    It seems to me that fundamental fairness counsels that I 
apply the same standard as a criminal court precisely because 
the House asserts that what makes his actions impeachable is 
that he has violated Federal criminal statutes regarding 
perjury and obstruction of justice. It strikes me as absurd 
that the Senate would have the arrogance to throw out a duly 
elected President on these grounds unless it was convinced that 
he would be convicted of those charges. Otherwise, we would be 
saying in effect that even though the President would not be 
convicted on these crimes, we are nevertheless throwing him out 
of office because he committed those crimes. That would clearly 
be giving the President less protection than we provide any 
other citizen when charged with a crime.
    Someone else can try to explain the logic of that decision, 
but not me.
    In addition, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt seems to me compelled by the fact that in the House's 
explanation of the harm to our system of government if the 
President is not thrown out, their entire explanation rises and 
falls depending upon whether or not the President would be 
convicted in a court of law for the crimes alleged. If he could 
not be convicted in a court of law, then the Senate is not 
``condoning'' perjury or obstruction of justice any more than a 
criminal court is condoning those crimes when someone is 
acquitted on such charges. But if the Senate is not condoning 
those crimes, there is no conceivable basis for concluding that 
the public will be harmed by the President's remaining in 
office.
    Furthermore, in applying the standard of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the Senate simply must pay attention to the 
precise legal definitions of the crimes. What the pundits have 
condemned as legal hair splitting, and what the public rightly 
condemns in the President's penchant for evasive answers when 
responding to questions in a public setting, must now 
necessarily occupy our attention with regard to the President's 
answers under oath, such as a deposition or a grand jury 
proceeding because the claim made by the House is that the 
President violated specific criminal laws. If your aim is to 
respect the rule of law, you must also respect the rules of 
law--the precise legal definitions of the crimes, as found in 
18 U.S.C. Sec. 1623, the federal perjury statute, and in 18 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 1503 and 1512, the applicable Federal 
obstruction of justice statutes.
    I have now studied the record sent to us by the House, 
listened to the presentations and arguments of the House 
Managers and the President's counsel, reviewed the videotape 
testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney 
Blumenthal, and listened to the views of my colleagues.
    On that basis, I have reached the conclusion that the House 
has not presented evidence that could persuade a criminal jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President has violated the 
applicable federal criminal statutes. There are too many holes, 
too many conclusions reached only by drawing negative 
inferences against the President, and too much evidence that 
apparently contradicts or is inconsistent with the House's 
case.
    Now, let me be frank with you. I do not know for sure what 
actually occurred. Notwithstanding that, I am forced to make a 
judgment. In order to preserve the constitutional separation of 
powers, the independence of the presidency and the sovereignty 
of democratic elections, the President deserves the benefit of 
the doubt. This record falls well short of the certainty 
required to remove a President from office.

           the constitutional balance the senate must strike

    While I believe that I must apply a standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt because of the nature of the charges 
that the House has brought to us, it is also quite true--and I 
have said as much on prior occasions--that the Senate does not 
sit as a court of law when it tries an impeachment. As 
Alexander Hamilton stated in Federalist 65, impeachment is a 
political process.
    ``Political'' in Hamilton's usage had two meanings as it 
relates to impeachments. The first I have mentioned already, 
and I have spoken about in this chamber before: impeachable 
offenses are offenses against the body politic. In the words of 
James Wilson, ``in the United States . . . impeachments are 
confined to political characters, to political crimes and 
misdemeanors, and to political punishments.''
    The Senate's judgment in an impeachment trial is ultimately 
political in a second sense, too. It is political in the sense 
that the Senate has the responsibility to weigh all the 
consequences to the body politic in making its decision--the 
consequences that might flow from removing the President as 
well as the consequences that might flow from failing to remove 
him.
    That is what I mean, and what Hamilton meant, by the 
ultimate judgment being a political one. As Senator Bumpers 
reminded us, the consequences of the decision we make will live 
on long after Bill Clinton has left office and long after each 
of us has left office. We must hand our constitutional 
structure on to our children and to future generations with its 
foundation as solid as it was when it was handed to us. It is 
our responsibility as Senators to make a judgment as to how 
best to accomplish that objective.
    The obligation to evaluate the competing costs of retention 
and removal, incidentally, is what clearly distinguishes 
judicial impeachments and Presidential impeachments--very 
different institutional and long term consequences weigh in the 
balance in these two cases.
    Removing the President from office without compelling 
evidence would be historically antidemocratic. Never in our 
history has the Senate overturned the results of an election 
and removed a President from office. History could not more 
plainly demonstrate what a dramatic step removing an elected 
President would be. The founding of our republic was the most 
dramatic assertion of the sovereignty of the people that the 
world had ever known. Abraham Lincoln dedicated the battlefield 
at Gettysburg to this proposition recalling that our union 
stands for ``government of the people, for the people, and by 
the people.''
    The sovereignty of the people is exercised through national 
elections. All citizens, but particularly those of us who have 
had the honor to stand for election, have an instinctive 
respect for the will of the people as expressed through 
national elections. Thomas Jefferson, in his first inaugural 
address, aptly called this democratic instinct a ``sacred 
principle.'' Reversing the people's sovereign decision would be 
in radical conflict with the principle on which our Nation is 
founded as understood and applied throughout our history.
    For one branch to remove the head of a co-equal branch 
unavoidably harms our constitutional structure. The framers 
intentionally chose not to create a parliamentary system of 
government. They meant for the President and Congress to be 
independent of and co-equal with one another. Maintaining each 
of those branches as strong and independent is fundamental to 
the Constitution's very structure--a structure they designed to 
safeguard the liberty of the governed against abuses of power 
by those who govern.
    It is true that impeachment is part of this structure. 
Removing a President from office for sufficient reasons and 
upon sufficient proof is therefore consistent with that 
structure. At the same time, the great dangers inherent in the 
too ready exercise of that power mean that impeachment should 
be seen as an extreme measure.
    The framers were accomplished, practical statesmen. They 
recognized that impeachment could be misapplied to undermine 
the primary structural guarantee of liberty--the separation of 
powers. They worried that Congress would be tempted to use the 
impeachment power to make the President ``less equal.'' As 
Charles Pinckney warned his colleagues at the Philadelphia 
Convention, Congress could hold impeachment ``as a rod over the 
Executive and by that means effectively destroy his 
independence.''
    How are we to keep the impeachment power within its 
constitutional boundaries, so that it stands ready to be used 
appropriately but does not become a ``rod'' in the hands of a 
partisan Congress, threatening the independence of the 
Presidency, as Charles Pinckney worried during the 
Constitutional convention?
    The solution to this problem must lie in approaching the 
Senate's ultimate decision from as much of a position of 
bipartisanship as we can possibly achieve. This is the only way 
in which we can possibly focus primarily on the institutional 
consequences of our actions to see them in terms of their long 
term consequences instead of their short term partisan ones.
    Nonpartisan faithfulness to the Constitution's structure, 
which protects the liberty of the governed must determine our 
action today.
    This was my view of our role in 1974, when I rose on the 
floor of the United States Senate and made a ``plea . . . for 
restraint on the part of all parties involved in the affair.'' 
That was in the case of the possible impeachment of Richard 
Nixon. And it was my view last year, when I urged restraint and 
bipartisanship as the attitude I hoped my colleagues would 
adopt. And it remains my view.
    Viewed from that perspective, it is hard for me to see how 
the harms flowing from keeping Bill Clinton in office outweigh 
the harms to our constitutional democracy that would result 
from removing him.

                   harmful consequences reconsidered

    I have listened attentively to the House managers' case. In 
all honesty, I can sympathize with their sense of outrage at 
the President's actions and his unwillingness to be fully 
accountable for those actions for so many months. 
Notwithstanding that, from the vantage point of a restrained 
view, and as nonpartisan a view as I can muster, the dangers 
they see from keeping President Clinton in office seem less 
dire than they claim. At the same time the harms to our system 
of government from removing him seem to me to be quite serious.
    The House managers warn that failure to remove the 
President would destroy or undermine the sound administration 
of justice and threaten the rule of law. If true, that would be 
a big deal.
    But we need to step back a moment and cool down the 
rhetoric. Manager Graham suggested as much when he reminded us 
all of the resiliency of the American system of government. 
``So when we talk about the consequences of this case,'' he 
said, ``no matter what you decide, in my opinion, this country 
will survive. If you acquit the President, we will survive. If 
you convict him, it will be traumatic, and if you remove him, 
it will be traumatic, but we will survive.''
    That same calmer judgment ought to apply to the 
administration of justice and the rule of law. The House 
managers presented no evidence whatsoever of the dire 
consequences they predict. And there is no evidence of such 
dire consequences that they could present--because their 
evaluation of the consequences is nothing but speculation.
    I would submit to you that the consequences of failing to 
remove the President will most likely be very different from 
those described by the House. This is one pebble whose ripples 
will in all likelihood simply wash up harmlessly on the shores 
and be forgotten forever. I, frankly, do not see how failing to 
remove the President will alter the conduct of the next 
prosecutor having to decide whether to bring a perjury 
indictment, nor do I think that juries will be persuaded by a 
lawyer's argument that because the President ``got away with 
it'' the jury should acquit his client. The fact of the matter 
is, lots of perjury trials result in acquittals without 
impacting the ability of the criminal justice system to bring 
such charges where appropriate.
    The House managers' cry of alarm ignores the fact that we 
are in an impeachment trial. This is not a criminal proceeding 
and thus the manner in which the Senate deals with the question 
has no implications at all for how a court of law would deal 
with it.
    The Constitution is very clear about this. In article I, 
Sec. 3, cl. 7, the Constitution provides that whether or not a 
person is removed from office through impeachment that party 
``shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, 
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.'' If the 
evidence is as overwhelming as the managers say, the President 
can be prosecuted for perjury and obstruction after he leaves 
office.
    The American people have a very robust understanding that 
impeachment is a political process--and a particularly clear 
understanding that this impeachment has been thoroughly 
politicized until it got to the Senate--I don't think anyone is 
confusing it with a legal process. No one, therefore, will take 
any solace from the President's acquittal in terms of their 
ability to commit perjury or obstruct justice and thereby avoid 
criminal charges.
    Now don't misunderstand me--I am not suggesting that 
letting a guilty person off from a crime he or she has 
committed is OK. I am saying, first, that the President has not 
been charged with a crime in a criminal court, so that failing 
to acquit him is not at all letting him off from a crime, and 
second, that our decision will not have the kind of ``sky is 
falling'' consequences described by the House in any event. In 
my judgment, the rule of law and the sound administration of 
justice in this country will be unaffected by the action we 
take in the Senate, one way or the other.
    The House managers have also warned that failing to remove 
the President will also condone his plot or scheme to deny a 
specific civil rights plaintiff--Paula Jones--her day in court, 
by withholding from her, through acts of perjury and 
obstruction, full information about the ``nature and details'' 
of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. Just how accurate and 
complete a description is this one? In order to answer that 
question, we need a fuller picture of the ``nature and 
details'' of the Jones litigation itself.
    If you listened just to the House managers, you would think 
that the Jones lawsuit was just a run-of-the-mill typical 
sexual harassment civil rights case.
    It was not. From the very beginning, that lawsuit had been 
politically motivated. All the facts we know about this case, 
even taking Paula Jones at her word that the incident in the 
Excelsior Hotel actually occurred, demonstrate that the lawsuit 
was also without merit. She had never been harmed in any way in 
her job, and the President had never repeated anything remotely 
resembling an unwanted sexual advance on her again. She had 
received merit pay raises in her State employment and she had 
received good job performance reviews. She was unable to prove 
that she had been damaged in any way by the President's 
actions.
    Actually, what damages she did assert--what caused her to 
file the lawsuit, according to her testimony--was the result of 
the publication of a hatchet-job article against President 
Clinton run in the American Spectator. The article was one 
salvo in an on going right wing probe into Clinton's life in 
Arkansas, aimed simply at digging up anything that could be 
politically damaging to the President. When the American 
Spectator ran a story making an unflattering reference to a 
``Paula,'' Jones found a lawyer to file suit in order to 
``reclaim her good name.''
    The lawyers Paula Jones eventually found were also 
underwritten by right wing conservative Republican money. In 
fact, investigative reporters as recently as this past Sunday 
continue to reveal more and more details of the tightly knit 
web of conservative lawyers and conservative financial backers 
who have hounded this President relentlessly since the day he 
took the office.
    Now the President knew that the lawsuit was without merit--
he might have behaved obnoxiously with Paula Jones, but he did 
not commit sexual harassment. He also knew that the real 
motivation of the lawsuit, the motivation that funded it and 
kept it going, was a political assault on him, not a legal 
assault. The law suit and its powers of discovery were being 
used to engage in a fishing expedition throughout Arkansas in 
search of political dirt. Leaks from that discovery appeared 
regularly in the Washington press.
    The President knew something else, as well. He knew that 
his illicit relationship with Monica Lewinsky had nothing to do 
with the merits of the Jones litigation. On this matter, you do 
not have to rely on the President's assessment or mine, because 
the court independently concluded the same thing. In the order 
denying the plaintiff's discovery into the Lewinsky facts, 
Judge Wright said that the Lewinsky facts, even if the 
allegations concerning them were true, had nothing to do with 
the essential or core elements of Paula Jones lawsuit.
    So keeping Lewinsky out of the politically motivated Jones 
case did not jeopardize Paula Jones' chances of prevailing, 
which were nonexistent in any event. What it did do was to 
prevent the President's political enemies from using the Jones 
discovery procedures to pry open that secret relationship and 
expose it, all to the political damage of the President.
    In this context, it is understandable that the President 
wanted to frustrate the Jones litigation. What is more, the 
President can hardly be said to have prevented Paula Jones from 
presenting a case, because there was no meritorious case to 
present.
    That doesn't justify perjury or obstruction, of course, but 
it does provide an accurate context for appraising the House 
managers' second claim. If they are permitted to convert a 
meritless and politically motivated lawsuit into a Presidential 
conviction for impeachable offenses, the Senate will be 
rewarding behavior that we ought to condemn. We need to think 
more than once about rewarding this kind of political witch 
hunt.
    All of what I have just said informs this Senator's 
judgment concerning the harms to the country that would be 
caused by failing to convict a President who had committed the 
acts alleged by the House.
    In fact, if the rule of law and the fair administration of 
justice will not be destroyed--contrary to the House managers' 
assertions--and if the American people understand that the 
President's actions were in the context of a politically-
motivated lawsuit and involved concealing an embarrassing 
improper relationship that was irrelevant to that lawsuit--then 
it is very hard for this Senator to see how the President's 
continuing in office poses the sort of grave danger to our 
system of government that the framers had in mind when they 
gave the Congress the awesome power to impeach and remove an 
elected President.
    In weighing the competing consequences of removal and 
retention in office, we must honor the constitutional 
obligation we undertook when we swore to do ``impartial 
justice.''
    To that end, I think we all could benefit from the wisdom 
on several participants in the impeachment of Andrew Johnson, 
131 years ago.
    Two of them--Chief Justice Salmon Chase and Congressman 
James G. Blaine--both of whom historians record as being highly 
critical of Johnson and initially favoring his removal--were 
nevertheless able to step back from the partisanship of that 
moment and weigh the competing harms in the way I have 
suggested is proper.
    Chief Justice Salmon Chase, who himself had political 
Presidential ambitions, wrote to a friend on the day the trial 
ended, saying, ``What possible harm can result in the country 
from continuance of Andrew Johnson months longer in the 
Presidential chair, compared with that which must arise if 
impeachment becomes a mere mode of getting rid of an obnoxious 
President?''
    And years later, James G. Blaine, who had voted for 
impeachment in the House, said, ``The sober reflection of after 
years has persuaded many who favored Impeachment that it was 
not justifiable on the charges made, and that its success would 
have resulted in greater injury to free institutions that 
Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able to inflict.''
    And in our contemporary situation, former President Ford 
and our distinguished colleague and former majority leader, 
Robert Dole, have both urged us not to go down the road to 
impeachment, but to seek other means to express our 
displeasure.
    We ought to follow these lessons, and to be attentive to 
the damage that removing a duly elected President on these 
charges will inflict on our system of government.
    A decision to remove Bill Clinton will not destroy our 
system of government. But it will stand as a precedent--the 
very first time the U.S. Senate has removed any President from 
office. If we vote to convict and remove the President after a 
highly partisan impeachment for conduct that appears to be 
private and non-official, we will create an opportunity for 
impeachments to become a tool of partisan politics by other 
means.

                               conclusion

    Engaging in the balance that the Constitution requires, I 
cannot vote to convict the President. The evidence of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President violated federal 
criminal statutes has not been presented. Even were the 
evidence stronger, the Constitution demands that we weigh the 
competing considerations in a nonpartisan manner.
    The President deserves our condemnation. He has brought 
shame to himself.
    But we have not reached this point due to his failings 
alone. It has taken the volatile combination of his 
blameworthiness and the unalloyed animosity of others toward 
him that have brought us to the brink of a profound 
constitutional moment.
    Given the essentially antidemocratic nature of impeachment 
and the great dangers inherent in the too ready exercise of 
that power, impeachment has no place in our system of 
constitutional democracy except as an extreme measure--reserved 
for breaches of the public trust by a President who so violates 
his official duties, misuses his official powers or places our 
system of government at such risk that our constitutional 
government is put in immediate danger by his continuing to 
serve out the term to which the people of the United States 
elected him.
    I urge my colleagues to remain faithful to the 
constitutional design and to our obligation to do impartial 
justice.
    (Below are significant issues of constitutional law, 
positive law, or Senate procedure that have arisen during the 
impeachment trial of President Clinton. As the impeachment 
process moved forward in the House to the point where its 
arriving in the Senate appeared likely, I began an intensive 
study of the Constitution, the framers' understanding, and our 
historical constitutional practices in the Senate to prepare 
for a possible impeachment trial, which I continued once the 
Senate assumed jurisdiction over the matter. Over the past 
several months, I have shared some of my conclusions with my 
colleagues and the public in speeches and memoranda, portions 
of which are below. Bracketed comments are additions to the 
original text, inserted to assist in comprehension.)
                             bipartisanship
    Mr. President, during the past twenty-six years as a United States 
Senator, I have been confronted with some of the most significant 
issues facing our Nation. Issues ranging from who sits on the highest 
court in the land to whether we should go to war. These are weighty 
issues. But none of these decisions has been more awesome, more 
daunting, more compelling, than the issue confronting us at the present 
time.
    The issue of whether to impeach a sitting President is a monumental 
responsibility. A responsibility that no Senator will take lightly.
    And as imposing as this undertaking is, I am sad to say that I have 
had to contemplate this issue twice during my service in the Senate; 
once during President Nixon's term and now.
    And while the circumstances surrounding these two events are 
starkly different, the consequences are starkly the same. The gravity 
of removing a sitting President from office is the same today as it was 
twenty-five years ago. Listen to what I said on the floor of the United 
States Senate on April 10, 1974 during the Watergate crisis:
    ``In the case of an impeachment trial, the emotions of the American 
people would be strummed, as a guitar, with every newscast and each 
edition of the daily paper in communities throughout the country. The 
incessant demand for news or rumors of news--whatever its basis of 
legitimacy--would be overwhelming. The consequential impact on the 
federal institutions of government would be intense--and not 
necessarily beneficial. This is why my plea today is for restraint on 
the part of all parties involved in the affair.''
    I could have said these same words today. It is uncanny how much 
things stay the same.
    Furthermore, in 1974 I urged my colleagues in the United States 
Senate to learn from the story of Alice in Wonderland. Then I cautioned 
that we remember Alice's plight when the Queen declared ``sentence 
first, verdict afterwards.''
    But the need for restraint is even greater today than it was in 
1974. In 1974, the impeachment question was not as politically charged 
as it is today. In 1974 we were willing to hear all the evidence before 
making a decision. Today, I hope, for our Nation's sake, that we do not 
follow the Queen's directive in Alice in Wonderland and that we will 
make a wise judgment after deliberate consideration.
    My legal training combined with more than a quarter century of 
experience in the United States Senate has taught me several important 
lessons. Two of these lessons are appropriate now.
    First, an ordered society must first care about justice.
    Second, all that is constitutionally permissible may not be just or 
wise.
    And it is with these two very important lessons guiding me, that I 
embark upon a very important decision regarding our country, our 
Constitution, and our President.
    The power to overturn and undo a popular election of the people, 
for the first time in our Nation's history, must be exercised with 
great care and sober deliberation.
    We should not forget that 47.4 million Americans voted for our 
President in 1996, 8.2 million more than voted for the President's 
opponent.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    Let me now stand back from the issues of substance and procedure, 
and look at the impeachment mechanism as it has actually functioned in 
our country's history. The proof of the Framers' design, after all, 
will be in how the mechanism has worked in practice.
    As we have seen, the Framers worried that impeaching a sitting 
President would most likely be highly charged with partisan politics 
and pre-existing factions, enlisting all the ``animosities, 
partialities, and influence and interest'' that inevitably swirl around 
a sitting President. History shows that they had a right to be worried.
    Prior to the case of President Nixon, Presidential impeachment had 
only been used for partisan reasons.
    History tells us that John Tyler was an enormously unpopular 
President, facing a hostile Congress dominated by his arch political 
enemy, Henry Clay. After several years of continual clashes, numerous 
Presidential vetoes and divisive conflicts with the senate over 
appointments, a select committee of the House issued a report 
recommending a formal impeachment inquiry.
    President Tyler reached out to his political enemies: he signed an 
important bill raising tariffs which he had formerly opposed--and he 
found other means of cooperating with the Congress. In the end, even 
Henry Clay, speaking from the Senate, urged a slowdown in the 
impeachment proceedings, suggesting instead the lesser action of a 
``want of confidence'' vote rather than formal impeachment proceedings. 
In early 1843, the resolution to proceed with an impeachment inquiry 
was defeated on the House floor, 127 to 83.
    In 1868, Andrew Johnson came much closer to conviction on charges 
of serious misconduct. Although Johnson's impeachment proceedings 
ostensibly focused on his disregarding the tenure in office act, 
historians uniformly agree that the true sources of opposition to 
President Johnson were policy disagreements and personal animosity. 
[Text note: The conflict this time was between Johnson's moderate post 
Civil War policies toward the Southern states and the overwhelming 
Radical Republican majorities in both chambers. One especially volatile 
division was over whether Southern Senators and Representatives ought 
to be admitted to Congress prior to the enactment of Constitutional 
amendments expressly denying the right of state succession. The 
Republicans feared dilution of their voting strength if the southerners 
were seated, especially since an effect of President Lincoln's 
Emancipation Proclamation would be to increase House representation for 
the Southern states, by virtue of the fact that each freed slave would 
count as a whole person, instead of the abandoned constitutional 
formula of three-fifths.
    The Tenure in Office Act had been enacted over his veto to restrict 
his ability to remove the Secretary of War--who was allied with the 
Radical Republicans--from that office without the Senate's consent. 
Johnson fired Edwin M. Stanton anyway, claiming that the restriction on 
his removal authority was unconstitutional.]
    The conflict this time was between Johnson's moderate post-Civil 
War policies toward the southern states and the overwhelming Republican 
majorities in both chambers. The Republicans feared dilution of their 
voting strength if the southerners were seated.
    Johnson's defenders in the Senate were eventually able to hold on 
to barely enough votes to prevent his conviction. In professor Raoul 
Berger's view, ``Johnson's trial serves as a frightening reminder that 
in the hands of a passion-driven congress, the process may bring down 
the very pillars of our constitutional system.''
    Yet, if the cases of Tyler and Johnson substantiate the Framers' 
fears, the Nixon situation vindicates the utility of the impeachment 
procedures. Notice how different the Nixon proceedings were from 
Tyler's and Johnson's. As the Nixon impeachment process unfolded, there 
was broad bipartisan consensus each step of the way.
    While it would be foolish to believe that Members of Congress did 
not worry about the partisan political repercussions of their actions, 
such factional considerations did not dominate decision making.
    Political friends and foes of the President agreed that the charges 
against the President were serious, that they warranted further inquiry 
and, once there was definitive evidence of serious complicity and 
wrongdoing, a consensus emerged that impeachment should be invoked. The 
President resigned after the House Judiciary Committee voted out 
articles of impeachment by a 28-10 vote.
    For me, several lessons stand out from our constitutional 
understanding of the impeachment process and our historical experience 
with it. Furthermore, I believe that a consensus has developed on 
several important points.
    While the founders included impeachment powers in the Constitution, 
they were concerned by the potential partisan abuse. We should be no 
less aware of the dangers of partisanship. As we have seen, the process 
functions best when there is a broad bipartisan consensus behind moving 
ahead. The country is not well served when either policy disagreements 
or personal animosities drive the process.
    Many scholars who have studied the Constitution have concluded that 
it should be reserved for offenses that are abuses of the public trust 
or abuses that relate to the public nature of the President's duties. 
Remember, what is impeachable is not necessarily criminal and what is 
criminal is not necessarily impeachable.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    I am here today to call for bipartisanship in the impeachment 
process. It is a concept many will say they agree with. But actions 
speak louder than words.
    The Framers of the Constitution knew that the greatest danger 
associated with impeachment was the presence of partisan factions that 
could dictate the outcome.
    It is clear from the debates and from the commentaries on the 
Constitutional Convention that the Framers were concerned that anything 
less than bipartisanship could, and would, do great damage to our form 
of government. They knew that to contemplate an action as profound as 
undoing a popular election requires at a minimum that members of both 
parties find that the alleged wrong is grave enough to overturn the 
will of the majority of the American people.
    The Framers also understood the sentiment expressed nearly 200 
years later by Congresswoman Barbara Jordan during the impeachment 
proceedings of Richard Nixon.
    She said, ``it is reason, and not passion, which must guide our 
deliberations, guide our debate, and guide our decision.''
    But the current debate is guided by faction, not reason. One 
example: The House Judiciary Committee this month heard a battery of 
witnesses address the question of what is an impeachable offense. 
Democrats called legal experts who testified that the President's acts 
are not impeachable offenses, and Republicans called witnesses who were 
just as certain they were. By the end of the hearing, anyone listening 
would have the overwhelming impression that there was no consensus in 
the legal community on the issue, that it was an open question.
    Yet the vast majority of historians and legal scholars have 
concluded--and stated publicly--that nothing that President Clinton has 
been accused of rises to the level of an impeachable offense. The 
hearing was a political charade. We are told that ultimately, this is a 
political process. Ultimately, it is. The question is whether it is 
going to be a fair process. I argue that it can, and must be fair.
    In his marvelous book on the impeachment process, published while 
the country was in the throes of President Nixon's Watergate troubles, 
Professor Charles Black alerted us to the danger of partisanship.
    Because the constitution and its history provide us with more 
questions about impeachment than answers, he said, ``it is always 
tempting to resolve such questions in favor of the immediate political 
result that is palatable to us, for one can never definitely be proved 
wrong, and so one is free to allow one's prejudices to assume the guise 
of reason.''
    Black was echoing Alexander Hamilton, who warned in Federalist 65 
that impeachments:
    ``will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, 
and to divide it into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to 
the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on the one side, or on the other; and in such 
cases there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will 
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than by the 
real demonstrations of guilt or innocence.''
    I don't think I am being partisan myself in warning about the risks 
of partisan excess. As a 32 year-old Senator, I expressed this same 
concern about the fate of a Republican President. On April 10, 1974, I 
rose on the floor of the United States Senate and said:
    ``In the case of an impeachment trial, the emotions of the American 
people would be strummed, as a guitar, with every newscast and each 
edition of the daily paper in communities throughout the country.
    The incessant demand for news or rumors of news--whatever its basis 
of legitimacy--would be overwhelming. The consequential impact on the 
federal institutions of government would be intense--and not 
necessarily beneficial. This is why my plea today is for restraint on 
the part of all parties involved in the affair.''
    I make the same plea for restraint today. And while the 
circumstances surrounding these two events are starkly different, the 
consequences for our Nation are the same. The gravity of removing a 
sitting President from office is the same today as it was twenty-four 
years ago.
    The American people understand that the consequences of impeaching 
a sitting President are grave and, thus far, they have shown a 
remarkable restraint--more than some of the pundits and experts. But I 
believe they have reached two clear conclusions: Congress should 
resolve the matter expeditiously and resolve the matter in a fair and 
non-partisan manner.
    These conclusions have great significance to the impeachment 
process. I believe the American people will ultimately make their 
judgment about the proceedings and the outcome based in part, on 
whether the House Judiciary Committee votes along strict party lines 
and whether the House of Representatives acts in a similar manner.
    That may not be fair, but I believe that is how they will judge it. 
Therefore, it seems clear to me that for history's sake, and with the 
Committee's legacy in mind, Chairman Hyde and the Republican majority 
in the House must bend over backwards to demonstrate that they have 
conducted this proceeding based on principle, not politics.
    There is yet another issue where public opinion comes into play. 
That is the question of whether the President's transgressions warrant 
impeachment. We know from survey after survey that the American people 
believe the President's actions do not justify impeaching him.
    Should that have any bearing on the outcome? Many of my colleagues 
say they will ignore public opinion. In most cases, this is a sound 
position for a member of Congress to take. When we are elected to the 
House and the Senate, we are sent here to exercise judgment, not simply 
to be weathervanes that shift with the political winds. The fact that 
this is an impeachment proceeding doesn't change that--it makes it even 
more important that we exercise our best judgment.
    But I believe it is a serious mistake to take the position that 
public opinion should have no bearing on how we act and what we do. Let 
me explain. Many people--and many legal scholars--have said that 
impeachment should be reserved for grave breaches of the public trust. 
Surely, if we are trying to decide whether an offense is a breach of 
the public trust, it is important to know what the public thinks. If 
the American people think the President's actions do not warrant 
impeachment, we should listen to their views, and take them seriously.
    It would be a serious mistake to ignore public opinion for another, 
more fundamental reason. This is their President we are talking about. 
The President of the United States doesn't serve at the pleasure of the 
legislature, as a prime minister does in a parliamentary system. He is 
elected directly by the people of the United States.
    The election of a President is the only nationwide vote that the 
American people ever cast. That is a big deal. If the American people 
don't think they have made a mistake in electing Bill Clinton, we in 
the Congress had better be very careful before we upset their decision.
    This was brought home to me several weeks before the elections at a 
filling station in Wilmington. The woman working the cash register 
looked up at me with something of a scowl on her face. I assumed--
incorrectly, it turned out--that she had voted against me the last time 
I ran. She said, ``You're Joe Biden, aren't you?'' I nodded. She said, 
``What are you going to do to President Clinton on this Lewinsky 
thing?'' I started to give her a noncommittal answer about the process 
needing to go forward, but she brought me up short. ``Don't you or 
anyone else take my vote away, Joe. He's my President! If you remove 
him, I will never vote again.''
    This woman--and the American people--understand the genius of the 
American system in their bones. They know that the Congress and the 
President are separate branches of government. They understand that 
each branch is responsible to them, not to the other branch of 
government. Just as they know that the Senators from their state are 
theirs, and the Representative from their district is theirs, they know 
that the President is theirs, too.
    Anyone who wants to impeach Bill Clinton needs to keep in mind what 
the American people think about it, because he is their President.
    Let me be absolutely clear. This does not mean just doing what the 
opinion polls say. It means proceeding in a manner that the American 
people understand to be fair. In the case of an impeachment, fair means 
bipartisan. It means putting aside the disagreements that stem from 
partisan factions. The time for partisan factions to play a role is in 
the process of elections, where candidates advance competing policies 
and platforms and the people vote. Once the election is held, our 
leaders hold office until the next election. It is simply antithetical 
to our constitutional democracy to use impeachment to overturn an 
election on partisan grounds. It violates the independence of the 
Presidency and it usurps the people's voice.
    The Framers saw this danger when they wrote the impeachment power 
into the Constitution. Hamilton warned that an impeachment would 
``connect itself with pre-existing factions,'' just as Black much later 
saw that impeachment was an occasion for ``prejudices to assume the 
guise of reason.''
    So those who wish to proceed with impeachment in the face of the 
public's contrary opinion bear a special obligation and confront a 
special risk. The obligation they face is that they must proceed in a 
bipartisan manner, so that we can defend the Congress' actions as fair 
and consistent with the constitutional framework--so that if 
impeachment goes forward, those who support it can look my constituent, 
or their constituent, straight in the eyes and defend the process as 
fair and just.
    Should they fail to do this, the risk they face is the chance that 
they will inflict more damage on our system of government and induce 
more cynicism and disgust with politics than anything the President has 
done so far.
    So we must be prudent. Otherwise we will succumb to the danger the 
Framers warned against. We will subject the President to what amounts 
to a vote of no confidence. If you disapprove of his presidency and its 
policies, or if you do not like the man, vote to impeach. If, on the 
other hand, you support his presidency and his policies, or if you do 
like the man, vote to acquit. But that is not our system of government.
    When Benjamin Netanyahu returned home after signing the Wye 
accords, he faced a vote of no confidence. If he had lost, he would 
have been out of office and another government would have to be formed.
    That is simply not our system of government. Ours is not a 
parliamentary system. That is not how impeachment is supposed to 
operate.
    Reflect for just a moment on how different our government is. Here, 
the President and the Congress are separate branches of government. 
Each is elected directly by the people. The President and Vice 
President are the only officials elected by ALL the people. Through the 
electoral process, they answer to all the people. In such a system, a 
vote of no confidence, as a means of removing the head of government 
when the Congress disapproves of his leadership, contradicts the theory 
of separated powers. It would trample on the choice made by the people 
through the electoral process.
    This is no small matter. It goes to the heart of the constitutional 
design. As Jack Rakove, the Stanford historian, noted during the 
recently held House hearings on the standard for impeachment, the 
prevailing principle that guided the Framers in shaping the institution 
of the Presidency during the Philadelphia Convention, the one major 
goal and idea that best explains how that office took shape over the 
summer of 1787, was their intention on ``making the presidency as 
politically independent of the Congress as they could.''
    The Framers saw the system of separated powers and checks and 
balances as a bulwark in support of individual liberty and against 
government tyranny. The separation of powers prevents government power 
from being concentrated in any single branch of government. Permit one 
branch of government to subjugate another to its partisan wishes, and 
you permit the kind of concentration of power that can lead to tyranny.
    So the system the Framers established is utterly incompatible with 
the idea that sharp partisan divisions could be sufficient to impeach. 
Preserving our system, with its checks and balances and separation of 
powers, ought to be part of our consideration as we attempt to resolve 
the current controversy.
    How do we ensure that impeachments do not become the partisan 
showdowns that the Framers warned about? The answer is both simple and 
elusive. The only thing that prevents the impeachment power from being 
abused is the good faith of Members of Congress.
    Professor Black proposed a simple test. He said that for the 
purposes of impeachment, members take off their party's hat--shed their 
partisan identity--and then try to take on the identity of a member of 
the other party. In other words, Republicans who favor Clinton's 
impeachment should try to pretend they are Democrats, and see if they 
still hold that same conclusion. Democrats who scoff at impeachment in 
the present instance should try to see it from the Republicans' point 
of view.
    It is very difficult to perform this test, especially in the highly 
charged partisan atmosphere in which we live, but you get the point. 
Before we undertake such a solemn act as impeachment, we should examine 
our reasoning very carefully to be sure we are not simply following 
partisan instincts.
    Impeachment can be legitimate if and only if it emanates from a 
bipartisan conviction that the President has committed high crimes and 
misdemeanors--when people of opposing viewpoints can come together in 
agreement over the seriousness of the offense and the appropriateness 
of the sanction.
    Partisanship need not disappear entirely--that would be impossible. 
It simply must be held in check for a time--a few weeks, perhaps a 
month--and by a relatively small number of people, so that a bipartisan 
consensus can take shape.
    Look back at the Nixon impeachment. It took on legitimacy when a 
core of Republicans on the House Judiciary Committee were moved by the 
nature of President Nixon's offenses to break party ranks and vote for 
articles of impeachment. In the Senate, it was the stark reality of 
eroding Republican support that prompted President Nixon to resign. 
There was bipartisan consensus that what Nixon did was impeachable.
    Partisanship did not evaporate entirely during the impeachment 
trial of Andrew Johnson. In fact, the entire episode was riddled with 
partisanship, and overall it stands as an excellent example of how not 
to conduct an impeachment.
    Still, seven Republican Senators did vote with the Democrats for 
acquittal, shedding their partisan preferences, to prevent that 
impeachment from succeeding. It took only that amount of bipartisanship 
to save the country from an impeachment that most people--in 
retrospect--have concluded would have been a terrible mistake. The fact 
that a conviction in the Senate requires a two-thirds majority 
guarantees a measure of necessary bipartisanship except in all but the 
most lopsided Senates.
    But bipartisanship should not wait until the matter reaches the 
Senate chamber. In previous impeachments the votes in both the House 
and the Senate have been by overwhelming majorities. In the past, 
except for the Johnson impeachment, the only times articles of 
impeachment reached the floor were in cases of tremendous bipartisan 
consensus that the offenses satisfy the constitutional standard and 
that the officer ought to be removed.
    As for the Johnson impeachment itself, according to James Blaine, 
one of the Republican House members who voted for impeachment, he and 
others came in time to regret the effort. In private correspondence, 
Blaine wrote that, ``the sober reflection of after years has persuaded 
many who favored impeachment that it was not justifiable on the charges 
made, and that its success would have resulted in greater injury to 
free institutions than Andrew Johnson in his utmost endeavor was able 
to inflict.''
    The conclusion I reach is this. The burden is, as it always has 
been, on those who seek to impeach and convict a President. To overturn 
a popular election, they must convince the American people and at least 
some in the President's party that the President's actions meet the 
high standard for impeachment settled upon by our founders in the 
Constitution.
    This is what I mean by bipartisanship.
    The standard is ``principled political neutrality.''
    And one measure of whether a member has met that principle is to 
ask in Professor Black's words: ``Would they have answered the same 
question the same way if it came up with respect to a President towards 
whom [they] felt oppositely from the way [they] feel toward the 
President threatened with removal.''
    The American people will know whether each member met that test. 
They will not demand unanimity, but they will demand consensus.
    Thus far, the House Judiciary Committee has proceeded without 
dignity, causing the American people to lose respect for the Committee.
    As a result, the burden of demonstrating that they are proceeding 
with a standard of ``principled political neutrality'' will be 
politically difficult to meet.
    Ken Starr will make his case, the President should be allowed to 
make his. Then let them decide if the President's conduct meets the 
test of what the Framers had in mind by ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    The choice is not whether the President's self-evidently shameful 
and possibly criminal conduct must be punished by impeachment or be 
condoned. The choice is whether the process for dealing with his 
conduct is removal from office or some other means--censure, or perhaps 
even a criminal trial after he has left office.
    To those who say that failure to bring articles of impeachment 
against the President would amount to condoning his immoral behavior or 
overlooking a criminal act, notwithstanding the fact it does not meet 
the test of an impeachable offense, I say they do not understand our 
system of government. For the Constitution contemplates and the law 
provides for such a circumstance--it is called a criminal trial after 
his term is served. It is a way to punish the President without doing 
damage to the system of separated powers or overruling the judgment of 
the American people.
    Failure to impeach, even failure to proceed with a criminal action, 
does not mean that the President has not paid for his immoral 
behavior--he has already been sentenced to a hundred years of shame in 
the history books, which is not an insignificant penalty.
    So I say to my colleagues in the House, do your duty. Proceed with 
principled political neutrality. For if you do, history will judge you 
kindly. And if you do not, it will judge you harshly.
    And for those of us who hold high public office and the public 
trust, history is a judge.--[Speech, 11/18/98]
                            burden of proof
    What is the standard of proof? The Constitution does not set forth 
an express standard of proof that the evidence must meet in order to 
allow the Senate to convict the President. Practice has left to each 
Senator to determine for him or herself what standard to apply.
    From the judicial setting there are three major standards from 
which to choose. Most civil trials require a plaintiff to prove his or 
her case by a preponderance of the evidence. This means that the 
plaintiff must prove that it is more likely than not that the 
plaintiff's assertions are true. Criminal trials require the most 
exacting degree of proof. The prosecution must prove the defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A third, middle course is applied in 
some cases. This standard, clear and convincing evidence, requires 
proof that substantially exceeds a mere preponderance but that does not 
eliminate all reasonable doubt. There must be a very high degree of 
probability that the evidence proves what the plaintiff asserts, but 
the proof may fall short of certainty.
    Many Senators, analogizing to a criminal trial, have expressed that 
they would require the House Managers to prove their case ``beyond a 
reasonable doubt.'' In anticipation of an impeachment trial of 
President Richard Nixon, Senators Sam Ervin, Strom Thurmond, and John 
Stennis all declared that they would apply the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard. But it is clear that individual Senators may opt for a 
civil standard.
    This issue may not have more than rhetorical significance for the 
impeachment trial of President Clinton. These standards are meant to 
guide juries in their fact-finding capacity. Insofar as the trial 
focuses on the question whether the President's conduct justifies 
conviction and removal from office, the proceedings will call on the 
Senate in its judicial character. Resolving that question requires the 
Senate to exercise its legal and political judgment in order to 
determine whether the constitutional punishment fits the misconduct. It 
does not call upon the Senate to make a factual determination about 
what conduct actually occurred.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
           the burden of proof in assessing the house's case
    But can the President rightly be charged with having committed the 
massive number of crimes that the House Managers allege? As Mr. 
McCollum said, if we cannot conclude that the President has violated 
the law, even the House Managers would agree that he should not be 
removed from office. Even if you accept their recitation of the dire 
consequences of President Clinton remaining in office, if the President 
cannot be shown to have been a serial perjurer and a massive obstructor 
of justice, the Senate should acquit.
    What standard of proof should a Senator apply in deciding whether 
the record supports these charges? Both the House Managers and the 
President's counsel addressed this significant issue. The House 
Managers quite correctly pointed out that the Senate has never sought 
to determine for the entire body what that burden of proof should be in 
an impeachment. In effect, we have left it to the good judgment of each 
Senator to decide whether or not they are convinced by the evidence 
presented to us.
    For this Senator, fundamental fairness as well as the nature of the 
House's case indicate that I ought to be convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the President violated the laws that the House alleges. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the same standard applied in 
criminal cases--it is the standard that would apply if the President 
were tried in a criminal court for perjury or obstruction of justice.
    It seems to me that fundamental fairness counsels that I apply the 
same standard a criminal court would apply precisely because the House 
asserts that what makes his actions impeachable is that he has violated 
the criminal statutes regarding perjury and obstruction of justice. It 
strikes me as absurd that the Senate would have the arrogance to throw 
out a duly elected President on these grounds unless it was convinced 
that he would be convicted of those charges. Otherwise, we would be 
saying in effect that even though the President would not be convicted 
on these crimes, we are nevertheless throwing him out of office because 
he committed those crimes. Someone else can try to explain the logic of 
that decision to the voters, but not me.
    In addition, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt seems 
to me compelled by the fact that in the House's explanation of the harm 
to our system of government if the President is not thrown out, their 
entire argument rises and falls depending upon whether or not the 
President would be convicted in a court of law for the crimes alleged. 
If he could not be convicted in a court of law, then the Senate is not 
``condoning'' perjury or obstruction of justice any more than a 
criminal court is condoning those crimes when someone is acquitted on 
such charges. The Senate, like a court, is simply saying, ``not 
proven.'' But if the Senate is not condoning those crimes, there is no 
conceivable basis for concluding that the public will be harmed by the 
President's remaining in office.
    (There is another way to look at this: In any impeachment, a 
Senator must simply be convinced to his or her satisfaction that the 
defendant committed the acts alleged. That standard never changes. 
However, when the articles of impeachment allege that offenses rise to 
an impeachable level because these actions violate the law and have 
harmful consequences to the country because the defendant has violated 
the law and would not be punished, in that case a Senator must be 
convinced that a defendant would in fact be punished by a criminal 
court. In other words, the Senator must simply be convinced that a 
court would find that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
    (In contrast, if the charges were that the President had lied to 
the American people, the Congress or foreign leaders, and that the 
harmful consequences flowed from being unable to rely upon his word, 
then a Senator must simply be convinced that the President lied, 
relying upon whatever level of proof is sufficient to convince him or 
her of that fact.)--[Memorandum, 1/21/98]
                                censure
    In recent days, some have suggested that because the Starr report 
provides prima facie evidence of what are arguably impeachable 
offenses, the House and the Senate have a constitutional responsibility 
to see the impeachment process through to its conclusion. In my view, 
the constitutional history that I have sketched here this evening shows 
this position to be entirely mistaken. Indeed, if anything, history 
shows a thoroughly understandable reluctance to have the procedure 
invoked.
    Stopping short of impeachment would not be reaching a solution 
``outside the Constitution,'' as some suggest--it would be entirely 
compatible and consistent with the Constitution.
    The 28th Congress [which contemplated but then terminated 
impeachment proceedings against President Tyler] hardly violated its 
constitutional duty when the House decided that, all things considered, 
terminating impeachment proceedings after cooperation between the 
Congress and the President improved was a better course of action than 
proceeding with impeachment based on his past actions, even though it 
apparently did so for reasons no more laudable than those that 
initiated the process.
    Impeachment was and remains an inherently political process, with 
all the pitfalls and promises that are thus put into play. Nothing in 
the document precludes the Congress from seeking means to resolve this 
or any other putative breach of duty short of removing him from office. 
In fact, the risky and potentially divisive nature of the impeachment 
process may counsel in favor of utilizing it only as a last resort.
    Of course, impeachment ought to be used if the breach of duty is 
serious enough--what the Congress was prepared to do in the case of 
Richard Nixon was the correct course of action. However, nothing in the 
Constitution precludes the congress from resolving this conflict in a 
manner short of impeachment.
    The crucial question--the question with which the country is 
currently struggling--is whether the President's breaches of conduct--
which are now well-known and which have been universally condemned--
warrant the ultimate political sanction. Are they serious enough to 
warrant removal?
    In answering that, we need to ask ourselves, what is in the best 
interest for the country?
    And while I have not decided what ultimately should happen, I do 
want to suggest that it is certainly constitutionally permissible to 
consider a middle ground as a resolution of this matter. Such an 
approach might bring together those of the President's detractors who 
believe there needs to be some sanction, but are willing to stop short 
of impeachment, as well as those of the President's supporters who 
reject impeachment, but are willing to concede that some sanction ought 
to be implemented.
    As a country, we have not often faced decisions as stark and 
potentially momentous as the impeachment of a President. On the other 
hand, we would be wise not to overstate such claims--surely we have 
faced some moments just as stark and serious as this one. We have 
survived those moments, and we will survive this one.
    Whatever the outcome of the present situation, I am confident that 
our form of government and the strength of our country present us not 
with any constitutional crisis, but rather with the constitutional 
framework and flexibility to deal responsibly with the decisions we 
face in the coming months.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
                     crimes and misdemeanors, high
    Let me say at the outset, that what President Clinton did was 
reprehensible. It was a horrible lapse in judgment and it has brought 
shame to him personally and to the office of the President. His actions 
have hurt his family, his friends, his supporters and the country as a 
whole. President Clinton has said this himself.
    Let me also say that I have not made any decision as to what I 
think should happen. I have not come to any conclusion as to what 
consequences the President should face for his shameful behavior. I 
believe the oath I have taken precludes me and other Senators from 
prejudging, as I may be required to serve as a judge and juror in the 
trial of the century.
    I can only make an assessment after hearing all of the evidence: 
evidence against the President, and evidence in support of the 
President.
    No one knows how this will turn out. However, I have given the 
topic some thought and would like to explore some of the issues that 
surely will confront responsible Members of Congress and all Americans 
as we enter this difficult period in our history.
    The Framers of the Constitution who met in Philadelphia in the 
summer 1787 considered offering the country a constitution that did not 
include the power to impeach the President. After all, any wrongs 
against the public could be dealt with by turning the President out in 
the next election.
    One delegate to the constitutional convention, Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina, worried that the threat of impeachment would place the 
President under the thumb of a hostile congress, thereby weakening the 
independence of the office and threatening the separation of powers. 
According to James Madison's notes, Pinckney called impeachment a 
``rod'' that congress would hold over the President.
    In being reluctant to include an impeachment power, the Framers 
were not trying to create an imperial presidency. In fact, what they 
were worried about was protecting all American citizens against the 
tyranny of a select group.
    In their view, the separation of powers constituted one of the most 
powerful means for protecting individual liberty, because it prevented 
government power from being concentrated in any single branch of 
government. To make the separation of powers work properly, each branch 
must be sufficiently strong and independent from the others.
    The Framers were concerned that any process whereby the legislative 
branch could sit in judgment of the President would be vulnerable to 
abuse by partisan factions. Federalist No. 65 begins its defense of the 
impeachment process by warning of the dangers of abuse. It argues that 
impeachments:
    ``Will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, 
and to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to 
the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by the 
real demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    So the Framers were fully aware that impeachment proceedings could 
become partisan attacks on the President--charged with animosities 
generated by all manner of prior struggles and disagreements, over 
executive branch decisions, over policy disputes, over resentment at 
losing the prior election. Federalist No. 65 expresses the view that 
the use of impeachment to vindicate these animosities would actually be 
an abuse of that power.
    This sentiment is as true today as it was when the constitution was 
being written. It was also true when Richard Nixon faced impeachment in 
1974. In fact, it would have been wrong for Richard Nixon to have been 
removed from office based upon a purely partisan vote. No President 
should be removed from office merely because one party enjoys a 
commanding lead in either house of the congress.
    Yet while the Framers knew that impeachment proceedings could 
become partisan, they needed to deal with strong anti-federalist 
factions.
    The anti-federalists strenuously argued that the federal government 
would quickly get out of step with the sentiments of the people and 
become vulnerable to corruption and intrigue, arrogance and tyranny. 
This charge proved close to fatal as the ratifying conventions in the 
states took up the proposed constitution.
    The Framers of the Constitution knew that the Constitution would 
have been even more vulnerable to charges of establishing a government 
remote from the people if the President were not subject to removal 
except at the time of re-election.
    James Madison's notes of the Philadelphia constitutional convention 
record his observations of the debate. He:
    ``Thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for 
defending the community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy 
of the chief magistrate [that is, the President]. The limitation of the 
period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might lose his 
capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration 
into a scheme of speculation or oppression. He might betray his trust 
to foreign powers.''
    So in the end, the Framers of the Constitution risked the abuse of 
power by the congress to gain the advantages of impeachment.
    Once the decision to include the power of impeachment had been 
made, the remainder of debate on the impeachment clauses focused on two 
issues:
          1. What was to constitute an impeachable offense or what were 
        the standards to be?
          2. How was impeachment to work or what were the procedures to 
        be?
    As we shall see, the Framers proved unable to separate these two 
issues entirely. Understanding how they are intertwined, however, helps 
us to understand the full implications of the power.
    The Constitution provides that ``the House of Representatives shall 
. . . have the power of impeachment.'' (Article I, Section 2, Clause 
5).
    The Framers decision that the House of Representatives would 
initiate the charges of impeachment follows the pattern of the English 
Parliament--where the House of Commons initiates charges of 
impeachment. Beyond this, the choice must have seemed fairly compelled 
by two related considerations.
    The first, already mentioned, was the need to provide the people as 
a whole with assurances that the government they were being asked to 
create would be responsive to the interests and concerns of the people 
themselves.
    The second was the Framers' substantive understanding of the 
impeachment power. It was a power to hold accountable government 
officers who had, in Hamilton's terms, committed ``an abuse or 
violation of some public trust'' thereby committing an injury ``done 
immediately to the society itself.''
    If the gravamen of an impeachment is the breach of the public's 
trust, no branch of the federal government could have seemed more 
appropriate to initiate such a proceeding than the House, which was 
conceived and defended as the chamber most in tune with the people's 
sympathies and hence most appropriate to reflect the people's views.
    The Constitution further provides that the President shall be 
``removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' (Article II, Section 
4).
    This language went through several changes during that summer of 
1787. In initial drafts, the grounds for impeachment were restricted to 
treason and bribery alone. When the matter was brought up on September 
8, 1787, George Mason of Virginia inquired as to why the grounds should 
be restricted to these two provisions.
    He argued that ``attempts to subvert the constitution may not be 
treason as above defined.'' Accordingly, he moved to add 
``maladministration'' as a third ground.
    James Madison objected to Mason's motion, contending that to add 
``so vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during the pleasure of 
the senate.'' Here again, we see the worry that impeachment would be 
misused by the congress to reduce the independence of the President, 
allowing partisan factions to interfere at the expense of the larger 
public good.
    The objection apparently proved effective because mason 
subsequently withdrew the motion and substituted the phrase ``or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    What does the phrase mean? It is clear the Framers thought it to be 
limited in scope. But beyond this, constitutional scholars have been 
debating the meaning of this phrase from the very early days of the 
republic.
    Yet despite this on-going dialogue, I believe there are two 
important points of agreement as to the original understanding of the 
phrase, and a third issue where the weight of history suggests a 
settled practice.
    First, as we have already seen, the Framers did not intend that the 
President could be impeached for ``maladministration'' alone.
    Second, a great deal of evidence from outside the convention shows 
that both the Framers and ratifiers saw ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' as pointing to offenses that are serious, not petty, and 
offenses that are public or political, not private or personal.
    In 1829, William Rawle authored one of the early commentaries on 
the Constitution of the United States. In it, Rawle states that ``the 
legitimate causes of impeachment . . . can only have reference to 
public character and official duty.''
    He went on to say, ``in general, those offences which may be 
committed equally by a private person as a public officer are not the 
subjects of impeachment.''
    In addition, more than one hundred fifty years ago, Joseph Story, 
in his influential Commentaries on the Constitution, stated that 
impeachment is:
    ``Ordinarily'' a remedy for offenses ``of a political character,'' 
``growing out of personal misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, 
or habitual disregard of the public interests, in the discharge of the 
duties of political office.''
    The public character of the impeachment offense is further 
reinforced by the limited nature of the remedy for the offense. In the 
English tradition, impeachments were punishable by fines, imprisonment 
and even death. In contrast, the American constitution completely 
separates the issue of criminal sanctions from the issue of removal 
from office.
    The Constitution states that ``judgment in cases of impeachment 
shall not extend further than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit 
under the United States.'' (Article I, Section 3, Clause 7).
    The remedy for violations of the public's trust in the performance 
of one's official duties, in other words, is limited to removal from 
that office and disqualification from holding future offices. Remedies 
that I might add, correspond nicely to the public nature of the 
offenses in the first instance.
    Additional support comes from yet another commentator, James 
Wilson, a delegate to the convention from Pennsylvania. In his lectures 
on the Constitution, Wilson wrote that ``in the United States and 
Pennsylvania, impeachments are confined to political characters, to 
political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political punishments.''
    All in all, the evidence is quite strong that impeachment was 
understood as a remedy for abuse of official power, breaches of public 
trust, or other derelictions of the duties of office.
    The third point to make about the scope of the impeachment power is 
this: to be impeachable, an offense does not have to be a breach of the 
criminal law.
    The renowned constitutional scholar and personal friend and 
advisor, the late Phillip Kurland, wrote that ``at both the convention 
that framed the constitution and at the conventions that ratified it, 
the essence of an impeachable offense was thought to be breach of trust 
and not violation of the criminal law. And this was in keeping with the 
primary function of impeachment, removal from office.''
    If you put the notion that an impeachable offense must be a serious 
breach of an official trust or duty, together with the point that it 
does not have to be a criminal violation, you reach the conclusion that 
not all crimes are impeachable, and not every impeachable offense is a 
crime.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    Reference has been made to an exchange between George Mason and 
James Madison at the Virginia Ratifying Convention. Mason is reported 
to have worried that a President might ``stop [an] inquiry'' into 
wrongdoing involving the President. Madison is reported to have replied 
that this concern was not substantial because the House of 
Representatives could impeach the President if he did so. The exchange, 
it has been argued, proves that the Framers viewed obstruction of 
justice as clearly an impeachable offense.
    A more extended look at the colloquy shows that Mason's precise 
concern was that the President would use his pardon power to pardon 
people whose investigations might reveal Presidential involvement in 
criminal activities. Mason used this concern as the basis for arguing 
that the pardon power should be placed in the House, and not with the 
President. To this concern, Madison replied that if the President so 
abused the pardon power, he could be impeached. So it was an action 
that abused an official power of the President that Madison thought was 
impeachable.
    Here is a condensed version of the exchange as reported in Eliot's 
Debates.
    Mr. GEORGE MASON, animadverting on the magnitude of the powers of 
the President, was alarmed . . . Now, I conceive that the President 
ought not to have the power of pardoning, because he may frequently 
pardon crimes which were advised by himself. It may happen, at some 
future day, that he will establish a monarchy, and destroy the 
republic. If he has the power of granting pardons before indictment, or 
conviction, may he not stop inquiry and prevent detection?
    Mr. MADISON, adverting to Mr. Mason's objection to the President's 
power of pardoning, said it would be extremely improper to vest it in 
the House of Representatives, and not much less so to place it in the 
Senate. . . . There is one security in this case to which gentlemen may 
not have adverted: if the President be connected, in any suspicious 
manner, with any person, and there be grounds to believe he will 
shelter him, the House of Representatives can impeach him. . . . This 
is a great security.''--[Memorandum, 2/9/99]
          * * * * * * *
     ii. the meaning of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' under the 
                              constitution
    The Constitution establishes that the President ``shall be removed 
from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of Treason, Bribery, or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' That instrument, by design, does 
not contain an express definition of the phrase ``other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' The Framers intended the Constitution to endure for 
centuries and recognized that they could not provide a more specific 
definition that would justly serve the Nation's interest into an 
unknowable future. Instead, they wisely entrusted the construction and 
adaptation of that phrase to the judgment and conscience of the 
people's chosen representatives in Congress. Thus, the Senate is left 
to exercise what Alexander Hamilton termed our ``awful discretion'' to 
judge whether the President's conduct warrants removing him from 
office.
    While the Constitution calls upon each Senator to bring his or her 
good faith political judgment to bear on the meaning of the 
constitutional standard of ``other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' it 
does not abandon us to an ad hoc or partisan exercise of our 
discretion. Indeed, the Framers strongly urged in both the Philadelphia 
convention and the state ratifying conventions that the constitutional 
standard is not properly understood to allow impeachment to be used as 
a tool of partisan punishment. The Constitution itself, the history of 
its framing and ratification, and the construction given through 
faithful interpretation and practice since its ratification converge to 
provide powerful guidance for determining what offenses justify 
impeachment and conviction. These touchstones of constitutional 
interpretation reveal that high crimes and misdemeanors are great 
offenses characterized by two elements: (1) grave harm to the 
constitutional system of government that (2) results from official 
misconduct.
                     a. the history of impeachment
    The Framers met in Philadelphia in 1787 because the government 
under the Articles of Confederation was so ineffectual as to have 
brought the fledgling union to ``the last stage of national 
humiliation.'' They intended to establish a government through which 
the people could effectively define and pursue the general welfare. To 
do so, the Framers understood that the government whose charter they 
were about to write would have to be entrusted with broad coercive 
powers to act directly upon American citizens. At the same time, the 
Framers were practical statesmen who understood that the powers 
necessary to make a government effective could be misused to make it 
potentially an instrument of oppression. Madison explained the dilemma:
    ``If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels 
were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on 
government would be necessary. In framing a government which is 
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you 
must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the 
next place oblige it to control itself.''
    To meet this potential threat to liberty, the Framers divided the 
federal government into three co-equal branches and further divided the 
legislative branch into two houses in order to require the concurrence 
of the branches before the government's coercive power could be brought 
to bear on the people. Thus, while Article 1, Section 1 of the 
Constitution vests the legislative power in Congress, this power is 
subject to Presidential veto and judicial review for constitutionality. 
Executive action generally requires a legislative basis or 
appropriation or other legislative support and is subject to judicial 
review.
    Finally, the establishment and jurisdiction of the federal courts 
generally depend upon legislative authorization, subject again to 
Presidential veto. Within this structure each branch is to be 
independent and is ``armed'' to defend itself against encroachments by 
the others. As Justice Robert Jackson observed, ``the Constitution 
diffuses power the better to secure liberty. . . . It enjoins upon its 
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.''
    Maintaining the independence of the three branches of government 
dominated the debates regarding impeachment at the Constitutional 
Convention. Initially, the Framers considered offering the country a 
constitution that did not include the power to impeach the President. 
After all, any wrongs against the public could be dealt with by turning 
the President out in the next election. One delegate to the 
constitutional convention, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina, worried 
that the threat of impeachment would place the President under the 
thumb of a hostile congress, thereby weakening the independence of the 
office and threatening the separation of powers. According to James 
Madison's notes, Pinckney called impeachment a ``rod'' that congress 
would hold over the President.
    In being reluctant to include an impeachment power, the Framers 
were not trying to create an imperial presidency; they were concerned 
about protecting all American citizens and the Nation as a whole. In 
their view, the separation of powers constituted one of the most 
powerful means for protecting individual liberty, because it prevented 
government power from being concentrated in any single branch of 
government. To make the separation of powers work properly, each branch 
must be sufficiently strong and independent from the others.
    The Framers' worry was largely animated by the concern that any 
process whereby the legislative branch could sit in judgment over the 
President would be vulnerable to abuse by partisan factions. Federalist 
No. 65 begins its defense of the impeachment process by warning of its 
potential for abuse. It argues that impeachments:
    ``Will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, 
and to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to 
the accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-
existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by the 
real demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    The Framers were fully aware that impeachment proceedings could 
become partisan attacks on the President charged with animosities 
generated by all manner of prior struggles and disagreements over 
executive branch decisions, over policy disputes, over resentment at 
losing the prior election. Federalist No. 65 expresses the view that 
the use of impeachment to vindicate these animosities would actually be 
an abuse of that power.
    Although the Framers were concerned about impeachment proceedings 
becoming partisan, they needed to deal with strong anti-federalist 
factions. They were very aware that the anti-federalists strenuously 
urged that the federal government would quickly get out of step with 
the sentiments of the people and would become vulnerable to corruption 
and intrigue, arrogance and tyranny. This charge proved close to fatal 
as the ratifying conventions in the states took up the proposed 
constitution. The Framers of the constitution knew that the 
constitution would have been even more vulnerable to charges of 
establishing a government remote from the people if the President were 
not subject to removal at all except at the time of re-election.
    James Madison's notes of the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention 
record his observations of the debate where he:
    ``Thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for 
defending the community against the incapacity, negligence or perfidy 
of the chief magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service 
was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his 
appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of 
speculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign 
powers.''
    So in the end, the Framers of the constitution risked the abuse of 
power by the Congress to gain the advantages of impeachment.
                b. the constitution's text and structure
    The Constitution does not define impeachable offenses, yet its text 
and structure provide clear manifestation that these words refer to 
official misconduct causing grave harm to our constitutional system of 
government. The starting point for any analysis of the Constitution's 
meaning must be its text, which in relevant part reads, ``the President 
. . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for and Conviction of 
Treason, Bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    Here, the text sets forth a list that begins with terms that have 
definite meaning (treason, which is defined in the Constitution itself, 
and bribery, whose definition was fixed at common law) and proceeds to 
relatively indefinite terms, high crimes and misdemeanors. In this 
setting, two rules of construction, ejusdem generis and noscitur a 
sociis, instruct that the meaning of the indefinite terms are to be 
understood as similar in kind to the definite terms. Application of 
these canons of construction is bolstered here by the text itself. The 
indefinite element, ``high crimes and misdemeanors,'' is introduced by 
the term ``other.'' This specifically refers the reader back to the 
preceding definite terms, treason and bribery, as supplying the context 
and parameters for the meaning of the indefinite phrase, ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors.''
    Every criminal offense, including such trivial infractions as 
parking offenses, involves public or societal harm. It is for this 
reason that criminal cases are titled, ``The State versus . . .'' or 
``The Government versus. . . .'' Each of the definite impeachable 
offenses, treason and bribery, are distinct in that they cause grave 
harm to the public not in some undifferentiated sense but in a way that 
strikes directly at our system of constitutional government. The 
Constitution defines treason as ``levying War against [the United 
States] or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort,'' 
which plainly involves the most serious offense against our system of 
government. Similarly, bribery inescapably involves a serious 
subversion of the processes of government. In describing the common 
characteristics of treason and bribery, Professor Charles Black of Yale 
Law School explained that each offense ``so seriously threaten[s] the 
order of political society as to make pestilent and dangerous the 
continuance in power of their perpetrator.''
    Furthermore, Professor Edwin Corwin quoted with approval the 
statement of Justice Benjamin Curtis who said in defense of President 
Andrew Johnson that ``treason and bribery . . . these are offenses 
which strike at the existence of [the] government. `Other high crimes 
and misdemeanors.' Noscitur a sociis. High crimes and misdemeanors; so 
high that they belong in this company with treason and bribery.''
    In this constitutional setting, the terms treason and bribery take 
on a second distinctive aspect. As used in Article II, Section 4, each 
term involves official misconduct. Bribery, by definition, occurs only 
where a public official undertakes an official act in return for 
payment or some other corrupt consideration. Likewise, treason 
necessarily involves official misconduct in the impeachment context. To 
be sure, it is possible for a private citizen to commit treason by 
giving aid and comfort to the enemies of the United States. It must be 
remembered that impeachment proceedings may be pursued only against 
civil officers of the United States. By limiting impeachable treason to 
civil officers, the Constitution expressly contemplates that treason 
will provide a grounds for impeachment and conviction only where a 
civil office is used to adhere to or aid the enemies of the United 
States.
    The textual construction expressed above--that high crimes and 
misdemeanors refer to grave harms to our constitutional system of 
government that result from official misconduct--comports with and 
draws significant support from the Constitution's structure. First, the 
structure reflects the Framers' conscious decision not to adopt a 
parliamentary system of government, in which the executive power is 
subordinate to and controlled by the legislature. The structure also 
reflects the Framers' judgment that the executive branch not be 
accorded primacy; their experience with the tyranny of the British 
monarchy was too recent to have permitted them to accept executive 
supremacy. Instead, the Constitution establishes three branches that 
are independent, strong, and co-equal. Construing the category of high 
crimes and misdemeanors too broadly would threaten the independence of 
the executive and judicial branches. This specific concern animated 
James Madison in the Philadelphia Convention and moved him to object to 
vague and potentially expansive formulations of the grounds upon which 
the President could be impeached and removed from office.
    The formulation of high crimes and misdemeanors must be understood 
as consistent with the Constitution's overall structure. In as much as 
the Constitution's structure specifically rejects the parliamentary 
form, the power of impeachment and removal must be construed and 
exercised in a way that respects this fundamental constitutional 
judgment. Understanding the grounds for impeachment to be limited to 
cases of official misconduct that cause serious harm to our system of 
government allows the Congress to protect the public against oppressive 
official action without undermining the necessary independence of the 
President or the judiciary.
    The Constitution's structure also supports limiting the category of 
impeachable offenses to those involving official misconduct. The 
constitutional separation of powers is designed to safeguard liberty 
against tyrannical or oppressive exercise of the government's power. In 
advocating the specific governmental structure erected in the 
Constitution, Madison repeatedly described the motivating concern to be 
establishing internal mechanisms, specifically the system of checks and 
balances, to control the federal government's power and minimize threat 
to the liberty of the people. This supports limiting the scope of 
impeachable offenses to official misconduct; that is, to conduct in 
which the civil officer misuses his or her official power. Other sorts 
of misbehavior by civil officers are simply beyond the concern of the 
separation of powers, of which the impeachment powers are a significant 
component. Indeed, the Constitution specifically provides that civil 
officers, including the President, remain subject to criminal 
prosecution and punishment for wrongdoing that does not involve 
official conduct.
     c. history of the debates and ratification of the constitution
    Moving beyond the text and structure of the Constitution itself, 
the debates at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, where the 
Constitution was drafted, and those in the subsequent state ratifying 
conventions provide important insight into the meaning of ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors.'' Close examination of these proceedings demonstrates 
that the Framers gave careful consideration to Congress' impeachment 
powers. This consideration led them to understand the Constitution as 
setting forth a very narrow category of impeachable offenses.
    Through most of the convention, the drafts of the Constitution 
denominated treason and bribery as the exclusive grounds for 
impeachment and removal of civil officers. In September 1787, as the 
convention was drawing to a close, Colonel George Mason and James 
Madison undertook colloquy that gave this provision its ultimate 
formulation. Because treason was expressly and narrowly defined in the 
Constitution itself, Mason was concerned that the impeachment power 
would not reach ``great and dangerous offenses'' and that ``attempts to 
subvert the Constitution may not be treason'' as defined in Article III 
of the Constitution. Mason moved to add ``maladministration'' as a 
catchall category. Significantly, this offense, which had been an 
accepted ground for impeachment in British practice, comprises 
exclusively official misconduct.
    Madison objected to this addition, not because it was too 
restrictive, but because it was too vague and so potentially too 
expansive. He feared that ``so vague a term will be equivalent to a 
tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.'' Here again it is clear that 
the Framers were concerned that impeachment would be misused by the 
Congress to reduce the independence of the President. In response Mason 
withdrew his own original motion and moved to add ``or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.'' His motion was quickly approved.
    The purpose of Mason's motions was to include all offenses that 
pose a threat to our system of constitutional government similarly to 
that posed by treason. Madison expressed the important concern that the 
expansion not be left so far open as to erode the essential 
independence of the other branches, and particularly of the President. 
In responding to Madison's concern, Mason must be understood to have 
intended to narrow a definition that already applied solely to official 
misconduct. The colloquy between Mason and Madison, then, strongly 
supports construing the phrase high crimes and misdemeanors to cover 
only official misconduct that threatens grievous harm to our 
governmental system.
    Madison was not alone in his concern that Congress might use 
impeachment as a tool for encroachments upon the executive branch. This 
concern was raised in various state ratifying conventions as well. For 
example, in supporting the Constitution at the Pennsylvania Convention, 
James Wilson repeatedly assured the delegates that only ``great 
injuries'' could serve as a basis for invoking impeachment. In his 
lectures on the Constitution, Wilson went on to say that ``in the 
United States and Pennsylvania, impeachments are confined to political 
characters, to political crimes and misdemeanors, and to political 
punishments.'' In the North Carolina Convention, several defenders of 
the Constitution, including James Iredell who was a delegate to the 
Philadelphia Convention and later became a Justice of the Supreme 
Court, argued that impeachment would ``arise from acts of great injury 
to the community.'' The debates surrounding ratification in New York 
produced the Federalist Papers. Alexander Hamilton explained that,
    ``[t]he subjects of [the Senate's impeachment] jurisdiction are 
those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in 
other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are 
of a nature which with peculiar propriety may be denominated POLITICAL, 
as they relate chiefly to injuries done to the society itself.''
    Like Hamilton, the founding generation understood impeachment to be 
a political remedy for political offenses. It is important to bear in 
mind what they meant by ``political.'' They meant that which relates to 
government and the pursuit of the general welfare; that which involves 
the system of government or ``society in its political character.'' 
They specifically did not mean political in the sense of partisan which 
the Framers affirmatively feared. Charles Pinckney, James Wilson, and 
Alexander Hamilton, for example, each decried construing the 
impeachment powers in ways that would allow these powers to be put to 
partisan ends. They lodged the power to try impeachments in the Senate 
precisely because they thought the Senate would have the necessary 
independence, stature, and impartiality to prevent the impeachment 
powers from becoming a tool of factionalism and partisanship. The 
Framers expected that the Senate was, among government institutions, 
uniquely capable of fidelity to the constitutional limits partisanship 
that the Framers understood to be implicit in the phrase high crimes 
and misdemeanors.
    Leading constitutional scholarship of the founding era reflects the 
same view of the intended narrow scope of high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Justice Joseph Story, in his pathbreaking Commentaries on the 
Constitution, looked to British practice to understand the scope of 
impeachment in the United States Constitution. Recognizing that the 
U.S. Constitution intended to confine impeachment to a narrower set of 
offenses than those permitted under British law, he observed that even 
in Great Britain, ``such kinds of misdeeds . . . as peculiarly injure 
the commonwealth by the abuse of high offices of trust are the most 
proper and have been the most usual ground for this kind of prosecution 
in parliament.'' Story went on to say that impeachment is a remedy for 
offenses ``of a political character,'' ``growing out of personal 
misconduct, or gross neglect, or usurpation, or habitual disregard of 
the public interests, in the discharge of the duties of political 
office.''
    The public character of the impeachment offense is further 
reinforced by the limited nature of the remedy for the offense. In the 
English tradition, impeachments were punishable by fines, imprisonment 
and even death. In contrast, the American Constitution completely 
separates the issue of criminal sanctions from the issue of removal 
from office. The Constitution states that ``judgment in cases of 
impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit 
under the United States.'' The remedy for violations of the public's 
trust in the performance of one's official duties, in other words, is 
limited to removal from that office and disqualification from holding 
future offices.
    Therefore, the Constitution contemplates both an impeachment and a 
criminal action as consequences for Presidents who commit impeachable 
offenses. This differs from the English model which only provides for 
criminal punishments after an impeachment conviction. If, however, a 
President engages in egregious but non-impeachable activity, the 
Constitution subjects the President to criminal liability. Impeachment 
therefore, is viewed not as a mechanism to punish a President, but 
rather a device to protect the populace. As Story said, impeachment 
proceedings are ``not so much designed to punish an offender as to 
secure the state against gross official misdemeanors.''
    Impeachment, therefore, is intended to preserve the constitutional 
form of government by removing from office an official who subverts the 
Constitution and is not intended to be a remedy for someone who breaks 
the law in connection with a private matter.
    At least one important early treatise writer, William Rawle, 
concluded that only official misconduct could provide a basis for 
impeachment. He contended that ``the causes of impeachment can only 
have reference to public character and official duty. . . . In general 
those which may be committed equally by a private person as a public 
officer are not the subject of impeachment.'' Additional support for 
this proposition comes from the renowned constitutional scholar, 
Phillip Kurland who wrote that ``at both the convention that framed the 
Constitution and at the conventions that ratified it, the essence of an 
impeachable offense was thought to be breach of trust and not violation 
of the criminal law. And this was in keeping with the primary function 
of impeachment, removal from office.'' Finally, additional support for 
this proposition comes from the United States Department of Justice. As 
a legal memorandum produced by the Justice Department's Office of Legal 
Counsel during impeachment proceedings against President Nixon 
observed, ``[t]he underlying purpose of impeachment is not to punish 
the individual, but is to protect the public against gross abuse of 
power.''
                d. constitutional practice and precedent
    Another important guide to the meaning of the Constitution is the 
construction applied throughout our history by those who have been 
charged with applying its provisions. The significance of 
constitutional practice is heightened in the absence of applicable 
judicial interpretation. As Justice Frankfurter stated:
    ``The Constitution is a framework for government. Therefore the way 
the framework has consistently operated fairly establishes that it has 
operated according to its true nature. Deeply embedded traditional ways 
of conducting government cannot supplant the Constitution or 
legislation, but they give meaning to the words of a text or supply 
them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American 
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and 
to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them.''
    In the history of the United States, the Senate has never convicted 
any President of an impeachable offense. This fact stands out as the 
sum total of the Senate's practical construction of the Constitution's 
impeachment provisions as they relate to the President of the United 
States. It must serve as a chilling call to self-restraint in 
construing those provisions.
    The Senate has convicted other civil officers of impeachable 
offenses, including high crimes and misdemeanors. There is reason to 
doubt whether these cases, mostly involving federal judges, provide 
directly analogous precedent for cases involving the President. First, 
the Madison-Mason colloquy and the debates in the state ratifying 
conventions demonstrate the Framers' primary concern was with the use 
of impeachment as a vehicle for encroachments on the President's 
structurally necessary independence from the legislature. Second, 
federal judges serve life terms and are not elected. The automatic 
removal of the President upon conviction of high crimes and 
misdemeanors has the widely remarked upon consequence of artificially 
altering the expected result of an election and thus is regarded as in 
tension with democratic principles. Moreover, because the President 
serves a limited term of four years, the need for an artificial removal 
mechanism is less urgent than it is in the case of judges who would 
otherwise serve an illimitable term.
    These caveats aside, an examination of congressional practice in 
the case of the fifteen officers who have been impeached by the House 
strongly supports construing high crimes and misdemeanors as aimed 
primarily at official misconduct that results in grave harm to our 
constitutional system of government. In every case, the misconduct 
cited as impeachable involved the misuse of office or the power of 
office. No case involved impeachment for conduct that did not involve 
the exercise of the impeached person's office or official power. The 
closest the Congress has come to impeaching and convicting an officer 
for conduct not involving abuse of office was the case of Judge Harry 
Claiborne. Judge Claiborne was impeached, convicted, and removed from 
office for committing tax evasion. Superficially, this conduct did not 
itself involve his judicial office in any direct way. The income he was 
convicted of withholding, however, allegedly came from improper 
payments to him, which were made because of his judicial office. In 
their essence, then, the charges against him were charges of serious 
abuse of office involving what amounted to bribery, though the articles 
of impeachment did not formally recount the source of the income at the 
heart of the tax evasion case against Judge Claiborne. [Memorandum, 12/
22/98]
                           evidence, rules of
    Are the Federal Rules of Evidence Applicable? Neither the Senate 
nor its presiding officer, the Chief Justice, is required to follow the 
Federal Rules of Evidence in ruling on evidentiary objections during an 
impeachment trial. As a matter of practice these decisionmakers have 
relied upon the Federal Rules in considering evidentiary objections, 
but have not always excluded evidence that the Federal Rules would 
exclude or admitted evidence that the Federal Rules would allow. The 
Senate's approach has been to receive all evidence except where doing 
so would be unfair to one of the parties. In determining what is fair, 
the Senate has placed great weight on the Federal Rules.
    The refusal to adopt the Federal Rules of Evidence is apparently 
based on the judgment that the Senate is highly sophisticated as a jury 
examining political crimes and weighing political remedies. 
Consequently, the Senate does not need the sort of protections that 
juries commonly require. The concern raised by not adopting the Federal 
Rules is that, where the only limit on the discretion of individual 
Senators is their sense of fairness, party-line voting may emerge and 
the impeachment process could come to be viewed as lacking the 
necessary impartiality.
    While the Senate has never accepted that it is bound by the Federal 
Rules, it may vote to require their application in a given case. In 
fact, the Senate did just that on at least one occasion. During the 
Rule XI committee deliberations in the impeachment trial of Judge Harry 
Claiborne, Senator Orrin Hatch argued that the committee should accept 
the Federal Rules as binding. Then-Senator Albert Gore argued against 
accepting the Federal Rules.
    Is the Starr Report Admissible? Either or both parties may seek to 
introduce the referral and supporting documentation that independent 
counsel Kenneth Starr submitted to the House Judiciary Committee. Much 
of this material would not be admissible in a judicial proceeding. The 
referral itself is not evidence, but a summation of evidence contained 
in the attachments. The attachments include grand jury testimony where 
witnesses were not subject to cross-examination and other material 
could represent hearsay.
    There is some precedent for admitting the record and proceedings 
from a judicial proceeding as substantive evidence in an impeachment 
trial. In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, one of the 
House Managers, then-Representative Michael DeWine, argued that the 
Rule XI committee should accept the record of the criminal trial in 
which Judge Claiborne was convicted of tax evasion charges. 
Specifically, Manager DeWine argued that accepting the evidence would 
establish an important precedent in favor of economy and efficiency in 
impeachment proceedings. The committee accepted DeWine's argument and 
received the trial record as substantive evidence.
    In Judge Claiborne's case, the committee agreed to receive evidence 
that had been subject to cross-examination by Judge Claiborne's 
attorneys. If the President's counsel objects to the Senate receiving 
the Starr report and supporting materials, he could distinguish the 
Claiborne precedent on the ground that the President's lawyers had no 
opportunity to cross examine grand jury witnesses.
    Is Evidence of Prosecutorial Misconduct Admissible? The President's 
counsel may seek to introduce evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The 
House Managers or Senators may object on the grounds that such evidence 
is irrelevant. Either the President committed high crimes or 
misdemeanors, or he did not; evidence relating to what the independent 
counsel may have done to investigate the President is beside the point.
    The President, however, would have a powerful contrary argument, 
particularly if the Starr report and supporting documents are admitted 
as substantive evidence. The report itself represents the conclusions 
drawn by the independent counsel. The supporting documents represent 
evidence and testimony collected by the independent counsel without 
opportunity for supplementation, challenge or cross-examination by the 
President. Understanding the independent counsel's bias or impartiality 
is crucial to assessing the weight and credibility of this type of 
evidence. For example, the independent counsel's office will have 
chosen to pursue certain lines of questioning with witnesses before the 
grand jury. If the independent counsel acted from bias, there is a 
reasonable inference that the roads the prosecutor chose not to follow 
would have revealed evidence favorable to the President. If, on the 
other hand, the independent counsel is impartial, one may reasonably 
infer that he sought to uncover all relevant information whether 
favorable or unfavorable to the President.
    In addition, if officials in the Office of the Independent Counsel 
threatened witnesses, that fact is relevant to assessing the 
credibility of the testimony and evidence given by those witnesses.
    In one previous case, the Rule XI committee voted to allow the 
defense to present evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, although it 
did not allow the defense to pursue elements of its theory that were 
purely speculative and highly dubious.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                            findings of fact
    Various proposals to have the Senate vote on ``findings of fact'' 
prior to a final vote on the articles of impeachment are circulating. 
The most onerous of these would ask the Senate to ``find'' that the 
President had violated federal laws against perjury and obstruction of 
justice.
    Under one presumed scenario, the findings of fact would pass, while 
the subsequent vote on the articles would fail. Thus, while the 
President would remain in office, his legacy would be besmirched by an 
impeachment trial's finding that he was guilty of crimes.
    There are several constitutional arguments against this procedure, 
each based on the fact that it is either equivalent to, or tantamount 
to, separating a vote on guilt or innocence from a vote on removal.
    Very early in the Senate's history, the Senate did in fact separate 
these two votes, notably in the case of Judge John Pickering. Pickering 
was charged with drunkenness, among other things, but not with any 
crimes. The Senate voted separately on whether he was guilty under the 
articles and then on whether or not he should be removed from office. 
(They voted to convict and to remove.)
    This procedure might signal that the Senate believed that in an 
impeachment trial a person could be found guilty by the Senate of 
offenses that did not rise to the level of ``treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Under that interpretation, the second 
vote would be necessary to establish whether or not the offenses 
justified removal from office.
    However, this possible interpretation of the trial procedure was 
repudiated in the 1936 impeachment trial of Judge Halstead Ritter, when 
the chair ruled that removal followed automatically from a finding of 
guilty, so that a separate vote on removal was not in order. The ruling 
was based on the text of Article II, Section 4, of the Constitution 
which provides that ``The President [and other civil officers] shall be 
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    The dominant view of constitutional scholars is that the chair's 
ruling in the Ritter case was correct. Notice that there are two 
significant components of the Ritter interpretation: (1) the President, 
vice President or other civil officers can only be impeached for 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' and (2) 
removal then follows by operation of Constitutional law upon 
conviction.
    Against this background, the proposed findings of fact could 
produce substantial constitutional mischief. Suppose they received a 
two-thirds vote. If the offenses outlined in the findings of fact are 
high crimes and misdemeanors, the President would have been removed 
from office by operation of Constitutional law.
    Suppose, further, that the Senate then took the final vote on the 
articles and on that vote the yeas were less than two-thirds. Looking 
strictly at this vote, the President has been acquitted, and remains in 
office.
    Who, then, is the President of the United States after these two 
votes have been cast--Bill Clinton or Al Gore? In other words, who 
decides whether the first vote convicted the President of high crimes 
and misdemeanors?
    Senators might well argue that the very fact that the Senate took 
the second vote proves that the first vote was not on offenses that 
justified removal. That would be an ironic position for many Republican 
Senators to be in, however, as many of them are on record defending the 
proposition that perjury and obstruction of justice are clearly 
impeachable offenses.
    One argument against the proposed findings of fact, then, is that 
it could create enormous uncertainty about who occupies the office of 
President. The impact of that uncertainty on foreign and domestic 
policy would potentially be quite great, infecting every official 
action the President might undertake. (Perhaps Bill Clinton and Al Gore 
could do everything in tandem--co-sign all official documents, co-
attend all foreign negotiations, etc.--thereby eliminating the legal 
ambiguities by creating a true co-presidency.)
    The uncertainty would, in all likelihood, result in litigation. 
Suit could be brought by someone adversely affected by a law ``signed'' 
by Bill Clinton that would otherwise have been pocket vetoed due to the 
adjournment of Congress, claiming that the bill never became law. Or it 
could be brought by someone seeking the benefits of a law that Bill 
Clinton had ``vetoed,'' claiming that the veto had no effect because 
Bill Clinton was not President.
    Even if such litigation would eventually lead to a resolution of 
the uncertainty, the country would suffer during the interim.
    There is a real possibility, however, that the Supreme Court would 
find the question of what constitutes a ``high crime and misdemeanor'' 
to be nonjusticiable. In United States v. Nixon, the Court held that 
nearly all questions regarding the Senate's power to try impeachments 
are nonjusticiable, and it might well so find in this instance, as 
well.
    Even if the findings of fact did not garner two-thirds support, a 
second argument against the findings of fact can be based on the two-
part Ritter interpretation of the impeachment power (i.e., impeachment 
available only for high crimes and misdemeanors; removal follows 
automatically from conviction). The contemplated bifurcated vote 
provides a mechanism for doing exactly what the Ritter interpretation 
and the prevailing view among scholars say the constitution does not 
permit: impeaching and convicting a person of lesser offenses than high 
crimes and misdemeanors.
    The consequences of sanctioning impeachment for ``low'' crimes and 
misdemeanors in this way are spelled out nicely in a draft op-ed by Jed 
Rubenfeld. He argues that if the Senate proceeds with the proposed 
findings of fact,
    ``[t]he Senate would then have taken another big step toward 
transforming impeachment into a tool of partisan politics.
    ``The Clinton Impeachment would then establish the proposition that 
it is a legitimate senatorial function in an impeachment proceeding to 
``find'' that the President committed crimes or serious misconduct (but 
not high crimes). In that case, why shouldn't a majority of the House 
impeach every President who has engaged in conduct worthy of censure? 
It would no longer matter whether this conduct rose to the level of 
high crimes and misdemeanors, for after all, one of the Senate's 
legitimate and proper functions would be to find that the President had 
committed ``low'' or ``medium'' crimes or other serious misconduct not 
requiring removal from office.
    ``If the Senate wants to censure the President, let it. But 
impeachment is not about finding criminal guilt or innocence, and it is 
not about censure. It is about removal from office. The Senate must 
vote, up or down, on conviction and removal. Anything less or in-
between is more partisan mud.''
    The idea that the House could routinely start up the Senate 
impeachment trial apparatus on the basis of offenses insufficient to 
constitute high crimes and misdemeanors because the bifurcated vote 
procedure supplied the Senate with a way to cope with such charges 
would probably have been anathema to the Framers, who thought that 
impeachment ought to be rarely used and reserved for the most serious 
breaches of public trust.
    Judge Bork agrees that the bifurcated approach poses serious 
separation of powers problems. He wrote in the February 1, edition of 
the Wall Street Journal:
    ``That course would also create an unconstitutional political 
weapon in the permanent struggle between the legislative and executive 
branches. Had the Isenbergh-Kmiec proposition been accepted during 
Iran-Contra, is there any doubt that the Democratic House and Senate 
would have impeached Ronald Reagan and, unable to convict him by a two-
thirds vote, adopted findings of fact by a majority vote that 
effectively condemned him as the perpetrator of high crimes and 
misdemeanors? This is precisely what the separation of powers does not 
allow and what anyone who thinks ahead should disavow.''
    (The Isenbergh-Kmiec proposition mentioned by Judge Bork refers to 
a law review article by Professor Isenbergh of Chicago Law School 
arguing that the Ritter interpretation is wrong--that in fact people 
can be impeached under the Constitution for offenses less than high 
crimes and misdemeanors, in which case lesser sanctions than removal 
are also available to the Senate.)
    These are powerful arguments. There are responses to them, however, 
which I believe make the ultimate judgment as to whether or not the 
bifurcated procedure passes constitutional muster open to reasonable 
disagreement.
    As to the complaint that the procedure unconstitutionally 
bifurcates a unitary vote, the complaint just misconceives what the 
findings of fact motion is. It is not a vote on guilt or innocence of 
impeachable offenses at all because it doesn't by its terms convict the 
President of anything. It is antecedent to any question of conviction 
for impeachable offenses or of remedy. It leaves Senators free to vote 
any way they wish on guilt or innocence and thus does not split up the 
conviction/remedy questions. If necessary, this could be made crystal 
clear through careful drafting, such as by phrasing the motion as, 
``Without prejudice to the final question of guilt or innocence on any 
of the articles of impeachment, the Senate finds . . .''
    This interpretation also responds to the complaint urged by 
Rubenfeld and echoed by Bork. Because the findings of fact are 
toothless as regards guilt or innocence, passing such a motion is not 
equivalent to convicting the President of low crimes and misdemeanors. 
The Rubenfeld-Bork objection would lie if and only if the Senate 
purported to convict the President of such offenses, and then sought to 
avoid removing him by rejecting the articles. But it is not doing that 
when it makes findings of fact. Because such findings lack any 
conceivable juridical effect, they are no more offensive to the 
Constitution than a censure resolution.
    One could even imagine a findings of fact motion serving a purpose 
that would be beneficial to the impeachment process. Findings of fact 
could help provide a clear historical record as to what this United 
States Senate believed did not rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses (or did rise to that level, depending upon the outcome of the 
vote on conviction). Historically, the Senate has left to each 
individual Senator the responsibility to make an overall unitary 
determination as to the facts that have been proven, the requisite 
burden of proof as to those facts, and the ultimate consequences that 
flow from those facts, taking into account both the costs of retaining 
the civil officer in office as well as the costs of removing him or 
her. It could be argued that our constitutional practices would be just 
as well served if the basis for the final judgment was expressed in 
more discrete and articulated collective judgments, first as to the 
facts proven, and then as to their consequences.
    This last point runs counter to the Senate's current rules and 
practices, of course. Rule XXIII of the rules of impeachment provides 
that ``an article of impeachment shall not be divisible for the purpose 
of voting thereon at any time during the trial.'' This provision was 
adopted in 1986. Some of its legislative history is pertinent:
    ``The portion of the amendment effectively enjoining the division 
of an individual article into separate specifications is proposed to 
permit the most judicious and efficacious handling of the final 
question both as a general matter and, in particular, with respect to 
the form of the articles that proposed the impeachment of President 
Richard Nixon. The latter did not follow the more familiar pattern of 
embodying an impeachable offense in an individual article but, in 
respect to the first and second of those articles, set out broadly 
based charges alleging constitutional improprieties followed by a 
recital of transactions illustrative or supportive of such charges. The 
wording of Articles I and II expressly provided that a conviction could 
be had thereunder if supported by `one or more of the' enumerated 
specifications. The general view of the Committee at that time was 
expressed by Senators Byrd and Allen, both of whom felt that division 
of the articles in question into potentially 14 separately voted 
specifications might `be time consuming and confusing, and a matter 
which could create great chaos and division, bitterness, and ill will . 
. .' ''
    The rule and its history suggest that the Senate currently operates 
under a norm of maximum individual Senatorial autonomy in reaching an 
overall unitary judgment as to guilt or innocence, without the 
interposition of potentially divisive antecedent motions seeking to 
clarify exactly what acts the Senate as a body has found the accused to 
have committed.
    It is possible to object to the proposed findings of fact as being 
inconsistent with Rule XXIII. The rejoinder to that objection, of 
course, is a version of what has already been stated: the findings need 
not be construed as ``dividing'' any article of impeachment, but rather 
as a motion antecedent to an eventual vote on the articles. Still, the 
findings do seem inconsistent with the spirit of Rule XXIII and with 
its evident intention to avoid divisive preliminary votes of this kind.
    Putting aside constitutional or rule-based objections to the 
proposed findings of fact, Rubenfeld-Bork make a very powerful 
practical argument that this bifurcation will have pernicious 
consequences. We are currently living through proof of how all-
consuming an impeachment and trial of a President can be. The country 
loses time and attention that could be devoted to constructive matters 
of public interest, trust in the ability of elected officials to work 
together by placing the Nation's business first is eroded, and the 
Presidency is placed under a cloud of uncertainty during the pendency 
of the proceedings. Lowering the impeachment bar through the use of 
this bifurcated procedure would be unwise and, as suggested earlier, 
would most likely be viewed with alarm by the Framers who drafted the 
impeachment power into the Constitution.
    There is, finally, an argument that such findings would amount to 
an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. The risk that such findings 
would be found to be an unconstitutional ``trial by legislature'' is 
enhanced (a) by the fact that under some of the proposals, the finding 
would be that the President had violated the law; (b) by the fact that 
the findings would occur in the context of a Senate trial.
    Such Senate action could well have an adverse effect on President 
Clinton's bar membership. Bar rules disqualify individuals who have 
been convicted of perjury or obstructed justice. If those consequences 
followed from the Senate action, they could be construed as punishment, 
thus bringing the findings of fact within the constitutional 
prohibition on bills of attainder.--[Memorandum, 2/2/99]
                     impeachment rules, changes to
    The existing Senate Rules establish the basic contours of how an 
impeachment trial will proceed. Many questions remain open, however--
just as in civil cases, the federal rules of civil procedure provide 
the basic contours, but the actual route traveled by any trial depends 
upon the particular facts and law of each case, the motions that 
parties choose to bring, and, in general, the manner in which the 
parties choose to litigate the matter.
    This section highlights the major questions that deserve 
examination before the trial begins. It also discusses the available 
mechanisms for resolving outstanding procedural issues.
    Should any of the existing rules be modified? The existing Rules 
were last amended in 1986. Should the Senate wish to revise any of 
them, motions to do so would be in order on the first day and would be 
fully debatable. Once the actual trial begins motions are not 
debatable, and a motion to suspend, modify, or amend the rules would 
require unanimous consent. Before the trial begins (the period between 
the exhibition of the articles of impeachment and the presentation of 
opening statements by the parties), Senate precedent supports allowing 
debate on preliminary motions that relate to how the Senate will 
organize itself to conduct the trial. It appears that such motions are 
subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate, and not the limitations on 
debate contained in the impeachment Rules. Thus, they could be 
filibustered during the pre-trial stage. As a motion to suspend, 
modify, or amend the rules, any such motion would be subject to a 
heightened cloture requirement. Standing Rule XXII requires a two-
thirds vote to invoke cloture and end debate on a motion to suspend, 
modify, or amend the rules.
    The impeachment rules provide for the proceedings to be ``double-
tracked'' (with legislative business conducted in the morning session 
and the impeachment trial conducted in the afternoon). Even after the 
trial has commenced, then, a motion to suspend, modify, or amend could 
be made in a morning legislative session, but would be subject to 
filibuster with a two-thirds cloture requirement.--[Memorandum, 12/28/
98]
                         obstruction of justice
    The House relies on two different federal obstruction of justice 
statutes. The first, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1503, is the general obstruction of 
justice statute. The second, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1512(b), addresses witness 
tampering.
    A. Elements of the General Obstruction of Justice Statute
    To establish a violation of the general obstruction of justice 
statute (Sec.  1503), the government must prove each of the following:
          (1) that there was a pending judicial proceeding;
          (2) that the defendant knew this proceeding was pending; and
          (3) that the defendant corruptly influenced, obstructed, or 
        impeded the due administration of justice or endeavored to 
        corruptly influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration 
        of justice.
    The first two elements are straightforward. The third element is 
more complex. In general:
    ``Corruptly'' means to engage in an act voluntarily and 
deliberately for the purpose of improperly influencing, obstructing, or 
interfering with the administration of justice.
    ``Endeavor'' means that the defendant also knowingly and 
deliberately acted or made an effort which had a reasonable tendency to 
bring about the desired result of interfering with the administration 
of justice.
    The defendant must engage in misconduct that has the ``natural and 
probable effect'' of interfering with the due administration of 
justice. He need only ``endeavor'' to obstruct justice; he need not 
succeed.
    B. Elements of the Witness Tampering Statute
    To establish a violation of the witness tampering statute (Sec.  
1512(b)), the government must establish that the defendant:
          (1) knowingly
          (2) corruptly persuaded another person or attempted to do so, 
        or engaged in misleading conduct toward another person
          (3) with the intent--
                  to influence, delay, or prevent a witness's testimony 
                from being presented at official federal proceedings,
                  to cause or induce any person to withhold testimony 
                or physical evidence from an official federal 
                proceeding; or
                  to prevent a witness from reporting evidence of a 
                crime to federal authorities.
    Unlike the general obstruction of justice statute, the witness 
tampering statute does not require that the defendant's misconduct be 
committed during the pendency of federal proceedings. Thus, the 
defendant need not be aware of any pending or contemplated federal 
proceedings or investigations at the time he engages in his obstructive 
conduct. Nonetheless, it must be proved that the defendant intended by 
his prohibited conduct to obstruct a federal proceeding or the 
reporting of a federal crime.
    There is no judicial consensus as to the meaning of ``corrupt 
persuasion,'' but several courts have defined the term to mean that the 
defendant's attempts to persuade ``were motivated by an improper 
purpose.''
    The term ``misleading conduct'' is defined in 18 U.S.C. Sec.  1515 
to include (A) knowingly making a false statement; (B) intentionally 
omitting information from a statement and thereby causing a portion of 
such statement to be misleading, or intentionally concealing a material 
fact, and thereby creating a false impression by such statement; (C) 
with intent to mislead, knowingly submitting or inviting reliance on a 
writing or recording that is false, forged, altered, or otherwise 
lacking in authenticity.
    At least one court has held that a defendant violates the witness 
tampering statute when he tells a potential witness a false story as if 
the story were true, intending that the witness believe the story and 
testify to it before the grand jury.--[Memorandum, 1/15/99]
                                perjury
    Under federal law, a witness commits grand jury perjury if shown, 
when under oath before a federal grand jury, to have made a: knowingly 
false declaration that is of a material matter that the grand jury has 
the power to investigate. Proof only of an intent to mislead is not 
sufficient for a perjury conviction.
    ``Knowingly false declarations'' can be proved by evidence that the 
individual did not believe a declaration to be true at the time it was 
made.
    Only unambiguous questions can form the basis of perjury 
convictions. If a question can reasonably be interpreted in multiple 
ways, perjury cannot be based only on the questioner's intended meaning 
and there must be evidence of what the person answering understood when 
responding.
    Grand jury perjury can not be based on an answer that was literally 
true even if misleading and nonresponsive to the question asked. The 
burden is on the questioner to identify evasive answers and press for 
clarity at the time rather than let it pass and charge perjury later.
    Grand jury perjury convictions can be based on the testimony of a 
single uncorroborated witness. And, even if no single statement can be 
shown to be knowingly false, perjury can be shown if the individual 
knowingly made multiple material declarations under oath that are 
``inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false.''
    A ``material matter'' for perjury convictions under federal law 
must have had some bearing on the substantive elements of the issues 
that the grand jury was convened to investigate and would have some 
bearing on influencing or impeding that investigation, regardless of 
whether the statement actually was misleading on a particular point.
    The Minority Views in the House Report argue that because the judge 
in the Jones sexual harassment case ruled in January 1998 that evidence 
relating to Monica Lewinsky was not ``essential to the core issues in 
that case,'' Jones' lawyers could not have introduced evidence about 
her relationship with the President in order to attack his credibility 
in that suit, so that his statements on the subject are not material 
under perjury law.--[Memorandum, 12/30/98]
                        president, indictment of
    The New York Times recently reported that Ken Starr and his staff 
have recently concluded that the Constitution does not prohibit them 
from indicting and prosecuting President Clinton while he is still in 
office. The independent counsel has a legitimate reason for seeking an 
indictment before the end of President Clinton's term. The grand jury 
that is currently impaneled and that has heard all the evidence will 
expire by August. If the Independent Counsel waits until the President 
leaves office, he will have to impanel a new grand jury and present 
evidence all over again.
    This memorandum reviews the constitutional issues that would be 
raised if a prosecutor were to attempt to indict and prosecute a 
sitting President. It concludes that the Constitution permits a 
prosecutor to indict a sitting President, but does not allow the 
prosecutor to proceed to prosecute the indictment until the President's 
term has expired. Although the Constitution does not forbid indictment 
of a sitting President, there are significant prudential arguments 
counseling against such a move. Moreover, there may be a statutory 
impediment to indicting the President.
                                i. text
    Until recently, numerous commentators interpreted the 
Constitution's text to prohibit criminal prosecution of any officer 
before the officer was impeached and removed. The only provision on 
point states, ``Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend 
further than to removal from office and disqualification to hold and 
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; 
but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to 
indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.'' Article 
I, section 3. This interpretation reads the phrase ``the party 
convicted shall nevertheless . . .'' to mean that only parties who have 
been convicted are subject to judicial process. In other words, 
impeachment and conviction are a prerequisite to judicial process.
    The better reading has always been that the Constitution's text is 
ambiguous. It can just as easily be understood to mean that impeachment 
and conviction, if that should occur first, are not a bar to judicial 
process. This interpretation has been vindicated by recent practice. 
The three judges impeached and convicted in the late 1980s were all 
indicted and prosecuted criminally first. In addition, Vice President 
Spiro Agnew was indicted while in office, as was sitting Vice President 
Aaron Burr in 1804. The provision cited does not distinguish between 
the President and other officers subject to impeachment. Thus, if the 
President is to be treated differently than other impeachable officers, 
it must be on some basis other than the Constitution's text.
                             ii. structure
    Even the most originalist minded constitutional scholars do not 
limit their arguments to those based on language alone. They also argue 
based on the structure of the document taken as a whole. Shifting the 
focus from text to structure, there is strong reason to conclude that 
the Constitution does not forbid indictment of a sitting President but 
that it does prohibit taking the further step of prosecuting him 
criminally.
    The Constitution structures the federal government by dividing it 
into three branches. In order to safeguard liberty, each of these 
branches must be fully functioning at all times. Anything that 
significantly impairs the President's ability to act as a check on the 
other branches may violate the Constitution's structural safeguards. By 
contrast, there are hundreds of district court judges. A criminal 
proceeding against one of them has only remote ramifications for the 
constitutional role of the judiciary as a collective institution.
    The constitutional status of the President is unique, and 
materially distinguishable from that of other impeachable officers, 
such as district court judges or even the Vice President. First, the 
President, of course, is the head of one of the three constitutional 
branches of government. The other branches have collective heads. The 
legislative branch is headed by the entire Congress, while the 
judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court. To indict and prosecute the 
President is in this sense the constitutional equivalent of indicting 
and prosecuting the entire Congress or the entire Supreme Court.
    Second, the presidency is a uniquely consuming office. Its occupant 
is perpetually on duty. Nearly every President from George Washington 
through George Bush has expressed just how consuming the office is. For 
example, Lyndon Johnson related that ``Of the 1,885 nights I was 
President there were not many when I got to sleep before 1 or 2 a.m. 
and there were few mornings when I didn't wake up by 6 or 6:30.'' The 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which provides for 
Presidential succession in the case of disability, recognizes not only 
how consuming the office is, but how critical it is that the office be 
filled at all times.
    Third, the President acts as the embodiment of the Nation on the 
international stage and even in domestic matters. As Justice Robert 
Jackson reminded us, the Presidential office locates the executive 
power ``in a single head in whose choice the whole Nation has a part, 
making him the focus of public hopes and expectations. In drama, 
magnitude and finality his decisions so far overshadow any others that 
almost alone he fills the public eye and ear.''
    Against this structural argument stand rule of law considerations. 
The continuing vitality of the rule of law as a fundamental principle 
requires that the President be subject to law as are all citizens. This 
commitment is voiced in the President's constitutional duty to ``take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed.'' The primary purpose of 
this provision is to make it clear that the President, unlike the King 
of England, has no ``dispensing power,'' that is, no power to declare a 
law inapplicable to himself or anyone else. Similarly, the courts have 
placed great weight on the integrity of the criminal justice system. In 
a variety of executive privilege cases, the courts have placed a great 
premium on according prosecutors access to evidence and on preserving 
evidence.
    Determining whether the Constitution permits either indictment or 
prosecution of a sitting President requires balancing these 
considerations.
      punishments upon conviction of high crimes and misdemeanors
    If the Senate convicts the President of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, the Constitution requires that he be removed from office. 
``The President--shall be removed from office upon impeachment for and 
conviction of--high crimes and misdemeanors.'' The Constitution allows 
the Senate to impose an additional punishment upon convicting the 
President; it may disqualify the President from holding any office of 
honor, trust or profit. Odd as it sounds, this disqualification 
probably does not apply to membership in the House of Representatives 
or the Senate. This is because the text of the Constitution, in several 
clauses, makes it clear that members of Congress are not ``officers.'' 
The very first impeachment trial proceeded against Senator Blount. 
Senator Blount was acquitted and many Senators refused to convict on 
the basis of their constitutional interpretation that a Senator is not 
an officer and so is not subject to impeachment.--[Memorandum, 12/28/
98]
          * * * * * * *
    Very early in the Senate's history, the Senate did in fact separate 
these two votes, notably in the case of Judge John Pickering. Pickering 
was charged with drunkenness, among other things, but not with any 
crimes. The Senate voted separately on whether he was guilty under the 
articles and then on whether or not he should be removed from office. 
(They voted to convict and to remove.)
    This procedure might signal that the Senate believed that in an 
impeachment trial a person could be found guilty by the Senate of 
offenses that did not rise to the level of ``treason, bribery, or other 
high crimes and misdemeanors.'' Under that interpretation, the second 
vote would be necessary to establish whether or not the offenses 
justified removal from office. However, this possible interpretation of 
the trial procedure was repudiated in the 1936 impeachment trial of 
Judge Halstead Ritter, when the chair ruled that removal followed 
automatically from a finding of guilty, so that a separate vote on 
removal was not in order. The ruling was based on the text of Article 
II, Section 4, of the Constitution which provides that ``The President 
[and other civil officers] shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and 
misdemeanors.''
    The dominant view of constitutional scholars is that the chair's 
ruling in the Ritter case was correct. Notice that there are two 
significant components of the Ritter interpretation: (1) the President, 
vice President or other civil officers can only be impeached for 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' and (2) 
removal then follows by operation of Constitutional law upon 
conviction.--[Memorandum, 2/2/99]
                         role of chief justice
    The Chief Justice of the United States is the Presiding Officer 
over the Senate's deliberations when the President has been impeached. 
His role is loosely analogous to that of a trial judge, but with less 
ultimate authority. He directs preparations for the trial, as well as 
the trial proceedings themselves. Under the precedent of the Johnson 
trial, the Chief Justice can make rulings on all evidentiary and 
procedural motions and objections, although he can also refer them 
directly to the Senate for its determination (this was in fact Chief 
Justice Chase's practice on evidentiary motions made during the Johnson 
trial). His rulings can be overruled by majority vote of the Senators 
present and voting.
    The Constitution dictates that the Chief Justice acts as the 
presiding officer during an impeachment trial of the President. The 
extent and content of his role is subject to determination by the 
Senate. There could be sentiment to expand his powers, such as by 
making him the chair of a Rule XI committee, on the theory that the 
Chief Justice will be non-partisan and impartial. Other powers that 
might be granted to the Chief Justice could include authority to 
conduct pre-trial proceedings or to oversee settlement negotiations. If 
the Chief Justice is perceived as impartial, his rulings on evidence 
and other motions will carry great weight and place a heavy burden on 
anyone seeking to overrule them. On the other hand, a determined 
majority can substantially minimize the effect of the Chief Justice on 
the proceedings by reversing his rulings and refusing to grant him 
powers beyond the inherent powers of the presiding officer.--
[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                         role of house managers
    The House of Representatives appoints a delegation of its own 
members to serve as prosecutors of the impeachment. These managers 
exhibit the articles of impeachment and perform all functions normally 
performed by a prosecutor. They make an opening and closing statement 
on the case, decide what evidence to present and what witnesses to 
call, subject to the Senate's decision to issue a subpoena to compel 
attendance of involuntary witnesses. The managers lead examination of 
witnesses they offer and cross-examine witnesses called by the 
President's counsel. They may also make procedural, evidentiary, and 
other motions.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                      role of president's counsel
    The President may choose an attorney or agent to present his 
defense. These attorneys perform the same functions in defense of the 
President as the House Managers perform in behalf of the impeachment. 
Neither the President's Counsel nor the House Managers may appeal a 
ruling of the Chief Justice. Only a member of the Senate may do that.--
[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                           role of the senate
    [The constitutional text, the Framers' understanding, and our 
constitutional practices] Provide important anchors for any impeachment 
inquiry, but they do not resolve all questions of scope that may arise. 
Much remains to be worked out--and only to be worked out--in the 
context of particular circumstances and allegations.
    As Hamilton explained in the Federalist No. 65, impeachment ``can 
never be tied down by . . . strict rules, either in the delineation of 
the offence by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the 
judges. . . .''
    After all of the legal research, we are still left with the 
realization that the power to convict for impeachment constitutes an 
``awful discretion.''
    This brings us directly to the Senate's role. To state it bluntly: 
I believe the role of the Senate is to resolve all the remaining 
questions. Let me elaborate.
    The Senate's role as final interpreter of impeachments was 
recognized from the beginning of the republic. For example, to refer 
again to Joseph Story, after he devoted almost fifty sections of his 
commentaries to various disputed questions about the impeachment power, 
he concluded that the final decision on the unresolved issues ``may be 
reasonably left to the high tribunal, constituting the court of 
impeachment.''
    The court of impeachment he refers to is the United States Senate. 
Similarly, the Federalist Papers refer to Senators as the judges of 
impeachment.
    Speaking of the Senate as the jury in impeachment trials is perhaps 
a more common analogy these days, but the judge analogy is more 
accurate.
    In impeachment trials, the Senate certainly does sit as a finder of 
fact, as would a jury. But it also sits as a definer of the applicable 
standards, as would a judge.
    The Senate, in other words, determines not only whether the accused 
has performed the acts that form the basis for the House's Articles of 
Impeachment, but also whether those actions justify removal from 
office.
    Once again we find support for this view from the country's 
history. In 2 of the first 3 impeachments brought forward from the 
House to the Senate, the Senate acquitted the accused.
    In each of the two acquittals, however, the Senate did not disagree 
with the House on the facts. One case involved a Senator, William 
Blount, the other an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Samuel 
Chase. In neither one was there any question that the individuals had 
done the deeds that formed the basis of the House's Articles of 
Impeachment.
    In each case, however, the Senate concluded that the deeds were not 
sufficient to constitute valid grounds for impeachment and so they 
acquitted.
    Eventually, then, if the current impeachment proceeds, it will fall 
to the Senate to decide not only the facts, but the law, and to 
evaluate whether or not the specific actions of the President are 
sufficiently serious to warrant impeachment.
    The Framers intended that the Senate have as its objective doing 
that what was best for the country, taking context and circumstance 
fully into account.
    I should try to be as clear as I can be about this point, because 
the media discussion has come close to missing it. It seems to be 
widely assumed that if the President committed perjury, then he must be 
impeached and convicted.
    Conversely, you may think that unless it can be proven that the 
President committed perjury or violated other laws, impeachment cannot 
occur.
    Both statements are wrong. Not all crimes are impeachable, and not 
every impeachable offense is a crime.
    The Senate could decline to convict even if the President has 
committed perjury, if it concluded that under the circumstances, this 
perjury did not constitute a sufficiently serious breach of duty to 
warrant removal of this President. On the other hand, the Senate could 
convict the President of an impeachable offense even if it were not a 
violation of the criminal law. For instance, if the Senate concluded 
that the President had committed abuses of power sufficiently grave, it 
need not find any action to amount to a violation of some criminal 
statute.--[Speech, 10/2/98]
          * * * * * * *
    The Senators have a multifaceted role that defies a simple label. 
They act in part as a jury, which considers evidence and makes the 
ultimate determination of whether to convict or acquit the President. 
This role explains the limitations that the rules impose on the ability 
of Senators to debate or discuss motions and evidence in open session.
    Senators also act as judges, with authority to decide whether a 
ruling by the Chief Justice should stand. This law interpreting role is 
also a component of the ultimate decision on conviction or acquittal. 
Senators must determine not only whether the factual allegations 
against the President are true, they must also determine whether the 
facts alleged, if true, represent a high crime and misdemeanor.
    Senators may also take actions that resemble those typically 
undertaken by counsel for the parties. They may propound questions 
(though only in writing) of witnesses or of counsel; they may make 
objections to questions by counsel or to evidence sought to be 
introduced; and they may make any motion that a party may make.
    The Senate has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses by 
instructing the Chief Justice to issue subpoenas and to enforce 
obedience to its orders. The Senate also has authority to punish 
summarily contempts of and disobedience to its orders, although the 
rules of impeachment do not specify the penalties it may impose. Under 
the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Senate can also refer a contempt 
citation to the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for 
prosecution pursuant to 2 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  191-194 for criminal 
prosecution.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
                            trial, nature of
    The Constitution assigns the Senate the sole power to try all 
impeachments. This power imposes upon the Senate a duty to adjudicate 
every case in which the House of Representatives impeaches a civil 
officer of the United States. The Framers were deeply concerned that 
impeachment could become a partisan tool used to gain control and 
influence over civil officers, and the President in particular. They 
entrusted to the Senate the role of adjudicating impeachments because 
the Senate's structurally conferred capacity for deliberation, 
independence, and impartiality would allow it to act as a check against 
partisanship. The Constitution fortifies the Senate in this role by 
providing that conviction requires a vote of two-thirds of the members 
present.
    The Constitution, however, does not define the Senate's power to 
``try'' impeachments and appears to leave broad discretion for the 
Senate to interpret it as allowing whatever method of inquiry and 
examination is best suited to a given case. Justice White declared 
emphatically that ``the Senate has very wide discretion in specifying 
impeachment trial procedures. . . .'' The constitutional power, and 
corresponding duty, to try impeachments does not absolutely require the 
full Senate or a committee to take live witness testimony subject to 
cross-examination. The Senate has routinely entertained and voted on 
motions for summary adjudication. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
that the Senate would be constitutionally required to hold live 
evidentiary proceedings in every conceivable impeachment case. If, for 
example, the House were to impeach an official who is not a civil 
officer, it would be absurd to construe the Constitution to require the 
Senate to go forward with an evidentiary proceeding. Similarly, if the 
House were to impeach a civil officer on the grounds of misconduct that 
is not properly considered a high crime or misdemeanor, no 
constitutional purpose is served by an evidentiary hearing.
    Even if an impeachment meets all of the constitutional criteria to 
invoke a Senate trial, evidentiary proceedings may be unnecessary. It 
is well-established that the House Managers charged with prosecuting 
the impeachment may introduce the record of other proceedings as 
substantive evidence in the Senate trial. The House Managers have 
independent discretion over their prosecution of the case, and may 
decide to rest their case on the documentary record. In addition, the 
impeached defendant may choose to present no affirmative evidence in 
his defense. Where the parties have decided that the documentary record 
is sufficiently encompassing to allow adjudication, the Constitution 
does not require the Senate to ferret out additional evidence.
    Strong support for summary adjudication as a faithful discharge of 
the Senate's constitutional duty to try impeachments can also be found 
in the operation of the federal judiciary. The constitution guarantees 
``the right of trial by jury'' in ``suits at common law.'' There is a 
tension between the right to trial by jury and summary adjudication by 
the court. Where a federal court grants summary judgment or dismisses a 
lawsuit, for example because it fails to state a claim, there is no 
trial at all, let alone a trial by jury. Nevertheless, the Supreme 
Court has upheld the authority of the federal courts to grant motions 
to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. There would seem to be 
even less concern regarding summary adjudication in the context of a 
Senate impeachment trial. This is because the Senate acts as both judge 
(finder of law) and juror (finder of fact) so there is no concern about 
the proper allocation of the adjudicative function between judge and 
jury.
    The Constitution imposes upon the Senate a duty to try impeachments 
so that the Senate can act as a check against partisan abuse of the 
impeachment process. Fidelity to the Constitution requires the Senate 
carefully to interpret the law of impeachment as set forth in the 
Constitution and to apply that law to the facts and circumstances of 
every impeachment approved by the House of Representatives. As with the 
federal judiciary, this adjudicative duty, however, does not require 
the Senate to discover new evidence or to hold evidentiary proceedings 
where the record does not warrant.--[Memorandum, 12/22/98]
          * * * * * * *
           i. the history of presidential impeachment trials
    We have had exactly one impeachment trial of a President, Andrew 
Johnson, in 1868. This resulted in his acquittal by a single vote. In 
1974, the House Judiciary Committee voted to send articles of 
impeachment with respect to President Richard Nixon to the House floor, 
but President Nixon resigned shortly thereafter, and the articles were 
never voted on by the full House.
    However, fourteen other impeachment trials have been held in the 
Senate over the country's history. In preparation for these trials, 
almost all of which involved federal judges, the Senate has developed a 
set of standing Rules of Procedure and Practice for such trials, as 
well as a body of precedent concerning questions of procedure that have 
arisen and been answered in previous trials. These rules and precedent 
provide a good basic outline to how the trial of President Clinton will 
proceed in the Senate, unless they are altered or amended prior to the 
beginning of President Clinton's trial.
           ii. current senate rules of procedure and practice
    Senate procedures while hearing an impeachment are strikingly 
different from those that operate during normal legislative and 
executive business. Senators are combinations of judges and jurors. 
Senators take an oath to do ``impartial justice.'' They cannot debate 
or discuss matters in open session. They are expected to commit 
questions to writing and send them to the Presiding Officer. The Senate 
when sitting to consider impeachment is a very different body than the 
Senate we are used to seeing on C-SPAN.
    Major points to bear in mind:
    The trial and its rules take precedence over normal business. Once 
the trial begins, the rules set forth a schedule for continuing the 
trial until conclusion. The fundamental provisions are Rule III, 
stating that the Senate shall continue in session from day to day 
(Sundays excepted) until the trial is concluded, and Rule XIII, stating 
that the trial proceedings shall begin at 12 noon each day, unless 
otherwise provided by the Senate.
    Majority rules. Motions and objections during the proceedings are 
governed by majority vote.
    There are few opportunities to filibuster. Unlike the normal 
Senate, almost all trial motions, decisions, and orders are resolved 
under strict time limits--although these time limits would not prevent 
a determined effort to prolong the trial through repeated motions, 
whether by counsel or by a group of Senators. In fact, during the trial 
itself, motions, objections or challenges to rulings by the chair 
raised by Senators (which must be submitted in writing to the Presiding 
Officer) are voted on without debate at all, unless the Senate elects 
to go into closed session. In that case, each Senator is entitled to 
speak once for no more than 10 minutes.
    Where the impeachment Rules are silent, the Standing Rules of the 
Senate apply.  Precedents extending back at least to the Johnson 
impeachment support this.
      iii. how might the matter be resolved without a formal trial?
    A. The Senate's duty to try the impeachment. The Constitution 
provides that ``the Senate shall have sole power to try all 
impeachments.'' Some consider this provision to impose a duty upon the 
Senate to try or adjudicate all impeachments. Even if the Constitution 
imposes such a duty, the Senate has not understood this duty to 
adjudicate as necessarily requiring a formal trial. There is precedent 
for the Senate considering dispositive motions that would allow the 
Senate to render a judgment without holding a trial. (In the 
impeachment proceedings against Judges Ritter, Claiborne, and Nixon, 
the Senate entertained motions to strike articles of impeachment or to 
summarily adjudicate the matter.) Although such a motion is not 
specifically discussed in the impeachment rules, the Senate has not 
viewed dispositive motions as seeking to suspend, modify, or amend the 
rules. As a result, dispositive motions are ordinary trial motions 
subject to the limits on debate set forth in the impeachment rules and 
governed by simple majority vote.
    An additional method available to resolve the matter is adjournment 
sine die. In the case of Andrew Johnson, the Senate voted on three 
articles of impeachment, acquitting on each. Rather than vote on the 
remaining eight articles, the Senate simply adjourned the impeachment 
proceedings sine die. The impeachment rules allow for a vote to adjourn 
sine die. Adjournment sine die does not specifically pass judgment on 
the articles of impeachment and so may not be satisfactory to those who 
consider the Senate duty-bound to try the impeachment.
    B. Different motions to adjudicate the matter without an 
evidentiary trial. Several different motions would seem possible, some 
drawing on analogies to judicial proceedings.
    1. A motion to dismiss would assert that the articles of 
impeachment fail as a matter of law to state actions upon which a 
conviction may constitutionally be based. Such an assertion could be 
based upon the claim that the articles do not state ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors.'' Because the articles accuse President Clinton of 
committing perjury before a grand jury and of obstructing justice 
(among other things), a ``motion to dismiss'' would assert that such 
actions can never support conviction for high crimes or misdemeanors. 
Additionally, a ``motion to dismiss'' could be a vehicle for the 
President to raise the contention that the articles of impeachment 
lapsed when the 105th Congress adjourned sine die.
    While there are no Senate rules governing the timing of motions, 
analogy to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would require a motion 
to dismiss to be made before the President submits his answer to the 
summons, or along with his answer to the summons.
    2. In contrast to the motion to dismiss, a motion for summary 
judgment asserts (1) that the parties agree on all material facts and 
(2) that those facts compel judgment for the moving party. A party 
submitting a motion for summary judgment is agreeing to have the 
dispute finally adjudicated on the basis of the facts asserted in his 
moving papers. The opposing party has the option of filing a cross 
motion for summary judgment or of objecting that the parties are not in 
agreement as to all material facts and that a trial is required on the 
disputed facts. If the opposing party chooses the first course of 
action (and this could be done by prior agreement between the parties), 
then the Senate could enter judgment in the case without holding any 
evidentiary trial.
    On a motion for summary judgment, the Senate by majority vote could 
issue a judgment for the President if it concluded that the undisputed 
facts fail to establish the existence of a high crime or misdemeanor 
warranting the President's removal from office. Because this motion 
rests on a view of the undisputed facts in the specific case, granting 
the President's motion for summary judgment would mean only that the 
specific perjury and obstructions charged in these articles of 
impeachment do not warrant conviction and removal from office (or that 
the facts failed to establish that these offenses had actually been 
committed). It would not imply that perjury or obstruction of justice 
could never serve as grounds adequate to impeach, convict, and remove a 
President from office.
    3. The trial might also be ended by a motion for a directed 
verdict. Such a motion in civil litigation is brought after the 
plaintiff has concluded his case, and before the defendant mounts a 
defense. The motion asserts that the plaintiff's evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the claim, and that no reasonable fact finder 
would disagree. Were the House Managers to decide to submit the 
impeachment to the Senate based solely on evidence already gathered by 
Starr, the President could bring a ``motion for a directed verdict'' 
prior to an evidentiary trial involving any live witness testimony.
    4. Finally, the Senate's own precedents supply the possibility of a 
fourth option, a motion for summary disposition. Such a motion might be 
entertained as an alternative to any of the motions just discussed, in 
order to avoid contending with the technicalities of such motions.
    In the impeachment trial of Judge Harry Claiborne, for example, the 
House Managers introduced a motion for summary disposition. Both sides 
argued this motion without invoking the federal rules of civil 
procedure or judicial opinions relating to summary dispositions. The 
parties disputed only whether the facts warranted further evidentiary 
proceedings in the Senate or if the matter could be decided solely on 
the basis of Judge Claiborne's conviction for tax evasion. The Senate 
considered the motion without reference to judicial standards.
    This approach is consistent with the Senate's position that it is 
not bound by the federal rules of civil procedure. Removing the motion 
from the technical categories and requirements under those rules allows 
each Senator the discretion to consider whether additional evidentiary 
proceedings, including live testimony, will serve the public interest.
    C. Should the Senate appoint a committee? If the matter is not 
resolved on a summary basis, Rule XI provides that the Senate can 
appoint a committee to ``receive evidence and take testimony'' rather 
than having the Senate as a whole do so. This procedure has been 
employed in the case of trials of federal judges, and has been 
sustained by the Supreme Court. Such a committee would not and could 
not decide the case, but it could assemble the evidence submitted, 
prepare a transcript of all testimony and submit it to the Senate. The 
committee meetings could be televised so that noncommittee Senators 
would be able to watch them as they occurred, and videotapes could also 
be prepared for subsequent review. A number of the early proponents of 
what is now Senate Rule XI option are on record stating their view that 
such a committee should not be used for a presidential trial.
    Composition of a Rule XI committee would be very important. 
Traditionally, these committees have been composed of twelve members, 
six from each party with the committee chair chosen from the committee 
members in the majority party. The Chair exercises the same role within 
the committee that the Chief Justice fulfills in the full Senate. This 
is significant because the decisions of the chair may be reversed only 
by a majority vote. If the votes in committee are on straight party 
lines, the ruling of the chair will be upheld in every instance. A 
complicating factor in a presidential impeachment is the requirement 
that the Chief Justice preside. This may require that the Chief Justice 
serve as the chair of a rule XI committee if one is appointed. In this 
event, the rulings of the Chief Justice would be upheld on any party-
line vote.--[Memorandum, 12/28/98]
          * * * * * * *
    House Managers have asserted repeatedly that live witness testimony 
will resolve discrepancies between the testimony of witnesses, and 
therefore they ought to be called. There are several points to be made 
against this point of view.
    Demeanor evidence is notoriously unreliable. Recall, for example, 
Alger Hiss/Whittaker Chambers. Some people were convinced by one side, 
some people by the other.
    Demeanor evidence is not necessarily dispositive, in any event. 
Both witnesses can come across as reliable, honest and trustworthy. 
Witnesses often give credible performances while dissembling.
    The House Managers are poorly situated to claim the necessity of 
hearing from live witnesses in order to resolve credibility issues. The 
House Judiciary Committee heard from no live witnesses, except Ken 
Starr, and yet the managers have had no difficulty in deciding all 
credibility disputes against the President or anyone giving testimony 
favorable to his story.
    Any gains from live witnesses need to be assessed against the 
costs. The costs will come when the Senate chamber descends into the 
facts of the case with the specificity that will come from live 
testimony.
    For example, one prominent disagreement that the House Managers 
have cited is that between President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky regarding 
whether the President ever touched Ms. Lewinsky's breasts or genitalia. 
If both witnesses are called and reiterate their prior testimony, the 
Senate will certainly get the opportunity to observe their demeanor. 
This might shed some additional light on the question, but it probably 
won't. The possibility of securing the additional credibility data must 
be weighed against the serious negative ramifications such proceedings 
would likely have.
                             a. indictment
    The Supreme Court engaged in a similar balancing exercise in 
deciding Clinton v. Jones. In that case, the court held that requiring 
the President to submit to judicial process in a civil case and go 
through an entire civil trial would not so damage the presidency as to 
justify interfering with the ordinary judicial process that vindicates 
the rule of law. Considering only indictment, as distinct from 
prosecution of a criminal trial, seems to impose less of a burden on 
the President. Indictment alone imposes no demands on the President's 
time.
    An attempt to distinguish indictment could proceed on two bases. 
First, the President is apt to be more concerned about being criminally 
convicted than found civilly liable. Thus, an indictment could be a 
greater distraction from the President's duties than is a civil suit. 
Second, criminal indictment, unlike filing a civil complaint, 
stigmatizes the President.
    Each of these distinctions is subject to dispute. As the Paula 
Jones suit itself demonstrates, a civil case can be extremely 
distracting. If a criminal indictment is more distracting, it seems 
doubtful that it is so much more distracting as to be constitutionally 
significant. A distinction based on stigma seems particularly weak in 
this case.
    President Clinton has been impeached. Correctly or not, the House 
of Representatives has construed this impeachment as analogous to a 
grand jury indictment. It is thus not obvious that an actual criminal 
indictment would add materially to the stigma the President has already 
suffered.
    Even accepting these grounds of distinction, the independent 
counsel may seek a sealed indictment. A sealed indictment would not be 
made known either publicly or to the President. If an indictment 
remains sealed until the President leaves office, it is difficult to 
see how it could either distract the President or stigmatize him.
                             b. prosecution
    Prosecution presents a different matter. Unlike an indictment with 
nothing more, proceeding to an actual prosecution would place 
significant physical and temporal burdens on the President. Preparing 
for trial and then actually presenting a defense would consume the 
President's time and attention over a lengthy period. During the 
pendency of criminal proceedings, the President would repeatedly face a 
choice between spending the time necessary to mount a meaningful 
defense and devoting time to fulfilling his constitutional and 
statutory duties. Even if the President were to choose to spend no time 
on his defense, it is difficult to imagine that his mind could be fully 
focused on his official duties.
    To so stigmatize and distract the President would seriously 
undermine his ability to act as a check on the legislative branch. It 
would also impose significant costs in terms of the nation's standing 
internationally.
    The Supreme Court's decision in Clinton v. Jones could be taken to 
support subjecting the President to criminal prosecution while in 
office. In that case, the President had argued that the civil lawsuit 
should be stayed until the President's term in office expired. He based 
this position on concerns that the demands of defending a civil lawsuit 
would impermissibly interfere with his ability to discharge his 
official duties. Admittedly, it is unlikely that defending against a 
criminal prosecution is any more time consuming than defending a civil 
lawsuit.
    There are, however, several crucial distinctions between a civil 
and a criminal lawsuit. In the Jones case, the Supreme Court emphasized 
that the burden imposed on the President could be minimized through 
proper case management by the trial judge. A court does not have the 
same broad array of options available in a criminal proceedings. 
Perhaps most significantly, the options for settling the suit without a 
trial are quite different. President Clinton settled the Paula Jones 
case by making a cash payment with no admission of wrongdoing. The 
rough equivalent of settlement in a criminal proceeding is a plea 
bargain. Such a ``settlement,'' however, requires the defendant to 
admit to some criminality. As such, there is far greater pressure on 
the president to proceed to trial in a criminal prosecution as opposed 
to a civil prosecution. Moreover, the President's attendance at a civil 
trial is not nearly so crucial as is his attendance at a criminal 
prosecution. The Sixth Amendment expresses the constitutional 
commitment to allowing a criminal defendant's presence at trial. 
Finally, consider what follows a judgment in a criminal trial as 
opposed to a civil trial.
    The Paula Jones suit threatened the President with nothing more 
than an assessment of monetary compensation. An adverse verdict at a 
criminal trial threatens imprisonment. It is clear that the 
Constitution does not allow the judiciary to order the imprisonment of 
the President. Thus, at the very least, sentencing would have to be 
stayed until the President leaves office.
    Extending the holding in Clinton v. Jones to cover criminal 
prosecutions is subject to an additional objection. The course of 
events since the Court rendered that decision casts significant doubt 
upon the conclusions the Court drew in that case. In Clinton v. Jones, 
the Supreme Court doubted that the civil lawsuit would consume much 
time or attention of the President. It could not be plainer that this 
prediction was wrong. While there is no reason to believe that the 
Court is considering overruling Clinton v. Jones, there is very 
powerful reason to apply the practical lessons we have learned since 
that decision to any claim for extending the Clinton v. Jones holding 
to criminal prosecutions. In light of all that has occurred since that 
ruling, it is wildly implausible to contend that a criminal proceeding 
against the President would not significantly disrupt his ability to 
fulfill his constitutional and statutory duties.
    Against this significant disruption is concern for the rule of law. 
As a practical matter, it is critical to recall that sentencing would 
be stayed until the President leaves office. Given this, it is doubtful 
that staying the trial as well would add significant concern from the 
standpoint of the rule of law. It is important to bear in mind what the 
rule of law requires. It demands that similarly situated citizens be 
treated similarly. In light of the President's unique constitutional 
role, it is error to contend that the President must be treated 
identically to a private citizen. The rule of law must encompass the 
fundamental law of the Constitution, and account for the peculiar role 
of the President within the constitutional structure. Accommodating 
that role by staying criminal proceedings until the President is out of 
office respects the rule of law as long as the President is subject to 
criminal prosecution once out of office. Under these circumstances, the 
President is subject to liability in the same way as any citizen.
    The New York Times reports that these conclusions accord with the 
view of most scholars. According to the Times, most scholars accept 
that the President may be indicted while in office, but that he may not 
be prosecuted. This assessment of the state of scholarship is probably 
accurate, but there is significant dissent as to each conclusion. In 
other words, the scholarship does not betray a consensus.
                             iii. practice
    There is very little practical experience dealing with the question 
of indicting or prosecuting a sitting President. The only precedent is 
the investigation of President Richard Nixon. The biographer to special 
counsel Archibald Cox reports that Cox had concluded that the 
separation of powers forbids indicting a sitting President. Cox' 
successor, Leon Jaworski, decided against seeking to indict President 
Nixon, although his decision was based on prudential considerations and 
he did not reach a certain constitutional interpretation.
    In 1972, Vice President Spiro Agnew argued to the Supreme Court 
that a sitting Vice President could not be indicted. Then-Solicitor 
General Robert Bork submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the United 
States in which he argued that a sitting Vice President could be 
impeached, but a sitting President could not be. Judge Bork repeated 
this position yesterday in an op-ed published in the New York Times.
                              iv. history
    A number of framers made statements that appear to assume that the 
President may not be indicted while in office. In The Federalist 
Alexander Hamilton claimed that the President would be ``liable to be 
impeached, tried, and removed from office; and would afterwards be 
liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.'' 
In two other numbers of The Federalist Hamilton repeated this sequence 
and that criminal process comes ``after'' impeachment and conviction. 
In none of these passages, however, is Hamilton addressing the specific 
question of whether the President could be subject to criminal process 
while in office. It may represent no more than Hamilton's assumption as 
to what the ordinary sequence would in fact be.
    Another framer, Gouverneur Morris, explained that the Constitution 
vests the power to try impeachments in the Senate rather than the 
judiciary because the judiciary would ``try the President after the 
trial of impeachment.'' In the First Congress, Vice President John 
Adams and Senator (later Justice) Oliver Ellsworth expressed the view 
that ``the President personally is not . . . subject to any [judicial] 
process whatever.'' But their view was disputed, for example by Senator 
William Maclay.
    The Supreme Court reviewed this historical record in Clinton v. 
Jones. They concluded that history provides no answer to this question. 
These comments reflect the view of only a few, albeit influential, 
individuals and either were not made in the context of whether a 
sitting President could be indicted or were disputed.
                      v. prudential considerations
    Even if the Constitution does not prohibit indictment, that does 
not mean there are not powerful prudential arguments against 
indictment. Brett Kavanaugh, who was Associate Independent Counsel in 
Ken Starr's office for three years, put this argument most succinctly 
in a recent article he published in the Georgetown Law Journal:
    The President is not simply another individual. He is unique. He is 
the embodiment of the federal government and the head of a political 
party. If he is to be removed, the entire government likely would 
suffer, [and] the military or economic consequences to the nation could 
be severe. . . . Those repercussions, if they are to occur, should not 
result from the judgment of a single prosecutor--whether it be the 
Attorney General or special counsel--and a single jury. Prosecution or 
nonprosecution of a President is, in short, inevitably and unavoidably 
a political act.
    Thus, as the Constitution suggests, the decision about the 
President while he is in office should be made where all great national 
political judgments in our country should be made--in the Congress of 
the United States.
    There is an additional, closely related, consideration--protecting 
Congress' constitutional impeachment power. If an independent counsel 
can indict a sitting President, this act alone tends to force Congress' 
hand with respect to impeachment. The mere fact of an indictment is an 
additional factor that generates some pressure to impeach and convict a 
sitting President. That pressure is even more coercive in the context 
of a prosecution and verdict than of indictment alone.
                    vi. department of justice policy
    Professor David Strauss recently argued that there is no need to 
address the constitutional issues because the independent counsel is 
statutorily barred from indicting a sitting President. The United 
States Code instructs that the independent counsel ``shall except where 
not possible comply with the written or other established policies of 
the Department of Justice respecting enforcement of the criminal 
laws.'' 28 U.S.C. 594(f). Professor Strauss argues Judge Bork's Supreme 
Court brief in the Spiro Agnew case established the Department's policy 
on indicting a sitting President and that this policy is confirmed in 
the practice of special counsels Cox and Jaworski.
    This is a strong argument, but there is a response: the brief in 
the Agnew case represents not a policy but an interpretation of the 
Constitution. That interpretation, the response would continue, has 
been demonstrated to be in error by the subsequent decision in Clinton 
v. Jones. An article published by Ken Starr's advisor on constitutional 
law, Professor Ronald Rotunda, argues that Clinton v. Jones makes clear 
what had previously been obscure--namely that a sitting President may 
be indicted and prosecuted.--[Memorandum, 2/4/99]
                                 ______
                                 

       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Spencer Abraham

    Mr. ABRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice, in light of our time 
constraints, I would like to focus my remarks today primarily 
on the one issue--more than any other--that has arisen during 
our deliberations: namely, whether the President should be 
convicted if we find he committed the acts alleged in the 
articles.
    I believe this issue is not only central to the case at 
hand, it is also central to all future evaluations and 
applications of what we do here.
    In arguing for the President, White House lawyers have 
asserted that the threshold for Presidential removal must be 
very high--and I agree. At the same time, however, we must 
remember that there is an inverse relationship between the 
level at which we set the removal bar and the degree of 
Presidential misconduct we will accept.
    So, then, where do we set the bar?
    As we know, the Constitution says: ``The President, Vice 
President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall 
be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.''
    Now it has been suggested by some that a ``high Crime'' 
must be a truly heinous crime. But that interpretation is 
obviously wrong. Treason is certainly among the most heinous 
crimes. But bribery is not.
    Taking a bribe, like treason, is however, a uniquely 
serious act of misconduct by a public official. That suggests a 
different meaning for ``high Crime,'' one that is linked 
somehow to the fact that the person committing it holds public 
office.
    Alexander Hamilton's comment about the impeachment power, 
quoted by so many of us here, provides the clue. In Federalist 
65, Hamilton says: ``The subjects of its jurisdiction are those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, 
in other words, from the violation of some public trust.''
    The President's lawyers invoked this line, but in my view 
they misread it. They argued that what it means is that a 
President's conduct must involve misuse of official power if he 
is to be removed from office, but that is not what the 
Constitution demands, or what Hamilton's comment, fairly read, 
suggests. Otherwise, as has been noted, we would have to leave 
in office a President or a Federal judge who committed murder, 
so long as they did not use any powers of their office in doing 
so.
    Rather, as Hamilton's language connotes, and our own 
precedents in the judicial impeachment cases confirm, the 
connection the Constitution requires between an official's 
actions and functions is a more practical one: the official's 
conduct must demonstrate that he or she cannot be trusted with 
the powers of the office in question.
    This rule certainly encompasses official acts demonstrating 
unfitness for the office in question--but it also reaches 
beyond such acts.
    In my view, we need not determine the outer limits of this 
principle to decide the question before us today: whether the 
President's actions, as alleged in these articles, constitute a 
violation of a ``public trust'' as Hamilton uses the term.
    The answer to that question is plain when we consider the 
President's conduct in relation to his responsibilities.
    The President's role and status in our system of government 
are unique. The Constitution vests the executive power in the 
President, and in the President alone. That means he is the 
officer chiefly charged with carrying out our laws. Therefore, 
far more than any Federal judge, he holds the scales of justice 
in his own hands.
    In the wrong hands, that power can easily be transformed 
from the power to carry out the laws, into the power to bend 
them to one's own ends.
    The very nature of the Presidency guarantees that its 
occupant will face daily temptations to twist the laws for 
personal gain, for party benefit or for the advantage of 
friends.
    To combat these temptations, the Constitution spells out--
in no uncertain terms--that the President shall ``take care 
that the laws be faithfully executed,'' and the President's 
oath of office requires him to swear that he will do so.
    If he obstructed justice and tampered with witnesses in the 
Jones case, a Federal civil rights case in which he was the 
defendant, the President violated his oath and failed to 
perform the bedrock duty of his office. He did not faithfully 
execute the laws.
    A President who commits these acts thereby makes clear that 
he cannot be trusted to exercise the executive power lawfully 
in the future, to handle impartially such specific Presidential 
responsibilities as serving as the final arbiter on bringing 
Federal, civil, or criminal cases, or determining the content 
of Federal regulations--especially if, as will often be the 
case, he has a personal or a political interest in the outcome.
    Surely retaining a President in office under these 
circumstances constitutes exactly the type of threat to our 
government and its institutions so many have said must exist 
for conviction.
    That brings the President's alleged conduct squarely within 
the purview of our impeachment power, whose purpose, as 
described by Hamilton, is to deal with ``the violation of some 
public trust.''
    Furthermore, if the articles' allegations are true, how can 
we leave the executive power in the hands of a President who, 
through his false grand jury testimony, even attempted to 
obstruct and subvert the impeachment process itself?
    For this particular grand jury before which the President 
testified was not only conducting a criminal investigation; it 
was also charged, under congressional statute, with advising 
the House of Representatives as to whether it had received any 
substantial and credible information that might constitute 
grounds for impeachment.
    The framers placed the impeachment power in our 
Constitution as the ultimate safeguard to address misuse of the 
executive power.
    A President who commits perjury, intending to thwart an 
investigation that might otherwise lead to his impeachment, 
has, I believe, committed a quintessential ``high Crime.''
    Such conduct of necessity impedes, and could even preclude, 
Congress from fulfilling its constitutional duty to prevent the 
President from usurping power and engaging in unlawful conduct.
    To permit such behavior would set an unacceptable 
precedent, because it could, in the future, allow nullification 
of the impeachment process itself, rendering it meaningless.
    Hence, a President who acts to subvert what the framers 
viewed as the ultimate constitutional check on abuse of 
executive power, most certainly violates the public trust as 
defined by Hamilton.
    Throughout this discussion I have analyzed this case as 
though one or more of the underlying counts in each impeachment 
article were established. I recognize that not everyone has 
reached this conclusion--and I confess that I have spent 
countless hours attempting to make this determination of guilt 
or innocence on each article.
    However, after listening to and studying the evidence, I 
have concluded beyond any reasonable doubt that the President 
committed one or more of the acts alleged under each article. 
Time does not permit me to fully explain the basis for my 
conclusions. But, in my view, that is where the evidence 
inescapably points.
    In my opinion, there is no way that the President could 
have testified as he did in his Jones deposition concerning his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky, unless he believed Ms. 
Lewinsky would validate his false statements if called as a 
witness.
    The President may not have explicitly told her to lie, but 
when he called her on December 17, he did say, ``You can always 
say you were coming to see Betty or that you were bringing me 
letters.''
    To whom did he intend her to say this? They had already 
agreed on the use of these cover stories in nonlegal contexts. 
The only new audience was, clearly, the Jones court, and the 
President's comments that night were surely aimed at 
influencing Ms. Lewinsky's potential testimony before that 
court, if she were to be subpoenaed.
    That this was the President's intent, is confirmed by his 
own testimony in the Jones case. What did he say when asked if 
Ms. Lewinsky had come to see him? He said that Ms. Lewinsky had 
come to visit Betty Currie and perhaps deliver him papers.
    In my opinion, there is also no way you can refresh your 
memory by making assertions you know to be false to another 
person--as the President twice did to Betty Currie after that 
deposition. No, the purpose of those statements was to cause 
her to validate the false testimony he had just given, if she 
were to be subpoenaed.
    Finally, if you believe that was the President's intention, 
then you must conclude he committed material perjury later in 
his grand jury testimony, when in response to the question: 
``You are saying that your only interest in speaking with Ms. 
Currie in the days after your deposition was to refresh your 
own recollection?'' he answered with one word: ``Yes.''
    There is more.
    Fellow Senators, none of us asked for this task, but we 
must live with the consequences of our actions, not just on 
this administration but on our Nation for generations to come.
    That responsibility cannot be shirked. It has led me to a 
difficult but inexorable decision.
    I deeply regret that it is necessary for me to conclude 
that President William Jefferson Clinton committed obstruction 
of justice and grand jury perjury as charged in the articles of 
impeachment brought by the House, that these are ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors'' under our Constitution, and that therefore I 
must vote to convict him on these charges.
    I ask unanimous consent that a fuller opinion be printed in 
the Record.
    There being no objection, the opinion was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                   Opinion by Senator Spencer Abraham

    The President has been impeached on the grounds that he obstructed 
justice and tampered with witnesses in connection with a Federal civil 
rights suit in which he was the defendant, and that he committed 
perjury before a grand jury charged with investigating whether his 
previous conduct warranted prosecution or possible impeachment. It is 
our duty to determine whether the President did what the articles of 
impeachment charge and, if so, whether his actions were ``high Crimes 
and Misdemeanors'' that under our Constitution should bar him from 
further service in his office.
    In considering these questions, I have done my best to imagine that 
I was deciding them, not about a President of the opposing political 
party, with whom I disagree on many issues, but about a President of my 
own party. I have tried to imagine what I would do if confronted with 
the same evidence concerning a popular Republican President whose 
policies I strongly supported. I have tried to decide the case before 
me just as I would the case of such a President.
    Let me start with the facts.
    After a great deal of listening, research, and contemplation, I am 
compelled by the evidence to conclude that the President did engage in 
the conduct charged in both articles. In reaching this conclusion, I 
rely exclusively on those elements of the case that I believe have been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Because I believe these dictate my 
conclusion, I do not decide whether in an impeachment trial, the 
Constitution requires application of this highest of evidentiary 
standards, which governs in ordinary criminal cases, or whether it 
would also be proper for me to rely on any of the other conduct charged 
by the House, much of which I might well find proven under either of 
the lower civil law standards.
    Let me briefly outline the basis for my conclusions. I will start 
with the second article because the conduct giving rise to it actually 
occurred first.
    In my view, the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that, for 
over 11 months, from December 6, 1997, to November 13, 1998, when the 
President agreed to pay Paula Jones $850,000 to withdraw her sexual 
harassment lawsuit, the President engaged in a systematic course of 
obstructing justice and tampering with witnesses in Ms. Jones' case. 
There is no room for reasonable doubt that as part of this course of 
conduct the President made statements to Ms. Monica Lewinsky and Ms. 
Betty Currie that were intended to cause them to validate, through 
testimony he thought they could well be called upon to give, the false 
story he was planning to tell or had already told in his own 
deposition. These statements to Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie constitute 
the second and sixth Acts of obstruction and witness tampering charged 
by the House. There is also no room for reasonable doubt that the 
President supported efforts to conceal gifts he had given to Ms. 
Lewinsky after those gifts had been subpoenaed as evidence in that 
case. That constitutes the third act of obstruction charged by the 
House.
    As to the first article: I am convinced that the House has shown 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President perjured himself before 
the grand jury in two instances. First, he stated that his only purpose 
in talking to Ms. Currie in the days following his Jones deposition was 
to refresh his own recollection, thereby falsely claiming to the grand 
jury that he did not intend to tamper with her potential testimony if 
she were called as a witness in the Jones case. Second, he reaffirmed 
the veracity of his Jones deposition denial of ``sexual relations'' 
with Ms. Lewinsky, under the definition of that term approved by the 
court in that case. This was not merely a ``lie about sex'' to protect 
his family. By the time of his grand jury appearance, the President had 
already acknowledged to his family his improper relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. Before the grand jury, the President falsely asserted the 
truth of his earlier sworn statements for the sole purpose of 
protecting himself from possible prosecution or impeachment.
    In light of these conclusions, the final overriding issue is 
whether the President's actions constitute ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' requiring his removal from office under article II, 
section 4 of the Constitution. As has been acknowledged on both sides, 
reasonable people can differ on this question. And indeed it is only on 
this issue, whether the President must be removed, that Americans are 
consequentially divided. A decided majority of Americans agree that the 
President committed the crimes alleged in at least one of the articles. 
And in their hearts I believe a significant majority of my colleagues 
do as well.
    The public, like us, is in disagreement over what the consequences 
should be. A clear majority oppose removal, but for a variety of 
reasons--ranging from a feeling that the President does not deserve to 
be removed, to a concern not to endanger current economic conditions, 
to a preference for the President over the Vice President, to the 
belief that, because the President has less than 2 years remaining in 
this term, removing him is not worth the disruption it would cause.
    These considerations would legitimately play a role in our decision 
if we were functioning as a legislative body in a parliamentary system 
deciding whether to retain the current government. But that is not our 
role here. The Constitution requires the Senate to sit not in an 
ordinary legislative capacity on this matter, but as a Court of 
Impeachment. That is why, at the beginning of a trial on articles of 
impeachment, article I, section 3 of the Constitution states that 
Senators must take a special oath to do impartial justice. Accordingly, 
it is my view that our decision cannot be based on other 
considerations, but instead must be based on what the Constitution 
dictates, and taken with a view toward the precedent we will establish 
regarding what is acceptable Presidential behavior.
    In arguing for the President, White House lawyers have asserted 
that the threshold for Presidential removal must be very high--and I 
agree. At the same time, however, we must remember that there is an 
inverse relationship between the level at which we set the removal bar 
and the degree of Presidential misconduct we will accept.
    So, then, where do we set the bar? What does the Constitution 
dictate? What precedent should we set for the ages?
    Let us start with the text of the Constitution, which states 
simply: ``The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
    The first interpretation that has been suggested is that a ``high 
Crime'' must be a truly heinous crime. But that is obviously wrong. 
Treason is certainly among the most heinous crimes. But bribery is not.
    Taking a bribe, like treason, is however uniquely serious 
misconduct by a public official. That suggests a different meaning for 
``high Crime,'' one that is linked somehow to the fact that the person 
committing it holds public office.
    A comment by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 65 provides the clue.
    In Federalist 65, speaking of impeachment, Hamilton says: ``The 
subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the 
misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the violation of 
some public trust.''
    The President's lawyers invoke this line, but they misread it. They 
argue that what it means is that to require removal, a President's 
conduct must involve misuse of official power.
    That is not what the Constitution demands, or what Hamilton's 
comment fairly read suggests. Otherwise we would have to leave in 
office a President or a Federal judge who committed murder, so long as 
they did not use any powers of their office in doing so. Rather, as 
Hamilton's language connotes, and our own precedents confirm, the 
connection the Constitution requires between the official's actions and 
functions is a more practical one: the official's conduct must 
demonstrate that he or she cannot be trusted with the powers of the 
office in question. This rule encompasses official acts demonstrating 
unfitness for the office in question, but it also reaches beyond such 
acts.
    We need not determine the outer limits of its principle to decide 
the question before us today: whether the President's actions here 
constitute a violation of a ``public trust'' as Hamilton uses the term. 
The answer to that question is plain when we consider his conduct in 
relation to his responsibilities.
    The President's role and status in our system of government are 
unique. The Constitution vests the executive power in the President, 
and in the President alone. That means he is the officer chiefly 
charged with carrying out our laws. Therefore, far more than any 
Federal judge, he holds the scales of justice in his own hands.
    In the wrong hands, that power can easily be transformed from the 
power to carry out the laws into the power to bend them to one's own 
ends. The very nature of the Presidency guarantees that its occupant 
will face daily temptations to twist the laws for personal gain, for 
party benefit, or for the advantage of friends in or out of power. To 
combat these temptations, the Constitution spells out in no uncertain 
terms that the President shall ``take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,'' and his oath of office requires him to swear that he will 
do so.
    By obstructing justice and tampering with witnesses in the Jones 
case, a Federal civil rights case in which he was the defendant, the 
President violated his oath and failed to perform the bedrock duty of 
his office. He did not faithfully execute the laws. He thereby made 
clear that he cannot be trusted to exercise the executive power 
lawfully in the future, to handle impartially such specific 
Presidential responsibilities as serving as the final arbiter on 
bringing Federal civil or criminal cases, or determining the content of 
Federal regulations--especially if, as will often be the case, he has a 
personal or political interest in the outcome.
    Surely retaining a President in office under these circumstances 
constitutes the type of threat to our government and its institutions 
so many have said must exist for conviction. That brings his conduct 
squarely within the purview of our impeachment power, whose purpose, as 
described by Hamilton, is to deal with ``the violation of some public 
trust.''
    Obstruction of justice, witness tampering, and grand jury perjury 
are serious Federal crimes. How do we explain to others who commit 
them, many out of motives surely as understandable as the President's, 
that while the President stays in the White House, his Department of 
Justice is trying to send them to prison? How can we expect ordinary 
citizens to accept that the President can remain in office after lying 
repeatedly under oath in court proceedings, but that it is still their 
duty to tell the truth?
    Finally, how can we leave the executive power in the hands of a 
President who, through his false grand jury testimony, has even 
attempted to obstruct and subvert the impeachment process itself? For 
the particular grand jury before which the President testified falsely 
was not only conducting a criminal investigation; it was also charged, 
under congressional statute, with advising the House of Representatives 
whether it had received any substantial and credible information that 
might constitute grounds for impeachment.
    The framers placed the impeachment power in our Constitution as the 
ultimate safeguard to address misuse of the executive power. A 
President who commits perjury, intending to thwart an investigation 
that might otherwise lead to his impeachment, has committed a 
quintessential ``high Crime.'' This crime impeded, and could have even 
precluded, Congress from fulfilling its duty to prevent the President 
from usurping power and engaging in unlawful conduct. To permit such 
behavior could, in effect, allow nullification of the impeachment 
process itself, rendering it meaningless. Hence, a President who acts 
to subvert what the framers viewed as the ultimate constitutional check 
on abuse of executive power, most certainly violates the public trust 
as defined by Hamilton.
    To allow a President to continue in office after committing these 
acts would place the Presidency above the law and grant the President 
powers close to those of a monarch. This, in turn, presents a clear and 
present danger to the rule of law, the birthright of all Americans. 
Indeed, we Americans take the rule of law so thoroughly for granted 
that while it has been much invoked in these proceedings, there has 
been little discussion of what it means or why it matters. Simply put, 
the rule of law is the guarantee our system makes to all of us that our 
rights and those of our countrymen will be determined according to 
rules established in advance. It is the guarantee that there will be no 
special rules, treatment, and outcomes for some, but that the same 
rules will be applied, in the same way, to everyone.
    If America's most powerful citizen may bend the law in his own 
favor with impunity, we have come dangerously close to trading in the 
rule of law for the rule of men. That in turn jeopardizes the freedoms 
we hold dear, for our equality before the law is central to their 
protection.
    We are a great nation because, in America, no man--no man--is above 
the law. Americans broke from Great Britain because the mother country 
claimed it had a right to rule its colonies without restraint, as it 
saw fit. Our tradition of chartered rights--rights laid down in laws, 
which no King, Parliament or other official could breach--culminated in 
our Constitution. That Constitution, which is itself only a higher law, 
protects us from tyranny. Once the law becomes an object of convenience 
rather than awe, that Constitution becomes a dead letter, and with it 
our freedoms and our way of life.
    Mr. Chief Justice, my grandparents did not come to this country 
seeking merely a more convenient, profitable life. They came here 
seeking the freedoms that were given birth on Bunker Hill and in the 
Convention at Philadelphia.
    I know some people mock as self-righteous or feckless the piety 
many Americans have toward their heritage and toward the Constitution 
that guards their freedom. But I will never forget that it is not the 
powerful or those favored by the powerful who need the law's 
protection.
    If we set a precedent that allows the President--the Chief 
Magistrate and the most powerful man in the world--to render the 
judicial process subordinate to his own interests, we tell ordinary 
citizens, like my grandparents, that Americans are no longer really 
equal in the eyes of the law. We tell them that they may be denied 
justice. And we thereby forfeit our own heritage of constitutional 
freedoms.
    None of us asked for this task, but we must live with the 
consequences of our actions, not just on this administration, but on 
our Nation for generations to come. That responsibility cannot be 
shirked. It has led me to a difficult but inexorable decision. I deeply 
regret that it is necessary for me to conclude that President William 
Jefferson Clinton committed obstruction of justice and grand jury 
perjury as charged in the articles of impeachment brought by the House, 
that these are ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors'' under our Constitution, 
and that therefore I must vote to convict him on these charges.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski

    Ms. MIKULSKI. Mr. Chief Justice, I will vote against the 
articles of impeachment accusing the President of the United 
States of perjury before a grand jury and obstruction of 
justice.
    The Republican House managers have asked the Senate to 
remove the President from office, overturning a free and fair 
election in which 100 million Americans cast their vote. Short 
of voting on whether or not to send our sons and daughters to 
war, I can envision no more profound decision.
    I have taken this responsibility as seriously as anything I 
have done in my life. A little over a month ago, I escorted the 
Chief Justice into this Chamber and stood with my colleagues 
when we took a collective oath, as an institution, to render 
impartial justice in this trial. Then, we individually signed 
our names and pledged our honor to faithfully fulfill our oath. 
That was an indelible and profound moment.
    I have sought to fulfill both responsibilities--to be 
impartial and to render justice. I have sought to be impartial, 
which I view as a test of character and will. And I have sought 
to pursue justice, which to me includes the responsibility to 
perform the homework--do the reading, review the evidence and 
weigh the facts.
    I have listened carefully, and with an open mind, to the 
presentations of the Republican House managers and the 
President's counsel. I have reviewed the evidence. I have read 
all of the key witnesses' testimony before the grand jury. I 
have intensely studied the law pertaining to perjury and 
obstruction of justice, discussed the issue with respected 
lawyers, developed an appropriate standard of proof, and 
reviewed the House testimony of Republican and Democratic 
former prosecutors for their views on the charges. Finally, I 
have read what our Nation's founders wrote about impeachment 
during those months in 1787 when the Constitution was formed, 
and considered the writings of many of today's finest scholars.
    As I reviewed the historical underpinnings of impeachment, 
I have reflected on the intentions of the Founding Fathers who 
developed our famed system of ``checks and balances''--our 
Constitution. That system, designed with the precision of Swiss 
watchmakers and the concern of loving parents, has served our 
Nation very well over the last 200 years and served as a 
guidepost for nations around the world as they struggled to 
establish democracies.
    I wondered what the framers of the Constitution would think 
of this trial--how they would counsel us. In fact, we can use 
their rationale and their framework to guide us as we reach 
conclusions about the evidence and as we determine whether that 
evidence merits removing a President from office.
    Using all this as my guide, I have concluded that the 
evidence presented by the House managers does not meet a 
sufficient standard of proof that President Clinton engaged in 
the criminal actions charged by the House. I conclude that the 
President should not be removed from office.
    In coming to that conclusion, I have used the highest legal 
standard of proof--``beyond a reasonable doubt,'' which is 
required in Federal and State criminal trials. I believe that 
removing a President is so serious, and such an undeniably 
tumultuous precedent to set in our Nation's history, that we 
should act only when the evidence meets that highest standard. 
The U.S. Senate must not make the decision to remove a 
President based on a hunch that the charges may be true. The 
strength of our Constitution and the strength of our Nation 
dictate that we be sure--beyond a reasonable doubt.
    The House managers' case is thin and circumstantial. It 
doesn't meet the standard of ``beyond a reasonable doubt.''
    The first article of impeachment, charging the President 
perjured himself before the grand jury, has not been proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt.
    For instance, the House managers claim that President 
Clinton committed perjury when he used the term ``on certain 
occasions'' to define the number of times he had inappropriate 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky. The managers believed the term ``on 
certain occasions'' meant fewer than the 11 times that were 
counted by Federal investigators and they labeled it ``a direct 
lie.''
    But there is no clear numeric or legal definition of 
``certain occasions.'' To disagree about the definition of 
``certain occasions'' is not perjury. And it is not material 
whether it was 11 times or ``on certain occasions.'' President 
Clinton admitted the relationship, which was the material 
point.
    The Republican House managers also claimed President 
Clinton committed perjury by not recalling the exact date, 
time, or place of events that occurred 2 years before. This was 
because other witnesses recalled things slightly differently. I 
do not believe this is or can be perjury because well-
established court standards state that ``the mere fact that 
recollections differ does not mean that one party is committing 
perjury.''
    Overall, the House managers' assertions rest on Mr. 
Clinton's vague and unhelpful responses to the independent 
counsel's questions. While those responses may be frustrating 
to the independent counsel, the Republican House managers, and, 
perhaps the American public, they are not perjurious as defined 
by law.
    Similarly, the case presented by the Republican House 
managers has not presented sufficient direct evidence to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the President obstructed 
justice. Instead, the House managers relied on extensive 
conjecture about what the President may have been thinking. In 
fact, there is direct and credible testimony by multiple 
witnesses that is directly contrary to the House managers' 
conjecture, leaving ample room for doubt.
    The Republican House managers also did not prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that there was a causal connection between Ms. 
Lewinsky's job search and the affidavit she gave in the Jones 
lawsuit. Ms. Lewinsky testified clearly and repeatedly that she 
was never promised a job for her silence. That testimony is not 
challenged by any other witness. In fact, other witnesses 
support that testimony and her most recent deposition by the 
House managers confirms it.
    From the outset of this trial, I established that I would 
use a two-tier analysis for my deliberations. First, I would 
determine whether the evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the President was guilty of the charges. Second, I would 
then determine whether or not those charges rose to the level 
of ``high Crimes and Misdemeanors''--the standard required by 
the Constitution for conviction and removal of a president.
    Since my analysis of the charges brought by the Republican 
House managers determined that they had not been proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the question of determining high crimes and 
misdemeanors is, I believe, moot. I will say, however, that I 
am again taken by the wisdom and prescience of the Founding 
Fathers in addressing this point. I, like many, have read and 
re-read the work of Alexander Hamilton with particular 
interest. On March 7, 1788, he wrote Federalist 65, outlining 
the reasons for, and consequences of, an impeachment trial in 
the Senate. In that writing, Mr. Hamilton asserted that the 
proper subject of an impeachment trial would be ``the abuse or 
violation of some public trust . . . as they relate to injuries 
done immediately to the society itself.''
    I believe it is clear from those words, and the words of 
others who drafted the Constitution, that impeachment was not 
intended to be used for an act that did not meet that standard. 
It was not meant to be used for punishment of the President. I 
believe that the framers intended the last resort of 
impeachment to be used when a presidential action was a clear 
offense against the institutions of government. I do not 
believe that President Clinton's conduct, as wrong as it was, 
rises to that level.
    I wish to choose my words judiciously for I believe the 
behavior of the President was wrong, reckless and immoral. 
President Clinton has acknowledged that his behavior has harmed 
his family and the Nation, and that his behavior, in the end, 
is what brought us to this day. Mr. Clinton engaged in an 
illicit, inappropriate relationship and tried to hide it out of 
shame and the fear of disgrace. Those actions are clearly 
deplorable and should be condemned in the most unequivocal 
terms. But the evidence simply and profoundly does not prove 
criminal wrongdoing.
    Certainly, the impeachment process has been a difficult 
period in our Nation's history. It has challenged the strength 
of our institutions and the strength of our Nation. But, Mr. 
Chief Justice, I still find reason for tremendous hope.
    First, I find hope in the unflagging commitment of the U.S. 
Senate to do the right thing for the right reason. I am proud 
to be a part of this Senate that was ably led by Mr. Lott and 
Mr. Daschle and conducted this trial in a serious, bipartisan, 
reflective, and cooperative spirit.
    I am reassured that Alexander Hamilton and other 
constitutional framers saw fit to charge the Senate with the 
responsibility to try such a case. I hope and believe that we 
have fulfilled their expectations to be a sufficiently 
dignified and independent tribunal, one that could preserve 
``unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality'' between 
the parties in this trial. I would like to thank my colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle for meeting their responsibilities 
with such commitment, honor, professionalism, and concern for 
this body and the judgment of history. I will modestly presume 
that history will say we discharged our duty well.
    I will never forget one of our finest hours--when, early in 
the process, we convened in the old Senate Chamber to 
deliberate. I had the honor to preside, with my Republican 
colleague Mr. Mack, over that colloquy in which we established 
a process that would maintain the dignity of the Senate and 
provide a framework for conducting the trial. That precedent 
set an important tone for the proceedings that followed and I 
believe that the goodwill generated in that historic meeting 
held throughout our deliberations.
    Finally, I also find tremendous hope in the growing 
national consensus that we must move forward together to 
address pressing problems in our neighborhoods, communities, 
and cities. Over the last month, the Nation has cried out for a 
focus on education, preserving Social Security and Medicare, 
investing in our economy, and providing global leadership.
    We should now heed those calls. I will not say that now we 
must ``return to the Nation's business.'' In fact, as difficult 
and time consuming as this process has been, I believe 
fulfilling our duty to ``render impartial justice'' has been 
the Nation's business. I am hopeful that with the conclusion of 
this trial, we may all return to the work of making our Nation 
more prosperous, our families stronger, our children better 
educated, our communities more cohesive, and our world safer at 
home and abroad. I believe we will move on knowing that we have 
fulfilled our constitutional responsibilities with diligence 
and honor.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Rod Grams

    Mr. GRAMS. Mr. Chief Justice, despite the handicaps placed 
upon the House managers, I feel they did an excellent job in 
presenting their case in support of the articles of impeachment 
and laying out the facts. I listened to them carefully, as I 
listened to the White House counsel and the President's lawyers 
in their vigorous defense of William Jefferson Clinton.
    I have heard some of my colleagues say that it was one 
particular fact or incident that led them to their conclusion. 
That was not the case with me. I needed to listen to all the 
facts throughout the trial, before I truly could decide how I 
would vote.
    But after carefully weighing all the evidence, all of the 
facts, and all the arguments, I have come to the conclusion--
the same conclusion reached by 84 percent of the American 
public--that President Clinton committed perjury and wove a 
cloth of obstruction of justice.
    Lead Presidential counsel Charles Ruff said in testimony 
before the House Judiciary Committee, and here during the 
Senate trial, that fair-minded people could draw different 
conclusions on the charges.
    I disagree in one aspect, but agree in another. I 
personally feel there is no room to disagree on whether the 
President is guilty of the charges in both article I and 
article II; he committed perjury and he clearly obstructed 
justice. But I agree we will differ on whether these charges 
rise to the level of high crimes which dictate conviction. 
Again, I believe they do and have voted yes, on both articles.
    The President was invited by letter to come and testify 
before the Senate. As the central figure in this trial, he 
alone knows what happened, and if truthful, he could have 
addressed the compelling evidence against him. He refused.
    It has been said that many have risked their political 
futures during this process. Perhaps--yet I will not hesitate 
telling constituents in my State how and why I voted the way I 
did. With a clear conscience, I will stand in their judgment 
and I will live with and respect whatever their decision on my 
political future may be.
    But remember, those who vote to acquit--that is, to not 
remove this President--will have the rest of their political 
lifetimes to explain their votes. They also will be judged.
    Collectively, too, we will have to await what history will 
say about this trial and how it was handled. Will this Senate 
be judged as having followed the rule of law; that is, deciding 
this case on the facts, or will we be remembered as the 
rulemaking body who deferred to public sentiment? The polls say 
this President is too popular to remove. If we base our 
decision on his popularity rather than the rule of law, we 
would be condoning a society where a majority could impose 
injustice on a minority group, only because it has a larger 
voice. A rule of law is followed so that justice is done and 
our Constitution is respected, regardless of popularity polls.
    The foundation of our legal system, I believe, is at risk 
if the Senate ignores these charges. The constitutional 
language of impeachment for judges is the same as for the 
President. Judges are removed from the bench for committing 
perjury, and also face criminal charges, as do ordinary 
citizens. We must not accept double standards.
    The prospect of such a double standard was raised countless 
times by the House managers. Consider the irony created by a 
two-tiered standard for perjury. A President commits perjury, 
yet remains in office. But would a Cabinet member who committed 
perjury be allowed to keep his or her job? Would a military 
officer who committed perjury be allowed to continue to serve? 
Would a judge who committed perjury remain on the bench? They 
would not, and yet our President, the Nation's chief law 
enforcement officer, is allowed to keep his office after having 
committed the same offense.
    Again, in my view, this is a double standard and is 
completely unacceptable for a nation that prides itself on a 
legal system which provides equal justice under the law.
    As to our final duty, the final vote, I believe the so-
called ``so what'' defense has controlled the outcome. ``He did 
it, but so what.'' We have heard it a thousand times from a 
hundred talking heads. We have heard it from our colleagues, 
too, in both Chambers. Well, for this Senator, ``so what'' 
stops at perjury and obstruction of justice. I will cast my 
vote with sorrow for the President, his family, and for the 
toll this trial has taken on the Nation, but with certainty 
that it is the only choice my conscience and the Constitution 
permit me to make.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator John B. Breaux

    Mr. BREAUX. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you very much, as so 
many people have said before, for serving with your patience 
and your fairness. If you care to extend your time with us, I 
would invite you to help preside over my Medicare Commission--
if you would like to help out in that regard.
    I also want to acknowledge and thank our two leaders for 
the fairness and the patience that they both have exhibited to 
all of us and the good job they have done keeping this body 
together, which I happen to think is extremely important as 
well.
    I think it is always very difficult for us to sit in 
judgment of another human being, and particularly is that very 
difficult when it involves moral behavior, or moral misbehavior 
as this case essentially is all about. I was always taught that 
there was a higher authority that made those types of 
decisions, but here we are, and that is part of our task.
    I think it is also especially difficult to make those kinds 
of decisions when they involve someone you know and someone you 
actually deal with in a relatively close relationship, almost 
on a day-to-day basis. It is difficult when it is someone that 
you can in private kid with or that you in private can joke 
with, as is the case for many of us with this accused whom we 
now sit in judgment of.
    I know this President and he is someone I have admired for 
his political accomplishments and I have admired for what he 
has been able to do for this country, but also quite well 
recognize the human frailties that he has, as all of us have. 
If this were a normal trial, many of us wouldn't even be here; 
we would have been excused a long time ago; we would never have 
been selected to sit in judgment of this President. We would 
have been excused because of friendship, we would have been 
excused because we know him, we would have been excused because 
we campaigned for him and with him, or we would have been 
excused for the opposite reasons--because he is a political 
adversary that we have campaigned against, that we have given 
speeches against, that we disagree with publicly on just about 
everything he stands for. None of us would find ourselves 
sitting in judgment of this individual if it were a normal 
trial. But, then again, it is not a normal trial, and these 
certainly are not normal times.
    For many of us, this is the first time we have ever had a 
President who has sort of been a contemporary--certainly for 
me, and many of my colleagues are in that same category. I was 
here, as were many of you in my generation, when President 
Johnson was here, and served throughout the time of President 
Johnson all the way through President Bush. I have met them all 
and knew them all to various degrees but never in the same way 
that I and many of us know this particular President, because 
he really is in the same generation as we are. I think we have 
that feeling, when we talk with him. I mean, many times I feel 
he knows what I am going to say before I say it and he 
understands what I am trying to convey to him before I even 
said anything about the subject matter.
    I think that many of us have had, with him, the same type 
of life experiences, and that our lives have been shaped by 
similar events because we really are of the same generation. So 
it is very difficult, coming from that position and now sitting 
in judgment of a person for his moral behavior. So I think we 
have to be extremely careful, those of us who come from this 
side with that personal friendship and relationship, as well as 
those who come from the opposite side, as a political 
adversary. It is very difficult to set those emotions aside and 
say I am going to be fair in judging someone I just cannot 
stand politically, that I don't agree with on anything, and I 
wish he wasn't my President; in fact, I supported someone else. 
So it is very difficult for all of us to try to set that aside 
and come to an honest and fair and decent conclusion.
    I think the American people have been able to do that. I 
think they have had a good understanding of what this case is 
about from the very beginning. They understood what it was 
about before the trial ever started. They understood what it 
was about during the trial, and I think they understand what it 
is all about after the trial. I think they understand what 
happened. I think they know when it happened, they know where 
it happened, and they know what was said about it. I think that 
they were correct from the very beginning.
    What we really have is a middle-aged man, who happens to be 
President of the United States, who has a sexual affair with 
someone in his office, and when people started finding out 
about it, he lied about it, tried to cover it up, tried to 
mislead people about what happened. I would daresay that this 
is not the first time in the history of the world that this has 
ever happened. I daresay it probably will not be the last time 
that it will happen. It is probably not the first time it has 
happened in this city.
    All of that does not make it right; it does not make it 
acceptable. It does not make it excusable. It cannot be 
condoned and it cannot be overlooked. Actions that are wrong 
have consequences, and now the consequences must be determined 
by the Senate.
    The question here is not really whether anything wrong was 
done. For heaven's sakes, everybody knows that what was done 
was clearly wrong. It was unacceptable. It was embarrassing. It 
was indefensible and any other adjective you can possibly think 
of to really describe it. But that is not really the question 
before us, and we can all agree on that. I think the question 
is not even whether this was perjury or whether it was 
obstruction of justice under the terms of the Constitution.
    I think the only question before us is whether what 
happened rises to the highest constitutional standards of high 
crimes and misdemeanors under the Constitution, justifying 
automatic removal of this President from the office of 
President.
    I have concluded that the Constitution was designed very 
carefully to remove the President of the United States for 
wrongful actions as President of the United States in his 
capacity as President of the United States and in carrying out 
his duties as President of the United States. For wrongful acts 
that are not connected with the official capacity and duties of 
the President of the United States, there are other ways to 
handle it. There is the judicial system. There is the court 
system. There are the U.S. attorneys out there waiting. There 
may even be the Office of Independent Counsel, which will still 
be there after all of this is finished.
    We here cannot expand the Constitution in this area. I 
think history supports my position. I will cite you just a 
quick two examples. Senator Slade Gorton earlier spoke about 
the situation with the Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander 
Hamilton. As Secretary, he was having an affair with a woman 
here in this city and they found out about it. He was paying 
off the husband of the wife that he was having an affair with. 
He was trying to get her to burn the evidence, which were 
letters that he had sent, to try to cover it up--criminal acts. 
But the Congress that was investigating him, came to the 
conclusion that the behavior was private. It was wrong, it was 
terrible, it was criminal, but it was private behavior and he 
was not impeached. Not because, I think, as Slade tried to say, 
that he wasn't impeached because he admitted it, he only 
admitted it when he got caught. But he was not impeached 
because they decided that it was essentially private behavior. 
That was in 1792, and Adams and the Founding Fathers were here 
at that time and they came to that conclusion.
    More recently, the situation with President Richard Nixon, 
I think, is a clear example of what we are struggling with 
here, to find this connection between official duties and what 
he did. One of the articles that they accused President Nixon 
with was that he had, not once, but four times filed fraudulent 
income tax returns under the criminal penalty of perjury--that 
he deducted things that he should not have deducted and that he 
didn't report income that should have been reported. By a 26-
to-12 vote, the House Judiciary Committee said, among other 
things, that ``the conduct must be seriously incompatible with 
either the constitutional form and principles of our Government 
or the proper performance of the constitutional duties of the 
President's office.'' They said that it did not demonstrate 
public misconduct, but rather private misconduct that had 
become public. I think the situation today is very similar.
    These are clear examples both in the beginning of our 
country's history and very recently about the need for this 
nexus or connection between the illegal acts and the duties of 
the office of the President.
    Let me conclude by saying I am voting not to convict and 
remove. But that is not a vote on the innocence of this 
President. He is not innocent. And by not voting to convict we 
can't somehow establish his innocence. If the standard of 
removal was bad behavior, he would be gone. I mean there would 
probably be no disagreement about that. But that is not the 
standard.
    I urge a ``no'' vote on conviction and removal and ask our 
colleagues to join in a bipartisan, strong, clear censure 
resolution and spell out what happened and where it happened 
and when it happened and what was said about what happened so 
that history will be able to, forever, look at that censure 
resolution and study it and learn from what we do today. That, 
my colleagues, I think is an appropriate and a proper remedy.
    Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Pete V. Domenici

    Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. Chief Justice, I have listened carefully 
to the arguments of the House managers and the counterarguments 
by the White House counsel during this impeachment trial. I 
have taken seriously my oath to render impartial justice.
    While the legal nuances offered by both sides were 
interesting and essential, I kept thinking as I sat listening 
that the most obvious and important but unstated question was: 
What standard of conduct should we insist our President live up 
to?
    Only by taking into account this question do I believe that 
we in the Senate can properly interpret our Founding Fathers' 
impeachment criteria comprised of ``Treason, Bribery, or other 
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Clearly, the Constitution 
recognizes that a President may be impeached not only for 
bribery and treason, but also for other actions that destroy 
the underlying integrity of the Presidency or the ``equal 
justice for all'' guarantee of the judiciary.
    All reasonable observers admit that the President lied 
under oath and undertook a substantial and purposeful effort to 
hide his behavior from others in order to obstruct justice in a 
legal proceeding. My good friends and Democratic colleagues, 
Senators Joe Lieberman, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Bob Kerrey, 
Dianne Feinstein, and Robert Byrd, among others, have bluntly 
acknowledged publically that the President lied, misled, 
obstructed, and attempted in many ways to thwart justice's 
impartial course in a civil rights case. The sticking point has 
been: Does this misbehavior rise to the level of impeachable 
offenses?
    I have concluded that President Clinton's actions do, 
indeed, rise to the level of impeachable offenses that the 
Founding Fathers envisioned.
    I am not a constitutional scholar, as I have told you 
before. But more than 200 years ago, Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court John Jay summed up my feelings about lying under 
oath and its subversion of the administration of justice and 
honest government:

    Independent of the abominable insult which Perjury offers to the 
divine Being, There is no Crime more pernicious to Society. It 
discolours and poisons the Streams of Justice, and by substituting 
Falsehood for Truth, saps the Foundations of personal and public 
rights. . . . Testimony is given under solemn obligations which an 
appeal to the God of Truth impose; and if oaths should cease to be held 
sacred, our dearest and most valuable Rights would become insecure.

    Lying under oath is an ``insult to the divine Being . . . 
It discolours and poisons the Streams of Justice . . . and . . 
. saps the Foundations of personal and public Rights.''
    How can anyone, after conceding that the President lied 
under oath and obstructed justice, listen to this quotation and 
not conclude that this President has committed acts which are 
clearly serious, which corrupt or subvert the political and 
government process, and which are plainly wrong to any 
honorable person or to a good citizen?
    We must start by saying that this trial has never been 
about the President's private sex acts, as tawdry as they may 
have been.
    This trial has been about his failure to properly discharge 
his public responsibility. The President had a choice to make 
during this entire, lamentable episode. At a number of critical 
junctures, he had a choice either to tell the truth or to lie, 
first in the civil rights case, before the grand jury, and on 
national television. Each time he chose to lie. He made that 
fateful choice.
    Truthfulness is the first pillar of good character in the 
Character Counts program of which I have been part of 
establishing in New Mexico. Many of you in this Chamber have 
joined me in declaring the annual ``Character Counts Weeks.'' 
This program teaches grade school youngsters throughout America 
about six pillars of good character. Public and private schools 
in every corner of my State teach children that character 
counts; character makes a difference; indeed, character makes 
all the difference.
    Guess which one of these pillars comes first? 
Trustworthiness. Trustworthiness.
    So what do I say to the children in my State when they ask, 
``Didn't the President lie? Doesn't that mean he isn't 
trustworthy? Then, Senator, why didn't the Senate punish him?''
    Let me quote one of the most critical passages from Charles 
L. Black, Jr., and his handbook on impeachment, one of the 
seminal works on the impeachment process. He ponders this 
question: what kinds of noncriminal acts by a President are 
clearly impeachable? He concludes that ``high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors'' are those kinds of offenses which fall into 
three categories: ``(1) which are extremely serious, (2) which 
in some way corrupt or subvert the political and governmental 
process, and (3) which are plainly wrong in themselves to a 
person of honor, or to a good citizen, regardless of words on 
the statute books.''
    Well, there you have it in my judgment. The President lied 
under oath in a civil rights case, he lied before a grand jury 
and he lied on national television to the American people.
    Regarding article II, obstruction of justice the House 
managers proved to my satisfaction the following facts:
    (1) The President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to prepare and 
submit a false affidavit; (2) He encouraged her to tell false 
and misleading cover stories if she were called to testify in a 
civil rights lawsuit; (3) He engaged in, encouraged or 
supported a scheme to conceal his gifts to Monica Lewinsky that 
had been subpoenaed in the civil rights lawsuit; (4) He 
intensified and succeeded in an effort to find Monica Lewinsky 
a job so that she would not testify truthfully in the civil 
rights lawsuit; (5) He gave a false account of his relationship 
with Monica Lewinsky to Betty Currie in order to influence Ms. 
Currie's expected testimony in the civil rights lawsuit; (6) At 
his deposition in a Federal civil rights action against him, 
William Jefferson Clinton allowed his attorney to make false 
and misleading statements to a Federal judge characterizing an 
affidavit, in order to prevent questioning deemed relevant by 
the judge. Such false and misleading statements were 
subsequently called to the attention of the judge by his 
attorney; (7) He lied to John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, 
Erskine Bowles, and other White House aides regarding his 
relationship with Monica Lewinsky to influence their expected 
testimony before the Federal grand jury.
    In this day and age of public yearning for heroes, we 
criticize basketball, football, and baseball players, and 
actors and singers who commit crimes or otherwise fail to be 
``good role models.'' One of those celebrities said a few years 
ago that he was only a basketball player, not a role model. He 
said in essence: ``Want a role model, look to the President.''
    Do not underestimate, my friends, the corrupting and 
cynical signal we will send if we fail to enforce the highest 
standards of conduct on the most powerful man in the Nation.
    Finally, I want to address a question that my good friend, 
Senator Byrd, raised over the weekend in a television show. 
After declaring that the President had lied and obstructed 
justice, and after concluding these acts were impeachable 
offenses, Senator Byrd, for whom I have great respect, noted 
that it was very hard, in his judgment, to impeach a President 
who enjoyed the public popularity that this President enjoys.
    Let me respond to that. Popularity is not a defense in an 
impeachment trial. Indeed, one of our Founding Fathers 
addressed this issue of popularity directly in the oft-quoted 
``Federalist Papers'': ``It takes more than talents of low 
intrigue and the little arts of popularity'' to be President. 
And, popularity isn't a pillar of Character Counts.
    What if a President committed the same acts as those 
alleged in this trial but he was presiding over a weak economy, 
a stock market at a 3-year low, 12-percent unemployment, 16-
percent inflation and a nation worried about their job security 
and families? I wonder if this would be a straight party line 
vote. I just wonder.
    Conversely, I wonder if you had a President who committed 
one of the impeachable crimes enumerated in the Constitution--
bribery or treason, and the facts were obvious and clear: he 
gave a job to someone in exchange for a $5,000 bribe and the 
entire episode was on videotape. In this hypothetical, what if 
this bribery-perpetrating President was very popular but the 
House, nonetheless, impeached him. It would be the Senate's 
responsibility to hold a trial. In this example, economy is 
strong, the country is at peace, everyone's stock market 
investments are soaring. Would we then interpret the 
Constitution to provide a popularity defense? Would we create a 
``booming economy exception'' to the conviction and removal 
clause of the Constitution? I doubt it. I doubt it very much. 
Let me repeat, temporary popularity of a President cannot be a 
legitimate defense against impeachment.
    The President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors, 
in violation of his oath of office. He lied under oath. He 
obstructed justice. His behavior was unworthy of the Presidency 
of the United States.
    Thus, I sadly conclude that the President is guilty of the 
charges made against him by the House of Representatives and I 
will vote to convict him on both counts before the Senate.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Paul S. Sarbanes

    Mr. SARBANES. Mr. Chief Justice and colleagues, in his 
award-winning book ``The Making of the President, 1960,'' 
Theodore H. White refers to an American Presidential election 
as ``the most awesome transfer of power in the world.''
    He notes that:

    No people has succeeded at it better or over a longer period of 
time than the Americans. Yet as the transfer of this power takes place, 
there is nothing to be seen except an occasional line outside a church 
or school or file of people fidgeting in the rain, waiting to enter the 
voting booths. No bands play on election day, no troops march, no guns 
are readied, no conspirators gather in secret headquarters.

    Later in that opening chapter White observes:

    Good or bad, whatever the decision, America will accept the 
decision and cut down any man who goes against it, even though for 
millions the decision runs contrary to their own votes. The general 
vote is an expression of national will, the only substitute for 
violence and blood.

    I begin with those quotes to underscore the critical 
significance of a Presidential election in the structure of our 
national politics. Many learned commentators have observed that 
one of the original contributions to the art of government made 
by the Constitutional Convention was to develop a Presidential, 
as opposed to a parliamentary, system of government, wherein 
the Executive is chosen by the electorate and is not dependent 
upon the confidence of the legislature for his office. As 
former Attorney General Katzenbach observed:

    It is a serious matter for the Congress to remove a President who 
has been elected in a democratic process for a term of four years, 
raising fundamental concerns about the separation of powers.

    He goes on to note that if the removal power is not 
limited, as it clearly is, impeachment could be converted into 
a parliamentary vote of no confidence which, whatever its 
merits, is not our constitutional system. The separation of 
powers embraced in our Constitution and the fixed term of the 
President have been credited by many observers with providing 
stability to our political system.
    It is important therefore to recognize that in considering 
the matter before us, we do so in the context of a Presidential 
election, wherein the people have chosen the single leader of 
the executive branch of our government--the President.
    Since the framers put the impeachment remedy in the 
Constitution, it is obvious they recognized that there may be 
circumstances which require the Congress to remove a duly 
elected President. However, in my judgment, as the framers 
indicated, we need to be very careful, very cautious, very 
prudent, in undertaking that remedy lest we introduce a 
dangerous instability in the workings of our political 
institutions.
    Viscount Bryce, whose bust is at the foot of the steps in 
the hallway below, was a distinguished commentator about the 
American political system. He wrote in ``The American 
Commonwealth'' in discussing the impeachment of a President:

    Impeachment is the heaviest piece of artillery in the congressional 
arsenal, but because it is so heavy, it is unfit for ordinary use. It 
is like a 100-ton gun which needs complex machinery to bring it into 
position, an enormous charge of powder to fire it, and a large mark to 
aim at. Or to vary this simile, impeachment is what physicians call a 
heroic medicine, an extreme remedy proper to be applied against an 
official guilty of political crimes.

    Let me turn next to the argument which seeks to draw an 
analogy between the impeachment of a President and the 
impeachment of judges, an argument that cites three recent 
cases in which judges have been removed from office. In my 
view, this analogy misses the mark.
    Two of the judges the Senate convicted and thus removed 
from office had been accused in a criminal case, tried before a 
jury, found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and were in jail. 
Until we removed them, they were still drawing their salaries. 
In the third case, the defendant had been acquitted of bribery, 
but a judicial inquiry found that he had perjured himself to 
cover up the bribery misdeeds. Difference No. 1: Judges can be 
criminally prosecuted while in office; the President cannot. At 
least that has been the theory up to this point.
    Secondly, elected versus appointed. Judges are appointed to 
the bench for life. They can only be removed by impeachment. 
The President is elected by the people for a 4-year term and 
can only hold two such terms. As President Ford, when he was a 
Congressman, stated:

    I think it is fair to come to one conclusion, however, from our 
history of impeachments. A higher standard is expected of Federal 
judges than of any other civil officers of the United States. The 
President and the Vice President and all persons holding office at the 
pleasure can be thrown out of office by the voters at least every 4 
years.

    Thirdly, one needs to consider the injury to the branch of 
government which would result from the removal of the officer. 
The removal of one judge out of hundreds and hundreds of judges 
does not significantly affect the operation of the judicial 
branch of our government. The removal of the President, the 
single head of the executive branch, obviously is in an 
entirely different category. The President, under our system, 
holds the executive power. In the end, executive branch 
decisions are his decisions.
    In the minority report in the House Watergate proceedings, 
Republican Members stated:

    The removal of a President from office would obviously have a far 
greater impact upon the equilibrium of our system of Government than 
removal of a single Federal judge.

    The House Judiciary Committee majority report accompanying 
the article of impeachment against Judge Walter Nixon in 1989 
similarly stated as follows:

    Judges must be held to a higher standard of conduct than other 
officials. As noted by the House Judiciary Committee in 1970, Congress 
has recognized that Federal judges must be held to a different standard 
of conduct than other civil officers because of the nature of their 
position and the tenure of their office.

    In putting on their case, the House Republican managers 
sought to portray a simple logical progression--first that the 
material which they brought before the Senate showed violations 
of provisions of the Federal Criminal Code, i.e., perjury and 
obstruction of justice. Then they argued that if you find such 
crimes, you have high crimes and misdemeanors and, ergo, 
removal from office. But let us look at this supposed logical 
progression which I view as flawed at each step.
    First, I do not believe the House managers carried the 
burden of proof with respect to the commission of crimes. Since 
they relied on the Federal Criminal Code--charging crimes--in 
making their case, it is appropriate that they be held to the 
burden of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt--the standard used 
in criminal cases.
    In the House Judiciary Committee a panel of distinguished 
former Federal prosecutors testified that a responsible Federal 
prosecutor would not have brought a criminal prosecution on the 
basis of the case set out in the Starr Report on which the 
House Judiciary Committee relied. One of them, Thomas P. 
Sullivan, a veteran of 40 years of practice in Federal criminal 
cases, and U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois 
from 1977 to 1981, stated the following:

    If the President were not involved, if an ordinary citizen were the 
subject of the inquiry, no serious consideration would be given to a 
criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in discovery in 
the Jones civil case having to do with an alleged coverup of a private 
sexual affair with another woman or the follow-on testimony before the 
grand jury. The case simply would not be given serious consideration 
for prosecution.

    Now, let me move beyond this question of proving the case 
and address the next step in the managers' ostensible logical 
progression, namely that the crimes that they were trying to 
prove are high crime and misdemeanors and, therefore, a vote 
for conviction and removal must follow.
    Actually, in considering this issue we must bear in mind 
the ultimate question: Does the conduct warrant removal from 
office? The House logic seems to be that any perjury, any 
obstruction of justice, warrants removal. As serious as those 
charges are, not all such conduct in all instances may rise to 
the level of an impeachable offense. In considering this 
matter, it is important to understand that the House articles 
included within them not only the charges but also the penalty. 
In the ordinary criminal case, there is a two-step judgment--
guilt and then sentence. In an impeachment case, the finding of 
guilty carries with it removal from office--the remedy provided 
by the Constitution.
    There is an important precedent for the view that in 
certain circumstances offenses of the sort alleged here may not 
rise to the level of a high crime and misdemeanor. That 
precedent is found in the tax article of impeachment of Richard 
Nixon which was before the House Judiciary Committee in 1974. 
That article charged President Nixon with knowingly filing tax 
returns which fraudulently claimed that he had donated pre-
Presidential papers before the date Congress had set for 
eliminating such a charitable tax deduction. It was worth 
$576,000 in deductions. This deduction was claimed in tax 
returns that contained the following assertion just above the 
taxpayer's signature:

    Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this 
return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and, to the 
best of my knowledge and belief, it is true, correct and complete.

    The House Judiciary Committee voted down that article of 
impeachment by a vote of 12 for, 26 against. As one of nine 
Democrats who joined the Republicans in voting against this 
article of impeachment in the Nixon case, I did not believe 
that in the circumstances of that case it rose to the level of 
a high crime and misdemeanor; I did not believe it was conduct 
against which the Founding Fathers intended the Congress to 
invoke the impeachment remedy.
    Let me turn briefly to the procedure followed in this 
impeachment matter, since good procedure enhances the chances 
of good results while bad procedure does the opposite. I am 
prompted to do so by various comments made by House managers 
criticizing the Senate for the procedure we have followed. I 
think the Senate has handled this matter well under very 
difficult circumstances. Given that the House managers 
questioned our procedure, let us look at the procedure on the 
House side.
    The House, which brought in no ``fact'' witnesses, came to 
the Senate and said to us, ``In order to evaluate testimony 
that is in the record, you must bring witnesses in and look 
them in the eye in order to assess their credibility.'' 
Obviously, one must ask, how did the House managers assess the 
credibility of witnesses when they brought none before them and 
yet voted to bring articles of impeachment recommending the 
President's removal to the Senate?
    Secondly, the other day, in response to a reasonable 
request by the President's lawyers on how the House planned to 
proceed in using deposition excerpts, a House manager said, ``I 
believe the appropriate legal response to your request is that 
it is none of your damn business what the other side is going 
to put on.'' This same attitude marked the treatment of 
President Clinton's lawyers before the House Judiciary 
Committee.
    Contrast this with the House Judiciary Committee's conduct 
in the matter of President Nixon's impeachment when the 
President's lawyers sat in with the committee in its closed 
sessions when committee staff presented findings of fact. The 
President's lawyers were able to challenge material, to ask 
questions, to supplement all presentations. Fact witnesses were 
called in and were subjected to questions by all. There was an 
understanding of the gravity of the matter for the Nation and 
the absolute imperative of having a fair process.
    In this matter, the House Judiciary Committee took only a 
few weeks to report impeachment articles. In the Nixon case the 
committee took 6 months. In the Judge Hastings case, the House 
Judiciary Committee received an 841-page report from the 
Judicial Conference as to why Hastings should be removed. 
Nevertheless, the committee undertook its own examination of 
the evidence. It heard 12 fact witnesses, deposed or 
interviewed 60 others, and held 7 days of hearings.
    In closing, it is very important to keep in mind the 
distinction between the person who is President and the office 
of President of the United States provided for in our 
Constitution.
    President Clinton has engaged in disgraceful and 
reprehensible conduct which has severely sullied and demeaned 
his tenure as President. Because of his shameful and reckless 
behavior he has brought dishonor upon himself, deeply hurt his 
family, and grievously diminished his reputation and standing 
now, and in history.
    But the diminishing of Bill Clinton must not lead us to 
diminish the Presidency for his successors as our Nation moves 
into the new millennium. There is a danger to the Nation in 
deposing a political leader chosen directly by the people and 
we must be wary of the instability it would bring to our 
political system.
    In the report of the staff of the impeachment inquiry in 
1974 on the constitutional grounds for Presidential 
impeachment, the conclusion states:

    Not all presidential misconduct is sufficient to constitute grounds 
for impeachment. There is a further requirement--substantiality. In 
deciding whether this further requirement has been met, the facts must 
be considered as a whole in the context of the office, not in terms of 
separate or isolated events. Because impeachment of a President is a 
grave step for the nation, it is to be predicated only upon conduct 
seriously incompatible with either the constitutional form and 
principles of our government or the proper performance of 
constitutional duties of the presidential office.

    I do not believe the conduct examined here meets this test.
    I will vote against removing the President.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

              Statement of Senator Ben Nighthorse Campbell

    Mr. CAMPBELL. Mr. Chief Justice and colleagues, my friends, 
I am not going to try to dazzle you with my knowledge of the 
law, which is minimal, or the 40 hand-written pages I have 
taken during these proceedings. But I signed the same oath you 
did, with a pen that should have had on it ``United States 
Senate,'' but did not. It said, ``Untied States Senate.''
    We were asked to turn the pens back in. I heard they are 
going to be valuable collectors' items, and I am not turning 
mine in. I want to see what it is worth.
    There you have it, an imperfect Senator being asked to 
judge an imperfect President. One of our colleagues noted 
yesterday that we all come from different backgrounds. It is 
true, and perhaps the living proof of that great aspect of this 
Nation is that I could be here at all.
    The same body where someone named Daniel Webster, John F. 
Kennedy, and Harry Truman once served also welcomed a mixed 
blood kid from the wrong side of the tracks. The offspring of 
an alcoholic father and a tubercular mother; in and out of 
orphanages; a lawbreaker and high school dropout who lied, 
cheated, stole, and did many other shameful things make me a 
poor judge, indeed, of someone else who used poor judgment.
    I would rather take a beating than to judge someone else 
for their indiscretions. But as one of our colleagues said 
yesterday, ``We didn't ask for this.''
    Still, with all my own human failings, I, like you, must 
try to separate them from the rule of law. I wish I had the 
historical knowledge of Senator Byrd or the legal knowledge of 
Orrin Hatch or the government experience of John Warner. But I 
don't--I must use common sense.
    I want to tell you an anecdote--about a conversation I had 
with the President right after he made his rather startling 
confession before this Nation and a group of reverends which I 
watched from my Denver office as millions of others were also 
watching at the same time.
    I was so moved by his statement that I wrote him a personal 
note telling him how sorry I was for what his family was going 
through. I told him I would not be one to pile on; that I would 
make no statements to the press; nor would I be a party to the 
impeachment process going on in the other body.
    As I look around this room, I see several others who 
subscribed to that same conduct as this proceeding moved to the 
Senate and took on soap opera proportions, and Members of both 
parties ran pell mell to the cameras at each recess.
    I sit right there in the back row 15 feet from the 
Cloakroom. But, at each recess by the time I walk to the 
Cloakroom and glance at the TV, some of my colleagues are 
already sprinting somewhere else to be in front of the cameras. 
As you know, I used to be on the U.S. Olympic Team, and I tell 
my speedy friends--you could have made the team.
    About 3 days after I wrote to the President, he called me 
to thank me for my note and we spoke for about 15 minutes. I 
asked him how his family was dealing with it and he told me 
they were having good days and bad, but it was hardest on his 
daughter, Chelsea, because she was away at college without the 
family unit to console her. He told me he would keep my note 
always. I felt badly then, and I do now.
    As I look around this room in which so many great people in 
our history have spoken and I read their names written in the 
desk drawers along with those who no one remembers, I tell you 
that I like this President.
    He came through a difficult childhood as I did, and I 
genuinely like him and feel sorry for both him and his family. 
But after agonizing as many of my Senate friends have, I 
remember the first question my then 9-year-old son, Colin, 
asked me 17 years ago when I told him I was going to run for 
public office. He asked, ``Dad, are you going to lie and 
stuff?''
    I told him, ``No.'' I don't have to learn how to lie--I 
still remembered how to lie from my delinquent days. I am still 
trying to forget it.
    I told him, human frailties not withstanding, elected 
officials should not ``lie and stuff.''
    Every one of us knows that when we step into the public 
arena, we are judged by a different standard. Being honest and 
truthful becomes more important because we must set the 
examples.
    As a Senator, if I ever forget it, this body will not have 
to throw me out because I will have brought it on myself, and I 
will save this body the time and expense and resign.
    I would not fear being thrown out. When I was young and not 
yet house-broken, I was thrown out of a lot of places. I swore 
a lot of oaths--not when I went in, but when I came out.
    There is a difference: one is about anger in private--the 
other is about honor in public. If we are not going to honor 
our oath, why don't we get rid of it and have an every-man-for-
himself kind of elected official?
    Better yet, let's change it. Mr. Chief Justice, you could 
say: ``Senators-elect. Raise your right hand and repeat after 
me: `On my honor, I'll do my best, to help myself and lie like 
the rest.''
    I took a solemn oath--perhaps it is the only thing in 
common I share with John F. Kennedy, Harry Truman and Daniel 
Webster as well as the founders of this Nation--and that is why 
honoring it is all the more important to me.
    Simply speaking, the President did, too. And, so even 
though I like him personally, I find I can only vote one way. 
And that is guilty on both articles.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator J. Robert Kerrey

    Mr. KERREY. Mr. Chief Justice, in the impeachment case of 
President Clinton I have read the depositions, reviewed the 
massive volume of evidence and carefully followed the detailed 
presentations of both the House managers and the President's 
counsel. The instructions for my decision come from two places: 
the oath I took to do impartial justice and the Constitution of 
the United States.
    Nebraskans, including me, are angry about the President's 
behavior. We find it deplorable on every level. It has 
permanently and deservedly marred his place in history. But 
impeachment is not about punishing an individual; it is about 
protecting the country. We punish a President who behaves 
immorally, lies and otherwise lacks the character we demand in 
public office with our votes. Presidents are also subject to 
criminal prosecution when they leave office.
    Impeachment must be reserved for extreme situations 
involving crimes against the state. Why? Because the founders 
of our country and the framers of our Constitution correctly 
placed stability of the Republic as their paramount concern. 
They did not want Congress to be able to easily remove a 
popularly elected President. They made clear they intended a 
decision to impeach to be used to protect the Nation against 
only the highest of crimes.
    On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives, on an 
almost straight party line vote, approved and delivered to the 
Senate two articles of impeachment. The Constitution permits me 
to judge and decide upon only these articles, not to wander 
through all of the President's conduct looking for any reason 
for removal.
    Some Nebraskans have told me the President should be 
removed from office by the Congress because he is no longer 
trusted, has lost the respect of many, and has displayed 
reprehensible behavior. As strong as those feelings are, the 
Constitution does not provide for overturning an election even 
if all of these things are true.
    Three recent letters to the editor in the Omaha World-
Herald help make the point. The first, from a man in Kearney, 
says that by voting to dismiss the trial, I ``voted to support 
sexual harassment,'' among other things. A second, from Honey 
Creek, IA, raises allegations regarding the President and 
China, says he is ``dangerous'' and urges Senator Hagel and I 
to ``oust him now.'' The third, from Omaha, reminds readers of 
an often quoted comment I once made about the President's 
credibility and asks how, in light of that, I could vote to 
leave him in office.
    However, the House did not charge the President with these 
offenses. Impeachment is not a judgment of a President's 
character, all his actions, or even his general fitness for 
office. We make those decisions every 4 years at the ballot 
box. Our job in contemplating the extraordinary step of 
overturning an election is to judge only those charges the 
House actually brought.
    Because the premium on constitutional stability is so high, 
I decided to judge the case against the strictest possible 
standard: proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, the 
President can be convicted only if there is no reasonable 
interpretation of the facts other than an intent to commit 
perjury and obstruction of justice. The following is a summary 
of my analysis of this case:
    Article I accuses the President of perjury in his August 
17, 1998, testimony to a Federal grand jury, during which he 
waived his rights against self-incrimination. Most important in 
determining guilt or innocence is the rule of law governing 
perjury, which makes it clear that a person has not committed 
perjury just because they misled or even lied. Perjury occurs 
when a false statement is made under oath with willful intent 
to mislead in a material matter. Lying is immoral; perjury is 
illegal. I should not accuse the President of ignoring the rule 
of law and then ignore it myself in making a judgment.
    After reading and watching the President's grand jury 
testimony, listening to the arguments of the House managers and 
the President's lawyers, discussing this case with prosecutors 
and reviewing the impeachment trial of U.S. District Judge 
Alcee Hastings, I have concluded the President did not commit 
the crime of perjury beyond a reasonable doubt. I frequently 
found the President's testimony maddening and misleading, but I 
did not find it material to a criminal act.
    Article II accuses the President of obstructing justice in 
seven instances. The House managers relied on circumstantial 
evidence, saying that common sense provides only one conclusion 
about why the President acted the way he did. However, the 
direct evidence, including the testimony of Monica Lewinsky 
herself, rebutted the circumstantial evidence. Second, while 
the House managers were correct in saying that common sense 
could lead to a conclusion that the President intended to 
obstruct justice, common sense could also lead to other 
reasonable conclusions about the reasons for his actions. 
Third, with respect to the allegations of obstructing justice 
in the civil case, Paula Jones' lawsuit was thrown out, then 
eventually settled. In the end, justice was done.
    As reprehensible as I find the President's behavior to be, 
I do not believe that high crimes and misdemeanors as defined 
by the framers have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Accordingly, I will vote to acquit on both articles. My vote to 
acquit is not a vote to exonerate. While there is plenty of 
blame to go around in this case, the person most responsible 
for it going this far is the President of the United States. He 
behaved immorally, recklessly, and reprehensibly. These were 
his choices. In the final analysis, they do not merit removal, 
but they do merit condemnation.
    While I am confident this vote is the right one--not just 
for this case, but as a precedent for future Congresses and 
Presidents too--I understand that reasonable people could reach 
the opposite conclusion. The bitterness in America on both 
sides of this debate has saddened me. I hope and pray that with 
this vote behind us the people's Congress can return without 
rancor to the important work of our country.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator George V. Voinovich

    Mr. VOINOVICH. Mr. Chief Justice, we are not here today 
because the President had a relationship that he himself has 
described as inappropriate and wrong. As House Manager James 
Rogan appropriately noted, ``Had the President's bad choice 
simply ended with this indiscretion, we would not be here 
today. Adultery may be a lot of things, but it is not an 
impeachable offense. Unfortunately, the President's bad choices 
only grew worse.'' It is not the President's inappropriate 
relationship, but his deliberate and willful attempts to 
conceal and mislead that bring us to this point.
    The very foundation of this Nation is the rule of law, not 
of men. The framers of our Constitution specifically provided 
article II, section 4 of the Constitution which states, ``The 
President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and 
Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.''
    On January 7, 1999, as one of my first official duties as a 
U.S. Senator, I took an oath to consider the evidence and 
arguments in the impeachment case against the President. We 
answered in the affirmative when the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court administered the following oath:

    Do you solemnly swear that in all things appertaining to the trial 
of the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton, President of the 
United States, now pending, you will do impartial justice according to 
the Constitution and laws, so help you God?

    I understood that the private inappropriate conduct of the 
President alone did not then and does not now rise to a level 
necessitating his removal from office. My responsibility is to 
fulfill the oath I took to determine impartially based on the 
facts, evidence, and testimony whether the President committed 
high crimes and misdemeanors as outlined in the Constitution.
    During my 33 years in public office, I have had to make 
some very difficult decisions. As Governor, I had to make 
determinations on hundreds of requests for commutations and 
pardons. To my recollection, in no case have I labored more 
than I have over the articles of impeachment of our President.
    After an exhaustive study, which included reading volumes 
of transcripts, watching the taped testimony and listening to 
the able arguments made by the House managers, the White House 
counsel, and my colleagues in the Senate, I have reached the 
conclusion that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the President 
committed both perjury and obstruction of justice as outlined 
in articles I and II in the articles of impeachment.
    I also have concluded that the President's obstruction of 
justice was premeditated and undertaken over a long period of 
time beginning when he learned that Monica Lewinsky was placed 
on the witness list in the Jones case.
    It is particularly disturbing that he used his brilliant 
mind and superb interpersonal skills to sweep other people into 
his scheme, thereby impairing their credibility, all to 
extricate himself from taking responsibility for his conduct. 
But for a conclusive DNA analysis, he may have succeeded in 
that scheme.
    By committing perjury and obstructing justice, the 
President is guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. As 
constitutional scholar Charles Cooper said, ``The crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, like the crimes of treason 
and bribery, are quintessentially offenses against our system 
of government, visiting injury immediately on society itself.''
    He violated his oath of office and failed to fulfill his 
responsibility under the Constitution, which provides that the 
President ``shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.'' Judge Griffin Bell has correctly noted, ``A 
president cannot faithfully execute the laws if he himself is 
breaking them.'' The President has undermined the fundamental 
principle that we are a nation ruled by laws and not by men. 
There is no way in good conscience that we as a nation can have 
a lawbreaker remain as President of the United States when his 
conduct in office has included the very same acts that have 
resulted in the impeachment of Federal judges and have sent 
hundreds of people to prison. Ours is a nation of equal justice 
under the law.
    I believe the framers of the Constitution had a President 
like Bill Clinton in mind when they drafted the impeachment 
provisions in article II, section 4--a very popular, brilliant 
communicator with extraordinary interpersonal skills who abuses 
his power, violates his oath of office, and evades 
responsibility for his actions because he believes he is above 
the law.
    One who has committed high crimes and misdemeanors 
disqualifies himself from serving as President, Commander in 
Chief, and chief law enforcement officer. The President also 
represents much more than these titles and responsibilities. He 
is a symbol of the greatness of the American people. 
Presidential scholar Clinton Rossiter observed that the 
President of the United States is ``the one-man distillation of 
the American people.'' And, President William Howard Taft 
described the President as ``the personal embodiment and 
representative of their dignity and majesty.''
    By virtue of his own conduct, William Jefferson Clinton has 
forfeited his elected right to hold the office of President. I 
sincerely believe that this country can survive the removal of 
a popular President who has forfeited public trust. But, our 
country cannot survive the abandonment of trust itself.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Frank R. Lautenberg

    Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. Chief Justice, the Senate must now 
fulfill a weighty and solemn duty. For only the second time in 
the more than 200 years since our Founding Fathers established 
the Constitution, we must vote on articles of impeachment 
against a President.
    When considering this issue, which goes to our core 
constitutional responsibilities as Senators, each of us must 
come to a conclusion based on his or her conscience. Guided by 
the Constitution, we must bring all of our moral beliefs, our 
education, our careers, and our experiences as public servants 
to the question. And we must try to reach a decision that will 
serve the best interests of the Nation for generations to come.
    As I reflect on the impeachment proceedings, I think first 
of the range of emotions I have felt. From the moment I 
realized that the President had engaged in this shameful 
relationship, I have struggled with my thoughts.
    I was angry, of course. I was ashamed for the President, a 
talented man--someone I consider a friend. How could he risk so 
much with his disgraceful behavior?
    I was saddened. I do not know how the President will 
reconcile himself to his family. I could imagine the 
embarrassment and the humiliation of the First Lady and his 
daughter Chelsea. I pitied them as they felt the searing glow 
of the public spotlight.
    I am sure that colleagues, on both sides of the aisle, have 
empathized with similar emotions.
    But now we must put those feelings aside. We have a very 
specific charge under the Constitution. That hallowed document 
delineates our duty. Under article II, section 4, we must 
determine whether the President has committed ``high Crimes or 
Misdemeanors'' requiring his removal from office.
    In my view, our Founding Fathers meant to set a very high 
standard for impeachment. Clearly, the phrase ``high Crimes or 
Misdemeanors'' does not include all crimes. But what are the 
crimes that meet that standard? I find the words of George 
Mason to be compelling. He understood the phrase to mean 
``great and dangerous offenses'' or ``attempts to subvert the 
Constitution.''
    When applying this standard, we must also consider the 
national interest. The Founding Fathers vested the impeachment 
power in the Senate, and not the judiciary, precisely because 
this body would be accountable to the people.
    In the words of Alexander Hamilton, only the Senate would 
``possess the degree of credit and authority'' required to act 
on the weighty issue of whether to remove a Federal official. 
In my view, this means that we must look not just at the facts 
and the law, but we must also try to determine what is in the 
best interests of the Nation.
    But we should not read the polls, or some other temporary 
gauge of the public temperament. Instead, we must look back 
through history, and toward the future, to reach a decision 
that will reflect well on the Senate and the Nation for 
generations to come.
    In my view, this case does not involve efforts to subvert 
the Constitution, and the national interest will not be served 
by removing the President from office.
    Before turning to the evidence, I want to express my 
concern with the way in which the articles of impeachment are 
written.
    They do not specify which statements and actions by the 
President are unlawful. Instead, they make general allegations. 
With this approach, we cannot fulfill our duty to the American 
people. The American people must know specifically what 
Presidential conduct justifies overturning an election.
    While the articles could have been more clearly written, 
there is a more fundamental problem. There is simply 
insufficient evidence for a vote to convict. Whether you apply 
the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt, or even the lower 
standard of clear and convincing evidence, the House managers 
have not proved their case.
    With regard to article I, the evidence does not support a 
charge of perjury. The President may have been uncooperative 
and evasive. He certainly was misleading. But he never 
committed perjury as that term is defined in the law. 
Consequently, the President should be acquitted on article I.
    There is also insufficient evidence to convict the 
President on article II, which charges him with obstruction of 
justice. The main problem with this article is that testimony 
from the principal witnesses do not support the allegations. 
Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, and Vernon Jordan testified that 
the President did not tamper with witnesses, conceal evidence, 
or take any other actions that would constitute obstruction of 
justice. All of the witnesses support the President's version 
of events.
    I realize that some of you may view the evidence 
differently. But I think we must still consider whether this is 
an appropriate case for the Senate to use the awesome power of 
impeachment to overturn a national election.
    I further ask you to consider the precedent we would set 
with a conviction of this President. We risk making the 
impeachment power another political weapon to be wielded in 
partisan battles.
    Our Founding Fathers warned against this. In ``The 
Federalist Papers'' No. 65, Alexander Hamilton noted that the 
prosecution of impeachable offenses would ``connect itself with 
the pre-existing factions.'' And that this would create ``the 
greatest danger, that the decision will be regulated more by 
the comparative strength of parties than by the real 
demonstrations of innocence or guilt.''
    Prior to the present case, the House of Representatives had 
seriously considered articles of impeachment against only two 
Presidents--Andrew Johnson and Richard Nixon. In the more than 
200 years since the Constitution was established, the House set 
the impeachment machinery in motion in only two occasions.
    Today, no one doubts that the serious abuses of our 
constitutional system by the Nixon administration warranted 
impeachment proceedings. And the bipartisan approach of 
Congress solidified President Nixon's decision to resign.
    But history has not been kind to those who pushed the 
impeachment of President Johnson upon the Nation. Scholars 
agree that the charges were baseless--a purely partisan 
campaign. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who has presided so 
effectively in this case, wrote in his book on impeachment that 
if the Senate had convicted President Johnson ``a long shadow 
would have been cast over the independence'' of the Presidency.
    So for most of our history, the fears of our Founding 
Fathers have not been realized. Congress has not resorted to 
impeachment even when previous administrations faced far-
ranging scandals--the Whiskey Ring scandal during the tenure of 
President Grant; the Teapot Dome scandal in the Harding 
administration, and more recently allegations that Presidents 
Reagan and Bush were not truthful regarding the Iran-Contra 
scandal.
    Historically, Congress has held its hand when circumstances 
might have warranted a pull of the impeachment lever. But 
contrast that history with the circumstances surrounding this 
case.
    President Clinton was a defendant in a civil lawsuit. In 
determining whether that lawsuit should be allowed to go 
forward while the President was in office, the Supreme Court of 
the United States noted that the case involved ``unofficial 
conduct.'' That case was eventually dismissed, and the 
plaintiff reached a settlement with the President.
    But with that lawsuit in place, the plaintiff's attorneys 
had license to probe into the President's personal life. The 
private lives of many people were paraded through the press.
    Then the independent counsel joined the hunt. Although he 
was originally appointed to investigate a real estate 
transaction in Arkansas, and even though he eventually cleared 
the President of any wrongdoing in that matter and other 
reckless accusations, the independent counsel turned his 
attention to a private affair.
    I think this background cautions against the use of the 
awesome and irrevocable power of impeachment. Think for a 
minute about how future partisans might proceed. We have a 
readily accessible legal system. Anyone with the filing fee can 
bring a lawsuit. And our laws provide great leeway in the 
discovery process.
    If we take the wrong path now, we can expect to see future 
Presidents hauled into court. They will be questioned 
repeatedly, and it will not be hard for skilled attorneys to 
hurl charges of perjury and obstruction of justice. We cannot 
allow the Presidency to be weakened in this way.
    Once again, we find the wisdom of our Founding Fathers 
providing guidance.
    James Wilson, who participated in the Philadelphia 
Convention at which the Constitution was drafted, observed that 
the President is ``amenable to [the law] in his private 
character as a citizen, and in his public character by 
impeachment.''
    In other words, the legal system, our civil and criminal 
laws provide the proper venue for a President who has failed in 
his private character, and in this case, the legal system can 
and will continue to address the President's personal 
transgressions.
    The Paula Jones lawsuit has been settled. When he leaves 
office, the President could be subject to further prosecution. 
But there is simply no injury to our constitutional system, no 
aspect of what James Wilson called the President's public 
character, which must be remedied through a Senate conviction 
under the impeachment power. Of course, I understand the great 
pain inflicted by the President's private character. As I said 
earlier, his behavior was reprehensible. He has shamed himself, 
his family, and the Nation.
    I understand the desire to punish the President for his 
conduct. But we must remember the many ways in which the 
President has already been punished. He has suffered enormous 
embarrassment and humiliation. Beyond that personal pain, he 
has also been subject to public condemnation. Every Member of 
Congress is on the record rebuking his behavior.
    Of course, this may not satisfy some. They may want more 
punishment. But please remember--the purpose of the impeachment 
power is not to punish. Instead, impeachment serves to protect 
the Nation from corrupt officials.
    So, to render a proper verdict, we must put aside the 
powerful desire to punish. And I submit that to impeach the 
President in this case would be a terrible use of the 
impeachment power, lacking proportionality and perspective.
    We must step back from the partisan precipice. We must not 
weaken the Presidency for future generations. We must reject 
these articles of impeachment and help restore the balance of 
power between the branches of the government.
    Let us put this matter behind, heal the wounds inflicted by 
partisanship, and rededicate ourselves to the challenges facing 
our Nation.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator Christopher S. Bond*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Bond submitted an additional statement on February 23, see p. 
3058 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. BOND. Mr. Chief Justice, on Friday, February 12, 1999, 
I voted to convict President William Jefferson Clinton on both 
counts of the impeachment articles brought by the U.S. House of 
Representatives charging that he committed perjury and 
obstruction of justice. My reasons follow.
    On January 16, 1998, at the request of the U.S. Attorney 
General Janet Reno, the three judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit expanded the 
previously entered order authorizing the Office of Independent 
Counsel Kenneth W. Starr to look into certain matters relating 
to a lawsuit brought against President William Jefferson 
Clinton by former Arkansas State employee Paula Jones alleging 
sexual harassment. Pursuant to that order, Ms. Jones' attorneys 
issued subpoenas for evidence and deposed Mr. Clinton and 
others seeking information on a pattern of conduct that might 
be relevant to the issues in the Jones case.
    The President denied in a deposition in the Jones case and 
in a forceful statement to the American public that he had 
sexual relations with ``that woman,'' referring to Monica 
Lewinsky. Subsequently, however, Ms. Lewinsky turned over a 
stained blue dress that she had worn in an encounter with the 
President; a scientific examination revealed that the DNA on 
the dress was President Clinton's DNA.
    The Office of Independent Counsel convened a Federal grand 
jury to look into the matter and deposed Mr. Clinton in the 
White House on August 17, 1998, about his participation in the 
Jones lawsuit.
    The Office of Independent Counsel then referred the matters 
developed in the investigation to the U.S. House of 
Representatives, which on December 19, 1998, voted two articles 
of impeachment against Mr. Clinton alleging that he committed 
perjury before the Federal grand jury in four instances and 
that on seven occasions he had obstructed justice by tampering 
with witnesses and evidence in the Jones case proceedings.
    For the sake of brevity, I shall only cover several of the 
allegations and evaluate the evidence supporting them.
    Counsel for the President has admitted that there was an 
inappropriate relationship between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky and that they had concocted a cover story to conceal 
their relationship and activities. On December 17, 1997, at 
approximately 2 a.m., Mr. Clinton telephoned Ms. Lewinsky after 
he learned that she had been summoned for a deposition in the 
Jones case. According to this testimony he called to tell her 
of the death of the brother of Mr. Clinton's secretary. Ms. 
Lewinsky states that he told her about the death of the 
brother, but that he also reminded her of their cover story and 
notified her that she was included on the witness list in the 
Jones case.
    According to Ms. Lewinsky's testimony, Mr. Clinton further 
stated that they might be able to avoid her testimony if she 
executed an affidavit. Although Mr. Clinton had also reminded 
Ms. Lewinsky of her cover story, the White House counsel made 
much of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky said that the President did 
not tell her to file a false affidavit and did not link the 
cover story to the need to file an affidavit.
    I do not believe it is at all inconsistent with a scheme or 
out of the ordinary to note that the President would not make 
such a connection. As an experienced attorney, the President 
would know he would be in grave danger if he ever explicitly 
asked anyone to file a false affidavit or to lie under oath. To 
paraphrase a statement made during the trial by Vernon Jordan, 
``He is no fool.'' He would have known that such a statement 
could be revealed by subsequent judicial inquiry.
    Mr. Clinton did not have to tell Ms. Lewinsky expressly to 
execute a false affidavit. She knew that in the absence of 
contrary instructions she was to continue to follow their 
story. She was referred by the President's best friend, Vernon 
Jordan, to an attorney who drafted the affidavit for her. The 
President, through Mr. Jordan, was kept advised of the progress 
of the affidavit.
    During the time that Mr. Jordan was serving as liaison 
between the attorney and the President in the procuring of the 
affidavit, he was also pursuing a job search for Ms. Lewinsky, 
which he admitted was under his control.
    The President's lawyer was presented the affidavit and 
offered it into the evidence when the President was summoned 
before federal judge Susan Webber Wright to participate in the 
deposition on January 17, 1998, by the Jones attorneys. The 
President's attorney, Mr. Bennett, referred to the deposition 
in evidence and stated that it showed that there ``is 
absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form'' 
with Mr. Clinton. Mr. Bennett further stated, ``In preparation 
of the witness for this deposition, the witness (Mr. Clinton) 
is fully aware of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, for I have not told 
him a single thing he doesn't know. . . .'' (Evidentiary 
Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. XIV, p. 23.) Although the videotape 
of the deposition showed the President looking in the direction 
of the attorney when the affidavit was presented, Mr. Clinton 
subsequently stated that he was not paying attention and had no 
knowledge of the representations made by his attorney about the 
affidavit.
    I believe that to be totally incredible.
    The President had known that Ms. Lewinsky would be a prime 
subject of the deposition and he had asked Ms. Lewinsky to file 
an affidavit and took steps to be kept advised of the progress 
of that affidavit. Subsequent events showed that his attorney, 
Mr. Bennett, did not at the time know the falsity of the 
affidavit and that Mr. Clinton was apparently the only one at 
the deposition who was fully aware of the fraud that was being 
perpetrated on the court.
    When Mr. Bennett later learned the falsity of the 
affidavit, he did what any attorney hates to do and that is to 
advise the court that he provided false information. He asked 
that the affidavit and his characterization of it be 
disregarded.
    I believe Mr. Clinton encouraged the execution of a false 
affidavit, secured job assistance to help prevent truthful 
testimony, and allowed his attorney to make false statements as 
alleged in article II, paragraphs 1, 4, and 5.
    When Mr. Clinton testified before the Federal grand jury on 
August 17, 1998, he was asked:

    A. If he misled Judge Wright in some way then you would have 
corrected the record and said, excuse me Mr. Bennett, I think the judge 
is getting a mis-impression by what you are saying?
    A. . . . I wasn't even paying much attention to this conversation.
    Q. Do you believe, Mr. President, that you have an obligation to 
make sure that the presiding federal judge was on board and had the 
correct facts?
    A. I don't believe I ever even focused on what Mr. Bennett said in 
the exact words he did until I started reading this transcript 
carefully for this deposition.--(Deposition of President Clinton, page 
30, lines 2-5.)

    I therefore believe he provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to the Federal grand jury concerning 
statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge 
as alleged in article I, paragraph 3.
    On December 28, 1997, the President met in his White House 
office with Ms. Lewinsky and exchanged gifts. During the course 
of the conversation Ms. Lewinsky raised the question of what to 
do with other gifts he had provided her and which had been 
subpoenaed by the attorneys for Paula Jones. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky, he made no definitive statement about the gifts.
    Very shortly thereafter, according to Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony, Mr. Clinton's personal secretary, Bettie Currie, 
initiated a series of telephone conversations, in which in 
effect Ms. Currie communicated to Ms. Lewinsky that she 
understood from the President that Ms. Lewinsky had something 
for her. Pursuant to those telephone calls Ms. Currie picked up 
gifts from Ms. Lewinsky and took them back to Ms. Currie's 
apartment where she stored them under her bed.
    During the course of proceedings in the Senate, Ms. 
Lewinsky was asked in a deposition about these telephone calls 
and expanded upon her testimony about them. A prior statement 
by Ms. Currie that Ms. Lewinsky had actually initiated the call 
was recanted by Ms. Currie, and I believe the testimony of Ms. 
Lewinsky is credible. By hiding the gifts rather than 
presenting them to the Jones attorneys pursuant to the 
subpoena, Ms. Lewinsky committed a felonious act and, if Ms. 
Currie had knowledge of the subpoena, she also committed a 
felonious act of concealing materials covered by a valid 
subpoena. Mr. Clinton, by orchestrating, facilitating, and 
encouraging the suppression of evidence under subpoena, also 
committed a felonious act. I, therefore, believe that the 
charge in article II, paragraph 3, of the impeachment articles 
is proven.
    During the course of his deposition by the Jones attorneys, 
President Clinton continued to rely on his cover story and on 
the perjurious affidavit submitted by Ms. Lewinsky. During that 
deposition he referred repeatedly to Ms. Currie as one who 
would corroborate the cover story which he and Ms. Lewinsky had 
devised. Immediately after his testimony on Saturday, January 
17, 1998, he called Ms. Currie and summoned her to come into 
his office on a Sunday, January 18, 1998. There he stated five 
rhetorical questions to Ms. Currie: (1) ``I was never really 
alone with her . . . right?''; (2) ``You were always there when 
Monica was there . . . right?''; (3) Monica came to see me and 
I never touched her right . . . right?''; (4) ``She wanted to 
have sex with me and I can't do that . . . ?''; (5) ``You could 
see and hear everything . . . right?''
    Each of these statements supported the position taken by 
the President in the Jones deposition, but each one of these 
statements was false. The President was transmitting to Ms. 
Currie what he wanted her to say should she be called as a 
witness in this case. For good measure, he even went back to 
her a couple of days later and walked her through the 
statements again. It is uncontroverted that he made those 
statements, but he attempted to justify them on the basis that 
he was trying to refresh his memory.
    His statements to Ms. Currie on January 18, 1998, and 
several days later constituted relating a false and misleading 
account of relevant events to influence corruptly the testimony 
of a witness in a Federal civil rights action as alleged in 
article II, paragraph 6, of the impeachment proceedings.
    Subsequently, he also made statements to his subordinates 
including Sidney Blumenthal, John Podesta, and Erskine Bowles. 
The statements he made to them were also known by him to be 
false and were designed to provide misleading information 
through them which could be and subsequently was transmitted 
under oath in the judicial proceedings by the subordinates.
    His statements to his subordinates on January 21, 23, and 
26, 1998, were false and misleading statements to potential 
witnesses in a Federal grand jury proceeding to influence 
corruptly the testimony of those witnesses as alleged in 
article II, section 7, of the articles of impeachment.
    At his Federal grand jury testimony on August 17, 1998, Mr. 
Clinton falsely and corruptly denied he had attempted to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and impede the discovery 
of evidence in civil rights actions as set out in the analysis 
above. Thus, he committed the acts as charged in article I, 
paragraph 4, the count charging perjury. (Evidentiary Record, 
S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. III, pp. 559-60.)
    I believe that the evidence presented on the above charges 
was clear and convincing that the President engaged in a 
continuing scheme to fabricate and establish in Federal court 
proceedings a false story about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky and that through circumstantial evidence, the direct 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky, Ms. Currie, Mr. Blumenthal, and 
others, plus the corroborating evidence, he was shown to have 
committed the acts charged.
    The totality of his actions can be judged in the success 
with which he maintained his cover story. Had it not been for 
the DNA on the stained dress, there is little likelihood that 
the false cover story would have been exposed for the lie that 
it was. In perpetrating that false and misleading story Mr. 
Clinton tampered with witnesses, obstructing justice in the 
civil rights lawsuit brought against him by Paula Jones. He 
also falsely misrepresented these acts in testimony before the 
grand jury August 17, 1998.
    Having resolved in my mind the question that clear and 
convincing evidence shows that William Jefferson Clinton 
obstructed justice and committed perjury before a grand jury, 
the next issue is whether these activities rise to the level of 
offenses for which removal from office is the appropriate 
remedy. Defenders of the President have said that no one would 
press charges in a case like this, that it was not grave enough 
to merit a criminal proceeding, and that it certainly was not 
sufficient to warrant removing the President from office.
    With respect to the seriousness of the offense, it is 
worthy of note that during the year 1997, 182 people were 
sentenced by Federal judges for perjury and another 144 were 
sentenced for obstruction and witness tampering. These 
prosecutions were brought by Clinton administration appointees 
and in many instances in front of Clinton-appointed judges.
    The case of Dr. Barbara Battaglia is particularly 
compelling. In a lawsuit brought by a patient of a Veterans' 
Administration hospital alleging sexual harassment, Dr. 
Battaglia was asked in a deposition if she had had consensual 
sex with the plaintiff. Her answer to that question was a 
simple, ``No.'' When that denial was shown to be a lie, she was 
convicted of a felony and sentenced to house arrest with an 
electronic monitoring device. She has lost her ability to 
practice medicine and also her ability to utilize her law 
degree to practice law.
    The serious nature of these offenses is particularly clear 
when considered in the context of the proceedings. The U.S. 
Supreme Court had ruled unanimously that Mr. Clinton, as 
President, had to answer the lawsuit filed by Paula Jones. A 
Federal judge was assigned to the suit and presided over the 
deposition in which Mr. Clinton testified and at which time he 
and his lawyer presented the false affidavit.
    It is totally inconsistent within the context of this case 
and the sound functioning of the judicial system to say that 
the Supreme Court meant that Mr. Clinton should respond to 
these charges but he was not bound to respond truthfully. His 
actions in procuring and using false affidavits, causing the 
hiding of subpoenaed evidence, and tampering with a potential 
witness by giving false information to use in any testimony 
effectively denied the plaintiff the civil rights the Supreme 
Court ruled she had. To say that the acts are not grave, not 
high crimes, and not a threat to the judicial system, is 
untenable. No lawyer could make such a statement in open court 
and not be subjected to the loss of a license to practice law.
    Likewise, his lies to a grand jury from his White House 
office were a serious challenge to the administration of 
justice.
    Moreover, the debates of the authors of the Constitution 
showed that they considered obstructing justice would warrant 
the President's impeachment and conviction. George Mason asked 
if the President could advise someone to commit a crime and 
then before an indictment or conviction use the power of a 
pardon to stop inquiry and prevent detection. James Madison 
responded that, ``If the President be connected, in any 
suspicious manner, with any person, and there be grounds to 
believe he will shelter him, the House of Representatives can 
impeach him.'' (Elliott, ``Debates on the Adoption of the 
Federal Constitution,'' Vol. III, p. 498 (1836 ed.).)
    Another argument has also been made by the White House 
counsel and supporters of the President that to remove the 
President from office on impeachment would be to nullify the 
election. This argument suggests that impeachment is never an 
appropriate remedy, provided the President is popular and the 
country is enjoying good times. The office of the Presidency is 
not so brittle that it would be gravely damaged by removing the 
current President or any other President. The Founding Fathers 
certainly did not envision that impeachment could only apply to 
an unpopular President or one who was leading the country in 
hard times.
    At the height of a cold war with United States forces 
engaged in Vietnam, impeachment proceedings against President 
Richard M. Nixon forced him to leave office. The country was 
not wounded, it did not lose its way; Vice President Gerald 
Ford assumed the Presidency and continued the course of 
government. In this case, Vice President Al Gore would assume 
office and would be expected to continue the policies of the 
Clinton administration.
    The U.S. Senate in recent years did not shirk from driving 
from office a colleague accused of obstructing justice in a 
sexual harassment case. No one objected that we had 
``nullified'' the votes of the citizens of his State.
    Some of my colleagues have argued that the President has 
been so strong and forceful in foreign policy and conducted 
such wise relations with other nations that we could not afford 
to lose him. That argument, too, smacks of a referendum on the 
President's conduct of office, not a judgment on his wrongful 
acts. If we were to judge impeachment on the basis of the 
policies of the President, then impeachment could always be 
expected to be purely a partisan matter turning on the approval 
or disapproval of formulation or implementation of policy by 
the President. The framers rightfully dismissed any option that 
the proper or improper administration of the regular powers of 
the President would be involved in a decision on impeachment, 
either positively or negatively.
    In addition, we have the precedents set by the removal by 
the Senate of judges who have been found to have committed 
perjury. During my tenure in the Senate we have twice removed 
judges for committing perjury because of the serious adverse 
impact perjury has on our judicial system. If a judge is 
removable for committing the significant act of perjury, can 
the one who appoints the judge be held to a lower standard?
    The President not only appoints the judges, he appoints the 
Attorney General, the U.S. attorneys, and the Supreme Court 
Justices. Certainly we should impose no lower standard on the 
person with the ultimate responsibility for the proper 
administration of justice than on those he appoints.
    It is precisely in good times, with the President high in 
the polls, that it is incumbent upon the Senate to exercise 
very thoroughly and carefully the responsibility under the 
Constitution to make the difficult decision on whether the 
President has committed high crimes and misdemeanors warranting 
his removal from office. If we are to have a government of laws 
and not of men and not of public opinion polls, then we must 
judge the President on the evidence presented to us. I believe 
that the acts that he committed constitute high crimes and 
misdemeanors warranting his conviction.
    I should note that the Senate made a serious mistake in 
beginning the proceedings by limiting the ability of the House 
managers to call witnesses. The absence of witnesses to testify 
to the acts alleged as the basis of impeachment charges 
significantly impeded the progress toward resolving the 
allegations against the President. I trust that the Senate will 
not make the same mistake in future impeachment proceedings.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                  Statement of Senator Charles S. Robb

    Mr. ROBB. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, sitting in 
judgment of the President of the United States is not easy for 
any of us. It is particularly difficult for me because of the 
personal and political relationship I have had with this 
President over the last 20 years. We served together as 
Governors in the early eighties, as several of you did. We 
traveled together on foreign trade missions. We shared similar 
priorities for our States. At my urging, he joined the 
fledgling Democratic Leadership Council, which would later 
become an intellectual and organizational resource for his 
Presidential campaign.
    From our earliest meetings, I recognized in him, as many of 
you have recognized, gifts of head and heart and a truly 
extraordinary range of political and communication skills that 
marked him with a potential for greatness. It was not as a 
friend, however, but as a U.S. Senator that I took an oath to 
render impartial justice under the Constitution in this 
impeachment trial. I was fully prepared to convict and remove 
the President from office if I concluded that the articles 
charged met the test of high crimes and misdemeanors as 
envisioned by the framers of our Constitution, and if the 
evidence convinced me of his guilt beyond any reasonable doubt. 
That is the standard I would require to remove this President 
or any President from office.
    As we wrestle with the decisions before us today, I believe 
that it is incumbent upon us to reflect on the consequence of 
these decisions tomorrow; for while this trial is about this 
President, it is also about the future of this Republic. We 
simply cannot escape the fact that what we do today will affect 
the strength and stability of our Nation because the actions we 
take, the precedent we set, directly affects the separation of 
powers and the independence of the Presidency as an 
institution.
    The writings of the framers and the overwhelming consensus 
of the scholarship that has followed demonstrate that the 
mechanism for removing a President was central to maintaining 
the delicate balance of power among the three branches of 
government. The Founding Fathers struggled to resolve the 
tension between making it too difficult to remove a President, 
thereby creating a king, and making it too easy, thereby 
creating a weak Chief Executive who would serve at the pleasure 
of the legislature. As more than 400 scholars concluded last 
November, the lower the threshold for impeachment, the weaker 
the President.
    The resolution of this dilemma--where to set the standard 
for removal--occupied the brilliant minds of several Virginians 
who took part in our constitutional debates two centuries ago. 
When George Mason offered specific language to define an 
impeachment standard, James Madison worried about making the 
standard too low. In worrying, he replied that so vague a term 
would be equivalent to a tenure at the pleasure of the Senate. 
After much deliberation, our founders finally agreed that the 
President should be removed only for committing treason, 
bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors against the 
United States. Thereafter, as we all know, a Committee on 
Style, which had no authority to make substantive changes, 
dropped the last four words, considering them redundant.
    Alexander Hamilton defined impeachable activities as those 
that relate chiefly to the injuries done immediately to society 
itself. During the debate, Edmund Randolph, a Virginia 
Governor, reflected concerns. He stated that the Executive will 
have great opportunities of abusing his power, particularly in 
time of war when the military force and, in some respects, the 
public's money will be in his hands. Clearly, our founders 
created impeachment not to punish the President, but to protect 
the Republic. They had lived under a king and they didn't want 
another.
    History and common sense tell us, therefore, that the 
threshold for impeachment should be high--very high. It should 
be difficult, not easy, to impeach a President of the United 
States because impeachment is the ultimate sanction for 
protecting the Republic. It is a weapon to be respected and 
feared, but wielded only under the most compelling 
circumstances. Similarly, history and common sense tell us that 
removing a President is not the same as removing a Federal 
judge. In James Madison's records of the debate at the Federal 
Constitutional Convention, he wrote, ``The judiciary hold their 
places not for a limited time, but during good behavior.'' The 
Executive was to hold his place for a limited term, like the 
members of the legislature.
    Like them--particularly the Senate, whose Members would 
continue in appointment in the same term of 6 years--he would 
periodically be tried for his behavior by his electors, who 
would continue or discontinue him in trust, according to the 
manner in which he had discharged it. Likewise, removing a 
President is not the same as removing a member of the Armed 
Forces for violating the military code of conduct. The Uniform 
Code of Military Justice is required to maintain the good order 
and discipline for waging war and securing peace. And all of us 
who have served in the Armed Forces understood that we swore an 
oath to obey a code not required of any civilian, even those 
with the power to send us into harm's way--a civilian Commander 
in Chief, our Secretary of Defense, and Members of Congress.
    Finally, removing a President is not the same as punishing 
a citizen in a court of law. Like any citizen, a President can 
be fully punished in court after he leaves office, and the 
failure to convict him in an impeachment trial in no way 
precludes a subsequent criminal prosecution.
    If a President is subject to the law, then he is clearly 
not above it, as some have claimed.
    Some also argued that since the President's oath requires 
him to faithfully execute the laws, any violation of those laws 
should thereby warrant his removal from office. While that 
argument may be appealing, it simply was not the standard 
adopted by the framers. Their standard was narrowly confined to 
treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors. And it 
is against this standard that we are called upon to judge the 
conduct of this President.
    I believe the President lied. When he came before the 
television cameras and addressed the American people, wagging 
his finger and denying that he had sexual relations with a 
subordinate employee, he lied. This offensive public conduct, 
which has caused me the greatest personal anguish, is an act 
that will be forever seared into our Nation's memory. His 
deception was calculated, politically motivated, and directed 
at each and every one of us.
    Though clearly reprehensible, this lie did not violate any 
law and was not the subject of any article of impeachment. So, 
while I am convinced that the President lied to us, I am not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he lied to the grand 
jury, which is the sole basis for the first of the two 
impeachment articles.
    Despite the apparent strength of the evidence, the House of 
Representatives defeated an article alleging perjury in the 
President's civil deposition. They voted to impeach the 
President for perjury based solely on his testimony before the 
grand jury. Article I alleges that the President willfully 
provided perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury.
    I listened intently to the arguments presented by both 
sides, and I have read the President's grand jury testimony 
carefully. In my judgment, the President's grand jury testimony 
ultimately boiled down to a few irreconcilable discrepancies, 
and while often slippery, hairsplitting, legalistic, and, in 
the words of the President's counsel, ``maddening,'' was not 
perjurious beyond a reasonable doubt.
    On article I, therefore, I will vote not guilty.
    Article II alleges obstruction of justice, a crime 
difficult to prove because it requires a determination beyond a 
reasonable doubt about what a person intended by his words or 
deeds.
    In this case, it is extremely difficult to determine 
whether the President's intentions were to obstruct justice in 
a civil or a criminal proceeding, or whether his intention was 
to mislead his family and the Nation about an embarrassing 
personal relationship. While his intent is difficult to prove, 
the unconstitutional bundling of charges contained in article 
II is clear to me.
    Article I, section 3, of the Constitution clearly requires 
that in an impeachment trial no person shall be convicted 
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present. 
The rule of law requires concurrence by two-thirds.
    While article I, in my judgment, violates this 
constitutional requirement, at least it focuses on a single 
event. Article II is flagrantly worse. Drafted in the 
disjunctive and containing 7 subparts each alleging a separate 
act of obstruction of justice, the bundling of these 
allegations would allow removal of the President if only 10 
Senators agreed on each of the 7 separate subparts. If, for 
example, 10 Senators voted to convict based solely on subpart 1 
and a different group of 10 Senators voted to convict based on 
subpart 2, and so on, it would be possible to reach a total of 
70 votes for conviction. But that total would not have been 
reached with a two-thirds concurrence on any individual 
subpart.
    Such a pleading is not allowed under the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure and would be thrown out by every Federal 
court in the land. Surely the founders did not envision 
removing a President from office if no more than 10 Senators 
could agree on a given allegation.
    Trying to justify this unconstitutional bundling by citing 
a similar approach in the Richard Nixon case is weak because 
the Nixon charges were not presented to the Senate. Trying to 
justify this unconstitutional bundling by citing the Senate 
impeachment rules is no more compelling since our rules cannot 
conflict with the Constitution. We simply cannot remove a 
President from office with an article of impeachment that so 
clearly violates constitutional standards that we are required 
by law to follow.
    On article II, therefore, I will vote not guilty.
    Thus, I will vote not to convict on both articles because 
the factual, legal, and constitutional standard for removal was 
not met.
    I am not prepared to say, however, that perjury and 
obstruction of justice are not impeachable offenses, because I 
believe it would be a mistake to attempt to do that which the 
founders chose not to do--to define what is impeachable with 
specificity.
    For impeachment to remain what our forefathers intended it 
to be--a deterrent to misconduct and a means to protect the 
Republic--future generations should be free in each case to 
examine the facts, apply the law, and follow the Constitution 
and to render impartial justice. That is the impeachment 
process we have inherited from those who came before us, and 
that is the precedent we bequeath to the ongoing chronicles of 
American history.
    The legacy of this trial, I believe, is not what becomes of 
one man. This trial is larger than one man. The legacy of this 
trial is that the Senate, sitting as a Court of Impeachment, 
proved worthy of the faith of our founders to render justice.
    No matter what judgment is rendered, however, this trial 
cannot exonerate the President. A vote against conviction is 
not a vote to condone his lying to the American people, nor 
does it suggest that any Member of the U.S. Senate believes 
that perjury or obstruction of justice charges are anything but 
serious. They are very serious charges.
    Sadly, the vote we are poised to take on these charges has 
divided our Nation. In the eyes of too many of our citizens, 
this vote will represent either a nonmilitary coup attempt 
against a duly elected President or a victory for those bent on 
accelerating the moral decline of the Nation. In truth, this 
vote represents neither. A vote for acquittal indicates nothing 
more and nothing less than what it says. The case to remove the 
President from office was not proven.
    We sit in judgment today not because we are free from human 
failings--I certainly have my share--but because our 
forefathers bestowed upon the Senate the responsibility of 
protecting the Republic by judging the President when articles 
of impeachment are exhibited by the House of Representatives. 
In doing so, they carefully and deliberately limited the scope 
of our judgment.
    We are judging the President in his capacity as President, 
and we are called upon to decide only one issue--whether he 
should be removed from office. The Senate does not have the 
duty nor the capacity to rule on the broader character of the 
President. In our limited role, we are not called upon to judge 
him as husband and father, for that is the province of his 
family. We are not called upon to judge him as accused citizen, 
for that is the province of the courts. We are not called upon 
to judge him as sinner, for that is the province of God. And we 
are not called upon to judge his legacy, for that is the 
province of history.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Barbara Boxer

    Mrs. BOXER. Mr. Chief Justice, thank you for your dignity. 
And to both our leaders, thank you for your patience.
    Colleagues, I will vote to acquit the President, and it is 
not because his poll numbers are high or because the economy is 
good. And it is not because Bill Clinton is a Democrat.
    When I was in the House of Representatives, an impeachment 
resolution was filed against Republican President Ronald 
Reagan--an impeachment resolution because of Iran-contra, which 
involved selling arms to a terrorist nation with the proceeds 
going to the Nicaraguan contras. This was against the law of 
the United States of America--against the law--against the rule 
of law.
    I voted for that law, but I never went on that impeachment 
resolution against Ronald Reagan because I felt it would have 
hurt the country and because there was no bipartisan support 
for it.
    I think the same should be said of this impeachment. There 
is no bipartisan support for it and the President's removal 
would hurt the country.
    One more preface: It has been said that what the President 
did in this case was worse than what Senator Packwood did.
    In this case, we have a consensual affair, wanted by both 
parties. It was irresponsible and indefensible: a young woman, 
a relationship wrong in every way, a President trying 
desperately to hide the affair.
    The young woman was secretly tape-recorded and forced to 
testify. Her mother was forced to testify.
    The more than 20 women who complained about Senator 
Packwood alleged forced sexual misconduct against them. One 
victim was 17 years old. They wanted to tell their stories.
    So each of us can decide for himself or herself the 
relationship of one case to the other. But surely that is not 
the issue before us.
    Neither is the Paula Jones case, which was thrown out of 
court by a Republican female judge who ruled that there was no 
sexual harassment by the President. Testimony about a 
consensual sexual affair was immaterial.
    Yes, the case was later settled, but that doesn't change 
its history: no sexual harassment, determined by a Republican 
female judge.
    So Senator Packwood is not before us, nor is Paula Jones. 
What is before us is the sanctity of the Constitution.
    Let me now offer an apology to my constituents for voting 
in favor of the independent counsel law in its current form--a 
law that has given one person an unlimited budget, unlimited 
scope, unlimited time and an unlimited ability to hurt people, 
and to hurt them badly.
    The Senate is now sitting as a Court of Impeachment, 
primarily because, for over 4 years, we had an independent 
counsel spending more than $42 million searching for an 
impeachable offense.
    And while I condemn the President's behavior, it was no 
excuse for the Ken Starr witchhunt, which went from a real 
estate deal, to several other fruitless investigations, to a 
sex deal built around illegally recorded phone conversations 
with someone named Linda Tripp. Linda Tripp, who says she's 
like all of us. Heaven help us if all of us act like Linda 
Tripp, secretly recording our dear friends. What a country this 
would be!
    I also want to comment on one other matter which is 
personal to me, and that is my daughter's family connection to 
the First Lady.
    While none of my Senate colleagues questioned the propriety 
of my participation in the impeachment matter--for which I 
thank you all--I was the target of a barrage of questions by 
the media and others outside this body.
    I just want to say that yes, my daughter is married to the 
First Lady's brother, a brother who loves and admires his 
sister and doesn't want to see her hurt. So I am far from being 
a defender of the President's behavior.
    I am a fierce defender of our Constitution. That is why I 
have joined a small number of Senators, led by the 
distinguished senator from West Virginia, in fighting 
amendments to that precious document.
    Believe me, being against the line-item veto and the 
balanced budget amendment were not popular positions in my 
State; my positions made my reelection tougher. But I have 
never doubted that defending the Constitution is worth risking 
my Senate seat, which I cherish so much, and it is because of 
my deep reverence for the Constitution that I believe we must 
reject the articles of impeachment before us today.
    Why? Because the high crimes and misdemeanors 
constitutional requirement for removal has not been met--not 
even close.
    The Constitution does not say remove the President if he 
fails to be a role model for our children. It does not say 
remove the President if he violates the military code of 
conduct, or the Senate Ethics Code. It does not say remove the 
President if he brings pain to his family.
    It says very clearly that the President shall be impeached 
and removed from office only for committing treason, bribery or 
other high crimes and misdemeanors.
    In his ``Commentaries on the Constitution,'' Justice Joseph 
Story endorsed the view that ``those offenses which may be 
committed equally by a private person as a public officer are 
not the subject of impeachment.'' This means that Presidential 
impeachable offenses are, generally, acts which could not be 
done by anyone other than the President.
    Impeachment and removal from office was not meant to be a 
punishment of the President, but rather a protection of the 
country from a tyrant who would use his or her power against 
the people and the Constitution.
    This President is not a tyrant who is threatening our 
democracy and freedom or the delicate balance of powers set up 
by our Constitution. So the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' 
standard established by the Constitution has not been met in my 
view.
    We must also reject these articles because there is every 
reason to doubt the House managers' case on perjury and 
obstruction of justice. They have presented not one shred of 
direct evidence for their claims, and the details of their 
circumstantial case have been decimated in many respects. As 
one manager said on national television, he couldn't win the 
case in a court of law as it was presented in the House.
    I don't see how the case was strengthened in the Senate. In 
fact, I believe that it was weakened in the Senate.
    When you have clear statements by Monica Lewinsky that the 
President never, ever told her to hide gifts and never 
discussed the contents of her affidavit--when you have Betty 
Currie saying she never felt intimidated by the President and 
Vernon Jordan saying the job search was never connected to 
anything else--it seems to me there is substantial doubt on 
both counts.
    That leads to another point. Rejecting these articles of 
impeachment does not place this President above the law. As the 
Constitution clearly says, he remains subject to the laws of 
the land just like any other citizen of the United States.
    As article I, section 3 of the Constitution says, the 
President ``shall . . . be liable and subject to Indictment, 
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.'' So it 
should be a comfort to those who believe the President 
committed crimes surrounding his affair that the President, 
indeed, is subject to the rule of law--our founders made that 
certain.
    At this point, I want to thank Senator Tom Harkin for his 
challenge to the House managers that the Senate is not a jury. 
In so ruling, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in my view, gave us the 
charge to look at the big picture, and that is very important.
    Part of that picture is how the House of Representatives 
acted in this matter. I served in the House for 10 years, and I 
never saw the minority party denied a vote on an alternative of 
their choosing in an important matter. Yet Democrats and 
moderate Republicans were denied a vote on censure, and I 
believe this was a disaster for democracy in that body.
    Listen to what a Republican House Member who voted against 
impeachment wrote to a constituent:

    I regret that congressional Republicans were so blinded by their 
opposition to President Clinton that they voted to impeach him rather 
than stand by the traditional principles of their party. I also regret 
that threats were made against me by the Republican leadership in an 
attempt to keep me from voting my conscience.

    Those are the words of one of the five brave Republicans 
who voted against impeachment in the House. To me that speaks 
volumes about the kind of illegitimate process that got us 
here, and I believe in my heart that history will judge the 
House proceedings very harshly.
    I believe the Senate, if it rejects the articles in a 
bipartisan way, will be viewed in a better light, and history 
will say that in 1999 the Senate decided that impeachment 
should not be used by one party to overturn the results of a 
Presidential election that it did not like.
    As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote of the Senate acquittal of 
President Andrew Johnson in 1868:

    The importance of the acquittal can hardly be overstated. With 
respect to the Chief Executive, it has meant that as to the policies he 
sought to pursue, he would be answerable only to the country as a whole 
in the quadrennial Presidential elections, and not to Congress through 
the process of impeachment.

    If I may, Mr. Chief Justice, I understand from your wise 
words that the President does not and should not serve at the 
pleasure of the House and Senate.
    The Senate did the right thing in 1868--and by its decision 
not to remove the President, it brought stability to our 
Nation. We should do no less now.
    Voting against the articles of impeachment is the right 
thing to do to keep faith with our Constitution and to keep 
faith with our democracy for generations to come.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Connie Mack

    Mr. MACK. Mr. Chief Justice, today the Senate finds itself 
at an unlikely crossroads in American history. We have 
assembled as a Court of Impeachment to sit in judgment of our 
President, William Jefferson Clinton, on the charges of perjury 
and obstruction of justice. We have worked our will in this 
matter according to a process rooted in English common law, 
written by our founders into the Constitution, and exercised 
against the Chief Executive only once before in American 
history.
    This is not a task to be taken lightly, and we have not 
arrived easily at our decision. The Senate today is engaged in 
weighty struggles that go to the very heart of our private and 
public lives. We are at an unlikely juncture between principle 
and public opinion, repentance and the rule of law, perception 
and punishment, forgiveness and findings of fact. These are 
difficult issues, Mr. Chief Justice. We approach our task fully 
aware that our decisions today will reverberate across this 
great land and throughout the length and breadth of history.
    There has been much discussion about how we got here. And 
while the answer to that question may be varied in all its 
permutations, then amplified in the echo chamber that is our 
modern public debate, it can be said with assurance that this 
whole unseemly business began when the President, caught in an 
improper private act, took deliberate steps to conceal it. And 
for all the other parties blamed for our presence here today--
the media, the independent counsel, the political factions 
opposed to the President, the House of Representatives--it must 
be clearly understood that this process began with the 
deliberate and willful acts of the President of the United 
States to lie in a Supreme Court sanctioned civil rights 
inquiry and obstruct the due course of justice. It all started 
with the high-handed disregard for the law exhibited by the 
Nation's Chief Executive. It ends today.
    Mr. Chief Justice, when the sound and fury of the moment 
has passed, and this episode can be observed with the 
objectivity that comes with the passage of time, I believe it 
will be self-evident that we have followed the Constitution to 
the best of our abilities. In a free, democratic society such 
as ours, the foundation of freedom is an independent judiciary, 
the rule of law, and most importantly the Constitution. Our 
Constitution is the framework for American society, and I have 
been constantly reminded throughout these proceedings of the 
importance of our duty to honor the dignity of this document.
    The magnitude of this undertaking deserves no less than a 
sincerity of purpose and an absolute confidence in the wisdom 
of our founders. The American people should not be swayed by 
those who argue the prominence of this case--in all its tawdry 
and unseemly detail--has made unnecessary a thorough process of 
determining the truth. We stand in judgment of the President. 
Our decisions will be remembered throughout history. Our 
precedent may be followed by future Senates. Yet still we have 
heard throughout this exercise the unfortunate call to end 
these proceedings, save a few weeks, and inject the politics of 
expediency into a monumental Constitutional undertaking. I find 
these arguments display a remarkable lack of confidence in the 
sound and just system outlined by our founders to address very 
serious charges levied against the President of the United 
States.
    I am grateful the Senate rejected those calls and put in 
place a responsible mechanism for the thorough airing of fact 
and argument. I am confident our process during this trial, 
though far from perfect, was appropriate. We allowed time for 
detailed presentations on the part of the House of 
Representatives and the President. We held an extensive 
question-and-answer session to review and clarify matters 
presented by both sides. And we have allowed for the 
appropriate and necessary deposition of key witnesses. 
Unfortunately, the simple fact is that the outcome of this 
matter was, in many minds, predetermined. In spite of this, the 
integrity of the process was, time and again, fought for and 
protected. Now--today--it only remains for us to cast our 
votes.
    I wish to address my remarks not so much to the people 
listening in this room today, but rather to those future 
generations who will look back at the record and transcripts 
for guidance, direction, and a more thorough understanding of 
the process that played out in this Chamber during the first 2 
months of 1999. I mentioned earlier the significance of the 
Constitution. I cannot stress enough the essential role that 
this historical document has played in the trial of William 
Jefferson Clinton. This document laid the framework for what 
has taken place. Be it understood, the Senate tried the 
President because the Constitution requires that we do so. 
There is no exception for popular Presidents, such as William 
Jefferson Clinton. The Constitution provides for this process 
to be applied to everyone evenhandedly.
    Although the trial of this President was not a trial in the 
traditional sense, it is important to note that if the 
impeachment of a President presents itself again, there is 
nothing restricting a more traditional trial from occurring. In 
fact, I would encourage future Senates to utilize a judicial 
proceeding more closely aligned to a typical courtroom trial. 
Every impeachment trial will have its own dynamic environment, 
determined by the political and social context in which it 
occurs. The trial of William Jefferson Clinton occurred in a 
prosperous time. The citizens of this Nation are largely 
satisfied, the President enjoys consistently high approval 
ratings, and the economy is outstanding. Impeaching and then 
trying the President has not engendered popular public support. 
I make these observations for future generations who reflect on 
this process simply to explain the mood of our Nation and the 
political environment in which this proceeding occurred. As a 
result, we should not deceive ourselves into believing that 
public opinion did not impact this process. I would like to 
believe, however, that the competing demands of expediting the 
process versus honoring our constitutional duties created a 
struggle that produced the most fair trial possible under the 
circumstances. Accordingly, the process we followed and the 
rules complied with may not be appropriate for the next trial. 
The decisions made in this environment should not be considered 
to set a precedent that is inflexible. In fact, the precedent 
we set deserves thoughtful consideration and reasoned critique 
when reflected upon in the years and decades to come.
    In that light, our official duties in this matter began on 
December 19, 1998, when the U.S. House of Representatives 
impeached the President, William Jefferson Clinton. After 
listening to the evidence, reading the trial memorandums and 
the record, and carefully considering the arguments presented 
by both the House managers and White House counsel, I believe 
the President is guilty of both articles.
    Before I address the merits of the case against the 
President, I think it is necessary to discuss whether the 
crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice constitute high 
crimes and misdemeanors as contemplated by the framers of our 
Constitution. This topic has been the subject of much 
controversy in the past months.
    It is true that private acts are the genesis of the matter 
before us. Had the acts stayed private, we would not be here 
today. The President, however, brought these private acts under 
our public purview and created a matter of public concern when 
he used his position and his power to deny and obstruct the 
civil rights of Paula Jones.
    Contrary to what has been asserted, this is not just a case 
about a sexual encounter between the President and a young 
White House intern. This instead is a case about depriving 
Paula Jones, an individual who sought and was granted the right 
to file a civil rights action against the President, of her 
constitutional right to a day in court, a right which nine 
Justices of the Supreme Court unanimously decided that she 
deserved. And--almost unbelievably--on the heels of this 
Supreme Court mandate, the President seemed to strengthen his 
efforts to deny Paula Jones' civil rights. Once these acts 
moved into the public arena, forming the basis for charges as 
serious as perjury and obstruction of justice, it is my opinion 
these acts became high crimes and misdemeanors as envisioned by 
our founders. While our only precedent involves the 
impeachments of Federal judges, I am satisfied the standards 
used in these cases also apply to the charges levied against 
the President.
    The President of the United States is the head of the 
executive branch and the chief law enforcement officer of this 
Nation. When the Founding Fathers established our tripartite 
system of government, it was decided that the three branches of 
government would operate as checks and balances on one another. 
As a result, no branch would be more powerful than the other. 
This structure is at the very core of our success as a 
Republic.
    By obstructing justice and lying under oath, William 
Jefferson Clinton violated his duty as chief law enforcement 
officer, disrespected the judicial branch of the government, 
and undermined the foundations of our judicial system's truth-
seeking process. If I were to determine that the President's 
actions did not constitute high crimes and misdemeanors, I 
would be asserting that the executive branch and the Office of 
the Presidency are more important than the judicial branch, and 
that the President of the United States is not obligated to 
abide by the rule of law. As a citizen and as a Senator, I 
cannot, in good faith, ignore the separation of powers 
argument. In my view, the President's conduct was in violation 
of the rule of law and his actions have betrayed the trust of 
the people of the United States. It is my firm belief that the 
serious offenses committed by William Jefferson Clinton are 
high crimes and misdemeanors and warrant impeachment, 
conviction, and removal from office.
    Amazingly, we continue to hear the argument that although 
the President's actions rise to the level of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, he should not be removed from office. The 
Constitution provides if a President is found guilty of high 
crimes, then he is automatically removed from office. Our 
Constitution does not allow for finding the President guilty of 
high crimes and misdemeanors, and then permitting him to stay 
in office. Only an amendment to the Constitution would make 
such a step permissible.
    There were several points during the trial of the President 
when I had a visceral reaction to certain charges raised by the 
House managers. This reaction occurred, each time, at precisely 
the point when the managers discussed the President's strategy 
to attack the character of Monica Lewinsky, Kathleen Willey and 
others. The callous disregard for the soul of another human 
being and the unsympathetic wounding of the character of 
another carried out by the President using the apparatus of the 
Presidency is chilling and deserves condemnation by those who 
cherish freedom.
    Before I proceed to my view of the specific articles, it 
may help to explain that I approach this process unencumbered 
by a law degree. While that in no way gives me license to 
disregard the legal aspects of the matter before me, it does 
permit me to translate legal concepts into layman's terms. As I 
worked my way through the voluminous record and sat through 
days of the trial, I found it easiest to understand this case 
if I approached it in chronological order. Given that, I will 
discuss the obstruction of justice count first, because in the 
course of this tragic series of events, I believe the President 
started down this slippery slope by the actions he took, as 
opposed to the words he spoke. Sadly, the words, uttered under 
an oath to tell the truth, came later.
    I view obstruction of justice, in its most simple terms, as 
actions that somehow interfere with the fact-finding or truth-
seeking mission of a lawsuit. The record before us is replete 
with examples which, in my opinion, prove that the President of 
the United States intended to, and did in fact, obstruct 
justice. Specifically, I believe the President obstructed 
justice by corruptly engaging in, encouraging, and supporting a 
scheme to conceal evidence that had been subpoenaed in the 
Jones case; by encouraging Ms. Lewinsky to file a false 
affidavit in the Jones case; by allowing his attorney to make 
false and misleading statements to a Federal court judge; by 
relating false and misleading statements to Ms. Currie and 
Presidential aides in order to influence their testimony; and 
by intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure job 
assistance for Ms. Lewinsky in order to encourage her to 
testify favorably toward the President in the Jones case.
    I believe the first example of obstruction occurred when 
the President was issued a subpoena in the Paula Jones case. 
This case was a Federal civil rights action in which the 
President was sued for sexual harassment, hostile work 
environment harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. As part of the discovery process in the Jones case, 
subpoenas were issued to several former State and Federal 
employees suspected of having sexual relations with the 
President. Included in these was a subpoena which requested the 
President to produce the gifts he had received from Monica 
Lewinsky. This request was denied by the President on five 
different occasions, as ultimately five separate subpoenas were 
issued. As a last resort, Judge Wright granted Paula Jones' 
motion to compel the President to produce gifts. The President, 
however, still did not turn over the gifts and instead replied 
that he had none. The President's unwillingness to comply is 
ironic given that later--in his grand jury testimony--he stated 
that he receives and gives hundreds of gifts a year, and that 
the whole gift-giving concept is inconsequential to him. The 
President's behavior belies his testimony.
    The gift concealment continued beyond the President 
refusing to turn over the presents Ms. Lewinsky gave him. Ms. 
Lewinsky was also subpoenaed in the Jones case and was asked to 
turn over gifts the President had given to her. According to 
Ms. Lewinsky, when she suggested to the President that the 
gifts be hidden, he responded that he would have to ``think 
about it.'' I am aware that the record does not reflect a 
specific directive by the President to Ms. Lewinsky to hide the 
gifts. My reading of the record and my interpretation of the 
evidence, however, leads me to the inescapable conclusion that 
the chief law enforcement officer of the country, and a well-
educated lawyer to boot, did not fulfill his duty to turn gifts 
over himself and did not abide by his duty again when Ms. 
Lewinsky asked him what she should do with her gifts.
    There is some confusion over exactly how the President's 
secretary, Ms. Currie, came to be in possession of the gifts 
that the President gave Ms. Lewinsky. I find it compelling, 
however, that when the President and Ms. Lewinsky met on the 
morning of December 28, Ms. Lewinsky suggested that the gifts 
the President had given to her should be hidden. A few hours 
later phone calls were made from Ms. Currie to Ms. Lewinsky. On 
that same afternoon, Ms. Currie arrived at Ms. Lewinsky's 
residence to pick up the gifts, and ultimately, the gifts were 
found under Ms. Currie's bed. In my view, this is sufficient 
evidence to connect the President's involvement with the gift 
concealment. I find it hard to believe that Ms. Currie would on 
her own, without influence from the President, decide to hide 
Ms. Lewinsky's gifts.
    As an aside, I feel compelled to point out a pattern that 
seems to have evolved during this administration. The hiding of 
evidence in a personal residence harks back to the mysterious 
reappearance of the Whitewater billing records in the White 
House residence several years ago. There seems, in my mind, a 
proclivity on the part of the President to cause the 
disappearance of key evidence whenever wrongdoing is alleged. 
Hence, gifts under the bed equate to billing records in the 
White House residence.
    In view of the President's actions up to this point, I am 
convinced the President was involved in Ms. Currie's receipt of 
the gifts. The simple truth is that, in spite of repeated 
requests, the gifts the President received were never produced 
and only some of the gifts given to Ms. Lewinsky were produced. 
In my view, it was no accident that gifts which were not handed 
over were instead hidden beneath the President's secretary's 
bed.
    As the Jones case progressed, so did the President's 
determination to obstruct justice. As fate would have it, 
Monica Lewinsky was named as a witness in the civil rights 
action. Upset and scared, the President suggested to Ms. 
Lewinsky that if she were subpoenaed she could file an 
affidavit in an effort to avoid testifying in a deposition. Ms. 
Lewinsky did in fact file an affidavit. The affidavit was 
claimed by the President to be truthful because of what Ms. 
Lewinsky understood ``sexual relations'' to mean at that time.
    While the President maintains the truth of the affidavit 
even until this day, Ms. Lewinsky testified before the grand 
jury that, in fact, it was not a truthful affidavit. 
Specifically, she testified before the grand jury that she was 
willing to submit a false affidavit under the penalty of 
perjury because she did not think that her affair with the 
President was anyone's business. I assume that we would still 
not have Ms. Lewinsky's admission that the affidavit was false, 
but for the fact that she was in fear of being prosecuted for 
perjury herself.
    I think the President's behavior in regard to the affidavit 
of Ms. Lewinsky fits squarely in the definition of obstruction 
of justice. I am not impressed with the President's argument 
that this conduct became ``irrelevant'' when Judge Wright later 
determined that the Lewinsky matter was not essential to the 
Jones lawsuit.
    On the contrary, I am compelled by the fact that when the 
President was weaving this contorted web, it was his clear 
intent to conceal his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. At the 
time the Lewinsky affidavit was prepared, the President could 
not have known Judge Wright would later determine that the 
Lewinsky matter was unrelated to the Jones lawsuit due to the 
consensual nature of the President and Ms. Lewinsky's 
relationship. Rather, the President was making every effort to 
see that nothing about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was 
disclosed.
    The next crucial event arrived on the day of the 
President's deposition in the Jones case. At the deposition, 
the President's attorney, Bob Bennett, stated that Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit was true. Specifically, Mr. Bennett stated 
that ``there is no sex of any kind, shape, or form.'' The 
President claims, not surprisingly, that he was not paying 
attention when his attorney made these statements, and in 
addition, that the Lewinsky affidavit was technically true 
because the word ``is'' means ``at this time.''
    My review of the President's videotaped testimony leads me 
to believe the President was paying attention to Mr. Bennett. 
When watching the videotape, it is apparent to me the 
President's attention is riveted on every person who speaks. He 
is attentive and his eyes track the speakers as they engage in 
dialog. I believe the President purposely allowed Mr. Bennett 
to mislead the court. Part of the record before us includes a 
letter from Mr. Bennett asking the trial court not to rely on 
the affidavit or his comments regarding the document. Thus, it 
appears Mr. Bennett also believed that the President allowed 
him to mislead the court.
    Moreover, I am not persuaded by the President's argument 
that the affidavit was technically true because ``is'' means 
``at this time.'' I am offended by the President's lack of 
respect for the truth-seeking process our justice system is 
designed to foster and protect. Indeed, I am disturbed that the 
President would attempt to manipulate each and every word. To 
take the President's interpretation of ``is'' to its logical 
conclusion that nothing was occurring at that very minute is 
ridiculous.
    Clearly, things did not go well at the Jones deposition. In 
fact, the President admitted later in his grand jury testimony 
that he was surprised by the depth of the inquiry regarding 
Monica Lewinsky. This probing questioning made the President 
increasingly desperate. On Saturday, after the President's 
deposition, he called his secretary, Ms. Currie, and asked her 
to come to the White House the following day. Both the 
President and Ms. Currie testified that such a Sunday meeting 
was out of the ordinary. When Ms. Currie arrived, the President 
called her into the Oval Office and made several statements, 
which he later described as questions, regarding Monica 
Lewinsky. Ms. Currie testified before the grand jury, that the 
President said the following to her:

    I was never really alone with Monica, right?
    You were always there when Monica was there, right?
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    You could see and hear everything, right?
    She wanted to have sex with me, and I cannot do that.

    This conversation was repeated between the President and 
Ms. Currie again 2 days later. Though Ms. Currie testified that 
on both occasions she felt ``no real pressure'' to agree with 
the President, she did nonetheless think he wanted her to agree 
with him. And, agree she did.
    Lawyers for the President have defended his actions by 
stating that the President was refreshing his memory with Betty 
Currie because he was aware that the media frenzy regarding 
Monica Lewinsky was about to break loose. I find this 
explanation unconvincing for numerous reasons. The first, and 
perhaps most obvious reason is that a person does not typically 
refresh his recollection with statements he knows to be false. 
It is beyond belief that the President could assert such a 
defense. He knew he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, and even he 
testified he would have been an ``exhibitionist'' if he had 
conducted these acts in public view. In fact, when asked during 
the grand jury proceedings if Ms. Currie was nearby when he and 
Ms. Lewinsky had intimate contact, the President responded: ``I 
never--I didn't try to involve Betty in that in any way.'' 
Further, the President's statements to Ms. Currie implying that 
she was always present, and that she could see and hear 
everything, defy logic by indicating that Ms. Currie was always 
with the President and Ms. Lewinsky. The President clearly knew 
that was not the case.
    The sum of this evidence convinces me the President was not 
only obstructing justice by tampering with a potential future 
witness, but also violating the gag order that had been put 
into effect by Judge Wright in the Jones case. The irony here 
is that one reason Ms. Currie became a potential witness was 
due to the President's own urging. Throughout the Jones 
deposition the President repeatedly offered ``you should ask 
Betty.'' Then, on the very next day following these remarks, he 
summoned Ms. Currie to the White House and asked and answered 
his own leading questions. Importantly, the following week, Ms. 
Currie was subpoenaed to testify in the Jones matter.
    I have also concluded the President's conversations with 
his aides concerning his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky 
constitute witness tampering. The President told his aides, 
John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, and Erskine Bowles, misleading 
and untrue statements about his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. In fact, Mr. Podesta testified in the grand jury 
proceedings that the President was extremely explicit in his 
comments about denying any physical relationship and any sexual 
contact with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Although the President's approach to this group of 
potential witnesses differed from his approach to Ms. Currie in 
that he did not ask this group to agree with his statements, I 
find these conversations equally disturbing. To mislead his key 
aides, who he admitted might be called to testify before the 
grand jury, demonstrates that there are no bounds on the 
President's attempts to protect himself. He was willing to 
mislead any person who might have blocked his intricate 
obstruction plan.
    In addition, I believe that the President obstructed 
justice by intensifying and succeeding in an effort to secure 
job assistance for Ms. Lewinsky in order corruptly to prevent 
her from truthfully testifying in the Jones case. Although the 
President promised Ms. Lewinsky assistance with her New York 
job search prior to her name appearing on a witness list in the 
Jones case, it seems odd and much too coincidental that the 
President's assistance intensified after he learned that Ms. 
Lewinsky was on the witness list.
    In October, Ms. Lewinsky expressed her interest to the 
President in moving to New York and finding a job. In early 
November, Ms. Lewinsky had a meeting with Vernon Jordan to 
discuss potential jobs in New York City. Ms. Lewinsky testified 
before the grand jury that this meeting resulted in no activity 
taking place. However, unbeknownst to Ms. Lewinsky, her job 
search would take a 360 degree turn in December. Possibly the 
most important day was December 6, 1997, when the President 
learned that Ms. Lewinsky's name had appeared on a list of 
potential witnesses in the Jones case. A little over a month 
later, Ms. Lewinsky was offered and accepted a job with Revlon 
in New York City.
    Because I believe the sequence of events that took place in 
December is extremely telling, I will lay out these events. On 
December 6, the President learned Ms. Lewinsky was a potential 
witness in the Jones case. On December 7, the President and Mr. 
Jordan met at the White House. According to both parties, 
however, Ms. Lewinsky was never discussed. On December 8, Mr. 
Jordan received Ms. Lewinsky's resume by courier. On December 
11, Mr. Jordan met with Ms. Lewinsky and made phone calls to 
various New York companies on her behalf. On December 17, after 
a job in New York seemed like a much more likely prospect for 
Ms. Lewinsky, the President telephoned Ms. Lewinsky at 2 a.m. 
to inform her that her name was on a witness list in the Jones 
case. On December 19, Ms. Lewinsky was served a subpoena in the 
Jones case. On December 31, Ms. Lewinsky and Mr. Jordan ate 
breakfast together at the Park Hyatt Hotel. On January 7, Ms. 
Lewinsky signed an affidavit to be filed in the Jones case in 
which she denied having sexual relations with the President. On 
January 8, Ms. Lewinsky interviewed in New York with MacAndrews 
& Forbes, a company recommended by Mr. Jordan. On that same 
day, Ms. Lewinsky informed Mr. Jordan that the interview did 
not go well. Mr. Jordan made a call to the chairman of the 
board and chief executive officer at MacAndrews & Forbes. On 
the morning of January 9, Ms. Lewinsky was given a second 
interview. On that same morning, Ms. Lewinsky was given an 
informal job offer, which she accepted. On January 13, 1998, 
Ms. Lewinsky received a formalized job offer.
    It is apparent from the above time line that the 
President's efforts in finding Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York 
intensified at an excessive rate once it was discovered that 
Ms. Lewinsky was going to be a witness in the Jones case. The 
President was well aware of the fact that Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony could be harmful to him, and thus, it was in his best 
interest to get Ms. Lewinsky a job in New York as soon as 
possible. It seems to be no coincidence that the President did 
not tell Ms. Lewinsky that she was a potential witness until 11 
days after he learned of this news. Rather, it appears the 
President was using these 11 days to ensure that Ms. Lewinsky 
understood the President was her friend and was trying to 
assist her in her New York job hunt. Interestingly, Ms. 
Lewinsky was not informed of her witness status until after 
interviews in New York had been scheduled for her by Vernon 
Jordan.
    The President is also charged with making perjurious, 
false, and misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury 
concerning his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in the Jones 
civil rights action. My review of this charge, and the evidence 
offered, leads me to conclude that the President engaged in 
several separate acts of perjury. Specifically, the President 
lied under oath regarding the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; lied regarding his conversation 
with Ms. Currie on the day following his Jones deposition; lied 
regarding his knowledge of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in the 
Jones case; lied regarding statements made to aides about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky; lied regarding prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney Bob Bennett to 
make to a Federal judge in the Jones case; and lied when he 
denied engaging in a plan to hide gifts that had been 
subpoenaed in the Jones case.
    After the Jones deposition, on January 26, 1998, the 
President went on national television and declared: ``I did not 
have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky.'' In 
addition, he denied that he urged her to lie about the affair. 
Over the next 7 months, the President continued to deny the 
relationship. In the face of mounting evidence to the contrary, 
the Office of the Independent Counsel sought and received 
permission from the Attorney General to expand its 
investigation to include whether the President lied under oath 
in his Jones deposition.
    Seven months later, on August 17, 1998, the President 
appeared before a grand jury to answer questions regarding his 
Jones deposition and his alleged affair with Ms. Lewinsky. 
Prior to his testimony, the President took a solemn oath to 
tell the truth. Specifically, when asked during the grand jury 
proceedings what this oath meant to him, the President stated: 
``I have sworn on an oath to tell the grand jury the truth, and 
that's what I intend to do.'' Moreover, the President stated: 
``I will try to answer, to the best of my ability, other 
questions including questions about my relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky; questions about my understanding of the term `sexual 
relations,' as I understood it to be defined at my January 17, 
1998 deposition; and questions concerning alleged subornation 
of perjury, obstruction of justice, and intimidation of 
witnesses.''
    In my opinion, however, the President violated his stated 
intention to answer questions honestly and to the best of his 
ability. Perjury is defined by the United States Code as 
``whoever under oath in any proceeding before or ancillary to 
any court or grand jury of the United States knowingly makes 
any false material declaration or makes or uses any other 
information, including any book, paper, document, record, 
recording, or other material, knowing the same to contain any 
false declaration.'' (18 U.S.C. 1623.) I believe that the 
President's statements fall within the above definition because 
his statements were both false and material to the proper 
inquiry of the grand jury.
    First, the President gave false and misleading testimony 
during the grand jury proceedings concerning the nature and 
details of his relationship with Monica Lewinsky. On August 17, 
1998, the President read a prepared statement to the grand jury 
as a response to the question of whether he was physically 
intimate with Monica Lewinsky. The prepared statement said:

    When I was alone with Ms. Lewinsky on certain occasions in early 
1996 and once in early 1997, I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These 
encounters did not consist of sexual intercourse. They did not 
constitute sexual relations as I understood that term to be defined at 
my January 17, 1998, deposition. But they did involve inappropriate 
intimate contact.
    These inappropriate encounters ended, at my insistence, in early 
1997. I also had occasional telephone conversations with Ms. Lewinsky 
that included inappropriate sexual banter.
    I regret that what began as a friendship came to include this 
conduct, and I will take full responsibility for my actions.

    During Ms. Lewinsky's grand jury testimony, she stated that 
the President had contact with various parts of her body. Even 
under the limited interpretation that the President has given 
the Jones definition of ``sexual relations,'' the contact 
between the President and Ms. Lewinsky, as testified to by Ms. 
Lewinsky, constituted sexual relations on the part of both 
parties.
    Before the grand jury, the President referred to his 
prepared response 19 times in order to avoid providing honest 
and complete answers to the questions posed. By referring to 
his prepared statement, the President asserted that his 
encounters with Ms. Lewinsky did not constitute ``sexual 
relations.'' The fact is that the evidence overwhelmingly 
affirms that the President had sexual contact with Ms. Lewinsky 
and his attempts at legal hairsplitting to maneuver around the 
truth failed.
    To address part of the perjury charge creates the need to 
resolve the credibility conflict between the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky. By finding that the President committed perjury in 
regard to testimony concerning the nature and details of his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, it is clear that I find the 
testimony of Ms. Lewinsky to be more honest and forthright. 
Some may question why I believe the testimony of Ms. Lewinsky 
over the testimony of the President. First and foremost, I 
believe Ms. Lewinsky had no motive to lie, whereas the 
President had every motive to conceal the details of this 
intimate relationship. Not only was his Presidency on the line, 
but his credibility with his staff would be destroyed if the 
truth were exposed. Even more importantly, the President's 
credibility is questionable because he had to fear that 
discovery of the truth would cause his family immense 
devastation.
    Furthermore, I believe Ms. Lewinsky is more credible 
because her statement is corroborated. Ms. Lewinsky told the 
intimate details of her relationship to her therapists, her 
friends, Linda Tripp, her mother, and her aunt. Thus, it is not 
difficult to find that Ms. Lewinsky is a more credible witness 
than the President.
    I further believe the President made perjurious and 
misleading statements before the grand jury when he disclosed 
his version of his conversations with Betty Currie. As stated 
earlier, I believe that the rhetorical questions the President 
asked Ms. Currie on two separate occasions were an effort to 
coach a potential witness in the Jones case. During his grand 
jury testimony, the President testified that he questioned Ms. 
Currie because he thought the story would break in the press, 
he needed to get the facts down, and he was trying to refresh 
his memory. The reality is the President was never trying to 
refresh his memory. Ms. Currie even acknowledged in the grand 
jury proceedings that based on the way the President stated the 
questions and his demeanor, she believed he wished for her to 
agree with his statements.
    In addition, according to the President's own grand jury 
testimony, he told no one of his relationship with Monica 
Lewinsky. Specifically, during grand jury questioning, the 
President was asked with regard to his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky: ``Had you told anyone?'' The President answered: 
``Absolutely not.'' Question: ``Had you tried, in fact, not to 
let anyone else know about this relationship?'' Answer: ``Well, 
of course.'' Question: ``What did you do?'' Answer: ``Well I 
never said anything about it, for one thing. And I did what 
people do when they do the wrong thing. I tried to do it where 
nobody else was looking at it.''
    Thus, if the President was hiding his intimate encounters 
with Ms. Lewinsky, how would Ms. Currie have been capable of 
refreshing his memory on details of his secret relationship? 
The truth is that the President was fully aware of the fact he 
touched Ms. Lewinsky. Likewise, the President was fully aware 
that there had been instances when he was alone with Ms. 
Lewinsky. The only reason the President asked Ms. Currie those 
five infamous rhetorical questions was to provide a false and 
misleading account of the events to Ms. Currie in the hope Ms. 
Currie would substantiate the false testimony he gave in his 
deposition. The President's grand jury testimony that he was 
trying to refresh his memory was simply a story concocted to 
cover up the fact that he obstructed justice. Thus, his grand 
jury testimony was perjurious.
    In addition to making false statements with regard to the 
potential testimony of Betty Currie, the President also made 
false statements with regard to tampering with the potential 
testimony of his aides. The President testified to the grand 
jury that he said to his aides things that were true about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. ``I said, I have not had sex 
with her as I defined it.'' This statement is, however, 
patently untrue, as White House deputy chief of staff John 
Podesta's testimony indicates. Mr. Podesta testified that the 
President was explicit in stating that no sexual contact of any 
kind occurred between the two parties.
    Furthermore, during the grand jury proceedings, the 
President testified that when he was asking Ms. Currie about 
the times he was alone with Ms. Lewinsky, he was referring to 
1997. The President stated: ``Keep in mind, sir, I just want to 
make it--I was talking about 1997. I was never, ever trying to 
get Betty Currie to claim that on the occasions when Monica 
Lewinsky was there when she wasn't anywhere around, that she 
was. I would never have done that to her, and I don't think she 
thought about that. I don't think she thought I was referring 
to that.'' The President was then asked: ``Did you put a date 
restriction? Did you make it clear to Ms. Currie that you were 
only asking her whether you were never alone with her after 
1997?'' The President responded: ``Well, I don't recall whether 
I did or not, but I assumed--if I didn't, I assumed she knew 
what I was talking about, because it was the point at which Ms. 
Lewinsky was out of the White House and had to have someone 
wave her in, in order to get in the White House.'' In my view, 
this is just one more example of the President creating a false 
story to cover up the fact that his conversation with Betty 
Currie constituted witness tampering.
    The President also provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony to a Federal grand jury regarding his 
knowledge that the contents of an affidavit executed by Ms. 
Lewinsky were untrue. Attorneys for Paula Jones were seeking 
evidence of sexual relationships the President may have had 
with other State or Federal employees. In this process, Ms. 
Lewinsky was subpoenaed as a witness. The President suggested 
that Ms. Lewinsky should file an affidavit to avoid having to 
testify. If the truth had been told in this affidavit, and if 
Ms. Lewinsky had been honest about the nature of her 
relationship with the President, Ms. Lewinsky indisputably 
would have been an important witness.
    The President stated before the grand jury, when asked 
about the Lewinsky affidavit: ``Did I hope [Monica Lewinsky 
would] be able to get out of testifying on an affidavit? 
Absolutely. . . . Did I want her to execute a false affidavit? 
No, I did not.'' The President's testimony is not credible and 
is misleading in light of the fact that it was virtually 
impossible for Ms. Lewinsky to file a truthful affidavit that 
would have permitted the President to achieve his objective of 
not having Ms. Lewinsky testify. This is just one more instance 
were the President lied, misled, and violated his solemn oath 
to tell the truth.
    In addition, the President gave perjurious testimony in 
regard to false and misleading statements he allowed his 
attorney Bob Bennett to make to a Federal judge in the Jones 
case. When asked during his grand jury testimony how he could 
have lawfully sat silent while his attorney made a false 
statement, the President explained that he was not paying ``a 
great deal of attention.'' As I stated earlier, from reviewing 
the President's videotaped deposition numerous times, I believe 
that it is apparent that the President was indeed paying 
attention when his attorney made these false statements.
    Finally, in his grand jury testimony, the President stated 
he told Ms. Lewinsky that if the attorneys for Paula Jones 
asked for the gifts, she had to provide them. In light of the 
fact that all of the gifts the President gave Ms. Lewinsky were 
never produced and some of the gifts were found under Ms. 
Currie's bed, I do not believe that the President's grand jury 
testimony regarding his conversation with Ms. Lewinsky was 
truthful.
    Accordingly, after considering all of the evidence, I 
believe that the President is guilty on both article I and 
article II.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the President of the United States has 
put the Senate in a difficult position. His actions have caused 
all of us to examine the uncomfortable details surrounding his 
reckless affair with a young White House intern. But it was not 
his unfortunate actions with the White House intern that 
brought us to this moment. Rather, it was his willful and 
deliberate attempt to cover it up in a judicial proceeding and 
then lie under oath to a Federal grand jury. We are not here 
because we disagree with the President's politics. In fact, I 
happen to consider the President a very capable man, who has, 
by his own actions, destroyed his place in history. For me to 
watch someone strategically dismantle all they have worked for 
is disturbing, to say the least. However, in spite of the human 
side of this tragedy, there is no escaping that we are here 
simply because of the President's intentionally deceptive 
behavior and his unwillingness to abide by the law.
    We were handed very serious charges against the President 
by the House of Representatives. In disposing of this matter, 
we have followed the only template we have: the Constitution 
and the precedent of previous Senates. We have followed the 
founders to the best of our abilities. Despite cries all around 
to end the trial and ignore our constitutional mandate, the 
Senate allowed for a process rooted in the search for truth. 
All sides had an opportunity to make their case, question 
witnesses, and answer inquiries posed by individual Senators.
    Although this journey was less than perfect, we did not 
fail in this endeavor. We did not fail our founders, we did not 
fail the House of Representatives or the President, and we did 
not fail the American people. I attended the meetings of the 
Senate, reviewed the material in the record, asked questions of 
the House managers and White House counsel, and reviewed the 
depositions of witnesses. I am satisfied that our proceedings 
over the past month allowed me sufficient information to arrive 
at my decision.
    I am convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that William 
Jefferson Clinton is guilty of the charges levied by the House 
of Representatives and should be removed from office. By 
employing that standard I do not wish to influence others who 
find a different standard to be more appropriate.
    I am proud of the U.S. Senate and how it conducted itself 
during this process. Despite extraordinary difficulty, we did 
our job according to the Constitution and to the best of our 
ability. I am hopeful that through this process we have 
provided future generations with enough information to make an 
informed judgment of this President's actions. In the end, 
however, history will be the final arbiter.
    Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice. I yield the floor.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                Statement of Senator Peter G. Fitzgerald

    Mr. FITZGERALD. Mr. Chief Justice, as a freshman Senator, I 
am saddened that the first issue I confront in my service to 
the people of Illinois is the impeachment of a President of the 
United States. It is difficult to imagine a task less welcome 
and more awesome to me. As a newly elected Senator, I have 
barely begun to know the Senate, my colleagues, our rules and 
procedures, our precedents, or, finally, even our duty. I have 
watched you all so carefully--looking for examples, and 
guidance--and wondering at the gravity of these days.
    On a personal note, before I begin, I want to thank those 
on both sides of the aisle--Senators who, in difficult days, 
have been so gracious to a newcomer. Thank you for taking the 
time, and making the effort, to welcome the newest among you. 
Through these hours, I have developed a deep respect for my new 
colleagues, for the Senate as an institution, and for the 
Constitution that has anchored our Republic for over 200 years. 
I thank God for the wisdom of the framers and their ability to 
construct enduring institutions that allow us to confront, 
peacefully, the question of whether our President should be 
removed from office. We now come to the conclusion of this 
constitutional process, itself an extraordinary example of the 
rule of law that makes our Nation the envy of the world.
    The people of Illinois have entrusted me with the duty to 
uphold the Constitution, a duty I share with all of you. In 
addition, we share the responsibility of abiding by the 
separate oath which we took in this proceeding to ``do 
impartial justice according to the Constitution and the laws.''
    As a trier of fact and law, I find that the President has 
committed perjury and obstruction of justice as charged in the 
two articles of impeachment, and that those offenses constitute 
``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I will vote for conviction on 
both counts.
    I reach this decision after detailed examination of the 
evidence presented, the arguments of counsel, Senate 
precedents, and the impeachment clause of the Constitution.
    The initial decision I made was to determine the 
appropriate burden of proof. Failure to impose a burden of 
proof on the House managers would severely weaken the 
Presidency, a result the founders feared and sought to avoid. 
The precedents of the Senate make it clear that there is no 
single standard that each of us must apply.
    The President has argued that we should apply the criminal 
standard of ``proof beyond a reasonable doubt.'' In recent 
impeachment trials of Federal judges, a number of Senators also 
argued that conviction was only appropriate if the proof met 
this standard. Some commentators have suggested that Senators 
could use the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard typically 
applied in civil cases, or some standard in between.
    I have concluded that, to support a conviction, allegations 
must be proven by ``clear and convincing'' evidence. The 
criminal standard is not warranted, because the relief in this 
instance, i.e., the removal of the President, is not punitive, 
but remedial. In contrast, the civil standard would place the 
Presidency at too great a risk. The ``clear and convincing'' 
evidence standard strikes a prudent balance, providing 
sufficient protection for the authority of the Presidency and 
the expression of popular will represented by the President's 
election, while avoiding the risk of a President remaining in 
office despite clear and convincing evidence of impeachable 
offenses.
    On Article I, the House has presented clear and convincing 
evidence that the President committed perjury when he testified 
before a Federal grand jury on August 17, 1998.
    On January 17, 1998, President Clinton testified in a civil 
deposition in the Jones v. Clinton lawsuit, after the Supreme 
Court had ruled unanimously that a civil suit against a sitting 
President could proceed. After the deposition, the independent 
counsel secured the approval of the Attorney General, and the 
three-judge Federal court which superintends the independent 
counsel law, to expand his jurisdiction to inquire into whether 
the President testified truthfully in his deposition. On August 
17, 1998, the President, as the target of the investigation 
testified by video to a Federal grand jury in Washington, DC.
    The President's deposition testimony in the Jones case was 
false in numerous respects, and his grand jury statements that 
he had sought to be completely truthful in his deposition 
testimony cannot be accurate. (Grand Jury Testimony of 
President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, pp. 458-59.) The 
falsehoods are of such a quantity and kind that a reasonable 
reading of the evidence suggests the President had to know at 
the time he gave his deposition in the Jones case that he was 
not being truthful. His testimony to the grand jury that he 
intended to be truthful at his deposition is false.
    Example: the President had testified in his deposition that 
he believed that, in the preceding 2 weeks, no one had reported 
to him any conversations with Ms. Lewinsky about the Jones 
suit. (Jones Deposition of President Clinton, 1/17/98, 
Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. XXII, p. 22.) In 
testifying to the grand jury that he was truthful in his 
deposition, the President reaffirmed this portion of his 
deposition testimony. (Grand Jury Testimony of President 
Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 458.) We know, however, 
that Vernon Jordan had, within the 2 weeks prior to the 
President's deposition, told the President that Ms. Lewinsky 
had signed her affidavit. (Deposition Testimony of Vernon 
Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 Cong. Rec. S1241 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).) 
The President's grand jury testimony was material to the issue 
of whether the President had sought to influence the content of 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit and thereby obstruct justice.
    The President again committed perjury before the Federal 
grand jury when he tried to explain why he made a series of 
false statements to his secretary, Betty Currie, on two 
separate occasions. At his deposition, the President was 
questioned about Ms. Lewinsky. The President attempted to 
employ Ms. Currie as an alibi witness. In the wake of the 
deposition, the President asked Ms. Currie to come to the 
office on a Sunday. Once there, the President asked Ms. Currie 
a series of leading questions concerning her recollection of 
events regarding Ms. Lewinsky. (Grand Jury Testimony of Betty 
Currie, 1/7/98, H. Doc. 105-316, pp. 559-60.) A few days later, 
the President again queried Ms. Currie with leading questions. 
(Id. at p. 561.)
    When questioned during his grand jury testimony about the 
series of leading questions he had directed to Ms. Currie, the 
President responded: ``I was trying to figure out what the 
facts were. I was trying to remember.'' (Grand Jury Testimony 
of President Clinton, 8/17/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 591.) He 
also claimed that he was only trying to ``ascertain what the 
facts were, trying to ascertain what Betty's perception was.'' 
(Id. at p. 593.)
    While Ms. Currie would not say she felt pressured by the 
President, she did testify that she believed that the President 
was seeking her agreement with those statements. (Grand Jury 
Testimony of Betty Currie, 1/7/98, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 559.) It 
is unreasonable to conclude that the President was trying to 
refresh his recollection by making patently false statements to 
Ms. Currie, in the days immediately following his deposition 
for the Jones case. Ms. Curry could not possibly have known the 
answers to some of the President's ``questions,'' and the 
President clearly already knew the answers to others.
    We took an oath to do impartial justice. We did not take an 
oath to check our common sense at the door of this Chamber. The 
President's proffered explanation of the questions he directed 
to Ms. Currie defies common sense. I believe he sought, 
instead, to influence Ms. Currie's anticipated testimony by 
imparting to Ms. Currie his preferred version of the events. 
His false explanation was material to the grand jury's inquiry 
and constitutes perjury.
    The President also committed perjury when he testified and 
then reiterated before the Federal grand jury, in answer to a 
question about false accounts he gave to his aides regarding 
Ms. Lewinsky, that ``I said to them things that were true.'' 
(Grand Jury Testimony of President Clinton, 8/17/98, p. 106, H. 
Doc. 105-311, pp. 557-58.)
    In fact, the President said to his aides things that were 
false. Presidential aide Sidney Blumenthal testified in his 
Senate deposition that the President had told him that Ms. 
Lewinsky had threatened him, and that she was called ``the 
stalker.'' (Deposition Testimony of Sidney Blumenthal, 2/3/99, 
145 Cong. Rec. S1301 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999).) Mr. Blumenthal 
testified he now knows that the President lied to him. (Id. at 
S1302.) The President knew what he said to Mr. Blumenthal was 
false because the President knew the facts. The one fact the 
President did not know was that Ms. Lewinsky would produce DNA 
evidence that would provide incontrovertible physical evidence 
to contradict him.
    The President's statements before a Federal grand jury 
regarding accounts he gave to his aides of Ms. Lewinsky were 
false, and the falsehoods were material to the grand jury's 
investigation into whether the President had testified falsely 
in the Jones deposition.
    On Article II, the House has presented clear and convincing 
evidence that President Clinton obstructed justice by engaging 
in a course of conduct designed to impede, cover up, and 
conceal evidence and testimony related to the Federal civil 
rights action brought against him.
    The evidence shows that the President improperly influenced 
Ms. Lewinsky to file a false affidavit in the Jones suit. I 
believe that the only version of the evidence that makes sense 
is that offered by the House. Thus, I conclude that the 
President influenced the entire process that led to the filing 
of the false affidavit, from its inception to its conclusion. 
He did so through direct conversations with Ms. Lewinsky, and 
through his close friend, Mr. Jordan, who was able to monitor 
the process through an attorney that he, Mr. Jordan, procured 
for Ms. Lewinsky.
    Ms. Lewinsky admitted that on December 17, 1997, the 
President informed her by telephone at 2 a.m. that she was on 
the witness list in the Jones case, and suggested that she 
might avoid testifying by filing an affidavit. (Deposition 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 2/1/99, 145 Cong. Rec. S1218 
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).) And the President told Ms. Lewinsky 
to call Betty Currie if she was subpoenaed. (Id.)
    The President's assertion that he thought Ms. Lewinsky 
could have avoided testifying by filing a truthful affidavit is 
unbelievable. I believe that the President knew that a truthful 
affidavit by Ms. Lewinsky would have ensured that she would 
have been called as a deposition witness, and that her 
subsequent truthful testimony would have been legally damaging 
to the President. In fact, in the very conversation in which 
the President suggested that Ms. Lewinsky file an affidavit, 
they discussed the cover stories they could use to avoid public 
knowledge of the truth. (Id. at S1219.)
    Vernon Jordan testified in his Senate deposition that he 
``was acting on behalf of the President to get Ms. Lewinsky a 
job.'' (Deposition Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 
Cong. Rec. S1293 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1999).) Mr. Jordan 
confirmed in the deposition that ``[t]he President was 
obviously interested in her job search.'' (Id. at S1314.) It 
was Mr. Jordan--one of the President's closest friends--whom 
Ms. Lewinsky called when she was subpoenaed. Mr. Jordan met 
with Ms. Lewinsky and arranged a lawyer for her. (Deposition 
Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 Cong. Rec. S1234-36 
(daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).) Mr. Jordan delivered Ms. Lewinsky to 
her lawyer's office. (Id. at S1238.) Mr. Jordan monitored the 
drafting and content of Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit. (Grand Jury 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 105-311, p. 920.) 
Ms. Lewinsky herself delivered a copy of her first signed 
affidavit to Mr. Jordan's office. Ms. Lewinsky testified that 
she and Mr. Jordan conferred about the contents of the 
affidavit and agreed to delete one portion inserted by her 
lawyer and make other changes. (Id. at pp. 921-22, 1229-30 
(Exhibit 3).)
    Mr. Jordan kept the President informed throughout the 
affidavit-drafting process. He personally notified the 
President that Ms. Lewinsky had signed the false affidavit. 
(Deposition Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 2/2/99, 145 Cong. Rec. 
S1241 (daily ed. Feb. 4, 1999).)
    The evidence also clearly and convincingly demonstrates 
that after Ms. Lewinsky's name appeared on the witness list in 
the Jones case, the President, through Mr. Jordan, provided 
intensified assistance to Ms. Lewinsky in finding a job in 
order to encourage her to file the false affidavit. Mr. Jordan 
accepted responsibility for the job search and has admitted 
that he and Ms. Lewinsky discussed both the job search and her 
affidavit in most conversations. (Id.) Mr. Jordan attempted to 
separate each aspect of his work with Ms. Lewinsky. He 
testified that ``[t]he affidavit was over here. The job was 
over here.'' (Id.) Whatever Mr. Jordan's belief, it cannot have 
been lost on Ms. Lewinsky that she had a very prominent and 
powerful lawyer soliciting job offers for her at the same time 
she was being asked to help that lawyer's friend, the 
President, who had first suggested that she file an affidavit.
    On the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed the false affidavit, 
Mr. Jordan personally called the CEO of a Fortune 500 company 
to secure a job for her, a job she was offered on the 
subsequent day. (Id. at S1241-42.) On the day that Ms. Lewinsky 
received the job offer, Mr. Jordan called the President, 
through Ms. Currie, and left the message ``mission 
accomplished.'' (Grand Jury Testimony of Vernon Jordan, 5/28/
98, Evidentiary Record, S. Doc. 106-3, Vol. IV, p. 1898.) The 
President's own testimony in his deposition for the Jones case 
followed exactly the false claims of Ms. Lewinsky's false 
affidavit. While the President's lawyers encouraged the 
perception that this convergence was a coincidence, I do not 
buy it.
    The evidence is clear and convincing that the President 
continued to involve Ms. Currie in his lies and obfuscation. 
Ms. Lewinsky testified that on December 28, 1997, she met with 
President Clinton and informed him that she had been 
subpoenaed, and that the subpoena required her to produce all 
gifts she had received from the President. She testified that 
the subpoena specifically requested a hat pin, which alarmed 
her. (Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 8/6/98, H. Doc. 
105-311, p. 852.) The President responded that the subpoena 
``concerned'' him. (Id. at p. 872.) When Ms. Lewinsky asked him 
what she should do in response to the subpoena for the gifts, 
the President answered, ``I don't know,'' or ``Let me think 
about that.'' (Id.) He never gave the only appropriate answer, 
which was to comply.
    Ms. Lewinsky testified that later that same day, Ms. Currie 
telephoned her, saying, ``I understand that you have something 
for me,'' or ``the President said that you have something to 
give me.'' (Id. at pp. 874-75.) Ms. Currie had an unclear 
memory about this incident, but said that ``the best [she] 
remembered,'' Ms. Lewinsky called her. (Grand Jury Testimony of 
Betty Currie, 5/6/98, H. Doc. 105-316, p. 581.)
    Ms. Lewinsky's testimony that Ms. Currie instigated the 
retrieval of the gifts is credible and convincing. In contrast, 
Ms. Currie's testimony that Ms. Lewinsky instigated the 
retrieval is not persuasive. I do not believe that the 
President's personal secretary would have acted upon a request 
from Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve the gifts without asking the 
reason for such an exchange or informing the President of the 
request. It is too bizarre that she would simply pick up a box 
of gifts and deposit them under her bed. It defies a 
commonsense reading of the evidence and the evidentiary 
narrative.
    The evidence is also clear and convincing that the 
President obstructed justice by coaching Ms. Currie, a 
potential witness in the Jones case, to provide false testimony 
in the Jones case, and by arranging for the concealment of 
gifts subpoenaed by the Jones lawyers.
    On Saturday, January 17, 1998, a few hours after completing 
his own deposition in the Jones case, the President called Ms. 
Currie and asked her to come to the White House on Sunday, 
January 18, 1998. (Id. at p. 558.) The President's assertions 
and leading questions to Ms. Currie on January 18 and January 
20 or 21, 1998, were indisputably false. The President knew 
that Ms. Currie was a potential witness when he made these 
false statements to her. In his deposition in the Jones case, 
the President brought Ms. Currie's name up, without prompting, 
in at least 16 different answers to questions, clearly 
anticipating and inviting the Jones attorneys to subpoena her 
to back up his account.
    I am unable to conclude that the President was attempting 
to ``refresh his recollections'' by calling Ms. Currie and 
requesting her to come to the White House on a weekend and 
making false statements to her. Simple common sense tells us 
that he was letting her know what he had said in his deposition 
and that he was hoping that she would later corroborate his 
false account.
    Although I have determined that the House has proven the 
acts alleged in both articles of impeachment by clear and 
convincing evidence, the inquiry does not end here. I must also 
consider whether the acts constitute ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' as required by the Constitution. This has been 
a singularly difficult question for this body, but I conclude 
that the President's offenses rise to the level of ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors'' within the meaning of the 
Constitution.
    The framers of our Constitution provide that the Senate can 
only convict a President for ``treason, bribery, or other high 
crimes and misdemeanors.'' The framers relied, in part, on 
William Blackstone for their understanding of the common law 
they inherited from England. In the fourth book of his 
``Commentaries on the Laws of England,'' Blackstone addressed 
the criminal law. He distinguished between crimes that ``more 
directly infringe the rights of the public or commonwealth, 
taken in its collective capacity,'' and ``those which in a more 
peculiar manner injure individuals or private subjects.'' 
(William Blackstone, ``Commentaries on the Laws of England,'' 
Book IV, pp. 74, 176 (special ed., 1983).)
    Within the latter category, Blackstone included crimes such 
as murder, burglary, and arson. The former category of 
``public'' crimes included offenses that were counted as 
``offenses against the public justice.'' Blackstone included 
within this category the crimes of perjury and bribery side by 
side. (Id. at pp. 127, 136-39.) Blackstone's formulation 
equating perjury and bribery as ``public'' offenses suggests 
that, within the definition of the Constitution, perjury may 
also be a high crime and misdemeanor.
    Because perjury, at its core, involves an effort to 
obstruct justice, other acts that obstruct justice may very 
well be considered ``public'' offenses as the framers would 
have understood them. Indeed, Blackstone writes that 
``impediments of justice'' are ``high misprisions'' and 
``contempts'' of the King's courts. (Id. at pp. 126-28.)
    The intent of the framers and subsequent interpretation of 
this clause show that impeachment and conviction of the 
President is a constitutional remedy for serious offenses 
against our system of government. Alexander Hamilton, in 
Federalist No. 65, explained that impeachable offenses ``relate 
chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself'' 
and arise ``from the abuse or violation of some public trust.''
    Certainly, perjury before a grand jury and obstruction of 
justice are offenses against the American system of government, 
as they strike at the rule of law itself. These acts subvert 
the truth-seeking process that is the very essence and 
foundation of the judicial branch. These acts, when committed 
by a President, are a repudiation of our judicial system by the 
Chief Executive of the country, undermining the checks and 
balances and disturbing the delicate balance between the 
branches of the Federal Government that is at the heart of our 
constitutional form of government.
    The President's counsel attempted to diminish the severity 
of the crimes of perjury before a Federal grand jury and 
obstruction of justice. But the Founding Fathers understood 
that these crimes are offenses against the public trust. 
Perjury was among the few offenses outlawed by statute by the 
First Congress, in 1790. And today, perjury is punishable by up 
to 5 years imprisonment in a Federal penitentiary. (18 U.S.C. 
1621-23.) The Supreme Court, in a 1976 plurality opinion, 
wrote, ``[p]erjured testimony is an obvious and flagrant 
affront to the basic concepts of judicial proceedings.'' 
(United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 576.)
    We do not need to decide whether the President's perjury 
before the grand jury would have risen to the level of a ``high 
crime and misdemeanor'' had the target of the grand jury been 
someone other than the President, nor do we need to decide 
whether a President's perjury in a civil trial in and of itself 
rises to the level of an impeachable offense. I have 
reservations about considering such acts ``high crimes'' or 
``high misdemeanors.'' But where, as here, the President 
committed perjury in a Federal grand jury investigation of 
which he was the target, I am convinced that his acts fall into 
the category that warrants removal from office.
    Further support for this conclusion comes from Senate 
precedent in the impeachment, conviction, and removal from 
office of two Federal judges in the 1980s--Walter Nixon and 
Alcee Hastings. Judge Nixon was impeached and convicted for 
lying to a grand jury that was investigating him, and Judge 
Hastings was impeached and convicted for making numerous false 
statements under oath in testimony in his own criminal trial.
    Obstruction of justice is particularly serious. Two Federal 
criminal statutes, sections 1503 and 1512 of title 18 of the 
United States Code, specifically prohibit corruptly influencing 
or obstructing the due administration of justice or the 
testimony of a person in an official proceeding.
    Federal appellate courts have applied these statutes to 
individuals who provide misleading stories to a potential 
witness without explicitly asking the witness to lie. For 
example, in 1988, a Federal appellate court upheld the 
conviction of an individual for attempting to influence a 
witness even though that witness was not scheduled to testify 
before the grand jury nor ever appeared before a grand jury. 
The court held that a conviction under section 1503 is 
appropriate so long as there is a possibility that the target 
of the defendant's activities will be called upon to testify in 
an official proceeding. (United States v. Shannon, 836 F. 2d 
1125, 1127 (8th Cir. 1988).)
    The Supreme Court has called the President's responsibility 
to enforce the laws ``the Chief Executive's most important 
Constitutional duty.'' (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 577 (1992).) A President who obstructs the very laws 
he is called upon to enforce has committed high crimes and 
misdemeanors as set out in the impeachment clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.
    Some argue that the Senate, sitting as a Court of 
Impeachment, should allow public opinion polls to influence its 
judgment, claiming that these proceedings are not judicial, but 
political in nature. I believe the Constitution, the intent of 
the framers, and the Senate's own impeachment procedures show 
that when the Senate convenes to fulfill its obligation to 
``try all impeachments,'' as article I of the Constitution 
prescribes, it takes on a judicial role quite distinct from its 
normal legislative proceedings. The Constitution also states, 
in article III, that ``the trial of all Crimes, except in Cases 
of Impeachment, shall be by Jury. . .,'' implying that an 
impeachment trial is a trial similar to all others. When a 
President stands accused, the Constitution requires the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court to preside, explicitly introducing 
the judicial branch into the trial by the Senate. And Alexander 
Hamilton, in Federalist No. 65, discusses ``the judicial 
character of the Senate'' when it meets as ``a court for the 
trial of impeachments.''
    We are required to take a special oath for impeachments, 
above and beyond our oath of office, to ``do impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and the laws.'' What can this 
oath mean if it does not place on us a special, judicial 
burden, unique among our senatorial duties, to apply rules of 
impartiality and independence in pursuit of a verdict that is 
just? If an innocent President can be convicted, or a guilty 
President can be acquitted, even in part because of the polls 
that purport to reflect the will of the moment, then we violate 
our constitutional duty and assault the very foundations of our 
system of justice.
    Carved into the West Pediment of the U.S. Supreme Court 
Building in Washington are four simple words: ``Equal Justice 
Under Law.'' Standing watch in front of that building is a 
statue of Justice, blindfolded because justice must be blind. 
Even the President must respect the laws of the land. To the 
extent that we allow the popularity or unpopularity of a 
particular President to inform our votes for either conviction 
or acquittal, we undermine the principle of ``Equal Justice 
Under Law,'' and we chip away at the blindfold that covers the 
eyes of Justice.
    As a trier of fact and law, I find that the President has 
committed perjury and obstructed justice as charged in the two 
articles of impeachment, and that those offenses constitute 
``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' I will vote to convict on 
both counts.
    For me, this is not an easy verdict to reach, and comes 
after great deliberation. I am 38 years old. Today is my 38th 
day as a Senator. Those 38 days feel like they have lasted my 
entire life. As a freshman, I have had to confront, very 
suddenly, difficult truths that at the very least have 
challenged the idealism that propelled me here in the first 
place. But through the din of argument and counterargument, it 
has occurred to me that the President's acts, however serious, 
are not nearly as consequential as our response. I have 
listened to those who assert that perjury before a grand jury 
and obstruction of justice are not removable offenses--or that 
if they are, removal of a President, in this time, is too 
disruptive to contemplate.
    And truly, the call to do nothing is seductive. I hear it, 
too. We are so comfortable--so prosperous--that it is difficult 
to be bothered with unpleasantness. But as the youngest Member 
of this body, I believe we must hold firm to the oldest truths. 
The material blessings of peace and prosperity are but the 
fruit of liberty that does not come without a price--a liberty 
sustained, only and finally, by the rule of law, and those 
willing to defend it. Our commitment to impartial justice, now 
and forever, is an abstraction more profound and precious than 
a soaring Dow and a plummeting deficit. I vote as I do because 
I will not stand for the proposition that a President can, with 
premeditation and deliberation, obstruct justice and commit 
perjury before a grand jury. It cannot be.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

               Statement of Senator William V. Roth, Jr.

    Mr. ROTH. Mr. Chief Justice, the House of Representatives 
presented to the Senate two articles of impeachment alleging 
that the President of the United States committed ``high crimes 
and misdemeanors'' in the form of perjury and obstruction of 
justice. These are serious offenses, not unlike those which in 
the past have been sufficient to remove other Federal officials 
from office.
    In deciding how to vote on the articles of impeachment, 
each Senator had to undertake a two-step analysis: first, to 
determine the facts--the conduct in which the accused engaged; 
and second, to determine whether that conduct constituted 
``treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors,'' 
which, under the Constitution, require removal from office. 
This second step calls for the Senate to determine the facts 
and evaluate the effect of the conduct on the office and on the 
operations of government.
    Having listened to the presentations made to the Senate by 
the House managers and by counsel for the President, it is my 
opinion that the President committed perjury and obstructed 
justice, and that this misconduct--based on constitutional 
definitions and historical precedents--meets the standard for 
convicting an official of an impeachable offense.
    As the impeachment process is not a criminal proceeding, it 
is not necessary that the evidence shows that the accused is 
guilty of a criminal offense under the United States Code. The 
framers wrote the Constitution before Congress wrote, and then 
amended, the criminal code. Nor is it required that relevant 
facts be established to the same standard as in a criminal 
trial, as Congress cannot punish the President, other than to 
remove him from office. Simply put, the framers' objective was 
to provide a remedy to protect the American people and their 
institutions of government from an unfit officeholder. In view 
of this, I believe that such remedy is to be available if there 
is clear and convincing evidence to establish the underlying 
facts which demonstrate that an officeholder is unfit to serve.
    In determining whether alleged conduct is a ``high crime 
and misdemeanor,'' Senators must examine each case 
individually. They must consider the officeholder's position in 
government and look at the effect of the officeholder's conduct 
in light of the particular position he or she holds. The fact 
that the Senate has convicted and removed Federal judges for 
committing perjury does not necessarily mean that it should 
automatically remove a President who commits perjury. The 
precedents regarding Federal judges are instructive, but they 
are not conclusive.
    The 1974 House Judiciary Committee Staff Report during the 
Nixon Impeachment Inquiry, drawing on two centuries of 
precedents, explains this concept in connection with a 
Presidential impeachment. The report states that the 
impeachment of the President should be ``predicated only upon 
conduct seriously incompatible with either the constitutional 
form and principles of our government or the proper performance 
of constitutional duties of the presidential office.'' In other 
words, Congress must determine whether the particular 
misconduct in which President Clinton engaged is serious enough 
to warrant removal from that particular office. This is what I 
call the ``incompatibility'' test.
    The ``incompatibility'' test requires Senators to exercise 
their expertise in, and knowledge of, government and to use 
their best judgment, focusing on the offenses committed and the 
effect of those offenses on the office and on the operation of 
government. It is this kind of threat to the Republic which we 
must evaluate in applying the ``incompatibility'' test. 
Accordingly, under this test we should focus on the unique 
nature of the Presidency and the offenses the President 
committed.
    The Constitution created three separate branches of 
government in order to limit the powers of government and to 
enhance the liberty of the American people. Each branch is 
supreme in its own area but must respect and defer to the 
others, when they are operating in their assigned areas. 
Reduced to the simplest characterization, the legislature makes 
the laws, the executive executes the laws, and the judiciary 
interprets the laws and dispenses justice. As the head of the 
executive branch, the President stands alone as the official 
responsible for executing the laws of our country.
    The duty of a branch to respect the other branches is a 
duty that can only be carried out by Federal officeholders. It 
cannot be borne by private citizens. And it is fundamental to 
the operations of the Federal Government. Our government could 
not function if the branches did not respect one another. I 
believe President Clinton violated this fundamental duty to 
respect the judicial branch by subverting its function.
    When a private citizen sued President Clinton under our 
civil rights statutes, the President took the position that he 
was unique in our system of law and could not be sued while 
President. When the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 that the President 
could be sued, the President decided to frustrate the judicial 
process while appearing outwardly to comply with the 
requirement of our constitutional plan. As a practical matter, 
he sought to veto this Supreme Court decision.
    The evidence shows that he undertook a deliberate and 
multifaceted plan to thwart the Supreme Court ruling. That plan 
included the commission of perjury and obstruction of justice, 
which are very serious and fundamental wrongs. Even worse is 
that his conduct was conscious and calculated. It was not a 
mistake of the moment. Rather he deliberated and chose to 
commit perjury. He deliberated and chose to obstruct justice. 
In making these conscious and calculated choices, he placed his 
personal and political interests above his Presidential duty to 
respect the judicial branch.
    This is what concerns me greatly. If the President is 
willing to place his personal and political interests above his 
duties as President, he is not fit for the office he holds.
    The President has, as one branch of the Federal Government, 
a duty to respect the requirements of the judicial branch and 
its proceedings. The President has, as the Chief Executive, an 
express duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. 
In committing perjury and in obstructing justice, he exhibited 
an attitude dangerous to the operation of government--an 
attitude where he viewed himself as more important than the 
rule of law, where his personal and political interests took 
precedence over the public interest in administering equal 
justice under law.
    Ours is a nation ruled by law, not by men, and not by 
personalities. The judgment that we render here will set a 
precedent for the ages. If Congress concludes that the Office 
of the Presidency should remain occupied by one who has sullied 
it with premeditated criminal conduct in violation of 
constitutional and legal duty, then it will have diminished 
America's right of self-defense against unfit officeholders, 
something that the framers specifically provided for in the 
Constitution.
    A President who commits perjury before a Federal grand jury 
and obstructs justice poisons the well from which justice is 
administered. As far as I know, this President has the dubious 
distinction of being the first and only President in the 
history of the United States to lie directly to a Federal grand 
jury. After taking an oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
and nothing but the truth, he deliberately violated that oath. 
The first Chief Justice of the United States, John Jay, 
accurately stated that there is no crime more extensively 
pernicious to society than perjury. If the President commits 
perjury and we conclude that nevertheless he may remain in 
office, by what authority does any judge ask any litigant to 
swear under oath?
    As far as I am concerned, this is not just an empty 
question that has no relevance in today's society. Every day, 
in courtrooms and grand jury rooms across the country, 
witnesses are asked to hold up their right hand and take an 
oath to tell the truth. The judicial process in the United 
States depends on the sanctity of that oath. The prosecutorial 
function of the United States depends on the sanctity of that 
oath. It is the cornerstone of our system of justice. We simply 
cannot allow people across the country to look at the conduct 
of our President and raise legitimate questions about whether 
they need to comply with their solemn oaths.
    Moreover, how can judges refer violations of perjury or 
obstruction of justice to the executive branch for prosecution, 
when the Chief Executive himself has committed these offenses? 
On prior occasions, the Senate has removed judges for perjury 
because it was ``incompatible'' to ask litigants not to commit 
perjury in a courtroom presided over by someone who had himself 
committed perjury. A similar ``incompatibility'' exists where 
the sanction for perjury or obstruction of justice must be 
applied by the executive branch presided over by someone who 
has likewise committed these violations.
    The President must be removed before the corrosive effect 
of his conduct eats away at the rule of law and undermines the 
legal system. To imagine this President remaining in office 
brings to mind Alexander Pope's troubling question: ``If gold 
should rust, what will iron do?'' If our President commits 
perjury and obstruction of justice, what can we expect of our 
citizens?
    The Senate should seek to protect the legal system from 
that threat. And that is why I voted to convict and remove 
William Jefferson Clinton from office.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Conrad Burns

    Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chief Justice and my Senate colleagues, we 
now close one of the most serious chapters in the history of 
this Senate. While some may not agree with the outcome, and 
others may not like the way I voted, I'm satisfied the 
Constitution has been followed. We must now accept this verdict 
and try to work together without talk of revenge or gloating.
    In reaching my conclusions, I asked myself two questions: 
Were the articles of impeachment proven, and if so, should the 
President be removed from office?
    I believe the President perjured himself before a grand 
jury. He put the protection of his Presidency ahead of the 
protection of the institution of the Presidency. He gave false 
testimony about his efforts to keep other witnesses from 
telling the truth. We have already learned in our history that 
lies lead to more lies, and the pattern in this case led to 
perjury.
    I also feel strongly that a case for obstruction of justice 
was proven conclusively. The Senate heard the many actions and 
motives of the President, and it was easy to connect the dots. 
Those dots reveal a clear and convincing case against the 
President.
    I believe the President tampered with the testimony of 
witnesses against him; that he allowed his lawyers to present 
false evidence on his behalf; that he directed a job search for 
a witness in exchange for false testimony; and that he directed 
the recovery and hiding of evidence under subpoena.
    Does this warrant the President's removal from office? I 
agree with my respected colleague, Senator Byrd, that this 
reaches the level of high crimes and misdemeanors, for a number 
of reasons: The President's actions crossed the line between 
private and public behavior when those actions legally became 
the subject of a civil rights lawsuit against him, and when he 
tried to undermine that lawsuit. His actions were an attack on 
the separation of powers between the executive and judicial 
branches when he abused his power in an effort to obstruct 
justice. Remember, he impeded a lawsuit the highest court in 
our land allowed to proceed on a 9-0 vote.
    It's clear even to some of the President's supporters that 
he committed many of the offenses he has been charged with. But 
given this outcome, I hope for our system of justice and for 
our character as a nation that these votes are never seen as 
treating actions such as perjury and obstruction of justice 
lightly, whether by a President or by any citizen.
    Our new world of communications has made more information 
available to us than ever before. But it also contributed to 
the media overkill that jaded the American people to this 
process long ago. When the Lewinsky story became public, the 
President conducted a poll in which he learned that Americans 
would tolerate a private affair, but not perjury or obstruction 
of justice. His goal from that point on to was to poison the 
well of public opinion. Once the focus shifted away from the 
facts and toward opinion, once the clatter and clutter echoed 
on 24-hour talk television, the President's goal was reached. 
But the facts remain, and they are not in dispute.
    Montanans didn't send me to the Senate to be a weathervane, 
shifting in the wind, but to be a compass. It may be common to 
say the President's offenses don't ``rise to the level of high 
crimes and misdemeanors,'' but I believe that would ignore our 
history and what we stand for as a nation.
    That's why I also oppose censuring the President. The 
Constitution gives us one way to deal with impeachable 
offenses: a yes or no vote on guilt. Anything else would be 
like amending the Constitution on the fly and infringing on the 
separation of powers between the branches of government.
    As we accept this outcome and move forward, we have plenty 
of time left ahead to help out Montana's farm and ranch 
communities, which is my top priority. We have time to save 
Social Security in a way that fixes the program without raising 
taxes. We have time to give control of education back to 
parents and teachers, and to give Federal funds to classrooms, 
not bureaucrats. We have time to cut the record burden of 
taxation on Montanans, many of whom are forced to take more 
than one job to make ends meet.
    We should all roll up our sleeves and get to work.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator James M. Inhofe*

    Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chief Justice, in the absence of hearing 
something that I haven't heard or seeing something that is 
unforeseen up to now, it is my plan to vote for conviction on 
the two articles of impeachment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   * * * * *                              
* Sen. Inhofe submitted an additional statement on February 12, see p. 
2987 below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I think this is probably the most important vote I will 
cast during the course of my lifetime. I say it very sincerely. 
I believe we are going to rise to the occasion.
    I had an experience back in 1975, 24 years ago. I was a 
member of the State senate in Oklahoma. I can remember being 
called for jury duty, and I was very happy to find myself 
assigned to a murder case about which I had already expressed a 
definite opinion. I said I believed this defendant was surely 
guilty, and besides, I was the author of the capital punishment 
bill in the State legislature. So I thought for sure I wasn't 
going to be qualified as a juror.
    Well, I went through the qualification procedure and 
somehow they qualified me. Five days later, I was the foreman 
of the jury that acquitted that accused murderer. This can 
happen. It is an experience that taught me a lot about our 
judicial system.
    I sometimes say one of the few qualifications I have for 
the U.S. Senate is I am not a lawyer. So that when I read the 
Constitution, I know what it says; when I read the oath of 
office, I know what it says; when I read the law, I know what 
it says. I don't have to clutter up my mind with what the 
definition of ``is'' is. So it makes it a little easier for me.
    From a nonlawyer perspective, let me share a couple of 
observations.
    First, insofar as perjury is concerned--lying under oath--I 
might be wrong, but I don't think there is a Senator in this 
Chamber who doesn't believe the President lied under oath.
    I quote from the White House counsel, Charles Ruff, himself 
who said: ``Reasonable people can believe the President lied 
under oath.''
    I quote from Senator Chuck Schumer who said: ``He lied 
under oath both in the Paula Jones deposition and what he said 
in the grand jury.''
    I quote from Representative Robert Wexler, a strong 
supporter of the President, who serves on the House Judiciary 
Committee, who said: ``The President did not tell the truth. He 
lied under oath.''
    I quote from former U.S. Senator Paul Simon, one of my 
favorite Democrat colleagues, who appeared with me on a 
television program before the trial, who said: ``You have to be 
an extreme Clinton zealot to believe perjury was not 
committed.''
    Second, as a nonattorney, I have a hard time reconciling 
the idea that there might be certain permissible exceptions to 
telling the truth under oath. Maybe you who are attorneys, and 
have a different background than mine, see it differently. But 
how can you reconcile this idea that under some conditions--if 
the subject matter is sex or something else--you can lie under 
oath? I really have a hard time with this.
    I know that morality is not supposed to be the issue here. 
We are supposed to concentrate on the two specific articles of 
impeachment. However, I don't think anyone can completely 
compartmentalize himself and totally disregard other things 
going on.
    All of us get many, many letters from young children, 
parents, teachers, and others who are deeply distressed about 
the President's behavior and its impact on the moral health of 
the Nation. I think I am very fortunate because my kids are all 
in their upper thirties and my eight grandchildren, make that 
nine--I count them when they are conceived--are all under six, 
so I don't get those embarrassing questions. But I know many 
parents are struggling with this.
    The other thing that concerns me is the reprehensible, 
consistent attitude this President has displayed over the years 
against women. Take Paula Jones as just one example. She may 
not win a popularity poll, but her civil rights have just as 
much standing as anyone else's, do they not? Is not our country 
based on the principle that even the least among us is entitled 
to equal treatment under the law?
    It amazes me how these feminist organizations continue to 
hold this President in such high regard--groups such as the 
National Organization for Women. I went back and read their 
bylaws. They claim to want to protect women with regard to 
``equal rights and responsibilities in all aspects of 
citizenship, public service, employment . . . including freedom 
from discrimination.''
    And here we have a President who not only misused his power 
to seduce a college-age intern, but who has also engaged in 
extensive similar misconduct outside of his marriage. It is not 
just Monica Lewinsky. There is Gennifer Flowers, Elizabeth Ward 
Gracen, Paula Jones, Kathleen Willey, Dolly Kyle Browning, Beth 
Coulson, Susan McDougal, Cristy Zercher--the list goes on and 
on.
    This President has a consistent pattern of using and 
abusing women. You know that. I imagine most of you watched the 
Monica Lewinsky tapes as I did. I don't know why the House 
managers didn't pick this up--somehow they let it slip 
through--about when she told this story concerning the two 
security badges. She came here to Washington, this wide-eyed 
kid, and there is a blue badge that lets you get into the White 
House proper and a pink badge that lets you only into the Old 
Executive Office Building. And she wanted to be in there--in 
the West Wing--where she could see what was going on.
    She had the pink badge so she had to be escorted to the 
West Wing by someone else. So the very first day she meets and 
talks to the President in person, he begins the relationship 
we're talking about. He didn't even know her name. And then he 
reached across and grabbed her pink badge, yanked it down, and 
said, ``This is going to be a problem.'' I don't think there is 
anyone in the room who doesn't know what he was referring to. 
He was preparing to use this girl and abuse her and discard her 
like an old shirt. But I know that these are not things the 
lawyers expect us to consider.
    I do want to give another observation, though. I thought 
the playing field would be very uneven when this trial started. 
The members of the Judiciary Committee who are the House 
managers are all lawyers. But mostly, they are Congressmen 
first. Many of these Congressmen-lawyers had not been in a 
courtroom for literally years. And here they were taking on the 
most prestigious, the most prominent, the most skilled, the 
most experienced, the highest priced lawyers anywhere in 
America. And yet when they finished with their opening 
statements, there was no doubt the House managers had risen 
superbly to the occasion, and I believe they have done a great 
job throughout.
    The White House lawyers are very skilled, very persuasive 
people. I would make this observation--again, a nonlawyer 
observation: I felt that three or four of them should have quit 
their opening remarks about 5 minutes sooner than they did. 
They had a tendency to close their presentations with arguments 
that undermined their credibility.
    Cheryl Mills, for example, was really doing well, and she 
was very persuasive until she started at the very last talking 
about the President's record on civil rights, as if the civil 
rights of a person his associates had dubbed as ``trailer park 
trash'' were not significant, or the dignity of the intern he 
had branded ``a stalker'' was not significant. I really think 
she destroyed her otherwise very persuasive presentation.
    I think the same thing was true with Gregory Craig. He 
ended by talking about how conviction in this case would 
somehow ``destroy a fundamental underpinning of democracy'' by 
overturning the results of an election, as if Bob Dole would 
come in if that were to happen.
    Even our good friend, Dale Bumpers--I knew Dale Bumpers 
long before I came here to the U.S. Senate--did a great job. 
But I think he should have quit early, too, because at the very 
last it sounded like he was predicating the innocence of this 
President on his foreign policy. And as I just look at Iraq and 
what is going on over there, I think if that had been the test 
for this, I could have made up my mind a lot earlier.
    Another perspective I bring to this is as chairman of the 
Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness. Having been in the 
service myself, and knowing how important discipline is, I am 
very disturbed that we have so many cases where severe 
punishment is dealt to individuals who have engaged in conduct 
far less serious than that of the President. Consider:
    Capt. Derrick Robinson, an Army officer, was caught up in 
the Aberdeen sex misconduct case and is serving time in 
Leavenworth for admitting to consensual sex with an enlisted 
person who was not his wife.
    Delmar Simpson is serving 25 years in a military prison 
because a court-martial found that, even though his 
relationship with a female recruit was consensual, the power 
granted him by his rank made such consensual sex with a 
subordinate unacceptable. Think of the power granted this 
President by his rank.
    Remember Kelly Flinn. She is not flying B-52s anymore. She 
was forced out the Air Force for lying about an adulterous 
affair.
    Sgt. Maj. Gene McKinney, the Army's top enlisted man, was 
tried for perjury, adultery, and obstruction of justice--all 
concerning sexual misconduct. He was convicted of obstruction, 
but not before his attorney asserted at the trial how people in 
uniform rightly ask: ``How can you hold an enlisted man to a 
higher standard than the President of the United States, the 
Commander in Chief?''
    So I have looked at this and studied it. I think anyone who 
votes to acquit has to say that we are going to hold this 
President to a lower standard of conduct and behavior than we 
hold other people. I do not understand how they can come to any 
other conclusion.
    My wife and I have been married 40 years. I have a thing 
called the wife test. You go home and when you want to get an 
opinion that is totally apolitical, you ask your wife. So I 
went home and I presented the case--as explained so eloquently 
by the White House lawyers and others--on why we could have a 
lower standard of conduct for a President than we have for a 
judge. And I know the argument. And I expressed the argument to 
my wife in the kitchen. I said, there are a thousand judges, 
only one President. I went through the whole thing. Then she 
looked up and said, ``I thought the President appointed the 
judges.'' You know, my wife is so dumb, she is always asking me 
questions I can't answer.
    I really believe that in this case we are getting at the 
truth. I really believe that the President of the United States 
should be held to the very highest of standards.
    Winston Churchill said: ``Truth is incontrovertible. 
Ignorance may deride it, panic may resent it, malice may 
destroy it, but there it is.''
    I think we have seen the truth. And I think the final truth 
is that this President should be held to the very highest of 
standards.
    Sometimes when I am not really sure I am right, I consult 
my best friend. His name is Jesus. And I asked that question. 
Now I will quote to you the response that is found in Luke: 
``From one who has been entrusted with more, much more will be 
asked.''
    Mr. Chief Justice, I think Jesus is right.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Max Cleland

    Mr. CLELAND. Mr. Chief Justice, inasmuch as the impeachment 
trial of the President has focused on the importance of oaths, 
I have begun to reflect on the oaths I have taken in my life. 
In terms of affirming my allegiance to this nation and the U.S. 
Constitution, I have taken an oath four times. I have followed 
up each oath with my signature.
    The first such oath I took was when I was 21 years old. I 
was sworn in to the U.S. Army as a young Second Lieutenant. 
Later I followed my flag and my Commander in Chief in being a 
part of the armed military forces in the Vietnam war.
    After the war, I took another oath. This time I was sworn 
in as head of the Veterans' Administration under President 
Carter. I still remember that turbulent time after the Vietnam 
war when so many of my fellow veterans were returning from that 
conflict. The words from Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural 
address seemed to constantly echo in my mind: ``. . . to care 
for him who has borne the battle and for his widow and his 
orphan.'' Having been wounded in Vietnam myself, I felt a grave 
responsibility to carry out my oath on behalf of my fellow 
veterans.
    The next time I took an oath it was January 1997. It was on 
the occasion of being sworn into the U.S. Senate. As Vice 
President Al Gore swore the new Senators in, I placed my right 
elbow on my Bible and raised my left hand in an oath to defend 
the Constitution against ``all enemies, foreign and domestic.'' 
Once in the Senate, I was fortunate to have been selected to 
follow distinguished former Georgia Senators Richard B. Russell 
and Sam Nunn in service on the Senate Armed Services Committee. 
I fully expected that any threat to our Constitution, our 
electoral process, or our delicately-honed system of checks and 
balances would come from outside our country, not from within.
    I was wrong.
    This leads me to my most recent oath to do ``impartial 
justice'' in the Senate in the impeachment trial of the 
President of the United States. In my personal view, this final 
oath, sealed with my signature in a book which will become part 
of the archives of American history, is a culmination of the 
other three oaths I have taken.
    I have sworn to defend this country.
    I have sworn to take care of its defenders.
    I have sworn to uphold the Constitution for which my fellow 
defenders have suffered and died.
    How can I now turn my back and ignore the challenge to that 
Constitution posed by this precedent-setting, first-time ever 
impeachment of an elected President of the United States?
    I cannot.
    When my name is called in regular order for my vote on the 
articles of impeachment, I will vote not guilty.
    I have reached my decision after much effort. I have tried 
to keep an open mind and an open heart. I have attempted to 
search the depths of American history and the lore of our 
English forebearers for insight and guidance. I have counseled 
privately with experts on American history and constitutional 
law. I have met with knowledgeable sources inside and outside 
the government. I have personally listened to constituents in 
my State and throughout the Nation. I have talked to them on 
the phone, read their letters and scanned their e-mail. I have 
tried to weave an appropriate course through the barrage of 
media talk and the system of political reporters doing their 
duty.
    I have given it my best shot.
    I understand now what Alexander Hamilton meant when he 
predicted 212 years ago that individual Senators faced with an 
impeachment trial had the ``awful discretion'' of removing a 
President. Yet I believe Hamilton was correct when long ago he 
advocated placing his faith in the Senators, where he hoped to 
find ``dignity and independence.'' I believe that under the 
circumstances the Senate has conducted itself appropriately, 
and has complied with Hamilton's standards of conducting an 
impeachment trial with ``dignity and independence.'' I also 
believe the Senate should continue to follow the standards set 
by our Founding Fathers regarding the use of impeachment power. 
According to the founders as articulated in the Constitution, 
the impeachment clearly should be reserved for ``bribery, 
treason or other high crimes and misdemeanors.'' This language 
did not just turn up in the Constitution overnight. The 
language grew and evolved over a period of months in 
Philadelphia in 1787.
    One of the Founding Fathers who especially impressed me is 
George Mason. Mason had an interesting background. Like many of 
our country's early statesmen, he was from Virginia. For me, 
Mason is a bridge of insight into what the impeachment clause 
in the Constitution is all about.
    Mason was a soldier. Indeed, he was an officer, a colonel. 
He, too, understood the grave responsibility of military 
leadership, of leading men in combat and in caring for them 
afterwards. He certainly knew about the gravity of his own 
personal oath. It was Mason, then, who articulated during the 
Constitutional Convention that the phrase in the Constitution 
regarding impeachment must be more fully fleshed out and should 
more appropriately read ``. . . and other high Crimes and 
Misdemeanors against the state.''
    Here was a soldier of the American Revolution. Here was an 
officer in that Revolution working with his fellow statesmen 
charting out a course for the Nation's future. Here was a 
brother of the bond from Northern Virginia who wanted to make 
sure the actual constitutional language was clear that any 
impeachment must rise to a high level. According to the thrust 
of Mason's argument, for an impeachment of the President to be 
legitimate, the impeachable offenses must pose a threat to the 
Nation itself. The committee which reviewed the language 
believed that the phrase ``against the state'' was redundant, 
and, in effect, assumed.
    President Clinton has committed serious offenses. His 
personal conduct in this matter was, as I have said before, 
wrongful, reprehensible and indefensible. He has admitted to 
personal offenses, and will be appropriately judged for his 
misconduct elsewhere. In my judgement, under all the others I 
have taken under the U.S. Constitution, his offenses do not 
rise to the required level for impeachable offenses under the 
U.S. Constitution.
    I will be voting against conviction and removal from office 
of the President on both articles because I do not believe that 
these particular charges reach the high standard for 
impeachment which I believe George Mason and the other founders 
intended: that such an offense must be conduct which threatens 
grievous harm to our entire system.
    As the Senate concludes this trial, I am reminded of other 
words from Abraham Lincoln's second inaugural address: ``with 
malice toward none, with clarity for all, let us bind up the 
Nation's wounds . . .'' If Lincoln can say that as the Nation 
was concluding the most divisive time in our history, which 
ultimately resulted in the first impeachment trial of an 
American President, surely we can say that to each other and to 
our nation as we conclude this historical second impeachment 
trial.
    It is time to end this trial.
    It is time to let the President conclude the term he was 
elected to by the American people.
    It is time to put an end to partisan bickering about the 
motives and conduct of all of those who have become involved in 
this sad episode.
    It is time for us all to bind up the Nation's wounds.
    It is time to get on with the business of the American 
people we were elected to conduct.
    I ask that a supplement of my statement be printed in the 
Record.
    Thank you.
    There being no objection, the statement was ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

 The Impeachment of President William Jefferson Clinton By Senator Max 
                                Cleland
    Mr. Chief Justice, let me begin by saying that the reason we are 
here today, the reason the U.S. Senate is being asked to exercise what 
Alexander Hamilton termed the ``awful discretion'' of impeachment, is 
because of the wrongful, reprehensible, indefensible conduct of one 
person, the President of the United States, William Jefferson Clinton. 
Indeed, I believe it is conduct deserving of the censure of the Senate, 
and I will support such a resolution when it comes before us.
    The question before the Senate, however, is not whether the 
President's conduct was wrong, or immoral, or even censurable. We must 
decide solely as to whether or not he should be convicted of the 
allegations contained in the articles of impeachment and thus removed 
from office. In my opinion, the case for removal, presented in great 
detail in the massive 60,000-page report submitted by the House, in 
many hours of very capable but often repetitive presentations to the 
Senate by the House managers and the President's defense team, and in 
many additional hours of Senators' questioning of the two sides, fails 
to meet the very high standards which we must demand with respect to 
Presidential impeachments. Therefore, I will vote to dismiss the 
impeachment case against William Jefferson Clinton, and to vote for the 
Senate resuming other necessary work for the American people.
    To this very point, I have reserved my judgment on this question 
because of my constitutional responsibility and oath to ``render 
impartial justice'' in this case. Most of the same record presented in 
great detail to Senators in the course of the last several weeks has 
long been before the public, and indeed most of that public, including 
editorial boards, talk show hosts, and so forth, long ago reached their 
own conclusions as to the impeachment of President Clinton. But I have 
now heard enough to make my decision. With respect to the witnesses the 
House managers apparently now wish to depose and call before the 
Senate, the existing record represents multiple interrogations by the 
Office of the Independent Counsel and its grand jury, with not only no 
cross-examinations by the President's counsel but, with the exception 
of the President's testimony, without even the presence of the 
witnesses' own counsel. It is difficult for me to see how that record 
would possibly be improved from the prosecution's standpoint. Thus, I 
will not support motions to depose or call witnesses.
    In reaching my decision on impeachment, there are a number of 
factors which have been discussed or speculated about in the news media 
which were not a part of my calculations.
    First of all, while as political creatures neither the Senate nor 
the House can or should be immune from public opinion, we have a very 
precise constitutionally prescribed responsibility in this matter, and 
popular opinion must not be controlling consideration. I believe 
Republican Senator William Pitt Fessenden of Maine said it best during 
the only previous Presidential impeachment trial in 1868:
    ``To the suggestion that popular opinion demands the conviction of 
the President on these charges, I reply that he is not now on trial 
before the people, but before the Senate. . . . The people have not 
heard the evidence as we have heard it. The responsibility is not on 
them, but upon us. They have not taken an oath to `do impartial justice 
according to the Constitution and the laws.' I have taken that oath. I 
cannot render judgment upon their convictions, nor can they transfer to 
themselves my punishment if I violate my own. And I should consider 
myself undeserving of the confidence of that just and intelligent 
people who imposed upon me this great responsibility, and unworthy of a 
place among honorable men, if for any fear of public reprobation, and 
for the sake of securing popular favor, I should disregard the 
convictions of my judgment and my conscience.''
    Nor was my decision premised on the notion, suggested by some, that 
the stability of our Government would be severely jeopardized by the 
impeachment of President Clinton. I have full faith in the strength of 
our Government and its leaders and, more importantly, faith in the 
American people to cope successfully with whatever the Senate decides. 
There can be no doubt that the impeachment of a President would not be 
easy for the country but just in this century, about to end, we have 
endured great depressions and world wars. Today, the U.S. economy is 
strong, the will of the people to move beyond this national nightmare 
is great, and we have an experienced and able Vice President who is 
more than capable of stepping up and assuming the role of the 
President.
    Third, although we have heard much argument that the precedents of 
judicial impeachments should be controlling in this case, I have not 
been convinced and did not rely on such testimony in making my 
decision. After review of the record, historical precedents, and 
consideration of the different roles of Presidents and Federal judges, 
I have concluded that there is indeed a different legal standard for 
impeachment of Presidents and Federal judges. Article II, section 4 of 
the Constitution provides that ``the President, Vice President, and all 
civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on 
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' Article III, section I of the Constitution 
indicates that judges ``shall hold their Offices during good 
Behavior.'' Presidents are elected by the people and serve for a fixed 
term of years, while Federal judges are appointed without public 
approval to serve a life tenure without any accountability to the 
public. Therefore, under our system, impeachment is the only way to 
remove a Federal judge from office while Presidents serve for a 
specified term and face accountability to the pubic through elections. 
With respect to the differing impeachment standards themselves, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist once wrote, ``the terms `treason, bribery and other 
high crimes and misdemeanors' are narrower than the malfeasance in 
office and failure to perform the duties of the office, which may be 
grounds for forfeiture of office held during good behavior.''
    And my conclusions with respect to impeachment were not based upon 
consideration of the proper punishment of President Clinton for his 
misdeeds. During the impeachment of President Nixon, the report by the 
staff of the impeachment inquiry concluded that ``impeachment is the 
first step in a remedial process--removal from office and possible 
disqualification from holding future office. The purpose of impeachment 
is not personal punishment; its function is primarily to maintain 
constitutional government.'' Regardless of the outcome of the Senate 
impeachment trial, President Clinton remains subject to censure by the 
House and Senate, and criminal prosecution for any crimes he may have 
committed. Whatever punishment President Clinton deserves for his 
misdeeds will be provided elsewhere.
    Finally, I do not believe that perjury or obstruction of justice 
could never rise to the level of threatening grievous harm to the 
Republic, and thus represent adequate grounds for removal of a 
President. However, we must approach such a determination with the 
greatest of care. Impeachment of a President is, perhaps with the power 
to declare war, the gravest of constitutional responsibilities bestowed 
upon the Congress. During the history of the United States, the Senate 
has only held impeachment trials for two Presidents, the 1868 trial of 
President Johnson, who had not been elected to that office, and now 
President Clinton. Although the Senate can look to impeachment trials 
of other public officials, primarily judicial, as I have already said, 
I do not believe that those precedents are or should be controlling in 
impeachment trials of Presidents, or indeed of other elected officials.
    My decision was based on one overriding concern: the impact of this 
precedent-setting case on the future of the Presidency, and indeed of 
the Congress itself. It is not Bill Clinton who should occupy our only 
attention. He already stands rebuked by the House impeachment votes, 
and by the words of virtually every Member of Congress of both 
political parties. And even if we do not remove him from office, he 
still stands liable to future criminal prosecution for his actions, as 
well as to the verdict of history. No, it is Mr. Clinton's successors, 
Republican, Democrat or any other party, who should be our concern.
    The Republican Senator, Edmund G. Ross of Kansas, who ``looked down 
into my open grave'' of political oblivion when he cast one of the 
decisive votes in acquitting Andrew Johnson in spite of his personal 
dislike of the President, explained his motivation this way:
    ``In a large sense, the independence of the executive office as a 
coordinate branch of the government was on trial. . . . If . . . the 
President must step down . . . upon insufficient proofs and from 
partisan considerations, the office of President would be degraded, 
cease to be a coordinate branch of government, and ever after 
subordinated to the legislative will. It would practically have 
revolutionized our splendid political fabric into a partisan 
Congressional autocracy.''
    While our government is certainly on a stronger foundation now than 
in the aftermath of the Civil War, the basic point remains valid. If 
anything, in today's world of rapidly emerging events and threats, we 
need an effective, independent Presidency even more than did mid-19th 
century Americans.
    While in the history of the United States the U.S. Senate has never 
before considered impeachment articles against a sitting elected 
official, we do have numerous cases of each House exercising its 
constitutional right to ``punish its Members for disorderly behavior, 
and, with the concurrence of two-thirds expel a Member.'' However, 
since the Civil War, while a variety of cases involving personal and 
private misconduct have been considered, the Senate has never voted to 
expel a Member, choosing to censure instead on seven occasions, and the 
House has rarely chosen the ultimate sanction. Should the removal of a 
President be subject to greater punishment with lesser standards of 
evidence than the Congress has applied to itself when the Constitution 
appears to call for the reverse in limiting impeachment to cases of 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes or misdemeanors?'' In my view, 
the answer must be no.
    Thus, for me, as one U.S. Senator, the bar for impeachment and 
removal from office of a President must be a high one, and I want the 
record to reflect that my vote to dismiss is based upon a standard of 
evidence equivalent to that used in criminal proceedings--that is, that 
guilt must be proven ``beyond a reasonable doubt''--and a standard of 
impeachable offense which, in my view, conforms to the founders' 
intentions that such an offense must be one which represents official 
misconduct threatening grievous harm to our whole system of government. 
To quote Federalist No. 65, Hamilton defined as impeachable ``those 
offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other 
words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a 
nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated political, as 
they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society 
itself.'' As I have said before, I can conceive of instances in which 
both perjury and obstruction of justice would meet this test, and I 
certainly believe that most, if not all, capital crimes, including 
murder, would qualify for impeachment and removal from office. However, 
in my judgment, the current case does not reach the necessary high 
standard.
    In the words of John F. Kennedy, ``with a good conscience our only 
sure reward, with history the final judge of our deeds,'' I believe 
that dismissal of the impeachment case against William Jefferson 
Clinton is the appropriate action for the U.S. Senate. It is the action 
which will best preserve the system of government which has served us 
so well for over 200 years, a system of checks and balances, with a 
strong and independent Chief Executive.
    In closing, I wish to address those in the Senate and House, and 
among the American public, who have reached a different conclusion than 
have I in this case. I do not question the sincerity or legitimacy of 
your viewpoint. The process itself pushes us to make absolute 
judgments--yes or no to conviction and removal from office--and the 
nature of debate yields portraits of complex issues in stark black-and-
white terms, but I believe it is possible for reasonable people to 
reach different conclusions on this matter. Indeed, I recognize that, 
while my decision seeks to avoid the dangers of setting the impeachment 
bar too low, setting that bar too high is not without risks. I believe 
the House managers spoke eloquently about the need to preserve respect 
for the rule of law, including the critical principle that no one, not 
even the President of the United States, is above that rule. However, I 
have concluded that the threat to our system of a weakened Presidency, 
made in some ways subordinate to the will of the legislative branch, 
outweighs the potential harm to the rule of law, because that latter 
risk is mitigated by: an intact, independent criminal justice system, 
which indeed will retain the ability to render final, legal judgment on 
the President's conduct; a vigorous, independent press corps which 
remains perfectly capable of exposing such conduct, and of extracting a 
personal, professional and political price; and an independent Congress 
which will presumably continue to have the will and means to oppose 
Presidents who threaten our system of government.
    By the very nature of this situation, where I sit in judgment of a 
Democratic President as a Democratic Senator, I realize that my 
decision cannot convey the nonpartisanship which is essential to 
achieve closure on this matter, one way or the other. Indeed, in words 
which could have been written today, the chief proponent among the 
Founding Fathers of a vigorous Chief Executive, Alexander Hamilton, 
wrote in 1788, in No. 65 of The Federalist Papers, that impeachments 
``will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and 
to divide them into parties, more or less friendly or inimical, to the 
accused. In many cases, it will connect itself with the pre-existing 
factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, 
influence and interest on one side, or on the other; and in such cases 
there will always be the greatest danger, that the decision will be 
regulated more by the comparative strength of the parties than by real 
demonstration of guilt or innocence.''
    I have, however, in making my decision laid out for you the 
standards which I believe to be appropriate whenever the Congress 
considers the removal from office of an elected official, whether 
executive branch or legislative branch. I will do my best to stand by 
those standards in all such cases to come before me while I have the 
privilege of representing the people of Georgia in the U.S. Senate, 
regardless of the party affiliation of the accused. I only hope and 
pray that no future President, of either party, will ever again engage 
in conduct which provides any basis, including the basis of the current 
case, for the Congress to consider the grave question of impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Bill Frist

    Mr. FRIST. Mr. Chief Justice, I rise to explain my decision 
to convict President William Jefferson Clinton on two articles 
of impeachment charging him with high crimes and misdemeanors. 
I have heard from thousands of fellow Tennesseans during this 
trial, and their opinions were deeply split. While I looked to 
the people of Tennessee for guidance, responsibility for my 
final vote ultimately turned on my own conscience. I am sure 
that this will be one of the most important votes I cast as a 
U.S. Senator, and I am honored to explain fully my vote.
    I sought throughout President Clinton's trial to be true to 
my oath to do ``impartial justice according to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States.'' When I raised my right hand 
and swore that oath on January 7, I accepted a solemn 
responsibility. I did not approach this trial with some 
preordained outcome in mind; I carefully listened during the 5 
weeks of this trial to the evidence and the arguments, and 
sought to do justice.
    In considering the allegations against President Clinton, I 
believed that I should apply a ``beyond a reasonable doubt'' 
burden of proof--even though the Constitution does not specify 
a particular burden of proof in impeachment trials. The 
Constitution entrusts the decision to convict an impeached 
officer to the individual judgment of each Senator; however, I 
wanted to give the President the benefit of the same high 
standard of proof applied in criminal trials. I would remove a 
President from office only if the House managers met this 
rigorous burden of proof.
    The jury instructions used in Federal courts explain what 
must be established to meet this burden of proof:

    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all 
possible doubt. Possible doubts or doubts based purely on speculation 
are not reasonable doubts. A reasonable doubt is based on reason and 
common sense. It may arise from evidence, the lack of evidence, or the 
nature of the evidence.
    Proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof which is so convincing 
that you would not hesitate to rely and act on it in making the most 
important decisions in your own lives.

    In the end, I concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that 
President Clinton repeatedly lied under oath before a Federal 
grand jury. I also concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that he 
engaged in a calculated, premeditated campaign to obstruct 
justice. I now wish to address each of those articles of 
impeachment in turn.
    The circumstantial and direct evidence demonstrates beyond 
a reasonable doubt that President Clinton committed perjury 
during his grand jury appearance. The criminal law of the 
United States forbids perjury before a grand jury. To prove a 
case of grand jury perjury, a prosecutor must demonstrate: (1) 
that the defendant testified under oath before a grand jury; 
(2) that the testimony so given was false in one or more 
respects; (3) the false testimony concerned material matters; 
and (4) the false testimony was knowingly given. There are 
three instances during the President's August 17, 1998, grand 
jury testimony in which these four elements were established.
    First, he lied when he denied that he had ``sexual 
relations'' with Ms. Lewinsky, even under his own 
interpretation of the definition of that term. Quite simply, 
Ms. Lewinsky offered a detailed account of numerous times when 
they did engage in such relations, even under President 
Clinton's interpretation of that term. Her testimony is 
corroborated by contemporaneous accounts she offered to a 
number of friends and professional counselors. President 
Clinton conjured up a tortured definition of the term ``sexual 
relations'' to explain the blue dress, and its physical 
evidence corroborating sexual relations, to the grand jury--
while still asserting the truthfulness of his earlier denial of 
``sexual relations'' in his deposition in the Paula Jones 
sexual harassment suit. This attempt to have it both ways, in 
turn, forced him to lie before the grand jury about the details 
and nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. There is no 
doubt in my mind that President Clinton lied about this matter. 
Moreover, this lie was material; that is, it had the tendency 
to affect the grand jury's investigation. That investigation 
focused on President Clinton's possible perjury and obstruction 
of justice in the Jones case. Lying to the grand jury to 
attempt to deny the earlier perjury in the Jones deposition was 
clearly material to that investigation.
    Second, President Clinton lied to the grand jury about his 
attempt to coach Ms. Currie immediately following the 
deposition. This coaching, which I will discuss in more detail 
later, was explicitly denied by the President before the grand 
jury. His testimony that he made a series of false statements 
to Ms. Currie and sought her agreement with them merely in an 
attempt ``to refresh [his] memory about what the facts were'' 
and that he was ``trying to get as much information as quickly 
as [he] could'' is false. He did not ask her what she recalled; 
he made false declarations and sought her agreement with them. 
One cannot refresh one's recollection by making knowingly false 
statements to another. This is a classic example of why courts 
instruct juries to use their common sense in resolving factual 
disputes. Moreover, President Clinton coached her twice in the 
exact same manner: Once on January 18, 1998, and again on 
January 20 or January 21. He had just finished lying in his 
civil deposition on January 17, and he wanted to enlist her 
support for his lies if she was called by Paula Jones' 
lawyers--as she was on January 22. Again, this issue was 
plainly material to an investigation into President Clinton's 
possible obstruction of justice.
    Third, President Clinton lied to the grand jury about 
attempting to influence the testimony of his aides whom he knew 
would be called before the grand jury. These allegations are 
discussed later. For now, it is only important to note that he 
testified that he ``said to them things that were true about 
this relationship. . . . So, I said things that were true. They 
may have been misleading. . . .'' In fact, he lied to his 
aides, as even Sidney Blumenthal stated in his videotaped 
deposition testimony. It is understandable that President 
Clinton would not admit to the grand jury that he lied to these 
aides, because to do so would admit that he obstructed justice. 
He could have asserted his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination; however, he chose to lie. He denied that he had 
lied to these aides. The Supreme Court has addressed just this 
sort of a lie, stating: ``A citizen may decline to answer the 
question, or answer it honestly, but he cannot with impunity 
knowingly and willfully answer with a falsehood.''
    The evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that 
President Clinton obstructed justice. He suggested that Ms. 
Lewinsky submit a false affidavit in a civil case. He coached a 
potential witness, Ms. Currie, in the civil case and the grand 
jury investigation by repeating a series of assertions to her 
that he knew to be false in the hope that she would adopt those 
assertions as her own. Last, he made false statements to his 
top advisors, knowing that they would then repeat those 
statements to a Federal grand jury.
    The United States Criminal Code makes it illegal for one to 
obstruct justice. The precise wording of the general 
obstruction of justice statute--title 18, section 1503 of the 
United States Code--provides: ``Whoever . . . corruptly . . . 
influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, 
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall 
be punished. . . .'' Courts have interpreted the word 
``corruptly'' to mean that the defendant had an intent to 
obstruct, impair, or impede the due administration of justice. 
In other words, one need not use threats of force or 
intimidation to obstruct justice. Thus, one who merely proposes 
to a potential witness that the witness lie in a judicial 
proceeding is guilty of obstructing justice.
    Also, an additional Federal statute, section 1512 of title 
18, deals specifically with witness tampering. It provides: 
``Whoever . . . corruptly persuades another person, or attempts 
to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another 
person with intent to . . . influence, delay, or prevent the 
testimony of any person in an official proceeding . . . shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned. . . .'' Unlike section 
1503, section 1512 has been interpreted as applying to more 
than just ``pending'' judicial proceedings; courts have found 
it adequate that a defendant ``feared'' that such a proceeding 
might begin and sought to influence the testimony of those who 
may be witnesses in such a proceeding.
    With this statutory backdrop in mind, I turn first to the 
allegation that President Clinton urged Ms. Lewinsky to submit 
a false affidavit and deny their sexual relationship. The 
evidence establishes that he telephoned her between 2 and 2:30 
a.m. on December 17, 1997. According to Ms. Lewinsky, President 
Clinton informed her that she was on the witness list in the 
Paula Jones sexual harassment lawsuit. He then suggested that, 
if she were subpoenaed to give a deposition, ``she could sign 
an affidavit to try to satisfy [Ms. Jones's] inquiry and not be 
deposed.'' As has been pointed out, a truthful affidavit about 
their relationship would not have prevented her deposition; in 
fact, a truthful affidavit would have encouraged the 
deposition. Notwithstanding this obvious fact, President 
Clinton's lawyers vigorously asserted at trial that a ``limited 
but truthful'' affidavit could have misled the Jones lawyers 
sufficiently to avoid her being deposed.
    The problem with this defense is that President Clinton on 
December 17, in the very same telephone conversation in which 
he suggested the affidavit, also encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to 
continue with the ``cover stories'' they had used to hide their 
relationship. According to Ms. Lewinsky, he told her that she 
``should say she visited [the White House] to see Ms. Currie 
and, on occasion when working at [the White House] she brought 
him letters when no one else was around.'' Of course, Ms. 
Lewinsky was going to the White House to see President Clinton, 
and the only time she ``brought him letters'' was to cover 
their illicit rendezvous. These cover stories, hatched as 
explanations to prevent coworkers from discovering their sexual 
relationship, amounted to obstruction of justice when the 
President suggested their use in judicial proceedings. These 
cover stories ultimately found their way into drafts of Ms. 
Lewinsky's affidavit. The evidence establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton was urging Ms. Lewinsky 
to file a false and misleading affidavit in the Jones case.
    As one court has observed, conduct amounting to less than 
an explicit command to lie can nonetheless form the basis for 
an obstruction conviction: ``The statute prohibits elliptical 
suggestions as much as it does direct commands.'' There is no 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton was suggesting that Ms. 
Lewinsky file an affidavit consistent with their previously-
agreed upon cover stories. Ms. Lewinsky testified that she 
understood after that conversation that she would deny their 
relationship to Paula Jones' lawyers.
    The evidence also establishes beyond a reasonable doubt 
that President Clinton sought to tamper with the testimony of 
his secretary, Ms. Currie. Within a few hours of completing his 
deposition in the Jones case on Saturday, January 17, 1998, 
President Clinton called Betty Currie and made an unusual 
request: She should come to work to meet with him the following 
day, Sunday. Sunday afternoon, she met with him at her desk 
outside the Oval Office. Ms. Currie testified that he seemed 
``concerned.'' He told her that he had been asked questions the 
previous day about Ms. Lewinsky. According to Ms. Currie, he 
then said, `` `There are several things you may want to know.' 
'' After that, he made a series of statements: You were always 
there when she was there, right? We were never really alone. 
Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right? You can 
see and hear everything, right? Monica wanted to have sex with 
me, but I told her I couldn't do that.
    Ms. Currie further testified that, although President 
Clinton did not ``pressure'' her, she observed from his 
demeanor and the way he said these statements that he wanted 
her to agree with those statements. She did agree with each 
statement, though she knew them to be false or beyond her 
knowledge.
    There is no reasonable doubt that this meeting was an 
attempt by President Clinton to coach Ms. Currie's probable 
testimony. In fact, during the previous day's deposition, 
President Clinton invoked Ms. Currie's name in relation to Ms. 
Lewinsky on at least six different occasions, even going so far 
as to tell Ms. Jones' lawyers that they would have to ``ask 
Betty'' whether he was ever alone with Ms. Lewinsky between 
midnight and 6 a.m. Simply put, he made her a potential witness 
in the Jones case. One who attempts to corruptly influence the 
testimony of a prospective witness has obstructed justice. In 
fact, the Jones lawyers issued a subpoena for Ms. Currie a few 
days after President Clinton's deposition.
    President Clinton's assertion that he posed these 
statements to Ms. Currie merely to refresh his recollection and 
test her own memory of the events is undercut by his repetition 
of the coaching exercise a few days later. According to Ms. 
Currie, either 2 or 3 days later he called her in again, 
presented the same statements, with which she again agreed, and 
had the same ``tone and demeanor'' as he had during the Sunday 
coaching session. This amounted to egregious witness tampering.
    Last, the unrefuted evidence establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that President Clinton obstructed justice by 
giving a false account of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky to 
aides that, by his own admission, he knew might be called by 
the grand jury. John Podesta, then-deputy chief of staff to 
President Clinton, testified before the grand jury about a 
conversation with President Clinton on January 23, 1998:

    [H]e said to me he had never had sex with her [Ms. Lewinsky], and 
that--and that he never asked--you know, he repeated the denial, but he 
was extremely explicit in saying he never had sex with her. . . .
    Well, I think he said--he said that--there was some spate of, you 
know, what sex acts were counted, and he said that he had never had sex 
with her in any way whatsoever--that they had not had oral sex.

    This, as we now know, was false. Yet, according to Mr. 
Podesta, President Clinton ``was very forceful. I believed what 
he was saying.''
    More important, on January 21, 1998, President Clinton told 
aide Sidney Blumenthal the following utterly false story:

    He said, ``Monica Lewinsky came at me and made a sexual demand on 
me.'' He rebuffed her. He said, ``I've gone down that road before, I've 
caused pain for a lot of people and I'm not going to do that again.''
    She threatened him. She said that she would tell people they'd had 
an affair, that she was known as the stalker among her peers, and that 
she hated it and if she had an affair or said she had an affair then 
she wouldn't be a stalker anymore.

    This story is eerily reminiscent of President Clinton's 
coaching of Betty Currie. ``Monica wanted to have sex with me, 
but I told her I couldn't do that.'' President Clinton sought 
to portray himself as a victim of Ms. Lewinsky. At the time, 
Mr. Blumenthal ``certainly believed his story. It was a very 
heartfelt story, he was pouring out his heart, and I believed 
him.'' Mr. Blumenthal admitted to the Senate that he now knows 
the President's story was a lie.
    President Clinton does not deny the testimony of either Mr. 
Podesta or Mr. Blumenthal. Their testimony establishes a clear-
cut case of obstruction. The President admitted knowing that 
both were likely to be called to testify before the grand jury. 
According to their testimony, he provided them with a false 
account of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky--and President 
Clinton does not deny their version of events. The unrefuted 
evidence establishes obstruction of justice. As the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has stated: ``The most obvious example 
of a section 1512 [witness tampering] violation may be the 
situation where a defendant tells a potential witness a false 
story as if the story were true, intending that the witness 
believe the story and testify to it before the grand jury.''
    I did not vote to convict President Clinton on every ground 
presented by the House managers. For example, though I was 
concerned that the intensification of efforts to secure Ms. 
Lewinsky a private sector job were undertaken to influence her 
testimony, and secure a false affidavit from her, I had 
reasonable doubt that there was a sufficiently direct nexus 
between the two to justify finding against President Clinton on 
that basis. The videotaped testimony of Vernon Jordan nearly 
made the case, but fell just short. Accordingly, I did not 
consider that element of the obstruction of justice case to be 
grounds for removing President Clinton.
    Another serious allegation of obstruction of justice 
concerned the mysterious fact that subpoenaed gifts from 
President Clinton to Ms. Lewinsky were found underneath Ms. 
Currie's bed. The evidence tends to establish that President 
Clinton directed Ms. Currie to get gifts from Ms. Lewinsky; 
however, I cannot say that the proof establishes beyond a 
reasonable doubt that this occurred. In the absence of hearing 
directly from Ms. Currie as a witness on this issue and having 
the chance to look her in the eye and gauge her credibility, I 
cannot resolve beyond a reasonable doubt the testimonial 
conflict between Ms. Lewinsky and Ms. Currie on who initiated 
the return of the gifts. The weight of the evidence suggests 
that Ms. Currie initiated the return on instructions from 
President Clinton; however, without Ms. Currie's testimony, I 
cannot say that case has been proven ``beyond a reasonable 
doubt.''
    For this reason, I am disappointed that the Senate chose to 
cut itself off from hearing from whatever fact witnesses either 
side wished to call. I voted to allow live testimony, but the 
motion was unsuccessful. Although there was ample evidence upon 
which to convict for many allegations, some allegations remain 
in doubt. Rather than have a traditional trial, we listened to 
lawyers argue, then argue some more, and then a bit more. The 
only time we actually had a chance to see witnesses was when we 
were allowed to see the videotapes of Ms. Lewinsky, Mr. Jordan, 
and Mr. Blumenthal. I learned from those tapes. The presence of 
live witnesses in accord with Senate precedent would have been 
helpful. I regret that the Senate chose not to allow live 
witnesses and that we did not see their cross-examination. We 
did not use the most powerful weapons in our truth-seeking 
arsenal. This truncated ``trial'' may have been politically 
expedient, but I doubt history will judge it kindly.
    Having found that President Clinton committed the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice, my duty to uphold the 
Constitution of the United States made it clear that these 
offenses were high crimes and misdemeanors requiring his 
removal from office. There is no serious question that perjury 
and obstruction of justice are high crimes and misdemeanors. 
Blackstone's famous Commentaries--widely read by the framers of 
the Constitution--put perjury on equal footing with bribery as 
a crime against the state. Perjury was understood to be as 
serious as bribery, which is specifically mentioned in the 
Constitution as a ground for impeachment. Today, we punish 
perjury and obstruction of justice at least as severely as we 
punish bribery. Apparently, the seriousness of perjury and 
obstruction of justice has not diminished over time.
    Indeed, our own Senate precedent establishes that perjury 
is a high crime and misdemeanor. The Senate has removed seven 
Federal judges from office. During the 1980s, three judges were 
convicted for the high crime and misdemeanor of perjury. 
Federal judges are removed under the exact same constitutional 
provision--article II, section 4--upon which we remove 
Presidents. To not remove President Clinton for grand jury 
perjury lowers uniquely the Constitution's removal standard, 
and thus requires less of the man who appoints all federal 
judges than we require of those judges themselves.
    I will have no part in the creation of a constitutional 
double-standard to benefit the President. He is not above the 
law. If an ordinary citizen committed these crimes, he would go 
to jail. Many Senators have voted to remove Federal judges 
guilty of perjury, and I have no doubt that the Senate would do 
so again. Those who by their votes today confer immunity on the 
President for the same crimes do violence to the core principle 
that we are all entitled to equal justice under law.
    Moreover, I agree with the view of Judge Griffin Bell, 
President Jimmy Carter's Attorney General and a former judge of 
the United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Judge Bell 
has stated: ``A President cannot faithfully execute the laws if 
he himself is breaking them.'' These offenses--perjury and 
obstruction of justice--are not trivial; they represent an 
assault on the judicial process. Again, Judge Bell's words are 
instructive:

    Truth and fairness are the two essential elements in a judicial 
system, and all of these statutes I mentioned, perjury, tampering with 
a witness, obstruction of justice, all [are] in the interest of truth. 
If we don't have truth in the judicial process and in the court system 
in our country, we don't have anything. So, this is serious business.

    I agree. The crimes of perjury and obstruction of justice 
are public crimes threatening the administration of justice. 
They therefore fit Alexander Hamilton's famous description of 
impeachable offenses in Federalist No. 65: ``[O]ffences which 
proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, 
from the abuse or violation of some public trust.'' The 
electorate entrusted President Clinton to enforce the laws, yet 
he chose to engage in a pattern of public crime against our 
system of justice. We must not countenance the commission of 
such serious crimes by the Chief Executive of our Nation.
    The President broke his oath to tell the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help him God. He likewise 
broke his oaths to take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed.
    Just how important are oaths? We take oaths to substantiate 
the sanctity of some of our highest callings. Years ago, I took 
the Hippocratic Oath to become a physician. In January 1995, I 
took an oath of office as a U.S. Senator to preserve, protect, 
and defend the Constitution of the United States. Then, just 
last month, I had to take a special oath of impartial justice 
for this impeachment trial. Raising your right hand and 
swearing before God is meant to be serious business. Swearing 
falsely is equally serious. I recall the conclusion of the 
Hippocratic Oath:

    If I fulfill this oath and do not violate it, may it be granted to 
me to enjoy life and art, being honored with fame among all men for all 
time to come; if I transgress it and swear falsely, may the opposite of 
all this be my lot.

    President Clinton broke his oaths; the opposite of honor 
and fame should be his lot.
    Many of my colleagues have publicly expressed their belief 
that President Clinton broke his oaths and committed the crimes 
of perjury and obstruction of justice. Some have gone further 
and said that these are high crimes and misdemeanors. Yet they 
flinched from removing President Clinton from office, hoping 
that we could just move on, put this behind us, and ``heal'' 
the Nation.
    Although our acquittal of President Clinton may bring 
initial relief at the end of this ordeal, it will also leave 
unfortunate, lasting lessons for the American people: Integrity 
is a second-class value; the hard job of being truthful is to 
be left to others; and virtue is for the credulous. Though we 
do not know how these lessons will manifest themselves over 
time in our society, they will not be lost. Thus, I do not 
believe the acquittal of President Clinton will heal the wounds 
of this ordeal; rather, acquittal regrettably will inject a 
slow-acting moral poison into the American consciousness.
    There is one aspect of the case that made me uncomfortable: 
The perjury and obstruction of justice arose out of an illicit 
sexual relationship between President Clinton and a young White 
House intern. President Clinton no doubt sought to shield the 
knowledge of that relationship from his family and staff, and 
that impulse is understandable. However reprehensible his 
affair might be, both it and his efforts to hide it were 
originally of no concern to the public or the Senate. None of 
us can claim to be free from sin.
    What began as an attempt to keep an affair secret from 
family and coworkers, however, escalated into illegal activity 
when keeping that affair secret trumped the civil rights of 
Paula Jones to seek redress in court, and, in turn, thwarted 
the investigation of a Federal grand jury. President Clinton 
chose to cheat. Cheating the judicial process, whether to keep 
an ordinary citizen from having her day in court or to avoid 
criminal indictment, is wrong.
    Dr. William Osler was a late 19th century physician and is 
regarded as the father of modern surgery. In a lecture to his 
medical students about the pursuit of truth, he said:

    Start with the conviction that absolute truth is hard to reach in 
matters relating to our fellow creatures, healthy or diseased, that 
slips in observation are inevitable even with the best trained 
faculties, that errors in judgment must occur in the practice of an art 
which consists largely in balancing probabilities.
    Start, I say, with this attitude of mind, and mistakes will be 
acknowledged and regretted; but instead of a slow process of self-
deception, with ever-increasing inability to recognize truth, you will 
draw from your errors the very lessons which may enable you to avoid 
their repetition.

    President Clinton's repetition of wrong, often illegal 
choices most disturbs me. He faced a series of choices about 
his affair once our system of justice became concerned with it. 
He could have come clean in the civil deposition and urged Ms. 
Lewinsky to do the same. He did not. When the story became 
public, he could have then come clean to the American public 
and revised his deposition testimony. Instead, he took a poll. 
Having learned that the American people would forgive him for 
adultery, but not for perjury or obstruction of justice, he 
declared that he would just have to ``win.'' He then wagged his 
finger at us on national TV and chided us for believing what 
has since proven true. He embarked on a quiet smear campaign 
against Ms. Lewinsky, calling her a ``stalker'' and sending 
aides into the grand jury to repeat that mean-spirited 
falsehood. Above all else, he could have come clean when he 
went before the grand jury. Indeed, the discovery of the 
infamous blue dress served as a powerful reminder to tell the 
truth. But he continued to lie.
    The pattern of behavior is disturbing. That pattern is 
driven by President Clinton's choice, on every occasion in this 
saga, to put his self-interest above the the public interest. 
Indeed, President Clinton is well down the dangerous road Dr. 
Osler described to his students: ``A slow process of self-
deception.''
    To me, his perjury before the grand jury was defining. Some 
of my fellow Senators urged him not to lie in that grand jury, 
lest he be impeached. He had a chance to try to set matters 
right by the American people and by our system of justice. 
Instead, he lied. It has been said, ``Character is what we know 
about ourselves. Reputation is what others know about us.'' 
What we now know about President Clinton's conduct before the 
bar of justice illuminates his integrity: We learned that he 
always cheated and put himself above the law. We can pray that 
God will forgive President Clinton for his sins, but we cannot 
ignore the consequences of his behavior to our society.
    We in the Senate faced the difficult choice of deciding 
whether to remove President Clinton. To find him not guilty of 
perjury and obstruction of justice and leave him in office 
would corrode the respect we all have for the office of 
President. More troubling, the example to our youth would be 
destructive. I have three sons, 15, 13, and 11 years old. As 
anyone with children knows, President Clinton's conduct has 
undermined all our efforts to instill in our children two 
essential virtues: truthfulness and responsibility. If we allow 
a known perjurer and obstructor of justice to continue in the 
office of President and lead us into the 21st century, we set a 
sad example for future generations.
    In a recent sermon on the topic, ``What Do I Tell My 
Children about the Crisis in Washington?'' a minister quoted 
from Michael Novak's book ``The Experience of Nothingness'':

    The young have a right to learn a way of discriminating right from 
wrong, the posed from the authentic, the excellent from the mediocre, 
the brilliant from the philistine, the shoddy from the workmanlike. 
When no one with experience bothers to insist--to insist--on such 
discrimination, they rightly get the idea that discernment is not 
important, that no one cares either about such things--or about them.

    President Clinton committed perjury and obstructed justice. 
In so doing, he broke his oath of office and his oath to tell 
the truth. He broke the public trust. I took an oath to do 
impartial justice by the Constitution and laws of our country. 
I had a duty to the Constitution and laws of this Nation to 
convict President Clinton, so I voted to remove him from office 
and restore the trust of the American people in the high office 
of President. Prosperity is never an excuse to keep a President 
who has committed high crimes and misdemeanors.
    Though many of my colleagues agreed with these conclusions, 
two-thirds of the Senate did not. I am concerned about the 
message this acquittal will send to our youth. So I am 
convinced that you and I now have a shared duty: Rather than 
give in to easy cynicism, we should work toward integrity and 
responsibility in all that we do. We must remind our children 
that telling the truth and accepting responsibility for 
wrongdoing are virtues with currency. Our Nation's future 
depends on how earnestly we fulfill that shared duty.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Jim Bunning

    Mr. BUNNING. Mr. Chief Justice, this is my first speech on 
the floor of the U.S. Senate. I had hoped my opening speech 
would be about Social Security. This year, in my opinion, we 
have a golden window of opportunity to reform and strengthen 
this vital program and I had hoped to use my first comments on 
the Senate floor to help open the debate on real Social 
Security reform.
    Unfortunately, it didn't turn out that way. Of necessity, 
my opening speech in this body is about the articles of 
impeachment against President Clinton. It was not my choice!
    In fact, none of us have much choice in this matter. Here 
in the U.S. Senate, we have been charged with the 
responsibility of looking at the facts as presented by the 
managers from the House of Representatives. Each of us took an 
oath to do impartial justice.
    And the Constitution doesn't give us much wiggle room when 
it comes to choices. The framers were pretty explicit about our 
options. If we determine that the President is guilty of the 
charges as outlined in the two articles of impeachment, the 
penalty is removal from office. We have no other choice.
    Because we are all political animals, I think it is natural 
that the legitimacy of this process and the outcome of this 
debate will be clouded to some degree by the perception that it 
is a partisan exercise.
    Many of the President's defenders and many of our friends 
in the media, in fact, have insisted all along that the whole 
process has been driven by partisan Republicans who are intent 
to removing a Democratic President they do not like from 
office.
    The difficulty you run into when you start throwing around 
the term ``partisan'' politics is that it is seldom a one-way 
street.
    Is it any more ``partisan'' to blindly support the 
impeachment of a President of the other party than it is to 
blindly support a President of your own regardless of the 
facts? Of course not. Just as each of us, in keeping with our 
oath to do impartial justice, must strive to avoid a partisan, 
knee-jerk solution to the process, we must also not let 
ourselves be deterred from doing what we feel is right simply 
to avoid charges of partisanship.
    So, hiding behind the charge that the process has been 
tainted by political partisanship gives us no relief from our 
responsibility to look at the facts nor does it expand our 
choices.
    So, it is the facts that matter. And each of us must weigh 
them individually. We are not talking about public opinion 
polls. They should have no bearing on the case at this point. 
It is a question of facts pure and simple.
    Each of us must weigh those facts individually. We might 
reach different conclusions. But if I determine that the 
President is guilty, and if you determine that the President is 
guilty, based on those facts we don't have any options. We must 
vote to convict and to remove the President from office.
    I am personally convinced that the President is guilty 
under both of the articles of impeachment presented to us by 
the House managers.
    The managers from the House have presented a strong case 
that President Clinton committed perjury. The circumstantial 
and supporting evidence is overwhelming that Bill Clinton did 
lie under oath to the grand jury when he testified about his 
attorney's use of a false affidavit at his deposition. He lied 
under oath to the grand jury when he testified about the nature 
of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He lied under oath about 
what he told his aides about his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky. He lied under oath to the grand jury about his 
conversations with Betty Currie.
    That is perjury. That is a felony. We cannot uphold our 
reverence for the rule of law and ignore it.
    The circumstantial and supporting evidence is also 
overwhelming that the President did willfully obstruct justice 
when he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to file an affidavit in the 
Jones case; when he coached Betty Currie on how to respond to 
questions about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    When he lied to aides whom he knew would be called as grand 
jury witnesses, when he promoted a job search for Ms. Lewinsky, 
and when he encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to return the gifts he had 
given her, he was attempting to obstruct justice.
    After listening to the facts and the evidence, and after 
listening to the President's defense team try to refute the 
charges, I have determined that he is guilty as charged.
    I have tried to the best of my ability to reach this 
determination impartially without being biased by my political 
affiliation. Have I been successful? I believe so.
    I am encouraged in the belief that I have reached the 
proper conclusion for the proper reasons by the harsh wording 
of the resolution being circulated by some of the defenders of 
the President, Senators who oppose impeachment but support a 
censure resolution.
    The most recent version of a censure resolution that I have 
seen admits that the President engaged in shameless, reckless 
and indefensible conduct. It goes on to say that the President 
of the United States deliberately misled and deceived the 
American people and officials of the U.S. Government.
    It also says that the President gave false or misleading 
testimony, and impeded discovery of evidence in judicial 
proceedings and that, as a result, he deserves censure.
    These are the people who are opposed to the articles of 
impeachment.
    The Constitution doesn't really give us that kind of 
choice. If the President is guilty of these charges, he must be 
convicted and he must be removed from office. Censure is not an 
option.
    I would rather be speaking about Social Security but I 
wasn't given a choice in the matter.
    I would prefer not to vote to convict any President of 
articles of impeachment. But I don't have a choice in that 
matter either.
    If he is guilty, he must be convicted. And I believe he is 
guilty as charged.
    There is one central, elemental ingredient that is 
necessary to the success of our ability, as a nation, to govern 
ourselves. That is trust.
    Before a President takes office, he swears a solemn oath to 
``preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United 
States.''
    We accept his word on that.
    When the Vice President, U.S. Senators and Members of the 
House of Representatives take office, they are required to take 
an oath ``to support and defend the Constitution of the United 
States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.''
    We trust that they will live up to that oath.
    We administer these oaths and we accept them as binding 
because government, at least in this Nation, is, above all 
else, a matter of trust. Trust is the glue that holds it all 
together. If that trust is destroyed or tarnished, it seriously 
undermines the basic foundations of our government.
    The President's defenders try to excuse him by saying that 
if he did lie under oath and obstructed justice, he did it to 
protect himself and his family from personal embarrassment 
about sexual indiscretions, and somehow this makes the lies all 
right.
    It doesn't. When he lied and when he tried to hide his lies 
from the grand jury, he broke trust with the Nation's justice 
system. He broke faith with the American people.
    Not only did he break the law, he also violated the sacred 
trust of the office of the President, and in so doing, he 
violated his oath of office. And that raises the two articles 
of impeachment to a level that definitely justifies his removal 
from office.
    It is a matter of trust. It leaves us no choice but to vote 
for conviction.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                 Statement of Senator Richard J. Durbin

    Mr. DURBIN. Mr. Chief Justice, from the opening statement 
to the closing argument, Chairman Henry Hyde and the House 
managers stated repeatedly that what is at stake in this trial 
is the rule of law.
    In a compelling reference to the life of Sir Thomas More, 
Mr. Hyde quoted from ``A Man for All Seasons'' by Robert Bolt 
to remind us that More was prepared to die rather than swear a 
false oath of loyalty to the King and his church. But Mr. Hyde 
did not read my favorite passage from that work. Let me share 
it with you and tell you why I think it is important to us in 
this deliberation.

    MORE. The law, Roper, the law. I know what's legal not what's 
right. And I'll stick to what's legal.
    ROPER. Then you set Man's law above God's!
    MORE. No far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact--I'm 
not God. The currents and eddies of right and wrong, which you find 
such plain-sailing, I can't navigate, I'm no voyager. But in the 
thickets of the law, oh there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a man 
alive who could follow me there, thank God.
    ALICE. While you talk, he's gone!
    MORE. And go he should if he was the devil himself until he broke 
the law!
    ROPER. So now you'd give the Devil benefit of law!
    MORE. Yes. What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to 
get after the Devil?
    ROPER. I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
    MORE. Oh? And when the last law was down, and the Devil turned 
round on you--where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? 
This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast--Man's laws, 
not God's--and if you cut them down--and you're just the man to do it--
d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow 
then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my own safety's sake.

    Sir Thomas More's words remind us the law must be followed 
not only by the accused but also by the accusers.
    Every day in America many who are accused of crimes are 
released because this government has violated their 
constitutional rights--denied them due process--forsaken the 
rule of law.
    How American of us. We are prepared to release an accused 
because the accuser has not played by the rules, the rules of 
law.
    The House managers built their case on one key question: 
Did the President respect the rule of law?
    But the same managers who exalted the rule of law from 
their opening words would have us ignore the process which 
brought us to this moment:
    An independent counsel in name only whose conduct before 
the House Judiciary Committee led Sam Dash, former Watergate 
counsel and Mr. Starr's ethics advisor, to resign in protest.
    Listen to Dash's words to Kenneth Starr in his letter of 
resignation concerning Starr's appearance and testimony:

    In doing this you have violated your obligation under the 
Independent Counsel Statute and have unlawfully intruded on the power 
of impeachment, which the Constitution gives solely to the House. . . . 
By your willingness to serve in this improper role (advocating for 
impeachment) you have seriously harmed the public confidence in the 
independence and objectivity of your office.

    Much has been made about the so-called pep rally which some 
House Democrats held for President Clinton at the White House 
after the impeachment vote. If you wonder how those Members 
could act in such an apparently partisan manner after the 
historic vote on December 19, 1998, I hope you will recall that 
the Republican Members of the House Judiciary Committee gave 
Mr. Starr nothing less than a standing ovation when he 
completed testimony which Mr. Dash characterized as 
``unlawful'' and ``improper.''
    Is it any wonder why the American people think this whole 
impeachment process reeks of partisanship and the excesses of 
the independent counsel have created a bipartisan sentiment to 
amend if not abolish that statute?
    Did Mr. Starr respect the rule of law?
    And the House Judiciary Committee--so anxious to complete 
its work in a lame-duck session that it would vote for 
impeachment without calling a single material witness. Then 
those same managers came to the Senate and argued justice 
cannot be served without live witnesses on the Senate floor.
    When I listen to Paul Sarbanes recount the painstaking 
efforts to avoid partisanship during the impeachment hearing on 
President Nixon, it is a stark contrast to the committee 
process which voted these articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton.
    Did the House Judiciary Committee respect the rule of law?
    And the House of Representatives, an institution which I 
was proud to serve in for 14 years, was so hellbent on 
impeachment that it bent the rules, denied the regular order of 
business and refused the House a vote to censure this President 
so the majority would have a better chance to visit the 
disgrace of impeachment on his record.
    Did the House of Representatives respect the rule of law?
    But it would be too facile to dismiss this case simply 
because the process which brought us to this point is so 
suspect--too easy to discard the fruit of this poisoned tree.
    Justice and history will not give us this easy exit. We 
must ignore the birthing of this impeachment and judge it on 
its merits.
    First, let me stipulate the obvious. The personal conduct 
of this President has been disgraceful and dishonorable. He has 
brought shame on himself and his Presidency. No one--not any 
Senator in this Chamber nor any person in this country--will 
look at this President in the same way again.
    I have known Bill Clinton for 35 years. I remember him as a 
popular student when we both attended Georgetown. And I know 
despite all of the talk about ``compartmentalization'' that 
this man has suffered the greatest humiliation of any President 
in our history. I hope his marriage and his family can survive 
it.
    But our job is not to judge Bill Clinton as a person, a 
husband, a father. Our responsibility under the Constitution is 
to judge Bill Clinton as a President, not whether he should be 
an object of scorn but whether he should be removed from 
office.
    Did William Jefferson Clinton commit perjury or obstruct 
justice, and for these acts should he be removed from office?
    When this trial began I believed that President Clinton's 
only refuge was in a strict reading of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors''--that James Madison, George Mason and Alexander 
Hamilton would have to serve as his defense team and save this 
President from removal.
    The managers' case was compelling, but as the defense team 
rebutted their evidence I saw the charges of perjury crack, 
obstruction of justice crumble and impeachment collapse.
    The managers failed in article I on perjury to meet the 
most basic requirement of the law: specificity. In the Andrew 
Johnson impeachment trial, Senator William Fessenden of Maine 
pointed out the unfairness of failing to name specific charges:

    It would be contrary to every principle of justice to the clearest 
dictates of right, to try and condemn any man, however guilty he may be 
thought, for an offense not charged, of which no notice has been given 
to him, and against which he has had no opportunity to defend himself.

    Senator Fessenden understood the rule of law.
    And by what standard should the President be judged?
    When the House managers discussed the gravity of the case 
for impeachment, they said repeatedly: ``These are crimes.'' 
But when asked why they failed to meet the most basic criminal 
procedural requirements of pleading and proof, Mr. Canady said: 
``This proceeding is not a criminal trial.''
    What is the difference between charging a crime and proving 
something less than a crime? The difference is known as the 
rule of law--a rule which requires fair notice and due process 
whether the accused is President or penniless.
    How many times have we seen the House managers run into the 
brick wall of sworn testimony contradicting their charges? On 
gifts--Monica Lewinsky said hiding them was Betty Currie's 
idea--Betty Currie claimed it was Lewinsky's idea--neither of 
them claimed it was the President's idea. On the affidavit 
issue--the House managers could not produce one witness--not 
Lewinsky, not Jordan and not the President to support their 
charge of obstruction.
    Time and again the House managers failed to prove their 
case--failed to produce testimony or evidence and at best 
played to a draw. I don't need to remind my colleagues in the 
Senate that playing to a draw on this field comes down in favor 
of the President.
    The House managers failed to meet their burden of proof.
    Let me say a word about witnesses. We have spent a lot of 
time on this issue. I do not know who came up with the 
limitation of three witnesses for the managers. But is there 
anyone in this Chamber who believes that Sidney Blumenthal was 
a more valuable witness to this case than Betty Currie?
    Surely my colleagues in the Senate remember that the House 
managers spent 3 solid days building their obstruction of 
justice case on concealing gifts and tampering with witnesses. 
And Betty Currie was critical to the most credible charges 
against the President.
    Then when the House managers were given a chance to call 
this key witness, they refused.
    What can we conclude from this tactical decision? Let me 
read rule 14.15 from Instructions for Federal Criminal Cases.

    If it is peculiarly within the power of either the government or 
the defense to produce a witness who could give relevant testimony on 
an issue in the case, failure to call that witness may give rise to an 
inference that this testimony would have been unfavorable to that 
party. No such conclusion should be drawn by you, however, with regard 
to a witness who is equally available to both parties or where the 
testimony of that witness would be merely cumulative.
    The jury must always bear in mind that the law never imposes on a 
defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any 
witnesses or producing any evidence.

    Betty Currie was no help to the House managers in her 
deposition and they clearly concluded she was more likely to 
hurt than help their case if called as a witness. The key 
witness in the obstruction of justice charge never materialized 
and neither did the proof the House managers needed.
    How will history judge this chapter in our history?
    The House managers and many of my colleagues believe an 
acquittal will violate the basic American principle of equal 
justice under the law--they argue that acquitting the President 
will cheapen the Presidency--and imperil our Nation and its 
values.
    I have heard my colleagues stand in disbelief that the 
American people could still want a man they find so lacking in 
character to continue as their President. William Bennett and 
his pharisaical followers have profited from books and lectures 
decrying the lack of moral outrage in our Nation against Bill 
Clinton.
    I hope my colleagues will pause and reflect on this 
conclusion that the American people have somehow lost their 
moral compass--that the polls demonstrate our people have lost 
their soul--and that we, their elected leaders, have to impeach 
this President to remind the American people of the values--the 
integrity--the honor which is so important to our Nation.
    May I respectfully suggest that those who appoint 
themselves as the guardians of moral order in America risk the 
vices of pride and arrogance themselves. Before we don the 
armor and choose our side in what Manager Hyde calls a 
``cultural war,'' let us not give up on the wisdom and judgment 
of the people we represent.
    Like Abraham Lincoln, I am a firm believer in the American 
people. If given the truth they can be depended upon to meet 
any national crisis.
    And the American people have this right. The President's 
personal conduct was clearly wrong. He has endured 
embarrassment and will spend the rest of his natural life and 
forever in the annals of history branded by this experience. 
The American people clearly believe that the process which 
brings him before us in this trial was too partisan, too 
unfair, too suspect.
    What has occurred here is a personal and family tragedy--it 
is not a national tragedy which should result in the removal of 
this President from office.
    In 1798, Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison: ``History 
shows that in England, impeachment has been an engine more of 
passion than justice.''
    Jefferson feared that even our process for impeachment 
could be a formidable partisan weapon. He feared that a 
determined faction in Congress would use it ``. . . for getting 
rid of any man whom they consider as dangerous to their views, 
and I do not know that we could count on one-third in an 
emergency.''
    In 1868, with the suffering and death of our Civil War 
still fresh in everyone's mind, this Senate came within one 
vote of impeaching a President who was viewed as too 
sympathetic to the vanquished South.
    In 1999, after 6 years and millions of tax dollars spent in 
investigation of this President, I believe the Senate will once 
again cool the political passions, preserve the Presidency, 
protect the Constitution, and prove to Thomas Jefferson that 
his trust in this body and that great document was not 
misplaced.
    I will vote to acquit William Jefferson Clinton on both 
articles of impeachment and support a strong resolution of 
censure to bring this sad chapter in American politics to a 
close.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                      Statement of Senator Jon Kyl

    Mr. KYL. Mr. Chief Justice, this case is about the rule of 
law--specifically, whether actions and statements of President 
Clinton in Federal court proceedings have done such harm to the 
rule of law that he should be removed from office. I conclude 
in the affirmative, and reluctantly vote to convict on both 
articles of impeachment.
    Chairman Henry Hyde observed that the House of 
Representatives had come to the Senate ``as advocates for the 
rule of law, for equal justice under law, and for the sanctity 
of the oath.'' (145 Cong. Rec. S221 (January 14, 1999).)
    These are not just grand words.
    The rule of law refers to our judicial process, which is 
governed by uniform standards and procedures that we say will 
always be guaranteed and applied fairly and equally. We are 
willing to submit ourselves to this process because we have 
worked hard for 210 years to ensure that it produces impartial 
justice for all.
    Equal justice means that each of us, including the least 
among us, has rights that the state is bound to protect; and it 
surely includes the requirement that those who make the laws, 
including the President, must live under them like anybody 
else.
    Oaths are essential to the rule of law because the judicial 
process is about seeking the truth; and that requires that we 
be able to trust what is said. The oath formalizes the 
commitment to tell the truth, and the whole truth--a commitment 
so important that its violation is itself a crime.
    I believe there are two questions to be answered.
    The first is whether the President impermissibly took the 
law into his own hands in a Federal civil rights case and 7 
months later before a Federal grand jury in order to suppress 
the truth. The second question is whether, if the President did 
engage in the impeachable conduct, it is a breach serious 
enough to warrant removal from office.
    The Constitution permits only one vote: to acquit or 
convict. This leaves some in the anomalous position of 
determining guilt on an impeachable offense, but having to vote 
to acquit because they deem the offense insufficiently serious 
to warrant removal. While the fact that the offense is 
impeachable should itself resolve the issue of 
``proportionality,'' I would not consider it impermissible to 
reach a contrary conclusion, as some will do in this case.
    For my part, I answer both questions in the affirmative. 
The President ``willfully provided perjurious, false, and 
misleading testimony'' under oath to a grand jury and he 
``prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of 
justice.'' (H. Res. 611.)
    While the House of Representatives asserted that the 
President's actions were criminal, violations of specific 
criminal statutes are not essential for wrongful conduct to 
constitute the ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' that 
demonstrate unfitness to continue as Chief Executive. Most 
authorities agree a President cannot be prosecuted while in 
office for crimes allegedly committed during his term. So, for 
example, whether a lie under oath would necessarily later 
result in a criminal perjury conviction cannot be known with 
certainty, and an impeachment trial is not an effective forum 
for establishing criminal guilt. It is conduct, not a proven 
crime, that is the basis for impeachment.
    This is one of the reasons why it is clear that each 
Senator may apply his or her standard of proof--it need not be 
the criminal standard ``beyond a reasonable doubt.'' (Senate 
Proceedings in the Impeachment Trial of Judge Claiborne, S. 
Doc. 99-48, p. 150.) Moreover, because the Senate constrained 
the House of Representatives as it did--by limiting the number 
of witnesses that could be deposed, by effectively foreclosing 
other discovery, and by precluding ``live'' testimony--it would 
be unfair to impose a ``beyond reasonable doubt'' standard.
    The President's counsel argued that the Senate should not 
consider article I because the House of Representatives 
defeated a perjury count relating to the Jones civil action. 
But article I also included allegations of ``perjurious, false, 
and misleading'' statements in the Jones case; so the argument 
is meritless. Moreover, the President's falsehoods in the Jones 
civil suit also formed part of his strategy to obstruct 
justice.
    What is striking about this case is the President's 
persistent, sustained, carefully calculated, deliberate, and 
callous manipulation of the judicial process for over a year.
    Without attempting to summarize all of the evidence, I 
conclude that the President lied before the Federal grand jury 
about: (1) the nature of details of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky; (2) his assertion that he told the truth in the Jones 
deposition; (3) the false and misleading statements that he 
allowed his lawyer to make to a Federal judge in the Paula 
Jones civil case; and (4) his corrupt efforts to influence the 
testimony of his aides who were potential grand jury witnesses.
    It seems clear to me that the President obstructed 
justice--that he corruptly: (1) encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to 
execute a false affidavit; (2) encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to lie 
if called as a witness; (3) encouraged Ms. Lewinsky to conceal 
gifts; (4) encouraged cooperation of Ms. Lewinsky through job 
assistance; (5) allowed his attorney to make false and 
misleading statements about the affidavit; (6) attempted to 
influence the testimony of his secretary, Ms. Currie; and (7) 
attempted to influence the testimony of other aides.
    The final question is whether the President should be 
removed for his actions.
    As a preliminary matter, there can be no doubt that 
perjurious, false, and misleading statements made under oath in 
Federal court proceedings are indeed impeachable offenses. The 
fact that the House of Representatives reached this conclusion, 
of course, establishes the precedent as to the kind of conduct 
in this case. But, it is also confirmed by the impeachment and 
conviction of Federal judges--of Judge Harry Claiborne, removed 
in 1986 for filing a false income tax return under penalty of 
perjury, of Judge Walter Nixon, removed in 1989 for perjury 
before a grand jury, and of Judge Alcee Hastings, removed in 
1989 for perjury related to financial misconduct. I cannot 
agree with those colleagues who assert that there is a 
different standard for a President--that it would require a 
more egregious kind of perjury to remove a President than a 
judge. Nothing in the Constitution suggests such a double 
standard.
    John Jay, the first Chief Justice of the United States, 
said ``there is no crime more extensively pernicious to 
society'' than perjury, precisely because it ``discolors and 
poisons the streams of justice.'' (John Jay's charge to the 
Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, 
Apr. 5, 1792, in Marcus, ed., ``The Documentary History of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 1789-1800,'' Vol. 2, pp. 
253, 255 (1988).)
    As to obstruction of justice, on which there is no other 
direct precedent, Chief Justice Rehnquist, our Presiding 
Officer, in his history of impeachment, ``Grand Inquests,'' 
wrote that ``the counts relating to the obstruction of justice 
and to the unlawful use of executive power [by President Nixon] 
were of the kind that would surely have justified removal from 
office.''
    The House managers pointed out, accurately, that even 
though perjury and obstruction of justice are not specifically 
listed as impeachable offenses in the Constitution, the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines treat these offenses more seriously than 
they do the crime of bribery--one of two specifically 
enumerated impeachable offenses. Significantly, where bribery 
is committed in connection with a judicial proceeding, such as 
bribing a witness in a case, its seriousness under the 
guidelines rises to that of perjury and obstruction. When 
misdeeds, in other words, take place in connection with a 
judicial process, to try to affect or control that process, 
they get extra attention in our legal system. They are not 
simply brushed aside. Far from it. Perjury and obstruction are 
like bribery; they are ``other high crimes'' by any reasonable 
construction.
    The President's counsel argued that the President's conduct 
could not be impeachable because he did not abuse the power of 
his office in conducting ``matters of state,'' and did not 
violate the public trust. But impeachable offenses are not 
limited to the President's conduct of ``matters of state.'' If 
this were so, Richard Nixon could never have been impeached. If 
this were so, a twenty dollar bribe for a Senator to vote for a 
bill would be impeachable, while a million dollar bribe to 
cover up political dirty tricks would not be.
    It simply cannot be, as some have argued, that the only 
impeachable offenses are those that can only be committed by 
the President. If a President commits murder, can he not be 
removed? Must we wait until his term is over to deal with his 
crime? It is clear that seriously wrongful official conduct is 
impeachable. But it is just as clear that impeachment cannot be 
limited to that.
    It is not only the exercise of Presidential power but also 
the violation of a public duty that can constitute impeachable 
conduct. As the head of the executive branch, the President has 
the duty under article II of the Constitution to ``take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed.'' The 1974 House 
Judiciary report on the ``Constitutional Grounds for 
Presidential Impeachment'' summarized that impeachment of a 
President can ``be predicated only upon conduct seriously 
incompatible with either the constitutional form and principles 
of our government or the proper performance of constitutional 
duties of the presidential office.'' (Staff of House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1974), 
Constitutional Grounds for Presidential Impeachment, p. 27.) 
Surely the violation of constitutional obligations can 
constitute high crimes or misdemeanors for which the President 
may be impeached. And surely, such violation would constitute 
an abuse of trust by the Chief Executive.
    By his oath of office and article II responsibilities, 
President Clinton is supposed to see that the sexual 
discrimination laws are faithfully executed. But he thought the 
Jones case was illegitimate, so he took the law into his own 
hands. His conduct in this case clearly violated his public 
duties, his oath, and the public trust. And it interfered with 
the proper functioning of another branch of the government.
    The same is true for his deliberate efforts to impede 
legitimate discovery efforts in Federal court proceedings. Such 
action ``is incompatible with . . . the constitutional form and 
principles of our government,'' as the 1974 House Judiciary 
report said. It simply cannot be that a President who 
wrongfully interferes with the proper functioning of another 
branch of our government by attempting to subvert justice in 
Federal court proceedings cannot be impeached because he did 
not do it as President, but, rather, as a citizen.
    That the underlying conduct covered up is sexual, is, if 
anything, an aggravating not a mitigating factor. In sex-
discrimination litigation, where there is frequently no 
corroboration for the plaintiff, a defendant who lies can 
easily subvert justice. Had the blue dress not been found, with 
its incontrovertible tangible evidence, I doubt Paula Jones 
would have gotten a dime in settlement.
    Judgements about the severity of the impeachable conduct in 
this case will lead different Senators to reach different 
conclusions. That is why some of us are willing to say 
reasonable people can differ. For those who fear the long-term 
consequences to the rule of law, however, I believe there can 
be only one result. Anyone who so willfully, callously, and 
persistently connived to deny the Federal court and grand jury 
the truth, and who used and abused the highest office in the 
land to advance his personal coverup is not only no longer 
worthy of trust--which all agree is essential to the conduct of 
his office--but also must be removed to avoid the perpetuation 
of a legal double standard. If Federal judges, such as Judges 
Claiborne, Nixon, and Hastings, are removed for similar 
conduct; if average Americans are imprisoned for it, can the 
rule of law long survive ``special exceptions'' for powerful 
people we like, or who are doing a good job, or who hold 
elective office? None of these rationalizations are defenses to 
illegal or impeachable conduct.
    As I said, sexual harassment cases are precisely the kind 
of judicial proceedings that demand the maximum cooperation of 
and truth-telling by the defendant because of the lack of 
third-party witnesses or corroborating evidence. In these 
cases, justice is denied if obstruction, witness tampering, or 
perjury prevent the truth from coming out. Can anyone say this 
is not serious? To what standard of seriousness does it not 
rise? How many plaintiffs will have to lose their sexual 
harassment, domestic violence, or sexual assault cases because 
defendants lie and obstruct justice, and there is no blue dress 
to keep them honest, before it becomes serious?
    An acquittal in this case will make it harder to deal 
properly with similar conduct in the future. We will be hard 
pressed to perpetuate a double standard, so the lowest common 
denominator of conduct will be established as the permissible 
norm. And this cannot help but weaken the ability of courts to 
enforce truth-telling and prevent obstruction of justice.
    The precedent set by this case may not change the law 
overnight, but this unforgettable episode is now part of the 
institutional life of our country. The chief magistrate 
perverted justice and remained in power. The lesson is 
corrosive. Like water dripping on a rock, it eventually makes a 
deep hollow in the American justice system.
    It is true the President could be sent to jail later. How 
does that validate his right to appoint judges and be head of 
U.S. law enforcement now? How does that square with his 
leadership of the armed forces right now, as our Commander in 
Chief? Should the standard for the President not be at least as 
high as for those he appoints and leads?
    In the end, my colleagues who would censure rather than 
convict the President are right about one thing: the 
President's conduct is ``unacceptable.'' But, if conduct is 
unacceptable, we cannot accept it--meaning, we have to do 
something about it that does not leave it stand. And under our 
Constitution that means removal of the President through 
conviction on the articles of impeachment.
    Henry Hyde closed the House case by warning that public 
cynicism is the greatest threat we face. Our failure to remove 
the President will only fuel the cynicism of Americans such as 
Louie Valenzuela of Glendale, AZ. He was quoted recently in a 
man-on-the-street interview about this case. ``They talk about 
justice,'' he told the Arizona Republic. ``They talk about 
doing the right thing,'' said Mr. Valenzuela. ``But they always 
look the other way when someone rich, famous or powerful does 
something wrong. Look at O.J. Simpson. Clinton will be next. 
Asi es. (That's just the way it is.)''
    That is not the way it has to be. But how it is is up to 
us.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Arlen Specter

    Mr. SPECTER. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, a great deal 
has been spoken in the Chamber about separation of powers and 
tomes have been written on it. And in reading the Constitution, 
article I, creating the Congress; and article II, the executive 
branch; and article III, the judiciary, we have seen the wisdom 
of limiting power through the separation of powers among the 
three branches of the Federal Government.
    The one provision of the Constitution--the impeachment 
provision--reaches across that divide. It is my thinking that 
before the Congress can exercise the power of removal, 
especially of an American President, there has to be a very, 
very heavy burden of proof.
    I had occasion, fairly recently, to go very deeply into the 
issue of separation of powers when I argued the Base Closing 
Commission case regarding the Philadelphia Navy Yard, which was 
unfairly closed--a subject that I will not amplify on--and I 
had an opportunity to appear before the Supreme Court.
    In my two earlier speeches during the closed session on the 
motion to dismiss and the issue of depositions, I did end 
within the allotted time. But I will say that the Chief Justice 
is a good deal more tolerant here than in the Supreme Court. In 
the Supreme Court, when I argued the base closing case, I was 
cut off in mid-syllable. I didn't know that was possible. But 
with the forcefulness of the Presiding Officer, he was able to 
limit the speakers to the precise time allotted. I did not do 
well in the outcome of that case in the Supreme Court. I had 
done better on my previous appearances in the Supreme Court 
when I was representing the district attorney's office on law 
and order.
    That sojourn into that case brought me into 200 years of 
reflection and analysis on case law on separation of powers, 
something that is not often done by practicing lawyers, and 
certainly not Senators. It instilled in me a very, very deep 
appreciation of separation of power.
    So when I approached this case--and it has been the 
toughest case I have ever seen, and I think it has been a very, 
very intense drain on this body and all of us individually--the 
focus I had was: what is the burden that you ought to have to 
show if the Senate is going to remove a President? As I 
reviewed the evidence, I am not satisfied at all that that 
burden was met.
    Perjury is a very tough offense to prove under the 
standards established by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in the famous Bronston case. Bronston was giving testimony in a 
bankruptcy proceeding in New York and was asked about bank 
accounts in Zurich, and said, ``My company had a bank account 
for about 6 months,'' leading to the implication that he did 
not have a personal bank account when in fact he did. His 
conviction in the district court was upheld by the Second 
Circuit, but reversed by a unanimous Supreme Court because the 
interrogator, the prosecutor, has to go further. You have to 
ask the last questions to prove perjury.
    The President was very artful, very careful and full of 
guile as he wound his way through the grand jury proceedings. 
We heard the testimony again and again. The President said he 
told his aides, things that were true. Well, he didn't comment 
about the things that he told them that were false. But nobody 
said, ``Did you tell them things that were false as well?'' to 
set the stage for a perjury prosecution.
    When asked about Monica Lewinsky--was he alone with her?--
on a series of rambling answers he said he wasn't alone with 
her in the hallway. But that is not the end of the question. He 
wasn't alone with her in the hallway. But nobody followed up, 
and said, ``Were you alone with her somewhere else?'' which he 
was not asked. Had he been asked whether he was alone with her 
somewhere else and denied that, there may have been a record to 
establish perjury. On this record, he did not commit perjury 
under the Bronston case.
    The testimony of Betty Currie we heard again and again and 
again. In late January 1998, Betty Currie testified that when 
the President gave her that series of questions, she thought 
the President was trying to lead her, to mold her testimony. 
Then when she came back to testify in July, she said, well, it 
was different on that occasion. She testified that the 
President gave her the option of either agreeing or 
disagreeing.
    Betty Currie was not a witness in this proceeding. Her 
deposition was not even taken because of very, very restrictive 
rules which the U.S. Senate established for what the House 
managers could do. The House managers were on very, very sharp 
notice that if they asked for too many depositions, they might 
get none at all. They made their selection of witnesses and 
they left off Betty Currie.
    Had House managers been able to present their case in the 
normal course of events, I daresay the proceeding would have 
been even faster. We heard some 12 days of speeches, 6 days of 
opening speeches; 3 and 3 on each side. We could have done that 
in 2 hours. We then spent 2 days propounding questions through 
the Chief Justice where we learned very, very little. We heard 
arguments on the motion to dismiss, and on depositions, and 
arguments on what to do about the witnesses on those 
videotapes. Again and again, we heard legal arguments, but we 
did not hear from witnesses.
    We are bound by this record. It is my view that, on this 
record, the burden of proof has not been met, the kind of a 
burden that would have to be sustained, in my judgment, for the 
Senate to remove an American President.
    One comment about mindset. The Senate really approached 
this matter as if it were a waste of time from the outset. 
There was an early effort to structure a vote to show that more 
than one-third of the Senators would not be for conviction and, 
therefore, to end it. Then when we had the vote on the motion 
to dismiss and 44 Senators voted to dismiss. It confirmed what 
we all knew; and that is that there would not be a two-thirds 
vote. I think that put a mindset in this body really not to 
conduct a trial.
    The Constitution calls for a trial. The proceeding we had 
does not measure up in any way, shape or form to a trial. It is 
true that there are some few cases submitted on a record where 
judges are going to decide it. But a trial customarily requires 
witnesses. Had witnesses appeared on the floor of the U.S. 
Senate with examination and cross-examination, you would have 
gotten a feel for what happened here. If Betty Currie had 
appeared on the floor of the U.S. Senate, or even if her 
deposition had been taken, there could have been a 
clarification of inconsistencies in her two lines of 
questioning.
    A word for the future: It would be my hope that if, as, and 
when the Senate has to revisit impeachment that it would be 
done differently. Senator Lieberman made a suggestion on a 
December 20 television show that there ought not to be party 
caucuses, that there only ought to be joint caucuses. I have 
passed that recommendation on. I realized that given the 
history of the Senate and our party caucuses, that would be a 
very, very abrupt change.
    But I came out of some of our party caucuses and walked 
over and talked to my friends on the other side of the aisle, 
the people who I had agreed with on many, many, many issues. We 
were just irreconcilably opposed, just totally opposed. My only 
conclusion was that it was the kind of argument and the kind of 
discussion on what happened in the caucuses--really choosing 
sides and having teams--as opposed to trying to make an 
analytical, judicial decision as to what was involved here.
    So it is my hope that if we ever have to undertake this 
again we will do it differently.
    My position in the matter is that the case has not been 
proved. I have gone back to Scottish law where there are three 
verdicts: guilty, not guilty, and not proved. I am not prepared 
to say on this record that President Clinton is not guilty. But 
I am certainly not prepared to say that he is guilty. There are 
precedents for a Senator voting present. I hope that I will be 
accorded the opportunity to vote ``not proved'' in this case.
    We really end up, colleagues, very much, in my judgment, 
where at least I started on the matter. I had thought at the 
outset that this was not an appropriate case for impeachment 
because the requisite two-thirds would not be present, and had 
hoped that impeachment would be bypassed, but instead we would 
allow the President to finish his term of office, which I 
thought an inevitability, just as it has worked out that way, 
and that the criminal process would do whatever was appropriate 
after his term was finished; if indicted, if convicted, 
whatever a judge would have to say as to sentencing. I am still 
hopeful that the rule of law will be vindicated in that 
process.
    We obviously have learned much from this proceeding. It is 
my hope that we will leave a mark to guide future Senates if we 
ever have to repeat this very, very trying sort of an 
experience.
    The removal of an American President through impeachment 
carries a high burden of proof and persuasion. For conviction 
in the criminal courts on charges of perjury and obstruction of 
justice, the proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt. An extra 
measure of certainty is necessary to persuade the Senate that 
the national interest mandates invoking the extraordinary 
remedy of removing the President.
    The starting point is article II, section 4 of the 
Constitution:

    The President . . . shall be removed from Office on Impeachment 
for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other High Crimes and 
Misdemeanors.

    From that language, there is reason to interpret ``other 
High Crimes and Misdemeanors'' as relating back to specific 
categories of offenses earlier enumerated, such as ``Treason 
and Bribery''; but I think that is too limited. Nor do I agree 
with the simplistic definition that perjury and obstruction of 
justice, being felonies and therefore more serious than 
misdemeanors in the criminal law, are automatically impeachable 
offenses.
    The framers did not foresee the circumstances before us. 
The omission of ``perjury'' and ``obstruction of justice'' from 
the enumerated offenses probably reflected the framers' thought 
that it would be unlikely that a President would be testifying 
under oath or be a participant in a judicial proceeding. Yet it 
is equally clear that perjury and obstruction of justice are 
serious crimes. For the President to commit either, he would be 
placing his own interest above his public duty and the people's 
interest in due process.
    In 1970, then-Congressman Gerald R. Ford offered this 
definition:

    . . . an impeachable offense is whatever a majority of the House of 
Representatives considers to be at a given moment in history . . .

    While that may state the raw power of Congress, it is too 
subjective to provide any real guidance. Instead, I look to the 
framers at the Constitutional Convention, ``The Federalist 
Papers,'' and the English and U.S. impeachment cases.
    Commenting on impeachment at the Constitutional Convention, 
James Wilson said:

    . . . far from being above the laws, he (the President) is amenable 
to them in his private character as a citizen, and in his public 
character by impeachment.

    The President's attorneys have argued that the charges 
arise from private conduct unrelated to his official duties. 
The issue then arises whether his conduct is ``in his public 
character'' by virtue of his constitutional duty:

    . . . he (the President) shall take care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed . . . Article II, Section 3--

    Such a public duty may be insufficient for impeachment 
under Alexander Hamilton's definition of impeachment in 
Federalist No. 65:

    . . . those offences (sic) which proceed from the misconduct of 
public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some 
public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be 
denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done 
immediately to the society itself.

    From Hamilton's statement, the conventional wisdom has 
evolved that impeachment is essentially a political question. 
The framers, cases and commentaries have not articulated a 
handy definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors.''
    Whether to impeach and convict transcends the facts and law 
to what is in the national interest at a specific time in the 
Nation's history on the totality of the circumstances.
    Consideration of the national interest may include whether 
there is a clear and present danger to the integrity or 
stability of the national government; or whether the conduct is 
so vile or reprehensible as to establish unfitness for office; 
or whether the electorate has lost confidence in the President 
to the extent that he cannot govern.
    The precedents and commentaries leave substantial latitude 
for Senators to establish their own standards. The ultimate 
definition may be analogous to Supreme Court Justice Potter 
Stewart's struggle to define obscenity when he concluded: ``. . 
. perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so. But I 
know it when I see it.''
    The extreme partisanship of the impeachment proceeding in 
the House prejudiced the matter before it came to the Senate. 
While it takes two to tango or be partisan, somehow the House 
Republicans bore the brunt of the public disdain on the 
partisan charge. It was more than the party-line votes. The 
whole process was filled with rancor, acrimony and bitterness 
which contributed significantly to the public view that it was 
all politics without real substances.
    It has been widely noted that there must be significant 
bipartisan support to remove a President. President Nixon's 
forced resignation occurred only when Republican elders like 
Senators Goldwater and Scott joined Democrats in urging his 
resignation.
    In an early Sunday TV talk show on December 20, 1998, the 
day after the House sent the articles to the Senate, Senator 
Joseph Lieberman and I appeared together on ``Face the Nation'' 
where he urged that there be no party caucuses but only joint 
caucuses. I recommended that to Senator Lott in my memorandum 
of December 29 and urged that policy to colleagues on both 
sides of the aisle. Perhaps, it was too much to expect or even 
hope that would be done given the Senate's history and practice 
of party caucuses.
    As noted in this floor statement, the Senate struggled to 
achieve bipartisanship, mostly without success, but we did 
avoid the rancor and bitterness which prevailed on the House 
side.
    From the outset, the conventional wisdom was there would 
not be two-thirds of the Senate in favor of conviction. That 
pervasive view has cast a long shadow over the impeachment 
proceedings. When the Senate convened on January 6, there was 
immediate informal consideration on taking a test vote to 
determine if there were 34 Senators opposed to conviction which 
would end the matter. There appeared to be even more than that 
number so opposed who based their judgments on news media 
accounts. That trial balloon was abandoned when many Senators 
objected on the ground that the Constitution called for a trial 
and the Senate owed the House the constitutional deference to 
give the House managers a chance to prove their case.
    In mid-November, I wrote in a New York Times op-ed article 
that impeachment should be bypassed and the President should be 
held accountable through the criminal process after his term 
ended. When the House of Representatives returned articles of 
impeachment in mid-December, I felt at that stage the Senate 
had a constitutional duty to proceed to a trial.
    The Constitution explicitly provides for a trial: ``The 
Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments,'' 
article I, section 3, clause 6.
    The same clause refers to being convicted and the next 
clause refers to judgment, so the constitutional mandate for a 
trial is plain. Senate impeachment rules VI and XVII deal with 
witnesses.
    The Senate was schizophrenic in wanting to avoid what many 
considered to be a pointless trial. Others considered it to be 
our constitutional duty to hold a trial and give appropriate 
deference to the House's action on the articles. In a series of 
halting half-steps, the Senate stumbled through a 
``pseudotrial,'' a ``sham trial''--really no trial at all. In 
the end, it would have taken less time to let the House 
managers put on their case with a full White House defense than 
the helter-skelter procedures adopted by the Senate.
    From the time the Senate reconvened on January 6, 1999, the 
public pressure to conclude the trial promptly was palpable. 
The improbability of a two-thirds vote for conviction was only 
one factor although the totality of the other factors 
contributed to that improbability.
    The adverse public reaction was reflected in consistent 
polling data and the feel on the streets in our various States. 
Notwithstanding the serious charges of perjury and obstruction 
of justice, Democratic Senators argued and many people agreed 
that a private sexual liaison should not have caused a 
multiyear, multimillion-dollar investigation. If the 
independent counsel, they argued, could establish no wrongdoing 
in Whitewater, Travelgate and Filegate, why elevate a charge 
based on sex to an impeachable offense?
    I think it is a significant distinction that President 
Clinton, unlike President Nixon, was not charged with covering 
up an underlying crime. President Clinton had the option of not 
answering deposition questions and/or simply not defending the 
Paula Jones lawsuit. At worst that would have resulted in a 
default judgment being entered against him with an assessment 
of damages. As it worked out, a nondefense might still have led 
to dismissal of the case as a matter of law and on the eventual 
settlement. In any event, the President would have avoided his 
present predicament by not responding.
    Once the President undertook his course of action, then he 
must answer to the serious charges of perjury and obstruction 
of justice even though he was not covering up criminal 
activity.
    Attorney General Reno made a major mistake in acting to 
expand Judge Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction to include the 
Lewinsky matter. In mid-January 1998, contemporaneously with 
the Attorney General's action, I commented that the public 
would suspect a vendetta on the part of Judge Starr because 
there had been so many apparently unproductive investigations 
going on for so long. This was not a criticism of Judge Starr, 
but an inevitable public reaction. The public's suspicion of 
Judge Starr carried over to impeachment.
    When I challenged Attorney General Reno in the Judiciary 
Committee oversight hearing on July 15, 1998, about why she 
acted to expand Judge Starr's authority, she refused to answer 
the question, saying only: ``The application speaks for itself, 
Senator.''
    The failure of the House to call witnesses during their 
hearings injected a Trojan horse into the articles. The House 
had good reason not to call witnesses because of its concern to 
finish its work before the 106th Congress convened to take up 
the Nation's important pending business. But, that set the 
stage for the witness issue to haunt the Senate from the 
outset.
    Early in January, there was a strenuous effort for 
bipartisanship on witnesses and procedures. At a joint caucus 
on January 8, by almost spontaneous combustion, agreement was 
reached 100-0 on preliminary procedures, leaving depositions 
and witnesses until later.
    Immediately thereafter, bipartisanship broke down. While 
this may seem self-serving from the Republican point of view, 
Republicans had more to gain from bipartisanship than Democrats 
to avoid the rancor of the House proceedings and give 
legitimacy to impeachment. Many Democrats openly said the 
President would be helped by party-line votes making the Senate 
look like the House.
    The Democrats then lined up solidly behind the President 
with a number of Republicans, sometimes more than six, 
teetering on joining the Democrats. There are obviously limits 
to what elected officials will do to vote a straight party line 
if it puts their seats in jeopardy. The Senate Democrats had 
the effective cover of a popular President and their party-line 
votes followed while a significant number of Republicans faced 
constituents opposed to impeachment in their election cycles.
    The sequence of partisan maneuvering on witnesses is 
important to understanding how the House managers were 
precluded from presenting their case in a fair way. Appendix A 
describes those events in some detail. The ultimate result was 
a sharply limited number of deposition witnesses, three, with 
videotaped depositions only and no live witnesses at trial.
    In my Senate tenure, I have not seen a more contentious 
issue than the calling of witnesses, either live or videotaped. 
It goes beyond the public pressure to terminate or at least 
abbreviate the Senate proceeding. The argument that the well of 
the Senate should not be the stage for lewd and lascivious 
testimony was answered by the commitment of the House managers 
to avoid such testimony. The argument that Monica Lewinsky 
should not appear on the Senate floor once occupied by Daniel 
Webster and John F. Kennedy has to give way to the Senate's 
duty to try this President. The Senate did not choose the 
President's consorts and potential witnesses, but the Senate is 
duty bound to ``try'' the case as mandated by the Constitution 
and do ``impartial justice'' as the Senators' oath specified.
    I was one of three Senator presiders/observers designated 
by Senator Lott, the majority leader, for the depositions of 
Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and Sidney Blumenthal. Observing 
these live witnesses confirmed my thinking that the full Senate 
should have seen and heard their testimony in the tradition of 
trial practice. While a videotape is very informative, there is 
no substitute for the more precise evaluation of demeanor and 
its many nuances which comes across fully only through live 
testimony.
    When the videotapes were played in the Senate Chamber, the 
contrast was stark with the same live testimony I saw and 
heard. On a number of occasions, the sound was inaudible and 
the tape could not be rewound. There was a far superior 
opportunity in person to observe the witnesses' facial 
responses, their reactions and their general demeanor. In 
addition, only a portion of their videos was played. Although 
Senators had a chance for full private viewings, it is 
inevitable that many Senator-jurors did not utilize that 
opportunity to observe all the videos.
    Ms. Monica Lewinsky was a very impressive witness: poised, 
articulate, well-prepared. Seeing her testify in person, I 
understand why the President's counsel had fought so 
strenuously to keep her away from the well of the Senate. Had 
she told her whole story in the well of the Senate, a rapt 
national TV audience would have been watching and the dynamics 
of the proceeding might have been dramatically changed.
    Instead of hearing testimony from live witnesses, the 
Senate listened to 12 days of lawyer's arguments. Six days were 
consumed with opening statements which should have taken a few 
hours. For 2 days, Senators submitted questions through the 
Chief Justice for responses from attorneys which added little 
illumination to what was already on the record. Two more days 
were spent arguing the motion to dismiss and the resolution on 
depositions where the lawyers essentially repeated earlier 
arguments with an additional day for votes on those issues.
    Finally, limited evidence was presented with three 
videotaped depositions--Monica Lewinsky, Vernon Jordan and 
Sidney Blumenthal. Another day was consumed on votes rejecting 
live witnesses and permitting use of the videotapes. On the day 
designated for presentation of those depositions, only snippets 
were shown with most of the time consumed by lawyers' 
arguments. A final day for closing arguments was held with 
lawyers again presenting arguments which had been repeated on 
11 prior days.
    So in place of a traditional trial with live witnesses such 
as Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie, Vernon Jordan, Erskine 
Bowles, John Podesta, Sidney Blumenthal, possibly Kathleen 
Willey or whomever the House managers chose to call, the Senate 
heard days of repetitious lawyers' argument from a grand jury 
record.
    The President's version was limited to his deposition in 
the Paula Jones case on January 17, 1998 and his grand jury 
testimony on August 17, 1998. In their totality, those two 
cameo appearances raised more questions by far than they 
answered. As expected, the President was exceptionally well 
prepared on the law and exceptionally adroit and manipulative 
on the facts or, more accurately, on evading the facts.
    The law on perjury is set forth in the case of Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 342 (1973), where the Supreme Court of 
the United States established a rigorous standard for proving 
perjury. Bronston, under oath in a 1966 bankruptcy hearing, was 
asked whether he ever had bank accounts in Swiss banks and he 
replied: ``the company had an account there for about 6 months, 
in Zurich.''
    His answer that the company had an account there for about 
6 months was accurate. It was not accurate that it was the only 
account the company had. The Supreme Court exonerated Bronston 
on the charge of perjury because the questioner did not press 
further to get a specific answer on whether the company had an 
account in addition to the one responded to by Bronston.
    Utilizing the holding in Bronston to the utmost, the 
President couched his answers with great care relying on the 
questioner not to pursue the unanswered issues. For example, 
the President did not deny lying to his aides, but rather 
evaded the question and there was no followup. John Podesta, 
President Clinton's deputy chief of staff at the time, 
testified that on January 23, 1998:

    He [President Clinton] said to me he had never had sex with her 
[Monica Lewinsky], and that--and that he never asked--you know, he 
repeated that denial, but he was extremely explicit in saying he never 
had sex with her--[H]e [President Clinton] said that he never had sex 
with her [Monica Lewinsky] in any way whatsoever--that they had not had 
oral sex.

    In a Senate deposition, Sidney Blumenthal, an assistant to 
the President, testified that the President lied to him. In 
testimony before the grand jury, Mr. Blumenthal testified that 
the President told him that he had ``rebuffed'' Ms. Lewinsky's 
advances. Mr. Blumenthal further testified that the President 
told him the following:

    She [Monica Lewinsky] threatened him. She said that she would tell 
people they'd had an affair, that she was known as the stalker among 
her peers, and that she hated it and if she had an affair or said she 
had an affair then she wouldn't be the stalker any more.
    He [President Clinton] told me that she [Monica Lewinsky] came on 
to him and that he had told her he couldn't have sexual relations with 
her and that she threatened him. That is what he told me.

    In his testimony before the grand jury, President Clinton 
stated,

    I told them [his aides] things that were true about this 
relationship. They [things the President said to his aides] may have 
been misleading, and if they were I have to take responsibility for it, 
and I'm sorry.

    Note that the President does not deny lying but only that:

    I told them things that were true about this relationship.

    The President did say some things which were true. The 
questioner did not then pursue the line of interrogation by 
asking if, in addition to saying some things which were true, 
the President told his aides other things which were lies. On 
that clever, ambiguous record, the President escapes the 
perjury net.
    Similarly, President Clinton dodged the perjury charges on 
his testimony on being alone with Monica Lewinsky. She 
testified they were alone when they had 11 sexual encounters 
either in the President's personal office or the adjacent 
hallway. In his January 17 deposition, the President was asked 
if he was ever alone with Monica Lewinsky in any room of the 
White House. The President responded,

    I have no specific recollection, but it seems to me that she was on 
duty on a couple of occasions working for the legislative affairs 
office and brought me some things to sign, something on the weekend.

    Further, when the President was asked if he was ever alone 
with Ms. Lewinsky in the hallway between the Oval Office and 
the kitchen area, the President responded,

    I don't believe so, unless we were walking back to the back dining 
room with the pizza. I just, I don't remember. I don't believe we were 
alone in the hallway, no.

    The President again gets away with vague, unresponsive 
replies. When the President says, ``I don't believe we were 
alone in the hallway, no'', there is then no pursuit as to 
whether they were alone in other places. He succeeds in 
avoiding and misleading, but does not make the unequivocal 
false statement required by Bronston to constitute perjury.
    The President was treated differently than other witnesses 
before a grand jury when he was permitted to read from a 
prepared statement:

    I engaged in conduct that was wrong. These encounters did not 
consist of sexual intercourse. They did not constitute sexual relations 
as I understood that term to be defined at my January 17th, 1998 
deposition. But they did involve inappropriate intimate contact.

    The President then declined to respond to Monica Lewinsky's 
specific charges and was not pressed for answers. He made a 
blanket denial of having sex with Monica Lewinsky relying on a 
tortured interpretation of Judge Wright's definition of sexual 
relations:

    I thought the definition included any activity by the person being 
deposed, where the person was the actor and came in contact with those 
parts of the bodies with the purpose or intent of gratification, and 
excluded any other activity. For example, kissing is not covered by 
that, I don't think.

    He further stated that:

    My understanding was, what I was giving to you, was that what was 
covered in those first two lines was any direct contact by the person 
being deposed with those body parts of another person's body, if the 
contact was done with an intent to arouse or gratify. That's what I 
believe it means today.

    The question was not pursued whether there was a sexual 
relationship where Ms. Lewinsky was the actor who made contact 
with the President's body with an intent to arouse or gratify. 
When asked specifically about oral sex, the President 
responded,

    . . . [Y]ou asked me did I believe that oral sex performed on the 
person being deposed was covered by that definition, and I said no. I 
don't believe it's covered by the definition.

    And there is the curious contention by the President on 
what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. A videotape of his 
deposition shows the President sitting quietly and listening to 
his attorney Robert Bennett's arguments to Judge Wright based 
on Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit which the President knew to be 
perjurious.
    In his grand jury testimony, the President defended his 
silence during this statement:

    I was not paying a great deal of attention to this exchange. I was 
focusing on my own testimony.

    The President also told the grand jury that Mr. Bennett's 
statement that there ``is'' no sex of any kind was not 
necessarily false, but rather:

    It depends on what the meaning of the word ``is'' is. If the--if 
he--if ``is'' means is and never has been, that is not--that is one 
thing. If it means there is none, that was a completely true statement.

    On this state of the record, the Senate should have pressed 
the President for responses to so many important unanswered 
questions. Since the President was, in effect, asking the 
Senate to leave him in office, why was the Senate not justified 
in, at least, insisting on answers to key questions. When 
Senators submitted interrogatories to the Chief Justice for 
responses from the attorneys, I submitted the following 
question:

    Would the President honor a request by the Senate to testify? If 
not, why not? If he declined to testify either on his own initiative or 
a Senate invitation, would the Senate be justified in drawing an 
adverse inference from his failure to testify?

    With so many other questions submitted, this one was not 
asked. During the trial, White House counsel said the President 
would respond to written questions, but that offer was 
rescinded. On January 25, the President refused to answer 10 
written questions submitted by Republican Senators.
    On February 3, 26 Republican Senators sent the President a 
letter requesting a deposition. As expected, he declined. In a 
context where the Senate voted against live witnesses and 
permitted only three deposition witnesses, it was not 
surprising that there was no political will to press the 
President for his testimony. I believe that was a serious 
mistake. In the context where the Senate could not even 
consider exercising the political will to ask, let alone 
compel, the President to leave the Oval Office for a day or a 
few days to testify at his impeachment trial or even to give a 
deposition, how could the Senate be expected to exercise the 
much greater political will to remove the President from 
office?
    In her civil lawsuit, Paula Jones had been able to compel 
the President to give a deposition. In the grand jury 
proceeding, the independent counsel, in effect, compelled the 
President to testify. Why, then, shouldn't the Senate exercise 
the commensurate power in an impeachment proceeding to obtain 
the President's testimony when there were so many open 
questions?
    In my legal judgment, the Senate has the power to subpoena 
the President. My memorandum to Senator Lott dated December 10, 
1998, attached as appendix B, discusses the Senate's legal 
authority to subpoena the President. My memorandum to Senator 
Lott dated December 29, 1998, attached as appendix C, discusses 
possible testimony by the President. Senate Impeachment Rule VI 
gives the Senate the subpoena power. The Supreme Court of the 
United States held President Nixon was subject to subpoena to 
turn over the famous tapes under the established principle 
``That the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.'' 
President Nixon's case, although not dealing with impeachment, 
is further instructive in the Supreme Court's sweeping language 
on the need for all the facts even where the President is 
subject to subpoena:

    The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would 
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative 
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system 
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all 
the facts, within the framework of the rule of evidence. To ensure that 
justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts that 
compulsory process be available for the production of evidence needed 
either by the prosecution or the defense.

    Following President Clinton's deposition in the Paula Jones 
case on January 17, 1998, the President called his personal 
secretary, Betty Currie, at home and asked her to come into the 
office on the following day. On Sunday, January 18, President 
Clinton met with Ms. Currie and, according to Ms. Currie, made 
the following statements to her, one right after the other:

    You were always there when she was, right?
    We were never really alone.
    Monica came on to me, and I never touched her, right?
    You can see and hear everything, right?

    Ms. Currie testified at first, on January 27, 1998, that, 
based on his demeanor and the way he made the statements, the 
President wanted her to agree with them.
    Six months later, on July 22, 1998, when she testified for 
the second time, Ms. Currie said that although the President 
stated ``right?'' at the end of the statements, she understood 
that she could agree or disagree with them.
    I find the testimony of Betty Currie on January 27, 1998, 
most troubling. Why would the President ask a series of 
questions when he knew the answers unless he sought to 
influence her testimony? But then, Ms. Currie undercut her 
January 27 testimony when she testified on July 22, 1998, that 
she understood from the President that she could disagree with 
him on those questions.
    In order to make a finding on an important issue like this 
which could lead to the removal of the President, the Senate 
should have heard Ms. Currie in person to clarify her 
testimony. In the absence of such clarification on this state 
of the record, there is at least a reasonable doubt on this 
issue.
    Monica Lewinsky testified that she met with the President 
in the Oval Office on December 28, 1997, and that the President 
gave her several Christmas presents at this meeting. Ms. 
Lewinsky further testified that at some point in the 
conversation she said to the President, ``Maybe I should put 
the gifts away outside my house somewhere or give them to 
someone, maybe Betty.'' Ms. Lewinsky recalled that the 
President responded either ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think 
about that.''
    The President testified that he has no distinct 
recollection of discussing the gifts with Ms. Lewinsky on 
December 28. He told the grand jury that:

    My memory is that on some day in December, and I'm sorry I don't 
remember when it was, she said, well, what if they ask me about the 
gifts you have given me. And I said, well, if you get a request to 
produce them, you have to give them whatever you have.

    In the afternoon of December 28, 1997, Betty Currie drove 
to Ms. Lewinsky's Watergate apartment and collected a box 
containing most of the President's gifts. Ms. Currie then drove 
home and placed this box under her bed. According to Ms. 
Lewinsky, the transfer originated in a phone call from Ms. 
Currie in which Ms. Currie stated, ``I understand you have 
something to give me,'' or, ``The President said you have 
something to give me.''
    Betty Currie testified that it was Ms. Lewinsky who first 
raised the idea of the gift transfer, either in person or over 
the telephone. Ms. Currie testified that she did not remember 
the President ever telling her to call Ms. Lewinsky or to pick 
something up from Ms. Lewinsky.
    Monica Lewinsky testified that Ms. Currie came over to pick 
up the gifts at ``around 2 p.m. or so.'' Cellular phone records 
reveal that Ms. Currie phoned Monica Lewinsky's home at 3:32 on 
December 28, and had a conversation of 1 minute or less.
    The evidence against the President on the gifts issue is 
equivocal where the idea returning the gifts in the 
conversation between the President and Monica Lewinsky 
originates with Ms. Lewinsky; Ms. Currie says she does not 
remember the President telling her to call or pick up something 
from Ms. Lewinsky; the time of the call as shown on the cell 
phone records, 3:32 p.m., conflicts with Ms. Lewinsky's version 
of the sequence of events and the President gave Monica 
Lewinsky more gifts on December 28, 1997, the same day that 
efforts were made for the return of some of the gifts.
    In December 1997 and January 1998, the President's close 
friend, Washington attorney Vernon Jordan, helped find Monica 
Lewinsky a job in New York City. On Friday, December 5, 1997, 
the President's attorneys received a witness list for the Paula 
Jones case. Monica Lewinsky was included on this list.
    On December 11, 1997, Judge Susan Webber Wright issued an 
order which stated that Paula Jones was entitled to 
``information regarding any individuals with whom the President 
had sexual relations or proposed or sought to have sexual 
relations and who were during the relevant time frame State or 
Federal employees.'' This order made it clear that Ms. Jones 
would be able to subpoena Monica Lewinsky.
    On December 11, 1997, Mr. Jordan and Ms. Lewinsky met and 
Mr. Jordan took concrete actions to help Ms. Lewinsky find a 
job. Mr. Jordan placed calls on her behalf to three business 
contacts. Mr. Jordan also told her to send letters to three 
additional business contacts that he provided to her. This 
meeting and the phone calls took place prior to the issuance of 
Judge Wright's order of the same day.
    On January 7, Ms. Lewinsky signed an affidavit denying a 
sexual relationship with the President. On January 8, Ms. 
Lewinsky had an interview with MacAndrews & Forbes in New York. 
Afterwards, she phoned Vernon Jordan to report that the 
interview had gone poorly. Vernon Jordan immediately phoned Mr. 
Ron Perelman, the CEO of MacAndrews & Forbes, and asked for his 
help. The next day, Ms. Lewinsky was given another interview 
and was extended an offer to work for Revlon, a subsidiary of 
MacAndrews & Forbes.
    Vernon Jordan defended his efforts to help Monica Lewinsky 
get a job as a payback for help he secured as a young lawyer in 
getting a job when he was a victim of racial discrimination. 
Jordan testified that he told no one at Revlon that Monica 
Lewinsky was a witness in a case involving the President and 
that Revlon offered Monica Lewinsky a job because she was 
qualified.
    If the Revlon job offer was part of a plan or conspiracy to 
obstruct justice, then Vernon Jordan would have had to be part 
of that. The House managers raise no such contention.
    An important piece of evidence on this issue was the 
uncontradicted testimony of Monica Lewinsky that she intended 
to deny her relationship with the President from the outset 
before she was subpoenaed or the President coached her or 
Vernon Jordan helped her get a job.
    The signals to the House managers from the Senate were 
unmistakable that the Senate was unlikely to approve 
depositions if the list was too long. Responding to that 
advance notice, the House managers submitted only three names 
for depositions necessarily leaving off potentially important 
witnesses like Ms. Currie. Given the absence of live witnesses 
and limitations on depositions, the House managers have been 
compelled to rely on transcripts from questioning by the 
independent counsel in grand jury proceedings. Those 
transcripts have left many key issues unresolved.
    The Senate proceeding posed a curious dichotomy with 100 
sitting silent Senators in the Chamber and nonstop Senators' 
interviews in the corridors and media galleries. The case was 
really not being tried in the Senate Chamber, but in a sense 
was being tried in the Senate corridors, on the evening TV 
interview shows and on the Sunday talk shows.
    I declined TV interviews after the day the trial began on 
the ground that my oath to do ``impartial justice'' was in 
jeopardy by interviews on the day's proceedings which might 
conflict with my juror's functions. Again, oddly, on the 
occasions when Senators were permitted to speak on the Senate 
floor on the motion to dismiss and the resolution on 
depositions, the sessions were closed so the public could not 
hear our debate.
    Efforts to open the Senate proceeding during final 
deliberations also failed to get the two-thirds vote to 
overturn the Senate rule closing the Chamber. I thought the 
public and posterity should know the reasons for our votes as a 
guide for today and the future. The informal, seat-of-the 
pants, corridor comments may be found in the CNN or MSNBC 
files, but there will be no Senate videotape to record what 
could be important Senators' views.
    Each Senator individually and the Senate collectively took 
an oath to do ``impartial justice.''
    The Senate has done only ``partial justice,'' a double 
entendre, both: (1) in the sense of not doing ``impartial 
justice'' to the House managers by unduly restricting them in 
the presentation of their case; and, (2) ``partial justice'' in 
the sense of hearing only part of the evidence.
    When the Senate prohibited live witnesses and permitted 
only three videotaped depositions, the House managers had one 
hand tied behind their back. There has been no ``trial'' but 
only a ``pseudotrial'' or a ``sham trial.'' The best the House 
managers could do was to cut, paste and glue together 
transcripts from the independent counsel's grand jury 
proceedings. Ms. Lewinsky testified briefly on videotape and 
the President gave two vague, evasive depositions.
    The House managers could not meet the heavy burden of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt. That is the only appropriate 
statement where the underlying charges are the crimes of 
perjury and obstruction of justice.
    Had the House managers sustained that burden under these 
articles, there was a further burden of persuasion, as I see 
it, to establish that the national interest warranted removal 
from office.
    Perjury and obstruction of justice are serious offenses 
which must not be tolerated by anyone in our society. However, 
I remain unconvinced that impeachment is the best course to 
vindicate the rule of law on this offensive conduct. President 
Clinton may still be prosecuted in the Federal criminal courts 
when his term ends. His lawyers have, in effect, invited that 
prosecution by citing it as the preferable remedy to 
impeachment.
    A criminal trial for the President after his term ends may 
yet be the best vindicator for the rule of law.
    If the full weight of the evidence with live witnesses had 
been presented to the Senate instead of bits and pieces of cold 
transcript, it is possible that the Senate and the American 
people would have demanded the President's appearance in the 
well of the Senate. Under firm examination, the President might 
have displayed the egregious character described harshly by his 
defenders in their proposed censure petitions. That sequence 
might have led to his removal.
    On this record, the proofs are not present. Juries in 
criminal cases under the laws of Scotland have three possible 
verdicts: guilty, not guilty, not proven. Given the option in 
this trial, I suspect that many Senators would choose ``not 
proven'' instead of ``not guilty.''
    That is my verdict: not proven. The President has dodged 
perjury by calculated evasion and poor interrogation. 
Obstruction of justice fails by gaps in the proofs.
    Many Senators have sought to express their gross 
displeasure by findings of fact or censure. I reject both. The 
Constitution says judgment in cases of impeachment shall not 
extend beyond removal and disqualification from future office. 
Under the crucial doctrine of separation of powers, the 
Congress is not and should not be in the business of censuring 
any President. We are properly in the business of examining our 
own conduct as Senators. On that score, on the record of this 
``pseudotrial,'' it is my view that the Senate failed to 
fulfill the constitutional mandate to ``try'' this case.
    I ask unanimous consent that Appendices A, B and C be 
printed in the Record.
    There being no objection, the appendices were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                               Appendix A

    When the Republican and Democratic caucuses could not agree on the 
preliminary procedures and witness issue, including depositions, a vote 
was set for late afternoon on January 7th. That vote was canceled in an 
effort to achieve a bi-partisan compromise. A joint caucus was then 
held in the Old Senate chamber at 9:30 am on January 8th where the 
outline of a procedural agreement was reached for the first stage 
without resolving the witness or deposition issues, but deferring them 
until we knew more about the opposing parties' cases.
    While a resolution of agreement was being drafted in the early 
afternoon fleshing out the compromise, Senator Lott asked Senator Kyl, 
Senator Sessions and me to explore the case to determine what 
witnesses, if any, the Senate should hear to make its decision. In mid 
afternoon, Senators Kyl and Sessions and I met with Chairman Henry Hyde 
and some of the House Managers to inform them of the joint discussions, 
to get a preliminary idea of their thinking on witnesses and to set up 
a meeting for the afternoon of January 11 to get their specification on 
what witnesses they believed necessary for the Senate trial. Later on 
the afternoon of January 8th, Resolution 16 was agreed to 100 to 0.
    In an effort to carry out a bi-partisan approach, I called Senator 
Lieberman on the morning of January 11th to invite him and/or other 
Senate Democrats to an afternoon meeting with House Managers. He said 
he would check with Senator Daschle and then called back to decline. 
Senators Kyl, Sessions and I met with the House Managers that afternoon 
to review their witness list. We advised them that the Democrats were 
opposed to witnesses and there was opposition among Republican Senators 
to a lengthy trial with many witnesses. We said their best opportunity 
for witnesses would be to show conflicts in the record testimony which 
could establish the need for seeing and hearing the witnesses to 
evaluate their demeanor. They responded they needed witnesses beyond 
conflicts to show the tone and tenor of their case. We said they might 
consider using their 24 hours of opening statements to develop the 
need, as they saw it, for specific witnesses.
    I called White House Counsel Charles Ruff on January 12th advising 
him of the meeting with House Managers stating that Senators Kyl, 
Sessions and I were interested in meeting with the President's 
attorneys. Mr. Ruff called back on January 13th declining the 
invitation.
    On January 25th, in advance of consideration of Senator Byrd's 
motion to dismiss and Senator Lott's resolution on taking depositions, 
Senator Lott requested Senator Kyl and me to talk again to House 
Managers to determine how many witnesses they would need and for what 
purpose. Senator Lott had extended an invitation to join in those 
discussions to Senator Daschle who declined. Before that meeting was 
held on January 25th, I advised Senator Lieberman of the scheduled 
meeting and told him Senator Daschle declined Senator Lott's 
invitation.
    Between our January 11 and January 25th meetings with House 
Managers, there had been numerous public comment by Republican Senators 
opposing many witnesses even for depositions with some expressing 
possible opposition to any deposition witnesses. When Senator Kyl and I 
met with House Managers on January 25th, we said it was problematic 
whether there would be 51 or more votes for a lengthy witness list.
    In arguments before the full Senate, House Managers complained 
about the limitations on deposition witnesses and expressed their 
interest in calling live witnesses with latitude to develop their cases 
as they saw fit in accordance with regular trial practice.
    Late in the evening on January 26th after closed door Senate debate 
on calling witnesses for depositions, Senator Carl Levin and I 
discussed a bi-partisan compromise. We continued that discussion early 
the next morning and presented our views to our respective caucuses on 
January 27th. While Senator Levin and I did not agree on all points, we 
were closer together than our caucuses. At mid-day on January 27th on 
an almost straight party line vote, the Senate decided to take 
depositions of only three witnesses.
    For the balance of the afternoon of January 27th and all day on the 
28th, there were strenuous efforts to agree on deposition procedures. 
Democrats were adamant that the depositions should not be videotaped; 
or, if videotaped, on the commitment that they could be viewed only by 
Senators and limited staff. Republicans insisted that the depositions 
should be videotaped deferring the decision on whether they would be 
used as a substitute for live witnesses. Late in the afternoon Senator 
Lott's resolution was adopted to videotape the depositions without 
specifying their use after defeating Senator Daschle's amendment to 
limit the depositions to a typed transcript without videotapes.
    After those depositions were taken, on February 4, 1999, the Senate 
voted to exclude live witnesses and to see the videotapes of the three 
deposed witnesses after the defeat of Senator Daschle's amendment to 
limit the depositions to the typed transcript only without videotapes.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix B

                                                 December 10, 1998.
To: Senator Trent Lott, Majority Leader.
From: Senator Arlen Specter.
    As a follow up to our recent meeting, this memorandum sets forth my 
thinking on how to handle the impeachment proceeding if it reaches the 
Senate and my analysis on some of the legal issues as follows:
    1. May the Senate consider in the next Congress articles of 
impeachment passed by the House in this Congress?
    2. Must the Senate trial begin the day following the House 
presentment?
    3. Is censure authorized in an impeachment proceeding?
    4. Must/should the Senate hear testimony from live witnesses?
    5. How long will the Senate impeachment trial take?
    6. Possibility of conviction
    7. Concluding observations
 may the senate in the 106th congress consider articles of impeachment 
     passed by the house of representatives in the 105th congress?
    Yes. Precedents hold that the Senate may carry an impeachment over 
into a subsequent Congress. As noted in the addenda to the Rules on 
Senate Impeachment Proceedings:
    ``Articles of impeachment against Harold Louderback, a United 
States district judge for the northern district of California were 
exhibited on March 3, 1933, at the end of the second session of the 72d 
Congress, and the trial occurred during the first session of the 73d 
Congress, . . .
    ``At the end of the 100th Congress, the Senate adopted a resolution 
to continue into the 101st Congress the proceedings in the impeachment 
of Alcee L. Hastings, a United State judge for the southern district of 
Florida''.
    Notwithstanding a contrary opinion given at the House proceeding, 
it is my judgment that these practical precedents would virtually 
certainly be upheld if any judicial challenge was attempted because of 
the decision of the United States Supreme Court in the case involving 
Judge Nixon where the Court held the Senate had the authority to 
establish procedures under the impeachment clause.
  must rule iii on senate impeachment procedure be read literally to 
require continuous consideration by the senate the day following house 
                presentation of articles of impeachment?
    No. While Rule III appears to impose such a rigid requirement on 
its face, the Rules taken on the whole and prior practice show the 
Senate may establish a more flexible schedule.
    The specific language of Rule III provides: ``Upon such articles of 
impeachment being presented to the Senate, the Senate shall, at 1 
o'clock afternoon of the day (Sunday excepted) following such 
presentation, or sooner if ordered by the Senate, proceed to the 
consideration of such articles, and shall continue in session from day 
to day (Sundays excepted) after the trial shall commence (unless 
otherwise ordered by the Senate) until final judgment shall be 
rendered.''
    Other Rules provide for intervening action between the time the 
articles are presented by the House to the Senate and subsequent 
proceedings before the Senate. For example, Rule 8 provides for a writ 
of summons to be issued to the person impeached with a date to appear 
before the Senate.
    The impeached party is given a date to answer the Articles and the 
House is then given a date to reply.
    For example, in the trial of President Andrew Johnson, the 
President was given 17 days to prepare his answer (his counsel had 
requested 47 days to prepare). The House managers took one day to file 
their brief reply to the President's answer. In the 1989 trial of Judge 
Walter Nixon, the Judge was given 29 days to prepare his answer, and 
the House was given 12 days to file its response.
    These rules and that prior practice demonstrate that there is a 
necessary time lapse between the presentation of the Articles to the 
Senate and the commencement of further Senate hearings or proceedings.
   is censure an authorized consequence or remedy in an impeachment 
                              proceeding?
    No. The specific language in the Constitution Article 1, Section 3, 
Clause 7 contains the clear implication that judgment in an impeachment 
proceeding shall not include censure or any consequence or remedy other 
than that specified in the Constitution: ``Judgment in Cases of 
Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and 
disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit 
under the United States.'' The language ``shall not extend further'' 
than the enumerated consequences or remedies precludes any judgment 
beyond ``removal from office'' and ``disqualification to hold and enjoy 
any Office of Honor, Trust or Profit under the United States''.
    Further support for the conclusion that impeachment does not 
contemplate penalties like censure is contained in the historical 
references. Of the fifteen individuals impeached by the House of 
Representatives, all seven convicted by trial in the Senate were 
removed from office.
    Contrasted to censure, impeachment and removal from office are not 
intended to be a punishment. In his ``Commentaries on the Constitution 
of the United States,'' Justice Joseph Story notes that impeachment 
``is not so much designed to punish an offender as to secure the state 
against gross political misdemeanors. It touches neither his person nor 
property but simply divests him of his political capacity.''
    Consequently, the impeachment process does not contemplate Congress 
imposing any penalty, including censure, as part of an impeachment 
proceeding. Once the impeachment proceeding is concluded, it is a 
different issue as to whether Congress can pass a resolution of censure 
in the same manner Congress enacts resolutions generally.
    would the constitutional requirements of the senate impeachment 
proceeding be satisfied by the factual recitations in the starr report 
   or is the senate obligated to hear testimony from live witnesses?
    While the Constitution provides no explicit answer, inferences from 
the Constitution, the Senate Rules on Impeachment and the prior 
practice strongly suggest that live witnesses were contemplated by the 
framers instead of merely a hearsay report.
    The Constitution explicitly provides for a trial in the provision 
of Article 1, Section 3, Clause 6: ``The Senate shall have the sole 
Power to try all impeachments'' (Emphasis added). The seriousness and 
magnitude of removal of a Federal official, especially the President, 
suggests that the jury (senators) should have the best evidence and 
that would require something more than a hearsay document no matter how 
extensive and explicit the Starr Report may be.
    That clause further provides: ``and no person shall be convicted 
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present'' 
(Emphasis added). The use of the word ``convicted'' again refers to a 
phase or the consequence of trial and the analogy to a criminal 
proceeding. While the Senate is not bound by traditional rules of 
evidence so that we might consider matters not admissible in a court of 
law, it would seem questionable or appear unseemly to base our judgment 
exclusively on hearsay in such an important proceeding.
    The provisions of Article 1, Section 3, Clause 7 carry forward the 
analogy of trial referring to the ultimate ``judgment'': ``Judgment in 
cases of impeachment shall not extend further . . .'' (Emphasis added).
    The Senate Rules on Impeachment further contemplate, although do 
not necessarily mandate, a proceeding with live witnesses and 
opportunities for the examination and cross-examination of such 
witnesses. For instance, Rule 6 provides that: ``The Senate shall have 
power to compel the attendance of witnesses. . . .'' Rule 17 provides 
that: ``Witnesses shall be examined by one person on behalf of the 
party producing them, and then cross-examined by one person on the 
other side.''
    Although the Rules never explicitly give the parties the right to 
call witnesses, the language ``on behalf of the party producing them'' 
in Rule 17 implies that the parties do have such a right. The practice 
of the Senate confirms this implication that the parties have the right 
to call witnesses. For example, in the trial of Andrew Johnson, 
witnesses for the President were called and heard over a period of one 
week. In the trial of Alcee Hastings, both sides were allowed to call a 
total of 55 witnesses.
    The foregoing analysis does not conclusively rule out the propriety 
of proceeding on the Starr Report.
    The House of Representatives relied upon the Starr Report for the 
facts even though the practice of the House in prior impeachment 
hearings has been to take testimony from witnesses. ``Hinds' Precedents 
of the House of Representatives'' notes that witnesses were called 
during the House impeachment hearings on Senator Blount and Judge 
Perry. More recently, during the House deliberations on the 
impeachments of President Nixon, Judge Claiborne, Judge Hastings and 
Judge Nixon, numerous witnesses were called to lay a factual basis for 
the impeachment charges. In the case of Judge Nixon alone, witnesses 
provided testimony to the House committee for over a month.
    As a practical matter, it is obvious the House did not take the 
time to hear witnesses because the House proceedings were structured to 
finish in the abbreviated time frame between the election of November 
3rd and the end of the year. Starting in mid-November and seeking to 
finish shortly after mid-December, that time frame was even further 
constricted.
            how long will the senate impeachment trial take?
    It depends entirely on what the Senate seeks to do and what 
parameters are established.
    If the Senate peremptorily chooses to dismiss the House articles 
without consideration, there is authority that could be accomplished at 
the outset by a majority vote on a motion to adjourn. Since there is no 
specific Rule relating to the adjournment of an impeachment trial, the 
general rules of the Senate would apply. A motion to adjourn the Senate 
requires only a majority vote and is not subject to debate. The Senate 
impeachment proceeding could be concluded by adjournment with, in 
effect, a dismissal which would be the equivalent of a nol pros in a 
criminal case. That is the equivalent of a judgment of acquittal. The 
Senate would then resume its normal business.
    There is historical precedent to concluding the Senate impeachment 
proceeding by passing a motion to adjourn. In the impeachment trial of 
Andrew Johnson, the Senate voted on three of the eleven articles of 
impeachment. After failing to secure a conviction on these three 
articles, Senator Williams moved that the Senate sitting as a court of 
implement adjourn sine die. The motion carried and the trial of Andrew 
Johnson ended prior to a vote on the remaining eight articles.
    If the Senate chose to accept the facts of the Starr Report, the 
entire trial could be relatively brief if the President did not put on 
a factual defense.
    An adequate Senate trial need not necessarily be long. The key 
witnesses would be Monica Lewinsky, Betty Currie and Vernon Jordan and 
possibly Kathleen Willey. There may be a few other peripheral witnesses 
such as Judge Susan Webber Wright. It is hard to calculate but it will 
probably be a matter of weeks, not months. That estimate would be 
expanded if President Clinton testifies and/or if he puts on a factual 
defense.
                       possibility of conviction
    This matter has had unprecedented and unpredictable turns of 
events. The President's August 17th short speech was a bomb. The 
House's release of the President's grand jury deposition reversed the 
tide. The President's answers to the House questions reversed the 
reversal.
    It is entirely conceivable that a Senate trial could defy 
conventional wisdom and find the two-third votes for conviction if the 
evidence is properly presented focusing on abuse of power and 
obstruction of justice instead of lying about sex. While impossible to 
quantify with precision, it may be that there are now about fifty votes 
for conviction, perhaps a half dozen open minds and maybe another dozen 
senators might be persuadable if they think there is insufficient 
political cover to acquit.
    Monica Lewinsky has the potential to be a strong witness because 
her recollection is so extraordinary. She was able to pinpoint with 
precision the two dates when, as she put it, the President received 
telephone calls from a congressman with a nickname and a sugar grower 
in Florida with a name something like ``Fanuli''. It was later 
confirmed that the President had talked on those two dates to 
Congressman Sonny Montgomery and a Florida sugar grower named Alfonso 
Fanjul.
    Although Betty Currie's testimony was watered down as the 
investigation proceeded, questioning her from her first statement might 
provide highly incriminating testimony on the obstruction charge. 
Vernon Jordan's testimony has substantial potential on the abuse of 
power issue. Jordan testified he reported to the President ``mission 
accomplished'' after Monica Lewinsky's perjurious affidavit was 
obtained and Jordan secured a job for Ms. Lewinsky with Revlon. When 
her initial interview went badly, Jordan called Ronald Perelman, head 
of Revlon's holding company, and Ms. Lewinsky was recalled the next day 
for another interview and given a job on the spot.
    The case is also reportedly strong on the perjury charge against 
the President on the incident involving Kathleen Willey. Judge Susan 
Webber Wright's testimony, in observing the President's attentiveness 
at this deposition in the Jones' case, could undercut the President's 
contention that he wasn't paying attention when his lawyer strenuously 
argued for the President's innocence at his deposition based on the 
Lewinsky affidavit. At that time, the President conclusively knew it 
was perjurious.
                        concluding observations
    As you know, my own initial preference was for both Houses to 
abandon impeachment proceedings and to then hold the President 
accountable through the judicial criminal process once his term was 
over leaving the Congress free to attend to the nation's other 
business: social security, health, education, etc.
    My view on waiting to hold the President accountable after he 
leaves office was based on the blunt proposition that it was more 
trouble to get rid of him than to keep him. It may well be that the 
public opposition to impeachment had the same basis. Once we get to the 
Senate trial, my view may change if it is no more trouble to get rid of 
him than to keep him. Perhaps the public will have a similar change of 
heart.
    If the House returns Articles of Impeachment, the Senate should 
proceed with a dignified trial with the calling of witnesses because 
the seriousness of the issue and the historical impact call for an 
unhurried, deliberative trial. To the maximum extent possible, we 
should make the proceeding non-partisan. Concessions to the minority on 
some procedural matter would be worthwhile. As the majority party in 
charge, we should take the lead on non-partisanship. We should avoid 
the House bickering at all reasonable costs.
    The Senate prides itself on being the world's greatest deliberative 
body. This trial will be by far the highest visibility for the Senate 
in its history to date and for the foreseeable future. While the 
President will be on trial, the Senate will also be on trial.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix C

                                                 December 29, 1998.
To: Senator Trent Lott, Majority Leader.
From: Senator Arlen Specter.
    Supplementing my memorandum of December 10 and our telephone 
conversation of December 22, this memo suggests procedures to deal with 
the Senate trial in light of the public dissatisfaction with the House 
proceedings, public impatience with impeachment generally and ways to 
achieve a judicious, non-partisan Senate trial. Since this memorandum 
was written while I have been traveling, the rules and case citations 
could be checked only by long-distance telephone.
    can procedures be structured to shorten the length of the trial?
    Yes. While it is impossible to say with certainty the duration of 
any trial, procedures can be put into place to abbreviate the trial 
with a reasonable likelihood of reaching a verdict within a few weeks 
(perhaps even three weeks as earlier predicted by you--Senator Lott) as 
contrasted with some assessments that the trial would take months or 
the better part of a year.
    The Senate already is under pressure and will probably be under 
greater pressure to finish at an early date which accounts for the call 
for short-circuiting the trial through a plea-bargained censure. It is 
obviously in the national interest to end the trial as soon as possible 
without rushing to judgment and it would doubtless meet with public 
approval to announce at the outset a plan to accomplish that.
    Several steps could be taken to abbreviate the trial time:
    (1) Require submission of pre-trial memoranda by the parties 
followed by a pre-trial conference with the Chief Justice to establish 
the parameters of the trial;
    (2) Organize the House Managers' case, with input from the Senate, 
to focus on only the key witnesses and indispensable lines of 
questions; and
    (3) Establish long trial days and Saturday sessions.
    Without management and limitations, the lawyers could take a long, 
indeterminate time. By analogy to Federal court litigation, this trial 
could be managed by having the parties submit pre-trial memoranda which 
would identify any pre-trial motions, list prospective witnesses and 
lines of questions, etc., and approximate the time involved at each 
stage.
    The Chief Justice would then meet with the parties and issue a pre-
trial order establishing the trial parameters just as the presiding 
judge does in Federal court trials.
                     an activist, bipartisan senate
    In an impeachment trial, Senators function in a very unusual way in 
that we are both jurors and judges. A majority of Senators may overrule 
the Chief Justice's rulings. We decide individually for ourselves what 
is the burden of proof and what evidence on what conduct is sufficient 
for a guilty verdict.
    The Senate will be proceeding without precedent on most issues. The 
Senate has broad latitude as noted by the Supreme Court of the United 
States in the case of Judge Nixon where the Court held the Senate had 
authority to establish its procedures under the Impeachment Clause.
    This case and these times call for a more activist approach by the 
Senate than prior impeachment trials. While it was not inconvenient or 
problemsome to allow the House managers to set the pace for the 
Hastings, Nixon or Claiborne trials, this is obviously a very different 
matter. The impeachment trials of President Johnson and those which 
occurred earlier offer little guidance on how the Senate should proceed 
today.
    The existing Senate rules on impeachment are a starting point. They 
can be changed by a majority vote unless there is disagreement in which 
case proposed changes are debatable and subject to a two-thirds vote.
    It is only through bipartisanship that the Senate can succeed in 
having a judicious, non-partisan trial which can gain public 
acceptance. So, all significant procedures must have the concurrence of 
most Senators from both parties.
    In my judgment, it would be appropriate and practical to structure 
the presentation of the evidence by having a small bipartisan Senate 
committee work with the House managers and President's lawyers on what 
the Senate wants presented in a tightly focused case, taking into 
consideration any differences with the House managers which could then 
be worked out.
    Arguments in appellate courts customarily take the form of the 
appeals judges focusing on the questions they want addressed by counsel 
as opposed to having the lawyers decide how to use their allotted time. 
It would be analogous to such appellate proceedings to have the Senate 
direct, or work out collaboratively with the House the evidence the 
Senate wants to hear.
    I suggest that a small committee, perhaps five Senators with three 
Republicans and two Democrats, work up a trial format and trial brief. 
It will be helpful for the Senators to have prosecution or criminal 
defense experience. This Senate committee, or perhaps one Republican 
and one Democrat, should participate in preparation of the pre-trial 
memorandum and pre-trial conference.
                          long trial sessions
    Substantial evidence could be presented with trial days from 9:30 
am to 5 pm or even 9 am to 6 pm with Saturday sessions. The 
Philadelphia criminal courts had the minimum trial day established from 
9:30 am to 5 pm. Senate Impeachment Rule 3 provides for Saturday 
sessions in impeachment trials.
    I recommend against the so-called double track with the Senate 
sitting half days on the trial and half on other Senate business. There 
is too much legitimate public concern to have the trial proceed 
expeditiously and end as soon as possible. Even with the trial ending 
at 5 pm or 6 pm, some Senate business could be conducted in the 
evenings on confirmations or other business which can be handled by 
unanimous consent.
    We might consider canceling our February and March recesses for the 
trial, which would likely produce significant public approval.
                    the importance of live witnesses
    I strongly recommend live witnesses on the key issues although 
there is no prohibition against use of hearsay such as the Starr 
Report. Prior impeachment cases establish the precedent for live 
witnesses and the Senate rules provide procedures for live witnesses. 
Live witnesses have customarily testified in House impeachment 
proceedings. In the Senate, for example, live witnesses testified in 
cases involving President Johnson and in the most recent impeachment 
case on Judge Alcee Hastings. Senate Rules 6 and 17 establish 
procedures for dealing with witnesses.
    The dignity, tenor and stature of the Senate Trial call for live 
witnesses on an impeachment of this magnitude. Everything the Senate 
does will be subjected to a microscope both contemporaneously and 
historically. While it is a sweeping generalization, I think it is fair 
and accurate to say that no trial in history to date has been or will 
be so closely watched.
    We have some gauge as to how closely this trial will be scrutinized 
from the work of the Warren Commission which has been the most closely 
dissected investigation in history. Notwithstanding constant pressure 
from Chief Justice Warren, who wanted the inquiry concluded at an early 
date, the staff lawyers insisted on extended tests and extensive 
interrogation knowing the record would be closely examined. At that 
time, we couldn't conceive of the extent of the scrutiny, but we had 
some inkling of what was coming. At this time, the Senate should be on 
notice to cross every ``t'' and dot every ``i'' twice.
    It may be sufficient to use the Starr Report to establish some of 
the lesser proofs for the record.
    Without attempting to be dispositive on who are all the key 
witnesses and what are all the indispensable lines of questioning, a 
suggested focused strategy would be to call:
    (1) Monica Lewinsky to testify on the perjury issue by covering the 
numerous times she and the President were alone (he claimed they were 
never alone) and the specifics of their conduct on the issue as to 
whether they had sex.
    It may be wise to have her testify in a closed session on the 
details of their sexual relationship. In retrospect, the Judiciary 
Committee might have been wise to hear some of the testimony by 
Professor Hill and Justice Thomas in a closed session. In the 
confirmation hearing of Justice Breyer, testimony was taken in a closed 
session on his finances.
    Even though most, if not all, of Ms. Lewinsky's testimony has 
already been made public, it would be less offensive to public taste 
and arguably less prejudicial or more considerate of the President to 
avoid the spectacle of television on the specifics of their sex. Any 
objection to the closed or secret hearing could be largely answered by 
releasing a transcript to the public at the end of each daily session.
    If the President testifies, consideration should also be given to a 
closed session on the specifics of their sexual activities. It is 
arguably, and perhaps realistically, different to have a closed session 
with the President, but these questions will have to be thrashed out at 
the time depending on the feel of the case if, as and when they arise.
    In order to have a closed session, there would have to be a 
modification of Rule 20 which requires the Senate doors to be open 
except during deliberation.
    (2) Vernon Jordan to testify about contacts with the President 
including his telephone call where he reported ``mission accomplished'' 
after arranging with another lawyer to get Ms. Lewinsky's perjurious 
affidavit and getting her a job with Revlon.
    (3) Betty Currie to testify on the President's efforts to alter and 
mold her version of what happened. Even though Ms. Currie gave several 
statements, the essential elements of her testimony could be put on the 
record at trial by going through her first statement to the FBI.
    The President's possible testimony is considered later in this 
memorandum.
 should the senate trial be terminated by an arranged disposition for 
                                censure?
    No, for several reasons:
    (1) The Constitution specifies the two remedies or consequences in 
cases of impeachment which necessarily excludes censure: ``Judgment in 
Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from 
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, 
Trust or Profit under the United States''--Article 1, Section 3, Clause 
7. The language ``shall not extend further'' specifically precludes 
censure or any other remedy not enumerated in the Constitution.
    The argument is now being strenuously advanced by many, including 
some Senators, that the impeachment trial should be ended at an early 
stage by a motion to adjourn the Senate and then, by pre-arrangement, 
taking up a Resolution of Censure to be approved by the Senate and 
House. In my judgment, that would be a perversion of and at variance 
with the Constitution or, simply stated, unconstitutional.
    (2) Censure would be meaningless for this President--not worth a 
``tinker's dam.''
    (3) Censure would be a bad precedent which could be used whenever 
the Congress of one party wanted to express displeasure or embarrass 
the President of the other party. Simply stated, the Congress is not in 
the business of censuring the President under our Constitutional 
separation of powers.
    (4) Censure would prejudice a possible later criminal prosecution 
of the President after he leaves office. There will be an inevitable 
sense that censure will constitute a form of punishment or final 
judgment, although not technically double jeopardy, which would 
preclude a later prosecution, as a practical matter.
    The prospects for censure have been dampened by Vice President 
Gore's statement that the President would not accept censure 
conditioned on the President's admitting to lying under oath even if 
that admission could not to be used against him in any criminal 
proceeding. Even if the President would admit to lying under oath, he 
would most certainly object to the procedures necessary to rule out use 
of that admission in a criminal prosecution.
    Only a court, not the Senate or Congress, can grant immunity from 
future criminal prosecution. The Senate can take steps to have immunity 
granted by the Court. But that action can be taken only after the 
President or any witness asserts the privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. The Court then grants immunity 
and the testimony cannot be later used against that person in a 
criminal prosecution.
    Since the President has announced his unwillingness to admit to 
lying under oath, it is fruitless to suggest the Fifth Amendment 
course.
                 president clinton's possible testimony
    For the Senate to have all the facts--or all versions of the facts 
from which Senator-jurors must determine what the facts are, the Senate 
should hear from the President. It may be that the President will 
choose to testify; and as a matter of comity, the Senate should await 
the President's decision.
    If the President elects not to testify, the Senate will be faced 
with a difficult legal question and perhaps an even more difficult 
political question. On its face, Impeachment Rule 6 gives the Senate 
the authority to compel the President to testify:
    ``The Senate shall have the power to compel the attendance of 
witnesses'' and ``to enforce obedience to its orders, mandates, writs, 
precepts and judgments.''
    Notwithstanding that express language, some doubt has arisen as to 
whether the President is subject to compulsory process (subpoena) 
because of Rule 8 which provides:
    ``A writ of summons shall issue to the person impeached reciting 
said articles and notifying him to appear before the Senate upon a day 
and at a place to be fixed by the Senate . . . and file his answer to 
said articles of impeachment . . .
    ``If the person impeached, after service, shall fail to appear, 
either in person or by attorney, on the day so fixed therefore as 
aforesaid, or appearing, shall fail to file his answer to such articles 
of impeachment, the trial shall proceed, nevertheless, as upon a plea 
of not guilty.''
    Some have cited President Johnson's refusal to appear at the Senate 
trial as authority for the proposition that the President cannot be 
compelled to attend and testify. That inference is unsound because Rule 
8 refers to responding to the summons and filing an answer ``either in 
person or by attorney.'' So the attorney's action satisfies the rule 
without the appearance or other action by the President. Accordingly, 
the impeached party complied with the Senate rules in President 
Johnson's case which did not raise the issue of the Senate's power to 
compel the President to testify.
    There is no precedent for a case where the impeached official 
declined to testify and the Senate attempted to compel his testimony. 
The other impeachment cases offer no close analogy where, as here, 
critical facts are known to only two people, one of whom is the 
impeached official.
    Analogies from other, although dissimilar, trials suggest the 
President would be subject to being subpoenaed. The Supreme Court of 
the United States held President Nixon was subject to compulsory 
process to turn over the famous tapes under the established principle: 
``That the public . . . has a right to every man's evidence.''
    President Nixon's case, although not dealing with impeachment, is 
further instructive in the Supreme Court's sweeping language on the 
need for all the facts:
    ``The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would 
be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative 
presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system 
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all 
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. To ensure 
that justice is done, it is imperative to the function of the courts 
that compulsory process be available for the production of evidence 
needed either by the prosecutions or the defense.''
    Since this is not a criminal trial, there would be no rule that a 
defendant has the right not to testify. Although not a controlling 
analogy, a party in a civil case may be called involuntarily to the 
witness stand by his/her opponent ``as on cross'' which means he/she 
may be cross-examined.
    In my legal judgment, President Clinton could be compelled to 
testify based on Senate Rule 6, analogies to compulsory process in 
President Nixon's case and civil litigation and the fact that President 
Clinton was subject to compulsory process in the Paula Jones case and 
Starr grand jury. Consideration of enforcing such a subpoena can be 
left to a later day if, as and when the issue arises.
    If the President did testify, it could have a profound effect on 
the public's view of the case and on the Senator-jurors. The 
President's lawyers could not shield him from cross-examination and he 
could not avoid the specifics on his contacts with Ms. Lewinsky as he 
did in his abbreviated grand jury testimony.
    If the President sticks to his story that he did not have sex with 
Ms. Lewinsky and did not lie under oath at his deposition in the Paula 
Jones case, his credibility could be severely impugned by pointed 
cross-examination and he could be viewed very negatively by the public 
and the Senator-jurors. Or, it may be that the public and many Senator-
jurors would not be any more adversely affected by his Senate trial 
testimony than they were by the videotapes of his grand jury testimony.
    At this moment, it is impossible to judge what the feel or tenor of 
the trial would be on subpoenaing the President if, as and when he 
declined to testify after serious incriminating evidence was presented 
against him. If subpoena sentiments formed along party lines, it would 
be the most severe test of acting only with a bipartisan consensus.
    Over several centuries, litigation experience has demonstrated the 
unpredictability of trials. That is why they are called trials. A two-
thirds majority may not appear out of thin air, as noted by Congressman 
DeLay, but it could appear from forceful presentation of the key 
evidence including cross-examination of the President. If the trial 
turned heavily against the President, it is conceivable, although 
highly unlikely at this point, that a plea bargain could be structured 
with the Independent Counsel's concurrence that the President would 
resign with his pension, his law license and immunity from prosecution.
    Once a trial starts, the genie is out of the bottle and anything 
can happen. Emotions in all directions are at an all-time high with 
Republicans, the President, Democrats or anybody else in the line of 
fire at risk for the ultimate public scorn. And the public's other 
business would not be attended to forever how long the trial took.
    That is why I continue personally to favor putting off holding the 
President accountable until after his term ends through the criminal 
process. That accommodates the public's short-term desires for the 
Congress, the President and the Supreme Court to focus on the nation's 
business and the long-term national interest to later hold the 
President accountable for the serious charges through indictment if the 
grand jury so decides, and to sentencing by a judge if a jury convicts.
                          the public reaction
    Prospects are reasonably good that the public would not react 
unfavorably to a non-partisan, judicious, focused, relatively brief 
Senate trial. In addition, the public would likely understand the 
Senate has an explicit Constitutional duty to hold a trial after 
Articles of Impeachment are passed by the House. There has already been 
a bipartisan recognition of this duty by Senators who are Democrats.
    Public reaction, as gauged by the polls, was adverse to the House 
proceedings, at least in part, because of their highly partisan, 
strident tenor; and because the House never zeroed in or highlighted 
the highly incriminating evidence. There may even be some grudging 
public approval that Congress is willing to take action on a 
significant matter contrary to the polls.
    A favorable public reaction will depend largely if not exclusively 
on the public's feeling that the proceedings are bipartisan, so the 
Senate must take extreme care to make the trial bipartisan. As the 
majority party, we Republicans should bend over backwards to avoid even 
the appearance of seeking partisan advantage which marred the House 
proceedings.
    I strongly support the suggestion that there should be no separate 
party caucuses on impeachment issues. It would be useful to convene all 
Senators at an early date, such as January 8, 1999, when we will all be 
in town, to discuss ideas on how to proceed. I recollect one such 
meeting of all Senators from both parties a couple of years ago on 
appropriations or budget issues near the end of the session.
                               conclusion
    History will cast a long shadow on what the Senate does in this 
impeachment proceeding.
    The Senate should not, in effect, sweep the matter under the rug by 
relying on the hearsay Starr Report for the key facts. Some say the 
Starr Report is a sufficient factual basis for Senate action because 
the facts are not in dispute. That is not true. A close reading of the 
President's grand jury testimony and his famous 82 answers to 
interrogatories demonstrate that he has not conceded the accuracy of 
the key incriminating evidence.
    As detailed above, the Senate can leave it to the criminal courts 
to put the facts on the historical record and have the indicting grand 
jury, trial jury and presiding judge hold the President accountable to 
whatever extent warranted after his term ends.
    A rush-to-judgment censure plea bargain would complete the trifecta 
of inappropriate action by the Senate as well as the House and 
President.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Carl Levin

    Mr. LEVIN. Mr. Chief Justice, colleagues, first a personal 
note to our leaders: How proud I am of them, and we all are of 
you, for holding us together during this very, very difficult 
time. We will all be closer for having come through this, 
regardless of what this vote is or how we individually vote.
    The burden of proof on the House that the President has 
committed high crimes and misdemeanors and should be removed 
from office is a heavy burden, because the effect is so dire in 
a democracy that depends upon the election of the President. In 
my judgment, the House of Representatives has not carried that 
burden of proof as to the specific allegations against the 
President. The House repeatedly relies on inferences while 
ignoring direct testimony to the contrary. There is nothing 
unusual about the reliance on inferences. It happens in trials 
all the time. What is unusual here is that the House's case 
relies on inferences from the testimony of people whose direct 
testimony contradicts the inference. Let me just cite some 
examples in the obstruction of justice article.
    First, the House managers in their report, in their brief, 
made the following statements: ``As evidenced by the testimony 
of Monica Lewinsky, the President encouraged her to lie.'' That 
is the words of the House brief. Second, ``The testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky leads to the conclusion that it was the 
President who initiated the retrieval of the gifts and the 
concealment of the evidence.'' Third, ``The President needed 
the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the false affidavit and 
that was assured by the efforts to secure her a job.''
    Those are all direct quotes. Each one of those relies on 
inferences. Each one of them is contradicted by the explicit 
testimony of people from whom those inferences are drawn.
    Let's just take them one by one. The House managers' 
inference that the President ``encouraged''--that is their 
word--Monica Lewinsky to lie was contradicted by Monica 
Lewinsky's proffer, which was then incorporated into her grand 
jury testimony, that the President ``never'' encouraged her to 
lie. That is her word. They say by inference the President 
encouraged her to lie. She says, ``The President never 
encouraged me to lie.''
    The House managers' inference that it was, ``President 
Clinton who initiated the retrieval of the gifts and the 
concealment of the evidence on December the 28th,'' was 
contradicted by Monica Lewinsky's direct testimony that she 
initiated the concealment of the gifts. It is uncontested that 
on December 22 she took some of the gifts and concealed the 
rest--some of the gifts to her lawyer's office. She decided on 
her own that she would not turn over the gifts in response to 
that subpoena because they would embarrass her, or they would, 
in her words, disclose that there was a special relationship. 
So on the 22nd she decided on her own to withhold some of the 
gifts. And yet we are told by the managers by inference that 
somehow or other it is the President who initiated the 
withholding and the concealment of the gifts.
    And then on the 28th, when they met at the White House, it 
was Monica Lewinsky who said, ``Maybe I should get some of the 
gifts to Betty.'' She initiated the issue. And then the 
President said either nothing or, ``Let me think about it.'' 
And then the question came up: Well, who then made the phone 
call relative to the pickup of the gifts? Was it Monica 
Lewinsky calling Betty Currie or was it Betty Currie calling 
Monica Lewinsky?
    Here is where another inference is drawn, that if in fact 
it was Betty Currie who initiated the call, then the inference 
is that the President told Betty Currie to call Monica 
Lewinsky. There is a conflict there between Betty Currie and 
Monica Lewinsky.
    One of the most intriguing issues in this whole matter, one 
that I have really given a lot of thought to, is the question: 
Why would the President give Monica Lewinsky gifts on December 
28 if he was concerned about it and wanted to withhold and hide 
the gifts? It is one of the questions that didn't get a lot of 
focus up here, by the way.
    The President gave Monica Lewinsky at least three things 
that day: a bear carving that Dale Bumpers referred to that 
came from Vancouver, a small blanket, and a stuffed animal.
    Here is the way the House addressed that issue. They asked 
themselves in their brief the question: Why would the President 
give Ms. Lewinsky gifts at the same time he was asking her to 
conceal others that he had already given her? Answer from the 
House in their brief: The only logical inference--only logical 
inference--is that the gifts, including the bear, symbolizing 
strength, were a tacit reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would 
deny the relationship even in the face of a Federal subpoena. 
That is the inference that they say is the only logical 
inference from giving three gifts to Monica Lewinsky, including 
a bear.
    There is a real problem with that. First of all, that bear 
was obtained by the President in Vancouver weeks before there 
was a witness list. We are not even offered speculation as to 
how the President could foresee that Monica Lewinsky would be 
on a witness list and pick up a symbol of strength while in 
Vancouver so that he could give it to her as a reminder to deny 
their relationship in the face of some future, unforeseen 
Federal subpoena.
    Even more to the point, Monica Lewinsky was asked directly 
at the grand jury--directly--this question as to whether or not 
she interpreted the gift of that bear as a signal to her to 
``be strong in your decision to conceal the relationship.'' Her 
direct, one-word answer was ``no.'' And yet the managers come 
here saying the only logical inference that can be drawn from 
three gifts being given from the President on the 28th is that 
the President was signaling to her to be strong in the face of 
a Federal subpoena. That is the kind of inference we are asked 
to draw.
    I was raised on the burden of proof, both as a prosecutor 
in civil rights cases and as a defense lawyer. The House cannot 
carry the burden of proof on the critical allegations of 
criminal misconduct that they have made when they depend on 
those kinds of inferences, a pile of inferences that run 
directly contrary to direct testimony on critical points. 
Impeachment and removal should be based on sturdier foundations 
than that kind of a heap of inferences. They would have us 
overlook the forest of direct testimony while getting lost in 
the trees of their multiple inferences.
    The December 11 issue has been discussed here. It was 
extraordinary to me, listening here as both factfinder and 
judge, that it could be represented to us that on December 11, 
the first activity calculated to actually help Monica Lewinsky 
get a job occurred. That is what they alleged on the floor of 
the Senate. The first activity--these are their words--
calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually get a job took place 
on December 11, and that something happened on that day to 
trigger Vernon Jordan's meeting and real activity. Something 
happened that day. What was it? Judge Wright's order.
    In their House brief, it is said that that order came in 
the morning, which was wrong, and in the presentation here in 
the opening arguments Manager Hutchinson said the following: 
``The witness list came in, the judge's order came in. That 
triggered the President to action. And the President triggered 
Vernon Jordan into action. That chain reaction here is what 
moved the job search along.''
    Wrong. It disintegrated here. Vernon Jordan's meeting was 
before the judge's order. And yet that is what we are asked to 
base the removal of a President on. And then the thinking 
shifts to another theory. Removal of an elected President from 
office has got to be made of sturdier stuff than those kinds of 
inferences.
    Finally, on the double standard issue--and I think we all 
must be concerned about that--a former prosecutor who appeared 
in front of the House said the following. And Senator Sarbanes 
quoted one line of this, and I want to repeat that, because it 
is so important, and then add one other thing that they said. 
``In conversations with many current and former Federal 
prosecutors in whose judgment I have great faith, virtually all 
concur that if the President were not involved, if an ordinary 
citizen were the subject of the inquiry, no serious 
consideration would be given to a criminal prosecution arising 
from alleged misconduct in discovery in the Jones civil case 
having to do with an alleged coverup of a private sexual affair 
with another woman or the follow-on testimony before the grand 
jury. I believe the President should be treated in the criminal 
justice system in the same way as any other U.S. citizen.
    ``If that were the case here,'' these former prosecutors 
said, ``it is my view that the alleged obstruction of justice 
and perjury would not be prosecuted by a responsible U.S. 
attorney.''
    I know this is not a criminal case, this is an impeachment 
trial, but I would think that our standards should be at least 
as high as they would be in a criminal case, and that if this 
President would not be prosecuted, much less convicted for 
these specific charges--and these were criminal charges that 
were very specifically made by the managers against the 
President--if that prosecution and conviction would not take 
place in a criminal case, we should be loathe, I believe, and 
very, very cautious and careful before we remove an elected 
President from office.
    I learned about the burden of proof and presumption of 
innocence as a young boy, long before law school, when my 
father, who was a lawyer, taught me that American justice is 
dependent on these principles. As I grew up and became a lawyer 
myself, I experienced firsthand the significance of these 
bedrock principles and learned that it applies to all Americans 
accused of crimes, including the President. These principles of 
the burden of proof and the presumption of innocence help guide 
me now as we exercise our constitutional duty to judge the 
specific accusations of criminal behavior lodged against the 
President of the United States.
    The burden of proof on the House of Representatives that 
the President has committed serious crimes and should be 
removed from office is a heavy one, because overturning an 
election in a democracy is a drastic and dire action. The House 
has not carried that burden of proof as to the specific 
accusations against the President.
    The arguments of the House managers in support of the 
articles suffer from fundamental weaknesses. They repeatedly 
rely on inferences while ignoring direct testimony to the 
contrary; they omit key materials which contradict their 
charges; and they contain serious misstatements of key facts. 
In a matter of such consequence as the removal of an elected 
President from office, such a case should not lead to 
conviction.
    Let me cite some key examples from article II, the 
allegation of obstruction of justice. First, the House managers 
in their report, brief, and arguments to the Senate repeatedly 
rely on inferences to prove key points and ignore direct 
testimony to the contrary. In opening arguments, House Manager 
Hutchinson made the following claims:

    As evidenced by the testimony of Monica Lewinsky, [the President] 
encouraged her to lie.
    . . . [T]he testimony of Monica Lewinsky . . . leads to the 
conclusion that it was the President who initiated the retrieval of the 
gifts and the concealment of the evidence.
    . . . The President needed the signature of Monica Lewinsky on the 
false affidavit, and that was assured by the efforts to secure her a 
job.

    Mr. Hutchinson's arguments rely on inferences. Relying on 
inferences is not unique to proving a case. What is unique is 
that in this case, the House managers use inferences primarily 
from bits and pieces of testimony of people who explicitly deny 
those inferences in their direct testimony. The House managers' 
inference that the President encouraged Monica Lewinsky to lie 
was contradicted by Monica Lewinsky's direct testimony that the 
President never ``encouraged'' her to lie.
    The House managers' inference that ``it was President 
Clinton who initiated the retrieval of the gifts and the 
concealment of the evidence on December 28, 1997,'' was 
contradicted by Monica Lewinsky's direct testimony that she 
initiated the concealment of gifts. Not only is it an 
uncontested fact based on direct testimony that it was Monica 
Lewinsky who on December 22, 1997, following the receipt of a 
subpoena for gifts and having decided on her own to withhold 
gifts which would ``give away any kind of special 
relationship,'' brought to her attorney only those gifts that 
were ``innocuous'' and typical of the kind of gifts an intern 
might receive. It is also an uncontested fact based on direct 
testimony that it was Monica Lewinsky who, on December 28, 
1997, expressed her interest in wanting to hide the gifts when 
she said to the President that maybe she should transfer the 
gifts to Betty Currie. Ms. Lewinsky testified that the 
President either didn't respond to her comment or said he'd 
think about it.
    But what makes the managers' inference even more 
speculative is the fact that at the December 28 visit, the 
President gave Ms. Lewinsky even more gifts, including a bear 
carving from Vancouver, a small blanket and a stuffed animal. 
Why would the President give Ms. Lewinsky gifts at the same 
time he is asking her to conceal others he had already given 
her? I was struck by the House's answer. ``The only logical 
inference,'' according to the House managers, ``is that the 
gifts--including the bear symbolizing strength--were a tacit 
reminder to Ms. Lewinsky that they would deny the 
relationship--even in the face of a federal subpoena.''
    That inference, called ``the only logical inference,'' is 
not only the rankest form of speculation, it is also contrary 
to the direct evidence.
    The undisputed grand jury testimony was that the bear 
carving was brought back by the President from Vancouver, a 
trip which occurred weeks before Monica Lewinsky's name 
appeared on any witness list. We're not even offered 
speculation as to how the President could foresee that Monica 
Lewinsky would be on a witness list, and pick up a symbol of 
strength while in Vancouver so that he could give it to her as 
a reminder to deny their relationship in the face of some 
future, unforseen federal subpoena. But even more to the point, 
when Ms. Lewinsky was asked the direct question at the grand 
jury whether she interpreted the gift of the Vancouver bear 
carving as a signal to her to ``be strong in your decision to 
continue to conceal the relationship,'' her direct, one-word 
answer was ``no.''
    The managers' reliance on inferences from testimony of 
persons whose direct testimony contradicts the inferences was a 
recurring pattern during this trial. The managers alleged that 
the signing of the affidavit and the obtaining of the job for 
Ms. Lewinsky were linked, based on inference from bits and 
pieces of testimony of Monica Lewinsky and Vernon Jordan. But 
Vernon Jordan and Monica Lewinsky explicitly denied any such 
linkage. Ms. Lewinsky said, ``There was no agreement with the 
President, Jordan, or anyone else that [I] had to sign the 
Jones affidavit before getting a job in New York.'' Mr. Jordan 
told the grand jury in answer to the question whether the job 
search and affidavit signing were linked, ``unequivocally, 
indubitably, no.''
    Impeachment and removal should be based on sturdier 
foundations than the heap of inferences that have been placed 
before us, when those inferences are pieced together from bits 
of testimony of witnesses whose direct, explicit testimony 
contradicts the inferences. The House managers would have us 
overlook the forest of direct testimony while getting lost in 
the trees of their multiple inferences.
    The House managers' case also omitted directly relevant, 
contradictory material and misstated key facts. For instance, 
the House managers argued in their brief that relative to the 
job search assistance for Ms. Lewinsky, ``nothing happened in 
November of 1997.'' But, in fact, our Ambassador to the United 
Nations, at the request of the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 
White House, offered Ms. Lewinsky a U.N. job on November 3.
    The House managers' report explicitly represented that 
``[t]he first activity calculated to help Ms. Lewinsky actually 
get a job took place on December 11,'' and that ``[s]omething 
happened that changed the priority assigned to the job 
search.'' What happened, the managers argued, was a court order 
``on the morning of December 11'' by Judge Wright requiring 
President Clinton to provide information about prior 
relationships involving state and federal employees. The Senate 
was told by the House managers that ``[s]uddenly, Mr. Jordan 
and President Clinton were now very interested in helping Ms. 
Lewinsky find a good job in New York'' and that Vernon Jordan 
got active on the afternoon of December 11 when he and Ms. 
Lewinsky met.
    Manager Hutchinson said in his argument to the Senate:

    The witness list came in. The judge's order came in. That triggered 
the President to action. And the President triggered Vernon Jordan into 
action. That chain reaction here is what moved the job search along.

    But that key argument disintegrated before our eyes when it 
turned out that Judge Wright's December 11 order came late in 
the day, well after the meeting between Vernon Jordan and 
Monica Lewinsky, and in addition, the meeting had been 
scheduled many days before.
    With respect to the perjury article, the House managers 
failed to meet their burden as well. The President admitted to 
the grand jury that he did have ``inappropriate intimate 
contact'' with Monica Lewinsky when he was alone with her, and 
the House managers failed to identify specific statements that 
would meet the requirements of a perjury charge.
    The lack of substantive evidence supporting the charges 
explains why a panel of five highly regarded former Democratic 
and Republican federal prosecutors, who appeared before the 
House Judiciary Committee, testified that this case against the 
President would not have been pursued by a responsible federal 
prosecutor. Thomas Sullivan, who served for 4 years as U.S. 
Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois, and whom 
Chairman Hyde described as having ``extraordinarily high'' 
qualifications had this to say:

    . . . [I]n conversations with many current and former Federal 
prosecutors in whose judgment I have great faith, virtually all concur 
that if the President were not involved--if an ordinary citizen were 
the subject of the inquiry--no serious consideration would be given to 
a criminal prosecution arising from alleged misconduct in discovery in 
the Jones civil case, having to do with an alleged coverup of a private 
sexual affair with another woman or the follow-on testimony before the 
grand jury . . . I believe the President should be treated in the 
criminal justice system in the same way as any other United States 
citizen. If that were the case here, it is my view that the alleged 
obstruction of justice and perjury would not be prosecuted by a 
responsible United States Attorney.

    Finally, I have had a deep concern about the impeachment 
process which formed the basis of this trial. While my decision 
to reject the articles is based on the inadequate proof of the 
crimes alleged, the process which brought this matter to trial 
was deeply flawed.
    The articles of impeachment before us are based on 
materials, the so-called Starr Report, compiled by an outside 
prosecutor, not by the legislative branch itself, which has 
under the Constitution the ``sole'' responsibility for 
impeachment. Instead of doing an independent investigation, the 
House of Representatives unwisely delegated, in my judgment, 
the critically important investigative function to an outside 
prosecutorial foe of the President and an actual advocate of 
his impeachment. The House took that prosecutor's record and 
his testimony and made them the basis of articles of 
impeachment presented to us.
    The contrast to the Watergate investigation and the 
impeachment of President Nixon is stark. In the Watergate 
investigation, the Senate convened a select committee in 
February 1973 to investigate the Watergate break-in and other 
campaign irregularities in the 1972 election. That committee 
took testimony for a year. In February 1974, the House voted to 
direct the House Judiciary Committee to conduct an inquiry into 
impeachment. The committee conducted its own investigation, 
including subpoenaing the White House tapes and calling 
numerous fact witnesses. The committee also obtained the report 
of the grand jury meeting under the authority of Leon Jaworski, 
the Watergate prosecutor. In deciding to allow the grand jury 
report to be forwarded to the House Judiciary Committee, Judge 
Sirica found that the report:

    ``draws no accusatory conclusions . . . contains no 
recommendations, advice or statements that infringe on the prerogatives 
of other branches of government . . . (and) renders no moral or social 
judgments. The Report is a simple and straightforward compilation of 
information gathered by the Grand Jury, and no more . . .'' (In re 
Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972, Grand Jury Concerning 
Transmission of Evidence to the House of Representatives, U.S. District 
Court, District of Columbia, March 18, 1974.)

    The report sent to the House of Representatives in the 
matter before us violated almost every standard followed by 
Judge Sirica. The Starr Report didn't present the evidence in 
an impartial manner as contemplated in the independent counsel 
law. It drew a host of ``accusatory conclusions'' and rendered 
judgments. The report contained a large volume of needlessly 
salacious detail and omitted or dismissed important exculpatory 
evidence. The impeachment process has suffered as a result.
    Moreover, the House made a significant and irreparable 
mistake in the actual drafting of the articles. Each article 
alleges multiple acts of wrongdoing. Thus, it would be 
impossible to determine after a vote on the articles whether a 
two-thirds majority of the Senate actually agreed on a 
particular allegation. Article I, for example, charges that 
President Clinton committed one or more of the four possible 
acts of perjury; article II charges that President Clinton 
committed one or more of seven possible acts of obstruction. 
Without separate votes on each of the alleged acts, it would be 
impossible to determine whether two-thirds of the Senate agreed 
that the President had committed any of the actions alleged. 
Since the Constitution requires conviction upon a vote of two-
thirds of the Senate, the articles as drafted do not allow us 
to guarantee to the American people that we are complying with 
the requirements of the U.S. Constitution. This is a flaw that 
cannot be fixed, because the Senate does not have authority to 
amend the articles.
    Alexander Hamilton, in ``The Federalist Papers,'' asked 
this question: ``Where else than in the Senate could have been 
found a tribunal . . . [which] . . . would be likely to feel 
confidence enough in its own situation to preserve, unawed and 
uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality between an individual 
accused and . . . his accusers?''
    Each of us, however we vote, will soon answer that 
question, as we stand between the accuser and the accused, 
weighing the evidence. The issue before us is not whether the 
President's conduct was reprehensible; that is clear beyond any 
reasonable doubt. The issue is whether the President committed 
the alleged crimes for which he should be removed from office, 
a proposition which places on his accusers a heavy burden of 
proof. It is a burden the House managers have not met, and I 
will, therefore, vote against the articles of impeachment.
    I would like to add my thoughts on censure as well, since 
this may be the only appropriate opportunity to do so. I 
support the censure resolution authored by Senator Feinstein, 
and I commend her for her openness, diligence and hard work in 
bringing to fruitition a bipartisan product. The President 
should know, the American people should know, and history 
should know that by voting to acquit on impeachment, we did not 
vote to acquit the President for his egregious conduct. I know 
of no Senator who is not deeply troubled by the President's 
conduct. While I do not believe the President's conduct in his 
private, consensual sexual relationship should have become the 
business of the American public, it did in fact become so, and 
when it did the President had the duty to tell the truth. And 
no matter how wrong or improper that disclosure of the 
President's private life was, it does not justify the lies the 
President told to the American people, his family and his 
staff.
    I hope that our votes today on impeachment will conclude 
this unfortunate chapter in our political history and that the 
President, through a forthright acknowledgment of the 
wrongfulness of his behavior, will lead the nation toward 
healing the wounds these events have opened. I believe the 
American people want an end to this matter more than anything, 
and that any further criminal investigation of the President 
with respect to the matters under Mr. Starr's jurisdiction 
should be immediately concluded. While Senator Feinstein's 
censure resolution states that President Clinton remains 
subject to criminal indictment, that is in the resolution as a 
statement of fact and not as a statement of encouragement. 
Indictment after this impeachment trial would not be 
appropriate nor would it be in the public interest. Today's 
votes should bring this tragic episode to an end.
    Mr. Chief Justice, as we close this chapter in the Senate's 
life and prepare our records for the annals of history, there 
are several points which I wish to highlight in a series of 
appendices.
    I ask unanimous consent that the appendices be printed in 
the Record.
    There being no objection, the appendices were ordered to be 
printed in the Record, as follows:

                               Appendix A

    The indisputable, underlying reality of the impeachment case was 
that Monica Lewinsky's denial of a sexual relationship with the 
President was part of a long-term understanding and pattern, long 
before the subpoena in the Paula Jones case.
    ``Q. Had you talked with him earlier about these false explanations 
about what you were doing visiting him on several occasions?
    ``A. Several occasions throughout the relationship. Yes. It was a 
pattern of the relationship to sort of conceal it.''--Grand Jury 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, 
Page 844.
    ``A Juror: Did you ever discuss with the President whether you 
should deny the relationship if you were asked about it?
    ``A. I think I always offered that.''--Grand Jury Testimony of 
Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 1077.
    ``A. And she [Linda Tripp] told me that I should put it in a safe 
deposit box because it could be evidence one day. And I said that was 
ludicrous because I would never--I would never disclose that I had a 
relationship with the President. I would never need it.''--Grand Jury 
Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, 
Page 1107.
    ``A Juror: And what about the next sentence also? Something to the 
effect that if two people who are involved say it didn't happen, it 
didn't happen. Do you recall him saying that to you?
    ``A. Sitting here today, very vaguely . . . And this was--I mean, 
this was early--obviously not something we discussed too often, I 
think, because it was--it's a somewhat unpleasant thought of having to 
deny it, having it even come to that point.
    ``A Juror: Is it possible that you also had these discussions after 
you learned that you were a witness in the Paula Jones case?
    ``A. I don't believe so. No.
    ``A Juror: Can you exclude the possibility?
    ``A. I pretty much can.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 
Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 1119.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix B

    Did Ms. Lewinsky think her affidavit in the Paula Jones case was 
false when she signed it?
    ``Ms. L had a physically intimate relationship with the President. 
Neither the Pres. nor Mr. Jordan (or anyone on their behalf) asked or 
encouraged Ms. L to lie. Ms. L was comfortable signing the affidavit 
with regard to the `sexual relationship' because she could justify to 
herself that she and the Pres. did not have sexual intercourse.''--
Proffer of Monica Lewinsky to the Independent Counsel.
    ``Q. When he said that you might sign an affidavit, what did you 
understand it to mean at that time?
    ``A. I thought that signing an affidavit could range from anywhere 
between maybe just somehow mentioning, you know, innocuous things or 
going as far as maybe having to deny any kind of relationship.''--Grand 
Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; Independent Counsel 
Appendices, Page 844.
    ``Q. You were trying to be truthful throughout [the proffer]?
    ``A. Exactly.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part One; 
Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 1142.
    ``A. But I did some justifying in signing the affidavit, so--
    ``Q. Justifying--does the word `rationalizing' apply as well?
    ``A. Rationalize, yes.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, 
Part One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 925.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix C

    House Managers implied that when the President allegedly told John 
Podesta Ms. Lewinsky threatened him, the President was lying. But 
Monica Lewinsky did write a threatening letter to President Clinton.
    ``If you believe the aides testified truthfully to the grand jury 
about what the President told them about his relationship, the 
President told them many falsehoods, absolute falsehoods. So when the 
President described them under oath to the grand jury as truths, he 
lied and committed the crime of perjury. One example of this comes from 
Deputy Chief John Podesta . . . [a]nother is Sidney Blumenthal. His 
testimony was that on January 23 the President told him that . . . 
Lewinsky threatened him and said that she would tell people that they 
had had an affair . . .''--House Manager McCollum, Congressional 
Record, January 15, 1999, Page S266.
    ``Q. You mentioned that in that July 3rd letter that you sent to 
the President through Betty you made a reference to the fact that you 
might have to explain things to your parents. What did you mean by 
that? . . . Were you meaning to threaten the President that you were 
going to tell, for example, your father about the sexual relationship 
with the President?
    ``A. Yes and no.''--Grand Jury Testimony of Monica Lewinsky, Part 
One; Independent Counsel Appendices, Page 807.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix D

    There was much debate about the consequences of calling live 
witnesses. The President's lawyers argued that calling witnesses would 
require them to engage in extensive discovery and would significantly 
stretch out the trial. It is relevant in evaluating that claim to look 
at the impeachments of Judge Nixon and Judge Alcee Hastings. In both of 
those cases, the Judges' attorneys were given extensive discovery, 
including Justice Department files, to prepare their defense. See 
letter of Senator Wyche Fowler, Chairman of the Senate Impeachment 
Trial Committee, and letter of Professor Terence Anderson, University 
of Miami School of Law, below:

                                               U.S. Senate,
                                     Washington, DC, July 18, 1989.
John C. Keeney,
Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of 
        Justice, Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Keeney: As Chairman of the Senate Impeachment Trial 
Committee on the Articles of Impeachment against Judge Nixon, I write 
to request the Department's assistance in the Committee's efforts to 
assure that Judge Nixon receives a fair trial in the Senate. The 
Committee has determined that it would make a useful contribution to 
the trial process if the Department were willing to permit the 
Committee, through its staff, to review the documents (excluding grand 
jury materials governed by Rule 6(e)) in the possession of the 
Department, including those possessed by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, that were requested by Judge Nixon in his June 1, 1989 
letter to the Attorney General, which was the subject of your response 
on June 21, 1989.
    The review would be consistent with that conducted in the case of 
the Hastings impeachment matter. That is, the focus of the review would 
be to determine if there is evidence that the investigations were 
conducted in a manner intended to mislead a court or trier of fact as 
to Judge Nixon's guilt or innocence. In the event that it is determined 
that particular documents should properly be made part of the pending 
impeachment proceedings, and accordingly made available to the parties 
for use at trial, the committee would hear from the Department prior to 
disclosing any documents that you believe contain particularly 
sensitive matters, so that we may address any continuing concerns that 
you have. No documents or portions of documents would be made available 
to the parties without the consent of the Department.
    Your expeditious response to this request would be most helpful to 
the committee in attempting to complete discovery by July 31st.
            Sincerely,
                                                  Wyche Fowler, Jr.
                                 ______
                                 
                     The University of Miami School of Law,
                                Coral Gables, FL, January 28, 1999.
Hon. Carl Levin,
U.S. Senate.

                   Discovery Precedents From Hastings

    Dear Senator Levin: Ms. Linda Gustitus asked that I describe the 
process by which and the materials to which I was given access as 
counsel for then Judge Hastings during the impeachment trial 
proceedings before the United States Senate. After the matter was 
referred to an Impeachment Trial Committee, I submitted requests for 
production of documents to the House, to the Investigating Committee of 
the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and the Justice Department. Over the initial objections 
of the House Managers, at the ``request'' of the Impeachment Trial 
Committee I received documents from all but the Justice Department. In 
lieu of direct production, the Impeachment Trial Committee examined the 
sensitive Justice Department materials to determine what should be 
supplied. I was also permitted to take at least three discovery 
depositions. The proceedings that resulted in this production are 
reported in Report of the Senate Impeachment Trial Committee on the 
Articles of Impeachment Against Judge Alcee L. Hastings, S. Hrg. 101-
194, Pt. I (Pretrial Matters).
    By way of illustrations I enclose an appendix to a memorandum that 
I submitted to the Impeachment Trial Committee. That appendix describes 
in some detail the materials that I received from the FBI and my 
estimate that in the aggregate the production amounted to about 16,000. 
The enclosed copy was reproduced from S. Hrg. 101-194, Pt. I at 433-
436. Please let me know if I can be of further assistance.
            Sincerely,
                                       Terence J. Anderson.
                                                  Professor of Law.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix E

    Many of us in the Senate thought the House of Representatives 
failed to meet its responsibilities by not calling witnesses before the 
House Judiciary Committee. A review of impeachments shows that in every 
impeachment but the one (where the subject of the impeachment was 
mentally incompetent and the House relied on the record of his 
decisions as a judge), the House called fact witnesses. According to 
information obtained by my staff from the Congressional Research 
Service, there have been 16 impeachments by the House. Fourteen of 
those impeachments have resulted in trials in the Senate; two did not 
because the impeached officials resigned.
    Fifteen of those impeachments had fact witnesses in the House; one 
didn't. That was the case of Judge Pickering. He was impeached for 
being mentally incapacitated. There were charges of drunkenness and 
``ungentlemanly language'' in the courtroom. The articles against him, 
however, all dealt with his rulings and decisions that ``proved'' he 
was mentally incompetent. During the House inquiry, a number of 
affidavits were presented.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix F

    Independent counsel Kenneth Starr intervened in the Senate 
impeachment trial by obtaining a court order addressed to Monica 
Lewinsky requiring her to meet privately with House Managers, based on 
a motion and ex parte hearing with no notice to the Senate counsel or 
White House counsel. The independent counsel then mischaracterized his 
own action in seeking that order, describing it as seeking an 
``interpretation'' rather than an ``order''.
    See the letters to Kenneth Starr, Robert Bittman, Jacob Stein, & 
Robert Bittman; the Emergency Motion on Immunity Agreement; the letter 
to Congressman Henry Hyde; the letter to Sen. Daschle; Congressman 
Hyde's press release; the order of Judge Norma Holloway Johnson and the 
transcript of Mr. Starr's remarks as follow:
                                            Washington, DC,
                                                  January 21, 1999.
Hon. Kenneth W. Starr,
Office of Independent Counsel,
Washington, DC.

Re Interview of Monica Lewinsky
    Dear Independent Counsel Starr: I am writing to you as the Lead 
Manager of the Managers of the Impeachment Trial of William Jefferson 
Clinton, currently underway in the United States Senate. We are in the 
process of selecting witnesses for testimony in these proceedings. The 
attorneys for Monica Lewinsky have declined to make her available for 
an interview.
    We have reviewed a copy of Ms. Lewinsky's Immunity Agreement. 
Pursuant to paragraph 1(c) of that Agreement, it would appear that she 
is required to submit to interviews and debriefings if so requested by 
the Office of Independent Counsel.
    We would like to arrange an interview with Ms. Lewinsky prior to 
any such testimony. We would be happy to accommodate her wishes as to 
the precise time and location of that interview. However, it is 
important that this interview be scheduled to take place on the 
earliest possible date, specifically Friday, Saturday, or Sunday. Your 
assistance with this interview will be appreciated.
    Thank you for your prompt attention.
            Sincerely,
                                     Henry H. Hyde,
                                  On Behalf of the Managers
                                          on the Part of the House.
                                 ______
                                 
                             Law Offices of Plato Cacheris,
                                  Washington, DC, January 21, 1999.
Robert J. Bittman, Esquire,
Deputy Independent Counsel, Office of the Independent Counsel, 
        Washington, DC.
    Dear Bob: In your call today you mentioned that the managers 
requested Ms. Lewinsky's cooperation by way of an interview. As I told 
you, we believe it is inappropriate for Ms. Lewinsky to be placed in 
the position of a partisan--meeting with one side and not the other--in 
this unique proceeding. Therefore, we have recommended against 
interviews with either side.
            Sincerely,
                                   Jacob A. Stein.
                                   Plato Cacheris.
                                 ______
                                 
                                       Independent Counsel,
                                  Washington, DC, January 21, 1999.
Jacob A. Stein, Esq.,
Stein, Mitchell & Mezines,
 Washington, DC.
Plato Cacheris, Esq.,
Law Offices of Plato Cacheris,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Jake and Plato: Pursuant to her Immunity Agreement with this 
Office, we hereby request that Monica Lewinsky meet for an interview 
with the House of Representatives' Impeachment Managers this Friday, 
Saturday, or Sunday, January 22, 23, or 24, 1999.
    As you will recall, both parties contemplated congressional 
proceedings at the time we entered into the Immunity Agreement. The 
Agreement specifically requires Ms. Lewinsky to ``testify truthfully . 
. . in any . . . congressional proceedings.'' It further requires Ms. 
Lewinsky to ``make herself available for any interviews upon reasonable 
request,'' and stipulates that these interviews may include 
``representatives of any other institutions as the OIC may require.''
    While I understand Ms. Lewinsky's misgivings, I must disagree with 
one statement in your letter to me today: your assertion that 
submitting to an interview would make Ms. Lewinsky into a partisan. The 
Managers are acting on behalf of the House of Representatives as a 
whole, not on behalf of a political party. Their task is constitutional 
in nature.
    Please feel free to call me if you have any questions.
            Sincerely,
                                         Robert J. Bittman,
                                        Deputy Independent Counsel.
                                 ______
                                 
                                 Stein, Mitchell & Mezines,
                                  Washington, DC, January 22, 1999.
Robert J. Bittman, Esquire,
Office of the Independent Counsel,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Bob: 
    1. We have your January 21, 1999 letter.
    2. The Agreement does not require Ms. Lewinsky to be interviewed by 
the House Managers or any Congressional body.
    3. Paragraph 1.C. of the Agreement states: ``Ms. Lewinsky will be 
fully debriefed concerning her knowledge of and participation in any 
activities within the OIC's jurisdiction. This debriefing will be 
conducted by the OIC, including attorneys, law enforcement agents, and 
representatives of any other institutions as the OIC may require. Ms. 
Lewinsky will make herself available for any interviews upon reasonable 
requests.''
    4. This paragraph deals with OIC debriefings, not OIC's acting as 
an agent for others.
    5. The Senate itself has provided its own rules for witness 
interviews. As we understand them, there first must be a deposition 
with equal access. As of now the Senate has not voted for depositions.
    6. Ms. Lewinsky will, of course, respond to a subpoena to appear 
and testify before the Senate. Yesterday, we raised with you the issue 
of immunity for any proposed congressional testimony. You opined that 
your office could grant such immunity in conformance with Title 18 
U.S.C. Sec. Sec. 6002, 6005. It is our understanding that only the 
Senate by majority vote can do that. We would appreciate your supplying 
your legal authority for your position.
            Sincerely,
                                   Jabob A. Stein.
                                   Plato Cacheris.
                                 ______
                                 
  [In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
                         Misc. No. 99-  (NHJ)]

                      In Re Grand Jury Proceedings

  emergency motion of the united states of america for enforcement of 
                           immunity agreement
    The United States of America, by Kenneth W. Starr, Independent 
Counsel, respectfully submits this motion for an order requiring Ms. 
Lewinsky to comply with the terms of her Immunity Agreement (the 
``Agreement'') with the Office of the Independent Counsel (``OIC''). 
Ms. Lewinsky has refused an OIC request that she be debriefed by the 
House of Representatives, as required by the Agreement. The United 
States respectfully requests that this Court orders Ms. Lewinsky to 
comply with the Agreement by allowing herself to be debriefed.
I. Factual background
    As this Court is no doubt aware, the United States Senate is 
currently conducting an Impeachment Trial of the President of the 
United States. According to public reports, it is expected that the 
House will be required to submit to the Senate its motion to call 
witnesses as early as Monday, January 25. Again according to public 
reports, some potential witnesses have spoken with the House Managers 
as the Managers attempt to determine which witnesses should be 
mentioned in their motion to the Senate.
    On January 21, 1999, House Judiciary Committee Chairman Henry J. 
Hyde, on behalf of the House of Representatives, as represented by its 
duly-appointed Managers, asked for the OIC's assistance in having Ms. 
Lewinsky debriefed by the House. See letter from Henry J. Hyde to 
Kenneth W. Starr (Jan. 21, 1999) (Attachment A). The House stressed 
that it needs this debriefing to occur no later than Sunday, January 
24.
    That same day, the OIC sent a letter to Ms. Lewinsky's counsel 
requesting that Ms. Lewinsky allow herself to be debriefed by the House 
Managers. See letter from Robert J. Bittman, Deputy Independent 
Counsel, to Jacob A. Stein, Esq. and Plato Cacheris, Esq. (Jan. 21, 
1999) (Attachment C). At approximately 1:20 p.m. this afternoon, Ms. 
Lewinsky informed the OIC that she does not intend to comply with this 
request. See letter from Jacob A. Stein and Plato Cacheris to Robert J. 
Bittman (Jan. 22, 1999) (Attachment D).
II. The immunity agreement plainly requires Ms. Lewinsky to be 
        debriefed by any institution that the OIC specifies
    Ordinary contract law principles govern immunity agreements. See In 
re Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, Misc. No. 98-59 (NHJ), slip op. at 
12 (D.D.C. May 1, 1998) (under seal) (``Courts generally interpret 
immunity and proffer agreements, like plea agreements, under principles 
of contract law.''), appeal dismissed sub nom. In re Sealed Case, 144 
F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (per curiam); accord United States v. Black, 
776 F.2d 1321, 1326 (6th Cir. 1985) (``Like a plea agreement, an 
immunity agreement is contractual in nature and may be interpreted 
according to contract law principles.''); United States v. Irvine, 756 
F.2d 708, 710 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (``Generally speaking, a 
cooperation-immunity agreement is contractual) in nature and subject to 
contract law standards.''); United States v. Hembree, 754 F.2d 314, 317 
(10th Cir. 1985) (characterizing an immunity agreement as ``simply a 
contract'').
    Under contract law, an agreement is interpreted according to its 
plain terms. See Nicholson v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 180, 191 
(1993). The operative portion of the Immunity Agreement states: ``C. 
Ms. Lewinsky will be fully debriefed concerning her knowledge of and 
participation in any activities within the OIC's jurisdiction. This 
debriefing will be conducted by the OIC, including attorneys, law 
enforcement agents, and representatives of any other institutions as 
the OIC may require. Ms. Lewinsky will make herself available for any 
interviews upon reasonable request.'' Immunity Agreement para. 1.C 
(emphasis added) (Attachment E). This provision follows paragraph 1.B, 
which expressly requires Ms. Lewinsky to ``testify truthfully . . . in 
. . . congressional proceedings.''
    By the plain terms of the Agreement, Ms. Lewinsky has agreed to be 
debriefed by representatives of any institution, when so required by 
the OIC. She is also required to ``make herself available for any 
interviews upon reasonable request.'' The duly-appointed House Managers 
represent the House of Representatives, which plainly is an 
institution. The OIC has unambiguously requested that Ms. Lewinsky 
submit to each debriefing. Accordingly, Ms. Lewinsky must allow herself 
to be debriefed by the House Managers or she will have violated the 
Agreement.
    To be sure, Ms. Lewinsky has the right to have her ``debriefing . . 
. conducted by the OIC.'' The OIC, of course, is fully willing to 
conduct these debriefings, if Ms. Lewinsky so desires. The suggestion 
in her counsel's letter that this provision is void if the OIC is 
``acting as an agent for other,'' Attachment D at para. 4, is contrary 
to the Agreement, as there is no such limitation on Ms. Lewinsky's 
duties. A party to an agreement may not invent clauses to a contract 
that are not contained therein.
    In any event, the OIC is not acting as an agent for the House 
Managers. The OIC has its own continuing duty to provide the House with 
information relating to impeachment. See 28 U.S.C. Sec. 595(c).
    Ms. Lewinsky's counsel's other suggestion--that a debriefing would 
be contrary to Senate Rules, see Attachment D at para. 5--is equally 
without merit. Senate Resolution 16 (106th Cong.) states, in relevant 
part: ``If the Senate agrees to allow either the House or the President 
to call witnesses, the witnesses shall first be deposed and the Senate 
shall decide after deposition which witnesses shall testify, pursuant 
to the impeachment rules.'' Although it is plain that depositions may 
not be conducted absent a vote of the Senate, nothing in this 
resolution restricts the ability of the House to debrief witnesses in a 
nondeposition setting. Indeed, it would be strange for the Senate to 
prohibit the House and the President from doing the investigation 
necessary to determine whether they wish to call witnesses and which 
witnesses to list in their motions.
III. This court should grant an order requiring Ms. Lewinsky to comply 
        with the immunity agreement or forfeit its protection
    Under the Agreement, this Court has the authority to determine 
whether Ms. Lewinsky has ``violated any provision of this Agreement.'' 
Immunity Agreement para. 30. ``[A] declaratory judgment will ordinarily 
be granted only when it will either serve a useful purpose in 
clarifying the legal relations in issue or terminate and afford relief 
from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving right to the 
proceeding.'' Tierney v. Schweiker, 718 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, a declaratory 
judgment will resolve the uncertainty arising from this controversy 
between the OIC and Ms. Lewinsky by settling whether she has the right 
to refuse to be debriefed without forfeiting the protections of the 
Agreement.
    Indeed, declaratory judgment is a common remedy when a party to a 
contract intends conduct that may be a breach: `` `(A) party to a 
contract is not compelled to wait until he has committed an act which 
the other party asserts will constitute a breach, but may seek relief 
by declaratory judgment and have the controversy adjudicated in order 
that he may avoid the risk of damages or other untoward consequence.' 
'' (Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc.) 
331 F.2d 1000, 1002 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (quoting Keener Oil & Gas v. 
Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 190 F.2d 985, 989 (10th Cir. 1951)); 
see Gilbert, Segall & Young v. Bank of Montreal, 785 F. Supp. 453. 462 
(S.D.N.Y. 1992); Fine v. Property Damage Appraisers, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 
1304, 1309-10 (E.D. La. 1975). Accordingly, this Court has the power to 
issue a declaratory judgment before Ms. Lewinsky's actions become 
irreversible.
IV. Conclusion
    The Immunity Agreement plainly requires that Ms. Lewinsky allow 
herself to be debriefed by any institution at the request of the OIC. 
Ms. Lewinsky has the right to insist that the OIC conduct the 
debriefing, but she must comply with the plain terms of the Immunity 
Agreement. Accordingly, the United States respectfully requests that 
this Court enter an order requiring Ms. Lewinsky to submit to 
debriefing by the House.
    The Senate's schedule requires the House to submit its motion to 
call witnesses as early as Monday, and the House has stressed its need 
to debrief Ms. Lewinsky this weekend. Accordingly, the United States 
respectfully requests that this Court act on this motion as an 
emergency matter. Specifically, we request a hearing on this matter 
today.
    Respectfully submitted,
                                   Kenneth W. Starr,
                                           Independent Counsel.
                                   Robert J. Bittman,
                                           Deputy Independent Counsel.
                                   Joseph M. Ditkoff,
                                           Associate Independent 
                                               Counsel.
                                   Richard C. Killough,
                                           Assistant Independent 
                                               Counsel.
                                 ______
                                 
                                            Washington, DC,
                                                  January 23, 1999.
Hon. Henry J. Hyde,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Manager Hyde: We understand that the Office of Independent 
Counsel, on behalf of the House Managers, sought a court order to 
compel Ms. Lewinsky to submit to an interview with the Managers in 
preparation for her possible testimony. We further understand that 
Chief Judge Norma Holloway Johnson has granted the order sought by the 
Independent Counsel.
    As you know, Senate Resolution 16, which was passed by a 100-0 vote 
just over two weeks ago, expressly deferred any consideration or action 
related to additional witness testimony until after opening 
presentations, a question-and-answer period and an affirmative vote to 
compel such testimony. These actions by the Managers, undertaken 
without notice to the Senate or the President's Counsel, raise profound 
questions of fundamental fairness and undermine the ability of this 
body to control the discovery procedures that will take place under the 
imprimatur of its authority.
    In light of these concerns, we ask that you withdraw any and all 
requests to Mr. Starr that he assist your efforts to interview Ms. 
Lewinsky. The Senate, in a matter of days, will have an opportunity to 
formally address this issue pursuant to the procedures established by 
Senate Resolution 16. Moreover, we insist that you take no action 
related to the proposed interview of any witness until such time as the 
Senate has given you the authority to do so.
            Sincerely,
                                                        Harry Reid.
    [Also signed by 43 Senators.]
                                 ______
                                 
                                            Washington, DC,
                                                  January 23, 1999.
Hon. Tom Daschle,
Democratic Leader, U.S. Senate,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Democratic Leader: I am in receipt of your letter of today 
expressing your concern with the House of Representatives' request to 
interview Monica Lewinsky.
    It has always been the position of the House Managers that a full 
trial with the benefit of relevant witnesses is in the best interest of 
the Senate and the American people. Representatives of President 
Clinton and many Senators have publicly stated that they want the 
Senate to preclude the testimony of witnesses. Many other Senators have 
made it clear that they prefer the witness lists for both sides to be 
sharply focused and limited to only the most relevant witnesses. The 
Managers have been mindful of these Senators' concerns.
    It is clear that the two most important witnesses in this trial are 
President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky. Yesterday, I wrote to Majority 
Leader Lott and you to express the Managers' willingness to participate 
in the fair examination of the President if the Senate chooses to 
invite him to testify. The presentation of the President's counsel 
ended just two days ago. We are in the process of evaluating that 
presentation and determining what witnesses we will request the Senate 
to call. We believe that interviewing Ms. Lewinsky will help us make 
this determination. Counsel for the President may have already 
interviewed witnesses or may wish to interview witnesses they will 
propose to the Senate. That is their prerogative. The Senate has 
required us to submit a proffer of anticipated testimony of any 
proposed witnesses. Interviews of potential witnesses will assist the 
parties in providing the Senate with informative proffers.
    The House of Representatives has not violated S. Res. 16. When the 
House passed H. Res. 10 appointing the Mangers, it authorized that the 
Managers may ``in connection with the preparation and the conduct of 
the trial, exhibit the articles of impeachment to the Senate and take 
all other actions necessary, which may include . . . sending for 
persons and papers . . .'' Implicit in this authority is the ability to 
conduct interviews and gather additional information relevant to the 
articles of impeachment.
    The Managers, who represent the House of Representatives, retain 
powers separate and apart from the Senate. The Managers are not, just 
as the President's Counsel are not, an office or subset of the Senate. 
The Managers, like the President's Counsel, may conduct activities, 
such as further investigation and legal research, that are not 
specifically authorized by the Senate.
    Senate Resolution 16 does not prohibit the Managers from conducting 
further investigation or interviews of witnesses. If the resolution was 
intended to restrict the Managers in this way, we believe that it would 
violate principles of bicameralism, the ability of each House to 
establish its own rules of procedure, and would therefore be an 
unconstitutional infringement on the prerogatives of the House.
    Implicit in the right of the Managers to report to the House 
amendments to articles of impeachment, is the right of the Managers to 
receive and evaluate additional information. For example, if the 
Managers received additional exculpatory or inculpatory information, 
they could file amendments to the articles of impeachment in the House.
    Senate Resolution 16 set a schedule for deciding whether to depose 
witnesses. The decision to depose witnesses is subject to a request 
from the House Managers. The House Managers have decided that they need 
to talk with Ms. Lewinsky before making a recommendation to the Senate 
to depose her. The action of the House Managers is not unusual. It is 
not unfair, and it is not contrary to the rules of the Senate.
    With all due respect to the Senate, the rules and the 
constitutional principles of bicameralism do not require that the House 
obtain the permission of the Senate merely to conduct an interview of a 
potential witness. A decision to merely interview a witness as opposed 
to conducting a deposition, does not interfere with the Senate's 
ability to control the procedures set forth under S. Res. 16.
            Sincerely,
                                     Henry J. Hyde,
                           On behalf of the Managers on the
                              Part of the House of Representatives.
                                 ______
                                 
 [From the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, 
                        Henry J. Hyde, Chairman]

                  Managers' Response to Judge's Ruling

    (Washington, D.C.)--Paul McNulty, chief spokesman for the House 
Managers, made the following statement today following Judge Johnson's 
ruling that Monica Lewinsky must cooperate with the managers' request 
for an interview, in keeping with her immunity agreement:
    ``Monica Lewinsky received extraordinary protection in exchange for 
her truthful testimony. Judge Johnson ruled that she has an obligation 
to cooperate in the search for truth.
    ``Ms. Lewinsky's testimony has never been more important than it is 
now. In the last four days, the White House has challenged the 
reliability of her testimony in a number of key instances relating to 
her conversations with the President and Ms. Currie.
    ``Ms. Lewinsky can resolve some of these crucial conflicts, and 
House Managers have a responsibility to interview her before deciding 
to call her as a witness. This is Lawyering 101--any good lawyer would 
talk to a witness before deciding to put her on the witness stand. When 
the House of Representatives appointed the Managers, it also granted 
them the investigative authority necessary to find the truth.
    ``The White House's protests are psuedo-objections designed to 
divert attention from the President's behavior.''
                                 ______
                                 
  [In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, 
                         Misc. No. 99-32 (NHJ)]

                      In re Grand Jury Proceedings

                                 order
    Upon consideration of the Emergency Motion of the United States of 
America for Enforcement of Immunity Agreement, it is hereby ordered 
that the Motion is granted. It is further ordered that Monica S. 
Lewinsky allow herself to be debriefed by the House Managers, to be 
conducted by the Office of the Independent Counsel if she so requests, 
or forfeit her protections under the Immunity Agreement between Ms. 
Lewinsky and the OIC.

January 23, 1999.
                                    Norma Holloway Johnson,
                                                       Chief Judge.
                                 ______
                                 

          Excerpt from CBS Radio Transcript, January 24, 1999

 kenneth starr delivers remarks concerning the upcoming interview with 
                   monica lewinsky; washington, d.c.
    QUESTION: Sir, people are saying on Capitol Hill that you're trying 
to influence the trial by bringing back Monica, before they had a 
chance to vote.
    What do you say about that?
    STARR: Well, as I indicated, we had a request from the Lead 
Manager, Chairman Hyde, it was a formal request. And we responded as I 
felt that we were obligated to do to that request. And we then took 
what I felt was the appropriate action and we went to court.
    I want to make it very clear that Chief Judge Johnson has only 
interpreted the agreement between Ms. Lewinsky, who's advised by her 
very able lawyers, and our office. She did not direct an order in any 
sense other than to interpret the meaning of the agreement, which we 
asked her to interpret. So, I want it to be very, very clear that the 
judge was simply acting at our request to interpret the terms of the 
agreement, which we believe are quite clear.
    QUESTION: Senator Harkin said yesterday that Judge Johnson may not 
have acted, you know, constitutionally. Do you have any comment on 
that?
    STARR: Well we think that we have taken the appropriate action in 
going to the court and the court acted appropriately in interpreting 
the agreement, which is all that she did. So if there is an issue, the 
issue has to be one that's entrusted to the wisdom of the Senate. And 
their relationship with the House managers.
    But from our standpoint, the agreement we felt was clear, we asked 
the judge to determine whether our interpretation of the agreement was 
clear. And she has issued her ruling.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix G

    Although the House Managers argued strenuously about the need to 
call witnesses in the Senate trial, their position in the House of 
Representatives on the same subject was the opposite.
    ``Well, they've already testified . . . I don't think we need to 
reinvent the wheel. To keep calling people to reiterate what they've 
already said under oath.''--Rep. Henry Hyde, CNN, October 10, 1998.
    ``I don't really believe that we need more live testimony from 
those type of witnesses. We have sworn testimony from Monica Lewinsky, 
from Betty Currie, from all the principal players. We also have sworn 
testimony from corroborating witnesses to their testimony . . . And--
and . . . I don't think we need any former witnesses. I don't think we 
need to bring any in.''--Rep. Bill McCollum, NBC ``Saturday Today'', 
November 28, 1998.
    ``Bringing in witnesses to rehash testimony that's already 
concretely in the record would be a waste of time and serve no purpose 
at all.''--Rep. George Gekas, New York Times, November 6, 1998.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix H

    Although the House Managers argued strenuously about the need to 
call witnesses in the Senate trial, they also claimed that the record 
conclusively proved the President's guilt.
    ``A reasonable and impartial review of the record as it presently 
exists demands nothing less than a guilty verdict.''--House Manager 
Bryant, Congressional Record, January 14, 1999, Page S232.
    ``Finally, before turning to that merger of the law and the facts, 
which I believe will illustrate conclusively that this President has 
committed and ought to be convicted on perjury and obstruction of 
justice . . .''--House Manager Barr, Congressional Record, January 15, 
1999, Page S274.
    ``[L]adies and gentlemen of the Senate, there are conclusive facts 
here that support a conviction.''--House Manager Bryant, Congressional 
Record, February 8, 1999, Page S1358.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix I

    At times, the House Managers took different and oft-time 
conflicting positions on the need to call witnesses in the Senate 
trial.
    ``I submit that the state of the evidence is such that unless and 
until the President has the opportunity to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses like Ms. Lewinsky, and himself, to testify if he desires, 
there could not be any doubt of his guilt on the facts.''--House 
Manager Bryant, Congressional Record, January 14, 1999, Page S232.
    ``[I]f we had Mr. Jordan on the witness stand--which I hope to be 
able to call Mr. Jordan--you would need to probe where his loyalties 
lie, listen to the tone of his voice, look into his eyes and determine 
the truthfulness of his statements. You must decide whether he is 
telling the truth or withholding information.''--House Manager 
Hutchinson, Congressional Record, January 14, 1999, Page S234.
    ``The case against the President rests to a great extent on whether 
or not you believe Monica Lewinsky. But it is also based on the sworn 
testimony of Vernon Jordan, Betty Currie, Sidney Blumenthal, John 
Podesta and corroborating witnesses. Time and again, the President says 
one thing and they say something entirely different. . . . But if you 
have serious doubts about the truthfulness of any of these witnesses, 
I, again, as all my colleagues do, encourage you to bring them in 
here.''--House Manager McCollum, Congressional Record, January 15, 
1999, Page S266.
    ``[O]n the record, the weight of the evidence, taken from what we 
have given you today, what you can read in all these books back here . 
. . I don't know what the witnesses will say, but, I assume if they are 
consistent, they'll say the same that's in here.''--House Manager 
McCollum, Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S266-S267.
    ``[N]o one in this Chamber at this juncture does not know all the 
facts that are pertinent to this case. That is a magnificent 
accomplishment on the part of the managers.''--House Manager Gekas, 
Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S267.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix J

    The House of Representatives articles were intended to charge 
President Clinton with specific crimes.
    ``[T]his honorable Senate must do the right thing. It must listen 
to the evidence; it must determine whether William Jefferson Clinton 
repeatedly broke our criminal laws and thus broke his trust with the 
people.''--House Manager Sensenbrenner, Congressional Record, January 
14, 1999, Page S227.
    ``Moreover, in engaging in this course of conduct, referring here 
to the words of the obstruction statute found at section 1503 of the 
Criminal Code, the President's actions constituted an endeavor to 
influence or impede the due administration of justice in that he was 
attempting to prevent the plaintiff in the Jones case from having a 
`free and fair opportunity to learn what she may learn concerning the 
material facts surrounding her claim'. These acts by the President also 
constituted an endeavor to `corruptly persuade another person with the 
intent to influence the testimony they might give in an official 
proceeding'. Such are the elements of tampering with witnesses found at 
section 1512 of the Federal Criminal Code.''--House Manager Barr, 
Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S274-S275.
    ``Under both sections of the Federal Criminal Code, that is, 1503, 
obstruction, and 1512, obstruction in the form of witness tampering, 
the President's conduct constituted a Federal crime and satisfies the 
elements of those statutes.''--House Manager Barr, Congressional 
Record, January 15, 1999, Page S275.
    ``The evidence, however, clearly establishes that the President's 
statement constitutes perjury, in violation of section 1623 of the U.S. 
Federal Criminal Code for the simple reason the only realistic way Ms. 
Lewinsky could get out of having to testify based on her affidavit. 
There was no other way it could have happened. The President knew this. 
Ms. Lewinsky knew this. And the President's testimony on this point is 
perjury within the clear meaning of the Federal perjury statute. It was 
willful, it was knowing, it was material, and it was false.''--House 
Manager Barr, Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S275.
    ``Please keep in mind also, it is not required that the target of 
the defendant's actions actually testify falsely. In fact, the witness 
tampering statute can be violated even when there is no proceeding 
pending at the time the defendant acted in suggesting testimony. As the 
cases discussed by Manager Cannon demonstrate, for a conviction under 
either section 1503, obstruction, or 1512, obstruction by witness 
tampering, it is necessary only to show it was possible the target of 
the defendant's actions might be called as a witness. That element has 
been more than met under the facts of this case.''--House Manager Barr, 
Congressional Record, January 15, 1999, Page S276.
    ``In my opening statement before this body, I outlined the four 
elements of perjury: An oath, intent, falsity, materiality. In this 
case, all those elements have been met.''--House Manager Chabot, 
Congressional Record, February 8, 1999, Page S1341.
    ``In the past month, you have heard much about the Constitution; 
and about the law. Probably more than you'd prefer; in a dizzying 
recitation of the U.S. Criminal Code: 18 U.S.C. 1503. 18 U.S.C. 1505. 
18 U.S.C. 1512. 18 U.S.C. 1621. 18 U.S.C. 1623. Tampering. Perjury. 
Obstruction. That is a lot to digest, but these are real laws and they 
are applicable to these proceedings and to this President.''--House 
Manager Barr, Congressional Record, February 8, 1999, Page S1342.
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix K

    Though written in his diary almost 200 hundred years ago, John 
Quincy Adams' thoughts on the impeachment of Justice Samuel P. Chase, 
who was acquitted, are relevant to the impeachment of President 
Clinton.
    On the day that Justice Chase was acquitted in 1805, John Quincy 
Adams wrote the following:
    ``. . . This was a party prosecution, and is issued in the 
unexpected and total disappointment of those by whom it was brought 
forward. It has exhibited the Senate of the United States fulfilling 
the most important purpose of its institution . . . It has proved that 
a sense of justice is yet strong enough to overpower the furies of 
factions; but it has, at the same time, shown the wisdom and necessity 
of that provision in the Constitution which requires the concurrence of 
two-thirds for conviction upon impeachments.''
                                 ______
                                 

                               Appendix L

 additional statement of senator carl levin regarding the independent 
                                counsel
    Mr. President, four and one half years ago, the Special Court under 
the independent counsel law appointed Kenneth Starr to investigate 
certain specific and credible allegations concerning President 
Clinton's involvement in the Madison Guaranty Savings and Loan 
Association of Little Rock, Arkansas. Three and half years later--and 
after what appears to be the most thorough criminal investigation of a 
sitting President, Mr. Starr was unable to find any criminal wrongdoing 
on the part of the President in what came to be known as 
``Whitewater.'' A similar conclusion was reached by Mr. Starr with 
respect to additional investigations assigned to Mr. Starr along the 
way--namely, allegations with respect to the White House use of FBI 
files and the discharge of White House employees from the White House 
Travel Office.
    A year ago Mr. Starr's investigation was coming to an end. That's 
when Linda Tripp walked through Mr. Starr's door with promises of taped 
phone conversations between Ms. Tripp and Monica Lewinsky about Ms. 
Lewinsky's sexual relationship with President Clinton. And what was the 
alleged crime? That President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky were about to 
lie about their relationship--if they were asked about it by the 
attorneys for Paula Jones in her sexual harassment case against 
President Clinton. Mr. Starr had to know that the relationship between 
President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky had been a consensual one. Mr. 
Starr had to know that, because Ms. Tripp was informed by Ms. Lewinsky 
of every aspect of her relationship with President Clinton. And at this 
point--January 12, 1998--neither Monica Lewinsky nor President Clinton 
had been deposed.
    I am convinced that no ordinary federal prosecutor, if confronted 
with the same situation involving a private citizen, would have pursued 
this case. But Mr. Starr was no ordinary federal prosecutor. Without 
jurisdiction with respect to these matters, he immediately gave Ms. 
Tripp immunity in exchange for access to her tapes, and he wired her to 
tape a private luncheon conversation with Ms. Lewinsky. Shortly after 
Mr. Starr wired Ms. Tripp, he confronted Ms. Lewinsky and, according to 
her, threatened her with 27 years in prison and the prosecution of her 
mother in order to get her cooperation and to tape Betty Currie, the 
President, and/or Vernon Jordan. Mr. Starr brought his enormous 
criminal investigative resources to bear on testimony yet to be given 
in a civil lawsuit involving a consensual, sexual relationship.
    At the time Ms. Lewinsky was threatened by Mr. Starr, her affidavit 
in the Jones case had not been filed. She was still in a position to 
retrieve it or amend it. Also, President Clinton had not been deposed. 
He had not given his testimony in the Paula Jones suit. In effect, Mr. 
Starr and his agents lay in wait--waiting for the President to be 
surprised at the Jones deposition with information about Monica 
Lewinsky. And how did that information about Monica Lewinsky get in the 
hands of the Jones attorneys? Ms. Tripp gave them the information. And 
she was able to do that even though she was under an immunity 
arrangement with Mr. Starr, because--as Mr. Starr acknowledged to the 
House Judiciary Committee under questioning--Mr. Starr's agents never 
directed Ms. Tripp to keep her information confidential, even though 
Mr. Starr had a major concern that the Lewinsky matter would leak to 
the press. Mr. Starr's agents did not tell Ms. Tripp not to talk to the 
Jones attorneys or anyone else in order to ensure that the story would 
not leak to the press.
    So the enormous criminal investigative resources of the federal 
government were brought to bear on the President of the United States 
to catch him by surprise in a future deposition in a civil proceeding 
on a matter peripheral to the lawsuit, prior to any of the suspected 
unlawful conduct.
    Once the President testified in that civil suit, Mr. Starr convened 
a grand jury to investigate the truthfulness of Mr. Clinton's 
testimony. Again, using the virtually unlimited resources of the 
federal government with respect to a criminal investigation, Mr. Starr 
called countless witnesses before the grand jury--recalling numerous 
witnesses multiple times. Betty Currie testified on 5 different 
occasions; so did Vernon Jordan. Monica Lewinsky testified 3 times and 
was interviewed over 20 separate times. I don't believe any regular 
prosecutor would have invested the time and money and resources in the 
kind of investigation that Kenneth Starr did.
    At the end, Mr. Starr wrote a report arguing for impeachment to the 
House of Representatives. He didn't just impartially forward evidence 
he thought may demonstrate possible impeachable offenses.
    The Starr report spared nothing. Lacking good judgment and balance, 
the Starr report contained a large amount of salacious detail, and 
skipped over or dismissed important exculpatory evidence, such as 
Monica Lewinsky's statement that no one asked her to lie and no one 
promised her a job for her silence. Mr. Starr violated the standards 
enunciated by Judge Sirica when he addressed the status of the grand 
jury report in the Watergate matter. In that case, Judge Sirica wrote 
in granting Leon Jaworski, the Watergate prosecutor, the right to 
forward grand jury information to the House of Representatives:
    ``It draws no accusatory conclusions. . . . It contains no 
recommendations, advice or statements that infringe on the prerogatives 
of other branches of government. . . . It renders no moral or social 
judgments. The Report is a simple and straightforward compilation of 
information gathered by the Grand Jury, and no more. . . . The Grand 
Jury has obviously taken care to assure that its Report contains no 
objectionable features, and has throughout acted in the interests of 
fairness. The Grand Jury having thus respected its own limitations and 
the rights of others, the Court ought to respect the Jury's exercise of 
its prerogatives.'' (In re Report and Recommendation of June 5, 1972, 
Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to the House of 
Representatives, U.S. District Court, District of Columbia, March 18, 
1974.)
    What a far cry the Watergate grand jury report was from Mr. 
Starr's. The Starr Report violates almost every one of the standards 
laid out by Judge Sirica in the Watergate case.
    The House of Representatives the Judiciary Committee then almost 
immediately released the Starr report and the thousands of pages of 
evidence to the public.
    Because of that release--enormous damage had been done to the 
public's sense of decorum and to appropriate limits between public and 
private life.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                     Statement of Senator Herb Kohl

    Mr. KOHL. Mr. Chief Justice, throughout this process my 
colleagues from both sides of the aisle have conducted 
themselves with decency and dignity, exactly the qualities 
President Clinton's conduct lacked. But we risk opening the 
floodgates to more party-line impeachments if we oust a 
President from office for behavior that--while truly 
deplorable--isn't truly removable. Lowering the standard would 
do as great a disservice to the Constitution as the President's 
behavior has done to the Oval Office. So I am voting to acquit 
on both articles.
    I state these conclusions with a certainty I do not feel. 
We have heard many say these votes are the most difficult they 
will ever cast, and I agree. This case is made up of many small 
questions, matters of opinion and fact: Did the President lie? 
Did he commit perjury? Did he obstruct justice? Did he weaken 
the judicial system? Did he undermine the Constitution? Are 
these ``high'' crimes? Is this what the founders envisioned 
when they talked about removal of a President?
    Most of us have answers for each of these questions. Most 
of us will lay them out in well-worded, well-argued statements. 
But the sum of the answers is not the sum of this case. The sum 
of our opinions, our findings of fact, and our legal briefs 
cannot sum up the deep disquiet I feel about the failings, 
lies, and weakness displayed by the President. Under the cold 
body of evidence before us runs the bad blood of bad character, 
and that deeply disturbs me.
    The evidence does not prove high crimes, but it does prove 
low character in our highest office--and that matters, it is 
relevant, it is material. This Nation is not defined merely by 
demographics, boundaries, geological features, and government 
regulations; it is also about families and individuals who 
struggle to be larger, braver, and stronger than their 
circumstances. It is a nation that has a history of putting 
lives, faith, and hope in causes bigger than any one person: 
justice, democracy, freedom. Similarly, the Office of the 
Presidency is not just a set of protocols, formalities, and 
policies. It is the human face we put on our country, and that 
face ought to be as honest, just, strong and brave as we all 
aspire to be--and as our history demands that we be.
    That's why character matters. I cannot find a way to fit my 
concern for that spirit into these very formal, legal 
proceedings, but I also cannot, in good conscience, let go of 
my deep concern for the harm and the loss this President has 
caused. I will not vote for either article of impeachment, but 
I also will not let go of my firm belief that this President 
has done real damage to the Office of the Presidency. And I 
will not let go of a commitment to do everything I can to 
restore and protect the idea that good character is essential 
in those who ask to serve and represent this country.
    Let me explain in more detail why I am voting against both 
articles. First, removing a President is a drastic measure, 
called for in only the most extraordinary circumstances. And 
our Founding Fathers clearly wanted it to be used sparingly: 
that's why they limited impeachment to only ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' involving abuse of power, incapacity to hold 
office, or a serious threat to our Constitution or system of 
government.
    But the President's conduct, however reprehensible, related 
to purely personal matters. He lied to the American people. He 
lied to his family, his friends and his staff. He lied under 
oath and evidence suggests that he may have obstructed justice. 
Simply put, his conduct was disgraceful and, possibly, illegal.
    However, his actions did not relate to abuse of power. They 
had nothing to do with his official acts or his capacity to 
hold office. They did not threaten our Constitution or system 
of government. Though serious offenses to our American values 
and decency, they do not rise to the level of constitutional 
``high'' crimes.
    Some of my colleagues have a different view, and I respect 
their position. But even the House prosecutors respect mine. In 
response to one of my questions, House Manager Graham 
acknowledged that ``reasonable people can disagree'' about 
whether the President should be removed. In fact, he went on to 
say:

    ``[I]f I was sitting where you're at, I would probably get down on 
my knees before I made that decision, because the impact on society is 
going to be real either way. And if you find the President guilty in 
your mind from the facts, that's he a perjurer and he obstructed 
justice, you've got to somehow reconcile continued service in light of 
that event. And I think it's important for this body not to have a 
disposition plan that doesn't take in consideration the good of this 
Nation. . . . [Y]ou've got to consider what's best for this Nation.''

    Representative Graham deserves credit for putting candor 
above partisanship, and inviting us to decide ``what's best for 
this Nation.'' To do that, it makes sense to consider the views 
of the American people. Most of them know what this case is 
about and most of them oppose this impeachment. Nothing we've 
heard clearly justifies rejecting the overwhelming weight of 
their opinion and removing a twice-elected President.
    Indeed, if ``reasonable people can disagree,'' as the House 
prosecutors concede, have we really met the high threshold 
established for removal?
    To ask that question is to answer it.
    It is true, of course, that we have removed judges for 
lying under oath; for example, 10 years ago the Senate removed 
Judge Nixon on that basis. But impeaching the President, our 
highest elected official, is far different. Judge Nixon was 
appointed. He held office during ``good Behaviour.'' At the 
time of his Senate trial, he was already convicted and sitting 
in jail. He lied about bribery, not sex. And most importantly, 
the only way a judge can be removed is by impeachment. A 
President, on the other hand, can be removed every 4 years 
through an election, and is automatically removed after 8 years 
by the 22d amendment.
    Second, in addition to the constitutional problems, the 
prosecution has not proved its allegations by clear and 
convincing evidence. This is especially true on the 
``obstruction of justice'' charge, which is by far the more 
serious allegation. The House managers argue that more 
witnesses would have made a difference in bolstering their 
case, and they may be right. But why then did the House choose 
not to call witnesses in its own proceedings, even though it 
had called ``fact'' witnesses in nearly every other 
impeachment?
    Third, as many of us told the House in the Judge Nixon 
impeachment trial, lumping together a series of charges in each 
article--at least four perjury charges and seven obstruction of 
justice charges here--isn't fair or responsible. Alarmingly, 
the President could be found guilty without a two-thirds 
majority believing any single charge. For example, in theory, 
even if each obstruction charge were rejected by a 90 to 10 
margin, the President could be convicted--because ten different 
Senators convicting on each of seven separate charges adds up 
to 70--more than a two-thirds majority.
    Mr. Chief Justice, this kind of ``one from column A and two 
from column B'' approach may work for a Chinese restaurant, but 
not for removing a President--or a judge. And this lack of 
specificity shortchanges the American people, who may never 
understand which charges were believed and which ones weren't.
    Still, President Clinton is not ``above the law.'' His 
conduct should not be excused, nor will it. The President can 
be criminally prosecuted, especially once he leaves office. In 
other words, his acts may not be ``removable'' wrongs, but they 
could be ``convictable'' crimes. Moreover, the House vote of 
impeachment--and the President's misconduct with Monica 
Lewinsky--will forever scar this President's legacy. Finally, 
the Senate can and should censure the President, and we ought 
make our condemnation of his conduct as strong as possible.
    In sum, Mr. Chief Justice, President Clinton's conduct was 
wrong, reckless and indefensible. Under the Constitution it 
does not justify removal. But for those who love this country, 
it demands outrage and disappointment. It demands a commitment 
from this President and future Presidents, this Congress and 
future Congresses--not now, and not ever again, to let personal 
weakness and personal failing stain or shake our democracy. 
Thank you.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Fred Thompson

    Mr. THOMPSON. Mr. Chief Justice, in 1994, Paula Corbin 
Jones sued President Clinton for sexual harassment which she 
alleged he committed against her in 1991, when he was Governor 
of Arkansas. The Supreme Court of the United States permitted 
the lawsuit to proceed in 1997.
    Monica Lewinsky began work as a White House intern on July 
10, 1995. At the time, she was 21 years old. She later worked 
in the Office of Legislative Affairs at the White House. In 
1996, she left the White House for a job at the Department of 
Defense.
    The first day that Ms. Lewinsky spoke with President 
Clinton, November 15, 1995, she and the President engaged in 
sexual relations. Their sexual relationship lasted until 1997. 
The two also engaged in telephone sex at least 17 times, and 
they exchanged numerous gifts. The two agreed to keep their 
relationship secret through the use of cover stories. Ms. 
Lewinsky, if discovered in the Oval Office, was to say that she 
was delivering papers, although her job duties never included 
delivering papers. Once she left the White House, her visits to 
the President were disguised as visits to Presidential 
secretary Betty Currie.
    The President told Ms. Lewinsky that she could return to 
the White House after the 1996 election had concluded. Although 
Ms. Lewinsky tried numerous times to regain employment at the 
White House, she was never able to do so. After being informed 
by a friend, Linda Tripp, that she would never be permitted to 
return to the White House, Ms. Lewinsky decided to seek 
employment in New York, initially receiving and rejecting a job 
offer with the United States Ambassador to the United Nations. 
She then decided to seek employment in New York in the private 
sector. On November 5, 1997, she met with Vernon Jordan, a 
prominent Washington lawyer and friend of President Clinton, to 
seek his assistance in securing such a position. This meeting 
was arranged by Ms. Currie. Mr. Jordan took no action to help 
her in November, and does not remember meeting her at this 
time.
    On December 5, 1997, attorneys for Ms. Jones notified the 
President's attorneys of their list of witnesses. That list 
included Ms. Lewinsky. Although she was unaware at the time 
that her name was on the Jones litigation witness list, 
Lewinsky coincidentally decided to terminate her relationship 
with the President the following day, but was unable to see him 
at the White House. President Clinton and Ms. Lewinsky 
initially exchanged angry words that day over the telephone, 
but later that day, she came to the White House at his 
invitation. During this meeting, Ms. Lewinsky told the 
President that Mr. Jordan had not appeared to have done 
anything to help her in her job search. In a conversation Ms. 
Lewinsky described as ``sweet'' and ``very affectionate,'' he 
told her that he would speak to Mr. Jordan about her job 
situation. The President did not at that time inform Ms. 
Lewinsky that her name was on the witness list.
    Ms. Currie again called Mr. Jordan, and on December 8, 
1997, Ms. Lewinsky called to set another appointment with Mr. 
Jordan for December 11. Although Ms. Lewinsky provided Mr. 
Jordan with a list of corporations in which she was interested 
in obtaining employment, Mr. Jordan determined based on his own 
contacts which companies he would pursue on Ms. Lewinsky's 
behalf. Following his meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, acting by his 
own admission at the behest of the President, Jordan called 
three corporate executives in New York. He also called the 
President to report on his efforts on behalf of Ms. Lewinsky.
    December 11, 1997, was also the date on which Judge Susan 
Webber Wright, the presiding judge in the Jones litigation, 
issued an order permitting Jones' attorneys to pursue discovery 
concerning the names of any state or federal employees with 
whom the President had had sexual relations, proposed sexual 
relations, or sought to have sexual relations.
    On December 17, 1997, between 2 and 2:30 a.m., the 
President telephoned Ms. Lewinsky. He informed her that Ms. 
Currie's brother had been killed, as well as that her name was 
on the Jones witness list. The President indicated that if Ms. 
Lewinsky were subpoenaed, she should let Ms. Currie know. He 
also told her that she might be able to sign an affidavit in 
that event to avoid testifying. In addition, he suggested that 
she could say that she was coming to see Betty or was bringing 
him papers. Ms. Lewinsky says that she understood implicitly 
that she was to continue to deny their relationship.
    Ms. Lewinsky was subpoenaed to testify in the Jones 
litigation on December 19, 1997. The subpoena also required Ms. 
Lewinsky to produce all gifts that she had received from the 
President, and enumerated one specific gift that the President 
had given Ms. Lewinsky, a hatpin. Because Ms. Currie was in 
mourning, Lewinsky called Jordan, who invited her to his 
office. She was in a highly emotional state, and that fact, 
combined with her statements in the conversation that 
demonstrated her personal fascination with the President, 
prompted Jordan to ask whether she, a person for whom he was 
providing job assistance, had had sexual relations with the 
President. He says she denied such relations. Jordan took a 
telephone call from the President during that meeting, and made 
plans to see him that night. Jordan later called Frank Carter, 
a Washington lawyer, to arrange a meeting at which he would 
refer Ms. Lewinsky to Mr. Carter as a client.
    Notwithstanding Ms. Lewinsky's denial of sexual relations 
with the President, Jordan asked President Clinton that same 
evening the same question. The President also denied having had 
sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. Jordan also conveyed a 
number of Lewinsky's statements to the President, and informed 
Clinton that Lewinsky had received a subpoena to testify in the 
Jones case. Following a discussion in which Lewinsky informed 
Jordan of the nature of the telephone calls she had had with 
the President, Jordan drove Lewinsky to a meeting at Mr. 
Carter's office on December 22.
    The President met with Ms. Lewinsky on December 28, 1997, 
at which time they again exchanged gifts. They discussed the 
subpoena, and she expressed concern, which the President 
shared, about the specific enumeration of the hatpin, since 
that suggested that someone knew details of their relationship. 
Ms. Lewinsky then suggested taking the gifts out of her 
apartment or giving them to Ms. Currie. The President 
responded, ``I don't know'' or ``Let me think about that.'' 
Later that same day, Ms. Lewinsky's consistent recollection is 
that Ms. Currie called her and stated, ``I understand you have 
something to give me'' or ``the President said you have 
something to give me.'' Ms. Currie later drove to Ms. 
Lewinsky's apartment, picked up a box containing gifts the 
President had given Ms. Lewinsky, and hid that box under her 
bed without asking any questions.
    On December 31, 1997, Jordan and Lewinsky had breakfast. 
Lewinsky, fearing that her relationship with the President 
would become known and wanting to ensure that she not appear 
responsible for its becoming known, told Jordan that she 
possessed notes she had addressed to the President that 
suggested the nature of their relationship. According to 
Lewinsky, Jordan told her to dispose of those notes. Jordan 
initially denied that he ever had breakfast with Lewinsky, but 
later recalled having done so when shown the receipt. But he 
denied ever telling Lewinsky to destroy any notes.
    Ms. Lewinsky pursued filing an affidavit to obviate the 
need for her to testify in the Jones case. On January 6, 1998, 
she communicated to Mr. Jordan concerns she had about the 
affidavit that Mr. Carter had drafted for her. Jordan 
telephoned Carter with her suggestions. Although Mr. Jordan 
denies the allegations, Ms. Lewinsky contends that she informed 
Jordan about the details of Carter's proposed affidavit, and 
that she and Jordan made changes to it prior to her signing it. 
Lewinsky also spoke with the President about Carter's questions 
to her about how she obtained her Pentagon job. The President 
told her that she ``could always say that the people in 
Legislative Affairs got it for you or helped you get it.''
    On January 7, 1998, Lewinsky signed an affidavit denying 
sexual relations with the President. She later testified that 
the affidavit was false. She showed Jordan the affidavit, and 
Jordan spoke with the President after conferring with Ms. 
Lewinsky about the changes. Lewinsky testified that she 
believed that the President would be satisfied with any 
affidavit that Jordan approved.
    The following day, Lewinsky was interviewed at a company 
that Jordan had called on her behalf. Believing that the 
interview had proceeded poorly, she called Jordan, who then 
called the head of the holding company of the firm with which 
she had interviewed. Jordan asked that a second interview be 
granted Lewinsky. She interviewed again the next day, and was 
made an informal job offer. Jordan testified that his ``magic'' 
was responsible for that offer. Lewinsky informed Jordan of her 
success, and he telephoned Ms. Currie to notify her: ``Mission 
accomplished.'' He later informed the President.
    The President was scheduled to be deposed in the Jones 
litigation on January 17, 1998. The President knew that one of 
the issues was his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. For the 
affidavit to successfully deflect questions to the President 
concerning that relationship, the affidavit would have had to 
have been filed in time for the court to consider it and for 
the President's lawyers to see it before the deposition. The 
President's lawyers called Ms. Lewinsky's attorney once on 
January 14, twice on January 15, and once on January 16. On the 
15th, Lewinsky's lawyer, Mr. Carter, sent President Clinton's 
counsel a copy of the affidavit. Mr. Carter also called the 
court twice on that day to ensure that the affidavit could be 
filed on January 17.
    During his deposition, President Clinton made numerous 
false statements while under oath. These included the sexual 
nature of his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and whether they 
had exchanged gifts. He relied on the same cover stories as he 
had discussed with Ms. Lewinsky. The President's lawyer used 
Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit in an attempt to deflect questions 
about the President's relationship with her, specifically 
stating that the President had already seen that affidavit. As 
the President appeared to be paying close attention, he did not 
contradict his attorney when he represented to the court that 
``there is absolutely no sex of any kind in any manner, shape 
or form with President Clinton. . . .'' And he testified, when 
asked by his attorney, that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit was 
absolutely true. However, the judge insisted that President 
Clinton answer additional questions about his relationship with 
Ms. Lewinsky. These questions were asked based on the judge's 
peculiar ruling that used only one-third of a standard 
courtroom definition of ``sexual relations'' and the 
plaintiff's attorneys' insistence in using that truncated 
definition as a reference for questions they posed to the 
President about the nature of his relationship with Ms. 
Lewinsky, rather than asking specific questions concerning what 
had occurred. In six instances, the President answered 
questions by referencing Betty Currie, such as in using the 
cover story that Ms. Lewinsky had come to the White House to 
visit Ms. Currie, and on one occasion, expressly stated that 
his questioners should ``ask Betty.'' Indeed, Ms. Jones' 
attorneys later placed Ms. Currie's name on their witness list.
    After the deposition, at 7 p.m. that evening, the President 
called his secretary, Betty Currie, at home. She later 
testified that she could not remember the President ever 
calling her at home so late on a Saturday. In that 
conversation, he asked Ms. Currie to see him in the Oval Office 
the following day, a Sunday. This was also an unusual 
occurrence. While in the Oval Office, and contrary to the 
admonition from the Jones case judge not to discuss his 
deposition testimony with anyone, the President made the 
following statements to Ms. Currie: (1) ``I was never really 
alone with Monica, right?'' (2) ``You were always there when 
Monica was there, right?'' (3) ``Monica came on to me, and I 
never touched her, right?'' (4) ``You could see and hear 
everything, right?'' (5) ``She wanted to have sex with me, and 
I could not do that.''
    Once the President met with Ms. Currie on January 18, Ms. 
Currie began to seek Ms. Lewinsky. She paged Ms. Lewinsky four 
times that night. Later than 11 p.m. that evening, the 
President called Ms. Currie at home to determine if she had yet 
reached Ms. Lewinsky. She had not. In a period of less than 2 
hours on the morning of the 19th, Ms. Currie paged Ms. Lewinsky 
an additional eight times. The President then called Mr. 
Jordan, who called the White House three times, paged Ms. 
Lewinsky, and called Mr. Carter, all within 24 minutes of 
receiving the President's call. Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter 
again that afternoon and learned that Mr. Carter had been 
replaced as Ms. Lewinsky's attorney. Mr. Jordan then called the 
White House six times in the next 24 minutes trying to relay 
this information. Mr. Jordan called Mr. Carter again, and then 
called the White House again.
    On January 20, the White House learned that a story about 
the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky would appear in 
the next day's edition of The Washington Post. On January 21, 
the President told his chief of staff and two deputies that he 
did not have sexual relations with Ms. Lewinsky. He later told 
one of those deputies, John Podesta, that he had not had oral 
sex with Ms. Lewinsky.
    Later on January 21, the President told his aide, Sidney 
Blumenthal, that Lewinsky had made a sexual demand on him, and 
that he rebuffed her. The President told Blumenthal that 
Lewinsky had threatened him. President Clinton also indicated 
that Lewinsky said that she was known among her peers as the 
stalker, that she hated it, and that she would say that she had 
an affair with the President whether it was true or not, so 
that she would not be known as the stalker any more. He also 
told Blumenthal that he felt like a victim who could not get 
out the truth. Blumenthal later testified that he believes the 
President lied to him. The President testified that he was 
aware at the time that he made his statements that his aides 
might be summoned before the grand jury.
    The President also met with his political consultant, Dick 
Morris, on January 21. The President authorized that Morris 
conduct an overnight poll measuring potential public reaction 
to the affair. The poll concluded that the American people 
would forgive the President for adultery, but not for perjury 
or obstruction of justice. The President then indicated that 
``we just have to win, then.'' The President's lawyers could 
not answer Senators' questions why such a poll had been 
undertaken if the President had not committed any of these 
acts.
    Shortly after the President met with Mr. Blumenthal, press 
reports began to appear that, quoting White House sources, 
characterized Ms. Lewinsky as a stalker, and as an 
``untrustworthy climber obsessed with the President.'' Although 
Mr. Blumenthal in his Senate deposition denied any knowledge of 
how White House sources were attributed to these stories, one 
journalist by the time of this writing has sworn to an 
affidavit stating that Mr. Blumenthal made such 
characterizations to him. A second similar affidavit has also 
been filed, corroborating the first one.
    Ultimately, Ms. Lewinsky was granted immunity from 
prosecution by the independent counsel. The independent counsel 
received from Ms. Lewinsky a dress that according to DNA 
testing was stained by the President's semen.
    On August 17, 1998, the President testified before the 
grand jury convened by the independent counsel. In a prepared 
statement, the President made a number of false statements. He 
stated that he engaged in inappropriate conduct with Ms. 
Lewinsky in 1996 and 1997, whereas the conduct actually began 
in 1995, when she was an intern. Based on Ms. Lewinsky's 
testimony and the dress, he appears to have testified 
untruthfully about whether he engaged in sexual relations even 
as that term had been defined at his deposition in the Jones 
case. And he also testified that he was not paying attention to 
his attorney when the attorney described the affidavit; that 
his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky had originally begun as a 
``friendship;'' that he made the statements to Ms. Currie after 
his deposition in an effort to refresh his recollection; and 
that he told his aides statements that were true about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. Nonetheless, when testifying 
before the grand jury, the President no longer made a number of 
the assertions that he had made in the deposition, including 
denying that he was ever alone with Ms. Lewinsky. With respect 
to his deposition testimony, the President told the grand jury 
that his ``goal in this deposition was to be truthful, but not 
particularly helpful . . . I was determined to walk through the 
mine field of this deposition without violating the law, and I 
believe I did.''
    The independent counsel filed a report with the House of 
Representatives that referred allegations of possible 
impeachable offenses. The House of Representatives voted to 
pass two articles of impeachment against President Clinton, for 
perjury before the grand jury and for obstruction of justice. 
Two other articles of impeachment, which had been based on 
perjury in his deposition in the Jones case and misstatements 
to the House in response to questions propounded to the 
President by the House of Representatives, failed to pass the 
House.
    The most fundamental question, against which the 
President's actions must be measured, is, ``What constitutes an 
impeachable offense?'' The Constitution makes impeachable 
``treason, bribery and other high crimes or misdemeanors.'' The 
Constitution also says that upon conviction in the Senate the 
President ``shall be removed.'' Therefore, the question 
becomes, in effect, ``What actions constitute grounds for 
removal?''
    It should be noted at the outset that what we have in 
effect is a ``mandatory sentence'' wherein if there is a 
finding of guilt then one particular sentence must be imposed--
in this case removal from office. However, unlike judges in a 
criminal case, the Senate may take into consideration the 
``punishment'' in determining guilt. Some have contended that 
the President may be guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors, 
but his actions may not be sufficient for removal. I believe 
the better analysis is that the Senate may conclude that the 
President's conduct is not sufficient for removal and that that 
determination, by definition, means that the President is not 
guilty of high crimes and misdemeanors. I believe that this 
analysis is important in understanding the scope of our 
discretion and helps us get away from the notion that there is 
an objective standard for high crimes and misdemeanors if we 
could only find it. Historical analysis covering over 600 years 
reveals that there is no ``secret list'' of high crimes and 
misdemeanors, but rather our forefathers perpetuated a 
framework that allows for a certain amount of subjectivity 
which may encompass changing times and differing circumstances.
    Such a conclusion emerges from an examination of English 
law, original State constitutions, our Federal Constitutional 
Convention, the ratification debates, American impeachment 
precedents and scholarly commentary.
    The phrase ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' can be traced 
back to the thirteen hundreds in England. It was clear from the 
outset that the phrase covered serious misconduct in office 
whether or not the conduct constituted a crime. Commentators 
say that the English impeachment tradition covered political 
crimes against the state and injuries to the state. Beyond 
that, it is difficult to glean covered conduct from the English 
tradition.
    Apparently there was only one discussion during the 
Constitutional Convention that dealt with the phrase ``high 
crimes and misdemeanors,'' and that occurred on September 8, 
1787. As reported out of committee, impeachable offenses 
included only ``treason and bribery.'' Mason wanted to add 
``maladministration,'' which was also contained in many state 
constitutions. Madison was under the impression that such 
language would leave the President at the mercy of the Senate. 
Madison relented and we wound up with the phrase as we have it 
today. The founding fathers quite clearly rejected impeachment 
for congressional disapproval of policy. Impeachable offenses 
were ``political'' offenses and, as under English law, not 
necessarily criminal. Other guidance that can be derived from 
the Convention is the fact that the founders were acutely aware 
of their rejection of bills of attainder as existed in the 
English system and, therefore, they thought that impeachable 
offenses should be something that any reasonable man could 
anticipate. He should not be punished for some crime made up 
after the fact. Also, there was to be a requirement for 
``substantiality.'' This mechanism was not designed for trivial 
offenses.
    We cannot determine the precise intent of the framers 
because their deliberations were in secret and nothing was 
printed from their deliberations. They intended for the 
ratifiers at the State Conventions to be the more authoritative 
voice for interpretation of the provisions in the Constitution. 
It is fair to conclude that the attitude of the ratifiers was 
reflected to a certain extent in ``The Federalist Papers.'' The 
most definitive comments concerning impeachment were by 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 65 wherein he stated:

    The subjects of [impeachment] are those offenses which proceed from 
the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or 
violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may be with 
peculiar propriety denominated political, as they relate chiefly to 
injuries done immediately to the society itself.

    The ratifiers at the North Carolina convention spoke in 
terms of serious injuries to the Federal Government. James 
Iredell, later to become an Associate Justice on the Supreme 
Court, stated that impeachment was ``calculated to bring [great 
offenders] to punishment for crimes which it is not easy to 
describe but which everyone must be convinced as a high crime 
and misdemeanor against governments . . . the occasion for its 
exercise will arise from acts of great injury to the 
community.'' He gave as an example of an impeachable offense 
the giving of false information to the Senate. Impeachment was 
not for ``want of judgment'' but rather to hold him responsible 
for ``willfully abusing his trust.'' Iredell also called 
attention to the complexity if not impossibility of defining 
the scope of impeachable offenses with any more precision than 
the above. And the ratifiers at the Virginia Convention clearly 
agreed that a President could be impeached for nonindictable 
offenses.
    There was continued discussion and debate after 
ratification concerning the impeachment process. James Madison 
contended that the wanton removal of meritorious officers would 
subject a President to impeachment and removal from office. 
Forty years later, Justice Story, in his ``Commentaries'' 
insisted that ``not every offence'' is a high crime and 
misdemeanor, that ``many offences, purely political . . . have 
been held to be within the reach of parliamentary impeachments, 
not one of which is in the slightest manner alluded to in our 
statute book,'' that ``the only safe guide'' in determining 
``high crimes and misdemeanors'' ``must be the common law,'' 
and left open the possibility that actions a civil officer took 
that were unconnected to his office might be properly the 
subject of impeachment.
    Therefore, it seems that despite the framers' and 
ratifiers' incomplete discussion, our inability to put our 
hands on documentation reflecting some of their thoughts, and 
the fact that perhaps they simply did not think of some of the 
problems that might arise in the future, we see a certain 
framework develop--certain perimeters within which our decision 
should be made.
    The Senate's own precedents do not change this evaluation 
because they are not terribly instructive either. In 
impeachment cases, the Senate has convicted on seven occasions, 
acquitted on five, dismissed two cases on jurisdictional 
grounds and one case was withdrawn because of resignation. An 
acquittal serves very little value as precedent beyond the 
facts of the case since an acquittal can be based on any number 
of grounds--jurisdictional, failure to prove the factual 
allegations, offenses not rising to the level of impeachable 
conduct, etc.--and the motivation for the vote is not reflected 
when the verdict is rendered ``not guilty.'' There is little 
more help derived from convictions, in terms of precedential 
value. There has only been one impeachment trial for a 
President, that of Andrew Johnson, and that, of course, 
resulted in an acquittal. A large majority of the remainder of 
the cases have been those of Federal judges.
    The question has arisen whether judicial impeachments are 
to be considered by the same standards as presidential 
impeachments. It seems to me that certainly the application of 
the standard of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' for a 
President must differ from that of a judge. Removing the 
President removes the elected head of the Nation. Removing a 
single judge does not carry the same implications for the 
country. And while a President should act according to the 
highest standards of probity, it is quite easy to imagine 
circumstances that would warrant judicial impeachment that 
would not justify presidential impeachment, such as making 
official decisions based purely on political considerations. It 
is also possible that certain crimes would be impeachable if a 
judge committed them, because of the specific nature of the 
judicial office in our system of government, but would not be 
impeachable for a President.
    It has been argued that the standard should be different 
for Presidents than judges because the former serves for a 
fixed term and the latter serve ``during good behavior.'' I do 
not share that view. The standard itself is the same for each 
category: treason, bribery, and other high crimes and 
misdemeanors. But the difference in tenure is relevant in a 
way. Because impeachment is not punishment and is political, 
the framers vested the process in the legislative branch. 
Prosecution for crimes was lodged in the judiciary. Thus, a 
President, who cannot be prosecuted while in office, can be 
impeached and removed from office before he faces criminal 
prosecution. While a judge can also be impeached and removed 
before being convicted of a crime, it is also the case that 
criminal punishment can be, and has been, imposed on sitting 
judges. But since courts were expressly not given the power to 
remove civil officers, Federal judges who have been criminally 
convicted and have refused to resign have continued to draw 
their salary ``during good behavior,'' i.e., until they were 
impeached. That is the only significance with respect to 
impeachment of judges and of Presidents based on their 
differing terms of service.
    Scholars have looked to the purposes to be served by the 
impeachment process as well as history in making their own 
analysis as to the meaning ``high crimes and misdemeanors.'' 
For Charles Black they would include offenses: (1) which are 
extremely serious, (2) which in some way corrupt or subvert the 
political and governmental process, and (3) which are plainly 
wrong in themselves to a person of honor or to a good citizen 
regardless of words on the statute books.
    Also qualifying according to Professor Black would be 
``serious offense against the Nation or its governmental or 
political processes.'' Furthermore, he would include purely 
personal actions that would make a President unviable as a 
national leader. Murder, of course, would be the prime example 
here. He would also include a totally different category of 
offenses which seriously threaten the order of political 
society as to make dangerous the continuation in power of the 
President. Finally, he would include actions that would 
``undermine government and confidence in government'' such as 
serious tax fraud.
    Professor Michael J. Gerhardt on the issue of purely 
personal conduct of the President states:

    Even if such a crime were unrelated to the President's 
Constitutional duties, his criminal act considerably cheapens the 
Presidency, destroys his credibility with the other branches (and other 
nations, for that matter), and shows such lack of respect for human 
life and disdain for the law (which he has sworn to enforce faithfully) 
that Congress could reasonably conclude that he had seriously breached 
his trust and no longer deserves to hold office.

    Again, murder was the easy example.
    However, he contends further that an official may be 
impeached for conduct in office that does not relate to his or 
her former responsibilities if an office holder violates his 
public trust and loses the confidence of the people. Then he 
must forfeit the privilege of holding at least his or her 
present office. ``In this context, conduct that may plainly be 
unrelated to the responsibilities of a particular office may 
still relate to an official's capacity to fulfill the functions 
of that office and to hold the people's trust.'' He gives the 
example of income tax fraud.
    Gerhardt points out that not all statutory crimes 
demonstrate unfitness for office, but that on the other hand, 
there are some indictable offenses for which certain high level 
government officials may be impeached. Among them are offenses 
which ``demonstrate serious lack of judgment or disdain for the 
law and the commission lowers respect for the office.'' In 
other words, there are certain statutory crimes, that, if 
committed by public officials, reflect, in Congress' estimation 
such lapses of judgment, breaches of the public trust and 
disregard for the public welfare, the law, and the integrity or 
reputation of the office held, that the occupant may be 
impeached.
    What I derive from this is that there is no ``holy grail'' 
of impeachable offenses. The framers provided the Senate with a 
framework within which to operate and history provides us with 
a map, but not a destination. Our conclusions must depend upon 
the particular circumstances of the case, the nature of the act 
or acts involved, and their effects on society or integral 
parts of our political structure.
    Today we are faced with an unprecedented situation. The 
President engaged in inappropriate personal conduct. It had 
nothing to do with his official duties, but it did involve a 
federal employee under his supervision, government time and 
government facilities. In an attempt to conceal and cover up 
that activity, he lied, misled and helped conceal evidence both 
physical and testimonial in a court proceeding. In doing so he 
elicited the help of other government employees. Therefore, the 
subject matter was essentially private, but the forum, a United 
States court, became public. One side says that he ``only lied 
about sex,'' and it had nothing to do with his official duties, 
therefore, it ``clearly does not rise to the level of an 
impeachable offense.'' The other side says that any perjury and 
any obstruction of justice ``clearly does rise to the level of 
an impeachable offense.'' I do not think that either position 
is consistent with history or proper analysis.
    For example, I agree with Professor Black that not every 
imaginable act that might technically constitute obstruction of 
justice would necessarily be impeachable.
    On the other hand, opponents of conviction in the present 
case, have raised the bar for impeachment to unreasonable 
heights. Usually they concede that an impeachable offense does 
not have to be a crime, but often it is maintained that the 
abuse of power has to come from his public position such as 
Nixon's abuse of the CIA or FBI. Of course, this immediately 
runs headlong into the murder hypothetical and many other 
hypotheticals of serious, although totally personal, conduct as 
well.
    They then make the further argument that the violation has 
to be ``an offense against the state.'' While I agree that an 
offense against the state is one of the categories of offenses 
that impeachment was primarily designed to cover, offenses 
against the state's governmental and political processes, 
including the court system, as well as attempts to subvert 
them, are also impeachable. Besides, it would seem to me, that 
subversion or serious damage to our governmental institutions 
constitute offenses against the state.
    They also point out that one of the purposes of impeachment 
is to protect the Nation from the offender President. I agree 
again that this may be one of the purposes of impeachment. 
However, it is not the only purpose, and protection of the 
public is not always a requirement. If an offense has been laid 
bare and totally exposed, and the President is completely 
incapable of continuing his conduct, this lack of imminent 
threat to the Nation does not necessarily mean that he should 
not and cannot be impeached. President Nixon probably would not 
have been forced from office if that were the only criteria.
    Opponents of conviction also overlook the fact that we may 
look to the effects of the President's conduct. Actions, even 
private actions, that serve to undermine the government or the 
people's confidence in the government or the President, may 
also be impeachable. In other words, opponents of impeachment 
rightly point out some of the categories that are applicable in 
impeachment cases, but they set them forth as exclusive when, 
in fact, they are not.
    The impeachment bar has been raised even higher most 
recently by respected commentators in the media. The New York 
Times editorial page, for example, takes a position that the 
President's action must ``threaten the welfare or stability of 
the state.'' On another occasion, they stated that the 
President's actions must ``show some fundamental harm to the 
security interest or stability of the state or some attempt to 
undermine the Constitution.'' The problem with this is that 
there is absolutely no authority to support such a contention. 
Such a theory relies exclusively upon the ``protect the 
Nation'' theory of impeachment. The founders certainly did not 
mean that the President had to be on the verge of throwing the 
Nation into chaos or endangering national security in order to 
be impeached.
    It is extremely important that we refrain from latching 
onto a definition of ``high crimes and misdemeanors'' simply 
because it leads us inexorably to a conclusion which we may 
desire. Clearly, a President's offense or offenses must be 
serious and/or have serious consequences. Also, while they do 
not have to be crimes, my own opinion is that in most cases 
they will be crimes. They must be crimes against the state, but 
we cannot adopt an unreasonable restriction of that term. The 
President does not have to order tanks to move on the J. Edgar 
Hoover Building. Offenses against the state can include 
activity which will undermine our governmental institutions. 
How can we say that bribing a judge to effect an outcome in a 
law suit involving a President's purely personal conduct 
constitutes an impeachable offense, but say that insinuating 
perjury into that same law suit to effect the same outcome is 
clearly not impeachable? And while it is true that the founders 
meant to cover ``public'' behavior, I believe they also meant 
to cover behavior that has a negative effect on the public if 
it is of sufficient gravity. Furthermore, if the President's 
conduct poses a threat and danger to a country, that certainly 
is a legitimate, though not exclusive, consideration. If that 
same conduct serves to undermine the President's credibility 
and moral authority, that could also pose a danger to the 
country and is similarly a legitimate consideration. And, again 
his conduct does not necessarily have to deal with his office. 
In the Constitution, a named offense is bribery--treason, 
bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors--and bribery 
itself does not necessarily have to do with the President's 
official capacity, if the President is making the bribe.
    I believe that the founders did not intend to make our job 
easy. They provided no list of offenses. They refused to spare 
us from the difficult analysis that we must now go through. We 
must take into consideration the offense or offenses, the 
capacity in which they were committed, the effect on our public 
institutions, the effect on our people and our people's 
attitude toward the Presidency and our other institutions, 
whether the President's conduct was one or more isolated 
events, or a pattern of conduct, the period of time over which 
the conduct was carried out and ultimately decide whether in 
view of all of these circumstances, it is in the best interest 
of the country to remove this President.
    The significance of a ``pattern of conduct'' is recognized 
by John R. Labovitz in his book ``Presidential Impeachment.'' 
Labovitz concluded that focusing on whether the President has 
committed ``an impeachable offense'' is of limited usefulness, 
since few individual crimes warrant removal, such as a single 
act of treason or a single act of bribery. Even in the case of 
President Nixon, ``[i]t was necessary to combine distinct 
actions into a pattern or course of conduct to establish 
grounds for removal from office.'' As he also wrote:

    The concept of an impeachable offense guts an impeachment case of 
the very factors--repetition, pattern, coherence--that tend to 
establish the requisite degree of seriousness warranting the removal of 
a president from office. Just as a recidivist deserves a more stringent 
sentence than a first offender, so presumably a repeated offender is 
more likely to deserve removal from an office of public trust, and 
especially the highest trust in the land. . . . [I]t is necessary to 
take a less divided view of the charges. Because the remedy is not 
additive, the offenses must be considered cumulatively in deciding 
whether or not it should be imposed. The House must decide whether or 
not to prosecute an impeachment on the basis of the charges taken as a 
whole. And, unless the Senate is to take the determination of the House 
without question, it too must judge the combined seriousness of the 
wrongdoing that is proved.

    I believe that this statement is very relevant to the 
obstruction of justice charge, which I will discuss later.
    Article I, after alleging generally that President Clinton 
violated his oath of office and failed to take care that the 
laws be faithfully executed by manipulating the judicial 
process for his personal gain, alleges that on August 17, 1998, 
following taking an oath to tell the truth, he

willfully provided perjurious, false, and misleading testimony to the 
grand jury concerning one or more of the following: (1) the nature and 
details of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee; (2) 
prior perjurious, false, and misleading testimony that he gave in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him; (3) prior false and 
misleading statements he allowed his attorney to make to a Federal 
judge in that civil rights action and (4) his corrupt efforts to 
influence the testimony of witnesses and to impede the discovery of 
evidence in that civil rights action.
    In doing this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

    Never has the Senate convicted on an article worded such as 
this. Several crimes or categories of crimes--the exact number 
cannot be determined from reading the article--are charged in 
this one article. The perjurious statements are not described, 
nor are their dates. In large part, this article charges that 
the President committed perjury because he denied prior 
perjury.
    At the outset, it is clear that a count such as this in an 
indictment would not survive court challenge. However, it is 
equally clear that the Senate is not bound to follow normal 
legal rules. Impeachment, Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 65, 
``can never be tied down by such strict rules, either in the 
delineation of the offense by the prosecutors or in the 
construction of it by the judges, as in common cases serve to 
limit discretion of courts in favor of personal security.'' 
Nevertheless, we should examine the basis for such rules and 
determine the extent, if any, we should apply them to our 
deliberations.
    The reason for rules against charging several offenses in 
one article is clear. A group of Senators, as few as 17, could 
conclude that the President was guilty of one offense in the 
article, and a group of other Senators could conclude that the 
President was guilty of another offense in the article and so 
on. This could result in the President being found guilty on 
one article without two-thirds of the Senators ever agreeing 
upon a single offense that the President committed.
    Compounding this problem, the individual items alleged in 
the article are vague because they could reach different 
instances of objectionable conduct within a general heading. 
The problem with failing to specifically identify the offenses 
charged is that it does not give the person charged fair 
notice. Although I believe that the President had actual notice 
for the most part, what is actually being charged in this 
article has not been without dispute.
    The articles pending against President Clinton are unique. 
Never has the Senate considered articles that are 
simultaneously omnibus, vague, and based upon ``one or more'' 
of the charges being proved.
    Again, we have substantial leeway in considering these 
matters, but we must be fair. We are creating precedent, and 
this is not good practice. The rule of law must apply to the 
President when it inures to his benefit just as when it inures 
to his detriment.
    The House relies on rule XXIII of the Senate's impeachment 
rules as granting this body's tacit approval for the drafting 
of impeachment articles in the form of those from President 
Nixon's impeachment proceedings. The House also argues that its 
committee report provided adequate notice of charges, occupying 
20 pages just to list ``the most glaring instances of the 
President's perjurious, false, and misleading testimony before 
a Federal grand jury and requir[ing] 13 pages just to list the 
most glaring incidents in the President's course of conduct 
designed to prevent, obstruct, and impede the administration of 
justice.'' But this argument underlines the problem. These 
allegations were not made in the articles themselves, and even 
now, can it truly be said that these were the entirety of the 
charges that could have been raised at trial, or even in a 
later impeachment?
    Articles of impeachment henceforth should not permit 
conviction based upon ``one or more'' findings of guilt. They 
should list specific conduct, preferably in separate articles. 
Removal of elected or appointed government officials, 
especially a President, should occur only when the public can 
be sure that the process has been appropriate. Articles such as 
those before the Senate in this case do not further that goal. 
The Senate should amend rule XXIII to permit impeachment 
articles to be divided, so as to eliminate any incentive for 
the House to adopt duplicitous articles of impeachment.
    In prior impeachments charging false statements, the House 
has always delineated the date and substance of the false 
statement. Indeed, in every impeachment proceeding since Judge 
Pickering in 1803, articles of impeachment exhibited by the 
House have included allegations of specific misconduct. 
Although the Senate has at times voted in favor of articles 
containing multiple or cumulative allegations, it has only done 
so where specific allegations were made in other separate 
articles and where the omnibus article was written in the 
conjunctive. Never has the Senate voted for conviction on an 
article that charged an individual with ``one or more'' 
improper actions.
    Unfortunately, instead of following precedent, the House in 
the case before us deviated from previous practice. In prior 
cases, the House avoided lumping together several amorphous 
charges into one article, with conviction permitted if ``one or 
more'' alleged offenses had been proved--in all cases but one: 
Richard Nixon. Here, the House explicitly followed the 
Watergate example, probably thinking that they would be on safe 
ground. Unfortunately, the articles drafted against President 
Nixon were deficient in the extreme.
    The first article of impeachment against President Nixon 
charged that the President had ``engaged in a course of conduct 
or plan designed to delay, impede and obstruct investigations 
of [the] unlawful entry [of the headquarters of the Democratic 
National Committee]; to cover up, conceal and protect those 
responsible; and to conceal the existence and scope of other 
unlawful activities. The means used to implement this course of 
conduct or plan have included one or more of the following.'' 
The article of impeachment then listed nine separate charges, 
each extremely broad. The second Nixon article charged dozens 
of indeterminate criminal offenses within several wide-ranging 
categories.
    The charges contained in the Nixon articles are alarmingly 
vague and duplicitous. The articles before us are not that 
deficient, but they represent a second step down a road we 
should not take. While these problems with article I in 
isolation may not be sufficient to defeat this article, they 
are more than technicalities, and pose potentially serious 
consequences for the future.
    The Senate, of course, did not have occasion to consider 
the impeachment articles against President Nixon. Only once in 
its history has the Senate actually considered an article of 
impeachment charging violations of ``one or more'' alleged 
acts. Among the articles of impeachment against Judge Walter 
Nixon in 1989 was an article alleging that Judge Nixon made 
``one or more'' false statements. Unlike the articles against 
Presidents Nixon or Clinton, however, the article in question 
in the case of Judge Nixon specifically enumerated the alleged 
material false statements, including the date and nature of the 
statement made. The Senate, though defeating a motion to 
dismiss the article, nevertheless acquitted Judge Nixon on this 
article. Several Senators explained their votes to acquit on 
this article due to the multiplicitous--actually, duplicitous--
and disjunctive ``one or more'' form of the article.
    I agree with those Senators who criticized the form of the 
omnibus article of impeachment that was brought against Judge 
Nixon. An article of impeachment charging a defendant with 
``one or more'' acts is not only unfair to the defendant, but 
it does not permit Senators to perform adequately their 
constitutional duty and the American people to understand their 
actions. If the Senate were to convict on a ``one or more'' 
acts count of an article of impeachment, the votes to convict 
would obscure the real basis for each Senator's vote. 
Ultimately, the American people would be deprived of knowing 
the basis on which the President they duly elected was removed 
from office.
    The Senate also has never been asked to convict someone for 
conduct that formed the basis for an article of impeachment 
that was rejected by the House. Although in a literal sense, no 
such article is before the Senate, in a practical sense that is 
the situation. The House failed to pass an article of 
impeachment against President Clinton that accused him of, on 
January 17, 1998, ``willfully provid[ing] perjurious, false, 
and misleading testimony in response to questions deemed 
relevant by a Federal judge concerning the nature and details 
of his relationship with a subordinate Government employee, his 
knowledge of that employee's involvement and participation in 
the civil rights action brought against him, and his corrupt 
efforts to influence the testimony of that employee.'' Yet, in 
article I, the Senate is asked to convict the President based 
on ``one or more'' sets of actions, one of which is the 
President's ``prior perjurious, false, and misleading testimony 
he gave in a Federal civil rights action brought against him.'' 
That portion of article I has resulted in the House recharging 
all the allegations of perjury made by the President in his 
civil deposition that were dismissed when the House rejected an 
article of impeachment that was based on that deposition. The 
House does so explicitly: ``In addition to his lie about not 
recalling being alone with Ms. Lewinsky, the President told 
numerous other lies at his deposition. All of those lies are 
incorporated in Article I, Item 2.'' (House Trial Memo., p. 
61.) The House claims that the President's statement in his 
grand jury testimony that he intended to be unhelpful but 
truthful in his deposition, and that he did not violate the law 
in his deposition, amount to perjury in the grand jury if a 
single statement in his deposition was perjurious. However, the 
President did not broadly reaffirm the truth of all his 
deposition testimony. Indeed, before the grand jury, the 
President revised many statements he had made in the Jones 
deposition.
    Two perjury statutes have been enacted as part of the 
federal criminal code, 18 U.S.C. 1623 and 1621. The elements of 
section 1623 are that the defendant: (1) knowingly make a (2) 
false (3) material declaration (4) under oath in a proceeding 
before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United 
States. Statements which are misleading but literally true 
cannot form the basis for a perjury conviction. Bronston v. 
United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). The most difficult element 
of the offense is materiality. A statement is said to be 
material ``if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is 
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body 
to whom it is addressed.'' United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d 
1325, 1329 (10th Cir. 1998); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 
759 (1988). The Supreme Court has characterized the conduct 
prohibited by section 1621 as follows: ``A witness testifying 
under oath or affirmation violates this section if she gives 
false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of 
confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.'' United States v. 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94 (1993). As with section 1621, 
testimony that is misleading but literally true does not fall 
within the ambit of section 1623.
    A preliminary matter before consideration of these charges 
concerns the burden of proof of the charges in the articles of 
impeachment which I believe should apply. It is well 
established that Senators are free to weigh the evidence in 
particular cases under a standard they consider appropriate. My 
own view is that different cases will be considered under 
different standards, depending on the nature of the particular 
charge. Impeachment is neither a civil nor a criminal 
proceeding, but a hybrid. It is therefore inappropriate to 
always apply one or the other of the criminal or civil burdens 
of proof. When the consequences to the nation of the alleged 
conduct are most serious, such as treason, then the Senate 
should consider the case under a clear and convincing standard, 
for fear of leaving a likely traitor in office simply because 
his guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt. 
By contrast, when the charges allege harms that are not 
imminently serious to the national well-being, it becomes more 
appropriate to apply the criminal burden of proof: beyond a 
reasonable doubt. I concede that the charges alleged here, 
while serious, do not fall within the former category, and I 
will therefore review the facts under the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard.
    With that background, I now consider the facts relating to 
the three perjury specifications concerning the President's 
grand jury testimony that are properly before the Senate. The 
first is his testimony concerning ``the details and nature of 
his relationship with a subordinate Government employee.'' The 
President admitted in the grand jury that he had an 
inappropriate relationship with Ms. Lewinsky.
    To be sure, President Clinton contended that the 
relationship began in 1996, rather than 1995. The House 
managers note that this is significant because Ms. Lewinsky was 
an intern in 1995. The House also points out that the President 
admitted inappropriate conduct ``on certain occasions,'' when, 
in reality, there were eleven such occasions, and that he had 
``occasional'' telephone encounters with Ms. Lewinsky when 
there were at least seventeen that contained sexual banter. I 
do think that these statements constitute perjury. They were 
false, were made willfully, and were material. Something that 
happens 17 times in a year does not occur ``occasionally.'' 
Given the sensitivity of Ms. Lewinsky's status as an intern, I 
believe that the President deliberately told the grand jury 
that his relationship with her began in 1996, when she no 
longer had that status. Finally, the statement is material 
because it concerns a matter that the grand jury was 
investigating as part of its work: the nature of the 
President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. For these reasons, 
the statement was perjurious.
    The President's statement to the grand jury that he 
regretted that what began as a friendship changed into an 
inappropriate sexual relationship was also knowingly false, 
since the two engaged in sexual relations twice on the same day 
that they first spoke. Thus, the statement was made to deceive, 
and given that it related to a subject of the grand jury's 
inquiry, it was material. Therefore, I agree that this 
statement also constitutes perjury, so that the first item of 
article I has been proved. The second item charged in article I 
addresses statements the President made in the grand jury 
regarding the truth of his deposition testimony. For the 
reasons above stated, I consider finding perjury based on an 
article of impeachment that the House rejected to be 
questionable.
    The third item charged in article I concerns grand jury 
testimony involving ``false and misleading statements he 
allowed his attorney to make to a Federal judge in that civil 
rights action.'' Before the grand jury, President Clinton 
testified that he was ``not even sure I paid attention to what 
he [Mr. Bennett] was saying'' when his attorney represented to 
the court that Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit stated that there was 
no sex of any kind between her and the President. As a factual 
matter, given the videotape that shows the President 
concentrating very carefully on his attorney's words and the 
great importance that he placed on that affidavit and its 
filing in time, this statement's characterization of the 
President's attention was certainly false. However, the 
President said that he ``was not even sure'' that he was paying 
attention. It is possible, although unlikely, that he was not 
sure in August that he was paying attention to that specific 
statement in January. That would make the statement literally 
true and thus, by definition, not perjurious. And in any event, 
I cannot determine beyond a reasonable doubt that his statement 
was perjurious. Indeed, the real issue is whether President 
Clinton used the affidavit to obstruct justice: whether he 
actually was paying attention to his unsuspecting attorney when 
the affidavit was actually used to obstruct justice is of 
questionable materiality.
    The fourth item of the perjury allegations in article I 
concerns ``his corrupt efforts to influence the testimony of 
witnesses and to impede the discovery of evidence in that civil 
rights action.'' The first set of facts under this category 
evidently concerns President Clinton's statements to Ms. Currie 
on January 18, 1998, which he described as having been made to 
refresh his recollection. The President's stated reason for 
making these statements to Ms. Currie was false. He knew that 
they were not true, and the President knew that Ms. Currie 
could not testify to their truthfulness. Thus, his statement of 
purported purpose for making them, as communicated to the grand 
jury, was made willfully, with the intent to deceive the grand 
jury. They were material as well, since they went to the issue 
of whether he had committed a Federal crime. They thus 
constitute perjury.
    The second set of facts at issue in item 4 of article I 
apparently concerns whether the President truthfully told the 
grand jury that when the subject of the subpoenaed gifts arose 
at his December 28, 1997, meeting with Ms. Lewinsky, he told 
her ``if they asked her for the gifts, she'd have to give them 
whatever she had, that that's what the law was.'' Although Ms. 
Lewinsky never testified that the President said this to her, 
she once indicated that it sounded familiar. Thus, I am not 
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the President lied 
when he testified that he made this statement.
    The third set of facts in item 4 of article I addresses 
alleged lies that he made to the grand jury concerning the 
truth of statements that he made to White House aides. Before 
the grand jury, the President stated that he had told his aides 
that he did not have sex with Ms. Lewinsky as he defined it, 
and that he told them ``things that were true about this 
relationship.'' In reality, the President told them false 
statements, such as a broader denial of sexual activity than 
that defined as even he had defined it, and that Ms. Lewinsky 
was a stalker who came on to him, but whom he rebuffed. The 
President's statements to the grand jury in this regard were 
false, and were intended to deceive the grand jury about a 
Federal crime of obstruction of justice through the telling of 
false statements to persons he knew might become witnesses 
before that grand jury, and therefore committed perjury.
    As noted above, not all impeachable offenses are crimes, 
and not all crimes are impeachable offenses. While I conclude 
that one of the three sets of facts at issue in item 4 of 
article I does not constitute perjury, I conclude that the 
statements concerning Betty Currie, and the statements 
concerning what he told his aides do constitute perjury. I also 
find that the President committed perjury with respect to item 
1 of article I with respect to his statements that he and Ms. 
Lewinsky's relationship began as a friendship, that it started 
in 1996, and that he had ``occasional'' encounters with her. 
These are the only examples of grand jury perjury that I 
believe have been proved in the entirety of article I. The 
question then is whether these examples of perjury warrant 
removal of the President for the commission of high crimes and 
misdemeanors.
    Make no mistake, perjury is a felony, and its commission by 
a President may sometimes constitute high crimes and 
misdemeanors. But is removal appropriate when the President 
lied about whether he was refreshing his recollection or 
coaching a witness about the nature of a sexual relationship? 
Is removal appropriate when the President lied to the grand 
jury that he denied to his aides that he had engaged in sex 
only as he had defined it, when in fact he had denied engaging 
in oral sex? Is removal warranted because the President stated 
that his relationship began as a friendship in the wrong year 
and actually encompassed more telephone encounters than could 
truthfully be described as ``occasional''? To ask the question 
is to answer it. In my opinion, these statements, while wrong 
and perhaps indictable after the President leaves office, do 
not justify removal of the President from office.
    In no way does my conclusion ratify the White House 
lawyers' view that private conduct never rises to impeachable 
offenses, or that only acts that will jeopardize the future of 
the nation warrant removal of the President. It simply 
recognizes how the principles the Founding Fathers established 
apply to these facts.
    I therefore vote to acquit the President of the charges 
alleged against him in article I.
    Article II charges that President William Jefferson 
Clinton, in violation of his oath of office, and in violation 
of his constitutional obligation to take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed:

has prevented, obstructed, and impeded the administration of justice, 
and has to that end engaged personally, and through his subordinates 
and agents, in a course of conduct or scheme designed to delay, impede, 
cover up, and conceal the existence of evidence and testimony related 
to a Federal civil rights action brought against him in a duly 
instituted judicial proceeding.
    The means used to implement this course of conduct or scheme 
included one or more of the following acts:
    (1) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to execute a sworn affidavit in that proceeding that he 
knew to be perjurious, false, and misleading.
    (2) On or about December 17, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly encouraged a witness in a Federal civil rights action brought 
against him to give perjurious, false and misleading testimony if and 
when called to testify personally in that proceeding.
    (3) On or about December 28, 1997, William Jefferson Clinton 
corruptly engaged in, encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal 
evidence that had been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him.
    (4) Beginning on or about December 7, 1997, and continuing through 
and including January 14, 1998, William Jefferson Clinton intensified 
and succeeded in an effort to secure job assistance to a witness in a 
Federal civil rights action brought against him in order to corruptly 
prevent the truthful testimony of that witness in that proceeding at a 
time when the truthful testimony of that witness would have been 
harmful to him.
    (5) On January 17, 1998, at his deposition in a Federal civil 
rights action brought against him, William Jefferson Clinton corruptly 
allowed his attorney to make false and misleading statements to a 
Federal judge characterizing an affidavit, in order to prevent 
questioning deemed relevant by the judge. Such false and misleading 
statements were subsequently acknowledged by his attorney in a 
communication to that judge.
    (6) On or about January 18 and January 20-21, 1998, William 
Jefferson Clinton related a false and misleading account of events 
relevant to a Federal civil rights action brought against him to a 
potential witness in that proceeding, in order to corruptly influence 
the testimony of that witness.
    (7) On or about January 21, 23, and 26, 1998, William Jefferson 
Clinton made false and misleading statements to potential witnesses in 
a Federal grand jury proceeding in order to corruptly influence the 
testimony of those witnesses. The false and misleading statements made 
by William Jefferson Clinton were repeated by the witnesses to the 
grand jury, causing the grand jury to receive false and misleading 
information.
    In all of this, William Jefferson Clinton has undermined the 
integrity of his office, has brought disrepute on the Presidency, has 
betrayed his trust as President, and has acted in a manner subversive 
of the rule of law and justice, to the manifest injury of the people of 
the United States.
    Wherefore, William Jefferson Clinton, by such conduct, warrants 
impeachment and trial, and removal from office and disqualification to 
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United 
States.

    Section 1503(a) of title 18 of the United States Code 
states:

    Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening 
letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede 
any grand or petit juror, or officer of any court of the United States, 
or officer who may be serving at any examination or other proceeding 
before any United States magistrate judge or other committing 
magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or injures any such grand or 
petit juror in his person or property on account of any verdict or 
indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having 
been such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or 
other committing magistrate in his person or property on account of the 
performance of his official duties . . . shall be punished as provided 
in subsection (b).

    Courts have interpreted this provision to require the 
Government to prove: ``(1) that there was a pending judicial 
proceeding, (2) that the defendant knew this proceeding was 
pending, and (3) that the defendant then corruptly endeavored 
to influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of 
justice.'' United States v. Monus, 128 F.3d 376, 387 (6th Cir. 
1998).
    Here, there is no doubt that a judicial proceeding was 
pending and that President Clinton knew that the proceeding was 
pending. The question is whether he corruptly intended to 
influence, obstruct, or impede the due administration of 
justice. Courts have held that to act corruptly means to act 
with the intent to influence, obstruct, or impede the 
proceeding in question. United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 
1369 (6th Cir. 1994); United States v. Littleton, 76 F.3d 614, 
619 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Russo, 104 F.3d 431, 435 
(D.C. Cir. 1997). Because the prohibited intent is so closely 
related to the prohibited act, courts have required a nexus 
between the obstructing conduct and the target proceedings. 
Thus, the defendant's acts must have the ``natural and probable 
effect'' of interfering with the due administration of justice. 
United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599 (1995). But the 
defendant need only endeavor to obstruct justice to commit this 
offense. There is no requirement that he actually succeed in 
obstructing justice. (Id. at 599, 600.)
    Among the acts that courts have concluded violate section 
1503(a) include the creation of false documents to be presented 
in evidence, United States v. Chihak, 137 F.3d 252 (5th Cir. 
1998); and instructing a subordinate to conceal evidence, 
United States v. Lefkowitz, 125 F.3d 608 (8th Cir. 1997). These 
actions are alleged to have occurred in article II.
    Section 1512(b) of title 18 prohibits witness tampering. 
Specifically, it prohibits knowingly using one or more of the 
prohibited forms of persuasion with the intent to prevent a 
witness's testimony from being presented at official Federal 
proceedings or with the intent to prevent a witness from 
reporting evidence of a crime to Federal authorities. United 
States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442, 452-53 (2d Cir. 1996). Unlike 
section 1503, section 1512(b) does not require that the 
defendant be aware of the pendency of Federal proceedings. 
United States v. Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1995). Courts 
differ about the standard of corrupt persuasion, but even the 
more stringent courts agree that it is sufficient if the 
defendant attempts to persuade a witness ``to violate her legal 
duty to testify truthfully in court.'' United States v. 
Morrison, 98 F.3d 619, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Contrary to the 
representations of White House counsel at the impeachment 
trial, it is not necessary that the defendant threaten or cause 
physical harm to a witness to fall within subsection (b). When 
the defendant's misconduct takes the form of deceiving a 
potential witness with the intent that the witness later repeat 
the deception in federal proceedings, the crime does not 
require that the potential witness was in fact deceived, nor 
that there was any particular likelihood that that potential 
witness would in fact ever be called upon to testify. United 
States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1997). The 
prohibited intent of this subsection is intent to obstruct a 
federal proceeding.
    There are seven specifications of obstruction of justice in 
article II. The first two charge that on or about December 17, 
1997, President Clinton corruptly urged a witness in a Federal 
civil rights action to execute a false affidavit and to give 
false testimony if called to testify. That is the day he 
informed Ms. Lewinsky that she was on the Jones witness list, 
that she should contact Ms. Currie if she were subpoenaed, and 
that she could file an affidavit in the case to avoid 
testifying. In this conversation, the President told Ms. 
Lewinsky that she could ``always say you were coming to see 
Betty or that you were bringing me letters.''
    The President conducted an improper relationship with an 
employee of the Federal Government, Monica Lewinsky. He carried 
on that relationship off the Oval Office. He engaged in sexual 
banter over unsecured telephone lines to Ms. Lewinsky's 
residence, compromising himself and making himself susceptible 
to blackmail.
    And on December 17, 1997, the President raised to Ms. 
Lewinsky both the cover stories and filing an affidavit to 
prevent these facts from being disclosed. While Ms. Lewinsky 
testified that he did not expressly tell her to raise the cover 
stories in the affidavit, his intent was unmistakable: to 
corruptly endeavor to influence Ms. Lewinsky to file an 
affidavit that would prevent Paula Jones's attorneys from 
learning of the President's relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, a 
relationship of the type that the judge in her case had ruled 
to be relevant. And even if not directly linked to the 
affidavit, there is no question from Ms. Lewinsky's consistent 
testimony that the President was asking her to use those cover 
stories if she were ultimately asked to testify, since that was 
the context of the conversation. The White House's repeated 
retort that the relationship with Ms. Lewinsky was consensual, 
while the allegations by Ms. Jones were of nonconsensual sex, 
is therefore irrelevant. President Clinton did not tell Ms. 
Lewinsky to lie, but neither did he need to, as she understood 
that she was to raise the cover stories. Ms. Lewinsky admitted 
that the affidavit was indeed false. And since Lewinsky's 
truthful testimony would have definitely led to her being 
called as a witness, the President clearly understood that Ms. 
Lewinsky would file an affidavit he had strong reason to 
believe would be false. That is obstruction of justice, as 
shown by the cases that have held creation of false documents 
to be presented in evidence to fit within the statutory 
prohibition. Moreover, this charge must be considered in 
connection with the President's discussions with Ms. Lewinsky 
as her affidavit was being prepared, his conversation with Mr. 
Jordan after he spoke with her, and his lawyer's deep 
involvement in ensuring that the affidavit was filed and that 
the President had an opportunity to see it before that 
occurred, all of which shed light on what the President 
intended Ms. Lewinsky to do in that affidavit and if she 
testified.
    The third item of article II charges that President 
Clinton, on or about December 28, 1997, corruptly engaged in, 
encouraged, or supported a scheme to conceal evidence that had 
been subpoenaed in a Federal civil rights action against him. 
That is the day the President discussed the subpoenaed gifts 
with Ms. Lewinsky, and there is no doubt that the President 
indicated that he was ``bothered'' by the specific gift, a 
hatpin, that the subpoena requested. In none of the many times 
that Ms. Lewinsky testified did she ever say that the President 
told her to turn over the gifts, although once she said that 
the remark seemed familiar, and a number of times she testified 
that he asked to think about her suggestion that she give the 
gifts to Ms. Currie. The gifts, of course, ultimately were 
secreted under Ms. Currie's bed, and there is no doubt in Ms. 
Lewinsky's mind that Ms. Currie initiated the call that led to 
that exchange of the gifts. Since only the President and Ms. 
Lewinsky were present when the subject of giving the gifts to 
Ms. Currie was raised, and since Ms. Lewinsky did not call Ms. 
Currie, the only way that Ms. Currie could have called Ms. 
Lewinsky and not be surprised to obtain the gifts was if the 
President had told her to contact Ms. Lewinsky to retrieve 
them. This is also consistent with the President's course of 
conduct in this matter.
    The President thus corruptly acted to obstruct the Jones 
case by asking Ms. Currie to retrieve and secret the gifts. 
That constitutes obstruction of justice, as demonstrated by the 
cases that have convicted defendants of that charge for having 
instructed subordinates to conceal evidence.
    The White House's arguments to the contrary are 
unpersuasive. It is irrelevant that the President did not 
initiate the subject of the gifts in his conversation with Ms. 
Lewinsky. It is also irrelevant that he did not tell her to 
conceal the gifts. What is relevant is that the President, 
after thinking about the gifts, instructed Ms. Currie to 
retrieve the gifts from Ms. Lewinsky. The President's and Ms. 
Currie's denials simply cannot be squared with the evidence.
    Also irrelevant is the fact that Ms. Currie's cell phone 
call to Ms. Lewinsky occurred at 3:30 p.m., whereas Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that the gift pickup occurred at 2 p.m. 
Notwithstanding the White House's willingness to excuse the 
President's error by two or more months concerning when his 
improper relationship with Ms. Lewinsky began, while insisting 
that the cell phone call's 90-minute mistiming is fatal to the 
theory that Ms. Currie instituted the gift exchange, the cell 
phone call at 3:30 does not prove that Ms. Lewinsky instituted 
the gift exchange. First, Ms. Lewinsky testified that she might 
have been mistaken about the time that Ms. Currie picked up the 
gifts. Second, there is no evidence that the cell phone call 
was the one in which Ms. Currie's gift pickup was proposed. Ms. 
Lewinsky testified that she received other telephone calls from 
Ms. Currie that day to learn when Ms. Currie was coming to her 
apartment and also to know when she should actually come 
outside to meet Ms. Currie.
    The White House also maintains that the President would not 
have given Ms. Lewinsky additional gifts on December 28, if he 
planned to hide the gifts. The facts do not support that 
theory. The President gave Ms. Lewinsky those gifts before, 
pondering Ms. Lewinsky's idea, he determined that he would ask 
Ms. Currie to retrieve them. Since he had no intent to retrieve 
the gifts at the time he gave her the gifts on December 28, 
there is no inconsistency with his later direction to Ms. 
Currie to pick them up.
    The fourth item of article II alleges that the President, 
beginning on December 7, 1997, and continuing through January 
14, 1998, intensified and succeeded in an effort to secure job 
assistance to a witness in a Federal civil rights action 
brought against him to corruptly prevent the truthful testimony 
of that witness. Following a meeting with Ms. Lewinsky in 
November in which she sought his assistance, Mr. Jordan took no 
action and provided no help. He does not even remember this 
meeting. Thus, he made no serious effort to find her a job 
until after December 7, once the President, not Ms. Lewinsky, 
asked him to conduct a job search for Ms. Lewinsky. That 
followed Ms. Lewinsky's appearance on the Jones lawyers' 
witness list, and followed the President's promise to Ms. 
Lewinsky that he would ask Mr. Jordan to do more to help her 
find a job.
    Although Ms. Currie, not the President, called Mr. Jordan, 
he was aware that the request came from the President and that 
he acted at the behest of the President. Jordan did not call 
the companies Ms. Lewinsky suggested, but rather, the companies 
where he was likely to produce a job for her. After December 
19, Jordan obviously became aware that the President may have 
been asking him to assist Ms. Lewinsky obtain a job because he 
may have had a sexual affair with Ms. Lewinsky. That prompted 
him to ask both Ms. Lewinsky and the President whether such a 
relationship had occurred. Jordan continued to help find Ms. 
Lewinsky employment once they both denied that this was the 
case. However, he took no additional action until the day after 
Ms. Lewinsky signed the affidavit, when he called the CEO of 
MacAndrews & Forbes to successfully obtain a second interview 
for her at Revlon after she told him that the first had 
proceeded badly. Thus, it is true that Mr. Jordan intensified 
his job assistance to Ms. Lewinsky at the President's request, 
following the President's, but not Mr. Jordan's knowledge, that 
she appeared on the Jones witness list. Jordan took no further 
action on her behalf until satisfying himself that each had 
denied that there had been any sexual relationship. He then 
obtained a job for Ms. Lewinsky by calling the CEO of the 
holding company of the company that offered Ms. Lewinsky a job. 
That call was made the day after Ms. Lewinsky signed her 
affidavit. Because President Clinton did ask Mr. Jordan to 
intensify his job efforts to assist Ms. Lewinsky to obtain a 
job after he knew she was on the Jones witness list, the 
President corruptly obstructed justice by attempting to 
influence the testimony of a witness in a case against him.
    The White House responses to this charge miss the mark. 
That Ms. Lewinsky had begun her job search in July, and after a 
few months had not landed a job of her liking is irrelevant to 
whether, not having obtained a job, the President took steps to 
make sure she did obtain one once her name appeared on the 
witness list. That Ms. Lewinsky testified that no one ever 
promised her a job in return for her silence does not change 
the fact that these efforts were undertaken. That Linda Tripp 
suggested that Ms. Lewinsky originally speak with Mr. Jordan 
means nothing because he took no action following that meeting; 
only after the President requested that Mr. Jordan assist Ms. 
Lewinsky once her name appeared on the witness list did he do 
so. That Mr. Jordan testified that he acted with no sense of 
urgency is also of no import: it was the President who acted 
with a sense of urgency, using Mr. Jordan as his agent. Nor is 
it of consequence that Mr. Jordan placed no undue pressure on 
the persons he contacted in support of Ms. Lewinsky. The 
corrupt influence in obstruction of justice that matters is 
directed to the witness, not to the prospective employer of the 
witness. President Clinton knew, and Mr. Jordan knew, that the 
``Jordan magic'' in finding people employment did not depend in 
any way on undue pressure being applied. Thus, the White 
House's contention that there was no connection between Ms. 
Lewinsky obtaining her Revlon offer and Mr. Jordan's call to 
Mr. Perelman is denied by Mr. Jordan himself. President Clinton 
could be sure that Mr. Jordan would find Ms. Lewinsky a job 
when her testimonial support of his denials was critical 
without his own need to do anything. It is also irrelevant that 
she did not obtain a job offer in each company Mr. Jordan 
called. Nothing in the record shows that the President ever 
requested Mr. Jordan to find employment for any White House 
intern who was not on a witness list in a federal case pending 
against him. The President obstructed justice through using Mr. 
Jordan to find Ms. Lewinsky a job once her name appeared on the 
Jones witness list.
    The fifth item of article II claims that the President 
obstructed justice by corruptly allowing his attorney to make 
false and misleading statements to a Federal judge. In the 
President's presence, his attorney represented to the court, 
based on Ms. Lewinsky's affidavit, that the President had seen 
the affidavit, and that it showed that ``there is absolutely no 
sex of any kind in any manner, shape or form with President 
Clinton,'' a statement his lawyer later retracted out of 
professional ethics obligations. The affidavit stated, inter 
alia, that ``I have never had a sexual relationship with the 
President, he did not propose that we have a sexual 
relationship . . .'' and ``the occasions that I saw the 
President after I left my employment at the White House in 
April 1996, were official receptions, formal functions or 
events related to the U.S. Department of Defense, where I was 
working at the time. There were other people present on those 
occasions.'' The President testified that the affidavit was 
``absolutely true.'' The President knew that Ms. Lewinsky's 
affidavit would be used to perpetrate a fraud on the court, and 
because he was briefed on its contents by his attorney in 
advance, he knew that his attorney misunderstood the affidavit, 
and would inadvertently present the affidavit to the court in a 
false light. Yet, he took no action to either change his 
lawyer's understanding or to prevent the use of the affidavit 
under those conditions. Moreover, with knowledge that the 
affidavit used the cover stories that he had reminded Ms. 
Lewinsky to continue on December 17, he testified to those same 
cover stories. Regardless of whether he was paying attention at 
the moment that this happened, the President clearly knew at 
the time the deposition commenced that the affidavit would be 
used in a way that perpetrated a fraud on the court and on Ms. 
Jones's proceedings. He corruptly impeded Ms. Jones's efforts 
to prove the fact relevant to her case that Mr. Clinton had had 
a sexual relationship with another government employee. He did 
so intentionally by allowing that affidavit to be portrayed by 
an officer of the court as proof that there was in fact no 
sexual relationship between the President and another 
government employee. That is obstruction of justice. The White 
House has addressed these facts only with respect to whether 
the President's statement denying that he was in fact paying 
attention to his attorney as opposed to looking at him 
constituted perjury, but has never refuted the President's 
knowledge that a false affidavit would be used in the 
deposition to obstruct the proceeding.
    The sixth item of article II concerns the President's 
obstruction of justice by relating false and misleading 
statements to Betty Currie in order to corruptly influence her 
testimony. The President's conversation with Ms. Currie 
followed his telephone call to her, a call that she testified 
was made later on a Saturday than any call she had ever 
received from the President at home. The conversation occurred 
on a Sunday, when it was rare for Ms. Currie to come to the 
White House. The conversation occurred in the Oval Office, 
where the President would exercise the full powers and 
trappings of his office in the presence of a subordinate. The 
conversation addressed issues from the President's testimony in 
the Jones case, despite the fact that at the end of his 
deposition, the presiding judge ordered him not to discuss his 
testimony with anyone. In that conversation, the President told 
Ms. Currie statements that he knew to be false about his 
relationship with Ms. Lewinsky, and that she also knew were 
false. Two or three days later, that is, the day the President 
learned that the court had permitted Independent Counsel Starr 
to expand his inquiry into the Lewinsky matter or the day 
after, the President repeated these same statements to Ms. 
Currie.
    The President's call to Ms. Currie followed rapidly upon 
his deposition in the Jones case, its questions concerning Ms. 
Lewinsky, and his repeated answers to such questions by 
invoking Ms. Currie's name, one of which invited the Jones 
attorneys to ``ask Betty.'' In fact, Ms. Jones' lawyers placed 
Ms. Currie's name on their witness list. The ``questions'' that 
he asked were leading, and even according to Ms. Currie, were 
more like statements than questions. He asked her to agree that 
he was never really alone with Ms. Lewinsky, even though they 
both knew that he had been alone with her. He asked her to 
agree that she was always there when Ms. Lewinsky was there, 
even though she could not logically know whether Ms. Lewinsky 
had ever been there when Ms. Currie was absent. He asked her to 
agree that Ms. Lewinsky came on to him and that he never 
touched her, even though Ms. Currie would have had no ability 
to know those ``facts.'' He asked her to agree that she had 
seen and heard everything, when that was also not the case. And 
he suggested to her that Ms. Lewinsky wanted to have sex with 
him and that he could not do that.
    These statements constitute witness tampering. The 
President engaged in misleading conduct, through the use of 
false statements and omissions to mislead, toward Ms. Currie, 
with intent to influence her testimony in a federal court 
proceeding. He acted corruptly, because he acted with the 
improper purpose of obtaining false testimony from a witness 
who would corroborate the lies he issued in the Jones 
deposition to obstruct that case. As stated above, witness 
tampering convictions need not rest on the defendant's actually 
having deceived the potential witness or any particular 
likelihood that the potential witness would in fact ever be 
called upon to testify. United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 
102-03 (2d Cir. 1997).
    The White House arguments in response to these facts are 
inadequate. It is inadequate as a matter of law for the White 
House to contend that the President did not know that Ms. 
Currie was an ``actual or contemplated witness,'' and is 
difficult to accept that proposition factually. Nor as a matter 
of law is it ``critical,'' as the White House contends, that 
Ms. Currie testified that she felt no pressure to agree with 
the President. Witness tampering under section 1512 can be 
accomplished through ``misleading conduct,'' which includes the 
making of false statements or intentional omissions that make 
statements misleading. The White House counsel repeatedly 
argued that threats are necessary for witness tampering, even 
after senatorial questions demonstrated the White House's 
misstatements of the law. The White House also misstated the 
law of witness tampering by claiming that there ``must be a 
known proceeding.'' In fact, the defendant need not know that 
there is any pending federal proceeding to constitute witness 
tampering. United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1128 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994). The White House contends that the President could 
not have tampered with Ms. Currie in the proceeding in which 
she was ultimately a witness, the independent counsel's 
investigation, since the President could not have known that it 
existed, at least as of January 18. But the statute does not 
require that the defendant know of any pending or even 
contemplated proceedings so long as he engages in misleading 
conduct with respect to a potential witness. United States v. 
Romero, 54 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1995).
    The White House's factual defense to this charge is also 
insufficient. The President could not have made these false 
statements to Ms. Currie for the purpose of refreshing his 
recollection. Nor could he have spoken with her for the purpose 
of seeking information for the same reason. These claims also 
do not explain why he simply did not ask her the questions over 
the telephone on the night of the seventeenth, if that was his 
intention, or explain why he spoke with her a second time.
    The seventh item of article II alleges that the President 
obstructed justice by relaying false and misleading statements 
to his aides. On January 21, the President told his chief of 
staff and two deputies that he had not had sexual relations 
with Ms. Lewinsky. On January 23, he told one of those deputy 
chiefs of staff, John Podesta, that he did not engage in oral 
sex with Ms. Lewinsky. The President on January 21 told his 
aide, Sidney Blumenthal, that Ms. Lewinsky had threatened him. 
President Clinton also indicated that Lewinsky was known among 
her peers as the stalker, and that she would say that she had 
an affair with the President whether it was true or not, so 
that she would not be known as the stalker any more. Blumenthal 
later testified that he believes the President lied to him. The 
President testified that he was aware at the time that he made 
his statements that his aides might be summoned before the 
grand jury. These facts constitute paradigmatic witness 
tampering. The President knowingly engaged in misleading 
conduct, as defined in the statute, towards his aides, with 
intent to influence the testimony of those aides in an official 
proceeding.
    Once again, the White House's arguments to the contrary are 
unavailing. The charge is not that the President lied to his 
friends, as the White House maintains, but that he lied to 
potential witnesses about his conduct that the grand jury was 
investigating. It is not relevant, as the White House contends, 
that the President did not attempt to influence his aides' own 
personal knowledge, only their knowledge of the President's 
views, nor, as stated above, is it relevant as a matter of law 
that the President did not know that any of these individuals 
would ultimately become witnesses. Most surprising was the 
claim that White House Counsel Mr. Ruff raised for the first 
time in closing argument that the President could not be 
convicted of obstructing justice with respect to his 
conversations with Mr. Blumenthal because the fact that the 
President claimed executive privilege with respect to his 
conversation with Mr. Blumenthal meant that he never expected 
the grand jury to hear about it. The President's conversation 
with Mr. Blumenthal was not subject to a legitimate claim of 
executive privilege for two independent reasons. First, it was 
not a discussion that related to the President's official 
duties. Second, it constituted evidence of crime in and of 
itself. There was no possibility that any court would have ever 
upheld such a personally self-serving and frivolous misuse of 
executive privilege, and the President, as a former 
constitutional law professor during the time of Watergate fully 
understood that, as does Mr. Ruff. Indeed, Mr. Blumenthal was 
required to testify to the grand jury about this conversation 
notwithstanding the fact that the President did invoke an 
unwarranted executive privilege claim in an attempt to prevent 
its disclosure. Nor is there evidence that the President 
intended to claim executive privilege at the time that he had 
his conversation with Blumenthal. In any case, there was no 
reason for the President to tell this tale to Mr. Blumenthal 
except to disseminate it to his press contacts and on any 
occasion when he might appear before the grand jury.
    Each and every allegation of obstruction of justice and 
witness tampering has thus been proven. The question then 
arises whether the conclusion that the President has broken the 
law in this respect warrants his removal from office. Since all 
have been proven, I am far less concerned that the ``one or 
more'' language appears in this article. It is appropriate to 
charge an omnibus article in which a series of specific charges 
are leveled, a finding of guilt on each of which is required 
for conviction.
    President Clinton has committed a pattern of acts of 
obstruction of justice. The record demonstrates that the 
President, when his misconduct became relevant to a civil court 
proceeding in which he was a defendant, used all the methods at 
his disposal, including his status as President, to obstruct 
these proceedings and to keep the truth from emerging, 
including:
    Coaching and encouraging a witness, another Federal 
employee, Betty Currie, to give false testimony;
    Facilitating and encouraging Monica Lewinsky to submit an 
affidavit that he had reason to believe would be false;
    Through Vernon Jordan, securing employment for Monica 
Lewinsky in order to keep her from divulging to the court the 
true nature of their relationship;
    Using Government employees to transfer false information to 
the grand jury;
    Allowing a false affidavit to be used to perpetrate a fraud 
on a Federal court;
    After lying in a civil deposition, authorized a poll and 
made a cold, calculated decision based on those poll results to 
continue his obstruction;
    Attempting to speak to Monica Lewinsky before she might 
testify truthfully to the independent counsel about their 
relationship;
    Following his inability to contact Monica Lewinsky, telling 
defamatory lies about her in order to discredit her with his 
aides and with the public;
    Facilitating the hiding of evidence in a civil lawsuit;
    Providing false and misleading testimony in both a civil 
deposition and before a grand jury in order to protect his 
personal interests;
    Lying to the American people in order to cover up his own 
personal misconduct;
    Still failing to acknowledge that he committed the above 
actions, while admitting only as little as he has been forced 
to by the discovery of definitive physical evidence.
    For at least 9 months and in some respects up until today, 
the President has done everything within his power to bring 
about a miscarriage of justice in both a civil court proceeding 
and a criminal court proceeding. He took these actions for the 
sole purpose of protecting himself personally, politically and 
legally. For those who emphasize the private nature of his 
original misconduct, I would ask if he should be protected 
because he obstructed justice for such a low purpose? Time and 
again, and with premeditation, he was willing to use government 
personnel to assist in his coverup and his lies, acknowledging 
part of the truth only when confronted with physical evidence. 
And he carried his lies and cover up right on into legal 
proceedings with the grace and ease of someone who regarded a 
court of law as deserving of no more respect than if he were 
dealing with a stranger on the street. It is this persistent 
relentless, remorseless pattern of conduct that requires a 
verdict of guilty. He was willing to lie, defame, hide evidence 
and enlist anyone necessary, including government employees 
over and over again. At every juncture when he had the 
opportunity to stop, relent or come clean with a forgiving 
public, he chose instead to go forward. And even today he 
refuses to acknowledge the damage he has done to the Presidency 
and the judiciary, choosing instead to rely upon his high job 
approval rating and acknowledging only what he is forced to 
after the production of physical evidence.
    Consider what those who oppose impeachment say about his 
actions:
    Senator Bumpers, one of the counsel for the President 
during his trial, described the President's conduct as 
``indefensible, outrageous, unforgivable, shameless.'' The New 
York Times editorialized that ``President Clinton behaved 
reprehensibly, [and] betrayed his constitutional duty to uphold 
the rule of law. . . .'' A censure resolution offered by 
Members of his own party in the House, including one of the 
strongest opponents of impeachment in the Judiciary Committee, 
concluded that President Clinton ``egregiously failed in [his] 
obligation'' ``to set an example of high moral standards and 
conduct himself in a manner that fosters respect for the 
truth;'' ``violated the trust of the American people, lessened 
their esteem for the office of President, and dishonored the 
office which they have entrusted to him;'' ``made false 
statements concerning his reprehensible conduct with a 
subordinate;'' and ``wrongly took steps to delay discovery of 
the truth.'' Respected members of the President's party in this 
body expressed or shared the expression of the view that his 
actions were ``disgraceful,'' that it was ``dismay[ing]'' to 
consider ``the impact of his actions on our democracy and its 
moral foundations,'' that it was ``immoral'' and ``harmful'' 
since ``the President's private conduct can and often does have 
profound public consequences'' and ``compromised his moral 
authority,'' and they described his deception as ``intentional 
and premeditated.''
    So we castigate the President in the most bitter terms; 
decry his disgraceful conduct and his damage to the 
institutions we hold most dear; disgrace him with the most 
condemnatory language at our command and yet refuse to even 
consider his removal from office? By such action we treat the 
loss of public office as the worst fate imaginable, reserved 
for only the most treasonous of villains. Has public office 
become so precious in the United States that we treat it as a 
divine right? Actually, by such treatment we cheapen it.
    At a time when all of our institutions are under assault, 
when the Presidency has been diminished and the Congress is 
viewed with scepticism, our judiciary and our court system have 
remarkably maintained the public's confidence. Now the 
President's actions are known to every schoolchild in America. 
And in the midst of these partisan battles, many people still 
think this matter is just ``lying about sex.'' But little by 
little, there will be a growing appreciation that it is about 
much more than that. And in years to come, in every court house 
in every town in America, juries, judges, and litigants will 
have the President's actions as a bench mark against which to 
measure any attempted subversion of the judicial process. The 
notion that anyone, no matter how powerless, can get equal 
justice will be seen by some as a farce. And our rule of law--
the principle that many other countries still dream about--the 
principle that sets us apart, will have been severely damaged. 
If this does not constitute damage to our government and our 
society, I cannot imagine what does. And for that he should be 
convicted.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

              Statement of Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan

    Mr. MOYNIHAN. Mr. Chief Justice, Senators, I speak to the 
matter of prudence. Charles L. Black, Jr. begins his masterful 
account ``Impeachment: A Handbook'' with a warning: ``Everyone 
must shrink from this most drastic of measures. . . . [t]his 
awful step.''
    For it is just that. The drafters of the American 
Constitution had, from England and from Colonial government, 
fully formed models of what a legislature should be, what a 
judiciary should do. But nowhere on earth was there a nation 
with an elected head of an executive branch of government.
    Here they turned to an understanding of governance which 
marks the American Constitution as a signal event in human 
history--what the framers called ``the new science of 
politics.'' What we might term the intellectual revolution of 
1787. The victors in the Revolution could agree that no one, or 
not many, wanted another monarchy in line with the long 
melancholy succession since Rome. Yet given what Madison termed 
``the fugitive and turbulent existence of . . . ancient 
republics,'' who could dare to suggest that a modern republic 
could hope for anything better?
    Madison could. And why? Because study had produced new 
knowledge, which could now be put to use. This great new claim 
rested upon a new and aggressively more ``realistic'' idea of 
human nature. Ancient and medieval thought and practice were 
said to have failed disastrously by clinging to illusions 
regarding how men ought to be. Instead, the new science would 
take man as he actually is, would accept as primary in his 
nature the self-interestedness and passion displayed by all men 
everywhere and, precisely on that basis, would work out decent 
political solutions.
    This was a declaration of intellectual independence equal 
to anything asserted in 1776. Until then, with but few 
exceptions, the whole of political thought had turned on ways 
to inculcate virtue in a small class that would govern. But, 
wrote Madison, ``If men were angels, no government would be 
necessary.'' We would have to work with the material at hand. 
Not pretty, but something more important: predictable. Thus, 
men could be relied upon to be selfish; nay, rapacious. Very 
well: ``Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.'' 
Whereupon we derive the central principle of the Constitution, 
the various devices which in Madison's formulation offset ``by 
opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives.''
    Impeachment was to be the device whereby the Congress might 
counteract the ``defect of better motives'' in a President. But 
any such behavior needed to be massive and immediately 
threatening to the state for impeachment ever to go forward. 
Otherwise a quadrennial election would serve to restitute 
wrongs.
    Further, they had a model for this process in the 
impeachment of Warren Hastings which had begun in April of 1786 
with Edmund Burke presenting 22 ``Articles of Charge of High 
Crimes and Misdemeanors.'' The debate in the House of Commons 
continued into 1787 and was reported in the Pennsylvania 
Gazette.
    Burke was hardly a stranger to the Americans at 
Philadelphia. He had championed the cause of the American 
colonies during the Revolution, and was now doing much the same 
as regards the governance of British India. He accused the 
Governor General of the highest crimes possible against, inter 
alia, the peoples of India.
    At Philadelphia, the standard for impeachment was discussed 
only once--on Saturday, September 8, 1787. At that point in the 
convention, the draft of the clause in the Constitution 
pertaining to impeachment referred only to ``treason and 
bribery.''
    Here are Madison's notes of the debate that day:

    The clause referring to the Senate, the trial of impeachments 
against the President, for Treason & bribery, was taken up.
    Col. MASON. Why is the provision restrained to Treason & bribery 
only? Treason as defined in the Constitution will not reach many great 
and dangerous offences. Hastings is not guilty of Treason. Attempts to 
subvert the Constitution may not be Treason as above defined. As bills 
of attainder which have saved the British Constitution are forbidden, 
it is the more necessary to extend: the power of impeachments. He mov.d 
to add after ``bribery'' ``or maladministration.'' Mr. GERRY seconded 
him.
    Mr. MADISON. So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during 
pleasure of the Senate.
    Mr. GOV. MORRIS. It will not be put in force & can do no harm. An 
election of every four years will prevent maladministration.
    Col. MASON withdrew ``maladministration'' & substitutes ``other 
high crimes & misdemeanors ag.st the State.''

    The convention later replaced the word ``State'' with 
``United States.'' And on September 12, 1787, the Committee of 
Style--which had no authority to alter the substantive meaning 
of the text--deleted the words ``against the United States.''
    Thus the framers clearly intended that a President should 
be removed only for offenses ``against the United States.'' It 
may also be concluded that the addition of the words ``high 
Crimes and Misdemeanors'' was intended to extend the 
impeachment power of Congress so as to reach ``great and 
dangerous offences,'' in Mason's phrase.
    The question now before the Senate is whether the acts that 
form the basis for the articles of impeachment against 
President Clinton rise to the level of ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors,'' which is to say ``great and dangerous 
offences'' against the United States.
    Over the course of 1998, as we proceeded through various 
revelations, thence to impeachment and so on to this trial at 
the outset of 1999, I found myself asking whether the assorted 
charges, even if proven, would rise to the standard of ``great 
and dangerous offences'' against the United States. More than 
one commentator observed that we were dealing with ``low 
crimes,'' matters that can be tried in criminal courts after 
the President's term expires. Early in his address to the 
Senate our distinguished former colleague Dale Bumpers made 
this point:

    Colleagues, you have such an awesome responsibility. My good 
friend, the senior Senator from New York, has said it well. He says a 
decision to convict holds the potential for destabilizing the Office of 
the Presidency.

    The former Senator from Arkansas was referring to an 
article in The New York Times on December 25 in which I said 
this:

    We are an indispensable nation and we have to protect the 
Presidency as an institution. You could very readily destabilize the 
Presidency, move to a randomness. That's an institution that has to be 
stable, not in dispute. Absent that, do not doubt that you could 
degrade the Republic quickly.

    This could happen if the President were removed from office 
for less than the ``great and dangerous offences'' contemplated 
by the framers.
    In ``Grand Inquests,'' his splendid and definitive history 
of the impeachments of Justice Samuel Chase in 1804, and of 
President Andrew Johnson in 1868, Mr. Chief Justice Rehnquist 
records how narrowly we twice escaped from a precedent that 
would indeed have given us a Presidency, and a Court, subject 
to ``tenure during the pleasure of the Senate.''
    It is startling how seductive this view can be. In 1804 it 
was the Jeffersonians, including Jefferson himself, who saw 
impeachment as a convenient device for getting rid of a Justice 
of the Supreme Court with whose opinions they disagreed. Not 
many years later radical Republicans sought the same approach 
to removing a President with whom they disagreed over policy 
matters.
    It could happen again. Impeachment is a power singularly 
lacking any of the checks and balances on which the framers 
depended. It is solely a power of the Congress. Do not doubt 
that it could bring radical instability to American Government.
    We are a blessed Nation. But our blessings could be our 
ruin if we do not see how rare they are. There are two nations 
on earth, the United States and Britain, that both existed in 
1800 and have not had their form of government changed by force 
since then. There are eight--I repeat eight--nations which both 
existed in 1914 and have not had their form of government 
changed by violence since then: the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, Sweden, 
and Switzerland.
    Senators, do not take the imprudent risk that removing 
William Jefferson Clinton for low crimes will not in the end 
jeopardize the Constitution itself. Censure him by all means. 
He will be gone in less than 2 years. But do not let his 
misdeeds put in jeopardy the Constitution we are sworn to 
uphold and defend.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                    Statement of Senator Bob Graham

    Mr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chief Justice: ``We hold these truths to be 
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that 
among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 
That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among 
men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed.''
    Those words were a radical declaration when spoken in 1776. 
Never before had it been asserted that the purpose of 
government was to secure the individual freedoms and liberties 
of its citizens. To the contrary, previous governments existed 
for the opposite purpose, to control the people and suppress 
their aspirations.
    Eleven years after the Continental Congress approved these 
revolutionary sentiments--and after a violent war which severed 
the colonies' tie to King George III--many of the same 
individuals who had declared independence gathered again in 
Philadelphia to secure those rights so recently and tenuously 
won.
    The governmental structure they constructed during those 
weeks in the oppressive summer heat was far from simple. But 
its complexity wasn't an accident, or simply a result of the 
diverse geographical and economic interests represented at the 
Constitutional Convention. As our colleague Senator Patrick 
Moynihan has so aptly observed, our Government was the first to 
insert conflict as a conscious element, to achieve inefficiency 
by design.
    Our Nation's founders had personal knowledge of and 
experience with English history, in which both kings and 
parliaments had at times exerted excessive power over the 
people. They realized that liberty would be enhanced if 
political power was divided instead of centralized.
    Unlike other forms of democracy, where a no confidence vote 
of the national legislature can bring down a government at any 
time, the framers took great pains to establish a delicate 
balance of powers--and a careful system of checks and 
balances--between the Nation and the States and among the 
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal 
Government. They created a structure in which every branch 
would have the strength needed to keep excessive power from 
flowing into the hands of any other branch and thus threatening 
the liberties of the people.
    This determination to achieve balance is reflected in the 
discussion of impeachment and removal from office in article I, 
section 3 of the Constitution. By requiring action from both 
houses of Congress, and mandating a two-thirds Senate majority 
for removal, the framers purposely made it difficult for 
Congress to undo the results of a properly constituted 
Presidential election--one of the most disruptive acts 
imaginable in a democracy--and relieve a President of his or 
her constitutional duties. The framers wisely recognized that 
impeachment, when improvidently used, could create an 
overbearing Congress from the ruins of a destabilized and 
delegitimized Presidency.
    But the framers' attention to balance was not limited to 
the procedures of impeachment. They also made clear their 
belief that impeachment and removal from office should only be 
an option in situations in which a President becomes a threat 
to the Government and the people it serves. We see this in 
their small number of enumerated offenses--``Treason, Bribery, 
other High Crimes and Misdemeanors''--and in their commentary.
    For example, at the Constitutional Convention in 1787, 
George Mason said that the term ``high crimes and 
misdemeanors'' referred to ``great and dangerous offenses'' and 
``attempts to subvert the Constitution.''
    Mr. Chief Justice, the President's self-indulgent actions 
were immoral, disgraceful, reprehensible. History should--and, 
I suspect, will--judge that William Jefferson Clinton 
dishonored himself and the highest office in our American 
democracy.
    But despite their disreputable nature, President Clinton's 
actions should not result in his conviction and removal from 
office. After careful objective study of each article presented 
by the House of Representatives, I have concluded that the 
charges against the President do not meet the high 
constitutional standards established by the framers. Removal of 
this President on the grounds established by the House managers 
would upset the delicate balance of powers so meticulously 
established 212 years ago.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the framers set high standards for 
removal because they understood that the office of the 
Presidency would be held by imperfect human beings. They 
assembled a Government that could withstand personal failings.
    We should be outraged that William Jefferson Clinton's 
personal failings debased himself and his office. But they did 
not cause permanent injury to the proper functioning of our 
Government. He did not upset the constitutional balance of 
powers.
    I hope that the Chief Justice, my colleagues, and the 
American people will not misinterpret my comments. While it has 
not been proven that President William Jefferson Clinton 
committed the high crimes and misdemeanors required for removal 
from office, he is not above the law. His acquittal in this 
impeachment trial is not exoneration.
    The framers made this clear in Article I of the 
Constitution. They established that an impeached President, 
even if convicted and removed from office, would still ``be 
liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and 
Punishment, according to law.'' When this President leaves 
office, he could face sanction or conviction for his actions.
    Mr. Chief Justice, during the questioning phase of this 
trial, I sought assurances from the President, through White 
House Counsel, Mr. Charles Ruff, that he would not attempt to 
circumvent this judicial process by seeking a pardon for his 
actions. Counsel Ruff responded as follows:

    I have stated formally on behalf of the President in response to a 
very specific question by the House Judiciary Committee that he would 
not, and, indeed, we have said in this Chamber, and we have said in 
other places, that the President is subject to the rule of law like any 
other citizen and would continue to be on January 21, 2001, and that he 
would submit himself to whatever law and whatever prosecution the law 
would impose on him. He is prepared to defend himself in that forum at 
any time following the end of his tenure. And I committed on his 
behalf, and I have no doubt that he would so state himself, that he 
would not seek or accept a pardon.

    I take Counsel Mr. Charles Ruff at his words. Once the 
President leaves office, he will be subject to the same 
prosecutorial and judicial review that all Americans face.
    Mr. Chief Justice, now that we are at the end of this 
divisive and unpleasant experience, what have we learned?
    We have learned that the Constitution works. The framers 
made it clear that the President should only be impeached and 
removed from office in cases where he becomes a threat to the 
government and the governed. The President's acquittal will 
uphold the sanctity of the office and prevent a weakening of 
the balance of powers that protects our individual rights and 
liberties.
    We have reaffirmed the principle that no man is above the 
law. While I believe that the President is not guilty of high 
crimes and misdemeanors in this court of impeachment, he will 
be subject to legal sanction in other forums when he becomes a 
private citizen.
    Mr. Chief Justice, the President's misdeeds will affect his 
standing in history. But they do not justify the first removal 
of a President of the United States from the office to which he 
was elected by the American people. When my name is called on 
the roll, I will vote ``not guilty'' on both articles of 
impeachment.
                                ------                                


       [From the Congressional Record--Senate, February 12, 1999]

                   Statement of Senator Wayne Allard

    Mr. ALLARD. Mr. Chief Justice, as we all know, this 
impeachment trial has been a difficult process for the Senate 
and for our nation.
    As this trial draws to a close each of us has the solemn 
duty of voting our conscience according to the dictates of the 
Constitution. I do not take this responsibility lightly.
    For me, the vote in this trial will be the second most 
important of my congressional career. The only other vote to 
rank higher was my vote to authorize the Gulf War and thereby 
send American soldiers into combat.
    My ultimate goal as we moved into this process was to 
maintain precedent and not shatter a very thoughtful process 
laid out in the Constitution and within Senate rules.
    At the start of this Senate impeachment trial I took an 
oath to do impartial justice according to the Constitution and 
laws. I worked hard to adhere to that oath, and I pray that I 
have kept that oath.
    This is particularly important to me since much of my 
thinking in this case centers on my conclusion that the 
President has violated his oath of office.
    I have determined to base my decision on the facts of the 
case, not the polls, the performance of the economy, the 
President's popularity or where he is in his term of office.
    Finally, I have felt that if any of the parts of an article 
constitute grounds for impeachment, then an affirmative vote on 
the article is warranted.
    While the Senate is clearly divided on conviction and 
removal, one thing we have all learned is the importance of the 
Constitution.
    We may be separated by political party or ideology, but we 
are united in our belief in the Constitution as the governing 
charter of our Republic.
    Presidents come and go, and Senators come and go. The 
Constitution remains. It is the foundation of our political 
system.
    The Constitution is what preserves the rule of law, and 
guarantees that we remain a nation of laws, not of men.